

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Case No. IT-04-74-T
Original: English

TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding
Judge Arpad Prandler
Judge Stefan Trechsel
Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua

Acting Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

Filed: 13 March 2009

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

**JADRANKO PRLIĆ
BRUNO STOJIĆ
SLOBODAN PRALJAK
MILIVOJ PETKOVIĆ
VALENTIN ĆORIĆ
BERISLAV PUŠIĆ**

- PUBLIC WITH PUBLIC ANNEXES -

**SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF
DR. JOSIP JURČEVIĆ**

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**SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF
DR. JOSIP JURČEVIĆ**

1. Pursuant to and for the purposes of Rule 94 *bis* of the Rules and Evidence and Procedure, the Praljak Defence hereby submits by this pleading the report of expert witness Dr. Josip Jurčević titled "Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990 – 1995" ("Expert Report") provided in Annex A in English and Croatian.
2. For the convenience of the Trial Chamber and the parties to this trial, the *Curriculum Vitae* of Dr. Jurčević is also provided in English and Croatian in Annex B.¹ Dr. Jurčević is the sole author of the Expert Report and is, in the Praljak Defence's respectful submission, fully qualified to provide expert testimony should it be required in order to submit these reports into evidence.
3. As a professional courtesy, all references have been provided to the Prosecution in February 2009, with the references ordered in a manner to precisely match the footnote number no later than early March 2009. This material is provided herein as Annex C. Accordingly, all reference material is now readily available to all parties.
4. If it is necessary to call Dr. Jurčević, the Praljak Defence will not schedule Dr. Jurčević sooner than 60 days after this submission.

Word Count: 386

Respectfully submitted,

By



Božidar Kovačić and Nika Pinter
Counsel for the Accused Slobodan Praljak

¹ Provided in Slobodan Praljak's Submission Pursuant to Rule 65 *ter*, Annex C on 31 March 2008.

ANNEX A

EXPERT REPORT

Professor Josip JURČEVIĆ

Expert Report for the ICTY

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
1990 - 1995**

Zagreb, December 2008

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Introductory Remarks

This expert report has been written at the request of General Slobodan PRALJAK's defence team in the trial which is currently underway against him and other persons at the *International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* (ICTY). The defence requested that an expert report be written chiefly on the following:

- a) History of BH territory and key developments leading up to 1995, with attention to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 1990 and 1995.
- b) Attitude of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, with attention to various crucial phenomena demonstrating and clarifying the attitude of the Republic of Croatia as a state towards the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, in the period between 1991 and 1995.

The author and General Slobodan PRALJAK's defence team agreed on the above basic (temporal, territorial and topical) scope of the expert report and then the author was given full freedom in how he would approach the research, select the methodology, structure the contents, find causal interpretations and present the results.

The expert report was done in accordance with the methodological standards applied in historical science. These standards were applied in all phases of the writing of the expert report: from the collection of historical sources and the *heuristics*, to the reconstruction of simple and complex historical facts and their causal diachronic interpretation.¹ The main goal of the expert report is to present the historical causes, flow and consequences of the key developments on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 1990 and 1995 in a scholarly and objective manner. The basic cognitive point of departure in the creation of this expert report was the general scientific principle of "getting to the truth through the facts".

It is important to stress this in the introductory remarks because of the highly disparate and contradictory stereotypes most of which, albeit unacceptable from the scholarly point of view, have been dominating the public (and "scientific") discourse on the recent political and war-related events on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. These stereotypes have often been presented as historical facts or "historical truths" in an attempt to legitimize the illogical and unscholarly postulate of there being many mutually disparate and contradictory "historical truths".

The creation of these seemingly convincing stereotypes was made possible by the application of a number of unscholarly procedures, all sharing the same basic premise that the end justifies the means. In other words, the stereotypes are what comes first and only later are unscholarly methods used to search for, manufacture and present selective sources to affirm them. The creation of these stereotypes was most certainly facilitated by a vast quantity of material sources (texts, images, video, audio and 3D materials) covering the most recent historical events, as well as a large number of participants and witnesses. Unscholarly selection of these materials led to the creation of unobjective and mutually contradictory stereotypes, i.e. to the erroneous perception of real events.

In contrast to this are historical science and its system of methods which make scientifically legitimate and research-oriented reconstruction of historical facts and processes possible. This implies that all research techniques, sources and results - used in accordance with scientific standards - are clearly and distinctly presented and

¹ Mirjana Gross, *Historijska znanost*, Zagreb, 1976.

confidential. Historical knowledge (simple and complex historical facts and interpretations) obtained in this scholarly manner may be considered a credible and adequate base for the objective evaluation of historical events (facts, participants) from the point of view of civilisation, world-view, morale, justice, history or any other aspect.

I

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BEFORE THE BREAK-UP OF THE
SECOND YUGOSLAVIA (1991)**

I.-1 HISTORY OF BH TERRITORY (from the Antiquity to 1989)

I.-1.1 Basic Characteristics

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBH), internationally recognized in 1992, is located in Southeastern Europe, in the north-west part of the Balkan Peninsula. Its surface area (51,129 km²) and population (4,365,000 according to the 1991 census), define RBH as one of the smaller and lesser populated European states. It is bordered by Croatia to the north, west and south and Serbia and Montenegro to the east.²

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is predominantly mountainous and has numerous rivers flowing inland and along its borders. Its major rivers flow northwards (the Una, Vrbas, Bosna and Drina: they are tributaries of the River Sava which constitutes the border with Croatia) and southwards (the Neretva, which flows into the Croatian part of the Adriatic). Most of the main traffic routes (past and present) also run north-south. Throughout the ages, many rich deposits of various ores and raw materials (iron, coal, silver, gold, lead, salt, etc.) have been discovered and exploited in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³

In addition to the above, its moderate climate, configuration and composition of soil, vegetation, rich animal life, distribution of waterways, fields and precipitation and other geographical features have made Bosnia and Herzegovina very suitable for human settlement,⁴ which is why its territory has been populated since time immemorial.

Its easily recognizable dual name (Bosnia and Herzegovina) - both as a geographic and geopolitical reference - has only been in systematic use since the so-called Austria-Hungary period, i.e. the seventh decade of the 19th century. According to what we know today, the geo-political appellation Bosnia (designating a specific area in the centre of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina) was first used in the 10th century, in a text by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus. This geo-political appellation is derived from the even older name of the eponymous river (Bosna). The river (like most of the rivers on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was named either in Roman times or on the arrival of the Southern Slavs (7th century). The geo-political appellation Herzegovina, or Herzeg's /duke's/ land, has been in use since the 15th century, mostly for the southern parts of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Many historical aspects, periods and problems encountered on BH territory have been either insufficiently or inexpertly researched. The ones that were researched were often shaped to suit various interests which, throughout BH history, underwent highly dynamic and complex changes (most often by force). Because of its geopolitical and other relevance, throughout history the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a place where various global, regional and local forces (political, military, cultural, religious, etc.) have interacted intensely, each leaving deep marks on all aspects of social life.

² Data taken from *Atlas Europe*, Zagreb, 1997, pp. 102-103, 305.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 306 and 310

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-306

These interactions were characterised by exceptionally complex temporal, spatial and qualitative dimensions involving (sometimes even simultaneous) contacts, conflicts, co-existence and syntheses of diversity. Thus, for instance, while many political and military conflicts which took place during the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a pronounced historical, religious and international dimension, specific forms of multiculturalism and crossculturality also occurred in terms of everyday life and identity.

Even the most sweeping view can testify to the fact that one of the key historical traits of social life on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is its exceptional complexity and lack of stability, as its most recent history has shown. Recognition of this historical continuity will contribute to a more objective identification and assessment of the events which occurred between 1990 and 1995.

I-1.2 BH territory from prehistory to the mid-12th century

In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are many archeological finds from all periods of human history. Few finds have been thoroughly researched; most were either partially explored or merely located. An approximately 10,000-year old Paleolithic drawing, a rarity in Europe, was discovered in the Badanj cave (near Stolac in Herzegovina), and Butmir (near Sarajevo) stands out among early Stone Age finds. Several bronze and iron age settlements have been examined (Glasinac, Donja Dolina, Golubić, etc.). Archeological finds and other historical sources show that many distinct tribes lived on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early and late Middle Ages: the Illyrians, the Celts, the Greeks, the Romans, the Avars and the Slavs.

In the centuries preceding the Modern Era, autochthonous Illyrian tribes (Delmatae, Breuci, Iapodes, etc.) constituted the majority on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the surrounding areas). In 4th century BC, Celtic tribes started penetrating the territory of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2nd century BC, the Illyrian kingdom, covering mostly the territories of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, started entering with increasing frequency into conflict with the ancient state of Rome, which was spreading its power over the Mediterranean coast and hinterland.

At the turn of the Modern era, the Romans consolidated their rule of the Illyrian lands, which they called Illyricum, organising it administratively into two or three Roman provinces. At the time, the territory of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina mostly belonged to the Roman province of Dalmatia, and its northern parts to the province of Pannonia. In 395, when the Roman Empire was divided into the Eastern Roman Empire and Western Roman Empire, the entire BH territory fell under the western half.



Fig. 1: BH territory as part of the Roman Empire from the 3rd to the 5th century. (Taken from: *Hrvatski povijesni zemljovid*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1996, p. 3)

/translation: Border between the Western and Eastern Roman empires; State border; District border; Roman districts; Old Christian Metropolitan sees; Old Christian Bishopric sees; Towns - colonies; Administrative centres after Diocletian's reform; Towns in general; Illyrian tribes; Main roads/

The systematic Romanisation to which the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was subjected during the centuries of Roman administration was manifested in many forms, from large-scale infrastructural projects (settlements, roads, mines) to the conversion of the population to Christianity. For instance, under the Western Roman Empire, part of BH territory belonged to the archdiocese of Salona (near the city of Split in today's Croatia) and the other to the archdiocese of Sirmium (near the city of Sremska Mitrovica in today's Serbia).

After the fall of the Western Roman Empire (476 AD), most of the BH territory found itself under the dominion of the Eastern Roman Empire, Eastern Goths and the Byzantium, each ruling with a different style and intensity.⁵

⁵ On the most ancient period of BH history: 1. Pavao Anđelić, "Marginalije o trgovinama starog rudarstva u srednjoj Bosni" in *Glasnik zemaljskog muzeja*, 38, Sarajevo, 1983; 2. *Arheološki leksikon Bosne i Hercegovine*, 1-3, Sarajevo, 1988; Alojz Benac, "Mlade kameno i prelazno doba" in *Kulturna historija BiH*, Sarajevo, 1984; 4. Ivo Bojanovski, *Bosna i Hercegovina u antičko doba*, Sarajevo, 1988;

In the second half of the 6th century, during the great migration of the European peoples, the Avar and Slavic tribes started invading BH territory (and the surrounding territories) more frequently, gradually pushing back and assimilating the autochthonous Illyrians and other Romanized ethnic groups. Since hardly any research has been done of BH territory during the Migration Period and the centuries that followed, only some fragments and indirect facts are known today.

The few known historical sources tell us that Croatian princes ruled over sometimes smaller and sometimes bigger portions of BH territory from the mid-9th century. Their rule was unstable and lasted for varying periods of time. The same went for the Croatian kings, who ruled from 925 onwards. At the same time, certain Serbian and Montenegrin princes also ruled for brief periods of time over certain portions of BH territory, while Byzantine emperors kept trying to establish feudal seignorial rule on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the surrounding areas). Thus, around 950, in his work entitled *De administrando Imperio* /On the Administration of the Empire/, Byzantine emperor and chronicler Constantine Porphyrogenitus mentions for the first time “the little land of Bosnia” as a separate district by the spring of the river Bosna and its upper tributaries.⁶

In 1102, Croatia entered into a personal union with Hungary and rulers of Hungarian dynasties succeeded one another as heads of the joint state. The strong Hungarian-Croatian state surrounded BH territory on three sides, which the Hungarian-Croatian rulers used to mount frequent military and political operations, trying to gain control of BH territory and cut it off from Byzantine influence as much as possible. With that purpose in mind, Borič was installed as the *ban* /Vice-Roy/ in a part of Bosnia. He was the first significant ruler of the area (1150 - 1163).⁷

I-1.3. Medieval Bosnian State (1180 - 1463)⁸

In contrast to the foreign political and religious influences (Hungarian-Croatian state v. Byzantium and Roman-Catholic church v. Eastern Orthodox church) converging on its territory at the time, Bosnia and Herzegovina also harboured internal political and religious resistance to external influences. These were the

5. Esad Pašalić, *Antička naselja i komunikacije u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1960; 6. Esad Pašalić, “Period rimske vladavine do kraja III vijeka naše ere” in *Kulturna istorija BiH*, Sarajevo, 1966; 7. Ante Škegro, *Gospodarstvo rimske provincije Dalmacije*, Zagreb, 1999; 8. Marin Zaninović, “Ilirsko pleme Delmati”, Part I and II, (*Politička povijest i rasprostranjenost Delmata* /Political history and distribution of the Dalmatae/) in *Godišnjak Centra za balkanološka ispitivanja Akademije nauka i umjetnosti BiH*, IV/2 and V/3, Sarajevo, 1966 and 1967; 9. Andrija Zirdum, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

⁶ Gavro Manojlović, “Studije o spisu “De Administrando Imperio” cara Konstantina VII Porfirogeneta” in *Rad Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti*, 182, 186, 187, Zagreb 1910 and 1911.

⁷ Basic literature for the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the surrounding territories in early Middle Ages: 1. Mladen Ančić, *Hrvatska u karolinško doba*, Split, 2001; 2. Bogo Grafenauer, “Slovanski naseljitveni valovi na Balkanski poluotok”, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XVIII, Ljubljana, 1964; 3. *Historija naroda Jugoslavije I*, Zagreb, 1953; 4. Nada Klaić, *Povijest Hrvata u ranom srednjem vijeku*, Zagreb, 1971; 5. Georgije Ostrogorski, *Povijest Bizanta*, Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2006; 6. Andrija Zirdum, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

⁸ Basic literature for this period of BH history: 1. Pavao Andelić, “Doba srednjovjekovne bosanske države”, in *Kulturna historija BiH*; 2. Anto Babić, “O pitanju formiranja srednjovjekovne bosanske države”, *Radovi naučnog društva BiH*, III/2, Sarajevo, 1955; 3. Sima Ćirković, *Historija srednjovjekovne bosanske države*, Belgrade, 1964; 4. *Historija naroda Jugoslavije I*, Zagreb, 1953; 5. Nada Klaić, *Srednjovjekovna Bosna*, Zagreb, 1989; 6. *Kršćanstvo srednjovjekovlje Bosne*, proceedings, Sarajevo, 1991; 7. Tomislav Raukar, *Hrvatsko srednjovjekovlje*, Zagreb, 1977; 8. Andrija Zirdum, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

circumstances in which the medieval Bosnian state, an independent state according to the feudal criteria at the time, came into being. The autochthonous Bosnian Church⁹, created in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the same time, was considered heretic by both the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches. Due to these conflicting interests, the period saw highly frequent political, military and religious conflicts perpetuate the territorial, administrative and religious instability of the BH territory.

The founder of the medieval Bosnian state was Ban Kulin (1180 - 1204) who ruled the large northern part of BH territory. Under pressure from the West, Kulin publicly denounced heresy and accepted the Catholic teachings. In everyday life, however, almost nothing changed. After Kulin, the Bosnian state grew weaker and was often invaded by the Hungarian-Croatian army embarking on so-called crusades against the “heretics”. As a result, parts of the Bosnian state were occupied by Croatian and Hungarian nobles.

The Bosnian state regained its strength in the time of Ban Stjepan II Kotromanić (1314 - 1353) who, by political, military and diplomatic means, gained control of the southern parts of BH territory and parts of Dalmatia. During his reign, the influence of the Catholic church in Bosnia and Herzegovina was significantly extended and reinforced, particularly through the activities of religious orders, notably the Franciscans who first came to Bosnia in 1291 and played a crucial role in the preservation of the Catholic faith (and Croatian ethnic and national identity) during the Ottoman period of BH history.

⁹ Pejo Ćošković, “Ustrojstvo Crkve bosanske”, in Zbornik radova o fra Anđelu Zvizdoviću, Sarajevo-Fojnica, 2000; *Fenomen «krstjani» u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu*, proceedings, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2005; Franjo Šanjek, *Bosansko-humski krstjani u povijesnim vrelima (13-15. stoljeće)*, Zagreb, 2003; Jaroslav Šidak, *Studije o «Crkvi bosanskoj» i bogumilstvu*, Zagreb, 1975.




Fig. 2: *Medieval Bosnian State*

(Taken from: Dragutin PAVLIČEVIĆ, *Kratka politička i kulturna povijest Bosne i Hercegovine*, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 2000, p. 43)

/translation: Original "Little land of Bosnia"; Bosnia at the time of Ban Kulin; Bosnia at the time of Ban Stjepan II; State of King Tvrtko I; Croatian Slavonia (Dubrovnik)/

The Bosnian state reached its apogee at the time of Stjepan Tvrtko I (1353 - 1391) whose military campaigns expanded its territory even further. Tvrtko I proclaimed himself the king of "the Serbs and the Bosnians" and his title was recognised by Louis I, because Bosnia, according to the feudal perception, fell under the Hungarian "Crown of St Stephen". In 1388, Tvrtko I defeated the Ottoman army and in 1390 took control of the Croatian coast all the way to Zadar, proclaiming himself "King of Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia and Primorje".

After the death of Tvrtko I, the Bosnian state suddenly weakened and its territory disintegrated as a result of countless internal conflicts, Ottoman invasions from the south-east and Hungarian-Croatian invasions from the north-west. Finally (in 1463) the Ottoman army occupied Bosnia and executed its last king, Stjepan Tomašević. His wife, Queen Katarina fled to Rome where, before she died, she

bequeathed her former kingdom of Bosnia to the Holy See. Two decades later (1482), the Ottomans also occupied the Land of Hum, called Herzegovina after 1448.

I-1.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina in Ottoman times (1463 - 1878)¹⁰

Four centuries of Ottoman rule of BH territory had far-reaching consequences not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina but also its neighbouring territories and even those more distant in Europe. Being the western-most Ottoman province, the territory of BH was exceptionally important. It was from there that the perennial global force of the time - the Ottoman Empire - tried through warfare to expand its power in western and northern Europe. This fact must be taken into consideration if one wishes to be objective in understanding the array of political, military, economic, cultural, national, migrational, religious and other historical and modern processes which were ongoing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its surroundings, and the Eurasian territory in general.

BH territory was subject to a sweeping process of Islamization because Islam was not only a faith but also an ideology and a way of life, in other words, a civilisation providing the Ottoman Empire with its spiritual structure. As part of their conquest plans, the Ottoman state systematically Islamicized the territory of BH: Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be turned into the most reliable fortification possible, a jumping-off point for the further conquest of Europe.

Islamization was universal and, in accordance with the imperial concept, conducted at all levels: from the cultural and religious to the administrative. It involved different methods, from imposition by force to financial incentives and the possibilities of objective advancement in status at the level of the entire Empire. Most high-ranking administrative positions in BH territories were given to people from Bosnia and Herzegovina who had converted to Islam and were faithful servants of the Empire, and Islamicized individuals from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina often held exceptionally high positions in the administration of the Empire. Because of this, during the four centuries of Ottoman rule BH territory was profoundly transformed and this left behind it extensive political and cultural changes, changes of identity and other consequences which carried on well into the 19th century and beyond.

In the Ottoman feudal (semi-military) system that was introduced on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the basic and most numerous ruling hierarchies were composed of low-ranking military nobles (*Spahis*) whom the ruler of the Empire (the Sultan who owned all the land) gave fiefs (*timars*) in exchange for military service. In the first centuries of Ottoman rule, neither the titles of *Spahi* nor the fiefs (*timars*) were hereditary but rather depended on military conquests. At the time, the titles of Spahi and the *timars* could also be awarded to non-Islamicized people who successfully fought for the expansion of the Empire, but large fiefs and titles could only be given to Islamicized feudal lords.

¹⁰ Basic literature for this period of BH history: 1. Srećko DŽAJA, *Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine. Predemancipacijsko razdoblje 1463-1804*, Mostar, 1999; 2. Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, Sarajevo, 1977; 3. Muhamed Hadžijahić, *Porijeklo bosanskih Muslimana*, Sarajevo, 1990; 4. Joseph von Hammer, *Historija Turskog/Osmanskog Carstva*, Zagreb, 1979; 5. Adem Handžić, "O islamizaciji u sjeveroistočnoj Bosni u XV i XVI vijeku" in *Jugoslavenski historijski časopis*, 4, Belgrade, 1969; 6. Muhamed Handžić, *Islamizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1940; 7. *Historija naroda Jugoslavije II*, Zagreb, 1959; 8. Franjo Marić, *Hrvati-katolici u BiH između 1463. i 1995. godine*, Sarajevo, 1998; 9. Andrija Zirdum, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

The Ottoman defeat at the Croatian city of Sisak (1593) and the gradual weakening of the Empire's conquering force led to an increase in the forced Islamization of all social strata on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Christian peasants found themselves in a progressively disadvantageous situation. The *Spahiluk* /the title of Spahi/ became hereditary and Christian Spahis were stripped of it.

During the Ottoman military triumphs in Europe (15th, 16th and 17th centuries) BH territory had already been completely Islamicized. The Islamic feudal hierarchy had taken hold and a significant portion of the ordinary people (peasants) had accepted Islam for various reasons (mostly the privileged social status).

The Ottoman state organised the conquered Bosnian kingdom as a separate administrative unit - a *sanjak* (district) which was part of the Rumelia Pashalic. At the same time, Hungary-Croatia was establishing the Jajce, Srebrenica and Mačva *banovinas* along the Bosnian Sanjak borders. These were buffer zones (from the river Una to Belgrade) intended to prevent further Ottoman conquests.

In the 16th century, the combination of a strong Ottoman Empire and the crises in the relations between European countries resulted in the Ottomans taking part of Hungary (Belgrade, 1521) and large swathes of Croatia (Knin in 1522, Jajce, Požega Klis, Virovitica and Bihać in 1592), thus reducing Croatia to the "remnants of remnants" (*reliquiae reliquiarum*). This was the culmination of the Ottoman Empire's expansion in Europe and in 1592 a new Bosnian Pashalic was established, composed of eight *sanjaks*.



Fig. 3 *Bosnian Pashalic at the turn of the 17th century.*
(Taken from: D. PAVLIČEVIĆ, *op. cit.* p. 45)

/translation: Bosnian Pashalic; Venetian property; Croatia, Republic of Dubrovnik; Territory liberated from the Ottomans by 1606; Borders of the Ottoman Empire; Pashalic borders; Sanjak borders; Border since 1606; Pashalic seat; Sanjak seat; /?Hajiluk/ seat; Fortified settlements; Other settlements/

The very next year (1593), the immense Ottoman army suffered a major and decisive defeat at the city of Sisak (in Croatia) and was forced to engage in a war of defence instead of a war of conquest. Ottoman chroniclers called this year “the year of disaster”.

In the following hundred years or so, the Ottoman army engaged in many minor and major incursions and battles, trying to conquer more of Central Europe. At the same time, many different European armies - jointly or separately - invaded the areas occupied by the Ottomans, trying to push them out of Europe and resolve the so-called Eastern Question.¹¹ The Ottoman army was heavily defeated in the great battles and wars of this exhausting conflict and, in 1699, was forced to sign peace in Sremski Karlovci, abandoning all territories on the left banks of the rivers Una, Sava and Danube. The borders of the Bosnian Pashalic were thus also pushed back to the right bank of rivers Sava and Danube.¹² Now the furthestmost part of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, the Bosnian Pashalic acquired a new strategic importance: it became the battlefield for the Empire’s position in Europe.

The wars fought by European states (mostly Austria and Russia) against the Ottomans in the 18th century did not significantly alter the borders established in 1699. At the end of the 18th and during the first few decades of the 19th century, European states fought between themselves and there were no large-scale campaigns against the Ottoman Empire.

With the enormous Ottoman Empire spiralling into an ever deepening internal political and social crisis, in the Balkans the Serbs, the Greeks, the Romanians and the Montenegrins, each for their own reasons and supported by the European forces (predominantly Russia), rose against the Ottomans. Greece thus gained its independence and, in 1830, Serbia its autonomy. As a result of the hostile environment and the weakness of the Ottoman state, BH territory became even more unstable.

In this period, the Ottoman Empire tried to ensure its survival and solve its deep internal crisis by implementing a number of detailed reforms, aimed at significantly modernizing the administrative model and social structure. The reforms were meant to be favourable for the general population and abolished the incentives awarded to the network of Ottoman feudal hierarchies. The Islamic nobles on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, opposed the reforms of the Ottoman Empire’s central authorities.

Because of this and many other reasons, the reforms the Ottoman Empire tried to implement never took hold and failed to change the situation on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The crisis in BH territory kept worsening, heading towards even greater internal disintegration and more frequent and large-scale armed conflicts.

In 1831-32, this complex situation gave rise to a movement and a rebellion for the autonomy of Bosnia, led by Captain Husein beg GRADAŠČEVIĆ whose followers came from all the social, ethnic and religious strata. The rebellion was

¹¹ Dragutin Pavličević, *Hrvati i istočno pitanje*, Zagreb, 2007.

¹² Ešref Kovačević, *Granice Bosanskog pašaluka prema Austriji i Mletačkoj republici po odredbama Karlovačkog mira*, Sarajevo, 1973.

crushed by the Empire's military might and with the assistance of some nobles from within BH territory.¹³

Bosnian anti-reformist nobles were completely defeated in 1850-51 when most of them were mercilessly executed in a military operation mounted at the order of the Empire by Omer paša Latas. But then (in 1852, 1857 and 1862), a chain of rebellions mounted by the subjugated and dissatisfied Christians (*raja*) erupted in Eastern Herzegovina. The rebellions were incited and assisted by Montenegro, Serbia, Russia and Austria, each furthering their own interests. The greatest rebellion, organised directly by Serbia, started in Herzegovina in 1875 and soon spread into large areas of north-western Bosnia. Serbia and Montenegro joined the rebel forces in 1876.

When the rebels and Serbia were defeated by the Ottoman Empire, Russia joined the war, defeated the Ottoman Empire and in 1878 forced it to accept conditions for peace which were signed in San Stefano. However, as the provisions of the peace agreement failed to take into account the interests of the European forces, the Peace Congress of Berlin was held that same year. At the Congress, Austria-Hungary was awarded the right of occupation (protectorate) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though Bosnia and Herzegovina nominally remained under the sovereignty of the Ottoman empire.¹⁴

I-1.5 BH under Austria-Hungary (1878 - 1918)¹⁵

According to the basic goals of the Berlin Congress, the occupation (protectorate) of Bosnia, was supposed to establish peace and introduce a new administration system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria-Hungary entered Bosnia and Herzegovina with approximately 80,000 soldiers who, in the first three months, had to face a successful armed opposition mounted against them mostly by the Muslim population. Austria-Hungary subsequently sent in much stronger forces and the new administration was implemented. Encouraged by Serbia, however, in 1881 and 1882 the Serbs in Herzegovina also mounted armed and other forms of rebellion against the new administration and the army of Austria-Hungary had to use force once again to establish peace.

As a part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Croatia expected the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its integration into the dual monarchy to proceed through a union of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus channelling the transformation of the dual monarchy into a tri-partite one, which was the main goal of the Croatian ruling structures at the time. This is why in 1878 the Croatian Assembly emphasized Croatia's historical rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But Austria had firmly decided to be the sole ruler of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to gradually annex it directly to the Monarchy and to keep the Monarchy dual. It therefore simply informed the Croatian Assembly that they had overstepped its authority.¹⁶

On the other hand, for several decades (since mid-19th century) Serbia had been, in various ways, systematically working on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina which it had set as its main strategic goal.

¹³ Ahmed Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832*, Sarajevo, 1996.

¹⁴ Milorad Ekmečić, *Ustanak u Bosni 1875-78*, Sarajevo, 1973.

¹⁵ Basic literature for this period: 1. Srećko Džaja, *Bosna i Hercegovina u austrougarskom razdoblju (1878-1919)*, Mostar-Zagreb, 2002; 2. Mustafa Imamović, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnji politički razvitak BiH od 1878 do 1914*, Sarajevo, 1997.

¹⁶ Jaroslav Šidak; Mirjana Gross; Igor Karaman; Dragovan Šepić, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda (1860-1914)*, Zagreb, 1968.

In such a situation where, as could have been expected, Serbia's interests were mainly supported by the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatian interest by the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Austro-Hungarian administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B. Kallay) implemented a number of measures in an attempt to neutralize Serbian and Croatian aspirations. Relying, among other things, on the Muslim nobility, he did not resolve the extremely important agrarian issue, tried to create a new Bosnian nation and impose the name "Bosnian" on the language. For various reasons Kallay failed to achieve any enduring political success. Some ten years before Kallay, a similar attempt made by Topal Pasha had also failed: his intention had been to create an integral Bosnian nation within the scope of the interests of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷

A new crisis in the Austro-Hungarian rule of Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred after the victory of the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire, when (expecting it to lead to Turkey laying claims on Bosnia and Herzegovina), Austria-Hungary (in 1908) annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus deepening the European crisis on the eve of WWI. Serbia and Montenegro threatened war because of the annexation.

The security position of Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated even further after the Balkan Wars (1912 - 1913) during which Turkey was pushed back from the continent of Europe and Serbia expanded and became more open about its intentions of conquering Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was particularly obvious from the intensified activities of public and secret pro-Serbian societies and organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914, members of the *Mlada Bosna* /Young Bosnia/ organisation (trained and armed by Serbia) killed the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, which led to the outbreak of WWI.¹⁸

It is interesting to note that the *Mlada Bosna* cell which prepared the Sarajevo assassination included a young Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ who, as a scientist and academic, advocated the Greater-Serbian concept in the decades to come. He was also a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) at the time of the adoption of the infamous *SANU Memorandum* (1986).

¹⁷ Enver Redžić, *op. cit.*, str. 117-132.

¹⁸ Štedimlija, Savić, Marković, *Zavjere protiv svjetskog mira*, Zagreb, 2005.




Fig. 4 *Bosnia and Herzegovina in Austria-Hungary (1978 /as printed/ - 1918)*
 (Taken from: D. PAVLIČEVIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 46)

During WWI, Austria Hungary mobilised many Bosnian-Herzegovinian people of all three denominations and sent them to fight on different European fronts. During the war, because of the Sarajevo assassination and the participation of many BH Serbs in pro-Serbian activities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austro-Hungarian authorities implemented a number of special repressive measures against BH Serbs and the network of their pro-Serbian organisations.

I-1.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the First Yugoslavia (1918 - 1941)¹⁹

Towards the end of WWI, political groups in the South-Slav areas of Austria-Hungary (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Banat and Bačka) established their own bodies of authority (the so-called *Narodna vijeća* /National Councils/) with the joint central National Council in Zagreb. Soon after that (29 October 1918), all relations with Austria-Hungary were severed and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (the State of SHS) was proclaimed, with its seat in Zagreb. This state included the territory of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Banat and Bačka. The main reason behind the formation of the SHS State was the most expeditious possible unification with the states of Serbia and Montenegro. This was done on 1 December 1918 and the first Yugoslavia was formed. At the time, it was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the Kingdom of SHS).²⁰

Until 1921, the countries of the first Yugoslavia (BH, Croatia, etc.) exercised various forms of self-administration. In 1921, a Constitution was imposed, implementing strict administrative centralization and national unity dominated by the Serbian Royal House of Karadorđević. Without taking into consideration any historical or ethnic criteria, the state was divided into 33 administrative districts governed by *veliki župani* /grand prefects/ who answered to the Minister of the Interior. Six of the districts were on BH territory and their seats were in Bihać, Banja Luka, Travnik, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Mostar.

The regime did not recognise any ethnic or national traits but prescribed the concept of a single, Yugoslav, people composed of three tribes (the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes). Other nations (the Muslims, the Albanians, the Montenegrins and the Macedonians) were not even awarded the status of a tribe. The census provided only the option of denominational choice. There was nothing on ethnicity or nationality.

The Bosnian Muslim party *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija* /Yugoslav Muslim Organization/ (JMO) also voted for the Yugoslav Constitution. In return, its members (mostly Muslim nobility) were promised compensation for the land the state had taken from them during the agrarian reform.

From the pragmatic point of view, the regime of the first Yugoslavia implemented repressive and distinctly pro-Serbian policies and relied, both socially and in terms of its staff, predominantly on ethnic Serbs. This, for instance, was the case during the implementation of the agrarian reform when (following the pattern already established in other areas) the properties of Islamic nobles in Bosnia and Herzegovina were seized and given mostly to Serbs with scant regard for the promises given to the JMO.²¹ In addition to that, the pro-Serbian regime committed large-scale violence (murder, imprisonment, persecution) against BH Muslims who were blamed for the disadvantageous position of BH Serbs during Austro-Hungarian rule.

As a result of many social and political problems and crises, in 1929 the regime of the first Yugoslavia established an open dictatorship. The country's name was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the formal parliamentary system was abolished, political and other organisation at the level of tribe (ethnic and national) or religion was banned, and so was the use of any tribal names. Administratively, the

¹⁹ Basic literature for this period: 1. Branko Petranović, *Historija Jugoslavije*, I, Belgrade, 1988; 2. Atif Purivatra, *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija*, Sarajevo 1974; 3. Enver Redžić, *Jugoslavenski radnički pokret i nacionalno pitanje u BiH (1918-1941)*, Sarajevo, 1983.

²⁰ Bogdan Krizman, *Raspad Austro-Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslavenske države*, Zagreb, 1977

²¹ Milivoje Erić, *Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941*, Sarajevo, 1958; Atif Purivatra, "Političke partije prema agrarnoj reformi u Bosni i Hercegovini neposredno poslije 1918" in *Prilozi*, Sarajevo, 1968.

Yugoslav territory was divided into nine *banovinas*, once again irrespective of any historical or ethnic criteria. Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into several *banovinas*, encompassing the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and some other areas.



Fig. 5 Administrative division of the first Yugoslavia into nine banovinas (1929 - 1939)

(Taken from: Josip JURČEVIĆ, Marija RAIĆ, *Povijest VIII*, Alfa, Zagreb, 2003, p. 37)

/translation: Adriatic Sea; Banovina borders/

The Vrbas *banovina* (seat in Banja Luka) consisted of the former districts of Banja Luka and Bihać and part of the Travnik district. The Drina *banovina* (seat in Sarajevo) consisted of Eastern Bosnia, Serbia up to river Kolubara, part of former Croatian Srijem and Eastern Slavonia. The Primorje *banovina* (seat in Split), among other areas, included Western Herzegovina and parts of Bosnia up to Travnik. The Zeta *banovina* (seat in Cetinje) included, among other areas, Eastern Herzegovina.

An administrative change was effected two years later (1931), detaching Srijem and Eastern Slavonia from the Drina *banovina* and attaching them to the Danube *banovina* (seat in Novi Sad).

I-1.6.1 Croatian *Banovina* (1939 - 1941)²²

The repressive nature of the regime in the first Yugoslavia failed to establish control over various forms of social, national and other types of discontent that were destabilizing the country from within. The most serious unresolved internal issue was the so-called Croatian issue. On the eve of WWII, the survival of the second /as printed/ Yugoslavia was even further jeopardized by international developments, in particular the increasingly aggressive policies and actions of the totalitarian states of Germany and Italy.

In these pre-war circumstances - following the German annexation of Austria and the break-up of Czechoslovakia - the Belgrade regime was forced to take further steps to reduce the threats to the survival of the state. In addition to the increasing number of political and economic ties that were being established between Yugoslavia and Germany (after 1935), after a long period of negotiations several days before the outbreak of WWII (in Europe), the so-called Cvetković-Maček Agreement was signed (26 August 1939).²³ The main item in the Agreement was the decision on the creation of the *Banovina Hrvatska* /Croatian Banovina/ as a new administrative unit in Yugoslavia.

The Croatian Banovina (with its seat in Zagreb) was composed of the then *banovinas* of Sava and Primorje, Herzegovina west of Stolac, the part of Bosnia between Livno and Travnik and three Posavina *kotars* /districts/ (Derventa, Gradačac and Brčko).

²² Basic literature: Ljubo Boban, *Sporazum Cvetković-Maček*, Belgrade, 1965; same author, *Maček i politika HSS-a 1928.-1941*, Zagreb, 1974.

²³ Dragiša CVETKOVIĆ was the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia at the time and Vlatko MAČEK the President of the *Croatian Peasant Party*, conclusively the strongest party among the Croats.




Fig 6. *Croatian Banovina in the third administrative division of the first Yugoslavia (1939 - 1941)*
(Taken from: *Historical Maps of Croatia*, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, p. 20)

Practically nobody was satisfied with the Agreement. Many political and other groups (Serbian, Croatian and Muslim alike) which did not participate in the preparation of the Agreement condemned it with greater or lesser fervour and the hierarchies which had prepared it were not satisfied either. The Serbs who were in power were obstructing a binding constitutional confirmation of the changes stipulated by the Agreement, while Croatian signatories, based on the agreements reached, considered the Agreement to be merely a first step in the reorganisation of Yugoslavia and expected to obtain further territorial and other gains for the *Croatian Banovina*.

In fact, "the Agreement was built on shaky legal foundations" because the constitutional revision should have "subsequently been presented to the National Presidency for approval, which was never done. The Agreement could therefore be

annulled at any convenient moment by either the /?Regency/ or the King, once he came to the throne”.²⁴ Because of this and many other reasons, the legislative organ of the *Croatian Banovina* (the Croatian Assembly) was never elected and throughout its entire existence (19 months) the *Banovina* was, in fact, merely a provisional political solution.²⁵

I-1.7 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Independent State of Croatia (1941 - 1945)²⁶

Several days after the German attack on Yugoslavia (6 April 1941), the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was proclaimed in Zagreb (10 April 1941), encompassing the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since, however, the NDH was in every aspect subordinated to predominantly German, and somewhat less so Italian, interests, the issues concerning its borders were resolved between these two countries.

At the very beginning (12 April 1941), in one of his orders Hitler stated that he was handing Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Italy²⁷, but approximately ten days later, it was agreed at the ministerial conference in Vienna (attended by Germany and Italy) that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be part of the NDH, which was finally recognized by Italy in the Roman Agreements (18 May 1941).²⁸ The entire NDH territory was divided along a west-east axis into German and Italian spheres of interest and zones of occupation. The demarcation line also crossed the central parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Internally, the NDH was divided into 22 administrative units called *županijas* /counties/ (the so-called *Velike župe* /?greater counties/), mostly bearing names dating back to the medieval Croatian and Bosnian kingdoms. The totalitarian NDH regime considered BH Muslims to be Croats of Islamic denomination (they were even sometimes referred to as the flower of Croatianhood) and many of them occupied high-ranking positions in the hierarchies of power and the ruling Ustasha Movement.

²⁴ Hodimir Sirotković, “Vladko Maček i pravna izgradnja Banovine Hrvatske”, in *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci*, no. 1, Rijeka, 2001, p. 280.

²⁵ See *Ibid.*, pp. 280-283.

²⁶ Basic literature: 1. Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, Zagreb, 1978; 2. Enver Redžić, *Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu*, Sarajevo, 1998.

²⁷ Bogdan Krizman, *Pavelić i ustaše*, Zagreb, 1978, p. 398.

²⁸ Rafael Brčić, “Njemačko-italijanske suprotnosti oko Bosne i Hercegovine u svjetlu okupacije 1941”, in *Prilozi*, 3, Sarajevo, 1967.



Fig. 7 Administrative division of the Independent State of Croatia (1941 - 1945)
(Taken from: D. PAVLIČEVIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 49)

/translation: State borders; Borders of greater counties; Borders between German and Italian zones; Occupied by Italy until 1943; Occupied by Hungary/

Because the military and political situation in the BH territory during the war was the most complex of all, it was there that the heaviest battles were fought and the most vicious reprisals against civilians were exacted. With each army trying to implement the interests of its regime, there was hardly any co-operation among German, Italian and NDH armies on BH territory. In addition to that, Yugoslav Communists and Serbian Chetniks were also highly active in the area, both militarily and politically.

Because of this, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the area of greatest overall insecurity and instability during WWII. Already in 1941, Chetnik and Communist Partizan units carried out mass executions of defenceless Muslim civilians in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the war, frequent armed battles of varying intensity were fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina, various acts of violence were committed on a massive scale, all the armies carried out forcible mobilisations and established

provisional authorities, the population organised itself locally or fled to safe areas, etc. The worst sufferings of the civilian population (executions, persecutions, mass exoduses) occurred towards the end of the war and immediately after its end, when the Communists used extreme forms of repression to establish their power.

I.1-8 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second Yugoslavia (1945 - 1990)²⁹

The second Yugoslavia was one of many Eastern European states governed for almost half a century (from the end of WWII to the 1990s) by totalitarian Communist regimes. The country was composed of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) which were constituent parts of both Serbia and Yugoslavia. Each of the republics, except for Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a majority people (nation) which the regime recognised as constituent. The second Yugoslavia was thus a state of six republics and five constituent peoples.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six Yugoslav federal republics, but before its federal status and territory were finally defined, very different interests and propositions circulated within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the KPJ (at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia and Yugoslavia). Ultimately, this issue, like all others, was decided by the KPJ leadership. Equally, all political, social and national changes which occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the second Yugoslavia were primarily adapted to the needs of the Communist regime.

Compared to other Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina was special in many ways. Being the central Yugoslav republic, it was of special importance for the security of the country and this was reflected in the country's defence strategy and the distribution of military resources. Its historical legacy and unresolved issues made Bosnia and Herzegovina the most complex Yugoslav republic: it was the only republic which - by the decision of the regime - had two constituent peoples (Serbs and Croats) for the first two and a half decades and three (Serbs, Croats, Muslims) for the following two. Because of this and a number of political, economic, cultural and other steps taken by the Communist regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this republic was frequently referred to as *Yugoslavia in Miniature*.

²⁹ Basic literature: 1. Dušan Bilandžić, *Historija SFRJ*, Zagreb, 1985; 2. Slobodan Nešović, *Temelji nove Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, 1973; 3. Branko Petranović, *Historija Jugoslavije*, II-III, Belgrade, 1988.



Fig. 8 *Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second Yugoslavia (1945 - 1990)*
(Taken from: Historical Maps of Croatia, p. 22)

At the censuses held in the first two and a half decades of Yugoslavia's existence, BH Muslims either declared themselves, or were coerced by the regime using various forms of incentives into declaring themselves to be either Serbs or Croats or Yugoslavs/undeclared. At the end of the 1960s (1968), responding to the pressure created by social discontent, the regime for the first time "promoted the Muslim nation under the name of Muslims".³⁰ Before long, BH citizens of Islamic faith (Muslims) were allowed during censuses (from the 1971 census onwards) to publicly declare themselves as Muslims and this new nation - the Muslims - was conferred a constituent status within the republic.

Even then, however, this solution provoked very different reactions and further conceptual and other rifts within BH Muslim social elites. The conceptual and political rifts proceeded in three basic directions and their description may be rather helpful in the understanding of events and social processes which occurred after 1990 as well.

Firstly, during the time Yugoslavia existed, the majority (partly in order to preserve their social status, partly from conviction) publicly advocated for the Muslim

³⁰ Enver Redžić, *Sto godina muslimanske politike*, Sarajevo, 2000, p. 82.

nation such as created by the regime.³¹ During and after the break-up of Yugoslavia, most of these advocates adapted to the various new situations.³²

Secondly, prominent individuals from the Islamic entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina opposed the regime's solution for a new Muslim nation, advocating the idea of a separate ethnic and national identity for Bosnianhood (Bosniakhood).³³ The Yugoslav regime initiated a public condemnation campaign against the proponents of Bosnianhood. This campaign was an "ideological and political activity, subsequently transferred to the press and the party organs in an organised manner".³⁴

Thirdly, some of the more prominent members of the Islamic faith were radical advocates of Islam as a global movement in which ethnic, national or any other affiliation is considered irrelevant and the only thing that matters is one's affiliation to Islam as a global religion and a way of private and social life. In 1969/1970, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ wrote the Islamic Declaration in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 1990 he became the President of the BH Presidency, in other words, the person in the highest position of institutional political power in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since in his Islamic Declaration Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ advocated radical Pan-Islamic engagement (that "it seeks to promote ideas and plans into organised action" and that "a Muslim can only die in the name of Allah and for the glory of Islam", etc.³⁵) and systematically tried to implement it in various ways, in 1983 the Yugoslav regime tried him and a group of several persons (the so-called Sarajevo Process) for "associating for hostile purposes" and "enemy propaganda".³⁶

Among a large number of people investigated and/or indicted at the time for "having drawn attention to themselves for their loyalty to the original interpretation of Islam"³⁷ were several persons who after 1990 became very prominent (Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, Hasan ČENGIĆ, Rusmir MAHMUTĆEHAJIĆ) or prominent participants in the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³¹ *Ibid*, pp. 89 -100.

³² *Ibid*, p. 6: E. Redžić is justified in claiming that the "proponents" of the Muslim nation as a concept created by the Yugoslav regime, "with the change of the social and economic order, became euphoric advocates of the national idea of Bosniakhood which they had been consistently rejecting for years... this phenomenon shows that some of today's Bosniaks, former proponents of Muslim ethnicity /?with a capital M/, have always been seeing the discipline of history as a servant to political power.

³³ For instance, at the time, Enver Redžić publicly presented his views, publishing them in detail in 1970 in Sarajevo, in his book entitled *Tokovi i otpori*. He held the regime's proclamation of the Muslim nation "unacceptable for several reasons. Firstly, by equating a religious community with a nation one only postpones the political practice of national determination ... and secondly ... even though many Muslim peoples have existed as part of various ethnic and national communities, there is no such thing as a Muslim people or nation." (E. Redžić, *Sto godina muslimanske politike*, p. 86). In the same vein, Muhamed FILIPOVIĆ believes that by recognising a Muslim nation, the regime "did not truly finalize or ensure the recognition of this entity or allow it to develop... the Muslims were put in a situation where they were the only ones in the world to use the name of a religious denomination for the name of their nation", i.e. defined in this manner, the identity of BH Muslims "was not historically conditioned and linked to Bosnian history ... could not bring about constitution of political will" (M. Filipović, *Bošnjačka politika*, Sarajevo, 1996, pp. 88-91). Compare with Avdo Sućeska, "Istorijske osnove nacionalne posebnosti bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana", in *Jugoslavenski istorijski časopis*, no. 4, Belgrade, 1969, pp. 47-53.

³⁴ E. Redžić, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

³⁵ Alija Izetbegović, *Islamska Deklaracija*, Sarajevo, 1990. *Islamska Deklaracija* was intended for global Islam and up to that moment (according to a statement of A. IZETBEGOVIĆ given in 1983) it had been "published in Kuwait (100,000 copies) and, as far as I have been informed, in Pakistan, Malaysia and Algeria" - from the book *Sarajevski proces*, Zürich, 1987, p. 60.

³⁶ *Sarajevski proces*, Zürich (published by the Bosnian Institute), 1987, p. 51.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 11.

Several years prior to the break-up of the second Yugoslavia, one of the hugest Yugoslav political and economic scandals (the so-called *Agrokomerc* affair) broke in Cazinska Krajina in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina, resulting in political and legal confrontations with some prominent BH Muslim politicians and businessmen. The first-accused in the staged trial which began in 1988 was Fikret ABDIĆ who had until that point been a member of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a deputy in the SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ Assembly and the President of the board of directors of the *Agrokomerc* Processing Complex.

Among other things, the indictment charged ABDIĆ and some other indictees of posing a “counter-revolutionary threat to the social order” of the second Yugoslavia through their *Agrokomerc* trading.³⁸ The public, political and economic aftershocks of the *Agrokomerc* affair spilled over into the 1990s and Fikret ABDIĆ became one of the prominent figures in the new developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I-2.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE BREAK-UP OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

The entire break-up of the second Yugoslavia may be analysed from two basic aspects: international and internal, i.e. Yugoslav. When observed from the international aspect, it is obvious that both the crisis and the fall of the Yugoslav Communist Regime occurred - judging by both the events themselves and the sequence in which they occurred - simultaneously with similar processes in other European states.

Before the break-up of European Communist regimes, during their collapse and in the process of their transition, international institutions and countries of the western, non-Communist, world adopted the same or a highly similar attitude towards all Communist states based on the value they had in terms of security, politics and other aspects. This was not only because of the immense difference which existed between the pragmatic (political, safety-related, economic) interests of the Communist and the non-Communist states and societies but also because of the discontinuity between these two worlds, completely separated by the iron curtain in all aspects (from worldviews to everyday lives) after WWII.

The Communists proclaimed, both theoretically and practically, this complete discontinuity and the irreconcilable nature of these two worlds, summarized succinctly in the slogan “Communism as a global process”. Communism proclaimed non-Communist societies, i.e. their values, management system and social elites, as the worst counter-revolutionary enemy which must literally be destroyed by means of total Communist revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat.³⁹

“In the past centuries, few peoples and countries have been spared certain types of mass violence ... None of this weakens the conclusion that our century (the 20th, author’s remark) seems to have surpassed all others in this respect ...In the flow of history, Communism appears as a tragic flood, overspilling the river bed. Indeed, it is one of the most forceful and most significant moments of our century. Communism,

³⁸ Hrvoje ŠOŠIĆ, *Treće pokriće Agrokomerca*, Zagreb, 1989, p. 43.

³⁹ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Dječja bolest ljevičarstva u komunizmu*, Zagreb, 1973, pp. 121-2: The dictatorship of the proletariat “is a most determined and the most ruthless war waged by the new class against a more powerful enemy, the bourgeoisie ... and victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, stubborn and desperate life-and-death struggle...”

the greatest phenomenon of this 'brief' 20th century, which began in 1914 and ended in 1991 in Moscow, stands at the very centre of the picture. Communism, which came into being before Fascism, before Nazism and survived both, across four vast continents ... in order to consolidate their power, the Communists actually incorporated mass crimes into the system governance."⁴⁰

In all aspects, the second, Communist, Yugoslavia was only a part of the global Communist movement and order. As early as 1919, at the founding congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), it was decided that "the newly-founded Party should join the Communist International"⁴¹ which had its seat in Moscow. The KPJ was a "section" (branch) of the Communist International (KI). Up to 1943 (when the KI was formally abolished), all important doctrinal, organisational and personnel-related changes in the KPJ were carried out in accordance with the directives issued by the KI and, subsequently (until the conflict erupted between the Informbiro and the KPJ in 1948), in accordance with the directives issued by the Soviet Union.

The totalitarian rule established by the KPJ in Yugoslavia during and after WWII was modelled on some other European Communist states. Its management model was characterized by the following: abolishment of basic human rights and freedoms, a blanket ban on any form of political and social pluralism, abolishment of private entrepreneurship and private ownership of manufacturing equipment, all forms of systematic terror used by the state.⁴²

It can therefore be objectively concluded that, just as "none of the Communist practices fleetingly popular in the West managed to avoid this pattern"⁴³, neither did the Yugoslav practice, of which positive stereotypes were formed after 1948 for cold war purposes by parts of the Western world. The principles of the last Yugoslav Constitution (1974) stressed that, in Yugoslavia, "the working class and all working people shall develop socialist self-management democracy as a special form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and they shall secure this."⁴⁴

Various forms of individual, group, national and other forms of social discontent, as well as permanent administrative and economic failure, were thus a constant feature of Communist Yugoslavia. Numerous crises were left unaddressed and their culminations postponed by the use of violence, propaganda rhetoric and the announcement of "new and successful reforms".

From the 1970s onwards, however, numerous exact economic indicators (a dramatic rise in prices and unemployment, salary reductions, galloping inflation, rising foreign debt, the shortage of basic consumer goods, the impossibility of creating budgetary revenue, etc.) testified to the existence of an internal crisis, viciously spiralling into general chaos and the disintegration of the Yugoslav Communist administrative system.

From the mid-1980s onwards – in addition to the mass strikes staged by dissatisfied workers (throughout Yugoslavia) and the Kosovo demonstrations and rebellion which were crushed by force – the Yugoslav media and sessions held by

⁴⁰ Stéphane Courtois, "Zločini komunizma" in *Crna knjiga komunizma*, Zagreb, 1999, pp. 10-11.

⁴¹ *Povijest Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, 1985, p. 63. The KPJ was founded as the *Socijalistička radnička partija (komunista) /Socialist Workers' Party (of Communists)/ – SRPJ(k)*. Already the following year, in 1920, it changed its name to KPJ and, in 1952, to *Savez komunista Jugoslavije /League of Communists of Yugoslavia/ – SKJ*, "after Marx's Communist League" - *Ibid*, p. 379.

⁴² See Josip Jurčević, *Bleiburg – jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima*, section entitled "Povijesne okolnosti nastanka totalitarne vlasti u drugoj Jugoslaviji", Zagreb, 2005.

⁴³ Courtois, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁴⁴ *SFRY Constitution*, 1974., "Basic Provisions", 1.1.4 IV.

party and state bodies had already started showing the varied and increasing conceptual and actual fragmentation and disintegration of the Communist administrative hierarchies which had until then, at least in public, been presented as ostensibly monolithic.

It is particularly important to take the above facts into consideration if one wishes to reach an objective understanding of the seemingly contradictory events which took place in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990 transition process. One fact which stands out as particularly conspicuous and important is that - in all republics - many individuals and parts of the Yugoslav Communist system had moved into key positions of power in the hierarchies of the newly-created pluralist non-Communist states, market-oriented economic subjects and civil society.

Many aspects of this structural shift (motivation, identification, expertise, spontaneity, organisation, etc.) have hardly been examined in the light of the overall social phenomenon.⁴⁵

I.-3

THE MAIN PLAYERS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AT THE END OF THE 1980s AND IN THE EARLY 1990s

I.3.1. Institutions of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

I.-3.1.1 The League of Communists of Yugoslavia - SKJ

The SKJ was the totalitarian political organisation which ruled the second Yugoslav state from 1945 onwards. The entire system of state and social institutions of the second Yugoslavia was under its direct rule: from the state level to local levels and from state bodies, economic entities and the trade unions to the media and various educational, scientific, cultural and sports organisations. Everywhere and at all levels, the SKJ decided on all ideological, organisational and personnel-related changes.

Here is how a prominent party historian from Serbia described the situation in Yugoslavia after WWII: “After the end of the war, the single-party system of revolutionary democracy had all the elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat which, in the name of the working class, was being implemented by the KPJ /Communist Party of Yugoslavia/ as its avant-garde ... The KPJ filled up the entire political space, made decisions on the course of development, implemented its will through the state apparatus, the legislature and mass-scale political organisms whose programs reflected the party programme”.⁴⁶

A similar description was provided by a prominent party historian from Croatia: “Members of the KPJ occupied almost all the management positions in the state’s administrative and governmental institutions ... the KPJ did not share power with any group with an opposing political or ideological orientation ... the KPJ leadership had almost unlimited opportunity to establish Yugoslavia’s social development policies. Few are the examples in history of a revolutionary movement with such a powerful and exclusive hold on authority; all organs of authority - legislative and executive, the army and the police, security services and the judiciary - were without exception firmly in the hands of the KPJ”.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ The rare successful attempts at scientifically clarifying certain broader aspects were published in the *Privatizacija i javnost* proceedings, Zagreb, 1999, and *Upravljačke elite i modernizacija*, Zagreb, 2001.

⁴⁶ Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, II, Belgrade, 1988, p. 481.

⁴⁷ Dušan Bilandžić, *Historija SFRJ*, Zagreb, 1985, p. 101.

Relations within the SKJ (KPJ) were centralized to the maximum, both in the actual and symbolic sense of the word. After 1948, when relations with the Soviet Union were broken off, all decisions were conceived and passed by the KPJ (SKJ) leadership and governmental bodies, while the authorities and other bodies of state and social management had to implement them faithfully and with dedication. The organisational hierarchy of the SKJ was a parallel system covering the entire state administration and all other institutions and organisations. Even though an increasing number of lower-level management positions in the state and the society was being filled with SKJ members, as were all the high-level management positions, a separate network of party organizations (each within its scope of activities, in its field and at its level) were drafting - in accordance with the directives issued by the party leadership - all the decisions for the state and social institutions and organisations at their level and controlling their implementation.

In other words, a separate network of party organisations stretched from the federal level, through republican organizations to the lowest levels of the territorial administration. The same applied to economic and other systems (cultural, educational, scientific, media, sports). It should be stressed here that a separate SKJ network covered the army, i.e. the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), popularly known as the Seventh Republic.

The most prominent and dedicated SKJ members carried out several different duties simultaneously in the party, the state administration and economic and other organizations. The most prominent example of this was Josip Broz Tito who was, at the same time, party leader, lifetime president of the state with enormous powers, supreme army commander and an official multiple hero with an untouchable cult of personality.

Also testifying to the exceptional power of J.B. Tito in the Yugoslav Communist hierarchy is the fact that his first name and family name were an institution incorporated into the Constitution, which stipulated that, "in view of the historic role of Josip Broz Tito ... the SFRY Assembly may ... elect Josip Broz Tito the President of the Republic for an unlimited term of office".⁴⁸ In addition to that, the Constitution gave J.B. Tito enormous dictatorial powers,⁴⁹ and stipulated that the institution of the President of the Republic would no longer exist after his death.

Because of that, the SKJ (KPJ) was in all aspects (legal, actual and symbolic) definitely the most important, i.e. key, institution of Communist Yugoslavia. This was reflected not only in the practical functioning of the system but also - in a highly declarative and propagandist manner - in all aspects of public life (culture, education, and media), the Constitution and the laws.⁵⁰

I.-3.1.2 Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)

During WWII the JNA was gradually organised as Communist Yugoslavia's armed force. In the war, the JNA (which changed its name several times) played a decisive role in helping the KPJ establish its totalitarian rule through revolutionary violence. In the decades following the war, the JNA was the main guarantor for

⁴⁸ *SFRY Constitution*, 1974, Article 333.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, articles 333-345.

⁵⁰ For instance, the first paragraph of the preamble to the Constitution (1974) already stresses that the KPJ is "at the head", while the 7th section of the Basic Principles of the Constitution refers to the SKJ as "the initiator and organiser ... a conscious champion of the aspirations and interests of the working class ... the leading organised ideological and political force of the working class and of all working people", etc.

preserving and securing the power of Yugoslav Communists.⁵¹ Throughout its existence the JNA was a typical party, i.e. Communist, revolutionary army.

At the very beginning of the formation of the Communist partisan army in 1941, it was already stipulated that these are “the military assault formation of the people of Yugoslavia under the command of the Communist Party”⁵² and the Central Committee of the KPJ “vigilantly observed and harshly intervened to keep the army from being separated from the movement”.⁵³ The entire organization of the Yugoslav Communist Army, and in particular its system of command, was subordinated to the KPJ. In addition to the military commanders who were Communists, various party institutions were also established within the army to carry out “political and propaganda activities aimed at the ideological formation of soldiers”.⁵⁴ Dual authority (dual chain of command) was also introduced, whereby even in military operations the political commissar was superior to the military commander (who was also a party member).

“The creation and strengthening of the new army, the creation and development of its military skills were directly founded on the policies of the KPJ. This army was the key factor in handling revolutionary tasks - this was the army of the revolution. Its soldiers and senior officers were the most elevated and the most aware members of the population - the bearers and interpreters of KPJ policies ... they organised massive-scale political activities among the people and initiated the creation of revolutionary authorities ...”⁵⁵ “There is iron discipline in the brigades. This discipline has nothing in common with the discipline in capitalist armies. This is self-discipline based on the awareness and political convictions of every individual soldier...”⁵⁶

These conceptual foundations and the actual and symbolic significance of the JNA did not undergo any significant changes until the fall of Communism and the break-up of the second Yugoslavia. For decades, numerous powerful political, military, economic and other positions in Yugoslavia were taken by the members of the military who, during WWII, had been deeply indoctrinated by the Communists. This is why during this entire time, in addition to being a real armed force, the JNA was (together with Tito) the untouchable and most cherished cult institution in the second Yugoslavia and why, for propaganda reasons, it was very often dubbed Tito’s Army.

A number of legal and constitutional amendments adopted in Yugoslavia between 1969 and 1974 established the defence concept of the so-called All-people’s Defence and social self-protection (ONO and DSZ), organising the Territorial Defence (TO) as part of the armed forces (in addition to the JNA). The aim was – “in the spirit of Marx’s concept of an armed people” – to make it possible, legally and actually, for “all able-bodied people of the country to join in armed combat, for combat to be conducted under all conditions of war and in all parts of the country: for every part of Yugoslavia to be a frontline and each of its citizens a fighter.”⁵⁷

⁵¹ See “Osnovne značajke jugoslavenske vojske”, in J. Jurčević, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-196.

⁵² “Statut proleterskih narodnooslobodilačkih brigada”, published in Leon Geršković, *Dokumenti o razvoju narodne vlasti*, Zagreb, 1983, p. 38.

⁵³ Milija Stanišić, “Osnovni principi izgradnje oružanih snaga revolucije 1941-1945. godine” in *Vojno delo* magazine, 1969, no. 2, p. 126.

⁵⁴ *Statut...*, L. Geršković, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁵⁵ Pero Morača, “Moralni faktor u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu”, in *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* magazine, 1955, no. 2-3, p. 268.

⁵⁶ *Statut...*, p. 38.

⁵⁷ *Povijest Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, p. 449.

Thus, “from the early 1970s onwards, Territorial Defence staffs were organised at all levels, from the republics and autonomous provinces to the basic associations of associated labour and local communes. At the same time, forms and systems linking JNA commands, units and institutions multiplied”.⁵⁸ Even though the Constitution (1974) generally defined the Yugoslav armed forces as “a unified whole /which/ shall consist of the Yugoslav People’s Army as the common armed force of all the nations and nationalities and of all working people and citizens and of Territorial Defence as the broadest form of organised total national armed resistance”⁵⁹, other constitutional and legal provisions, reality in particular, turned the TO into an army of republics and provinces (and even smaller “socio-political communities”).

This can, for instance, be concluded from the constitutional provision which stipulates, “It shall be the right and duty of the Communes, Autonomous Provinces and the Republics and other socio-political communities ... each on its own territory, to regulate and organize national defence and to direct territorial defence, civil defence and other preparations for the defence of the country, and, in the event of an attack upon the country, to organize and direct total national resistance.”⁶⁰ In addition to that, the Constitution stipulated that “no one shall have the right to acknowledge or sign an act of capitulation, nor to accept or recognize the occupation” and “no one shall have the right to prevent citizens ... from fighting against an enemy who has attacked the country.”⁶¹

Territorial Defence weapons and military equipment were purchased with the funds of the republics, autonomous provinces, municipalities, enterprises, etc., and TO Staffs (either in co-operation with the JNA or not) organised various types of military exercises, competitions and in other ways of preparing people for ONO and DSZ. Also, various ONO and DSZ experts were educated at universities and the ONO and DSZ was an obligatory module at all levels and in all types of educational institutions, from primary schools to universities.

In order to better understand the causes of numerous crimes systematically committed - under the operative organisation and monitoring of JNA-educated hierarchies - in the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and Bosnia and Herzegovina (and subsequently in Kosovo) in the 1990s, one must stress the /?ethical/ instructions which continued providing the foundations for the National Defence School, i.e. the Maršal Tito Centre for Military Higher Education well after the 1980s.

In 1981 the Centre published the Draft Instructions in the form of a large book entitled *Priprema i izvođenje operacija oružanih snaga u ONOR-u* /Preparation and Implementation of Operations of the Armed Forces in the All-People's Defence War/,⁶² which served as mandatory instructional “material, further developing the concept and doctrine of all-people’s defence and social self-protection and the strategy of armed defence in the preparation and conduct of operations, i.e. the use of strategic and operative groups and operative systems.”⁶³ At the beginning, the book stresses that, “all candidates must pass exams on the Instruction in its entirety”.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

⁵⁹ *SFRY Constitution*, 1974, Article. 240, second paragraph.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Article. 239, second paragraph.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Article 238, first paragraph.

⁶² *Priprema i izvođenje operacija oružanih snaga u ONOR-u*, Maršal Tito JNA Centre for Military Higher Education– National Defence School, Belgrade, 1981.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, “Introduction”, at the start of the book – unpaginated.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, first unpaginated page.

In the chapter called “The role and tasks of the SKJ and the SSOJ (Union of the Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, author’s remark) in groups and bodies” the book, among other things, stresses the following: “SKJ organisations are the leading ideological and political force in strategic and operative groups and operative bodies. They are responsible for the implementation of SKJ policies in overall combat, moral and political development of these groups and hierarchies and their engagement on concrete tasks.

In the preparation and execution of operations, Communists and SKJ organisations and organs are primarily engaged on: raising soldiers’ and officers’ awareness of the justified nature of the battle we are engaged in ... explaining the current military and political situation, the essence of class and the country’s defence perspective; uncovering enemy goals and actions, primarily their propaganda activities, and inciting hatred against them....”⁶⁵

As for the SSOJ, it was defined that its activities within the armed forces “would be founded on the programmatic and statutory documents of the SKJ and SSOJ.

The SSOJ organisation and its organs are constantly engaged on “the consistent implementation of SKJ policies, positions and tasks ... cultivation of mass-scale heroism, fighting spirit and revolutionary zeal; affirmation of faith in our victory, deepening of our hatred towards our enemy...”⁶⁶

I.-3.1.3 Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

The institution of Presidency was first introduced in the Yugoslav Communist administrative system in 1966, as part of the SKJ party structure. Subsequently, the state management system was gradually reorganised in the same manner and the institution of the SFRY Presidency established by the 1974 Constitution and introduced at the level of republics and provinces.

In fact, the SFRY Presidency was the collective head of state with a very broad scope of authority. Among other things, the SFRY Presidency was “the supreme body in charge of the administration and command of the Armed Forces ... in war and peace”,⁶⁷ “appointing, promoting and relieving of duty generals and admirals and other army officers, as specified by the federal statute; appointing and relieving of office the presidents, judges and lay-assessors of military courts, and military public prosecutors”,⁶⁸ “laying down the fundamentals of plans and preparatory measures for the defence of the country ... determining the existence of an immediate threat of war ... ordering the use of Armed Forces in peace-time”,⁶⁹ and in specific cases passing decree laws and suspending the implementation of individual provisions of the Constitution.⁷⁰

“The SFRY Presidency shall be composed of a member from each Republic and Autonomous Province, elected by the Assembly of the Republic or the Assembly of the Autonomous Province”.⁷¹ This means that the SFRY Presidency was composed of eight members. Members of the SFRY Presidency were elected to a five-year mandate. According to the Constitution, the SFRY

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 13.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 14.

⁶⁷ *SFRY Constitution*, 1974, Article 313, third paragraph.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, Article 315, item 6.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, Article 316.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, Article 317 and Amendment XLI, item 3, 1988.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, Amendment XLI, item 1, 1988.

Presidency was headed by the President of the SFRY Presidency whose term of office lasted for one year and who was automatically (by rotation) replaced by the next member of the SFRY Presidency, in accordance with a previously determined roster. The President of the Presidency was at the same time the President of the National Defence Council.⁷²

The SFRY Presidency operated in this manner only after the death of J.B. Tito (1980), who, according to the SFRY Constitution, held the offices of both the President of the Republic and the President of the SFRY Presidency for life.⁷³ According to the Constitution, Tito (as the President of the Republic, i.e. Yugoslavia) had the same powers as the SFRY Presidency and ruled as such. Thus, the SFRY Presidency did not consummate its constitutional powers before that time (1980) and met at Tito's will.⁷⁴

I.-3.1.4. Security Services

The security services were established by the KPJ in WWII.⁷⁵ They continued operating after the war, were re-organised on several occasions (division into military and civilian security services, division according to type of work and jurisdiction) and had the names of individual services changed.⁷⁶ The security services of Communist Yugoslavia were exceptionally significant for the preservation of the totalitarian Communist regime and therefore wielded enormous power and had a highly developed network of employees and collaborators. In their activities, the security services frequently carried out assassinations of *personae non gratae* in Yugoslavia and abroad. Following the break-up of the second Yugoslavia, a number of service employees and other authors published a great many documents and data about this.⁷⁷

A top secret overhaul of the Yugoslav civilian State Security Service - the SDS (carried out in 1997 for the needs of the security service of the Republic of Croatia by prominent SDS employees who had, since 1990, assumed even more prominent security positions in the Republic of Croatia)⁷⁸ revealed many details in the organisation and activities of the SDS. For instance, under the category of "internal enemies" the SDS carried out non-stop surveillance of, among others, all religious communities, universities and student dormitories. In foreign countries it "covered" Yugoslav emigrants.

According to the Law on Basic State Security Systems, "the SFRY Presidency and the SIV (Federal Executive Council, the SFRY Government, author's remark) were responsible for providing political and security guidelines for the activities of the State Security Service".⁷⁹

In many ways, state security services very actively participated in the political, military and economic crises which took place in the second Yugoslavia during the 1980s. They were intensively involved in the intervention in Kosovo at the beginning of the 1980s.⁸⁰ In the mid-1980s, when the advent of pluralist democracy became

⁷² *Ibid*, articles 327-332.

⁷³ *Ibid*, Article 335, second paragraph.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, articles 335-345.

⁷⁵ See J. Jurčević, *Bleiburg....*, chapter "Glavni represivni organi".

⁷⁶ See Marko Lopušina, *Ubij bližnjeg svog*, Belgrade, 1996; Bože Vukušić, *Tajni rat Udbe protiv hrvatskog iseljništva*, chapter "Nastanak, ustroj i rad jugoslavenskih tajnih službi", Zagreb, 2002.

⁷⁷ See: *Ibid*; also Hans Peter Rullman, *Mordauftrag aus Belgrad*, Hamburg, 1990; Božidar Spasić, *Lasica koja govori*, Belgrade, 2000.

⁷⁸ Josip Perković; Jan Gabriš, *Služba državne sigurnosti*, Zagreb 1997.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 14.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 13-14.

apparent, security services started systematically clearing out the archives which, in the new circumstances, could have compromised the Communist administrative elites.⁸¹

During the break-up of the second Yugoslavia, a large number of SDS employees and associates left the Yugoslav state security system and took up a number of prominent security and other management positions in the newly created states.⁸² The extent to which this transfer was organised by the Yugoslav services as part of their security activities in the new order and the extent to which it was spontaneous remains an open issue.

It is significant that a large quantity of data and documents on Yugoslav civilian security services and their members have been made public (books, media, internet) since 1990. Contrary to that, information on the Yugoslav military security services, which were clearly very active and systematic both prior to and after 1990, are exceptionally difficult to access publicly.⁸³

On the one hand, none of the states newly created on the territory of the former Yugoslavia has ever taken any steps (scientific, social, legal or from the aspect of lustration) to confront the activities of the Yugoslav military and civilian security services. This testifies to their importance and power as players prior to and, even more so, after 1990. On the other hand, the many confrontations which did occur, even with the most prominent political and military figures, failed to include the members of Yugoslav security services. Certain well-known examples show that in today's Croatia, the security services and their members are still being, in a manner of speaking, protected.⁸⁴

I-3.1.5 SFRY Assembly

According to the SFRY Constitution, the SFRY Assembly was the “supreme organ of power”,⁸⁵ and, in accordance with the Constitution and the federal laws, had a very wide scope of formal authority: “to decide on amendments to the Constitution ... discuss and lay down the fundamentals of internal and foreign policy ... decide on alterations of the boundaries ... decide on war and peace ... elect the President of the Republic”, elect and relieve the members of the Federal Government, etc.⁸⁶ For a number of reasons, however, the Assembly was far less powerful than the Constitution stipulated, the main reason being, of course, that Yugoslavia was a typical totalitarian state in which the assembly system and its actual influence were all but formal.

⁸¹ See J. Jurčević, *op. cit.*, pp.138-139.

⁸² Many cases described in books and the media testify to that. The most obvious examples in the Republic of Croatia are: a) Josip MANOLIĆ, former member of Yugoslav security services (in the period from 1989 to 1994 one of the most powerful members of the ruling HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/), who was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia, the Chief of the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and, during the four initial and crucial years, the top state personnel officer; b) Josip PERKOVIĆ, former member of Yugoslav security services and subsequently a long-serving Chief of the Military Security Service in the Republic of Croatia.

⁸³ See: 1. statement of Sefer HALILOVIĆ and others on their activities for the Yugoslav military security service; 2. Veljko Kadijević: *Moje videnje raspada*, Belgrade, 1993.

⁸⁴ The German Supreme Court recently accused the authorities of the Republic of Croatia (usually consistent in their co-operation with the international community) of refusing to co-operate in a trial regarding the investigation of the role played by Josip PERKOVIĆ (a high-ranking Yugoslav official and subsequently even higher-ranking official in Croatian security services) in the murder of a Croatian émigré in Germany in the 1980s.

⁸⁵ *SFRY Constitution*, Article. 282.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, articles 283-290.

The second reason was the manner, in which the Assembly functioned and its prescribed jurisdiction. It was composed of two councils, based on the specific Yugoslav principle of delegates, in which the passing of decisions involved complex procedures requiring a consensus to be reached between delegations from republics and other organisations.⁸⁷

The actual weakness of the Assembly became increasingly obvious during the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis and the process of its break-up, and its role was soon marginalized.

I-3.1.6 Federal Executive Council (SIV)

According to the 1974 SFRY Constitution, the SIV was “the executive body of the SFRY Assembly”, in other words, the federal Yugoslav Government responsible to the “SFRY Assembly for the state in all spheres of social life”.⁸⁸ It was determined that “ethnic composition would be taken into account”⁸⁹ in the nomination of the members of the SIV.

The jurisdiction of the SIV mainly pertained to the implementation of the policies and decisions adopted by the Assembly and the SFRY Presidency. During the break-up of the second Yugoslavia and due to the marginalization of the Assembly and the blockade of the SFRY Presidency, the SIV sometimes acted independently, encouraged by the international community or various internal interests.

I-3.1.7 Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ)

According to the Constitution, the SSRNJ “was created during the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution as a voluntary and democratic front of the working people and citizens and all organized socialist forces, headed by the Communist Party”.⁹⁰ This was, in fact, the largest and most mass-scale organisation incorporating all other mass-scale organisations (trade unions, youth organisations, women’s organisations, etc.) established and controlled by the KPJ. The SSRNJ came into being in 1953 when the previous mass-scale organisation called the Yugoslav People’s Front (NFJ) was reorganised and renamed.

Membership in most of these mass-scale organisations was automatic and binding; when a person was employed he or she became a member of the trade union, or when a student started school he or she became Tito’s pioneer, at a certain age a person became a member of the youth organisation, etc. Owing to this, already in 1947 the NFJ had approximately as many as seven million members. Through its management hierarchies in the NFJ (SSRNJ) and its member organisations, the KPJ carried out various mass-scale actions and promoted the legitimacy of the totalitarian regime.⁹¹

During the first multi-party parliamentary elections (1990) held in the republics of the former Yugoslavia, new parties were formed in semi-legal – legally unclarified – conditions, and formally registered as members of the SSRNJ.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, articles 283-312, amendments I and III from 1981 and XXXVII from 1988.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, Article 346.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, Article 348, second paragraph.

⁹⁰ *SFRY Constitution*, Basic Principles, section VIII, third paragraph.

⁹¹ “There is hardly a political, economic, cultural or educational action in which the People’s Front did not act as organiser or executor, popularizer and an active agitation and propaganda force”, *Povijest SKJ*, p. 329.

I.3.1.8 Alliance of Reserve Army Officers (SRVSJ)

The SRVSJ was a mass-scale organisation which brought together military commanders and active military personnel and citizens occupying management positions in Yugoslav defence hierarchies. The organisation was established in 1952 as part of the KPJ programme. It was organised on territorial principles and had approximately half a million members.

Many members of this organisation participated actively - on different sides - in the preparation and execution of the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1990.

I.-3.1.9 Federal Association of WWII Veterans (SUBNOR)

The organisation was created in 1961 when the following organisations entered into association: the Association of WWII veterans (established in 1947), the Disabled Veterans' Association and the SRVSJ. In 1969 the SRVSJ stepped out of the SUBNOR and became an independent organisation once again.

A member of the SUBNOR could be any citizen who, as soldier or supporter, participated in the war on the side of Communist Partisans, and citizens who were members of Allied forces. Family members of soldiers killed and disabled veterans were also accepted as members. In this way, SUBNOR became one of the most massive organisations and, in the mid-1970s, had approximately 950,000 members.

The SUBNOR was organised on the territorial principle. From 1969 onwards, the veterans' associations of individual republics and provinces were independent organisations under the Yugoslav SUBNOR.⁹² Being the KPJ's army, the soldiers and the monolithic network of their organisations provided very strong political and social support to the Yugoslav totalitarian regime both in terms of propaganda and in real terms. After the war, the entire newly created management hierarchy of the Communist state was largely filled by veterans, in spite of their lack of expertise and because of their dedication to the Party.

The SUBNOR was very active during the changes which occurred during and after 1990. SUBNOR organisations and members gradually started dividing along different lines and new organisations came into being, preserving its monolithic nature and ideological radicalism. Even though advanced in age, many SUBNOR members became influential members of new political and military hierarchies in 1990.

I.-3.2 Institutions in former Yugoslav republics

In every aspect, the institutional management engine of the Yugoslav republics imitated the federal state. Actions taken by Communist republican institutions were therefore of crucial importance, both in the preparatory phase and the initial years of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the formation of new institutions and relations. In other words, an overview of the activities of various institutions in individual republics in 1990 can provide an objective insight into the degree to which individual republics had been systematically and institutionally prepared for the key developments of the 1990s. This overview is of particular importance for a more objective *legal* identification and assessment of the degree to which individual institutions and prominent individuals/players in the states newly created on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were designed, organised and responsible.

⁹² Šesti kongres Saveza udruženja boraca NOR Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 1969.

I.-3.2.1 *Serbia*

In mid-1985, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) adopted a decision on the drafting of a report on “current social issues” and on 24 October 1986, Belgrade’s *Večernje novosti* (highest-circulation newspapers in Yugoslavia) published a voluminous *SANU Memorandum*, which claimed that the Serbs in Yugoslavia were discriminated against and in perpetual (demographic, economic and political) danger. It demanded a revision of internal Yugoslav borders and the centralisation of the state to the advantage of the Serbs.

In April 1987, groups of Kosovo Serbs, “systematically created tensions in Kosovo under the auspices of the Serbian secret service,” and Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ publicly told them, “Nobody is allowed to beat you!” This sentence provided the controlled media with an opening for the creation of the cult of MILOŠEVIĆ as the ‘defender of the Serbs’. From that moment on, his rise was meteoric.”⁹³

November 1987 saw the 8th session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, where MILOŠEVIĆ and his hierarchies took complete control of the republican party, which was a crucial event in the further incorporation of Greater Serbian hierarchies in Serbia’s political and social organisation. The aim was to implement a plan keeping South Slav peoples and the federal state under the domination of Serbian rulers.⁹⁴

At the end of June 1988, on St Vitus’ Day, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) set out to carry the remains (relics) of medieval Serbian *knez* /prince/ Lazar. The aim was to “visit as many parts of Serbia as possible” within a year and “inspire the Serbs to return to their religious and national roots”.⁹⁵ This radical mass-scale action soon spread to include parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the summer of 1988, Serbian intelligence structures organised mass-scale visits (the so-called anti-bureaucratic or yoghurt revolution) of militant Serbs from Kosovo and other places to the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, toppling the local authorities and replacing them with pro-MILOŠEVIĆ politicians. At the time, the model of mass-scale anti-bureaucratic or yoghurt revolution and other forms of mass-media pressure were frequently used in Serbia to “cleanse” all state and social institutions (politics, state administration, economy, media, etc.) of persons (cadres) who did not agree with the plan symbolised by Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ.

In January 1989, “in a series of co-ordinated rallies culminating in Titograd/Podgorica (50,000 people), MILOŠEVIĆ overthrows the Montenegrin government and appoints a regime loyal to him.”⁹⁶

At the end of February 1989, Serbs in Knin (Croatia) organised demonstrations “in support of Belgrade’s ‘settling accounts with the counter-revolution in Kosovo’”.⁹⁷

⁹³ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini*, (group of authors), Zagreb-Sarajevo, 1999, p. 371.

⁹⁴ See 1. Josip Jurčević, “Srbijanska oružana agresija na Hrvatsku 1990-1995” in *Jugoistočna Europa 1918-1995* proceedings, Zagreb, 1995, pp. 216-217; 2. *Izvori velikosrpske agresije*, (group of authors), Zagreb, 1991.

⁹⁵ *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, p. 372.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 372.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 372.

At the end of March 1989, the Serbian Assembly adopted amendments to the republican constitution, abolishing the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This was in direct opposition to the SFRY Constitution which guaranteed Kosovo and Vojvodina their autonomy and constituent position in the Yugoslav federation. Based on their constituent status, the provinces had representatives in all bodies of the federal government (the Presidency, the Assembly, etc.) It is significant that Serbia abolished the autonomy of the provinces but kept the seats in the bodies of the federal government they had been entitled to on the basis of that very autonomy.

At the end of June 1989, the most massive Serbian national and religious rally (up to a million people were present, according to estimates from Serbia) was held at Gazimestan (Kosovo). The main speaker was Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ who said, "...now, we are engaged in battles and facing new ones. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot yet be excluded."⁹⁸ In a special issue, the magazine of the Serbian Orthodox Church (*Glas Crkve*) published a Draft Serbian Religious and Ethnic Programme "providing support for the abolishment of provincial autonomies and demanding from the Serbian leadership to 'protect and preserve the rights, freedoms and integrity of its people on the entire Yugoslav territory'"⁹⁹.

Another massive Serbian rally, similar in concept and scenario, was soon held (9 July 1989) in Croatia (in the village of Kosovo near Knin) and attended by "approximately 50,000 people, mostly from Serbia, who arrived in more than 1,500 buses"¹⁰⁰.

At the beginning of December 1989, MILOŠEVIĆ was elected the President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

In February 1990, "a state of emergency was imposed in Kosovo; tanks and armoured units in the streets, 33 Albanian protesters killed"¹⁰¹.

At the beginning of March 1990, "a Greater Serbian rally was held in Petrova Gora (Croatia); retired JNA General Dušan PEKIĆ demands that new Communist politicians in Croatia and Slovenia be arrested and the crowds shout, 'We want weapons!'"¹⁰²

Even this brief overview shows that the majority of Serbian scientific, political, military and religious¹⁰³ institutions and hierarchies - at least from the mid-1980s onwards - were systematically, operatively and ever more intensely preparing for a radical and forceful intervention within the second Yugoslav state. Proof of this is the fact that the reformed Communists led by Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ convincingly won (held on to the power) the first multi-party elections in Serbia (December 1990), which means that Serbia (and Montenegro) was the only /state/ to fully preserve the continuity of its institutions from the Yugoslav times. In other words, this is how the entire management hierarchy which had been preparing for the events in the 1990s was preserved in Serbia.

What renders the tragedy of the events which transpired on the territory of the second Yugoslavia at the end of the 20th century even more awful is the fact that the concept behind the Greater Serbian Project had become totally obsolete, particularly from the aspect of modern European standards.

⁹⁸ *Večernji list* (daily newspaper), Zagreb, 29 June 1989.

⁹⁹ *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, p. 373.

¹⁰⁰ *Kronologija rata 1989-1998*, Zagreb, 1998, p. 7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 374; compare with *Kronologija rata*, p. 19.

¹⁰³ See Milorad Tomanić, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, Belgrade, 2001.

“The majority of European nations (particularly the developed ones) do not equate nations with ethnic origins and do not achieve national goals through military conquest and ethnic cleansing but by economic, technological, scientific, political, diplomatic and similar means. Serbian aggression built its ideological and political foundations on ethnic and religious identification (“All Serbs in one state”, religious ornaments, invocation of graves, involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church, etc.) and planned and tried to achieve its national interests through military occupation, ethnic cleansing of the non-Serbian population and ethnic colonization of the formerly occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia and of the Republika Srpska, which still exists on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are best testimonies to that).

Serbian aggression proceeded without a declaration of war; many banned weapons were used and so were, in addition to the official army, a wide array of paramilitary and voluntary units and groups. Ethnic cleansing was carried out by means of intimidation, abuse, mass murder, camp detention and expulsion. The main targets of devastating attacks - carried out without military reasons - were civilian facilities (apartments, hospitals, schools, etc.), the cultural heritage in particular (settlements, castles, museums, churches, cemeteries), and the purpose of the attacks was to destroy the area’s historical identity”.¹⁰⁴

I-3.2.2 Croatia

At the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, Croatian institutional life was dominated mostly by topics dealing with the escalating Yugoslav (and Croatian) economic crisis and the resulting social and political problems. Communist propaganda stereotypes on “the difficulties which will be surmounted” dominated the public discourse (mostly controlled by the party) and Croatian institutions never once brought into question Yugoslavia’s constitutional and territorial integrity.

As the 1990s neared, the radicalisation of political developments in Serbia and the problems encountered by Croatian party and state representatives at federal-level meetings in Belgrade gradually started causing concern and drawing more media attention in Croatia. In addition to that, repeated bankruptcies of Communist companies and frequent and massive strikes of dissatisfied workers on the streets of Croatian cities started capturing the public attention.

In July 1989, in delayed and bureaucratically constrained statements, Croatian party and state bodies condemned “the display of Serbian nationalism and the rallying atmosphere during the celebration of the Battle of Kosovo in Knin Krajina”.¹⁰⁵

In mid-May 1989, the first new Communist party in Croatia, the *Croatian Social Liberal Alliance* (HSLA), was founded in semi-legal conditions in Zagreb.

In mid-June 1989, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was founded at the premises of a small football club on the outskirts of Zagreb. Ten months

¹⁰⁴ J. Jurčević, “Vukovar 91 – Medunarodno pravo i europska sigurnost” in *Vukovar 91 – Medunarodni odjeci i značaj* proceedings, Zagreb, 2004, pp. 24-25.

¹⁰⁵ *Kronologija rata*, p. 7.

later, it won the first multi-party elections in Croatia. During the preparations for the Party's formation, disagreements on the party programme, title and leader were rife. In the end, the group supporting Franjo TUĐMAN - in fear of the Yugoslav police but also hiding from the majority of HDZ founders who did not support Franjo TUĐMAN as the leader of the emerging party - held the party's founding assembly on the private premises at the outskirts of the city, not in the hotel for which public invitations had been issued.¹⁰⁶

Only at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 did the bodies of republican and party authorities in Croatia start legally opening the process of political pluralism. This is why it was only at the beginning of February 1990 (two and a half months after the first multi-party elections in Croatia) that the semi-legally founded parties were registered with the Croatian republican Secretariat for Judiciary and Administration.

In December 1989, following the example of other Eastern-European Communist states - the citizens of Zagreb showed up *en masse* to light candles and sign a petition demanding the calling of multi-party elections. The first multi-party (runoff) elections in Croatia were held in the second half of April and at the beginning of May 1990. Contrary to all expectations and research, the HDZ won by a landslide.

Judging by a large number of available documents, historical sources, books and published works, the state and social institutions and hierarchies in Croatia were almost completely unprepared for 1990, i.e. for the fall of Communism and the break-up of Yugoslavia. These sources and literature do not show any systematic preparations for internal armed conflict or radical policies aimed at breaking-up Yugoslavia on the part of Croatian institutions in the 1980s and early 1990s, or the existence of any plans and organisations intended for that purpose.

In addition to that, the 1990 elections in Croatia resulted in the change of the ruling party and the concept of government and led to an extensive restructuring of institutions and staff, even though the positions of power in the new ruling party (HDZ) were kept by many members of the old Communist (in particular intelligence) hierarchies.

I.-3.2.3 *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

During the second half of the 1980s, the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was very similar to that of Croatia. The public sphere was dominated by inter-republican Communist political, economic and social topics which were typical for the times. This included the long-winded *Agrokomerc* trial. Towards the end of the 1980s, the radical developments in Serbia started increasingly occupying the attention of the BH public as well.

In October 1989, when the Serbian security services invaded the BH security system - BH Communist party leaders qualified it as an "attack on the sovereignty of the Republic and an attempt to Kosovise Bosnia and Herzegovina".¹⁰⁷ At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, however, there were very few safety concerns in the BH public sphere (even less than in Croatia) and few people believed Yugoslavia would fall apart, even though historical experiences and current events pointed to the contrary. It is interesting to observe that - even in 1991 when the Serbian occupation of Croatia

¹⁰⁶ *Deset godina Hrvatske demokratske zajednice*, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 43-65.

¹⁰⁷ *Kronologija rata*, p. 10.

had reached its culmination - the BH public was confident that the war would not reach Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Because the process of gradual legalization of political pluralism and the formation of new parties proceeded more slowly in Bosnia and Herzegovina than it did in Slovenia and Croatia, the first multi-party (runoff) elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held only in the second half of November and the beginning of December 1990.

Based on the sources and information available today it is obvious that, prior to 1990, the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina were almost completely unprepared for the fall of Communism and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Also, available sources do not show that by the 1990s there were any republican-level plans or organisations preparing an internal Yugoslav armed conflict and the break-up of Yugoslavia in official BH institutions. It was believed that such potential actions were, in principle, less likely to occur in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina than other Yugoslav republics because of the constituent status enjoyed by the three peoples, their mixed demographics and management parity, and many other historical reasons and interests.

Moreover, the newly formed parties did win at the 1990 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the concept of government was changed and extensive restructuring of institutions and staff carried out.

I.-3.3 Institutions of the International Community

Globally and generally speaking, the operations and efficiency of international institutions during the crisis, as well as before, during and after the war were defined by a number of different factors. In the first place were their obligations, dictated by what they were responsible for. In the second place were their real operative capabilities which depended on the perception of the organization, its overall influence, the accessibility and difficulty of problems and many other interests, directly or indirectly linked to a certain issue.

Also, with the passage of time, there has been an increase in the number and quality of analyses, assessments and interpretations of the activities carried out by international institutions during the crisis (and war) in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁸

In any case, it is an undisputed fact that, even though almost 20 years has passed since the start of the so-called Yugoslav crisis, the most powerful global and European international institutions failed to preserve peace in South-Eastern Europe and the unresolved geopolitical and other issues caused by this war still pose a threat to European security and stability.

I.-3.3.1 *United Nations (UN)*

The UN is the largest and the most powerful global organisation which, according to the very first article of the UN Charter which defines the purposes and principles of the organisation (“To maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace...”), and the events in the former Yugoslavia undoubtedly came under their responsibility.

¹⁰⁸ See Carole Hodge, *Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas*, Zagreb, 2007; Josip Jurčević, *Međunarodno pravo i europska sigurnost*, u zborniku «Vukovar 91 – međunarodni odjeci i značaj», Zagreb, 2004.

The UN only became seriously involved in the so-called Yugoslav crisis at the end of September 1991 with the adoption of a Security Council Resolution imposing an arms embargo on the entire territory of Yugoslavia was adopted. Since Serbia (which had an abundance of weapons) was engaged in total war against unarmed Croatia and, shortly after, against Bosnia and Herzegovina, also unarmed, the soundness of the UN's decision and the motives that lay behind it were challenged at the time the embargo decision was adopted, as they are today. In the same manner, the issue of why the UN had not become engaged much earlier in the former Yugoslavia and why it was not more efficient once it did, also remains open.

I.-3.3.2 *European Community (EC)*

Through its monitoring mechanism, the EC was the first international institution present on the territory of Yugoslavia. However, this only occurred in July 1991 on the territory of Slovenia where military conflicts had ceased. In September 1991, the EC established the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia which failed to halt Serbian armed aggression.

On several occasions prior to that, in the first half of 1991, EC representatives promised financial help for Yugoslavia and advocated nothing but its survival even though its break-up had reached a point of no return.

I.3.3.3 *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)*

Since its foundation (in 1972), the CSCE played an important role in the establishment of security co-operation between European blocs and contributed to the peaceful ending of the cold war in Europe at the time of the fall of the Communist regimes. The CSCE performed this role as an *ad hoc* organisation and in 1990 it was transformed into an international organisation with permanent institutions.

At the time, however, the CSCE failed to seriously engage in the solving of the so-called Yugoslav crisis which was transformed into the first (and long-lasting) war in Europe after WWII. This can certainly be considered a huge failure on the part of the CSCE as the organisation whose primary task is to preserve peace, or rather, European security and co-operation. This particularly pertains to the large number of provisions and obligations adopted by the CSCE in its Helsinki Final Act (Helsinki, 1975) and the Copenhagen Document (Copenhagen 1990) which were systematically and drastically violated in the former Yugoslavia.

I.4 BREAK-DOWN OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA

The institutional management system of totalitarian Yugoslavia was built for decades, in a planned manner, based on scientific foundations and in accordance with the Marxist paradigm of “scientific socialism/communism”. Many structural and personnel changes and adjustments were constantly effected, among other things, with the basic aim of achieving the greatest possible institutional stability of the state and its Communist regime.

The enormous size, complexity (complicated nature) and mutual conditionality of all Yugoslav state and social institutions served the purpose of creating an illusion of their monolithic and timeless quality and of concealing the conceptual weaknesses and practical failures of the totalitarian Communist administrative model.

The above is illustrated by the following data: in 1981, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had 2,120,000 members, or approximately 9.5% of the total population. This means that every seventh adult was a member of the SKJ. The percentage of SKJ members in the entire workforce was as high as 28.6%.

Individual republics differed considerably as to the percentage of the total population who were members of the SKJ. The lowest percentage of SKJ members with respect to the number of inhabitants was in Slovenia (6.6%) and Croatia (7.6%) and the highest in Montenegro (12.5%), Serbia (10.5%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (9.5%).

However, the monolithic nature of the Yugoslav administrative hierarchy, in spite of its enormous size, gradually faced a serious crisis, primarily because of the disastrous economic failure of the country’s regime which was practically in charge of the entire economy. In 1981, Yugoslavia’s foreign debt exceeded USD 20 billion. That year alone, two billion dollars were paid as interest on the foreign debt. At the time, even books dedicated to the party described the situation as follows, “The structural imbalance in the economy, the deficit in the balance of payments and extent of the country’s obligations will become key factors limiting its economic development and threatening the very self-management foundations of its economic and political system”.¹⁰⁹

The party experts’ assessment of the possible failure of the foundations of the economic and political system of the Communist state constitute the starting point for an understanding of the basic internal reasons for the break-up of the second Yugoslavia.

Along with the escalation of the economic crisis, political relations in Yugoslavia also started worsening because of different interests. Many military experts¹¹⁰ believe that key changes which led to the destruction of institutions began with the reorganisation of the JNA carried out from the mid- to late 1980s. These changes - which abolished the army districts established along the republican borders and set up three theatres of operations - were contrary to the constitutional federal defence concept of the Yugoslav state and led to a

¹⁰⁹ *Povijest SKJ*, p. 469; the numerical indicators were taken from the book.

¹¹⁰ Davor Domazet, *Hrvatska i veliko ratište*, Association of St George, Zagreb, 2003; Sefer Halilović, *Lukava strategija*, Sarajevo, 1997; Martin Špegelj, “Prva faza rata: pripreme JNA za agresiju i hrvatski obrambeni planovi” in the book *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995*, Zagreb-Sarajevo, 1999; Veljko Kadijević, *Moje videnje raspada*, Belgrade 1993.

centralisation of the state and political management of the army,¹¹¹ thus facilitating subsequent Serbian military aggression against Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

In taking these steps, the military leadership is said to have been motivated by two principal interests. The first is JNA's vast material power (large-scale manufacture and sales of weapons at home and abroad, enormous military budget) and its political power (the placing of retired and active military personnel in civilian institutions, the cult of the Communist Army). This power caused the JNA to refer to itself in popular terms as the seventh republic, and to implement systematic changes in order to insure, among other things, that the Army's material and political power would be preserved even in a time of crisis. The second interest (motive) was the result of the pronounced Serbianization of the military leadership. Both interests were therefore completely in tune with the *SANU Memorandum* and the policies implemented by the Serbian hierarchies lead by Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ.

These were the foundations on which, towards the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of 1990s, the Serbian political hierarchies and the Serbianized leadership of the JNA started publicly and ostensibly unifying their activities (in the declarative, political and military sense).¹¹²

The second direct attack against the foundations of the SFRY Constitution and the survival of Yugoslavia occurred in March 1989 when Serbia abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Federal bodies which, based on their constitutional and legal jurisdiction, should have reacted to this counter-constitutional act, failed to do so. One of the reasons for their failure to react to these and subsequent counter-constitutional moves made by Serbia, was the blockade of federal bodies because Serbia (having kept the Kosovo and Vojvodina seats in federal bodies and control of the representatives of Montenegro which had been subjugated by mass rallies) had direct control of half of the seats in the most important federal bodies of authority.

I.-4.1 1990, the decisive year

With hindsight, it is evident that the most important events which took the break-down of the institutional system of the second Yugoslavia to the point of no return, occurred in 1990.

In the second half of January 1990, the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the SKJ was held in Belgrade and lasted for three days. During the session, the public and media atmosphere in Serbia and the whole of Yugoslavia was dramatic, but the main drama was unfolding at the congress itself. The greatest discord ruled between the Slovenian and Serbian Communist delegations and the situation at the Congress turned into a conflict along ethnic lines. The Serbian delegation controlled the majority of the delegates present at the Congress and outvoted all (numerous) Slovenian proposals.

After three days of this exclusive behaviour, the Slovenian delegation walked out of the Congress in protest and Slovenian Communists announced that they were freezing their relations with the SKJ. The Serbian delegation tried - contrary to the Statute - to proceed with the Congress without the Slovenian

¹¹¹ The paradoxical nature of the counter-constitutional, but legal, legalisation of the reorganisation of the JNA is explained by M. Špegelj in *op. cit.*, p. 40-46.

¹¹² Veljko KADIJEVIĆ – the highest-ranking JNA officer at the time - explained this in his book published in 1993.

Communists and take full control of the SKJ. The Croatian delegation, however, did not agree with that and soon left Belgrade as well, announcing it would return once problems within the party had been resolved.

The problems were not dealt with, however, and some ten days later, the League of Communists of Slovenia concluded that the SKJ Congress was finished and that, from that point on, the Slovenian SK /Communist Alliance/ was henceforth an independent political organisation.

Thus in 1990 the SKJ disintegrated, the sole political organisation in the second Yugoslavia which held together the entire state and social administrative hierarchy. This is why, at the time, certain analysts were justified in predicting that the breakdown of the SKJ also implied the breakdown of Yugoslavia,¹¹³ which was fully confirmed by the future events.

The second key event (process) was the first multi-party elections, conducted in all republics of the former Yugoslavia in 1990.¹¹⁴ It is highly significant that in each of the republics the elections were held according to completely independent (newly adopted) republican laws and to the structure of the parties, which were in no way connected or co-ordinated at the Yugoslav federal level or with other republics.

After the independent internal republican elections, old Communist (but formally renamed) parties remained in power only in Serbia and Montenegro. Power was taken over in the other four republics by the newly formed parties. After the 1990 elections, the authorities (administrative hierarchies) in all the Yugoslav republics started acting with increasing sovereignty, i.e. cutting off with increasing speed any ties with the recently shared state and its institutions.

After the elections, all - practically and formally - administrative life in the newly independent states (republics) went on in a sovereign fashion. Individual republics participated in federal institutions and were occasionally called to fulfil the so-called federal obligations and laws, but only in so far as the fulfilment of republican (state) interests was concerned. Anything beyond that was proclaimed illegitimate and illegal or evaded in various ways.

The Federal Assembly practically ceased to exist, as did the SKJ. The SFRY Presidency was in a state of internal 4:4 deadlock of relations. Even when decisions were adopted, they were not adhered to by either the republics or, with increasing frequency, the remaining federal bodies. The Federal Executive Council (SIV), or rather, its President (Ante MARKOVIĆ), tried to be an all-Yugoslav player but to no avail.¹¹⁵

By 1990, the JNA leadership and most of its commanding hierarchy (composed mostly of ethnic Serbs), at the time the sole federal binding force at the time that could be imposed on the republics by force, ceased - both actually and constitutionally - to be an institutional part of the federal state by subordinating itself completely to the Greater Serbian Project: it operatively prepared the Serbian armed aggression and participated in it from the very start,

¹¹³ The events of the 14th Congress of the SKJ and assessments were published by almost all media at the time; *see*, for example, *Večernji list* of 24 January 1990.

¹¹⁴ In Slovenia in April; in Croatia at the beginning of May; in Macedonia in November; in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of December; in Serbia and Montenegro, separately but at the same time, in the second half of December.

¹¹⁵ In the summer of 1990 MARKOVIĆ even founded his own party, intending to run in the remaining republican elections on its slate, but the project failed dismally. In the autumn of 1990, JNA leadership also founded a party which completely failed. These two attempts testify to the overall situation at the time and to the greatly advanced state of disintegration of the Yugoslav state.

i.e. by attacking Croatia on 17 August 1990 and by occupying a part of its territory. Within the JNA, the rifts quickly deepened: most persons of non-Serbian ethnicity left the commanding hierarchy, either of their own free will or under pressure, and joined the newly created state hierarchies in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Under the weight of the increasingly radical ethnic homogenisation imposed by the Serbian hierarchies, ethnic divisions among JNA soldiers (conscripts) became deeper and deeper. Serbian recruits and reservists were divided into those who wanted to fight for the Project of Greater Serbian Conquest and those who did not.¹¹⁶

Thus, by the end of 1990, federal institutions were disoriented and in disarray and their objective powers reduced to a minimum. Some of the most important individual federal institutions (the SKJ and the Assembly), to all intents and purposes, mostly ceased to exist. Other most important federal institutions (SFRY Presidency and the SIV) operated individually and without a plan and soon lost all real support and power.

Contrary to that, in Slovenia and Croatia at the end of 1990, the processes leading towards institutional independence were firmly shaped. A referendum was held in Slovenia at the end of December 1990 and 86% of the voters voted for independence. In Croatia, a new Constitution was adopted, laying foundations for the state's independence. Serbia and its subordinate Montenegro had for all intents and purposes seceded from the federal state even prior to 1990 and the election results (at the end of 1990) only confirmed the institutional independence of their state. The high degree of independence in these four countries and the results of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia forced these two states to carry out extensive internal restructuring of institutions and personnel, leading towards full independence.¹¹⁷

In view of these events and processes, it was unrealistic and exceptionally difficult at the end of 1990 to expect the Yugoslav state to be restored along the conceptual foundations of the second Yugoslavia. Also, Serbian armed aggression and the occupation of a part of Croatia at the end of 1990 rendered the creation of a joint Yugoslav state based on a new and different political agreement seriously difficult because in such a situation, there was not enough trust for any political negotiations to be conducted from the positions of military power.

In other words - Serbia, a key player and the only state with an enormous military force at its disposal, unlike other states who had no armed forces at all - decided to make good use of this sole and enormous advantage and resolve the internal Yugoslav doubts by using the military to its own advantage. A part of Croatia was thus occupied on 17 August 1990 and armed and other provocations carried out with increased frequency and higher intensity in its other parts. This was the moment when it became completely clear that the federal (joint) army, the JNA, had taken the side of the Greater Serbian Project, because it prevented the Croatian police from legitimately and legally intervening in the occupied territory.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ For processes of division within the JNA, see M. Špegelj, *op. cit.*

¹¹⁷ Already at the end of January 1991, the Macedonian *Sobranje* (Assembly) adopted the Declaration on the sovereignty and independence of Macedonia.

¹¹⁸ For an overview of many other important events in 1990, see Josip Jurčević, *Srbijanska oružana agresija...*, chapter "1990 – preparation and start of the aggression".

This is why, when in mid-September 1990 Slovenia and Croatia proposed a new political solution for a peaceful reorganisation of Yugoslavia into a confederation, the proposal was “ridiculed by the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities and media”.¹¹⁹

I.-4.2 1991

The strengthening of Serbian hierarchies’ (including the JNA) endorsement of, exclusively, the armed option continued in January 1991, when pressure was exerted on the SFRY Presidency to adopt a decision on military intervention in Croatia. Simultaneously, the JNA Military Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Croatian Defence Minister (M/artin/ ŠPEGELJ). At the end of February 1991, Serbian authorities in the occupied areas of Croatia adopted a *Declaration* on secession from Croatia and declared independence in mid-March.

The armed destabilization of Croatia continued to worsen. At the beginning of March 1991 it continued in Western Slavonia (the Pakrac area), at the end of March in central Croatia (Plitvice) and at the beginning of May in Podunavlje near Vukovar (Borovo Selo).¹²⁰

Republican delegations and/or presidents of the republican presidencies discussed ways of addressing the so-called Yugoslav crisis at several dozens of meetings held in the first six months of 1991. The meetings were held in various compositions and combinations (bilateral, trilateral and six-party) and in a number of different locations in all newly created countries.

First - from the end of January to the end of March 1991 - a number of bilateral meetings were held between republican delegations and/or presidents of the presidency according to the principle of “everyone with everyone”, followed by six more meetings, held from the end of March to the beginning of June and attended by all presidents of republican presidencies. Each of the six meetings was held in a different state created by the break-up of Yugoslavia.¹²¹

At all these meetings, representatives of each republic mostly presented their view of the problems and their proposals for solving the crisis. The talks were long, extensive and superficial and yielded no final conclusions or concrete plans. Declaratively, everyone advocated the survival of Yugoslavia and a political agreement but, conceptually, their departure points were either completely incompatible or highly disparate. The basic theses advocated by Serbia and Montenegro were in line with the *Memorandum*: regardless of whether Yugoslavia survived or fell apart, all Serbs had to live in a single state. In case of a break-up, areas populated by the Serbs were to be severed from other republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia). The basic theses advocated by Slovenia and Croatia were: there would be a new, confederate agreement of independent states and, in case of the break-up of Yugoslavia, republican borders would turn into state borders in accordance with international law and the SFRY Constitution. At the talks, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia advocated their own integrity and did not have a solid proposal for a solution to the Yugoslav crisis.

¹¹⁹ *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, p. 376.

¹²⁰ See Josip Jurčević, *Srbijanska oružana agresija...*, pp. 220-221.

¹²¹ 28 March in Split (Croatia); 4 April in Belgrade (Serbia); 11 April on Brdo near Kranj (Slovenia); 18 April in Ohrid (Macedonia); 29 April in Cetinje (Montenegro); 6 June in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Overall, the talks showed no progress towards a common political solution. Rather, they revealed that it was impossible to reach a mutual agreement on the survival of Yugoslavia in any shape or form. It can therefore be questioned to what extent the participants in the talks were being sincere and whether they, indeed, had a motive and were interested in achieving such an agreement at all. Each of the participants probably had different motives and interests. It is certain, however, that the talks and their media coverage significantly contributed to the affirmation of the independence of the newly created states and of the negotiators themselves.

It also drastically confirmed the break-up of the federal state and the actual powerlessness of the remaining federal institutions. Thus, in the second half of 1991, as the SFRY Presidency and the SIV had ceased to play any role whatsoever, towards the end of the year their leaders submitted their resignations.¹²²

At a referendum held in Croatia in mid-May 1991, 93% voters voted for independence and on 25 June 1991 the parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia declared the independence of their states. The JNA, stationed in Slovenia, tried to stage a coup using its heaviest military equipment and combat aircraft. The Slovenian Territorial Defence (which the JNA failed to disarm in 1990) successfully blocked the JNA and - through the mediation of the European Community (EC) - the conflict was interrupted after several days. After that (7 July 1991), pressured by the EC, Slovenia and Croatia introduced a three-month moratorium on their decisions on independence and the EC guaranteed to find a peaceful solution to the so-called Yugoslav crisis.

The Serbian hierarchies, however, stepped up their military attacks and began waging a full-scale war against Croatia, carrying out mass executions of civilians and engaging in ethnic cleansing and large-scale destruction of non-military targets, in particular the identity-defining heritage of the area. At the time, Croatia had only begun organising its army and weapons, and resistance against the enemy on eight fronts was mostly put up by self-organised voluntary units and reserve police forces.¹²³ In this seemingly hopeless situation Croatia fought a decisive battle for Vukovar. This battle was a military phenomenon because, in spite of the exceptionally uneven balance of powers, it completely unexpectedly lasted for three months, inflicting heavy losses on the Serbian aggressor and giving the Croatian state time to arm and organise its army.¹²⁴

When, after the battle for Vukovar, it became obvious that Serbian aggression no longer had the power to conquer Croatia,¹²⁵ Serbia urged that a truce be signed. The truce was signed through international mediation in Sarajevo at the very beginning of 1992.

The first result of the Sarajevo Agreement was that a quarter of Croatian territory remained occupied and that, soon after, UN Protection Forces arrived at the borders of the occupied areas. The second result of the Agreement was the

¹²² The President of the SFRY Presidency Stjepan MESIĆ submitted his resignation on 18 November and the President of the SIV, Ante MARKOVIĆ, on 20 December 1991.

¹²³ See Josip Jurčević, *Srbijanska oružana agresija...*, pp. 221-225 and 228-229; Martin Špegelj, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-63; Anton Tus, "Rat u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj do Sarajevskog primirja" in the book *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*

¹²⁴ See Josip Jurčević, "Vukovarski otpor srbijanskoj oružanoj agresiji na Hrvatsku 1991", in *Društvena istraživanja* magazine, no. 4-5, Zagreb, 1993, pp. 479-499.

¹²⁵ In November and December 1991, the Croatian Army even embarked on its first military offensive, liberating a part of Western Slavonia.

transfer of a large number of Serbian troops from Croatia to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the beginning of full-fledged Serbian aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is important to stress that large JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina and certain units of BH Territorial Defence, manned not only by Serbs but also Bosniaks/Muslims, participated in Serbian aggression against Croatia in 1991.¹²⁶ It is also important to bear in mind that, in terms of the concept and implementation of Serbian aggression, the territory of the Republic of Croatia and that of Bosnia and Herzegovina were considered to be one integral front. In other words, the Serbian forces (the JNA, a part of the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and various units from Serbia and Montenegro) were only *de iure* on the territory of two republics (states). *De facto*, the Serbian aggressor saw the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single area and a single front.¹²⁷

Only in mid-1991 did the international community start showing more interest in the so-called Yugoslav crisis and supported the survival of Yugoslavia which, by that time, no longer existed at all.¹²⁸ Pressure was openly exerted on Slovenia and Croatia not to put their referendum decisions on independence through parliamentary procedure. When they nevertheless declared independence, the international community pressured them into introducing a three-month moratorium on their implementation.

In July 1991, by introducing the arms embargo in Yugoslavia, the EC revealed its lack, to say the least, of understanding of the situation because the embargo made it significantly more difficult for the victims of the aggression to defend themselves. In August, for the first time, the international community publicly started declaring that international forces should be sent to Yugoslavia.

The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was established only at the beginning of September 1991. It immediately stressed two main principles of negotiations: no changing to the internal Yugoslav borders by force and the protection of human rights.¹²⁹ Then, at the end of September 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 713, implementing the arms embargo in Yugoslavia, thus rendering the defence of the victims of the aggression even more difficult.

¹²⁶ This can be clearly seen from the video footage taken by the aggressors themselves. Portions of the footage were published in Pavle VRANJICAN's documentary *Komšije /Neighbours/*.

¹²⁷ This does not only flow from the operative, military execution of the Serbian aggression, but from a number of other facts. For instance, the "Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780...", "confirms the Serbian armed aggression as an undivided (integral) project. The system of camps constituted one whole, as confirmed by the Commission's Report which states that Croatian and BH detainees were without any obstacles assigned and transferred to camps located on the territory of all three states (occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the territory of Serbia and Montenegro). The Report also states that Serbian civilians and soldiers from one country visited camps in the other two countries in order to 'take part in the abuse of detainees'." - Josip Jurčević; Katica Ivanda, "Vukovar 91 – Ženevske konvencije i logoraška iskustva", in *Vukovar 91 – Međunarodni odjeci i značaj* proceedings, Zagreb, 2004, p. 63.

¹²⁸ See *Kronologija rata...*, p. 68-69.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 90.

In the autumn of 1991, a large number of truce agreements and understandings were signed through the mediation of the international community, but each was used to build up and expand Serbian armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia. In mid-October, at the Peace conference in The Hague, the EC presented the plan for Yugoslavia as a community of sovereign states.

The perception of the international community only began to change significantly and formally in mid-December, after the Arbitrage (known as Badinter) Commission concluded in its final report that Yugoslavia was undergoing the final phase of its break-up (dissolution). The EC then called on all the Yugoslav republics who wished to do so, to submit a request for international recognition in the following seven days.¹³⁰ Four republics and the province of Kosovo responded, while Serbia and Montenegro refused, claiming that Yugoslavia was not going through a process of dissolution but that this was a case of secession and they demanded to be the sole successor to the state of Yugoslavia.

However, the international community used its mechanisms to impose its solutions. The EC soon recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The recognition of Macedonia was postponed because of Greece's opposition and it was requested that a referendum be conducted prior to the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN had also started implementing its so-called (Vance) peace plan.

It can be concluded from the above that, in spite of its late response, the international community very quickly (by the end of 1991) imposed itself as a main player in the events on the territory of the second Yugoslavia. This becomes even more evident if one observes more closely how countries (and their parts) created by the break-up of Yugoslavia fulfilled the demands of the international community. The thing is that, at the time, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina fully complied with the compromising demands made by the international community.

The fact that, at the time, Serbia and Montenegro and their occupying structures in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina only partially accepted the demands of the international community also testifies to the crucial role played by the international community on the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992: local players, who were the victims of Serbian aggression, could come nowhere near to achieving as much with the aggressor.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 122.

II
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
1990 - 1995

II.-1 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A STATE OF THREE CONSTITUENT NATIONS

The process of forming three nations with different identities - the Bosniaks/Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats - on BH territory may be systematically traced to the mid-19th century when, slowly and with great difficulty, civil institutions and social interactions started emerging in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its surroundings (primarily in Croatia and Serbia). Many different political, scientific and other discussions on ethnic and other historical foundations, the genesis of these three nations and their identity have been going on since.

Most of the discussions were not founded on objective premises but were - in different periods and circumstances - adapted to political and other interests which existed or were introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its immediate and wider environment. The intensity of the discussions and the degree of disagreement depended greatly on the general (geopolitical, security and institutional) instability which has, undoubtedly, always been the main historical trait of the entire BH territory.¹³¹

Attempts made throughout BH history to further different (historical, religious, economic, cultural, civilisational) interests on its territory regularly invoked, among other things, the so-called historical right, trying to legitimize the actions taken with the purpose of achieving goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that sense, it was particularly important to prove and show the historic ethnic and national identity of the BH population.

In doing so, however, science has hardly ever highlighted a very important fact: that the vast majority of BH citizens had almost never in history been given the opportunity to participate in political or any other organised decision-making process concerning their destiny. This was always done by the ruling elites, who were few in number, or the so-called political figures. The fact that as much as 97% of BH population was illiterate on the eve of the Austro-Hungarian occupation (1878) clearly illustrates this.¹³²

For a host of historical reasons, the genesis of ethnic and national identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to a great extent intertwined with and defined by religious institutions and identities. In other words, ethnic and national identification and differentiation in Bosnia and Herzegovina today (in the 21st century) is still unusually strongly linked with religious affiliation. Also, religious affiliation does not only refer to general religious or ethnic national affiliation but also to the differences reaching all the way down to the everyday way of living life.

¹³¹ See Enver Redžić, *Istorijski pogledi na vjerske i nacionalne odnose u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1993, p. 7, "... Bosnia could and had to accept the fate of a small country, destined to survive on the brink of political existence ... the uncertainty of its position is the main trait of its historical development"; Andrija Zirdum, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007, p 13: In BH history "periods of peace are rare and war and destruction frequent; uncertainty is almost permanent."

¹³² For this and a number of other data, see Mitar Papić, *Školstvo u BiH za vrijeme austrougarske okupacije*, Sarajevo, 1973, p. 84 and onwards.

II.-1.1 Muslims/Bosniaks¹³³

Most researchers from Muslim/Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian entities agree that the roots of the Muslim/Bosniak nation can be traced back to the four centuries of Ottoman rule (the 15th to 19th centuries) when BH territory was subject to long-term systematic and structured Islamicization.¹³⁴ It is beyond doubt that this period saw the emergence of social strata which became the bearers of an Islamic, Muslim/Bosniak identity which differed from the identity of the Christian peoples.¹³⁵

Certain advocates of the Muslim/Bosniak nation are trying to move its historical roots as far back in history as possible, pointing out that, even prior to the Ottoman period, a separate ethnic entity - the Bosniak/Bosnian people - existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and belonged, by its religion, to the Bosnian Church. However, the lack of sources and the fact that little research has been conducted into the early medieval period on the BH territory also gave rise to opposed interpretations (advocated by certain members of the Islamic denomination from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who identify themselves with these interpretations), according to which the inhabitants of the medieval Bosnian state were mostly ethnic Croats and/or Serbs who were subsequently Islamicized.

BH history from the Austro-Hungarian period (1878) onwards is of far greater significance for this expert report because it allows one to clearly recognise the situations, circumstances and players that participated in the complex process of shaping the current Muslim/Bosniak nation. In many ways, this process was unfortunate, both for the relations between the members of the Islamic faith and the other two largest religious and national communities (Orthodox/Serbs and Catholic/Croats) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the relations between the members of the Islamic faith in Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves.

Even though the basic European task of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was to reincorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina in European (Christian) civilization, the interests of the state and the concept of dual monarchy resulted in the preservation of the fundamental levers of social injustice towards Christian peoples (the Croats and the Serbs), inherited from the Ottoman times, throughout the Austro-Hungarian period of BH history (1878 - 1918). First of all, there was no agrarian reform and the land (90% of people lived from farming) mostly remained in the hands of the Muslim nobility. Also, in order to neutralize

¹³³ The term Muslims (with capital M) in the sense of a people was first introduced by Communist Yugoslavia in the 1960s. Prior to that, the term muslims (with a lowercase m) was used to denote a religious denomination. The term Bosniaks, as a formal term denoting one of the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been used more frequently since 1994. In order to avoid potential misunderstandings, this expert report consistently uses the dual term Muslims/Bosniaks because between 1990 and 1995 most sources and literature, as well as people in everyday speech, used Muslims (more frequently), Bosniaks or the dual term.

¹³⁴ See *op.cit.* of: E. Redžić, M. Hadžijahić, A. Handžić, M. Handžić, M. Imamović, M. Filipović, S. Ćirković, S. Džaja, A. Zirdum.

¹³⁵ "One of the first consequences of the Islamicization in the Bosnian countryside was the creation of separate groups, the emergence of Muslim and Christian hamlets which were not open towards each other . . . Separation along religious lines was even more obvious in the cities . . . 'Everyone lived next to each other, coming into contact only through work or in the street, their houses and their souls were closed for those who were not part of their (religious) laws.' . . . For instance, religious division was reflected in the choice of one's trade . . . One's affiliation with a religious community was also reflected in the way one dressed . . . The death penalty also differed depending on the convicted person's religious affiliation . . . The religious division of the Bosnian population was also expressed in other ways..." - E. Redžić, *Istorijski pogledi*..., pp. 26-27.

Serbian and Croatian territorial aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Austro-Hungarian administration pressed for the institutional establishment of the Bosnian (mostly Muslim) nation, which was utterly unacceptable to either the Serbs or the Croats or partly, even, to the Muslims.

Thus, by preserving the inherited state at all levels, the policies of Austria-Hungary continued providing the foundations for religious and ethnic intolerance between the Islamic and Christian worlds in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other forms of social stratification. This basic fact was not significantly altered with the introduction of formal and legal equality, industrialization, development of infrastructure or any other significant material feats accomplished by Austria-Hungary in the four decades of its rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the same time, the arrival of the non-Islamic (Austro-Hungarian) administration model in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in multiple divisions within the Muslim entity. Part of the nobility and educated elites accepted the new authorities to further their own interests. Part of the old Ottoman feudal structures and a significant portion of the Muslim population found the new authorities, in principle and otherwise, mostly unacceptable and either mounted armed rebellions and/or moved en masse to Turkey. Also, driven by various interests and motives, parts of the Muslim elites and population were drawn towards either Croatian (predominantly) or Serbian national ideas.¹³⁶ A part of the Muslim elites tried to take advantage of various crises and other opportunities for their own affirmation or for the achievement of a different degree of autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina within Austria-Hungary.

This justifies the conclusion that, at the end of the Austro-Hungarian period, “political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... was characterized by a deep religious and ethnic rift” in which instability and a lack of definition for the Muslim/Bosniak national identity issue constituted a particular problem and the “dominant direction taken by the Muslim policies advocated a historically, geopolitically and nationally absurd formula - the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Hungary”.¹³⁷

The most powerful Muslim organisation in the first Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO). Its most influent members were the representatives of the former Muslim feudal nobility who were primarily trying to protect their own narrow interests.¹³⁸ In such a pragmatic environment, the JMO changed its political positions and alliances in accordance with the changes in the state. Consequently, the party often had its representatives in the government and rarely co-operated with the opposition.

This is why, most of the time, the JMO fit into the regime’s thesis on integral Yugoslavhood, pointing out that the “Muslims have the necessary ‘preconditions to become the core of real and complete Yugoslavhood ... the best foundation for the Yugoslav idea’”, in other words, that the Muslims belonged to the “‘Yugoslav people’ as its ‘Muslim part’”¹³⁹ Only occasionally, again for pragmatic reasons, did the JMO switch to the opposition by “activating autonomist affiliations”, but would soon return to co-operating with the regime,

¹³⁶ E. Redžić, *Sto godina muslimanske politike*, p. 152, “... A significant number of Muslim politicians declared themselves ethnically Croatian”, compare with *ibid*, pp. 150-152.

¹³⁷ E. Redžić, *Istorijski pogledi...*, p. 57.

¹³⁸ See Atif Purivatra, *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija*, Sarajevo, 1974.

¹³⁹ E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, p. 97.

thus contributing to some members of Muslim intelligentsia declaring themselves as Croats.¹⁴⁰

When the Croatian Banovina was created (1939), the autonomist movement among the BH Muslims was gaining ground. “Simultaneously with the rallying cries of “Serbs, come together!” and “Croats, come together!” the call “Muslims, come together!” was also spreading through Bosnia and Herzegovina. One national homogenization encouraged another. The national-denominational confrontation in Bosnia and Herzegovina threatened to become general.”¹⁴¹

During WWII on the territory of Yugoslavia (1941 - 1945), Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). Considered by the Ustasha regime to be Croats of Islamic faith, the Muslims occupied high-ranking administrative positions in the entire totalitarian state system and the Ustasha movement. A large portion of the Muslim elite accepted this national concept and the corresponding state and social status. The fact that, for decades after the war, numerous Croats of Islamic faith and a network of Croatian Islamic centres operated among Croatian emigrants testifies to the profundity of their personal identification.

In the NDH, “Hakija HADŽIĆ and Alija ŠULJAK enjoyed PAVELIĆ’s special confidence and, as his BH delegates, organised political institutions and organisations of the Ustasha movement.”¹⁴²

In the difficult and unstable times of war, however, not all BH Muslim elites were loyal to the NDH regime; in various situations some of them tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina directly from the Germans.¹⁴³ Also, some of the BH Muslims joined the Communist Partizan movement.

Out of various motives and interests, most of the Muslim elites in Communist Yugoslavia were loyal to the totalitarian regime, both in the period when the Muslims were not recognised as a national entity and in the period when the regime - to further its own interests - recognised them as a special and constituent entity. In this period, however, the aforementioned stratification within the Muslim national entity had already begun and was carried into the break-up of Yugoslavia.

The insight into the historical genesis of the Muslim/Bosniak nation thus testifies to the exceptionally complex and unstable historical circumstances in which many processes and institutions on the BH territory could not develop in a continuum, but often faced interruptions, unfinished projects and frequent re-starts. The coming into being of the Muslim/Bosniak nation was also uneven, erratic and took very different, almost incompatible, routes. This is why, after 1990, Muslim/Bosniak elites had only very opposing concepts of the Muslim/Bosniak nation, its identity, name and the scope and organisation of the state they should be living in.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ E. Redžić, *Historijski pogledi...*, p. 69; compare with Ljubo Boban, *Maček i politika Hrvatske seljačke stranke 1928-1941*, Zagreb, 1974.

¹⁴¹ E. Redžić, *Historijski pogledi...*, p. 75.

¹⁴² E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, p. 149.

¹⁴³ See Zija Sulejmanpašić, *13. SS divizija Handžar. Istine i laži*, Zagreb, 2000; Enver Redžić, *Muslimansko autonomaštvo i 13. SS divizija*, Sarajevo, 1987; Zdravko Dizdar, “Prva pobuna u nacističkoj vojsci: Pobuna Trinaestog pionirskog bataljuna 13. SS divizije «Croatia» u Villefranche-de-Rouergueu 17. rujna 1943. godine” in *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* magazine, Zagreb, 1993.

¹⁴⁴ This will be presented in further detail at a later stage in the report.

II.-1.2. Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The national identity of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina - both at the beginning of the 19th and the end of the 20th century - was very closely and institutionally connected with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and the state of Serbia. These links can be traced back to medieval times.

The Serbs were Christianized by Byzantium in the 9th century, i.e. at a time when all of Christianity was under one church. After the great schism (1054), Catholicism remained a united supranational church with the Pope at its head, while Orthodoxy was divided into individual independent (autocephalous) state churches in which the Patriarch of Constantinople played but a symbolic role.

The Serbian Orthodox Church became autocephalous in 1219, at the time when Stefan NEMANJIĆ became the first Serbian king and his brother (Sava NEMANJIĆ) a church leader and a saint. This marked the beginning of a close and unbreakable bond between the Serbian state and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Serbianhood became a part of religion, religion became a part of the state identity and the cult of St Sava became a perennial symbol of this symbiosis. In medieval times, the pragmatic consequence of this process was that the expansion or diminishing of the SPC's authority coincided with the expansion and diminishing of the Serbian state.¹⁴⁵ Monasteries and high-ranking SPC clergy provided the main support to the Serbian medieval rulers.

When, in 1459, the Ottoman Empire occupied the whole of Serbia, destroyed its medieval state and dynasty and established its own system of authority (the same model as in Bosnia and Herzegovina), the SPC remained the only relevant institution maintaining the identity of the Serbian people and the myth of the Serbian state (empire) in the coming centuries (until the 19th century). In spite of the adverse and difficult situation the SPC found itself in during the Ottoman period, new circumstances (conquest successes and failures of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing migrations), however, opened new possibilities for the expansion of its religious and political influence.¹⁴⁶

In the Ottoman Empire, Orthodox churches were a part of the Ottoman feudal system and their rights and obligations were similar to those of the spahi. The SPC thus assumed jurisdiction over the parts of the Ottoman territories west of the former medieval Serbian state (i.e. including Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well as jurisdiction over the people (Vlachs, etc.) arriving there in the wake of persecutions, colonisation and other migratory trends. The SPC thus gradually turned part of this population into its followers and, later on (during the 19th century) into the Serbian people.¹⁴⁷

In the 19th century, Serbia gradually increased the degree of its independence from the Ottoman Empire. By the middle of the century, Serbia had become mainly independent and received a formal recognition of its independence at the Berlin Congress (1878). The overall crisis in Bosnia and

¹⁴⁵ Sima Ćirković, "Pravoslavna crkva u srednjevjekovnoj srpskoj državi" in *Srpska pravoslavna crkva 1219-1969, spomenica povodom 750-godišnjice autokefalnosti*, Belgrade, 1969.

¹⁴⁶ Mirko Mirković, *Pravni položaj i karakter srpske crkve pod turskom vlašću (1459-1766)*, Belgrade, 1965.

¹⁴⁷ Mirko Valentić, "O etničkom korijenu hrvatskih i bosanskih Srba" in *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* magazine, 24, Zagreb, 1992; Rajko Veselinović, "Srpska pravoslavna crkva u BiH" in *Srpska pravoslavna crkva 1219-1969*, Belgrade, 1969; Aleksa Ivić, "Migracije Srba u Hrvatskoj tokom XVI, XVII i XVIII stoleća", in *Naselja i poreklo stanovništva*, 16, Subotica, 1923.

Herzegovina grew as Serbia's independence grew. This suited the Serbian hierarchy which had been progressively interfering in the events on BH territory and displaying growing and ever overt ambition to annex BH territory.

The main players involved in Serbian activities on BH territory were the following: parts of the SPC institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an increasing number of various interlinked Serbian organisations and societies (secret and public) which had been established on BH territory in order, among other things, to act with the purpose of annexing BH territory to the state of Serbia.¹⁴⁸ Such systematic actions, aimed at increasing the intensity and number of members, reinforced the sense of identity among BH Serbs in the 19th century; institutionally, almost all of them were committed to annexing the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia.¹⁴⁹

This process gained even more speed and momentum after Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite of the many measures taken by the Austrian administration in BH to contain it. Among other things, the Austrian administration invested a lot of money in the institutions and cadres of the SPC in Bosnia and Herzegovina, expecting the "loyalty of the Orthodox clergy and the acceptance of the rule of Austria-Hungary among the Serbian people, but achieving little or no success".¹⁵⁰

The establishment of the first Yugoslav state (1918) - into which the state of Serbia transferred most of its governing structures (administration, army, diplomacy) - created the institutional conditions for the implementation of an even more radical national homogenisation aiming "to establish a centralist state in which Serbia would have prestige and dominance."¹⁵¹ Also, "Serbian politicians were quick to include the Orthodox churches from outside of Serbia into the new patriarchy because they were aware that the Church was the strongest factor in bringing all Serbs together".¹⁵² The Serbian Patriarchy (abolished during the Ottoman rule) was thus reconstructed in 1920 and the decision of "the SPC bishop to unite was proclaimed by ... Regent Alexandar".¹⁵³

During the first Yugoslavia, many new organisations and societies were founded supporting the regime's pro-Serbian policies, including the Chetnik movement which in WWII "supported a national ideology based on the idea of a large national state".¹⁵⁴ The ideological and political programme of the Chetnik movement was "formulated by the Banja Luka attorney Stevan MOLJEVIĆ in his act 'Homogenous Serbia' ... MOLJEVIĆ demanded that they commence cleansing Serbian lands of non-Serbian elements - the Croats and the Muslims". Thus, in WWII, "Eastern Bosnia, just like other parts of Bosnia and

¹⁴⁸ See Savić, Marković, Štedimlija, *Zavjere protiv svjetskog mira*, Zagreb, 2005.

¹⁴⁹ "Bosnia was in the centre of Serbian political propaganda and plans ... GARAŠANIN's 'Načertanije' became the doctrine and the ideology of Serbian national politics for more than a century; its programme was to gradually expand Serbia and its first task to annex the so-called "Serbian lands" of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other areas inhabited by Serbian population." - E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, pp. 135-136; compare with Vasa Čubrilović, *Historija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka*, Belgrade, 1982.

¹⁵⁰ A. Zirdum, *op. cit.*, p. 366. In the first ten years or so of the Austrian occupation, as many as "151 Orthodox churches and monasteries were rebuilt and 54 churches reconstructed" in Bosnia and Herzegovina." - *Ibid*, p. 365, note 51.

¹⁵¹ E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, p. 139.

¹⁵² A. Zirdum, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 371.

¹⁵⁴ E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, p. 140.

Herzegovina, turned into mass execution sites where Chetniks ... slaughtered and killed tens of thousands of Muslims".¹⁵⁵

Serbian institutions in the second Yugoslavia and the preponderance of Serbs in Yugoslav administrative hierarchies reflected the above-average homogeneity of all Serbs in Yugoslavia and their awareness of their own superiority. The major crisis which erupted in Communist Yugoslavia (in the 1980s) advanced the implementation of the radical homogenization of the Serbian national entity throughout Yugoslav institutions, including those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that sense, "the Greater-Serbian aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992) was meant to mark the extinction of Bosnian Muslims".¹⁵⁶

The national identity of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus has deep ethnic and religious roots, which are almost exclusively linked to the idea of an all-Serbian state and the Serbian St Sava Orthodoxy. Historical circumstances of the 19th century and the network of pro-Serbian institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina had already formed a homogenous Serbian national identity which was very advanced and politically exclusive: Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be a part of the Serbian state. The perpetuation and further reinforcement of this awareness was helped by the general circumstances and a number of events which occurred in the 20th century. In the first place, both Yugoslav states had a repressive administrative system, were economically underdeveloped and unsuccessful in addressing their national, social and other problems. Yugoslavia's permanent internal crisis made it simple for the Serbian hierarchy - dominant in the institutions and staff of both Yugoslavias - to engage in radical actions. As a rule, the events which occurred on Yugoslav territory towards the end of the 20th century reproduced experiences similar to those from the previous hundred years or so.

II.1.3 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The national identity of BH Croats in the 19th and 20th century, like the identities of the other two constituent peoples, was essentially linked with their religious affiliation. The vast majority of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina identify themselves with the Roman Catholic Church, which is a supranational church and has therefore had a very different influence on the historical identity of its congregation and a different attitude towards particular national and state-related issues. In other words, because of its supranational structure, the Roman Catholic Church does not identify itself with any individual state. This was clearly visible in medieval BH, when the Roman Catholic Church - trying to establish a solid church organisation - used the power of various states and dispatched many of its officials, mostly from Western European countries, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵⁷

As a principle, Christians (Catholics and Orthodox) in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina had the same status, i.e. unfavourable, in relation to Islam which was the state ideology and faith. The practical treatment of Catholics (Croats) was worse than that of the Orthodox (Serbs) because the Catholic leader (the Pope) was not only not subordinated to the Ottoman authorities but indeed its adversary. This is why the Catholic hierarchy could not operate in Bosnia and

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁵⁷ See A. Zirdum, *op. cit.*, p. 183-231

Herzegovina in the Ottoman times. For pragmatic reasons (to prevent Catholic peasants from running away), the Ottoman authorities allowed only the Franciscan order to operate on its territory, provided they stayed loyal to the authorities.¹⁵⁸

Also, the position of Croats-Catholics in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina was even worse because the neighbouring Croatian state was part of the Habsburg monarchy which had been engaged in a centuries-long conflict with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans therefore “considered the term Croatian hostile and politically inappropriate”, which prompted the BH Croats, “educated people, priests or tradesmen” to introduce themselves when communicating with other people “as Slovenes, Illyrians ... Croatsians, Slavonians, Bosnians, Dalmatians ... certain Franciscan friars sometimes declared themselves as Bosnians and referred to their language as the ‘Bosnian language’.”¹⁵⁹

Civic institutions (political, cultural, scientific) in the 19th century Croatia emerged slowly and in a highly unfavourable situation because Croatian districts (though they were a part of the Habsburg Monarchy), were neither politically nor administratively united. The situation became even worse in 1867 when the Monarchy was reorganised as a dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, creating an even greater political and administrative rift between Croatian districts and subordinating the central Ban-governed Croatia to the Hungarian part of the Monarchy, depriving it of its financial independence.

Croatian leadership elites and the emerging civic institutions had drastically opposing ideas on the solution of the so-called Croatian issue. Some were in favour of the existing situation while others advocated the reorganisation of the dual monarchy into a tri-partite one or the creation of a new, Yugoslav state, or the creation of an independent Croatian state.¹⁶⁰ Accordingly, the Croatian national identity took two basic (mutually opposing) directions: first - Croats as a separate nation and second - Croats as part of the South-Slav nation.¹⁶¹

Each of these concepts had different views on how to solve the problems developing in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. The most important fact, however, is that Croatia was unable to resolve or even improve its position within the dual monarchy (which was a strong priority), let alone have any significant influence on the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the other hand, due to a number of reasons, the overall position of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina was significantly worse than the position of other Croats in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and institutional processes among the BH Croats therefore proceeded more slowly and with much more difficulty. In such a situation, the identity and politics of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time (19th century) were already oriented towards Croatia. This was also influenced by the fact that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there were far fewer Catholics (mostly Croats) than members of the Orthodox faith (mostly Serbs) and Muslims.

¹⁵⁸ See *Sedam stoljeća bosanskih franjevaca 1291-1991*, proceedings, Samobor, 1994; Anđelko Barun, *Svjedoci i učitelji - povijest franjevaca Bosne Srebre*, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2003.

¹⁵⁹ A. Zirdum, *op. cit.*, p. 331-332.

¹⁶⁰ See Jaroslav Šidak; Mirjana Gross; Igor Karaman; Dragovan Šepić, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda 1860-1914*, Zagreb, 1968.

¹⁶¹ In this respect it is significant that, in 1966, when the first Academy was formed in Croatia as the most prestigious intellectual institution, it was named the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (JAZU).

After 1878, a deep rift which appeared in the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina created additional difficulties for the identity and political activities of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the start of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Roman Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina started setting up a regular hierarchy, demanding the Franciscans to return to their monasteries and permanently remove their presence from all the *župe* /parishes/ they had run for years. The Roman Curia adopted a compromise solution, but the Bishop in Bosnia and Herzegovina still “tried to remove /the Franciscans/ ... the Franciscan province resisted vigorously” and the internal church conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued and “has still not finished today”.¹⁶²

With the structure of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina being almost the sole carrier of Croatian public (lay) activity, this internal conflict was transferred onto the social and political life of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In these circumstances, it was only in 1908 that the BH Croats founded their national organisation, *Hrvatska Nacionalna Zajednica* /Croatian National Union/ (HNZ) which was joined by several tens of thousands of Croats in its first year alone. In the wake of the aforementioned internal church rift, however, another organisation called *Hrvatska katolička udruga* /Croatian Catholic Association/ (HKU) was formed already in 1910. This led to a conflict and a rift within the Croatian national movement and in 1912, following an intervention of the Roman *Curia*, the HKU was disbanded.¹⁶³

Even though Croatian institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (particularly the structures of the Catholic Church) supported the creation of the first Yugoslavia and pledged their loyalty to the regime, the pro-Serbian concept and the centralized nature of the state did not change and any advocating or expression of Croatian national feelings in Bosnia and Herzegovina was subject to indirect and direct repression, thus rendering difficult or impossible institutional articulation of national identity of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which increased their expectations and orientation towards Croatia.¹⁶⁴

During the brief period of WWII, most BH Croats divided along ideological and political lines: some supported and were loyal to the ruling regime of the Independent State of Croatia while others joined the Communist Partisans. In this manner, Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the entire NDH) fought and engaged in political conflicts amongst themselves.¹⁶⁵

In Communist Yugoslavia, BH Croats were divided in a manner similar to the Muslims (or Muslims). A minor number of Croats participated in the ruling regime because of their interests and/or convictions, the majority lived a politically passive life, and large numbers (for political or economic reasons)

¹⁶² Zirum, *op. cit.*, p. 361; compare with Berislav Gavranović, *Uspostava redovite katoličke hijerarhije u BiH 1881. godine*, Belgrade, 1935; Srećko Džaja, *Bosna i Hercegovina u austrougarskom razdoblju (1878-1918)*, Mostar-Zagreb, 2002.

¹⁶³ Marko Karamatić, “Katoličanstvo u BiH u doba Austrougarske (1878-1918)” in *Katoličanstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1997.

¹⁶⁴ See Lj. Boban, *Maček i politika...*; Božo Goluža, *Katolička crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini 1918-41*, Mostar, 1995.

¹⁶⁵ See E. Redžić, *Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu*, Sarajevo, 1998; F. Jelić Butić, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941-1945*, Zagreb, 1978.

emigrated to the West (mostly Europe) or other parts of Yugoslavia (mostly Croatia).

The national identity of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus formed late, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. The basic concepts underpinning their identity were (and still are): dedication to the BH as their homeland, to Catholicism and an awareness of nationality shared with the Croats in Croatia and elsewhere.

II.-1.4 Demographic Indicators

Censuses have been regularly carried out on the BH territory since 1895. However, many demographic processes and aspects in 20th century BH have been either poorly researched or not researched at all. Among the demographic topics that were poorly researched were those pertaining to ethnic and national traits of BH population. There are many reasons for that¹⁶⁶, and “only the 1971-1991 censuses can be compared because they provide a uniform classification of the population’s national affiliation”.¹⁶⁷

Year	Total	Croats		Muslims		Serbs	
		Abs.	Rel. (%)	Abs.	Rel. (%)	Abs.	Rel. (%)
1895	1,566,781	(304,000)	19.4	548,631	35.0	669,311	42.7
1910	1,894,829	393,168	20.7	606,306	32.0	819,868	43.3
1921	1,890,325	416,516	22.0	587,316	31.1	822,710	43.6
1931	2,324,255	523,983	22.5	715,233	30.8	1,023,383	44.0
1948	2,564,308	614,123	23.9	788,403	30.7	1,135,147	44.3
1953	2,847,459	654,227	23.0	891,798	31.3	1,264,045	44.4
1961	3,277,948	711,665	21.7	842,248	25.7	1,406,057	42.9
1971	3,746,111	772,491	20.6	1,482,430	39.6	1,393,148	37.2
1981	4,124,256	758,140	18.4	1,630,033	39.5	1,320,738	32.0
1991	4,377,033	760,852	17.4	1,902,956	43.5	1,366,104	31.2

Fig. 9 *Trends in the absolute number of inhabitants and the absolute and relative number of Croats, muslims and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 1895 and 1991.*
(Taken from: N. Pokos, *op. cit.*, p. 14)

“Data for 1910, 1921 and 1931 were deduced from the mother tongue and religious denomination, and data from 1895 present the number of persons of Islamic and Orthodox faith as Muslims and Serbs, and provide an estimated number of Croats”.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Nenad Pokos, *Hrvati u Bosni i Hercegovini 1895-1991 (demografski aspekti)*, Magistarski rad, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 1996, pp. 1-13.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 6.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 14.

Year	Total	Croats	Muslims	Serbs
1895	100	100	100	100
1910	120.9	129.4	110.5	122.5
1921	120.7	137.0	107.1	122.9
1931	148.3	172.4	130.4	152.9
1948	163.7	202.1	143.7	169.6
1953	181.7	215.3	162.5	188.9
1961	209.2	234.1	153.5	210.1
1971	239.1	254.2	270.2	208.1
1981	263.2	249.4	297.1	197.3
1991	279.4	250.3	346.9	204.1

Fig. 10 *Relative change in the total number of inhabitants, and Croats, Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1895 and 1991. (1895 =100)*




Fig. 11 *Trends in the proportion of Croats, Muslims and Serbs in total BH population between 1895 and 1991.*
(Figures 10 and 11 taken from: N. Pokos, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 and 18)

/translation: Muslims; Serbs; Croats/

II.-2 THE MAIN POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF THE STRUCTURES OF THE CONSTITUENT PEOPLES

At the time when the Yugoslav crisis intensified rapidly and as the Greater Serbian /nationalist/ project gained momentum (the late 1980s), the Communist authorities in BH failed to carry out effective political and security-related activities. Thus the structure of the totalitarian Communist system in BH was actually in a state of accelerated decay as well and the political, social and public domains were gradually taken over by a new, civic, pluralist paradigm. In this process in BH (as in most of the other Yugoslav republics and communist countries in Europe), the former representatives of the communist paradigm began to join this new paradigm – both structurally and individually – on a broad scale.

Due to the historical legacy and a host of other reasons, the establishment of the new civic structures, institutions and relations in BH proceeded along national lines in the 1990s and the corresponding political concepts of the constituent nations in BH gradually took shape. The leading role in each of the nations was carried by the structures of the newly-established national parties which had won the first multi-party elections (held in two rounds, on 17-18 November and 1-2 December 1990) and thus acquired political legitimacy to represent the interests of their voters, i.e. nations, because each of the three most prominent parties was almost exclusively backed by voters from “their” nation. Other political parties in BH, those not based on ethnicity, suffered a serious blow in the elections and were relegated to the margins of influence on what was going on and soon became almost invisible in public life.

II.-2.1. Muslims/Bosniaks

In late May 1990, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was founded in Sarajevo and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ was elected its president, which essentially determined in reality and in symbolic terms the political concept advocated and implemented by the SDA. It is an interesting fact that the title of this party has no national designators (because of formal reasons at the time in BH) although the SDA was unquestionably since its establishment the party of the Muslim/Bosniak nation.

The SDA won at the BH parliamentary elections (with a relative majority) taking 86 of the 240 deputy seats and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ was elected President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic (SR) of BH, i.e. head of the collective presidency of the state of the Socialist Republic of BH, although Fikret ABDIĆ had won more votes.¹⁶⁹

The Muslim/Bosniak elites and structures disagreed among themselves about the political concept to be applied in BH. Part of the Muslim elites advocated the concept of an integral state for BH, with all three constituent nations living on equal terms, but the other part favoured Islamic radicalism which ranged from a

¹⁶⁹ The Presidency consisted of seven members: three from the SDA, two from the Serbian Democratic Party and two from the Croatian Democratic Union. In addition to A. IZETBEGOVIĆ, the other two SDA members of the Presidency were Fikret ABDIĆ and Ejup GANIĆ (on the list of the so-called other nations). See: *Kronologija rata...*, p. 36.

Muslim/Bosniak hegemony in the whole of BH to the establishment of an independent Muslim (Islamic) state in a part of this territory.

The process of rifts within the Muslim community in BH can be traced conceptually, structurally and personnel-wise from the summer of 1990 to the present day. As early as the summer of 1990, a symposium entitled *Bosnia and Bosnianhood*, attended by “elite scientists, philosophers, historians, sociologists and writers”¹⁷⁰ was held in Sarajevo and in 1991, “two academic gatherings” took place with the aim of “broadly articulating the possibilities of reaffirming national Bosnianhood.”¹⁷¹

In the summer of 1991, the Serbs and the Muslims announced a political agreement (the so-called *Historijski sporazum* /Historical Agreement/) drafted by Radovan KARADŽIĆ on the part of the Serbs and Muhamed FILIPOVIĆ for the Muslim side. The Agreement was based on awareness of the difficulties which existed in the Yugoslav territory and in BH and included basic decisions to “commit ourselves to realising the historical and political interests of our two nations... to ensure the full territorial integrity and political subjectivity of our Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” etc.¹⁷²

In December 1992, the Congress of Bosnian-Muslim Intellectuals “adopted a decision to establish the Council of the Congress of Bosnian-Muslim Intellectuals (VKBMI), with the task of drafting a ‘programme of the fundamental interests and tasks of the Bosnian-Muslim (Bosniak) people in all spheres of society’... during the war, the Council will affirm itself with broad and productive activity.”¹⁷³

To that same end, an Assembly of Bosniaks was held in late September 1993, ending in “controversies regarding the plan of its organiser to declare the establishment of a Bosniak state in a part of the territory of BH in a separate document.”¹⁷⁴ The Assembly did not adopt the document, but one of the most prominent advocates of Bosnianhood and a member of the BH Government until the end of 1993, Mr Rusmir MAHMUTĆEHAJIĆ, “believes that the idea of a piece of Bosnia for Bosniaks, as a way to break up the BH state, is part and parcel of the overall plan to destroy the Bosniaks.”¹⁷⁵

Despite the discussions, however, after the 1990 BH elections, the prevailing political concept in the Muslim/Bosniak institutional structure was based on Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ’s political platform in his text *Islamska deklaracija* /Islamic Declaration/, published that year in Sarajevo in no less than 200,000 copies. This radical pan-Islamic concept espoused by the top officials of the leading Muslim/Bosniak party (the SDA) and its leader was absolutely unacceptable for the peoples outside the Islamic cultural circle and it was even unacceptable for a part of the Muslim/Bosniak nation, including a part of the Muslim/Bosniak social elites.

The unacceptability of the concept promoted by the *Islamic Declaration* had several levels in BH. Primarily, the *Islamic Declaration* emerged in BH, i.e. at the “periphery of the Islamic world” and it “did not contain a trace of a certain Bosnian component.” The *Declaration* is “pure in /the teaching of/ Islam, both in terms of inspiration and messages. It is ‘Bosnian’ only in the fact that it was written in Bosnia

¹⁷⁰ E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, p. 167.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 169.

¹⁷² Quotations from the *Sporazum* /Agreement/, *Oslobodenje* (daily newspaper), Sarajevo, 2 August 1991; the text of the *Sporazum* taken from Miroslav Tudman, *Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini*, Zagreb, 2005, pp. 64-65.

¹⁷³ E. Redžić, op. cit., p. 169.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 170; See: Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, *Živa Bosna*, Sarajevo, 1994, p. 199-200.

by an author who is a Bosnian Muslim.” In it, “its Bosnian voice cannot be heard – the voice that can be heard is solely and utterly Islamic.”¹⁷⁶

Then, the pragmatic political messages of the *Islamic Declaration* are extremely radical and unambiguous. Inter alia, the *Declaration* states: “we announce to our friends and foes that the Muslims have decided to take the fate of the Islamic world into their own hands and organise it in accordance with their concept... the *Declaration* does not contain ideas that could be regarded as completely new... what is novel is that it calls for ideas and plans to be translated into organised action and turned into reality.”¹⁷⁷

Further on, “...the principle of the Islamic order as a unity of faith and politics leads to other important conclusions... The first and the most important of these conclusions is definitely the one on the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be no peace or co-existence between the ‘Islamic faith’ and non-Islamic social and political institutions... Islam clearly rules out any right or possibility of action of any foreign ideology in its territory. There is no room for the secular principle and the state should be an expression of, and support to, the moral concepts of religion.”¹⁷⁸

This is why moderate Bosniaks/Muslims justifiably concluded that “the *Islamic Declaration* promotes ideological totalitarianism as the fundamental principle of global Islam in building the Islamic order”¹⁷⁹ at a time when “in Western and Eastern Europe, totalitarianism is collapsing to make way for civilisation, culture, progress and democracy.”¹⁸⁰ In that context, concern was expressed about the fact that “from 1990 to the present day, the Bosniak SDA has persistently been aspiring to hegemony in BH.”¹⁸¹

After several months of preparations, mostly within the SDA, “on 10 June 1991, at a meeting of 365 leading Muslim political, cultural and humanitarian activists from all over Yugoslavia, the Council of National Defence was established” as a civilian and military Bosniak/Muslim national organisation.¹⁸²

II.2.2 Serbs in BH

The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of BH, led by Radovan KARADŽIĆ, was founded in mid-July 1990 in Sarajevo. Another party with the same name (SDS) had been founded earlier (February 1990) in the Republic of Croatia. At the first multi-party elections in BH, in 1990, the BH SDS won 72 seats in the Parliament (of a total of 240). Biljana PLAVŠIĆ and Nikola KOLJEVIĆ were BH SDS representatives elected to the BH Presidency.

The concept, public speeches and organisational action of the SDS in BH were consistent with the idea of a Greater Serbia and they were presented to the public

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 102-103.

¹⁷⁷ Alija Izetbegović, *Islamska deklaracija*, Sarajevo, 1990, p. 2.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁷⁹ E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, p. 109.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 106.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁸² Marko Atilla Hoare, *Civilno-vojni odnosi u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992-1995 /Civilian-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995/ in *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 210; the founding date of the Council of National Defence (i.e. the Patriotic League) is in dispute; more on this and the Patriotic League in general will be given in the following chapters.*

often and widely. For example, looking to the events in Serbia, the SDS BH, together with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and politicians from Serbia, spent a year organising mass events “in commemoration of Serbian victims of World War II, exhuming their bones from karst pits and explicitly calling for revenge (the key message being that the ‘descendents of the victims,’ the Serbs, did not want to and could not live with the ‘descendents of murderers,’ the Croats and Bosniaks). KARADŽIĆ himself made a theatrical descent into one of the pits.”¹⁸³

In late March 1991, the founding assembly of the Association of Serbs from BH in Belgrade took place, at which “KARADŽIĆ’s and Bishop Amfilohije RADOVIĆ’s statements about the establishment of the ‘united Serbian states’ were greeted with ovations.”¹⁸⁴

In the second half of 1991, as a consequence of various activities of Greater-Serbian institutions, the political and security tensions in BH mounted. Under such circumstances the BH SDS “thwarted the adoption of documents at the Assembly and undermined” the legitimate authorities in BH “all of this in concert with the Serbian government.”¹⁸⁵ Simultaneously, separate Serbian territorial organisations were established in BH and promptly proclaimed by the BH SDS in April and November 1991 – depending on the circumstances.¹⁸⁶

In mid-October 1991, the Assembly of the Socialist Republic (SR) of BH published a Memorandum, of which the starting point was the sequence of events and decisions which “irreversibly changed the composition of Yugoslavia and created a new legal and factual reality.” Thus, it was emphasised that according to its Constitution, BH was a “democratic sovereign state of equal citizens, the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that different interests could be achieved in BH “on the condition that they are achieved without force and in a legal and democratic manner.”¹⁸⁷

Several days later, under dramatic circumstances, at the proposal of the SDA and with the support of the Croatian Democratic Union of BH (BH HDZ), but in the absence of BH SDS deputies, the SRBH Assembly adopted the Platform on the Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Future Organisation of the Yugoslav Community.¹⁸⁸ Serbian deputies, led by the President of the SRBH Assembly, Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK, left in protest during the discussion, but prior to this, KARADŽIĆ, “who was not a deputy or a state official of any sort, but who regularly attended discussions at the Assembly” took the floor and threatened: “Do not think that you won’t drive BH to hell and the Muslim people possibly to extinction.”¹⁸⁹

Ten days later, on 24 October 1991, “the deputies of the Serbian Democratic Party’s Club and the Club of the Serbian Renewal Movement at the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina” adopted the unlawful Decision to Establish the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, declaring this Assembly, in its Article 1, “the supreme representative and legislative organ of the Serbian people in Bosnia

¹⁸³ J. Divjak, *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 377.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 378.

¹⁸⁵ J. Divjak, *Prva faza rata 1992-1993: Borba za opstanak i nastanak Armije BH /The First Phase of the War – 1992-1993: The Struggle for Survival and Establishment of the Army of BH/ in *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 182.*

¹⁸⁶ More about this in the Chapter entitled *Republika Srpska*.

¹⁸⁷ HINA (news agency) Zagreb, EVA Database, News HNA0121, 16 October 1991/1714; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 70-71; (3D00320).

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-74; (3D00320).

¹⁸⁹ J. Divjak, *op. cit.*, p. 182, b. 2.

and Herzegovina.”¹⁹⁰ To understand the situation in BH, one should be aware of the important fact that this decision (as well as a range of those that ensued) was signed by the president of this unlawful (so-called *Serbian*) Assembly, Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK, who was still the official President of the legitimate and joint Assembly of the SRBH.

On the basis of the facts given above, it is evident that the national concept of the structure of the Serbian people in BH was an integral part of the (Greater-)Serbian project and that it was in an advanced phase of operational political implementation as early as 1991.

II.-2.3 Croats in BH

In mid-August 1990, the Croatian Democratic Union of BH (BH HDZ) was established in Sarajevo.¹⁹¹ At the time of its establishment and throughout its active period, it maintained more or less close relations with its namesake party from the Republic of Croatia.¹⁹²

The leader of the party (BH HDZ) in the first few weeks was Davorin PERINOVIĆ, but he was replaced in September 1990 due to a clash of interests within the BH HDZ. The new President of the party became Stjepan KLJUJIĆ. KLJUJIĆ was the leader of the party until the beginning of February 1992, when he was replaced by Miljenko BRKIĆ, who was a temporary solution. In late October 1992, Mate BOBAN was elected President of the party. In early February 1994, Mr BOBAN was replaced by Krešimir ZUBAK.

In the first elections in BH, the BH HDZ won 44 deputy seats in the BH Parliament (of the total of 240). Franjo BORAS and Stjepan KLJUJIĆ were elected into the Presidency of the SRBH. The BH HDZ thus became the legitimate political representative of the Croats in BH.

In comparison to the Bosniak/Muslim and Serbian national structures in BH, the Croatian national structure, i.e. the BH HDZ, was the most heterogeneous in terms of the political concepts and practical actions. This was manifested, inter alia, in the facts that the BH HDZ was established after the SDA and the BH SDS, and that there were frequent and serious disputes, conflicts and personnel changes at the top.

Because of this and the fact that there were far fewer Croats in BH than the Muslims/Bosniaks and the Serbs, the BH HDZ was considerably weaker than the SDA and the BH SDS in every aspect. In such a situation, the party made efforts to adapt its activity to the developments in BH. In this, the main aim and concept of the BH HDZ was generally determined to be protecting the interests of the Croatian people in the state of the SR /Socialist Republic/ of BH. In addition, due to the poor quality and the heterogeneity of the structure of the BH HDZ, this concept was not thought out thoroughly – rather it adapted superficially to the complex ongoing events in BH, trying to achieve aims which were often in mutual contradiction.

Hence, throughout the period after 1990, the policy of the BH HDZ was almost exclusively one of reaction (in theory and in practice), lacking initiative or a clearly defined plan. This was manifested in frequently inconsistent, heterogeneous or

¹⁹⁰ Smail Čekić, *Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima 1991-1993 /The 1991-1993 Aggression on Bosnia and Genocide against Bosniaks/,* Sarajevo, 1994, pp. 270-272; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 83-84 (3D00320).

¹⁹¹ A party with the same title (HDZ) had been established in Croatia in 1989 and won the first elections in the Republic of Croatia.

¹⁹² See: *Deset godina Hrvatske demokratske zajednice – Spomenica*, Zagreb, 1999.

contradictory behaviour by the BH HDZ in reaction to (as a consequence of) the events in BH, which were developing very complexly and in various contradictory directions. Consequently, there was much disagreement among and quite opposite action taken by the different groups within the BH HDZ, particularly those from different regions.¹⁹³

In late February 1991, when the SDA proposed the Declaration on the Sovereignty and Indivisibility of the State of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the SR of BH Assembly, the BH HDZ voted in favour of the Declaration, but it was not adopted because the deputies of the BH SDS voted against it.¹⁹⁴ A similar situation occurred in October 1991, when the SDA proposed the aforementioned Platform on the position of BH to the Assembly of the SRBH.¹⁹⁵

Likewise – after the Bosniak/Muslim structure had established the Council of National Defence of the Muslim People and after the Serbian hierarchy in BH had made a host of political and military moves, including the proclamation of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH in October 1991 – the Croatian structure acted in reaction and proclaimed the Croatian Community of Posavina in Bosanski Brod as late as 12 November 1991 and, on 18 November 1991, adopted the Decision on the Establishment of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. After the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been formally proclaimed on 9 January, the Croatian hierarchy proclaimed the Croatian Community of Central Bosnia on 27 January 1992.

Both then and later, strong political and other disagreements, conflicts and rifts kept erupting among the different Croatian communities and their formally joint leaderships.

The Croatian national hierarchy in BH therefore failed to define a unified national concept or to establish and demonstrate the required interconnection of the leadership in its activities. Hence, the reaction-based response, fickleness, heterogeneity and contradiction were the main characteristics of the actions taken by the Croatian hierarchy in BH.

¹⁹³ Anto Marinčić, *Općina Žepče ili ključ za funkcioniranje Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine*, Zagreb, 2000.

¹⁹⁴ The document and event are published in M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 53-54; (3D00320).

¹⁹⁵ See: text referring to footnotes 187 and 188.

II-3

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL POLITICAL ENTITIES

II-3.1 The Patriotic League (PL)

The beginnings of the separate national, political and military organising of Muslims/Bosniaks have not been fully explored because, due to the uncertain and threatening security situation in BH and the region, the SDA worked gradually in secret on the establishment of the political and military organisation, “the existence and activity of which was not known even to all the members of the SDA.”¹⁹⁶ Even then, there were differences within the SDA about the assessment of how the situation would develop in BH and in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia and about the political and security measures to be taken. This, inter alia, influenced the later deep rifts in the military and political Bosniak/Muslim structure led by the SDA.¹⁹⁷

The (semi)secret organisation, later named the Patriotic League, was most likely established on 31 March 1991.¹⁹⁸ “The father of the Patriotic League is the founder of the SDA and the President of the Presidency of the Republic of BH, Mr. Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ” and its name “was created at the SDA, when Messrs Hasan ČENGIĆ, Dr Rusmir MAHMUTĆEHAJIĆ and others agreed on it.”¹⁹⁹ The Patriotic League was “divided into a civilian wing, headed by IZETBEGOVIĆ, and a military wing, composed of Muslim officers who had left the JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/.” Despite the differences, the Patriotic League “would stay anchored to the structure of the SDA. The bodies which grew into Bosnian civilian and military leadership were thus originally two halves of one and the same Muslim national organisation.”²⁰⁰

The SDA leadership, which was also the leadership of the new state authorities of the SRBH, acted under contradictory circumstances. On the one hand, “the SDA leadership stood at the top of the state administration and barely had any supervision over it” and on the other, the new authorities “discovered that its most dangerous opponents were those who persecuted the security services of the very same republic. The Yugoslav military counterintelligence service (KOS) had its agents at all levels of the Bosnian state.”²⁰¹

In such a situation, the SDA leadership, with Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ as their leader, opted for a pragmatic policy. In a state whose political, security and national spheres were in disorder, an attempt was made to take over institutions of the government by accepting as many individuals and groups from the existing state system as possible who wanted to be loyal to the new government. In this fashion, in BH, a number of policemen, clerks, JNA officers and others “who had served under

¹⁹⁶ Nihad Halilbegović, *Činjenice o Patriotskoj ligi Bosne i Hercegovine*, Sarajevo, 1994, p. 10; Halilbegović dates the roots of the Patriotic League to late 1990 (Ibid, pp. 9 and 16), whereas Hoare dates it to February 1991 (Hoare, op. cit. p. 210).

¹⁹⁷ See: R. Mahmutćehajić, *Kriva politika*, Tuzla-Sarajevo-Zagreb, 1988; Sefer Halilović, *Lukava strategija*, Sarajevo, 1997.

¹⁹⁸ See: N. Halilbegović, op. cit., pp. 5 and 9.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 9-10.

²⁰⁰ M. A. Hoare, op. cit., p. 210.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 210.

the communist government, adapted to the new times and entered the orbit of the SDA... the SDA leadership was trying to find a peaceful solution with Belgrade, the JNA and the SDS through negotiations.”²⁰²

“IZETBEGOVIĆ naively hoped that the JNA units in the Bosnian territory would either transform into a Bosnian army or withdraw from the country without bloodshed – he later admitted that he had not believed that after fifty years of preaching “brotherhood and unity” the Yugoslav Army would engage in genocide.”²⁰³

Although some founders of the Patriotic League must have been aware even then that the “forming of quasi-state and paramilitary structures was directly in the interest of the destroyers of BH” and therefore tried to protect the survival of the intact BH “through institutions... on the basis of a patriotic alliance of all of its people,”²⁰⁴ still, the state institutions of BH, through the activities of the Patriotic League, continued to transform into an exclusive national organisation of Muslims/Bosniaks.

The process of the transformation and the overall Islamisation of BH state institutions into a Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy reached radical proportions in 1993. “The sway of the SDA, as the leading Bosniak party, grew increasingly... All of this, the interference of religious officials and the overall introduction of religion to the armed forces in 1993, led to the creation of a monoethnic hierarchy and political beliefs.”²⁰⁵ In consequence of many influences, reasons and interests, this process continued throughout 1994 and 1995, although in this period, formal agreements on political and military integrations of the Muslim/Bosniak and the Croatian side were signed and their military cooperation (with the assistance of the Republic of Croatia) inflicted strategic losses on Serbian aggression.

One should bear in mind that as the process of Islamisation of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina went on, the Decree Law (of 6 August 1992) established that the “units of the Croatian Defence Council were an integral part of the Army...”²⁰⁶

From the radical Muslim/Bosniak viewpoint, the “joint institutions of the Bosnian statehood were deemed unreliable and were therefore demolished, while the Bosnian national interest was identified exclusively with the President, the ruling party and the Army, causing these three institutions to grow even closer. The high Bosnian officials, generals and politicians who opposed this merging... were replaced or shoved aside.”²⁰⁷

A question that remains open is – to what extent this process was planned and by whom, and to what extent it was simply spurred by complex events and various factors. It is unquestionable, however, that the disintegrating social system in BH, which was inherited from communism, was permeated with “double agents of all nationalities, who had a tendency to cooperate with the efforts of Belgrade and the JNA to undermine the Bosnian state from within and subjugate it.”²⁰⁸

²⁰² Ibid., p. 211.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 211.

²⁰⁴ R. Mahmutćehajić, *Put u rat /The Way to War/ in Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 175.

²⁰⁵ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 191.

²⁰⁶ “Decree Law on the Amendment of the Decree Law on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Presidency, 6 August 1992; See: *Tape recording of the 153rd session of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on 6 August 1992 in National Security and the Future*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007, pp. 7-9; (4D00410).

²⁰⁷ M. A. Hoare, op. cit., p. 228.

²⁰⁸ M. A. Hoare, op. cit., p. 209.

In any event, the process of transforming BH state institutions into Muslim/Bosniak institutions facilitated the implementation of the Greater-Serbian concept and had immense effects on the three-way national homogenisation in BH and, by this, on the long-term disintegration of the territory of BH in terms of identity and organisation. On the one hand, this even caused division within the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy, which concluded that Bosnianhood was “instrumentalised to fit the interests and requests of the leading Bosniak party,”²⁰⁹ and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ was even directly accused (together with Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ and Franjo TUĐMAN) of being a part of the “central force of the destruction of unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”²¹⁰

On the other hand, this process was used by the (Greater-)Serbian structures for propaganda purposes to justify armed aggression against BH, simultaneously contributing at a social and psychological level to an even deeper homogenisation of the Serbs in BH. Thirdly, the national, political and military organising of Muslims/Bosniaks contributed to a growing general mistrust, more divisions and the eruption of limited armed clashes between the Croats and Muslims/Bosniaks, paved the way for a similar process of political and military organising in the Croatian national community in BH.

To sum up (regarding the balance of power and the events in which various interests were realised in the territory of BH in the period from 1990 to 1995), the process of national divisions and homogenisation in BH was beneficial only to Serbian aggression against BH, while the national interests of Muslims/Bosniaks and the Croats in BH suffered immense and long-lasting damage from it.

These facts were reaffirmed indirectly in the later statements of some prominent Muslim/Bosniak activists who disassociated themselves from the process of strictly national organisation and homogenisation only after it had left negative consequences. Thus, one of the founders of the Patriotic League and a member of the Government of RBH, Rusmir MAHMUTĆEHAJIĆ, in an attempt to justify his prominent participation in the negative processes, subsequently gave a contradictory account: “In hindsight, nobody can show or prove that the Patriotic League or the other organisations we created were quasi-state organisations or that they existed outside the state institutions. There are those who write along these lines, but nobody can prove this! Some parts of this system were closely linked to the patriotic segment of the leadership and served as a forum for analysing and preparing the stable anchors for the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with the state organs.”²¹¹

II-3.2 Republika Srpska (RS)

The institutional hierarchy of the Serbs in BH, which was expressed in political form in the BH SDS, was not as undecided about politics and organisation as the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchies were, but rather implemented the Greater-Serbian plan systematically, of which they were an integral part. All this time, the Greater-Serbian political, security-related and propaganda activities on all levels – in the Yugoslav institutional hierarchy, in Serbia, in Croatia and in BH – were synchronised and interlinked. They also kept up with international circumstances,

²⁰⁹ E. Redžić, *Sto godina...*, p. 171.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

²¹¹ J. Divjak, *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 280.

both substance-wise and time-wise, particularly the meetings and decisions of the international *Peace Conference on the (Former) Yugoslavia* and other international factors.

In all variants of the resolution of the so-called Yugoslav crisis, the main aim of the Greater-Serbian structure was to achieve territorial unity of all so-called *Serbian* territories in the Former Yugoslavia, including ethnic cleansing of these territories in order to ensure a convincing Serbian majority in them. All their political and military activities were subordinated to this. Thus, the main political and military developments in the Former Yugoslavia and in the territory of BH had been determined clearly and made public by the Greater-Serbian structure even before they were put into practice operationally in the territory of BH.

For this reason and in order to ensure objectivity, to comprehend and understand the events in BH (1990 – 1995), one must be familiar with the events in the Republic of Croatia, because they are one indivisible set of events in causal terms (cause, course, effect, participants), regardless of the fact that there were republican (state) borders between BH and the Republic of Croatia.

The other participants *from within Yugoslavia*, who were weaker in every aspect, particularly in the military one, and generally unprepared at an institutional level, mostly just followed the events (trying to adapt to them as much as possible) dictated by the Greater-Serbian structure and/or, consequently, the international community.

According to the scenario which had been applied earlier in the Republic of Croatia, throughout April and May 1991, the BH SDS established illegal *Communities of Municipalities* in some parts of BH. The first one established was the *Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina*, in April 1991. The *Community of Municipalities of the Eastern and Old Herzegovina* and the *Community of Romanija Municipalities* followed in May.²¹²

In mid-June 1991, the leader of the SDS in Croatia (Jovan RAŠKOVIĆ) established the *Homeland Front* “which proclaimed as its aim the unification of the SAO /Serbian Autonomous District of/ Krajina (the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia, *author’s note*) and Bosnian Krajina “into one federal unit, if Yugoslavia should break up.”²¹³ Several days earlier, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, and Franjo TUĐMAN had met in Split and “discussed BH, in particular”²¹⁴ although “without results; at the press conference, MILOŠEVIĆ supported the Serbian para-government in Knin.”²¹⁵

In mid-September 1991, the BH SDS proclaimed (consecutively) three Serbian Autonomous Districts (SAO): SAO Eastern Herzegovina, SAO Bosanska Krajina and SAO Romanija. Two more were created subsequently (SAO Semberija and SAO Ozren and Posavina). Separate Serbian authorities were established at municipal level as well, primarily for the purpose of establishing security control, particularly that of the local police. At both levels (district and municipal), this was done in the same way as in the Republic of Croatia in 1990, and it was a prerequisite for and an integral part of the armed aggression and occupation.²¹⁶

In the first half of November 1991, the BH SDS organised an unlawful referendum of only the Serbian people in BH, “offering the Serbs a choice between an

²¹² *Glas*, (Banja Luka newspaper), 27 and 28 April 1991; *Javnost* (official periodical of the SDS, Sarajevo) 11 May and 1 June 1991.

²¹³ J. Divjak, *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 379.

²¹⁴ *Kronologija rata...*, p. 67.

²¹⁵ J. Divjak, *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 379.

²¹⁶ See: Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995*, Zagreb, 2005.

independent BH and staying in Yugoslavia and, on the basis of falsified results, announced that the second option had won the majority.”²¹⁷ On the basis of the unlawful referendum, the unlawful “Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” at its session on 21 November 1991, adopted a Decision to Verify the Serbian Autonomous Districts Proclaimed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”²¹⁸

At the same session, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH adopted a *Decision* to recognise “the Republic of Srpska Krajina as a federal unit of Yugoslavia”²¹⁹ This Decision – which was absurd in many ways because an illegal assembly from a part of BH recognised the occupying authorities in a part of a neighbouring state, the Republic of Croatia, as part of a third state (Yugoslavia) – is primarily testimony to how elements of the Greater-Serbian project were synchronised and how they were adapted to give results at the level of international institutions.

In the second half of December 1991, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH adopted a Decision to Proceed with Preparations for Forming ‘Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina’,” and that it will be established “no later than the Serbian /Eastern Orthodox/ New Year in 1992.”²²⁰

In accordance with the above, on 9 January 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH adopted the Declaration Proclaiming the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which determined that the “Republic is in the composition of the federal state of Yugoslavia as one of its federal units.” This was in direct contravention of the Constitution of the SFRY /Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ and the Constitution of the SRBH in force at that time. Inter alia, the Declaration was supposed to prevent the international recognition of BH, judging by its Article X, stating that: “This implementation of the Declaration shall be postponed for an indefinite period of time on condition that those who submitted the request for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence withdraw their request by 15 January 1992.”²²¹ The Declaration achieved this aim – pursuant to Opinion No. 4 of the Arbitration Commission, the SRBH was not internationally recognised by the European Community (EZ) simultaneously with the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (15 January 1992).

After the referendum in the SRBH (in accordance with international instructions and supervision) and after the announcement of the European Union’s (EU)²²² peace plan (the so-called Cutilheiro’s Plan) for BH in late February, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH adopted a Decision Proclaiming the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the second half of March 1992, “the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH in Pale (in Sarajevo, *author’s note*) opposed an independent and sovereign BH.”²²³

On 6 April 1992, BH was recognised by the EU and the USA (effective from 7 April). On the same day, “Serbian terrorists fired at the participants of anti-war

²¹⁷ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 182.

²¹⁸ *Odluka /Decision/...*, in S. Čekić, op. cit., p. 275-276; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 101-102; (3D00320).

²¹⁹ *Odluka...*, in S. Čekić, op. cit., p. 277; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 103; (3D00320).

²²⁰ *Odluka...*, in S. Čekić, op. cit., p. 278; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 117; (3D00320).

²²¹ *Borba* (daily newspaper), Beograd, 10 January 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 119-121; (3D00320).

²²² A decision from the *Maastricht Treaty* (7 February 1992) changed the name from EZ to EU.

²²³ J. Divjak, *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 386.

demonstrations outside the BH Assembly in Sarajevo (killing four and wounding six people).”²²⁴ The following day, “at a session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina... a decision was adopted to proclaim the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina an independent republic.”²²⁵

Ten days later, the Government of the Serbian Republic of BH issued a public statement in Belgrade, accusing the EU and its “premature recognition... of contributing to the aggravation of the situation in this Republic (BH, *author’s note*)” and that “those who were the most responsible for the aggravated situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina were the Muslim and Croatian members of the Presidency” of the SRBH. For propaganda purposes in order to cover up Serbian armed aggression and the mass crimes which had already been committed against the Muslims/Bosniaks in Eastern BH, the statement also said that “this is not a struggle to expand Serbia. The Serbian people in BH are defending their sheer survival...” And before this, to the same end, the statement said that the armed conflicts in BH were “started by the army of the Republic of Croatia” and that the international community “did nothing to stop Croatian aggression.”²²⁶

In mid-August 1992, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina changed its name to Republika Srpska (RS).

In the second half of September 1992, the Protocol on Cooperation between Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina was adopted. In practical terms, it envisaged the establishment of a state. Specifically, the Protocol envisaged “cooperation between the two republics in all economic and social spheres” and that “all the existing constitutional and legislative solutions will be analysed and proposals submitted to the Assemblies for the harmonisation required” in order to “establish the same form of government and political system... determine the same state symbols... both republics agree that there will be no borders or border crossings between them... the defence of sovereignty will be organised and carried out jointly... by the establishment of joint forces... and a single command.” The cooperation also entailed “the establishment of a unified educational system... the validity of health care records and personal health insurance cards in both republics ... the establishment of a unified information system...”²²⁷

The following step was the adoption of the so-called Prijedor Declaration adopted at a “joint session” of the two Assemblies (RSK and RS) in late October 1992, “proclaiming that the legal systems in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska will be identical,” that they “are forming a defence alliance... a monetary and customs union... entrusting the organs responsible within the two republics to form immediately the appropriate joint bodies for achieving the proclaimed aims” and “all forms of cooperation will be offered to other Serbian states... An initiative will be launched for convening an all-Serbian assembly (of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Republika Srpska, Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro)... the Assembly of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 386.

²²⁵ *Večernje novosti* (daily newspaper), Belgrade, 8 April 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 169-170; (3D00320).

²²⁶ Ibid., pp. 171-172; (3D00320).

²²⁷ *Protokol...*, Hrvatski informativni centar /Croatian Information Centre/ (HIC) Zagreb, Documentation, Document No. L-A002/041; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 245-248; (3D00320).

Krajina proclaim the determination of the Serbian people in these republics to be united in a state.”²²⁸

II-3.3 The Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna (HRHB)

The *Decision* to Establish the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZHB) of 18 November 1991 determined the HZHB “as a political, cultural, economic and territorial entity” comprising the territories of the municipalities listed in Article 2 of the Decision. Article 5 of the decision states that the “Community will respect the democratically elected government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as Bosnia and Herzegovina retains its state sovereignty in relation to the Former or any other Yugoslavia.”²²⁹

This brief Decision also specifies the following: “The supreme body of the Community shall be the Presidency, which shall comprise representatives of the Croatian people in the municipal authorities, the first by virtue of their office, or chairmen of Croatian Democratic Union municipal boards. The Presidency shall elect a President, two Vice-Presidents and a Secretary.”

However, due to a series of various events in the first half of 1992 (conflicts in the party, the referendum, international recognition of BH, intensified Serbian armed aggression), the HZHB did almost nothing to organise itself at institutional level.

It is important to emphasise that members of the BH HDZ were active in institutions of the central (S)RBH, both then and in the following years.

In the first half of April 1992, the Presidency of the HZHB “faced with aggression in the territory” of the HZHB and “being aware of the powerlessness of the legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly of the collapse of its defence system,” adopted a very brief Decision (of only a few lines) on the Establishment of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO).²³⁰

The Decision established the HVO “as a supreme body of the defence of the Croatian people in” the HZHB and that it would be responsible for “defending the sovereignty of the territory” of the HZHB “and protecting the Croatian people, as well as other peoples in this community attacked by any aggressor.” The Decision was signed by the “President of the HVO and HZHB, Mate BOBAN.”²³¹

In mid-May 1992, the Presidency of the HZHB adopted the Statutory Decision on Temporary Organisation of the Executive Government and Administration in the Territory of the HZHB.²³² The Decision was amended in early July 1992. Article 1 read: “the Croatian Defence Council is hereby established... as the highest body of executive government and administration” in the territory of the HZHB, although “as a temporary body, to execute its powers until the establishment of the regular executive government.”²³³ The HVO HZHB had six departments: defence, interior, economy, finance, social affairs, justice and administration), and there was an option

²²⁸ In Srdan Radulović, *Sudbina Krajine*, Beograd, 1996, pp. 154-155; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 290-292; (3D00320).

²²⁹ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 99-100; (3D00320).

²³⁰ *Odluka...*, document published in *Narodni list HZHB* /Official Gazette of the HZHB/, No. 1, September 1992, p. 4; (P00151). The very fact that the first issue of *Narodni list HZHB* was not published until September indirectly shows the low level of organisation of the HZHB at the time.

²³¹ *Ibid.*; (P00151).

²³² *Narodni list*, No. 1., pp. 5-7. (1D00156).

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 5; (P00290).

for the establishment of independent professional and other bodies.²³⁴ The HVO HZHB supervised "the work of its departments and municipal HVOs," and was authorised to "dissolve a municipal HVO" if "the basic principles of the HZ HB were violated by it."²³⁵

In mid-June 1992, the HVO HZHB adopted a Statutory Decision according to which "the activities of the executive government at municipal level in HZHB are executed by the Croatian Defence Council."²³⁶

As late as early July 1992, the Presidency of the HZHB adopted a series of decisions, decree laws and codes which formally, at least in part, regulated basic relations within the HZHB. Thus, after more than seven and a half months, the (amended) Decision on the Establishment of the HZHB was again adopted. In relation to the previous Decision, the new version contained a new part – "Reasons for the Establishment," which, inter alia, said: "Faced with ruthless aggression by the Yugoslav Army... an enormous number of victims, suffering and peril... and the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its legally elected bodies."²³⁷ The new Decision introduced the duty of the President of the HZHB, which had not been included in the earlier version, and the Presidency of the HZHB was designated as a "legislative body".²³⁸

The highest bodies of authority in the HZHB did not pass laws, instead they passed decree laws, decisions, etc. adopting the existing laws or parts of laws of the state of BH, most often with a note that these regulations were implemented in the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna at a time of an imminent threat of war or a state of war.

It is very important to emphasise that the institutional signature block in all formal decisions, decree laws and documents adopted by the highest bodies of the HZHB, first gave the name "REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA", followed by "CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA".

This state administration hierarchy was also adhered to consistently in official forms, school diplomas, certificates, military ID booklets and other documents used in the territory of the HZHB. The prescribed graphic forms of these documents were published as images in *Narodni list*, the official gazette of the HZHB (HRHB).


²³⁴ Ibid., p. 7; (P00290).

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 6; (P00250).

²³⁶ Ibid., p. 8; (P00290).

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 2; (P00302).

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 2-3; (P00302).

REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA		OSOBNNA ISKAZNICA	
JMBG		BR.	
	Ime		
	Prezime		
	Datum rođenja		
	Mjesto i država rođenja		
	Prebivalište i adresa stanovanja		
Izdala		Datum izdavanja	
Vlastoručni potpis		Vrijedi do	
			

Prednja stranica

Figure 12: The prescribed template for the cover page of the personal identity card in the HZHB. (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 12/93, p. 328)

/translation: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Personal Identity Card; No.; JMBG /personal identification number/; First name; Surname; Date of Birth; Place and State of Birth; Place of residence and address; Issued by; Date; Signature; Valid until/


	
REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA	
VOJNA ISKAZNICA	
Korice — prednja strana	

Figure 13: The prescribed template for the cover page of the military ID booklet in the HZHB (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 7/92, p. 36)

/translation: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Military ID Booklet; Cover – first page/




Figure 14: The prescribed template for the cover page of the vehicle registration document in HZHB (heading) (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 1/93, p. 16)

/translation: Form 1; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Vehicle Registration/

Obrazac 1a




Figure 15: The prescribed template for a primary school certificate (heading) (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 10/93, p. 256)

/translation: Form 1a; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Municipality; School; Place; School register; Number; Primary School Certificate/



Figure 16: The prescribed template for the cover page of School Register in the HZHB (heading) (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 10/93, p. 264)

/translation: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Gymnasium – Vocational Secondary School/



Figure 17: The prescribed template for the copy of a birth certificate in the HZHB (heading) (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 13/93, p. 393)

/translation: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Municipality; Copy of a Birth Certificate/




Figure 18: The prescribed template for a marriage certificate in the HZHB (heading) (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 13/93, p. 394)

/translation: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Municipality; Marriage Certificate/



Figure 19: The prescribed template for a certificate of death in the HZHB (heading) (Source: *Narodni list HZHB*, 13/93, p. 395)

/translation: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; Municipality; Certificate of Death/

The name, status and organisation of the HZHB did not change significantly until late August 1993, when the Basic Decision on the Establishment and Proclamation of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna (HRHB) was adopted.²³⁹ The adoption of this decision and other documents stemming from it was influenced by a host of factors, the most important of which was certainly the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg's peace plan,²⁴⁰ which envisaged a joint state (*union*) consisting of "three constituent republics" and that the agreement between the legitimate representatives of the republics (nations) in BH would "enter into force once there was agreement on the maps and appendices regarding strict guarantees of human rights."²⁴¹

Like similar plans before and after, this peace plan was the focus of the attention of negotiators, politicians and the military for several months; it was accepted, rejected and, on several occasions, amended and supplemented.

In general, judging by the already inflamed national expectations and fears, the *peace plans* of the international community had significant influence on political developments in BH and the region.²⁴² In addition, political and armed conflicts between parts of Croatian and Muslim/Bosniak political and military hierarchies were erupting in some localities in BH and war crimes against civilians of different religion and nationality were committed in some places.

Although Owen-Stoltenberg's peace plan eventually failed, the authority structures of the HRHB acted as if had been accepted and continued to adopt the relevant political and legal documents needed for the establishment of the HRHB as one of the constituent republics of the joint state of BH. In addition to the *Basic Decision*, the following documents were adopted: Decision on Constituting the House of Representatives of the HRHB and the Presidential Decree on the Promulgation of the Law on the Government of the HRHB, etc.²⁴³

Such action of the HRHB structure (and the HZHB earlier) was conducive to a deepening of existing inter-ethnic mistrust and intolerance in BH and contributed to further processes of disintegration in BH. This was definitely not in the national interest of the Croats in BH because (inter alia) most of the Croats lived in other areas of BH outside the HRHB.

Nonetheless, as during the HZHB, all official documents of the HRHB formally and strictly abided by the hierarchy of state titles, meaning that the title "Bosnia and Herzegovina" always preceded that of "Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna".

The HRHB structure, however, despite the high normative production – as earlier, under the name of HZHB – was not able to stabilise the situation at any level (within the BH Croatian community, in relations with the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy, in relations with the Republic of Croatia and in relations with the international community). Actually, throughout the period from 1990 to 1995 (and later), the internal synergy of the Croatian hierarchy in BH, as well as its general situation in

²³⁹ *Narodni list HRHB*, no. 1, October 1993, pp. 5-6; (P04611).

²⁴⁰ At that time, David OWEN and Thorwald STOLTENBERG were the co-chairs of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, who offered a peace plan for BH as peace mediators, on the basis of negotiations with representatives from the territory of the Former Yugoslavia; (3D00320).

²⁴¹ Details about the document were taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 414-415 and 429-431; (3D00320).

²⁴² See documents about this in M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 410-490; (3D00320).

²⁴³ For these and similar documents, see *Narodni list HRHB*, 1, October 1993; (P04589).

relation to the Serbian and Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy in BH, were noticeably of poorer quality, weaker and less successful.

Although the question of causes and factors which led to this is still open for research, it cannot be explained merely by the small number of Croats in BH, because this fact intrinsically facilitated the quality of the structuring of Croatian national interests in BH. Thus, throughout the period before, during and after the war, Croatian structures in BH remained divided in various respects – regional membership, political beliefs and aims, common and individual interests, etc.

The general situation and actions of the Croatian hierarchy in BH was hence very similar to that of the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy, as were its final outcomes. Actually, the Croatian hierarchy was heterogeneous within itself (even more so than the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy), but the part which prevailed was the one which was limited to superficially and narrowly defined national interests, used as a pretext for working in the interest of small groups which, coincidentally, gained great institutional and financial power and used it disregarding the common good.

Of the three leading national parties in BH, the internal situation in the BH HDZ was the most chaotic. This was reflected primarily in the numerous dramatic changes at the head of the party (presidents and secretaries) and in civilian (the HZHB and HRHB) and military (HVO) managing hierarchies.

There is no justification for the fact that full political and military cooperation between Croatian and Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy was not established promptly and that there were partial armed clashes and crimes – in a few localities – that happened mutually. These are equal and vast failures of both the Croatian and the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchies, because in the balance of power in BH that was absolutely clear, they were expected to join forces in full-fledged defence against Serbian aggression (the full implementation of which did not begin until after March 1994, i.e. after the signing of the Washington agreements). However, the overall situation in BH was significantly shaped by factors, interests and individuals outside the territory of BH, which one must also take into account in order to understand and assess the events in BH objectively.²⁴⁴

For a host of reasons, the BH HDZ, HZHB and, subsequently, HRHB, were dependent, to an extent, in finance, the military and politics upon the Republic of Croatia, just as the security and stability of the Republic of Croatia (particularly its southern areas) depended on the development of the situation in BH. However, one dimension of this inter-dependence was the fact that the continually unstable and chaotic state of the Croatian structures in BH weakened the position of the Republic of Croatia in relation to the international community (whose help Croatia expected in regaining parts of the occupied territory) and in relation to the BH state (which Croatia assisted abundantly for its own strategic interests),²⁴⁵ because some parts of the international community and BH began to believe in the unfounded stereotype that the Republic of Croatia was working secretly on the destruction and partitioning of the BH state.²⁴⁶

For this issue to be understood objectively, it is important to emphasise that the HZHB (and the HRHB) introduced very clear normative regulations on cross-border relations with the RH by adopting the Decision on Border Crossings towards the Republic of Croatia in 1992²⁴⁷ and, in 1993, the Decision to Amend...²⁴⁸ the first

²⁴⁴ See: Carole Hodge, *Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas*, Zagreb, 2007.

²⁴⁵ More on this in the third chapter of this expert report.

²⁴⁶ See J. Divjak, *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*; and M. Tudman, *Vrijeme krivokletnika*, Zagreb, 2006.

²⁴⁷ *Narodni list*, 6/92, p. 42.

Decision and also by adopting a new Decision on Border Crossings towards the Republic of Croatia.²⁴⁹

Finally, the impact of the poor quality and other shortcomings of the institutional hierarchy of the Croats in BH on the peace-establishing process of the international community in BH contributed to the fact that only the Croatian national institutions in BH were largely deconstructed, which brought into question the issue of whether the Croats were indeed a constituent people in BH.

The HRHB ceased to exist on 31 August 1996 “in keeping with the Dayton General Framework Agreement” and the agreement on the Federation of BH, which specified that “HVO control of the territory of the Federation” would cease on this day.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 4/93, p. 88.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 10/93, p. 239.

²⁵⁰ *Vjesnik* (daily newspaper), Zagreb, 16 August 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 697-698; (3D00320).

II.-4 REFERENDUM

The events which took place in the territory of BH in the period from 1990 to 1995 were burdened by various interests, an unstable historical legacy and incomplete institutions. In addition, these instabilities changed greatly during the war, which – on the whole - significantly impeded the forming of impartial views of the whole process, its separate parts and the actors in it.

In such a situation, the referendum organised in BH was a very important event for two main reasons. Firstly, a referendum is one of the key instruments of direct democracy, through which the will of the people regarding important issues can be determined. Secondly, in the complex and changing situation in BH, from the way the governing hierarchies of the constituent peoples in BH treated the referendum question about the political future of the state, one can recognise the basis of their political concepts.

In mid-December 1991, the EC Council of Ministers prepared and adopted the Guidelines on the Formal Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union²⁵¹ and the Declaration on Yugoslavia.²⁵² In accordance with the stipulations of these documents, the state of SRBH requested international recognition and the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia issued its Opinion no. 4 on 11 January 1992, stating that according to the declarations and undertakings assumed by BH, the state of BH had met the requirements for recognition, with the exception of the fact that the “Serbian members of the Presidency did not associate themselves with those declarations and undertakings.”²⁵³

The Commission concluded: “In these circumstances the Arbitration Commission is of the opinion that the will of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to constitute the SRBH as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established.” However, “this assessment could be reviewed if appropriate guarantees were provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of all the citizens of the SRBH without distinction, carried out under international supervision.”²⁵⁴

On 25 January 1992, the Assembly of the SRBH adopted a Decision to Call for a Referendum on the Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deputies of all parties voted for the referendum, with the exception of the BH SDS and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), who left the session of the Assembly before the vote. The Referendum was scheduled for 29 February and 1 March 1992.

In the period preceding the referendum, consistent with their vote at the Assembly of the SRBH, the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchies in BH, as well as the institutions of the Republic of Croatia, publicly encouraged the citizens of BH to participate in the referendum and vote for an independent BH state. There were some disagreements about the phrasing of the referendum question, because the BH HDZ proposed that the question emphasise BH as a state union of “constituent and

²⁵¹ See Anđelko Milardović, *Dokumenti o državnosti Republike Hrvatske*, Zagreb, 1992, p. 136; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp.11-112; (3D00320).

²⁵² *Slobodna Dalmacija* (daily newspaper), Split, 18 December 1991; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 113-114; (3D00320).

²⁵³ *Vjesnik*, 23 January 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 126-128; (3D00320).

²⁵⁴ M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 128; (3D00320).

sovereign Croatian, Muslim and Serbian peoples in their national territories (cantons)”²⁵⁵

As the population waited for the referendum, the Serbian hierarchies in BH condemned it with increasing vehemence and announced that the Serbs would not take part. Before the referendum, throughout BH, in the organisation of the Serbian hierarchies, “barricades appeared overnight and detonations reverberated and, on the night before the referendum, shots were heard everywhere and the population was intimidated.”²⁵⁶ During the referendum, “the SDS set up barricades in Sarajevo in order to interfere with the collection of ballot boxes.”²⁵⁷

On 9 March 1992, the BH Republican Electoral Secretariat announced the final and official results of the referendum. Of a total of approximately 3,250,000 citizens with the right to vote, 64% took part in the referendum. Of them, as many as 99.4 % voted for a sovereign and independent state of BH. There were approximately 5,000 voting stations and the referendum was successfully “conducted in 107 of the 109 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not conducted only in Drvar and Bosansko Grahovo and only partially in Bosanski Brod.”²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ See S. Čekić, op. cit., p. 312; document taken from M. Tudman, M., *Istina...*, p. 133; (3D00320). A document on the closed (secret) session of the SDA Main Board held on 25 February 1992 in Sarajevo illustrates the political activities of the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchies regarding the referendum and the role of the international community. See *Dani* (weekly), Sarajevo, 7 March 2008.

²⁵⁶ *Kronologija rata...*, p. 142.

²⁵⁷ J. Divjak, *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 385.

²⁵⁸ *Kronologija rata...*, p. 147.

II-5 THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATIONAL ENTITIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

II-5.1 The Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)

The key institution for the establishment of the VRS was the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/, which was one of the most important institutional components of the whole Greater-Serbian project. The JNA had all the prerequisites for armed organisation of the Serbs in the territory of BH because, in accordance with the Yugoslav defence concept, there were very strong forces deployed within it. Thus, as early as 1990, the JNA was "arming the members and supporters of the SDS... pursuant to orders of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ and the political and military factors of Serbia and Montenegro."²⁵⁹

According to documents which were kept at the Command of the Yugoslav Second Military District (Sarajevo) "by 19 March 1992, the JNA issued about 51,900 firearms to Serbian volunteer units, of which 23,298 were given to SDS members."²⁶⁰

The presence of JNA troops in BH was significantly bolstered from the summer until October 1991, when almost all JNA units and equipment had been withdrawn from Slovenia and chiefly deployed in the territory of BH. In November 1991, an agreement was reached between the JNA and the Republic of Croatia for JNA to withdraw from about 40 barracks which had been sealed off by Croatian forces. In the ensuing months, "the JNA pulled out 310 tanks, 210 APCs, 260 field guns, 210 aircraft, 40 helicopters, 4 submarines, 4 frigates and 38 smaller warships from Croatia."²⁶¹

This is how the territory of BH became densely covered with Serbian military forces. The then JNA commander-in-chief, General Veljko KADIJEVIĆ, explained the reasons clearly: "In the assessment of future developments, we believed that after leaving Croatia, the JNA should keep strong forces in BH. This was consistent with any realistic and possible option of future developments in BH."²⁶²

Accordingly, at the very end of 1991, the rump (pro-Serbian) Presidency of the SFRY adopted a decision to reorganise the JNA. The Plan was made in early 1992 by the Federal Secretariat for People's Defence (SSNO) and the Republic of Serbia Defence Ministry, under the title *The Concept of Forming Yugoslav Defence Forces*.

The Plan invited the JNA to "continue to protect the Serbian population outside Serbia by transforming its command structures into Territorial Defence units and supplying them with personal weapons, artillery, armoured units and rocket launching systems. The SAO defence ministries in Croatia and BH were subordinated to the Serbian Defence Ministry and were expected to coordinate their defence plans and protect the outer borders and the constitutional order together. The SAO were

²⁵⁹ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 183.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 183; "One of the three snipers arrested by MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ special unit members on 6 April 1992 while they were shooting at the crowd gathered in front of the BH Assembly was Branko KOVAČEVIĆ, Assistant Secretary for the People's Defence of Sarajevo, former personal secretary to Radovan KARADŽIĆ."

²⁶¹ T. Kulenović, "Pripreme za rat i početak rata u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992. godine", in *Polemos*, 1. Zagreb, 1998, p. 104.

²⁶² V. Kadjević, *Moje videnje raspada*, Beograd, 1993, p. 147.

required to organise their armed forces and recruit conscripts with prior approval from Belgrade. The JNA General Staff had operative command over all forces.”²⁶³

In the first half of January 1992, simultaneously with the proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People in BH, “MILOŠEVIĆ issued an order requesting that all JNA officers born in BH return to this Republic.”²⁶⁴

After the international recognition of BH (7 April 1992) and despite the fact that the JNA had already become the instrument of Serbian armed aggression against BH, at its sessions in the second half of April 1992, the Presidency of RBH invited the “JNA forces in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to subordinate themselves to the command of the legal authorities of this republic and thwart the aggressor forces in all spheres.”²⁶⁵

At a session held in late April 1992, however, “in view of the fact that BH /was/ a sovereign and internationally recognised state and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been proclaimed,” the RBH Presidency “adopted a Decision on the Withdrawal of JNA units from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”²⁶⁶

Shortly after, on 4 May 1992, the “JNA General Staff announced the withdrawal of military personnel who were not citizens of Bosnia and their families from BH... while members of the Federal forces who were citizens of Bosnia were transformed into the Territorial Defence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later on, the VRS).”²⁶⁷ In mid-May 1992, JNA Colonel Ratko MLADIĆ, Commander of the Knin Corps of the JNA, was appointed “Commander of the Serbian army in BH, i.e. the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS).”²⁶⁸

“Organisation-wise, the VRS was divided into five corps: the 1st Krajina Corps (Banja Luka), the 2nd Krajina Corps (Drvar), the 3rd Northern Bosnia Corps, the 4th Eastern Bosnia Corps (Sarajevo – Romanija) and the 5th Herzegovina Corps.”²⁶⁹

In this period, the total strength of all VRS corps “was between 90,000 and 100,000 well-armed soldiers, cadets and officers, 750-800 tanks, about 1,000 APCs and other armoured vehicles, more than 4,000 mortars and artillery pieces and up to 100 aircraft and 50 helicopters.”²⁷⁰

In conclusion, the VRS was put together from large parts of the JNA, parts of the BH Territorial Defence and various paramilitary units.

KADIJEVIĆ, however, rightfully concluded: “JNA commands and units were the backbone of the army of Republika Srpska, together with the weapons and equipment. This army, fully relying on the people... created military prerequisites for the adequate political solutions, which would suit their national interests and aims, of course, to the extent allowed by the current international circumstances.”²⁷¹

²⁶³ Milan Vego, “The Yugoslav Ground Forces,” in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 5, 6, 1993, p. 250; quote taken from T. Kulenović, op. cit. 107-108.

²⁶⁴ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 384.

²⁶⁵ Minutes of the 69th Session of the BH Presidency, held on 13 and 14 April 1992, published in *National Security and the Future*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2006, p. 136.

²⁶⁶ Minutes of the 79th Session..., published in *National Security...*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2006, p. 178.

²⁶⁷ Minutes of the 79th Session.... held on 27 April 1992, in *Ibid.*, p. 177.

²⁶⁸ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 184.

²⁶⁹ T. Kulenović, op. cit., p. 108.

²⁷⁰ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 184.

²⁷¹ V. Kadjević, op. cit., p. 148; See Davor Domazet, “Uloga JNA kao srpske imperijalne sile u bosanskohercegovačkom ratu,” *Hrvatski vojniki*, Zagreb, 1998. (English translation: The Role of the JNA as a Serbian Imperial Force in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina); see corresponding images at www.slobodanpraljak.com.

II-5.2 Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH Army)

The beginning of the BH Army was in the (semi)secret military part of the Patriotic League (PL), established in late 1990 or early 1991 under the auspices of the SDA. The military part of the PL was engaged in organising armed resistance, while its civilian part – through the SDA and the BH governmental bureaucracy composed of SDA members – sought a political resolution at the level of Yugoslavia and BH through negotiations.

The first PL units were established under conspiratorial conditions, on a voluntary basis, without a clear military structure and hierarchy. It was because of this that the units had many different names (*Bosnia-1, Bosnia-2, Zelene Beretke /Green Berets/, etc.*), which did not indicate their type and strength. The Commander of the PL was Sefer HALILOVIĆ, a former JNA officer and collaborator of the JNA Counterintelligence Service (KOS).

The PL gradually grew in numbers and developed its structure, so “at the military consultation meeting held in Mehurići near Travnik (7-8 February 1992)... it was established that the Patriotic League had 60,000 to 70,000 armed members. The force covered the whole territory of BH and consisted of the Main Staff of the PL at the level of the Republic, nine regional staffs, 103 municipal staffs and many different units, organised in formations from platoons to brigades.”²⁷²

A day after the international recognition of BH, on 8 April 1992, the Presidency of RBH adopted a “Decree Law... abrogating the Republican Territorial Defence Staff and establishing the Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (TORBH Staff). Hasan EFENDIĆ was appointed its Commander. “It was decided that the Presidency of the Republic... would make decisions regarding the use of Territorial Defence.” At this session, the Presidency of BH also adopted decisions “declaring an immediate threat of war” and “changing the name of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”²⁷³

“On this and the following day (8 April 1992, *author’s note*) 40 of 48 members of the earlier Republican TO Staff affirmed their loyalty to the new TO Staff in writing... In 1990, there were nine district TO staffs in BH, and on this day (8 April 1992, *author’s note*) seven of them confirmed their acceptance of the decision... 73 out of 109 municipal staffs did the same.”²⁷⁴

At its next session (9 April 1992), the Presidency of RBH adopted a Decision to Join all Armed Forces in the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to which “all armed forces and individuals, except the JNA and the MUP, were to report to the local TO responsible “in order to be placed under unified command and assigned a unique designation.”

This meant that all units of the Patriotic League were to join the new TO in BH. “The Main Staff of the Patriotic League joined the TORBH Staff straight away, on 12 April.”²⁷⁵ This is when the gradual regrouping and systematisation of the existing units began: “TO staffs and units – platoons, companies and battalions – will be organised in May and June; brigades will be established in June and July, and

²⁷² T. Kulenović, op. cit., p. 105; See: S. Halilović, op. cit., p. 120.

²⁷³ “Zapisnik 65. sjednice Predsjedništva Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine” /Minutes of the 65th Session of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in *National Security...*, 7, 3, 2006, p.126.

²⁷⁴ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 187.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 187.

corps will be formed from September until the end of 1992.”²⁷⁶ A significant and objective difficulty, which seriously slowed down and threatened the smoothness and continuity of the process of integration of BH armed forces was the isolation of Sarajevo, both in military and in communications terms. Sarajevo was the formal centre of military and political authorities, whose communications and, even more, the supervision of subordinate structures, were carried out with difficulties.²⁷⁷

Many other problems emerged during the establishment of the armed forces of RBH, and some “lasted until the end of the war.”²⁷⁸ Two serious “technical” problems included the shortage of educated military professionals²⁷⁹ and a lack of weapons and ammunition. “About 75% of armed forces members spent the first year of the war in civilian clothes and footwear... even the insignia were different – from the emblems of the TO and the Patriotic League to the coats-of-arms of various towns (Tuzla, Mostar) and stripes on the sleeves.”²⁸⁰

The other types of problems were much more difficult to overcome. They concerned the fact that the Patriotic League had “kept its staff, which was separate from the TO and the inevitable rivalry did not end even when... the Republican TO Staff formally assumed the command of all BH units which were based on the political platform of the PL.”²⁸¹ In addition, the lack of unity of the RBH armed forces was also strongly influenced by the fact that various other armies and units should have been involved: “the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), the Croatian defence forces (HOS), the Green Berets, as the SDA party police, and other resistance groups which were emerging throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.”²⁸²

A particular problem of the highest and high command levels was in the fact that in the structure of civilian and military authorities “the importance of personal relations between individual politicians, officials and commanders grew,”²⁸³ which is why the influence of “political and military leaders on military issues depended on their own networks of patron-client relations, which in turn encouraged struggles for power.”²⁸⁴ “Everything was a part of the broader process in which the leaders and officials the SDA and the bureaucrats and security officers of the former Communist regime blended in into a new Bosniak elite.”²⁸⁵

In this situation lacking any control, one should not overlook the fact that in various areas of BH “the criminal elements in Bosnian armed forces... had their own selfish interests too.” For instance, with regard to the siege of Sarajevo, the interest of criminal groups which were a part of defence was in “maintaining the siege and the lucrative black market... where they operated in cooperation with their criminal counterparts from among the Serbian soldiers who held the siege and those in the

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 189.

²⁷⁷ See Tomo Šimić, “Djelovanje Predsjedništva BiH u uvjetima bitno smanjene komunikacije između Sarajeva i drugih dijelova BiH...” /Activities of the Presidency of BH under Conditions of Significantly Limited Communication between Sarajevo and Other Parts of BH/ in *National Security and the Future*, Vol. 7, No. 1-2, 2006, p. 115-161.

²⁷⁸ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 187.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 189: “In many brigades commander posts were held by men who had not even completed compulsory military service and in one 5,000-plus-strong brigade, they even bragged about not having a single commissioned or non-commissioned officer.”

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 189.

²⁸¹ M. A. Hoare, op. cit., p. 213.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 213.

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 213.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 215.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 216.

HVO. The commander of the 1st Bosnian (Sarajevo) Corps... insists that the frontlines on Igman were controlled by a mafia composed of all nationalities.”²⁸⁶

As early as the second half of May 1992, Hasan EFENDIĆ, Chief of the TORBH Staff was replaced by Sefer HALILOVIĆ. On 4 July 1992, the BH armed forces were officially named the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH Army).²⁸⁷

The conflicts of interest within the SDA Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy were also reflected in the struggle for dominance over the BH Army. “The replacement of HALILOVIĆ was considered as early as July 1992,” but only in June 1993, with the reorganisation of the Supreme Command of the BH Army was he “demoted to the fourth place in the Army hierarchy”²⁸⁸ and in Operation Trebević (which started in late October 1993) “HALILOVIĆ was immediately removed from the position of Chief of Staff and an investigation was initiated against him.”²⁸⁹

When Rasim DELIĆ was appointed to the top position of the BH Army in June 1993, a process of deeper, radical changes in personnel and ideology began in the BH Army, through which it gradually “became a party army of the SDA, independent of the supervision of official state bodies. Accordingly, the role of President IZETBEGOVIĆ as an individual was becoming more central in army propaganda.”²⁹⁰ In the process of reorganisation of the BH Army in 1993 “the Army’s Islamic orientation grew stronger.”²⁹¹ The symbolic expression of this process was exhibited in October 1994, when IZETBEGOVIĆ was “pronounced ‘honorary commander’” of the 7th Muslim Brigade,²⁹² which excelled in radical religious indoctrination.

The strength of the BH Army grew continually. In 1993, it had close to “200,000 men, although not all of them were armed, but in 1994, the number reached 250,000. Our main problem was that we did not even have a rifle for each soldier.”²⁹³

The course of the war and the growth of the BH Army, was accompanied by the corresponding changes in the military organisation. The main problem of the units was their poor manoeuvring capability, which is why operations groups were formed in early 1994, while manoeuvre battalions were organised in brigades. In the spring of 1995, “operations groups were disbanded and manoeuvre brigades and divisions were formed.”²⁹⁴

Throughout the entire war, the BH Army also depended on assistance from institutions of the Croatian state in various ways (logistically, organisationally, in training, joint activities). This is explored in detail in the third part of this report.

II-5.3 Croatian Defence Council (HVO)

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 217.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 215.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 219.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 221; It is an open question to what extent the fact that Mr. Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ’s term of office at the helm of the RBH Presidency was ending in December 1992 and that, according to the Constitution, he was to be replaced (and succeeded by a representative of the Croats, i.e. the HDZ), affected the processes in the BH Army until the end of 1992 (and other processes in BH). However, he was not replaced, and this was justified by the state of war, and IZETBEGOVIĆ was the President of the RBH Presidency until the end of the war.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 223.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 222.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 223.

²⁹³ J. Divjak, op. cit., p. 191.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 194.

The roots of the emergence of the HVO lie primarily in the fact that many Croats from BH (the estimate is 10,000 to 20,000)²⁹⁵ participated in the defence of the Republic of Croatia from Serbian armed aggression in 1990 and 1991. Hence, throughout 1991, in various ways – and in response to the increasingly open Serbian threats in the territory of BH – weapons kept being sent to the Croats in BH to be used for defence and local, unconnected volunteer groups were formed. It should be said that a yet unknown number of Muslims/Bosniaks from BH who had participated in the defence of RH also participated in the establishment and activities of the HVO.

Furthermore, the territory of BH was used intensively for Serbian aggression against Croatia and the southern territories of BH became a part of the Croatian theatre of war in the second half of 1991. Thus, groups or individuals who had already volunteered in the Republic of Croatia began to arrive (return) gradually to join the Croats in BH.

In the unusually complex (or even chaotic) political and military circumstances which prevailed particularly in the initial years of the war in BH, the process of involvement of the then members of the Croatian Army – HV (from the Republic of Croatia) in the defence of BH, i.e. the armed forces in the territory of BH (HVO, HOS, BH Army) is an open question for researchers. The process was undoubtedly massive and went on in a range of various fashions, aided by the overall situation in the RH, which was uncertain and with the organisation of the institutional hierarchy in the RH in its initial stages, significantly burdened by so-called transitional problems. This process will be explored partly in the third chapter of this report.

On the other hand, the vital state interests of the RH were linked to the defence of BH from Serbian armed aggression, which is why the RH generously and diversely assisted the survival of BH.²⁹⁶ In that context, as early as 7 July 1992, a brief Instruction was issued by the Minister of Defence (RH) to all commands of the Croatian Army, which clearly defined the relationship and interests of the RH state towards the defence of the state of the RBH.

The Instruction specified: “No commanders are allowed to send or use the Croatian Army outside the borders of the Republic of Croatia. Anyone doing so without the explicit command of the Supreme Commander shall suffer the consequences of his actions. Should volunteers from Croatian units who are natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina wish to go to battle and defend their homes, commanders are not allowed to stop them.”²⁹⁷

During the process of organising various armed groups and units into the composition of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) as part of the armed forces of the HZHB (subsequently, the HRHB) and part of the Armed Forces of BH, a particular problem was that of the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), the establishment of which was initiated and which was later partially supervised by the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP). The HOS Staff for Herzegovina was “established on 3 January 1992” and it is estimated that the “HOS had up to 5,000 members in BH... the HOS played an important role in the liberation of Mostar, Čapljina, Neum and Stolac.”²⁹⁸

²⁹⁵ T. Kulenović, op. cit., p. 106.

²⁹⁶ This is explored in the third chapter of the report (The Relationship of the RH towards BH from 1990 to 1995).

²⁹⁷ Archives of Slobodan PRALJAK, POS-2-113.

²⁹⁸ T. Kulenović, op. cit., p. 106.

There were many Muslim/Bosniak members in HOS units. The Commander of the HOS was Blaž KRALJEVIĆ, a Croat who had emigrated to Australia and returned as a volunteer. He supported the cooperation between the Croats and the Muslims/Bosniaks. In early August 1992, “the Government in Sarajevo appointed General KRALJEVIĆ a member of the BH Army Main Staff.”²⁹⁹ Due to the many differences between parts of the HVO and the HOS, KRALJEVIĆ was soon killed in an ambush near Mostar. At this point, an all-out armed conflict between the HOS and the HVO was avoided by an agreement signed on 23 August 1992 by Mate BOBAN and the Chief of the Main Staff of the HOS (Ante PRKAČIN). After this, the HOS was completely disbanded when groups or individual members transferred to the HVO or the BH Army.

According to assessments, which vary extensively, in the most critical period in political and military terms, the HVO probably had between “35,000 and 37,000 members, organised in 40 to 45 battalion-strong and 20 platoon-strong units. Territorially, there were about 20,000 HVO members in western Herzegovina, 10,000 to 12,000 in northern Bosnia, 3,000 in central Bosnia and 2,000 in northwestern Bosnia.”³⁰⁰

There are multiple reasons, however, for the fact that the problems remain unresolved of ascertaining the strength, activities and other characteristics of the HVO.

The first reason is the (abovementioned) disorganised and chaotic (inferior) Croatian hierarchy in BH. These weaknesses were even more pronounced in the armed forces collectively called the HVO. The reliability of their records is therefore problematic, as are the data processed from them. Symbolically, the fact that the highest body of the executive administration and government in the territory of the HZHB was also called the HVO is also interesting,³⁰¹ and was a source of confusion at the time and still is today among the less informed.

In 1992 and 1993, the highest authority bodies of the HZHB and the HRHB adopted many different regulations on the armed forces, war and an immediate threat of war.³⁰²

In practice, the armed forces (i.e. the HVO) survived despite several elementary shortcomings. It is an interesting fact that the often very extensive regulations concerning defence and the army mention the term HVO (in the military sense) extremely rarely, but rather refer to the “armed forces” etc.

The basic document is certainly the extensive Decree Law on the Armed Forces of the HZHB, adopted on 3 July 1992 and published in September 1992. It was amended to an extent in mid-October 1992 and published in November 1992. Its Article 2 specified: “The defence system of the HZHB is a unified form of

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 106.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 102 and 106. The data given in the ICTY case against PRLIĆ et al. specifies: “... as for the HVO, the total number of soldiers was 36,797, divided as follows: 20,841 Croats and 15,956 Muslims.” (taken from Slobodan Praljak, *Financiranje HVO-a*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2008, p. 97).

³⁰¹ *Narodni list*, 1, 1992, p. 5.

³⁰² *Narodni list*, 1992, No. 1 (“Decree Law on the Armed Forces”, “Decree Law on Taking Over the /?Equipment/ of the JNA and the SSNO /Federal Secretariat of National Defence/...”, “Decree Law on the Treatment of Persons Taken Prisoner in Armed Conflicts,” “Decree Law on Salaries and Other Financial Compensation for Members of the Armed Forces of the HZHB,” “Decree Law on Ranks...,” “Code of Military Discipline”); No. 4 (“Decree Law on the Establishment of War Damages”); No. 5 (“Decree Law on the Status of Refugees and Expellees,” “Rules of Requirements and Procedures for Posting, Conferring Ranks and Promotions...”); No. 7 (“Rules on Completing Compulsory Military Service and Civilian Service”); *Narodni list*, 1993, No. 4 (“Rules on Military ID Booklets”); No. 11 (“Rules on Implementing and Carrying Out Mobilisation”).

organisation of the armed forces, command bodies and legal entities with the purpose of prompt and organised prevention of attacks and other threats... the armed forces and other bodies have the right and the responsibility to immediately commence armed combat and other forms of resistance against the attackers.”³⁰³

Almost all important powers over the armed forces were given to the President of the HZHB, who is “the supreme commander of the Armed Forces,” who “determines the basic organisation of the Armed Forces... adopts the plan of use and orders the use of the Armed Forces... provides the guidelines for stand-by measures and mobilisation... establishes the basis of personnel policy... adopts general and basic rules... appoints and relieves army commanders.”³⁰⁴

In practice, however, under these chaotic circumstances, it was impossible to establish meaningful and comprehensive coordination between the Croatian political and military components in BH and the situation was similar within the military relations in the HVO. The HVO commanding structures, particularly those in units, mostly lacked personnel with a military education, most of the soldiers had no military training, hierarchy and discipline were almost inexistent, the units were incomplete in structure and manning levels, they were formed in accordance with the territorial principle and hence acted and were supplied accordingly.

As a result of all of the above, subordination, communication and cooperation in and among the units were very poor, but also impeded by other circumstances: a total absence of links among areas controlled by some parts of the Croatian hierarchies or HVO units (Herzegovina, central BH, Posavina, western BH). Under such circumstances, in which units were mostly organised at municipal level and isolated, one of the largest problems of the HVO was the strong influence of local (municipal) civilian structures and /?local/ interests and relations on HVO units. This additionally harmed the already weak command hierarchy and introduced the deviation of amoral informality into military affairs, decisions and activities.

The indicated problems and lack of information regarding the emergence, strength, methods of operating and other issues regarding the HVO are recognised clearly in the available documents concerning the financing of the HVO.³⁰⁵ The governing hierarchy of the HZHB (HRHB) including the military and civilian components of the HVO was financed from several sources: its own central revenue (taxes, war tax, compensations, etc.), local revenue (war taxes, etc.), loans from the RH and donations from Croatian émigrés. The common characteristic of all these methods was their mutual and individual poor quality (formal and actual incompleteness, inconsistency or contradiction, etc.).

For example, in January 1994, the HRHB Ministry of Defence prepared a balance sheet, i.e. its Annual Report for 1993,³⁰⁶ where “the main difficulty in the preparation of the Annual Report was created by all units and military districts which failed to send us their balance sheets... with the exception of Orašje ZP /Military District/, which did send us their balance sheet.”³⁰⁷

Furthermore, the document stressed that in 1993, the financial operations of the HRHB Ministry of Defence were carried out with as much as 18 important “limiting factors,” including the following: “the lack of a unified system of financing... self-financing of the HVO units through municipal organs... the lack of a

³⁰³ *Narodni list*, 6, 1992, p. 9.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12, Article 29.

³⁰⁵ See the selected documents published in S. Praljak, *Financiranje HVO-a*, Zagreb, 2008, and a more comprehensive compilation of documents at www.slobodanpraljak.com.

³⁰⁶ S. Praljak, *Financiranje HVO-a*, str. 79-88.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

complete military system... Units/institutions being constantly formed and re-organised... the lack of war reserves... the lack of the required storage space... supplies not /?classified/ by type... the lack of permanent sources of financing.”³⁰⁸

The Report on the Transfer of Fun. (Funds, *author's note*) to the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, i.e. the Federation of BH, sent by the Sector for Finances and Accounting of the RH Defence Ministry to the State Auditing Office of the RH, provides precise and detailed information on the funds transferred by the RH from 1992 to 1998 “to the budget of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, i.e. the Croatian component of the Federation of BH... for the following purposes:

- basic salaries of HVO members;
- war allowance for HVO members;
- subsidies for the expenses of the establishments and public institutions of the

Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, i.e. the Croatian component of the Federation of BH.”³⁰⁹

This document also reveals that “... the transfers of funds were planned as a separate budget line in the budget of the MORH (RH Defence Ministry, *author's note*) for the entire reporting period... Every year, the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia adopted the aforementioned budgets of the Defence Ministry.”³¹⁰ The other documents clearly show that the MORH transferred the funds to the HZHB (HRHB) as a loan, to be charged from the budget of the HZHB (HRHB).³¹¹

Local municipal authorities (presidencies of municipal assemblies, municipal war presidencies, municipal executive boards, etc.) in the territory of the HZHB (HRHB) and other areas in BH controlled by Croatian and/or Muslim/Bosniak hierarchies adopted decisions or orders on war taxes which people working abroad or beneficiaries of foreign pensions had to pay to municipal budgets. The amounts collected by this war tax and the way it was spent varied among municipalities and some of them changed it in accordance with their assessments and needs.³¹²

A good example illustrating what the situation in the territory of the HZHB was actually like, was a letter sent by the local (municipal) HVO in Tomislavgrad on 20 February 1993 to the central HVO HZHB, requesting that the HVO HZHB take over future funding of the local HVO brigade (*Kralj /King/ Tomislav*),³¹³ and that they reimburse the municipality for “the expenses incurred so far.” The letter states: “From the beginning of the war until today, Tomislavgrad Municipality has not received financial aid from the HZHB or any other municipality. It had to pay for all war expenses by itself... We know for certain that the financial burden and all other burdens concerning the war – in personnel, equipment, machines or finances – have not been distributed evenly among municipalities.

Kralj Tomislav Brigade includes a battalion from Kupres and one from Posušje. It was unlikely to expect that Kupres municipality would cover the expenses of its army and refugees by itself, but Posušje municipality did not finance the expenses of its battalion either... In addition, Tomislavgrad municipality funded the organisation and training of the Jajce battalion and after the fall of Jajce, it was stationed in the territory of Tomislavgrad, together with refugees... All these expenses have been duly recorded in documents... it is evident that the expenses of

³⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 81-82.

³⁰⁹ www.slobodanpraljak.com.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ S. Praljak, *Financiranje HVO-a*, pp. 77-78.

³¹² Ibid., pp. 11, 39, 40, 41, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71, 72, 73 and 74.

³¹³ Ibid., p. 69.

units from other municipalities covered by Tomislavgrad municipality amounted to 1,479,550 DEM /German marks/ in 1992... we therefore request that the HZHB:

- take over the funding of all defence costs,
- distribute war expenses, on all bases, evenly among all HZHB municipalities,
- find ways to compensate the funds spent so far to Tomislavgrad municipality.”³¹⁴

The second main problem of the HVO was the ambivalent political and military relations between the Croatian hierarchy in BH and the state authorities of BH and the BH Army (which mostly consisted of Muslims/Bosniaks). There were moments when, HVO units would be clashing with the BH Army in some localities (central Bosnia, Mostar), while at the same time elsewhere, they would be fighting together against Serbian aggression (Orašje, Tuzla, Sarajevo).³¹⁵

In view of all of the above, if one attempts to comprehend objectively the overall activity of the HVO as a military force, from its establishment until 1994, one should not disregard the crucial differences which existed in specific periods and the crucial differences which existed in some areas and /?local communities/ in BH. For example, at first, the HV had more troops and operations in the border area, particularly to the south (in accordance with the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation signed by the RBH and RH on 21 July 1992 and its Supplement of 23 September 1992)³¹⁶ and – due to the fact that they were on a single front, with a common enemy (the Serbian aggressor) – had greater influence on the HVO at the time.

Likewise, in some areas (fronts), the HVO (and the Croats) acted in conjunction with the BH Army and its predecessors (and Muslims/Bosniaks) throughout the war, while in some areas their joint operations lasted until mid-1993. In addition, one should be aware of the complexity of the general situation in BH and the changes that took place at the political level (from local, through BH to international) and those at the military level (the balance of powers in BH, restructuring, etc.).

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. 69-70.

³¹⁵ See J. Divjak, op. cit., pp. 201-203; M. A. Hoare, op. cit., pp. 217-218.

³¹⁶ More about this in the third chapter of this report - “Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation of the RBH and the RH.” See also documents in: S. Praljak, *Pad Bosanske Posavine 1992. godine*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

II.-6

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

II.-6.1 Up to the International Recognition of BH (7 April 1992)

In 1990, each of the former Yugoslav republics held their own independent parliamentary elections, based on which new sovereign systems of state authorities were established in these republics. Concurrently, the main institutions of the Federal state of Yugoslavia either ceased to exist (SKJ /League of Communists of Yugoslavia/) or were in the final stages of formal and actual dissolution.

The international community focused its attention on the problem of the crisis and break-up of the second Yugoslavia only in mid-1991, which was too late, as the crisis had reached a critical stage and the process of dissolution of the joint state was truly and formally irreversible. Coming to the problem so late, the international community failed to acknowledge the situation at hand (the existing dissolution) and used entirely the wrong approach which boiled down to supporting something which no longer existed (Yugoslavia) and which none of the dominant institutional agents in the territory of the former Yugoslavia wanted.

The other compound error made by the international community was in the fact that at the beginning of its involvement, it focused on Slovenia and Croatia, trying to bring them back into the framework of a non-existent state, although in mid-1991, Slovenia and Croatia were for all intents and purposes independent states (referendums had been held and the parliaments had proclaimed their independence). At that time, the international community showed almost no direct interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the fact that an internal political and security-related drama was already happening and that BH and its resources were key to Serbian armed aggression, which was being conducted on a full scale against the Republic of Croatia.

Two days after the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, on 27 June 1991, the Assembly of the SR /Socialist Republic/ of BH discussed the “Six Items of the President of the Presidency Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ on the future of the SFRY,”³¹⁷ which announced the forthcoming referendum in BH. On this occasion IZETBEGOVIĆ said that he had “asked the US Secretary of State (James BAKER had visited Yugoslavia several days earlier, *author’s note*) ’for the international community to focus on BH,’ because a civil war, as a realistic threat, could first break out in this republic. ’BAKER agreed with this,’ added IZETBEGOVIĆ.”³¹⁸

“Expecting a national partition of the republic, IZETBEGOVIĆ wrote to the Presidency of the European Community on 12 July 1991 and requested a “good will mission.” The request was supported by BH Croats Stjepan KLJUIĆ and Ivan MARKEŠIĆ, leaders of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”³¹⁹ “The Government of BH requested again, on 11 September, that EU observers be sent to BH.”³²⁰

This, however, produced no results and in December 1991, the international community mentioned BH for the first time, although in passing, in Opinion Number 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, quoting the

³¹⁷ *Borba* (daily newspaper), Belgrade, 28 June 1991; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 55-56; (3D00320).

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56; (3D00320).

³¹⁹ Carole Hodge, *Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas*, Zagreb, 2007, p. 64.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

BH Resolution “on sovereignty, adopted by the Assembly on 14 October 1991,” as one of the facts which led to the important opinion of the Arbitration Commission that Yugoslavia was in the “process of dissolution.”³²¹

Then followed the above-described request of the BH for international recognition, which was postponed and tied to the referendum.

II.-6.1.1 Cutilheiro’s Peace Plan

In mid-1992, the foreign ministers of European Union (EU) member states published the brief, so-called Lisbon Statement on Yugoslavia, in an attempt to overcome the crisis of the EU /as printed Peace Conference on Yugoslavia which had started in October 1991, when Serbia rejected the offered proposals. Inter alia, the Lisbon Statement said that the EU supported “the current efforts of the Conference promoting dialogue of the interested parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the aim of reaching a constitutional resolution, which will take into account the legitimate aspirations of all nations within the inviolable borders of the republic.”³²²

The Statement was an overture to the first peace plan (of the EU) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is widely known as Cutilheiro’s Peace Plan or the Lisbon Agreement.³²³ The foundations of this plan were laid on 22 February 1992 at a press conference in Sarajevo, after the delegations of the three constituent peoples, led by Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, Radovan KARADŽIĆ and Mirko LASIĆ, returned from Lisbon.

They announced that “an agreement was reached in Lisbon on the ‘reconstruction’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” where BH would “remain within the existing borders, but a thorough decentralisation will be carried out and (three, *author’s note*) national units will be established, with limited self-government.”³²⁴

³²¹ Vladimir Đuro Degan, *Hrvatska država u međunarodnoj zajednici*, Zagreb, 2002, p. 334-336; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 108-110; (3D00320).

³²² *Večernji list* (daily newspaper), Zagreb, 20 February 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp.134-135; (3D00320).

³²³ In January 1992, Portugal took over the presidency of the EC and the Portuguese Foreign Minister José CUTILHEIRO became the president of the EC Council of Ministers. Carole Hodge wrote that Cutilheiro’s Plan was developed by Lord CARRINGTON “in close cooperation with Belgrade.” C. Hodge, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

³²⁴ *Večernji list*, 24 February 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 136-137; (3D00320).




Fig. 20: The so-called Cutillero's Peace Plan
(Taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 734)

/translation: Croatian part, Muslim part, Serbian part; Sarajevo, Konak Residence, 18 March 1992; Proposal of the EC on the internal organisation of BH into three constituent units based on ethnic principles – Cutillero's Plan; Source: *Vjesnik*, 19 March 1992/

The representatives of all three peoples announced that they were satisfied with the agreement and KARADŽIĆ called for "rifles to be put back on rifle racks" and said: "The SDS will halt that which could interfere with the agreement, there is no need for the proclamation of *krajinas*" and "We do not aspire to annex a single fraction of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia."³²⁵

Several days later, the HDZHB issued a statement about the Lisbon Agreement: "The HDZ's main request is preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its historical borders, which are also the current borders, as an independent and sovereign state of three constituent and sovereign peoples and citizens living in this

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 137; (3D00320).

territory.”³²⁶ In addition, the statement said that this model of a state was not unusual in the world (the United States, Switzerland, Belgium) and that the HDZBH “is not asking for any more rights for the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina than what it finds belong to the other constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”³²⁷

In the following month or so (until the end of March 1992), several meetings were held of further negotiations and the interested parties from BH presented their proposals and suggestions. In the fifth round of negotiations, on 18 March 1992, under the auspices of the EU, a Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina³²⁸ was adopted in Sarajevo. Item 1 of this document reads: “Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a state comprising three constituent units founded on the principles of nation and with respect to economic, geographical and other criteria.”³²⁹ A large number of principles was elaborated on the general legal standards, responsibilities and the organisation of bodies in BH and its “constituent units”.

In the sixth round of negotiations, held “in Brussels on 30 and 31 March and chaired by Ambassador J. CUTILHEIRO, coordinator of the Peace Conference,” the participants adopted a Supplement to the Statement on Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³³⁰ “An appeal was sent from this meeting to everybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina to refrain from violence and all other activities which could threaten a peaceful resolution of the problem.”³³¹ According to the Supplement, among other things, “it was agreed that a working group will be established, chaired by an EU representative, to define the territories of the constituent units” and submit its recommendations to “the Chairman of these negotiations by 15 May 1992... The working group will make a map of constituent units. It will base its work on the criterion of the nation.”³³²

However, Cutilheiro’s international peace plan failed because the Serbian hierarchy in BH rejected it (by continuing their military and political action and by directly giving up). To them, the negotiations served only as a tactical means (the Greater-Serbian hierarchy had done exactly the same in the Republic of Croatia in 1991 and continued in BH). Actually, “the Serbian leaders... obviously assessed that they could achieve more through war than at the negotiating table.”³³³

The Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy also gave up on Cutilheiro’s international peace plan, but in a more cautious fashion and more slowly. Any deeper motives and interests of these two hierarchies and other interests and factors which influenced their giving up of the plan have only been researched partially.³³⁴

It was only the Croatian side which took the plan seriously and agreed with it fully.

The most important impact of Cutilheiro’s international peace plan on further developments in the territory of BH was the fact that it “introduced the concept of

³²⁶ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 141-143; (3D00320).

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 143; (3D00320).

³²⁸ *Vjesnik* (daily newspaper), Zagreb, 16 March 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 156-159; (3D00320).

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 156; (3D00320).

³³⁰ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 160-162; (3D00320).

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 160; (3D00320).

³³² *Ibid.*, pp. 160-162; (3D00320).

³³³ C. Hodge, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

³³⁴ See *Ibid.*, pp. 70-81. A document quoted in *Dani* weekly (Sarajevo), 7 March 2008, should be considered in the exploration of the motives, interests and political actions of the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy in relation to Cutilheiro’s peace plan and, in general, with regard to the resolution of the problem in BH.

territorial partition in accordance with national criteria into the international peace process” very early (in February 1992) in addressing the problem in BH and “the fact that this later influenced all peace plans, including the Dayton Agreement.”³³⁵

On the other hand, the actions of all the parties in the territory of BH and the former Yugoslavia were more or less shaped by the influence of the international community, since all of them were aware that sooner or later the final decision would be made by institutions of the international community. In this context, a particular international problem (which had a long-term reach far beyond the territory of the former Yugoslavia) was the fact that the international plan “nevertheless created a precedent by indirectly endorsing and supporting the “ethnic cleansing” which had started several months earlier.”³³⁶

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 70.

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

**II.-6.2. From the International Recognition of BH to the Failure
of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
(7 April 1992 – 19 May 1993)**

In April 1992, Serbian armed aggression against BH was at its highest; in eastern and northwestern BH, the ethnic cleansing of Muslims/Bosniaks was conducted through mass expulsions, detention in camps and killings. Armed members of the BH SDS took over power in Banja Luka by force; the area between Kupres and Neretva was under attack. In consequence, at the end of April, “the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were over 400,000 displaced persons in BH.”³³⁷ Of this number, according to the same source, 122,000 people remained in BH and 201,000 refugees from all over BH went to the Republic of Croatia.

On 12 May 1992, the EU adopted a Declaration on BH, which stated that the EU monitored, “the situation in BH with great concern, reaffirming its opinion that a political resolution may only be based on the principles established through discussions on the constitutional arrangement held between the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims under the auspices of the Peace Conference.”³³⁸

The Declaration was also clear about who was responsible: “Although all parties, each in its own way, contributed to the state of affairs, those who are by far the most responsible are the authorities in Belgrade, which control the army directly and indirectly, by assisting paramilitary forces. The killing and expulsion of the population... siege and the systematic shelling of Sarajevo... are acts deserving of general condemnation.” This is why the EU and its members requested, inter alia, “the complete withdrawal of the JNA and its weapons from BH or that its forces be disbanded and subordinated to effective international supervision.”³³⁹

At the end of May 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 757, imposing sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a country which had been officially formed several days earlier as a union of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbian armed aggression against BH, however, continued unabated.

In the first half of June 1992, the UN Security Council allowed the peace-keeping forces to assume control of the Sarajevo airport in order to enable the supply of humanitarian aid. Until then, the airport had been controlled by Serbian forces.

In mid-May 1992 (more than a month after the international recognition of BH), the chairman of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (Lord CARRINGTON) asked the Arbitration Commission whether the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia could be considered finished. In its Opinion No. 8, adopted on 4 July 1992, it concluded that “that the process of dissolution of the SFRY has ended and it must be noted that the SFRY no longer exists.”³⁴⁰

In order to explain the intricate complexity of the overall situation in BH (at the time and now) one must emphasise that in the period from mid-June until late July 1992, there was a telling trial held by the High Court in Sarajevo. Namely, on 15 June 1992, filed with the High Court in Sarajevo by the High Public Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo (i.e. the High Public Prosecutor Ivica STANIĆ) was a Proposal to Ban the

³³⁷ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 387.

³³⁸ *Večernji list*, 13 May 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 178-179; (3D00320).

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 178; (3D00320).

³⁴⁰ V. Đ. Degan, op. cit., pp. 357-362; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 188-194; (3D00320).

Serbian Democratic Party, the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community, for their activities which were in contravention with the law, the programme and the aims declared at their establishment.³⁴¹

In the Statement of Reasons for the Proposal, the High Public Prosecutor provided a detailed description of the catastrophic security-related, economic, political, social and inter-ethnic situations in BH, directly and completely accusing the three ruling parties in BH. One separate charge against the three parties referred to: “Agreeing to conducting negotiations on the partition of the territory of BH on the basis of nation, imposing the option on representatives of the European Community, participation in discussions on such partition and accepting the principles of this partition...”³⁴²

At the end of this comprehensive Proposal, the High Public Prosecutor drew a conclusion which was typical of many political trials in the Communist Yugoslavia: “All of the reasons presented above are corroborated by a host of NOTORIOUS FACTS, additional evidence therefore being unnecessary for now.”³⁴³

On 24 July 1992, after several hearings, the Trial Chamber of the Court in Sarajevo (Judge Suljo BABIĆ Presiding) “rejected the Proposal of the High Public Prosecutor to ban the BH HDZ... Such an outcome was to be expected because several days ago, this same Trial Chamber rejected the Proposal of the High Public Prosecutor to ban the SDA for almost identical sins...”³⁴⁴

In early July 1992, the United Kingdom took over the presidency of the EU “at a critical moment for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”³⁴⁵ From the perspective of the problem of BH, the period of the UK presidency was characterised by the production of a large number of ineffective international documents (including the Vance-Owen peace plan), which had a great influence on the culmination of the security-related and humanitarian disaster in BH.³⁴⁶

In this period, basic stereotypes (erroneous perceptions of reality) of the events in BH were created. They significantly influenced the international perception and further political and judicial treatment of the events in BH and the region.

Namely, in the summer of 1992, in addition to the intensive activities of Serbian lobbying organisations, even Radovan KARADŽIĆ, “at a press conference held at the House of Commons (of the UK Parliament, *author’s note*), chaired by Henry BELLINGHAM, then parliamentary Private Secretary to Defence Secretary Malcolm RIFKIND... presented a document entitled *Concentration Camps in the New Europe 1992*, listing alleged ‘concentration camp sites and detention facilities used for the imprisonment or extermination of Bosnian Serbs.’”³⁴⁷

Thus, “the seed sown by Serb lobbyists nurtured the ‘civil war’ myth essential to British strategy and suggested a symmetry of guilt while the platform chosen – the House of Commons – lent a gloss of credibility.”³⁴⁸

Further evidence of how the situation developed in BH is the fact that “at the G7 annual summit in July, the Bosnian war was singled out as carrying considerable

³⁴¹ *Proposal of the High Public Prosecutor’s Office*, Number: UT 65/92, of 15 June 1992, p. 1. The author of this report has a copy of the document.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁴⁴ *Oslobodenje* (daily newspaper), Sarajevo, 25 July 1992.

³⁴⁵ C. Hodge, *op. cit.*, 83.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-112.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 85-86.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

risks for European stability.”³⁴⁹ However, the situation in BH quickly deteriorated and the international community was inefficient.

For example, on 17 July 1992, “the President of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia Lord CARRINGTON, read the full text of the Agreement signed in London by representatives of the three ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to journalists.”³⁵⁰ The first item of the Agreement read: “We have agreed to a cease-fire, to come into effect on Sunday, at 1800 hours local time, in the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”³⁵¹ However, only three days later (on 20 July 1992), the EU Council of Ministers adopted a Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia, in which the first item read: “The European Union and its Member States express deep concern about the fact that the Agreement signed by the parties in BH on 17 July in London under the auspices of the EU, has not yet been implemented.”³⁵²

In the following 40 days or so, the three parties adopted several general documents in preparation for the announced London Conference, held on 26 and 27 August 1992, when a document entitled *Draft Declaration on Principles and Programme of Action*³⁵³ was adopted. The document listed a large number of principles and announced the establishment of a Steering Committee, six working groups and some other bodies and determined that “the conference will last until a final resolution is found for the problem of the former Yugoslavia.”³⁵⁴

Thus, several days later, in early September 1992, commenced the work of a new, permanent International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), based in Geneva. Very soon, the ICFY began the production of extensive, complicated and mostly general and inefficient documents. At the same time, as the Greater-Serbian hierarchy in Serbia and BH hailed the establishment and work of the new international peace conference, Serbian aggression continued by way of ethnic cleansing, destruction and an expanding occupation of territories in BH.

In September 1992, the ICFY adopted several documents.³⁵⁵ A document called *Trust, Security Building and Verification*, in its ambitious chapter entitled “Current Decisions of the Conference,” inappropriately stated the following: “The most important task is to alleviate the suffering in BH by continually reporting on the locations of staffs and the names of commanders in all military, including paramilitary units.”³⁵⁶

In mid-September 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 776, which allowed international peace forces to be sent to BH and in the first half of October, Resolution 781 of the UN Security Council banned combat aircraft flights in BH airspace.

In the last trimester of 1992, the ICFY even increased the production of documents, both its own and those issued under its auspices.³⁵⁷ The most significant

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 84.

³⁵⁰ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 209; (3D00320).

³⁵¹ Ibid., p. 209; (3D00320).

³⁵² *Vjesnik*, 22 July 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, M., *Istina...*, pp. 210-211; (3D00320).

³⁵³ *Vjesnik*, 26 September 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 225-230; (3D00320).

³⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 226; (3D00320).

³⁵⁵ Documents in M. Tudman, *Istina...*; “Povjerenje, izgradnja sigurnosti i verifikacija” /Trust, Security Building and Verification/ (pp. 236-238); “Cjelovit tekst zajedničkog priopćenja – Vance, Owen, Čosić, Panić” /Full Text of a Joint Statement – Vance, Owen, Čosić, Panić/ (pp. 240-242); “Tekst zajedničke izjave predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana i predsjednika SRJ Dobrice Čosića” /Text of the Joint Statement of the President of the RH Dr Franjo Tuđman and the President of the FRY Dobrica Čosić/ (pp. 249-250); (3D00320).

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 236; (3D00320).

³⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 252-303; (3D00320).

of them was certainly the Draft Constitutional Arrangement of BH by the Working Group of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which later (early 1993) became the basis for a new officially presented international peace plan, the so-called Vance-Owen peace plan. The Draft proposed the most important (and the most disputed) provision of general arrangement: "BH would be a decentralised state" which "would be divided into 7 to 10 autonomous provinces."³⁵⁸

The adoption of the Draft which indicated an unspecified partition (7 to 10 regions or provinces) and unclear criteria in ethnic, geographical, historical, communications and economic terms for this partition, and the protracted negotiating process was really bait for the parties interested, which used all political, military and other means to reach the best possible positions in the final international adjudication on territorial partition.

Finally, in early 1993 (2 January), the Draft Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was presented in Geneva. The first part of the plan (entitled: Determining the Borders of Provinces) contained only one, very explicit sentence: "Bosnia and Herzegovina will be divided in accordance with the enclosed map" (there were 10 provinces).

The second part of the Vance-Owen Peace plan (entitled: Constitutional Framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina) foresaw that the three-party negotiations of the representatives of the three nations from BH "would continue in Geneva" under the auspices of the ICFY, "with the task of agreeing on the system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in keeping with the following principles:

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a decentralised state and most functions of the government will be performed by its provinces."³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 261; (3D00320).

³⁵⁹ *Slobodna Dalmacija* (daily newspaper), Split, 15-18 January 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 309-314; (3D00320).



Fig 21: The so-called Vance-Owen Peace Plan
(Taken from: M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 737)

/translation: Province 1, Province 2, Province 3, Province 4, Province 5, Province 6, Province 7, Province 8, Province 9, Province 10; Geneva, 2 January 1992; Vance Owen Peace Plan; Source: David Owen, *Balkanska odiseja /Balkan Odyssey/*, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 1998, p. 129.

However, the official publication of the Vance-Owen international peace plan caused a further escalation and deepening of political and military clashes in BH and its immediate vicinity³⁶⁰ and a new crisis in the international community about the problems in BH.³⁶¹ This expert report cannot go into deeper causal analysis of this fact. Rather, it would be sufficient to emphasise its basic and obvious problem at the level of phenomenology. And the problem is: this international peace plan for BH (as

³⁶⁰ This is clearly recognisable from several documents published in M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 315-387; (3D00320).

³⁶¹ C. Hodge, op. cit., pp. 118-155.

the other plans), regardless of its basic intentions, could not have been implemented without some corresponding mechanisms for imposing /implementation/ (which the international community did not use until 1994) and it therefore had – due to the situation in BH and its vicinity – negative ramifications.

In view of the above, the reaction of the US should also be considered. Already in the first half of February 1993, the US expressed their “reservations about the Vance-Owen plan for the very aspect which *de facto* awarded the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’”³⁶² and said that the US President (Bill CLINTON) decided to take “six steps,” of which the first was that the US would “become actively involved in the Vance-Owen negotiations with the full weight of American diplomacy.”³⁶³

In the following period, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions which referred to the territory of BH; Resolution 816 (of 31 March 1993), permitting NATO to down aircraft violating the flight ban; Resolution 819 (of 16 April), proclaiming Srebrenica a safe zone; Resolution 820 (of 27 April) imposing strict sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, for numerous reasons, Serbian aggression continued, unabated.

Following a series of proposals from various sides, negotiations and some amendments, on 25 March 1993, the leaders of the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchies in BH (Alija IZETBEOVIĆ and Mate BOBAN) signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in New York, although IZETBEOVIĆ added that the agreement (the signed plan) would not be valid unless the third (Serbian) party signed it “within a reasonable period of time,” “unless the international community soon takes efficient steps for the implementation of the signed documents” and “should aggression continue.”³⁶⁴

None of these conditions were met. The Serbian side in BH, having organised a “referendum” on 19 May 1993,³⁶⁵ announced that the voters “rejected the Vance-Owen plan.” This was the ultimate failure of this international peace plan.

Therefore, the Vance-Owen peace plan was rejected by the Serbian hierarchy in BH, while the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy abandoned it with a soft strategy, by laying down legitimate conditions.

Again, only the Croatian hierarchy in BH accepted the international (Vance-Owen) peace plan unconditionally, thus being truer to it than its international creators – which testifies to the afore-mentioned (non-)qualitative characteristics of this hierarchy.

II.-6.3.1 From 20 May 1993 to July 1994

II.-6.3.1 Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan

According to a Report³⁶⁶ written by the co-chairs as early as January 1992, the Vance-Owen peace plan was based on very clear basic premises: “The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is indivisible and intermixed. It is therefore impossible to

³⁶² *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, p. 391.

³⁶³ *Vjesnik*, 12 February 1993; document “Šest točaka...” /Six items/ taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 330-331; (3D00320).

³⁶⁴ *Vjesnik*, 26 and 27 March 1993; documents taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 336-338; (3D00320).

³⁶⁵ See document in M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 386-387; (3D00320).

³⁶⁶ Document “Izvješće supredsjedatelja o izradi nacrtu ustavnog ustrojstva Bosne i Hercegovine” /Co-Chairs Report on the Creation of the Draft Constitutional Arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 272-289; (3D00320).

create three territorially separate states based on ethnic or religious principles... Such a plan could achieve the unity and coherence of borders only through a process of forced moving of the population – already condemned by the International Conference and the main Assembly... and the Security Council” of the UN and “Mr VANCE and Lord OWEN concluded that any model based on three separate states which are based on ethnic/religious principles must be rejected.”³⁶⁷

Only a month after the failure of the Vance-Owen peace plan, on 20 June 1993, foreign ministers of the EU member states agreed on the new basic principles of a new international peace plan for BH.³⁶⁸ The EU ministers “established that the proposal to create three territorial units does not necessarily have to lead to the dissolution of the republic and the expansion of Serbia and Croatia at the expense of the Muslims,” which was quite the opposite from the basic principles of the previous peace plan.

Prior to this, on 22 May 1993 (only three days after the failure of the Vance-Owen peace plan), five members of the UN Security Council (France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the UK and the US) had issued a joint Statement on BH, expressing their “profound concern over the continuation of clashes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the ardent efforts of the international community and the co-chairs of the International Conference”³⁶⁹ and stating that they would “continue to work expeditiously to stop this horrible war and achieve a permanent and just solution.”

This new international “just solution” was the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan. “At the 16 June Geneva Conference, under the chairmanship of Lord OWEN and Thorvald STOLTENBERG, the Serbian and Croatian presidents (Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ and Franjo TUĐMAN) announced an agreement on the establishment of a new Bosnian state, comprising three ethnically based republics.”³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 275; (3D00320).

³⁶⁸ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 396-397; (3D00320).

³⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 388; (3D00320).

³⁷⁰ C. Hodge, op. cit., p. 155.




Fig: 22: The so-called Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan
 (Taken from: M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, p. 742)

/translation: Croatian majority; Muslim majority; Serbian majority; Sarajevo area; Geneva, 20 August 1993; Proposal of the MZ /international community/ on the organisation of BH as a union of three republics; Source: David Owen: *Balkanska odiseja* /Balkan Odyssey/, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 1998, p. 266/

The *France-Presse* news agency published this on 23 June 1993 as a confidential document, adding that "Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a confederation

of republics. The constitution will recognise three constituent peoples and most of the functions of the government will be performed by the republics themselves.”³⁷¹

Subsequently, on 30 July 1993, an announcement was made that the “agreement on the Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed” and that it “laid out a state of three constituent republics with a joint government and limited powers... One of the changes in relation to the original text of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan concerns the right to veto, to which each of the republics will be entitled.”³⁷²

However, on the very next day, 31 July 1993, “the head of the Muslim delegation at the Geneva negotiations, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, withdrew... his acceptance of the peace plan... in a letter to the peace mediators, IZETBEGOVIĆ... emphasised that his advisors believed that the text of the plan has ambiguities regarding the legal status of the new ‘union’... In spite of the disputes, IZETBEGOVIĆ continued the negotiations with Radovan KARADŽIĆ and Mate BOBAN on the maps to determine the territories of the three republics.”³⁷³

Further negotiations went on bilaterally and trilaterally and each of the sides would occasionally – directly or indirectly – make its proposals known. As a result, in Geneva, on 1 September 1993, a new version was created of the “Agreement on Peace and the Union of the Republics of BH, which was not signed.”³⁷⁴ But on 14 September 1993, IZETBEGOVIĆ and TUĐMAN signed a Joint Declaration in Geneva, agreeing, inter alia, on the following: “1. to ensure an urgent cessation of all hostilities and military clashes between units of the BH Army and the HVO... 2. to ensure bilateral and unconditional closing of all detention camps and release of detainees.”³⁷⁵ A similar declaration was signed by IZETBEGOVIĆ and Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK (representative of the Serbs from BH) on 16 September 1993.³⁷⁶

Yet another version of the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan was created on 20 September 1993 on the British aircraft carrier (*HMS Invincible*) in international waters of the Adriatic Sea. But this draft agreement was not signed either, although it laid out what had been reached by agreement – that the “Constitutional agreement... will enter into force one week after the Security Council has been informed of this agreement and after it has confirmed that the Union of the Republics of BH will continue its membership in the UN.”³⁷⁷

In late September 1993, this “new, amended version” of this peace plan was created. The plan contained both the peace agreement and seven annexes and thus actually was a complete package for peace. It did not differ significantly from the previous version, the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan, because it was based on the following: “The alliance of the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises three constituent republics and encompasses three constituent peoples: the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats.”³⁷⁸

³⁷¹ *Vjesnik*, 26 June 1993; document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, pp. 400-401; (3D00320).

³⁷² Document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, pp. 414-415; (3D00320).

³⁷³ Document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, p. 416; (3D00320).

³⁷⁴ *Vjesnik*, 4 September 1993; document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, pp. 429-431; (3D00320).

³⁷⁵ *Večernji list*, 15 September 1993; document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, pp. 436-438; (3D00320).

³⁷⁶ *Večernji list*, 17 September 1993; document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, pp. 440-442; (3D00320).

³⁷⁷ *Vjesnik*, 23 September 1993; document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, pp. 444-447; (3D00320).

³⁷⁸ *Večernji list*, 30 September 1993; document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, pp. 450-477; (3D00320).

At the end of September 1993, however, the Assembly of RBH, i.e. the Muslim/Bosniak majority hierarchy, permanently rejected this peace package, which also meant that the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg plan ultimately failed. At this time, another division of the Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy took place and Fikret ABDIĆ left for the western parts of BH and proclaimed the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APZB), where armed clashes broke out among the Muslims/Bosniaks. All this additionally complicated the political and military situation in BH.³⁷⁹

Until the end of 1993, the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan existed only as a tactical, political and propaganda tool used every now and then on different occasions by some of the participants in the events in the territory of BH. The so-called Action Plan should therefore be regarded as a superficial, brief and unsuccessful attempt of the EU to resuscitate some versions of the failed Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan.³⁸⁰

In conclusion, the prevailing Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy was always reserved about the Owen-Stoltenberg international peace plan, until it finally and decidedly rejected it. The Serbian hierarchy in BH used it for tactical purposes.

Again, it was only the Croatian hierarchy of the HZHB that accepted this international peace plan, as it had other plans earlier, although various representatives of many Croats in BH who had been excluded from negotiations, as well as Croats who were not included in the envisaged Croatian republic in BH did not support it.

II-6.3.2 The Washington Agreements

At the time of negotiations on the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan and in the months following its failure, the overall security situation in BH continued to deteriorate. In addition, the peace efforts of the EU were becoming increasingly futile. This opened space for more active and direct involvement on the part of the US in addressing the crisis in the territory of the second Yugoslavia. Actually, in early 1994, the US was obviously successful in many activities because in late February 1994, the armed clashes between the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian units ended and a new round of Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian peace negotiations commenced in Washington under the auspices of the US.³⁸¹

On the basis of this, the so-called Washington Agreement was signed as early as 1 March 1994. The agreement initiated a period for establishment of full military and political cooperation between the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchies in BH and an era of very close strategic relations between the BH and the Republic of Croatia.

In practice, this meant that several documents (agreements) were signed. First, the documents signed (on 1 March) included: the Declaration of Understanding and Provisional Agreement on the Federation of BH,³⁸² the Draft on a Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina³⁸³ and the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and

³⁷⁹ See *Kronologija rata*, pp. 309, 311, 315 and 317.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 333 and 338.

³⁸¹ See *Kronologija rata...*, p. 350.

³⁸² *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 5 March 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 528-537; (3D00320).

³⁸³ *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 5 March 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 538-539; (3D00320).

Herzegovina on Access to the Adriatic Sea through the Territory of the Republic of Croatia.³⁸⁴ Subsequently, several other documents were signed in March,³⁸⁵ including a Decision on the Promulgation of the Constitution and the Constitution of the Federation of BH,³⁸⁶ on 30 March 1994.

II-6.3.3 The Peace Plan of the Contact Group

The ICFY became finally defunct with the signing of the Washington Agreement and the so-called Contact Group (CG), which comprised the US, the Russian Federation, the UK, France, Germany, Belgium and Greece, became the key international player in the territory of BH. The first meeting of the CG was held in London on 25 April 1994.

The peace plan of the Contact Group was presented on 13 May 1994 in Geneva. It was based on a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina into “into largely autonomous entities, with 51 per cent of territory ceded to the Croatian-Bosniak Federation, and 49 per cent to the Serbs. On 5 July, the parties were presented with the final map and a working paper on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis, with massive penalties for non-compliance.”³⁸⁷

³⁸⁴ *Vjesnik*, 4 March 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 540-542; (3D00320).

³⁸⁵ See documents in M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 548-554; (3D00320).

³⁸⁶ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 555-570; (3D00320).

³⁸⁷ C. Hodge, p. 201.




Fig. 23: Contact Group Peace Plan

(Taken from: M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 747)

/translation: The Croatian-Muslim entity; The City of Sarajevo; The Serbian entity; Geneva, 4 July 1994; Proposal of the Contact Group on the internal division of BH into two entities and the city of Sarajevo, under UN administration; Source: *Vjesnik*, 5 July 1994/

The Contact Group peace plan was accepted immediately and in all respects by the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchy in BH. However, the Serbian hierarchy in BH, which had occupied about 70% of the territory of BH until then, rejected it. “The Contact Group, following a well-trodden path, abandoned the corrective measures previously announced and reverted to diplomacy,”³⁸⁸ which opened a new round of an even more vehement war in BH between the Serbs on the one side and the allied Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian forces and RH forces on the other.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 202.

II.-7 IMPORTANT WAR-RELATED TOPICS

II.-7.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the War against the Republic of Croatia

In the course of preparations for Serbian armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia and its implementation, the aggressor considered and used the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one entity, without inter-republican or (after international recognition) inter-state borders.

This approach was also present in pre-war JNA reorganisations, because “the entire story about the so-called modernisation of armed forces boiled down to the abolishment of armies whose commands were in republican centres and which were almost consistent with republican borders... and the establishment of three theatres of operations for land forces and one naval theatre of operations.”³⁸⁹



Fig. 24: Spatial reorganisation of the JNA in three theatres of operations (after 1988) (Taken from: *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, Map 2, at the end of the book)

/translation: Northwestern Theatre of Operations (1st Military District); Northern Theatre of Operations (1st Military District); Southeastern Theatre of Operations (3rd Military District); Naval District (VPO); Theatre of operation – military districts borders; corps – VP /Military Post/ sectors borders; republican – provincial borders; KOGB – Command of the Defence of the City of Belgrade; OG – Operations group of the VPO; K – Corps; VPS – Military Naval Sector; ■ Corps – VP Sector Base.

³⁸⁹ M. Špegelj, op. cit., p. 44; more on this in D. Domazet, op. cit.; T. Kulenović, op. cit.; S. Praljak, *Agresija Bosne i Hercegovine na Republiku Hrvatsku, - činjenice*, Zagreb, 2007.

Within this concept, the northwestern theatre of operations and the naval theatre of operations partly corresponded to the traditional maps of the imaginary borders of Greater Serbia and later (1990-1995) they were almost identical to the war conquests of the Serbian army and were consistently supported and included in the political concept at various negotiations. Many maps published in books and papers are clear testimonies to this.³⁹⁰

Namely, “the JNA used the territory of BH as a basis for military operations against the Republic of Croatia and for assisting riots of part of the Serbian population in Croatia”³⁹¹ and later, all communication toward the occupied parts of Croatia (except for Eastern Slavonia) went through the territory of BH.

Further rather obvious evidence that Serbian armed aggression regarded and used the territories of RH and BH as one entirety is the detailed operational Report on the Possible Variants of Use in the Zone of Responsibility, which was approved by the Command of the 10th Motorised Brigade of the JNA in June 1991 (signed by Commander Colonel Milojko PANTELIĆ).³⁹²

Furthermore, in addition to JNA units from the territory of BH, some units of the republican army – Territorial Defence (TO) of BH participated in the campaign against the Republic of Croatia.³⁹³ It is noteworthy that on 15 October 1991, in the final item of the document entitled *The Platform on the Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of BH, noted, inter alia, that “the Territorial Defence forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be under the control of the Presidency of the Republic. In the event of an outside attack on the Yugoslav community, those forces will be placed under joint command.”³⁹⁴

At the beginning of Serbian armed aggression in the Republic of Croatia, on 17 August 1990, JNA aircraft which were stationed in Bihac (BH territory) prevented an intervention of Croatian police helicopters. Likewise, on 7 October 1991, when the base of the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo TUĐMAN, was shelled, the JNA war aircraft took off from Bihac.

Confidential report number 301/1, of 19-20 September 1991, sent by the Main Staff of the SAOK TO (Territorial Defence of the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina, *author's note*) to the “Supreme Commander of the SAOK OS (Armed Forces of the SAOK)” stated, inter alia, that “at the initiative of Krajina natives from Grahovo, Drvar and Petrovac (towns in BH territory, *author's note*) to become actively involved in the defence of Krajina SAO and help our people, President Milan BABIĆ and Secretary Milan MARTIĆ visited the area and accepted the cooperation offered and arranged for the reception of personnel.”³⁹⁵

An exceptionally important document entitled Information on the Transit of JNA Military Columns, “number 04-32/92, Sarajevo, 13 January 1992,” issued by the JNA and forwarded by the Ministry for National Defence of BH to governmental bodies in BH, shows that even institutions of the new authorities in BH occasionally cooperated directly with Serbian hierarchies in the implementation of armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia, but also in the attacks against “their own” town of Mostar. The Information also stated: “We hereby inform you that on their

³⁹⁰ See *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, annexes at the end of the book – maps 1, 2, 5 and 7; S. Praljak, *Agresija...*, maps and data on pp. 5-9.

³⁹¹ T. Kulenović, op. cit., p. 93.

³⁹² www.slobodanpraljak.com.

³⁹³ See original video recordings used in Pavle Vranjican's documentary *Komšije*, Zagreb, 2003.

³⁹⁴ *Vjesnik*, 16 October 1991; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 72-74; (3D00320).

³⁹⁵ Document taken from S. Praljak, *Agresija...*, pp. 28-29.

way to assume obligations at the front or to their base garrisons, the units will be dispatched along axes leading from western Serbia, Montenegro and eastern Herzegovina towards Dubrovnik, Ston (both towns in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, *author's note*) and Mostar (town in BH, *author's note*).³⁹⁶

In addition, a host of documents from 1992 and 1993 proves that the Serbian units and logistics stationed in BH continually (throughout 1992 and 1993) participated in aggression and occupation of parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.³⁹⁷

II.-7.2 Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ Taken Prisoner

In late April 1992, the war drama in BH escalated. In this situation, the EU called for a new round of negotiations in Lisbon. A session of the RBH Presidency was held on 28 April 1992, on the eve of Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ's departure to Lisbon, which "warned the public in the country and abroad" that a "dialogue cannot be held under conditions of occupation, as towns and populated areas are being destroyed and innocent civilians are being killed en masse and when communications are fully blocked."

At this session the RBH Presidency expressed its views on the situation in BH for the first time by concluding that "aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out by Chetnik-terrorist armed formations from Serbia, assisted by reserve forces of the former JNA from Serbia and Montenegro and the armed formations of the SDS, assisted by the forces of the former JNA from BH. The Presidency does not accept the assessment that all parties are responsible for the current situation in BH. The Presidency adopted these positions unanimously."³⁹⁸

At this time, "a decisive political and military battle for control over the Bosnian capital" was being waged... "On 2 May, the Green Berets and the population of Sarajevo prevented the JNA from removing files from the JNA Social Centre... In response to this obstruction, the Commander of the JNA Sarajevo Corps, General KUKANJAC, ordered a general attack and seizure of the Bosnian Presidency building. It seems that this was not meant to have been coordinated with the abduction of IZETBEGOVIĆ at the Sarajevo airport and an attempt of a coup d'état by ABDIĆ and DELIMUSTAFIĆ."³⁹⁹

KUKANJAC was unsuccessful, however, in his intentions and he remained sealed off in his Sarajevo barracks. On his way back from Lisbon, IZETBEGOVIĆ and his daughter were taken prisoner by KUKANJAC. A real-life drama went on in the public, as television broadcast IZETBEGOVIĆ's audio transmissions from where he was being held. On 3 May 1992, the Presidency held an "extraordinary session" and discussed which action should be taken for the release of IZETBEGOVIĆ, but in the panicked situation, there was no consensus any one form of action. Rather, each

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 48-92.

³⁹⁸ "Zapisnik 80. sjednice Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, održane 28. aprila 1992. godine" /Minutes of the 80th session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on 28 April 1992/, Document taken from *National Security...*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2006, pp.179-181.

³⁹⁹ M. A. Hoare, op. cit., p. 215.

member had their own confused views and nobody was willing to go and negotiate with the JNA, rightfully fearing being taken prisoner too.⁴⁰⁰

In the meantime, IZETBEGOVIĆ was released under unexplained circumstances and transported, with the assistance of UNPROFOR, to the part of Sarajevo controlled by the legal authorities. In return, KUKANJAC was let go from the encirclement, along with 20 trucks loaded with equipment and soldiers. On the following day, 4 May, the BH Presidency held another session and the minutes of this session only briefly stated: “The Presidency adopted a Report on the Activities Carried Out by Members of the Presidency during the absence and imprisonment of the President of the Presidency of JNA Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ /as printed/ by the former JNA on his return from Lisbon.”⁴⁰¹

The Tape Recording of the 81st Session..., is very extensive. It testifies to the overwhelming chaos and lack of control over the events in BH by the legal authorities. Inter alia, IZETBEGOVIĆ said the following of UNPROFOR: “They are the only eye left to us through which we can see into the outside world. No telephones, there is nothing any more... We have been cut off, our post office is not working, we have no communications with the outside world. The telephones are not working, we have no communications with Zagreb, Vienna, no communications with anybody.”⁴⁰²

Many other sources (of which some were used in this expert report) clearly confirm that in the spring of 1992, Sarajevo was completely sealed off by Serbian units and the RBH Presidency’s road access and communications were mostly cut off from other parts in BH and the rest of the world. “The aggressor had 35 artillery pieces of over 12.7 mm per kilometre of front around Sarajevo... for the purposes of illustration, one should be aware that the highest concentration of artillery pieces in World War II was with the Red Army at Berlin – 25 artillery pieces per kilometre of front.”⁴⁰³

For example, in such a situation, “it was impossible” for Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ “to leave Sarajevo” and meet with Franjo TUĐMAN. Hence, without having met, but after a telephone conversation, they published a Joint Statement in mid-June 1992.”⁴⁰⁴

II.-7.3 Armed Attacks against Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991

The complexity of the political and military situation in BH is recognised in many ambiguities and lack of knowledge about many topics related to the war and pre-war periods. Inter alia, there are many differences in the dating of the onset of Serbian armed aggression against BH. The prevailing opinion is that it started in the spring of 1992, but there are differences about the events and dates which marked the beginning.

⁴⁰⁰ “Magnetofonski snimak vanredne sjednice Predsjedništva...” /Tape recording of the Extraordinary Session of the Presidency.../, document taken from National Security..., Vol. 7., No. 3, 2006, pp. 183-194.

⁴⁰¹ “Zapisnik 81. sjednice...” /Minutes of the 81st Session.../, document taken from National Security..., Vol. 7, No. 3, 2006, pp. 195-196.

⁴⁰² “Magnetofonski snimak 81. sjednice...” /Tape Recording of the 81st Session/, document taken from National Security..., Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 199-245; the quote is on pages 199 and 203.

⁴⁰³ J. Divjak, op. cit., 193.

⁴⁰⁴ See *Vjesnik*, 16 June 1992; or M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 181; (3D00320).

For various interests and reasons, three events from 1991, which prove that the Serbian armed attacks (aggression) against BH took place as early as 1991 are rarely mentioned.

The first event took place on 10 May 1991. It was an armed attack by units of the Krajina SAO police from the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia on a populated place called Uništa in the western part of BH.⁴⁰⁵ The population of Uništa, Croats from BH, found themselves “in a hopeless situation, after they were encircled by MARTIĆ’s outlaws, who cut off their water and power supplies.”⁴⁰⁶

The second event, on 8 June 1991, was a “surprise attack by 200 MARTIĆ’s special unit members from the so-called Krajina SAO on Bosansko Grahovo and Titov Drvar (towns in western BH, *author’s note*).” As “MARTIĆ’s men were lining up for troop review in Titov Drvar... the BH MUP (Ministry of the Interior, *author’s note*) remained absolutely powerless and fragmented.”⁴⁰⁷ In response, on 9 June 1991, the “BH Government stated that the surprise attack of illegal armed forces from the so-called Krajina SAO was an unprecedented violation of the constitutional order of BH.”⁴⁰⁸

The following day, however, on 10 June 1991, in response to the aforementioned incident, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ addressed the public on BH national television (*Televizija Sarajevo*) “as a private person and as President of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” with a very inconsistent statement, offering a rather questionable concluding message: “Remember, this is not our war. Let it be fought by those who want to fight it.”⁴⁰⁹ Actually, in such a difficult security-related situation in BH and its region, this public message coming from the President of the Presidency of SR BH had manifold negative social and psychological effects. On the one hand, the message encouraged the aggressors while on the other, the population of BH were clearly being told that the state institutions of BH had no intention of defending them and that they were left to themselves.

The third event would be an armed attack on Ravno village (in southeastern BH). The village was Croatian, but the surrounding villages in eastern Herzegovina were mostly Serbian. The attacks began on 15 September 1991 and continued intermittently until 6 October 1991. The village of Ravno was one of the targets of the Serbian large-scale operation with the aim of occupying southern parts of the Republic of Croatia to the confluence of the Neretva River, Dubrovnik and Prevlaka and western Herzegovina.

In mid-September 1991, reports were issued that the entire Herzegovina was “under general threat, since JNA units from Bileća and Trebinje were moving toward Čapljina, a town with a Croatian majority ... Thirty five buses and a hundred armoured vehicles, trucks and cars were transporting JNA soldiers and civilians fully equipped for war, who fired all their weapons as they were passing through Stolac... Eight thousand Montenegrin reservists were stationed in the Dubrovnik area; they started their attack by destroying the village of Ravno in Herzegovina and went on to destroy Dubrovnik.”⁴¹⁰

Eventually, on 6 October 1991, Ravno village was “burnt down to the ground and all its inhabitants who did not manage to get away were massacred. The JNA

⁴⁰⁵ See S. Praljak, *Agresija...*, p. 10.

⁴⁰⁶ *Kronologija rata...*, p. 57.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁹ A. IZETBEGOVIĆ’s address to the public on TV Sarajevo, 10 June 1991; www.slobodanpraljak.com.

⁴¹⁰ *Kronologija rata...*, p. 95.

denied access to the village during the investigation to the Republican Prime Minister or the EC observers stationed in the area, not to mention the press.”⁴¹¹

II.-7.4 Partial Muslim/Bosniak – Croatian armed clashes

For many reasons and interests, objective understanding and exploration of the partial Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian conflict is still rather burdened by stereotypes. It is therefore necessary to explain the main scope and consequences of the conflict at several levels, as well as the types of causes behind it.

Most importantly, it should be emphasised that the Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian conflict was actually marginal in relation to all the events that happened during the war in BH. Territory-wise, the clashes took place on some sites, mostly in central BH and in some parts of western Herzegovina. Time-wise, the conflict was not continual – in most cases (except Mostar, to an extent) it involved brief armed clashes. The total time span during which these separate clashes took place was from October 1992 to the first months of 1994. The intensity of these separate armed clashes was at a low level.

It is essential to emphasise that there was never a general Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian war. That is to say, the clashes on these individual sites were not strategic, organised or time-coordinated. The fact that best proves this point is that when these individual clashes occurred – and during the entire period of their recurrence – the BH Army and the HVO armed forces cooperated without interruption in other areas and on other battlefields. This is what one of the senior commanders of the BH Army literally said: “It is essential to note that even during the fiercest clashes between the BH Army and the HVO, there was uninterrupted cooperation going on between these two armies in many other joint theatres of operations, from Orašje in the north of Bosnia, through the Tuzla region... to the Sarajevo battlefield...”⁴¹²

In any case, in the period when the Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats were clashing, neither of the sides was capable of conducting (integrated) offensive military operations for a range of reasons. First of all, the BH Army and, particularly, the HVO were then in the process of establishment, which was divergent, both on the overall and in some individual areas. Then, in 1992 and 1993, as the powerful Serbian aggressor was advancing in his conquest of the BH territory, defence was the necessary option of the weaker BH Army and the HVO.

In the period from the second half of 1994 and throughout 1995, when the BH Army and the HVO were at their strongest and most capable for offensive operations, they cooperated fully and successfully in war activities, which (along with the political and military assistance of the Republic of Croatia and the international community) eventually forced the Serbian aggressor to accept a political agreement.

Out of a range of circumstances which facilitated or caused the clashes between the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian armed forces, one is obvious and striking: before the clashes, a large number of Muslims/Bosniaks arrived in central BH from other areas in BH. This in itself caused great demographic, humanitarian, social and

⁴¹¹ Ibid., p. 101; See S. Praljak, *Agresija...*, p. 11. See also documents in: Slobodan Praljak, *Zločini koje su počinili neki pripadnici JNA/VRS (srpske postrojbe) nad Hrvatima u BiH 1991.-1995.*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

⁴¹² J. Divjak, op. cit., 203.

security-related disturbances in central BH, an area with a historical tradition of successful co-existence between the Muslims/Bosniaks and the Croats.

This is to say, due to the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbian aggressor in BH, a large number of the expelled Muslims/Bosniaks arrived in the small territory of central BH. Thus “the urgent need to find a place for them to live”⁴¹³ also affected the breaking out of clashes between Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats in central BH. One of the people who participated in the event in central BH testified about this and explained it in a simplified way: “the local Croats and Muslims would never have clashed had there not been the influx of refugees who were looking for space for themselves, having lost their own in western and eastern Bosnia.”⁴¹⁴ This situation was undoubtedly favourable for the breaking out of clashes between individuals and small groups, which in turn – under these extremely disorganised circumstances – opened further multiplication of various negative events.

Likewise, the unsuccessful international peace plans which offered various types of disputable internal territorial partitions based on ethnicity and religion presented a permanent framework which encouraged the focusing of poor quality Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian management structures (central and local) on mutual political and military conflicts based on ethnicity and religion.

In this way, considering the overall issue, the partial Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian armed clashes were indeed a paradox, since they happened while both the Muslims/Bosniaks and the Croats were the practically unprotected victims of the military superior Serbian aggressor, while subsequently – when the BH Army and the HVO became stronger, with the capacity to attack – they cooperated in full.

For this very reason, one must explore and ascertain the causes and circumstances behind every individual Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian armed conflict with extreme caution.

Undoubtedly, at the general logical level, as well as at the level of actual events, the Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian conflicts were only beneficial for many reasons to the Serbian aggressor. They primarily facilitated the Serbian campaign of conquest and their occupation of two-thirds of the territory of BH. Then, the partial Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian armed conflicts were used by Serbia and some other interests to create and maintain an entirely unrealistic and unselective perception of the *civil war* and the *balance of* (moral, political, legal, historical) *responsibilities* of the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim/Bosniak hierarchies for the events in BH.

This was also a strategic interest of the Serbian aggressor, because this perception of the events in BH strongly influenced the same perception for other parts of the former Yugoslavia where Serbia was the aggressor.⁴¹⁵ It is indicative that the stereotypes about the *civil war* and the *balance of responsibility* began to form in the period when the international community rightfully and clearly began to refer to Serbia as the aggressor and imposed sanctions against it. Finally, the existence of these stereotypes enabled the emergence and survival of the international verification of the territorial acquisitions of Serbian aggression in BH, which were achieved through the worst crimes known to international humanitarian law.

⁴¹³ Charles R. Shrader, *Muslimansko-hrvatski gradanski rat u srednjoj Bosni*, Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 2004, p. 27.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27; Statement of Franjo NAKIĆ (Chief of Staff of the HVO Central Bosnia Operations Zone from December 1992 to December 1996), 13 April 2000, in the trial of KORDIĆ and ČERKEZ, The Hague.

⁴¹⁵ See C. Hodge, *op. cit.*; Norman Cigar, “Srpski ratni napor i okončanje rata /Serbian War Efforts and the End of the War?”, in *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, pp. 229-254.

Secondarily, the Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian conflicts were encouraged by many circumstances which existed within the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchies. In general, this included their unpreparedness and therefore a lack of quality on both sides, which led to their distorted understanding of the hierarchy of the values, both at the level of world civilisation and the nation, and the interests, in accordance with which they often made decisions on concrete actions – whereas this was actually a struggle for power between groups at central (state), regional and local levels in BH.

The most systematic way to follow this process is at the highest level in BH – the Presidency of the (S)RBH, which took over the entire central authority in practical terms during the war. From the available minutes and tape recordings of Presidency sessions from 1991 to 1994,⁴¹⁶ one can easily follow the process of division and the conflict of interests between Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian representatives in the Presidency of the (S)RBH, as well as the identical separate processes which went on within both groups. It is obvious from these source materials that the processes of all the aforementioned divisions and conflicts were actually based on the interests of smaller groups (hierarchies) and individuals, although they occasionally invoked the common state, national and ethnic interests.

This situation spread from the Presidency of the (S)RBH to the political and military hierarchies, for which decisions were made by the Presidency at a time of war, although (due to aggression, isolation, lack of organisation and other weaknesses of the hierarchy of the legal authorities in BH) this influence was generally not powerful and was very different or absolutely subsided at lower levels, depending on the circumstances. There is no doubt, however, that the situation in the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian hierarchies, which were the most powerful in formal terms, contributed to the general atmosphere of intolerance and irresponsibility at the lower levels.

On the other hand, for the sake of impartiality, such overall circumstances require very careful research and assessment of each individual case of the partial Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian armed conflicts, without the methodologically erroneous automatic generalisation.

II.7.5 The Destruction of *Stari most* /Old Bridge/ in Mostar

The war which was fought at the end of the 20th century in BH has not yet been sufficiently researched from the aspects of its cause, course of events and consequences. On the one hand this has fostered significant ignorance and, on the other hand, it has meant the emergence or production of distorted or entirely fabricated “knowledge”. Likewise, the war in BH was a very complex event and there are few individual war-related events in BH which can serve as an example of its overall complexity.

The destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar is one of the events illustrating how insufficiently the war and post-war events in BH have been researched, as well as how complex they are.

From a statistical point of view, the Old Bridge in Mostar, which was destroyed on 9 November 1993, is merely yet another of the many bridges destroyed in the war in BH. Before and after its destruction, other bridges of much greater

⁴¹⁶ A large number of *Minutes* and transcripts of tape recordings were published in six issues of the *National Security and the Future* (periodical) in 2006 and 2007.

military importance were destroyed in Mostar and BH. Even before the summer of 1992, the Serbian aggressor had destroyed all the bridges in Mostar except for the Old Bridge, which was fully damaged. In general, the greatest objective significance of the Old Bridge, which was used only by pedestrians, was its historical value, as an old masterpiece of 16th-century Ottoman architecture.

Until its destruction, the Old Bridge was a direct physical source of knowledge about the wartime events going on in Mostar and an indirect source for the territory of BH, as Mostar had strategic importance for everybody concerned in BH. It illustrated – for a long time and with much intensity – political and military relations in the Mostar area and the entire BH.

The Old Bridge was first damaged as early as June 1992 in Serbian shelling during their attack on Mostar. This was reported with text and picture in the then local papers.⁴¹⁷ Because of this, in June 1992, “the HVO put planks as temporary protection on the bridge... The protection was installed under the constant threat of Serbian shells.”⁴¹⁸ In October 1992, repeated Serbian shelling damaged the Old Bridge even more extensively. This, too, was reported with text and picture in local papers.⁴¹⁹

In the period that followed, the bridge was in the heart of the Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian armed clashes in Mostar. The Old Bridge was in the zone controlled by the BH Army, several hundred metres from the line of disengagement – therefore, in the area of relatively fierce armed clashes. People crossed at great risk. Members of the BH Army frequently transported war materiel over the Old Bridge (including weapons and ammunition) and troops for maintaining manning levels. Hence, the Old Bridge was undoubtedly a military facility at that time.

On several instances, the bridge was damaged by all parties to the conflict using various types of weapons. Under the circumstances of war and with so many casualties and so much material destruction, it is understandable up to a point why the fact that the bridge was being continuously damaged did not draw the attention of the public. The bridge endured despite being damaged, most probably because it was not targeted for destruction until 9 November 1993.

It is indicative that this very act of destruction was recorded by video cameras from several locations and that later “albums and a video-tape entitled *The War in Mostar*, a BBC production, were sold in 2000.”⁴²⁰ After its destruction, in the next 12 years, through systematic political, media and other activities, the Old Bridge was turned into a key and allegedly unquestionable indicator, proof and symbol “testifying” to the alleged negative wartime identity and the further negative identity and character of the Croatian hierarchies in BH and the Republic of Croatia.

The marketing premise of this stereotype was simple: the Croatian side allegedly ordered artillery fire and destroyed the Old Bridge, allegedly insignificant in military terms, thus exhibiting the depth of its alleged criminal plan. The alleged commander of the destruction of the Old Bridge was General Slobodan PRALJAK, until then Commander of the HVO Main Staff.

The marketing power in disseminating this stigmatising stereotype was enormous. Thus, even some very obvious basic facts remained overlooked.⁴²¹ The production of the public veracity of the stereotype regarding the destruction of the Old

⁴¹⁷ Božo Goluža, *Tko je uistinu srušio Stari most?*, Motrišta 28, Matica Hrvatska, Mostar, 2003, p. 74. See also documents in: S. Praljak, *Urbicid koji su počinile postrojbe JA pod vodstvom Momčila Perišića nad Mostarom u ljeto '92.*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., p. 65.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., p. 74.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p. 65.

⁴²¹ S. Praljak, *Kako je srušen Stari most*, Zagreb, 2006.

Bridge was so vast, that it caused immeasurable damage in political and other terms to the Croatian hierarchies in BH and the Republic of Croatia at international and national levels. Even they themselves believed the stereotype, to such an extent that the President of the Republic of Croatia refused to see General PRALJAK, who wanted to acquaint him with the facts.⁴²²

Only in 2006 – with the publication of the book *Kako je srušen Stari most – činjenice* /How the Old Bridge was Destroyed – the Facts/, which, in addition to many documents, included a detailed “Analysis of the Destruction of the Old Bridge,” written by three prominent scholars, who proved that the bridge was knocked down by planted explosives and not by an artillery shell – did the systematic and intensive marketing activities suddenly cease, and the story of the Old Bridge and its fate was pushed to the margins of public attention, even further than before its destruction. Even more significant was the fact that public enquiry into the causes, interests and participants in the fabrication of stereotypes on the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar was obstructed. Coincidentally, any inquiry or expression of public interest of in an answer to the open question of who really destroyed the Old Bridge and why, has been totally suppressed.

II.-7-6 The Mujahidin and Al-Qa’eda in BH

In parallel to the rapid expansion and strengthening of Serbian armed aggression in BH in the first half of 1992, there was an increasing presence of Islamic humanitarian organisations and radical Islamic volunteers (the mujahidin) arriving in BH from Islamic parts of the world. The Islamic humanitarian organisations and the mujahidin were focused exclusively on assisting Muslims/Bosniaks. In the complex and difficult times in BH at the time, this exclusivity was self-explanatory in a way, and was thus not seen as a problem or analysed. Moreover, a large (unknown) number of humanitarian organisations, groups, individuals and volunteers from all over the world had been present earlier (in the Republic of Croatia) and then, in BH, and nobody asked about their motives, interests or purposes.

After the shocking terrorist attack in the US on 11 September 2001 as well as other terrorist attacks and the explicit long-term security threats sent subsequently to the countries of the West, very systematic police, intelligence, scientific, media and other research of the problem commenced. In this context, many traces led to the territory of BH and the period of war and a very different understanding of the presence of Islamic humanitarian organisations and the mujahidin in the territory of BH.

It was ascertained that the presence of Islamic humanitarian organisations and the mujahidin in BH was not so much of a spontaneous act of solidarity, as a comprehensive, thoroughly planned and highly sophisticated operation of the radical Islamic terrorist organisation Al-Qa’eda (basis, network).⁴²³ “Unfortunately, the importance of the conflict in the Balkans has often been underestimated. The Americans and the Europeans often wonder how Al-Qa’eda infiltrated Europe and the West so successfully, organising terrorist cells... Some of the most important answers

⁴²² Ibid., p. 47.

⁴²³ See Evan F. Kohlmann, *Al-Qa’idin džihad u Evropi, afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, Zagreb, 2005; Evan F. Kohlmann is an advisor of the US Department of Justice and the FBI for international terrorism.

may be found in Bosnia, where the cream of the Afghani Arabs honed their war skills... and trained a new generation of hardened guerrilla followers.”⁴²⁴

“From the hills of Afghanistan and the Saudi desert, connections were established easily with Sudan... with supporters in Canada and – with Bosnia... When the first mujahidin began to arrive in BH, they brought along equipment which was unusual at first sight: tin crates with satellite telephones and antennas, computer monitors and keyboards. Throughout the war in BH (1992-1995) BIN LADEN’s men and trusted connections thus controlled the Islamic fighters, regardless of the fact that they were formally subordinated to the BH Army.”⁴²⁵

“Al-Qa’eda used Bosnia for infiltration at five levels. In terms of propaganda, the organisation was an ideal setting for the promotion of its ideas on pure Islamic states... These propaganda workshops used only computer technology.” Al-Qa’eda used the propaganda clips made in BH “to show as much to those interested Bosniaks they meant to recruit as to its supporters in the Arabic and Islamic countries... and the fresh authentic video shots of the ‘holy war’ were often sufficient to motivate the undecided.”⁴²⁶

People from around the world who wanted to join Al-Qa’eda were sent to BH to so-called “live training in the field.” For example, the key men of the banned Algerian organisations – the FIS and the GIA – were trained in fierce fighting, where else than in BH... Al-Qa’eda needed Bosnia for money laundering not only through humanitarian and cultural associations, but also through the marginal parts of the administration built and maintained by Bosniaks and the government of Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ.”⁴²⁷

As early as April 1992, following the mujahidin conquest of Kabul (in Afghanistan), “Shaykh Abu Abdel Aziz had travelled with four other unidentified veteran Arab-Afghan commanders to Bosnia-Herzegovina to ‘check out the landscape,’” and soon “concluded that this was indeed a legitimate holy war. ‘All Muslims should participate’ he suggested, ‘either by contributing money, caring for orphans and widows, taking in refugees or fighting in the jihad... There are a lot of organisations that can do that. We bring men.”⁴²⁸

The mujahidin leaders in BH and Afghanistan “designated Shaykh Abu Abdel Aziz as the first *Amir*, or commander-in-chief of the Bosnian Arab-Afghans” and he quickly “established the first headquarters at the Mehurići training camp, near the central-Bosnian town of Travnik.”⁴²⁹

At the same time, in the spring of 1992, “the militant Egyptian Shaykh Anwar Shaaban fashioned an epic role... as the political leader and chief spokesman for the foreign *jihadis* based in Bosnia.”⁴³⁰ Soon, a new Islamic Centre was opened in Milan (Italy), which “quickly developed under Shaaban’s leadership into the major hub in the network of Arab-Afghan activity in all of southern Europe.”⁴³¹ Already in the summer of 1992, Mr Shabaan “led the first quasi-official Arab-Afghan delegation to

⁴²⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴²⁵ Fran Višnar, *Al-Qa’idin put: od Afganistana preko BiH do mekanog trbuha Europe*, Afterword in E. F. Kohlmann, op. cit., p. 290.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., p. 293.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 293.

⁴²⁸ E. F. Kohlmann, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p. 35.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., p. 37.

⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 39.

arrive in Bosnia” and subsequently “served for over three years as the spiritual and political Shaykh of the foreign mujahidin in the Balkans.”⁴³²

Warriors were a part of Al-Qa’eda’s complex activities with extensive, diverse and ample financial support. A 1996 US intelligence report concluded that “nearly one third of the Islamic NGOs in the Balkans have facilitated the activities of Islamic group that engage in terrorism...”⁴³³ Among them, “the Benevolence International Foundation or BIF was used ‘to move funds to areas where Al-Qa’eda was carrying out operations’” and “its headquarters in Croatia was established ‘for relief operations and support to *jihad* in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”⁴³⁴

Similarly, “the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), founded in 1987 in Vienna, Austria (with additional offices in Sarajevo, Budapest, Moscow and Istanbul) quickly became notorious for allegedly serving as a financier of - and arms broker for - irregular Muslim soldiers and mujahidin in Bosnia, in direct violations of an international arms embargo.”⁴³⁵

In May 1992, the first two *jihad* (holy war) military training camps were established in Zenica and in Mehurići, near Travnik. More military camps were then established in other places, mostly in central Bosnia: on the Igman hill and in “Turbe, Radina and elsewhere in the Lašva Valley.” The camps were arranged “exactly along the Afghan model: intense, aggressive recruitment and training in both military tactics and violent, confrontational form of Islamic fundamentalism.”⁴³⁶

The mujahidin armed operations in central BH may be followed from September 1992 and, according to some estimations, from late 1992⁴³⁷ there were about “700 men drawn from Iran, Turkey, north Africa, Afghanistan and Palestine”⁴³⁸ in Bosnia. Interestingly, until September 1992, “Muslim fighters were usually able to cross Croatia and transport weapons en route to Bosnia without incident” but in September “Croatia suddenly cracked down on arms smuggling routes through its territory.”⁴³⁹

Throughout 1993 and the early months of 1994, the mujahidin participated in Muslim/Bosniak-Croatian armed clashes in a number of localities, both independently and in cooperation with the BH Army.⁴⁴⁰ In addition to participating in armed conflicts, in some parts of central Bosnia, the mujahidin were “charged with the responsibility of ‘special operations,’ primarily the kidnapping and assassination of Croatian ‘leadership figures’”⁴⁴¹ and committed various crimes and intimidation in order to expel Croats from some parts of central BH. “International monitors reported ‘civilians running away from the Bosnian (Muslim) militia under machinegun fire. There is strong evidence of atrocities... We have no witnesses of a massacre, but we have found a large number of civilians dead’.”⁴⁴²

The following situation was described: “In late June, the Arab extremists marched from Guča Gora (near Travnik in central BH, *author’s note*) to a school in the neighbouring town of Metrovići containing 231 Croat civilian refugees. Without

⁴³² Ibid., p. 40.

⁴³³ Ibid., pp. 55-56.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., pp. 57-58.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 69.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., Chapter: The Battle Begins, pp. 75-94.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 92.

⁴³⁹ Ibid., p. 107.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., Chapter: Confrontation with the Croats (1993-94).

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., p. 110.

⁴⁴² Ibid., p. 116.

provocations, the *jihadis* suddenly took the refugees hostage and threatened to slaughter them en masse. In the end, local Bosnian army guards forcibly ejected the Arabs from Metrovići and eventually negotiated an acceptable compromise with them by agreeing to move all the Croats out of Muslim territory.”⁴⁴³

The mujahidin also were also in conflict with units of the international peace-keeping forces. In the first half of June 1993, the “confrontation between the mujahidin and British UN troops attempting to protect civilians along the Zenica-Travnik access routes grew more serious.” The *jihadis* “instantly trained their rocket propelled grenade launchers and rifles on the UN vehicles,” and “the mujahid commander on scene, an unidentified man of British origin wearing an Afghanistan hat and a blue scarf over his face, addressed the British officer in charge of the patrol, Major Vaughan Kent-Payne, in perfect English and coldly reassured him ‘be cool, these people won’t fire until I give them the order’.”⁴⁴⁴ When an agreement was eventually reached, the mujahid refused to shake hands with the British officer, saying that “he would not touch the flesh of an infidel.”⁴⁴⁵

Although the role of Al-Qa’eda in the political and war-related events in BH has largely not been researched, several conclusions may safely be drawn on the basis of the information gathered so far. The first one is: “Al-Qa’eda’s decision to take up arms in the Bosnian civil war contributed in turning much of central Bosnia into a humanitarian nightmare.”⁴⁴⁶ The second conclusion is a fact-based logical presumption: “The government of Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, its military personnel and the people (Muslim/Bosniak, *author’s note*) welcomed the mujahidin with enthusiasm and relief, hoping that with their assistance, war luck would finally turn around to the advantage of the Bosnian side.”⁴⁴⁷

A total of about “5,000 volunteers from the Arabic-Islamic world” arrived in BH “and joined the BH Army.”⁴⁴⁸ They were a significant military power in the situation in BH, mostly because they were well-trained and fanatical and due to the fact that their operations were concentrated in the small area of central BH.

The significance of the *jihadis* in terms of war, politics and identity for a part of the most powerful Muslim/Bosniak hierarchy in BH is illustrated in the following fact: “On 13 August (1993, *author’s note*), the government officially mobilised the Kateebat al Mujahideen (‘Battalion of the Holy Warriors’) on the personal orders of Bosnian president Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, to whom the unit was directly responsible.”⁴⁴⁹

Extensive further research is required in order to draw conclusions on the pace, implementation, depth and degree to which the Muslim/Bosniak military, political and societal governing hierarchies were permeated by radical Islamism. It is certain, however, that it was present and that it shaped the overall war and post-war developments in BH, as testified to by the facts presented in this and several other chapters of this expert report.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p. 117.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 119.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 120.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

⁴⁴⁷ F. Višnar, op. cit. 291.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 291.

⁴⁴⁹ E. F. Kohlmann, op. cit., p. 126.

⁴⁵⁰ Eg.: *Islamska deklaracija*, the layering of the Muslim/Bosniak elites, the process of Islamisation of the BH Army, etc.

III.**THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
TOWARDS BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(1991 – 1995)**

Introductory Remarks

In order to fully understand and assess the relation of the Republic of Croatia (RH) toward Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1990 to 1995, it is necessary to be familiar with and recognise the crucial issues the RH was facing in this period. Just before the Serbian armed aggression, the RH and BH were in a very similar position. In the Serbian plans at the time the territories of the RH and BH were a single unit clearly marked as the target for conquest. In accordance with this, Serbian leaderships in the territories of the RH and BH were politically active, using propaganda and arming part of the Serbian population in the RH and BH. As early as 1990 the pro-Serbian JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ illegally took a large majority of weapons from the TO RH /Territorial Defence of the Republic of Croatia/ and TO BH /Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, so that the two states – which were in the process of establishment – were left with no army or weapons.

In such an extremely unequal military balance of power, the fundamental interest of the RH and BH (as well as Slovenia and Macedonia, and Kosovo) was to find a political way to unravel the so-called Yugoslav crisis. In other words, even if they wanted to, the RH and BH did not have even the basic prerequisites to resolve the Yugoslav crisis by military (armed) means. Thus the RH, BH, Slovenia and Macedonia had to focus on overall mutual cooperation.

However, organised systematic strategic cooperation between them was not established (until 1994), but instead specific – mainly spontaneous and occasional – forms of agreement appeared. This type of “cooperation” was institutionally mostly evident in 1990 and 1991 at (previously mentioned) sessions of the Yugoslav Presidency. Agreement was evident to a lesser extent at the (previously mentioned) inter-republican meetings in 1991.

Although it is illogical, even paradoxical, in the initial (most important) period there was absolutely no cooperation among the victims of the Serbian armed aggression in the crucial – security-related – area, which significantly facilitated Serbian involvement in the war and conquests in the RH and BH, and later in Kosovo.

It is still a very open question in terms of research which factors caused (how and to what extent for each factor) caused the lack of overall, but particularly security-related cooperation among the states which were victims of Serbian aggression. Later specific and very successful forms of political and security-related cooperation between the RH and BH best indicate how useful this cooperation could have been in the initial period of the war, and what an enormous strategic mistake the lack of this cooperation had been.

The relationship of the RH toward BH (and also the relationship of BH toward the RH) must also be viewed in this general context. Therefore, as a whole, this relationship was neither systematic nor bilaterally arranged nor was it reciprocal. In other words, it depended (where the RH was concerned) on assessments and decisions by the government institutions of the RH (Assembly, President, Government) which primarily used their perception of interests of the RH as a guide.

The principal interest of the RH in the period from 1990 to 1992 consisted of three intertwined parts: the establishment of a state (in very difficult conditions with approximately 1/3 of the territory occupied), defence from the Serbian armed aggression and international recognition.

In the period from mid-1992 to 1998 the absolute primary interest of the RH was simpler in principle: to reintegrate (return) the occupied parts of the territory into the constitutional and legal order of the RH. After 1991 about one fourth of the territory of the RH was occupied, and the occupied parts – in terms of territory and

security – still jeopardised the survival of the RH, because the occupied parts in three directions prevented in practical terms the integrity of the free parts of the country. The most critical point was the fact that the large southern part of the RH was cut off by land so communication between the northern (and central) and southern parts of the RH ran across the islands. In terms of security and communication, the situation was only slightly less critical in the occupied parts in the directions toward Slovenia and Hungary.

The entire national and social life in the RH until the end of 1995 (when most of the occupied parts had been reintegrated, except Podunavlje) was almost entirely subjected and committed to resolving these problems. This is, for example, clearly discernible from the structure of the budget and foreign policy activities, but also from political and media speech and everyday life in the RH.

Until 1995 these main problems of the RH were crucially and manifoldly connected with the area of BH. Even before Serbian aggression, and unrelated to it, it was clear at first sight (both geographically and historically) that the areas of the RH and BH were extremely interdependent in every respect (in terms of security, economy, communication, etc.), and it was therefore difficult to imagine any sort of stability in one area without stability in the other.

With reference to logistics, armed operations, units and replenishment, Serbian armed aggression against the RH relied on the area of BH and its resources to a large extent. Furthermore, the territory of most of the occupied parts of the RH bordered with BH. Since Serbian aggression westward involved an integral plan and operative implementation, after 1991 the occupied parts of the RH became part of the Serbian conquering process in BH. Suffice it to say that from 1992 to 1995 all (military and civilian) supplies for of the occupied parts of the RH (except Podunavlje) traversed the territory of BH. Thus in fact any future reintegration of the occupied parts of the RH crucially and directly depended on the outcome of the war in BH.

And finally, integrally viewed, due to Croatia's lack of political and military readiness for the events in the 1990s, the inadequacy of the majority of the governing bodies which carried over their institutional power from communism to the system of the RH, and a number of other *transitional* problems – in most of the crucial events in 1990 – 1995 the RH had taken a *reactive* course of action, which was particularly evident in its treatment of the variable and contradictory requests put before the RH by the international community.

For example, in June 1991 the RH accepted the unfavourable Brijuni Declaration; in early 1992 it accepted the unfavourable Sarajevo Accord, for which it halted its very successful operation for liberation of western Slavonia and even abandoned a part of the liberated territory; the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate in the RH was accepted on several occasions, although UNPROFOR did not carry out the obligations it had taken on; in the 1992-1995 period (and beyond) the RH followed all the variable and contradictory actions taken by the international community in relation to BH; in 1995 the RH accepted the very unfavourable international Z-4 Plan which practically offered all the attributes of a state to the occupied parts of the RH.

The facts as laid out here constitute a framework without which it is not possible perceive objectively the causality (causes, course and consequences) of the relationship of the RH towards BH in the period of 1990-1995.

In this part of the expert report – for analytical reasons and easy reference – the representation of the relationship of the RH towards BH is divided into eight thematic chapters comprising a single section. This section, using an approach standardised through scholarships, provides an objective and integral reconstruction

of the institutional relationship of the state of the RH towards the state of BH between 1991 and 1995.

III – 1 STATE AND POLITICAL LEVEL

III – 1.1. The RH Recognises the Independent State of BH (7 April 1992)

The specific state and political level of the relationship of the RH towards the state of BH is most reliably and objectively discussed if one proceeds from the interaction between the leading state institutions (Assembly, President, Government) in the period following the international recognition of BH (7 April 1992). Up to that time (after 1990) there is any number of topics and facts (founding of the political parties and the first multi-party elections in BH in the second half of 1990: inter-republican talks and negotiations in the first half of 1991, etc.) which have their historiographical significance and interest, but this part of the expert report is not focused on it, rather – just like other earlier historical periods – these are adequately covered in previous chapters.

The fact that the RH recognised BH as an independent state at the same time as the EU and the US did has particularly great political weight, but it must be noted that the EU's decision was a decision issued by the community, while individual EU states implemented it later. Thus the EU, US and RH – the first to recognise BH – clearly indicated that their greatest interest lies in the existence of BH as an independent state. This international recognition did not happen all at once. The preparation process itself took around half a year, during which a number of international decisions, opinions and recommendations were issued, and an internationally monitored referendum was conducted in BH in accordance therewith.

Throughout this international process, the RH firmly held the position that BH must be an independent state, and used its influence to directly urge the Croats in BH to vote for BH independence at the referendum. Serbia and the Serbian leaderships in BH opposed this fiercely and in a number of ways.

The very act of the international recognition of BH had its direct international overture in the joint Declaration “on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics” issued by the EU and US (10 March 1992),⁴⁵¹ culminating in the Decision on the international recognition of BH, adopted by the EU and US on 6 April, with the recognition coming into effect as of 7 April 1992.

The highest state institutions of the RH monitored this international process and the Decision of the President of the RH (Franjo TUĐMAN) “on the recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state” was based on a corresponding conclusion of the “Assembly of the Republic of Croatia of 27 March 1992” and proposal of the “Government of the Republic of Croatia of 6 April 1992”.⁴⁵² The Decision also proposed “dual citizenship to members of the Croatian people who wish it, and /we/ propose that this issue be resolved by a bilateral agreement” and that “the governments of our countries begin talks as soon as possible on the establishment of diplomatic relations and comprehensive cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia”.⁴⁵³

III. – 1.2 Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the R BH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and the RH (21 July 1992)

⁴⁵¹ See *Vjesnik*, 12 March 1992; the document can also be found in M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 151-152; (3D00320).

⁴⁵² Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 167-168; (3D00320).

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*; (3D00320).

However, the concretisation of bilateral relations between the R BH and the RH, which both sides wanted in principle, was being substantially slowed down because – due to Serbian aggression on BH – “it is (was, *author’s note*) not possible for IZETBEGOVIĆ to leave Sarajevo”. Therefore, without meeting but “hoping that they would be able to meet soon”, on 15 June 1992 Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Franjo TUĐMAN decided to issue a Joint Declaration in which, among other things, BH “extends its gratitude to the Republic of Croatia for the humanitarian aid provided and the reception and care for a large number of refugees, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and the RH “supports the efforts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to preserve its independence and prevent aggression, providing its help, and will continue to do so”.⁴⁵⁴

The Joint Declaration furthermore stated that “both Presidents expressed their full agreement regarding the principle that when the war is over a political solution for relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be sought on the basis of the equality of its three constituent peoples”, and that the President of the RH “supports the efforts of the international community to stop the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the appeal of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the international community requesting help and efficient action for preventing further aggression”.⁴⁵⁵

In early July 1992 the President of the RH (Franjo TUĐMAN) replied to a letter from the President of the Presidency of the R BH (Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ), explaining that “faced with Serbian aggression”, the Croatian people in BH “had to organise themselves”, adding that “we interpret” the organising of the HZBH /Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna/ and the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ “as initiatives within the framework of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and only as such do we support them.”⁴⁵⁶

The leaders of the RBH and the RH finally met “at the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, *author’s note*)” on 8 July 1992 in Helsinki, and after a talk at which their associates were also present, they issued another Joint Declaration.⁴⁵⁷ In it they said that both states have “a common interest in defending their independence and territorial integrity against Serbian and Montenegrin aggression”, and that they agree “that this common interest must be pursued with efforts and by means which are envisaged in the Charter” of the UN and CSCE documents.⁴⁵⁸

After that it was pointed out that BH “appreciates the efforts of the International Community and the Republic of Croatia to provide help, particularly in terms of receiving and accommodating a large number of refugees”, and that “both Presidents once again emphasised the adherence of their states to the principle that ... the internal arrangement” of BH is “organised democratically on the basis of equality of the three constituent peoples”.⁴⁵⁹

In his speech at a CSCE plenary meeting in Helsinki on 9 July 1992 Franjo TUĐMAN⁴⁶⁰ made a point of the following: “When joining the CSCE the Republic of Croatia adopted all the principles and values of the CSCE ... In this context, allow me

⁴⁵⁴ *Vjesnik*, 16 June 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 181-182; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁶ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 195-196; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁷ *Novi Vjesnik* (daily newspaper), Zagreb, 7 July 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 197-198; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 198; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁰ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 199-202; (3D00320).

to present very clearly once again the position of my country in relation to the neighbouring state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia was among the first countries that recognised the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it fully observes the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia supports the efforts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to preserve its independence and its resistance to the common enemy.”

Soon after that, on 21 July 1992, the President of the Presidency of the RBH and the President of the RH signed a bilateral Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation in Zagreb,⁴⁶¹ which was the most important bilateral document until 1994 because almost all the relations between the two states (until 1994) were based on it, and in particular, the uncommonly broad spectrum of help provided institutionally by the RH to BH in defence against Serbian aggression and repairing the grave consequences caused by Serbian aggression in BH territory.

The start of this Agreement proceeded from the joint interests of the R BH and the RH “in defending their independence and territorial integrity” and serious concern “over the continuation of aggression carried out by the remnants of the Yugoslav People's Army of the former Yugoslavia and Serbian and Montenegrin regular and irregular military forces against the territories of their countries”.⁴⁶² It went on to establish the adoption of a number of documents and opinions issued for the area of the former Yugoslavia by the international institutions and groups.

After that, the ten items of the Agreement list agreements reached on various matters. Among other things, it is established in item one of the Agreement that the “future composition” of BH “shall be based on the principle of total equality between the three constituent peoples”, and that the constitutional and political composition of BH shall be based “on constituent entities, during the formation of which, national, historical, cultural, economic, transport and other elements shall be taken into consideration”.⁴⁶³

Item two of the Agreement states that the RBH and the RH shall “cooperate and reach mutual agreements, respecting the specific interests and being aware of the common interests of their countries”.⁴⁶⁴

A special item of the Agreement (item three) reads: “The state delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to express its gratitude to the Republic of Croatia for accepting and providing accommodation for refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina beyond its capacities”.⁴⁶⁵

Item six of the Agreement established that “the armed part of the Croatian Defence Council is an integral part of the united armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... The temporary civilian authorities formed within the Croatian Defence Council in war-time conditions shall be brought into line as soon as possible with the constitutional and legal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and talks on this issue shall be held immediately in accordance with the provisions of Item 1 of this Agreement”.⁴⁶⁶

A particularly important, and also most extensive item of the Agreement, is item eight which served as the basis for the future complex bilateral military relations, including the military assistance which the RH provided for the BH Army and the

⁴⁶¹ *Novi Vjesnik*, Zagreb, 22 July 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 212-214; (3D00320).

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 212; (3D00320).

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 213; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 213; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214; (3D00320).

HVO and occasional activities of the HV /Croatian Army/ in the border regions of BH. This item of the Agreement noted “the continuation of aggression by Serbian and Montenegrin military forces against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but to a large degree also from border areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Republic of Croatia,” and called on the institutions of the international community (UN and EU) “to take real and effective measures to decisively stop the aggression ... prevent further casualties, the persecution and expulsion ... and the destruction of property ”.⁴⁶⁷

In addition, item 8 of the Agreement concluded that – in order to stop Serbian aggression – the RBH and the RH “shall continue their current successful cooperation and shall constantly coordinate their defence activities in the border areas between them. Being aware of the fact that failure to halt aggression against both states could result in further destruction of their statehood and integrity, the two states shall, in the event that the efforts of the international community remain unsuccessful, discuss and apply all forms of closer cooperation in the military sphere and coordinate their military operations with the aim of finally removing all threats”.⁴⁶⁸

In late August 1992 groups of leaders of the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ and the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ of BH met in Medugorje and adopted Conclusions “for the purpose of implementation of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation”.⁴⁶⁹ The Conclusions proposed “the establishment of four constituent units comprising several regions”, and an organisation in which “the legislative power in BH would be held by a War Presidency, and the executive power by a War Government” which would be composed “on principles of parity”. It was also proposed to establish state-level “unified armed forces made up of HVO and BH Army members with a parity joint command”.⁴⁷⁰

However, 12 days later (9 September 1992) the Office of the President of the Presidency of BH issued a statement indirectly dissociating itself from the Conclusions in Medugorje stating that the Presidency of BH “did not initiate the work of these commissions nor does the Presidency have anything to do with this”.⁴⁷¹

During a session of the UN General Assembly on 21 September 1992 the delegations of the RBH and RH, led by Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Franjo TUĐMAN, met in New York and “proceeding from the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation” of 21 July 1992, “they agreed to sign” the Annex to the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation.⁴⁷² The Annex proceeded from the fact that “the diplomatic, political and humanitarian efforts of the international community have so far failed to stop aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia”, and therefore, BH and the RH decided, among other things, (in accordance with the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation) to set up “a joint Committee order to harmonize defence efforts, until aggression stops completely”.⁴⁷³

III. – 1.3 Attempts to Establish Full Cooperation (October 1992 – April 1993)

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 214; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 214; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁹ *Večernji list*, 9 August 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 234-235; (3D00320).

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 234; (3D00320).

⁴⁷¹ *Večernji list*, 10 September 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 239; (3D00320).

⁴⁷² Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 243-244; (3D00320).

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 244; (3D00320).

In accordance with this, on 16 October 1992 Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ sent an official letter to the Minister of Defence of the RH (Gojko ŠUŠAK) informing him of his decision (appointment of): “In accordance with the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, the following persons are hereby appointed to the Commission for Coordination of Military Activities as representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

1. Rifat BILAJAC,
2. Fabijan BENO,
3. Hasan ČENGIĆ (substitute Salem ŠABIĆ)”.⁴⁷⁴

On the same day, “in accordance with the responsibility and powers I have as the Chairman of the National Defence Council and the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ issued the following Order: “1. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH Army and HVO) shall immediately start preparing an operation to lift the blockade of the city of Sarajevo by military means ... The operation must be prepared and carried out as soon as possible ... Jasmin JAGANJAC is hereby appointed operation commander, with full powers.”⁴⁷⁵

However, despite the displayed awareness and intentions of the states of the RBH and the RH, which are particularly clearly manifested in item 8 of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation and its Annex, events took place which decelerated and impeded full cooperation between the two states (the R BH and the RH) which were victims of Serbian aggression. Although it is absolutely evident that decelerating and impeding full cooperation between the R BH and the RH constituted the fundamental interest of the Serbian aggressor, it is open to investigation to answer the historiographical question regarding the deep mechanisms, participants and interests which specifically controlled the process involving the attempts at destroying and delaying full cooperation between the R BH and the RH.⁴⁷⁶

But on the factual level, it is clear that instead of the establishment of swift strategic cooperation between the R BH and the RH, several partial local armed clashes between the BH Army and the HVO units took place in the central R BH, which – inappropriate to its objective importance – had an impact on the current (and former) process of cooperation between the R BH and the RH, and the overall unobjective (mostly negative) perception of that relation.

The first partial local armed clashes between the BH Army and the HVO units occurred in the central R BH (in the area of Novi Travnik, Vitez and Prozor). These clashes stopped after a few days.

Regarding this first clash in some localities in central BH, on 27 October 1992 the President of the Presidency of the R BH sent a letter to the President of the RH, most gravely accusing the “Croatian side” in BH, and to some extent also the international community. The letter includes the following statement: “HVO units have systematically provoked conflicts in Novi Travnik, Vitez and Prozor, in which there were casualties and destruction. All the roads through western Herzegovina have been closed, even for humanitarian aid. At the same time, a propaganda war against Bosnia and Herzegovina and its legal authorities is being waged in the Croatian media.”⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁴ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁷⁵ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁷⁶ A specific aspect of special warfare is evident from the document “Report for Mr Mate BOBAN” which was sent on 23 December 1992 by Brigadier Milivoj PETKOVIĆ, Chief of the HVO Main Staff; www.slobodanpraljak.com.

⁴⁷⁷ *Vjesnik*, 30 October 1992; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 259-260; (3D00320).

Furthermore, IZETBEGOVIĆ said this in the letter: “Negotiations are in progress in Geneva regarding the future organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time a policy of *fait accompli* is being implemented by force, invalidating the negotiations in London and making them pointless.”⁴⁷⁸

Three days later, the President of the RH replied as follows in his letter: “Croatia has recognised the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... and it is actively promoting the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single state ... since we are interconnected historically, spatially and economically, this is a long-term strategic interest of Croatia and, I am sure, of Bosnia and Herzegovina too. ... I have kept encouraging the leaders of these Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and you and your associates – the leaders of the Muslim people – to reach an agreement and link up ... I assure you that the Republic of Croatia will implement all provisions of our agreement consistently. ... Full friendship and honest and active cooperation are of vital interest to both of our states, and therefore it is the duty of both you and me to work hard on them.”⁴⁷⁹

Indicative for understanding the complexity of the background leading to the start of these armed clashes is the fact that as early as 4 November 1992 Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ informed the Minister of Defence of the RH that a replacement has been made among the BH representatives in the Commission for Coordination of Military Activities between BH and the RH “and instead of Beno FABIJAN, we hereby appoint Milivoj PETKOVIĆ, which is in accordance with the proposal by the HVO”.⁴⁸⁰

On 27 January 1993 the President of the RH sent another letter to the President of the Presidency of the R BH, stating as follows: “The grievous events of the last few days, in which the Muslim extremists in Central Bosnia have been attacking Croatian settlements in an organised, criminal and brutal way, and shooting at civilians and defenders, force me to write this letter to you ... I use this opportunity to appeal directly to the Croatian and Muslim peoples in BH to cease hostilities and achieve full cooperation in defence against the common aggressor and in seeking a way to achieve harmonious coexistence.”⁴⁸¹

Soon, on 11 February 1993, the Main Staffs of the BH Army and the HVO signed an agreement with the aim of preventing “further misunderstandings and conflicts between the BH Army and the HVO and organising a common struggle against the aggressor”.⁴⁸² The Agreement also specified that “a joint coordinating team” will be formed in Central Bosnia which will “issue joint orders ... for units to immediately abandon positions between the HVO and the BH Army ... for all units brought in from other areas to immediately withdraw”.⁴⁸³

After the talks in Zagreb, on 27 March 1993 the President of the RH and the President of the Presidency of the R BH issued a Joint Statement stating as follows: “The Republic of Croatia welcomes the signing of the VANCE-OWEN plan by Mr. Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Mr. Mate BOBAN.”⁴⁸⁴ Under item 2 Franjo TUĐMAN and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ “demand efficient and consistent implementation of the VANCE-OWEN plan by the international community, bearing in mind the bad experiences with the inefficacious implementation of the VANCE plan in the

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 260; (3D00320).

⁴⁷⁹ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 270-271; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁰ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁸¹ *Vjesnik*, 28 January 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 322-323; (3D00320).

⁴⁸² *Vjesnik*, 12 February 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 328-329; (3D00320).

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 328; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁴ *Vjesnik*, 28 March 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 339; (3D00320).

Republic of Croatia”, and then under item 5 “express their readiness for the closest possible cooperation in future between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and stress the need for comprehensive cooperation between the Croatian and the Muslim peoples in BH”.⁴⁸⁵

On 21 April 1993 the BH Army and the HVO signed a Ceasefire Agreement in Zenica which opens with the following statement: “The BH Army and the HVO are the legal military forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and have equal status,” and then specifies that “all commanders at all levels must observe and implement an absolute ceasefire throughout the territory of the Republic”.⁴⁸⁶



Fig. 25: The extent of Serbian conquest in the winter of 1992/1993

(Taken from: *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, map 5, at the end of the book)

Then on 25 April 1993 in Zagreb, in the presence of numerous international representatives (David OWEN, Peter HALL, Herbert OKUNA, Geert AHRENS, John WILSON, MESSERVY-WHITING, Frederick ECKHARD, David LUDLOW, Mr BRADE), BH representatives (Ejup GANIĆ, Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Bisera

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁶ *Vjesnik*, 22 April 1993; document taken from M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, p. 343; (3D00320).

TURKOVIĆ, Muhamed ŠAĆIRBEGOVIĆ, Kasim TRNKA, Milivoj PETKOVIĆ) and RH representatives (Jure RADIĆ, Vladimir ŠEKS, Gojko ŠUŠAK, Zdenko ŠKRABALO, Janko BOBETKO, Zdravko SANČEVIĆ, Željko MATIĆ, Ivan JARNJAK, Branimir JAKŠIĆ, Mile ĆUK), Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Mate BOBAN signed a Joint Statement (with Franjo TUDJMAN signed as a witness) on cessation of hostilities between the BH Army and the HVO and on “establishing a joint command of these forces comprising representatives of both staffs”.⁴⁸⁷

In addition, the signatories stated that they “reaffirm that the clashes between the HVO and the BH Army in the Republic of BH are contrary to the policy implemented by representatives of these two peoples” and that they “most strongly condemn all violations of provisions of international humanitarian law, regardless of who perpetrated them”.⁴⁸⁸

The Joint Statement also had Annex I which specified as follows: “The BH Army and the HVO will retain their separate identity and command organization ... They shall set up a Joint Command ... The Joint Command shall comprise two supreme commanders, General HALILOVIĆ and General PETKOVIĆ ... They shall set up a joint main staff ... The two supreme commanders shall form military districts under a joint staff ... Each military district shall exercise operational control over all units of the BH Army and the HVO in its areas.”

The Chamber of Deputies of the Croatian Assembly (presided over by Stjepan MESIĆ) also joined the process of attempting to stop the partial clashes and restore cooperation between the Muslims/Bosniaks and the Croats and on 30 April 1993 it issued a Conclusion stating as follows: “Muslims and Croats, the conflicting parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are called to immediately suspend all armed conflicts”, and “to resist with joint forces Serbian imperialistic aggression whose objective is to annihilate both peoples”. Then it was concluded: “With the aim of promoting a peaceful solution to existing disagreements and preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the friendly, neighbouring State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Chamber of Representatives of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia shall send a multi-party delegation on a mission of peace and good will.”⁴⁸⁹

On the same day the Assembly appointed seven members to the multi-party delegation, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RH (Ivo SANADER) sent a letter to the UNPROFOR Commander (Lars-Eric WAHLGREN) informing him of the intentions and the composition of the parliamentary delegation and places in BH that the delegation will visit, at the same time requesting the assistance and protection of the UNPROFOR forces for the parliamentary delegation.⁴⁹⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RH sent a similar letter to the BH Embassy “asking the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide the necessary assistance during the delegation’s stay in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁴⁹¹

With the same intention and on the same day, 30 April 1993, the state delegations of Turkey and the Republic of Croatia (led by the Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman DEMIREL and the President of the RH Franjo TUDJMAN) signed a Joint Declaration on the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia.⁴⁹² The Declaration includes the following statement: “Turkey and Croatia are two countries in this region with a

⁴⁸⁷ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 348-349; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 349; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁹ *Official Gazette* of the RH, Zagreb, no. 43/1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 351; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁰ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁹¹ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁹² Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 352-353; (3D00320).

special interest in preserving peace and stability and in promoting the spirit of cooperation. Turkey and Croatia share the view that the causes of the crisis in the region are militant nationalistic expansionism and racist policies, whose aim is to create a Greater Serbia. Both countries strongly condemn continued aggression by the SR /Federal Republic of/ Yugoslavia ... They strongly condemn the shocking practice of genocidal ethnic cleansing.”⁴⁹³

Also, “both countries have agreed to set up a joint government mission of good will that would be sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina”, but they believe that “the international community shall have no other choice but to impose peace through credible and effective military measures, to be decided by the UN Security Council”.⁴⁹⁴

III. – 1.4 New Dissent (May – October 1993)

Despite the attempts by different participants and a relative calming of the situation, in some localities clashes soon again broke out between the Muslims/Bosniaks and the Croats. Due to this on 10 May 1993 the President of the RH sent a public message to Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Mate BOBAN. The Message first lists the agreements that have been signed, and the actions taken by the RH to stop the clashes. It was pointed out that the multi-party delegation of the Croatian Assembly “has as yet not been able to visit the crisis area”, adding the following: “Yesterday, 9 May 1993, I agreed with Mr. Šefko OMERBAŠIĆ, President of the Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Croatia and Slovenia, that he join the group of Croatian representatives and go to BH, also with the task of acting in the interest of the establishment of peace and cooperation between Croats and Muslims.”⁴⁹⁵

The Message went on to state the following: “I most strongly condemn the armed conflicts between Croats and Muslims in BH, irrespective of which party has caused them.”⁴⁹⁶ TUĐMAN in particular appealed to “all Muslims who have been offered protection and asylum in Croatia during this aggression to influence their compatriots to refrain from any conflicts with Croats and to ensure their mutual cooperation”, and “also all Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina not to allow themselves to be fooled by provocations and to do their best to avoid this highly detrimental conflict”. Lastly, he called upon Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Mate BOBAN to immediately order “all /their/ commanders and units to end all conflicts without any delay and to start cooperation in the spirit of the agreements and statements already signed”.⁴⁹⁷

A day later the Presidential Defence and National Security Council in the RH issued a similar statement from its session.⁴⁹⁸ Then on 12 May 1993 the President of the RH sent a letter to the UN Secretary General which was focused on the problem of reintegration of the occupied parts of the RH, but under a separate item of this document a request was also made to “set up international observers on the borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which are adjacent to the UN Protected Areas ... in order to prevent military activities against these two republics”.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 352; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 353; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁵ *Večernji list*, 11 May 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 359-360; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 360; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 360; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁸ *Vjesnik*, 12 May 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 364-365; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁹ *Večernji list*, 13 May 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 369-372; (3D00320).

One of the most severe letters addressed to the RH (regarding BH) by the international community is a letter sent on 12 May 1993 to the President of the RH by the Chairman of the EU Council of Ministers (Niels HELVEG).⁵⁰⁰ The letter also states that the EU “and its member states are shocked by the constant Croatian attacks and violence against the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... Moreover, reports indicating Croatia’s direct involvement in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina are alarming”.⁵⁰¹

The letter ended on an even more severe and direct note, indicating that the EU “and its member states ask for a swift, clear and concrete manifestation which would clearly show that the Croatian leadership is not only doing everything in its power to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is also succeeding in doing so”.⁵⁰²

Franjo TUĐMAN sent an extensive reply to this letter a day later (13 May 1993). First it listed seven concrete actions (or documents) in which the institutions of the RH, using the options available to them, participated in the attempts to stop the ongoing conflicts between the Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats in BH. Then it was pointed out to Niels HELVEG that in his letter “he makes no distinction between the Republic of Croatia and the Croats living in BH”, and that the RH “cannot be responsible for all the developments or possible atrocities committed in the territory of another sovereign state”, and that “Croatia can by no means be held responsible for acts committed in a foreign territory by persons who are not Croatian nationals”.⁵⁰³

At the end of the letter Franjo TUĐMAN was also severe, saying that he was “surprised by the new legal standard introduced in international law by the European Community”, and asked “how could anyone blame Croatia for not doing everything it could to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if he is aware of the facts mentioned in this letter? It would be very hard to apply the standard of evaluating how honest and appropriate the efforts made are in terms of how successful they have been to the activities of the United Nations and the European Community in the crisis in the area of the former Yugoslavia without reaching very interesting conclusions”.⁵⁰⁴

In a letter sent by the Ministry of Defence of the RH to the Government of BH, the Government of the RH also responded extensively to a number of misunderstandings and doubts which had appeared at the time in relations between the RH and BH. The letter indicates the principal starting points in the relation of the RH toward BH and the concrete facts which refute the suspicions regarding the relation of the state of the RH toward the state of BH, ending with the following conclusion: “We sincerely hope that you will stop making such false accusations which divert attention from the war in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, and from aggression aimed at creating a Greater Serbia, which stands to benefit from your approach. Only its absolute defeat will make peace possible in the area of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and throughout the former Yugoslavia.”⁵⁰⁵

On 25 June 1993 the President of the RH sent a letter to the Presidency of BH, stating as follows: “The Croatian public has been greatly outraged and alarmed by the

⁵⁰⁰ *Vjesnik*, 14 May 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 373-374; (3D00320).

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 373; (3D00320).

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 374; (3D00320).

⁵⁰³ *Vjesnik*, 14 May 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 375-377; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 377; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁵ *Glas Slavonije* (daily newspaper), Osijek, 19 May 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 378-380; (3D00320).

conflict between the HVO and BH Army which degenerated into open aggression and misdeeds by the Muslim forces ... against the Croatian people.”⁵⁰⁶

The letter then points out that “The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina freely hold sessions in Zagreb; representatives of these authorities move freely throughout the Republic of Croatia, disregarding basic international rules on announcing and seeking permission for their activities on the territory of another sovereign state; and in many places in Croatia, numerous different offices and logistical centres of political organisations and the military are in operation, and are committing crimes and aggression against the Croatian people ... Due to this, if the aggression and crimes are not halted immediately, the Republic of Croatia will seriously re-examine its overall policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁵⁰⁷

On 4 August 1993 the President of the Presidency of BH sent an interesting letter to the President of the RH proposing for adoption a number of proposals regarding the internal organisation of BH for the Croatian people in BH.⁵⁰⁸ The President of the RH soon replied, and the most important point he made was this: “The State of Croatia will welcome and support any initiative that is aimed at achieving close cooperation between the Muslim and Croatian constituent entities in the future Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this agreement should be reached by the leaderships and legitimate representatives of these republics.”⁵⁰⁹

On 6 September 1993 the President of the RH sent a letter to the President of the HRHB, Mate BOBAN, which includes the following statement: “...I urge you to condemn all violations of the international law of war and humanitarian law in the strongest possible terms and do everything necessary in the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna to ensure the immediate humane treatment of detainees in detention centres in accordance with humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions ... to see to it that the International Committee of the Red Cross is granted free access, wherever this has not yet been done... I appeal to you once more not to allow any kind of obstructions to the delivery of humanitarian aid to all those in need ... At the same time I also call on all the warring sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina to do the same.”⁵¹⁰

After the news on the crime committed against Muslims/Bosniaks in Stupni Dol was widely covered in the international media, in late October 1993 both the President of the RH and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RH strongly condemned all the crimes regardless of the perpetrators, but they also stated that “the international public must be informed that simultaneous crimes against the Croats do not cause such media attention or concern of political circles”, and therefore “one could conclude that there are double standards” and that “such an approach in establishing the responsibility of the individual sides to the conflict is not helping the establishment of a just peace in the area of BH”.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁶ *Vjesnik*, 26 June 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 402-403; (3D00320). Also, see Slobodan Praljak, *Zločini koje su počinili neki pripadnici A BiH (muslimanske postrojbe) nad Hrvatima u BiH 1991.-1995.*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2006. And Slobodan Praljak: *Srušene i oštećene katoličke crkve i vjerski objekti u Bosni i Hercegovini u ratu 1991.-1995.*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 402 and 403; for example, at that time (11 July 1993) the Presidency of BH held its session in Zagreb; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁸ *Vjesnik*, 8 August 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 417-418; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁹ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 419; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁰ *Večernji list*, 7 September 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 432-433; (3D00320).

⁵¹¹ *Novi list* (daily newspaper), Rijeka, 31 October 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 489-490; (3D00320).

As a result, Croatia asked that that “all those who committed crimes in BH be brought to justice”, but it added that it “also expects the international community and the International War Crimes Tribunal to shed light on all the crimes committed in the territory of the Republic of Croatia”.⁵¹²

Although disagreements appeared in this period in the relations between the states of the RH and BH, neither the RH nor BH (government institutions) did not at any point say or indicate in any other appropriate way that the RH and BH were involved in an armed conflict against each other or a conflict which could be described as such. The fact that there was no armed conflict between the RH and BH is even more evident if we examine the concrete relation of the RH toward the state of BH, particularly regarding the arming of the BH Army, and organising and training of BH Army units in the territory of the RH, which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections of this expert report.

III. – 1.5 The Process of Establishing Full Cooperation (November 1993-1995)

The first indication that agreements on full military and political cooperation will be reached later between the RH and the BH Army appeared as early as in mid-September 1993 during a stay in Geneva at a session of the MKBJ /International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia/, when the so-called Secret Agreement on Confederation between the RH and BH was reached between Franjo TUĐMAN and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ. The Agreement is very brief, outlines the principles and states that accord has been reached “to develop relations in all areas between the Bosnian-Muslim republic and the Croatian republic within the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of forming a common state which will simultaneously enter into a confederate relation with the Republic of Croatia”.⁵¹³

In early November 1993 when the Geneva Convention and other international attempts came to a standstill, the President of the RH presented a proposal for a peace initiative which involved a comprehensive solution to the problems in the RH and in the R BH. Franjo TUĐMAN’s main motive was most probably to resolve the most vital problem of the RH, i.e. reintegration of the occupied part of the territory of the RH, because at the time this problem was of secondary importance for the international community in relation to the problem of the R BH. Therefore Franjo TUĐMAN’s proposal first includes an elaborate peace plan proposal for the RH, followed by a brief peace plan proposal for the R BH.⁵¹⁴

Neither of the peace proposals contained any major new solutions, rather they restored parts of the peace documents formerly issued or proposed, which needed a firmer support of the international community. A special aspect of Franjo TUĐMAN’s peace proposal for the RH was contained in the following very compromise proposal: “The Croatian Government is willing to conclude within 15 days an agreement on the cessation of all hostilities with the representatives of local Serbs, giving them guarantees of local and cultural autonomy.”⁵¹⁵

The next peace proposal which Franjo TUĐMAN presented on 10 January 1994 in Bonn was related only to the R BH. It involved a detailed draft Contract Agreement on Establishing a Permanent and Coherent Peace between the Croatian and Bosniak- Muslim Peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Grounds for Future Co-

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, p. 490; (3D00320).

⁵¹³ *Večernji list*, 30 January 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 439; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁴ *Vjesnik*, 3 November 1993; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 493-497; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 493; (3D00320).

existence.⁵¹⁶ The starting point for the proposal was the fact that “considering their territorial links, historical experiences and common strategic interests, co-existence on friendly terms between the Croatian and the Bosniak-Muslim peoples in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a historical necessity”.⁵¹⁷

On 2 February 1994 the Chamber of Deputies of the Assembly of the RH issued a Resolution on Foreign Policy, reaffirming “once again Croatia’s decisiveness and commitment to reaching a permanent peace, security and stability in these areas primarily by political means”.⁵¹⁸ This Resolution also expressed regret that the peace proposals for the R BH which were current at the time “did not bear fruit” and clearly stated: “If the Muslim forces do not stop the offensive in Central Bosnia, the Chamber of Deputies of the Croatian Assembly believes that the Government and the President of the Republic should review and re-examine the current state of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁵¹⁹

On 5 February 1994 the Presidential Defence and National Security Council adopted conclusions which mainly referred to the situation in BH, including as follows: “The Council reiterates that Croatia allowed up to 2,000 volunteers, originally from BH, to leave the Republic of Croatia in order to help their compatriots in Bosnia protect themselves from aggression and ethnic cleansing ... Regarding the allegations that regular units of the Croatian Army are in central and southern Bosnia ... Croatia is already not only expressing readiness but also requesting that the actual situation be internationally monitored.”⁵²⁰

On 10 February 1994 in Geneva the President of the Government of BH and Minister of Internal Affairs of the RH issued a Joint Statement which included the following: “The two sides agreed that the commanders of the HVO and the BH Army ... meet in the next seven days in order to concretise the reached agreement on absolute ceasefire.”⁵²¹ In accordance with this, on 23 February 1994 in Zagreb the Commanders in Chief of the HVO and the BH Army signed a Ceasefire Agreement stipulating “immediate and full cessation of hostilities which shall take effect on 25 February”.⁵²²

Negotiations were held after this under the auspices of the US and on 1 March 1994 the so-called Washington Agreements were signed which also included a document called Draft Preliminary Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵²³ The Draft states as follows: “It is expected that a Confederation will be established between the Republic of Croatia ... and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... The steps toward the establishment of the Confederation shall be as follows: (1) Preliminary Agreement, which shall be concluded as soon as possible, and (2) Final Agreement.”⁵²⁴ The Draft also called for the establishment of a customs and monetary union and a defence agreement in the Confederation.

⁵¹⁶ *Vjesnik*, 11 January 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 503-509; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 504; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁸ *Vjesnik*, 3 February 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 512-514; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 513; (3D00320).

⁵²⁰ *Vjesnik*, 6 February 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 515-518; (3D00320).

⁵²¹ *Vjesnik*, 11 February 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 523; (3D00320).

⁵²² *Večernji list*, 24 February 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 524-525; (3D00320).

⁵²³ *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 5 March 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 538-539; (3D00320).

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 538; (3D00320).

On 1 March 1994 in Washington a document was signed entitled Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on Access to the Adriatic Sea through the area of the Republic of Croatia, stating that it is considered “desirable that the Federation ... has safe and unlimited access to the Adriatic Sea”, and that Croatia would “lease to the Federation, while this Agreement is in effect, a portion of the land inside the port of Ploče”.⁵²⁵

Since the Washington Agreements were issued suddenly and most probably at the dictate of the US, and they crucially modified the constitutional definitions of the position of the RH (for which the signatories on behalf of the RH were not authorised), as early as on 3 March 1994 the President of the RH addressed the public via national television “regarding the signing of the Washington Agreement”.⁵²⁶ The speech was very long and full of vague phrases which were unconvincingly used to try to justify the manner and content of the signed agreements.

Thus it contained the following statements: “... this agreement has far-reaching, even crucial historical significance ... As a result of the principled and consistent nature of our policy in that sense, Croatia was gradually winning the favour ... and full guarantees of the most responsible international factors for the security of its country and future of the Croatian people ... The implementation of the Washington Agreement will ensure the survival and future of the Croatian people ... This confederate union will be based on common interests in developing comprehensive relations in all areas ... Croats must realise that such a solution is historically necessary and purposeful ... and it all bears evidence that our consistent government policy is correct and purposeful ... Let us be proud of the results achieved and new open perspectives, but also aware of the obligations and the difficulty of the tasks before us in the new more favourable international circumstances!”⁵²⁷

In accordance with the Washington Agreements (Framework Agreement on the Federation in BH and Draft Preliminary Agreement on Confederation between the RH and the F BH /Federation of BH/) on 12 March 1994 in Split military representatives of the BH Army and the HVO (General Rasim DELIĆ and General Ante Zorislav ROSO) signed an agreement for “transition period” on the principles which will constitute the “bases for the future military agreements”.⁵²⁸ This Agreement first accepted the principles from the Framework Agreement (“the current command structures shall remain”, “forces shall immediately be separated from each other...”), and then a number of other corresponding principles were worked out. The most important points of the agreement referred to “merging the BH Army and the HVO” into a Federation Army, and for a transformation process, it was agreed that a parity joint staff will be established which will organise military districts under its jurisdiction, each of which will “have operative control over all the BH Army and HVO units in its district”.⁵²⁹

Then on 26 March 1994 in Sarajevo the Commanders of the BH Army (“ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ Commander, Army General Rasim DELIĆ”) and the HVO (“Chief of the HVO Main Staff, Colonel General Ante Zorislav ROSO”) signed an agreement for the “transition period” on the “organisation of a joint staff” of the BH Army and the HVO which will comprise five officers from each side, who will be

⁵²⁵ *Vjesnik*, 4 March 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 540-542; (3D00320).

⁵²⁶ *Vjesnik*, 4 March 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 543-547; (3D00320).

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁸ Croatian State Archives

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*

appointed within five days by the “Commanders of the BH ARMY and the CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL”.⁵³⁰ The Agreement also stipulated the following: “The current organisation and method of unit command” of the BH Army and the HVO “is hereby adopted”, and “The existing situation regarding the zones of responsibility of the BH Army Corps Commands and the command districts of the Croatian Defence Council are hereby adopted”,⁵³¹ thereby verifying once again the military organisation which was in place and the military situation which the BH Army and the HVO had achieved up to that point.

The duration of the transition period was specified descriptively, i.e. the Agreement shall be in effect “until the transition period ends and changes are introduced by the organisation of the FEDERAL ARMY – ARMY OF THE FEDERATION”, which shall be established and organised “after the Constitution of the Federation is examined and appropriate decisions are adopted by the highest state organs and the Ministry of Defence”.⁵³²

On the same day (26 March 1994) Generals Rasim DELIĆ and Ante Zorislav ROSO issued a joint order (comprising 10 items) for the BH Army Corps Commands and the HVO Military Districts.⁵³³ In the order they proceeded from “the Zagreb and the Split Agreements, considering the results achieved in effecting the cessation of combat operations between the HVO units and the BH Army”, in order to “enable free movement on some roads, unhindered passage of humanitarian convoys and establishment of normal living conditions for the population”.⁵³⁴

A few months later, on 17 August 1994, a secret meeting was held in Hrasnica near Sarajevo between the highest representatives of the Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian structures in BH,⁵³⁵ in order to “examine to what extent the current agreements have been implemented and what joint actions must be taken to overcome the weaknesses detected”.⁵³⁶ Thirteen joint conclusions were adopted after a debate at the meeting. The first and basic conclusion was as follows: “In the implementation of the agreements signed so far, the goals set have mainly been achieved, in the military field more than in others.”⁵³⁷ Item eight reads as follows: “Cooperation of the HVO and Army (BH ARMY, *author’s note*) with the Serbo-Chetniks must be stopped at once.”⁵³⁸

Item 12 of the conclusions was particularly important, stating as follows: “Conditions for a joint army are currently not in place, but we can aim at coordinating combat operations against the Serbo-Chetnik aggressor. In certain areas we must aim at joint actions which will be planned by the ZS (joint staff) in cooperation with the GS HVO /Croatian Defence Council Main Staff/ and the ŠVKA /Army Supreme

⁵³⁰ The document is kept in the Croatian State Archives and entitled *Ustrojstvo združenog stožera i zadaci* /The Organisation of the Joint Staff and Tasks/.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*, items 3 and 5.

⁵³² *Ibid.*, items 3 and 6.

⁵³³ The document is kept in the Croatian State Archives.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, chapter *Commands*.

⁵³⁵ The following persons were present on the Muslim/Bosniak side: Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, Haris SILAJDŽIĆ (President of the Government of the R BH and President of the Government of the F BH), Ejup GANIĆ (member of the Presidency of the R BH and Vice President of the F BH), Rasim DELIĆ (BH Army ŠVK Commander) and General Sulejman VRANJ. The following persons were present on the Croatian side: Krešimir ZUBAK (President of the Presidential Council of the HRHB and President of the F BH), Jadranko PRLIĆ (Prime Minister of the HRHB and Minister of Defence of the F BH), General Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ (Chief of the HRHB HVO Main Staff) and Brigadier Ivan KOLAK.

⁵³⁶ The document is kept in the Croatian State Archives, p. 1.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Command Staff/.”⁵³⁹ It is interesting that the conclusions also state as follows: “The proposal for the organisation of the BH Federation Army was sent by the GS HVO. The proposal of the ŠVKA will be sent to the Federation MO (Ministry of Defence, *author’s note*) after the debate at the BH Presidency.”⁵⁴⁰

In the part of the Washington Agreements which referred to the establishment of a confederation between the BH Federation (F BH) and the RH, military and political events evolved in different directions from the ones which had been agreed on and the provisions on the Confederation slowly faded away, despite the fact that a new round of Washington documents was signed on 18 March 1994,⁵⁴¹ and the fact that on 22 July 1995 a Declaration on the Implementation of the Washington Agreements, Joint Defence from Serbian aggression and Finding a Political Solution in Accordance with the Efforts of the International Community was signed in Split between the RH, R BH and F BH.⁵⁴²

Very soon the decline of the idea of the Confederation became evident on the bilateral level of relations as well between the RH and BH. For instance, in a letter which Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ sent to Franjo TUĐMAN on 30 April 1994,⁵⁴³ and also in Franjo TUĐMAN’s reply (2 May 1994),⁵⁴⁴ in which no particular concern is expressed due to the “delayed” implementation of the agreement on the Confederation.

Furthermore, in September 1994 top (and large) “delegations of the Republic of Croatia, Republic of BH and Federation of BH led by Franjo TUĐMAN and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ” met in Zagreb for a two-day session, and on 14 September 1994 they published a Joint Statement, in which the delegations “expressed their common and unquestionable political will to implement the Washington Agreement consistently and fully”.⁵⁴⁵ But in the conclusions on the relations “between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” it is only mentioned at the end that “a joint group” made up of national television broadcasters “must be appointed which will produce a joint programme or broadcast through which they will inform the public once a week ... on the development of relations and cooperation, and on the development of the Federation and establishment of confederate relations”.

Generally speaking, the success of the Washington Agreements was most rapidly and clearly evident in the military operations. In early November 1994 the HVO freed a very important area of the Kupres plateau and its surrounding area totalling around 600 km², and at the same time the BH Army freed the area southwest of Bugojno. After that, on 13 November 1994, a meeting was held in Kreševo between the representatives of the HVO and the BH Army “led by the President of the BH Federation, Mr Krešimir ZUBAK, and the Vice President of the BH Federation, Mr Ejup GANIĆ”.⁵⁴⁶ Joint conclusions were adopted at the meeting, among which the first and the ninth (last) figure prominently.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵⁴¹ *Sporazum između Federacije BiH i Republike Hrvatske kojim se Hrvatskoj jamči slobodan prolaz područjem Federacije /The Agreement between the BH Federation and the Republic of Croatia guaranteeing Croatia free passage through the area of the Federation/ – see M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 553-554; (3D00320).*

⁵⁴² *Vjesnik*, 24 July 1995; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 614-616; (3D00320).

⁵⁴³ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 576-577; (3D00320).

⁵⁴⁴ *Večernji list*, 3 May 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 578; (3D00320).

⁵⁴⁵ *Vjesnik*, 16 September 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 598-602; (3D00320).

⁵⁴⁶ The document is kept in the Croatian State Archives.

The first states as follows: “Joint actions of the Army and the HVO in the operation to free Kupres were of great military and political significance in terms of encouraging more rapid and efficient resolution of all the other matters and problems which are present in the relations between the Army and the HVO. At a special meeting the Army Commander and the Chief of the GS HVO will reach an agreement on combining Army and HVO operations at the operative and tactical level.”⁵⁴⁷ The ninth conclusion reads as follows: “In the planning and implementation of joint combat operations and resolving all other problems and matters it will be taken into account that after the territory of the Federation of BH is liberated the HVO wants to proceed with operations until all the territory of the Republic of BH is finally liberated.”⁵⁴⁸

By mid-December 1994 the HVO liberated a part of the area in the direction of Glamoč and Bosansko Grahovo (western part of BH). At the same time Serbian units from the occupied parts of the RH (the area under the control of UNPROFOR) helped Fikret ABDIĆ’s army to push the 5th Corps of the BH Army and capture Velika Kladuša (in north-western BH), bringing the humanitarian catastrophe in the international (UN) “Bihać safe area” to a culmination.

It is important to note that as early as mid-November 1994 Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ sent a letter to Franjo TUĐMAN informing him of military attacks on the UN “Bihać safe area” from the occupied areas of the RH (which were under the control of the international peacekeeping forces), and asked that “in the spirit of the provisions of international law, without delay, take all the necessary measures to prevent attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina from the territory of your country”.⁵⁴⁹

An agreement on ceasefire in BH was signed on 23 December 1994 in Sarajevo by Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and General Rasim DELIĆ on one side and Radovan KARADŽIĆ and General Ratko MLADIĆ on the other side,⁵⁵⁰ and on 12 January 1995, also in Sarajevo, Generals Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ, Rasim DELIĆ and Ratko MLADIĆ signed an agreement on cessation of hostilities in BH.⁵⁵¹

However these agreements did not result in a cessation of armed conflicts, on the contrary, it was becoming more and more evident that peace will be possible only after Serbian aggression was defeated militarily. The Plan in Nine Points for Support of the Federation of BH,⁵⁵² adopted on 5 February 1995 in München by member countries of the Contact Group, must also be interpreted in that sense. The Plan also specifies that the US “will send a senior retired officer to help in the integration of federal military institutions”.⁵⁵³

During the first half of 1995 military and political events in the area of the RH and the R BH were becoming more and more interconnected, both regarding military operations and from the position of the political negotiating process led by the international community, with which they attempted to reach an integral solution for peace-enforcement in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

In a rapid military operation (so-called Flash /*Bljesak*/) in early May 1995 the Croatian Army (HV) freed 600 km² of territory in western Slavonia, and then from 4 to 11 June 1995 the HV and HVO freed a number of strategic mountaintops in the

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3; cf. article *Kupres je samo prvi korak* /Kupres is only a first step/ in *Kronologija rata...*, p. 426.

⁵⁴⁹ Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 606; (3D00320).

⁵⁵⁰ *Vjesnik*, 24 December 1994; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, p. 607; (3D00320).

⁵⁵¹ *Večernji list*, 13 January 1995; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 608-609; (3D00320).

⁵⁵² Document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 610-611; (3D00320).

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 611.

border area between the western R BH and the RH. Then the Serbian army committed a mass crime in the international (UN) “Srebrenica safe area”, and fiercely attacked the “Bihać safe area” which was being defended by besieged and exhausted BH Army and HVO units.

In such circumstances, on 20 July 1995, “the BH Army Commander, Army General Rasim DELIĆ” sent an “appeal” to the HV and HVO on behalf of the BH Army General Staff, asking for “direct assistance” for the BH Army 5th Corps “in the defence of the free territory of the Bihać area”. DELIĆ proposed that the HVO and HV also provide assistance in the following way: “by continuing offensive operations and exploiting the success achieved on the axis toward Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč (in BH, *author’s note*)”, and “possibly starting offensive operations on the Sinj – Vrlika – Knin axis (in the RH, *author’s note*), and also on the Karlovac – Vojnić – Petrova Gora axis (in the RH, *author’s note*)”.

The unusual type of salute with which General Rasim DELIĆ ended the “appeal” indicates the gravity of the situation at the time and the particular importance of the Bihać area: “Death to fascism and Chetniks – freedom to the Bosniak and Croatian peoples. Long live the Republic/Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Long live the Republic of Croatia.”⁵⁵⁴

A day later (21 July 1995) Franjo TUĐMAN and the President of the Republic of Turkey, Sulejman DEMIREL, met on Brijuni (in the RH) and issued a Joint Statement.⁵⁵⁵ In the Statement they strongly “condemned the newest offensives and invasion of the United Nations safe areas in BH by the Bosnian Serbs ... They also condemned the attacks by the Croatian Serbs on areas in BH ... The two Presidents are dismayed by the lack of will of the international community to take appropriate measures to prevent and alleviate the current very dangerous developments ... They repeated their conviction that Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as the victims of aggression have a right to defend themselves. They reiterated their conviction that the gravity of the situation reaffirms the need for direct and full implementation of the Washington Agreements ... They called on the Contact Group to take concrete and resolute measures to prevent further Serbian aggression”.⁵⁵⁶

The next day (22 July 1995) in Split the delegations of the RH (led by Franjo TUĐMAN), R BH (led by Alija IZETBEGOVIC) and F BH (led by Krešimir ZUBAK) adopted the Declaration on the Implementation of the Washington Agreements, Joint Defence against Serbian Aggression and Reaching a Political Solution in accordance with the Efforts of the International Community.⁵⁵⁷ As a result of this Declaration (the so-called Split Declaration) the highest levels of military and political cooperation was achieved between the states of the RH and R BH in defence against Serbian armed aggression, and the successful military operations that were carried out in the next few months made possible the signing of the so-called Dayton Peace Agreement.

In the Split Declaration an agreement was also reached regarding “the continuation of cooperation and permanent coordination of defence activities between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arrangements for cooperation were made between the Croatian Army Main Staff and the Joint Staff of the BH Army and the HVO in order to coordinate defence activities in the field of command, logistics,

⁵⁵⁴ The document is kept in the Croatian State Archives.

⁵⁵⁵ *Vjesnik*, 22 July 1995; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 612-613; (3D00320).

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁷ *Vjesnik*, 24 July 1995; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 614-616; (3D00320).

military-industrial production, communication systems, IT and analytical needs and other fields”.⁵⁵⁸

Once full security cooperation was achieved between the RH and the R BH, by late (25-20) July 1995, the HVO freed the strategically important towns of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč, and in early (4-10) August 1995, in the greatest liberating operation (so-called Operation Storm /*Oluja*) the HV swiftly freed approximately 11,000 km² of occupied territory of the RH, and prevented a humanitarian catastrophe in the UN “Bihać safe area”.

As early as 7 August 1995 the “Commander of the BH Army General Staff” (General Rasim DELIĆ) sent a confidential letter to the Chief of the HV Main Staff (General Zvonimir ČERVENKO) congratulating him personally and on behalf of BH Army members “on successful operations carried out by the Croatian Army in liberating the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia”, expressing “satisfaction that there has been a high degree of coordination between the units of the BH Army 5th Corps, the HVO and the HV”, and remarking that it has been once again “demonstrated that we can defeat the common aggressor militarily through absolute mutual trust and coordinated action”.⁵⁵⁹

By mid-September 1995, in additional liberating operations (so-called operation Breeze /*Maestral*), the HV, HVO and BH Army freed approximately 2,000 km² of territory in central and western parts of the R BH (Drvar, Šipovo, Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Bosanski Petrovac). After that, “from 22 to 24 September 1995, work teams fortified the positions reached by the Croatian forces and the Army, mapped the area and both sides signed”, and on 25 September 1995 representatives of the Croatian forces (HV and HVO) and the BH Army met in Novi Travnik and compiled a protocol, arranging the following: “Operation Commanders, Colonel General Ante GOTOVINA and Brigadier General Vahid KARAVELIĆ will make a draft of the basic idea for further b/d (combat operations, *author's note*) and send it to the Leadership by 1200 hours on 30 September 1995.”⁵⁶⁰

Based on this, on 5 October 1995 a meeting was held in Zagreb between the HV (Minister of Defence of the RH, Gojko ŠUŠAK; Generals: Zvonimir ČERVENKO, Ante GOTOVINA, Mirko NORAC and Mladen MAREKOVIĆ, and Colonel Dunja ZLOIĆ-GOTOVINA), HVO (Minister of Defence of the HRHB, Vladimir ŠOLJIĆ, and General Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ) and the BH Army (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the R BH, Muhamed ŠAĆIRBEJ; Generals: Rasim DELIĆ, Mehmed ALAGIĆ, Vahid KARAVELIĆ and Ferid BULJUBAŠIĆ). Conclusions were adopted at the meeting regarding “cooperation in the upcoming military operation”⁵⁶¹ (so-called *Južni potez* /*Southern Stretch*), in which, by mid-October 1995, the HV, BH Army and HVO exacted new extensive defeats against the Serbian army in central and north-western R BH, and the occupational Serbian system of government in the R BH was on the brink of total collapse.

However, the great liberating progression of joint Muslim/Bosniak and Croatian forces, which was supposed to reverse the conquests resulting from Serbian

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, item 1.

⁵⁵⁹ Croatian State Archives.

⁵⁶⁰ www.slobodanpraljak.com: Document entitled *Protocol*, which was sent as strictly confidential to the MORH /Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia/ by the Security Sector of the Ministry of Defence of the HRHB (No. 02-09-95-01-1534/95) on 26 September 1995.

⁵⁶¹ Files of General Slobodan Praljak: MORH (S)-2-431.

armed aggression against the R BH, was stopped by the imposition of a hasty truce and peace talks under international sponsorship.⁵⁶²

Thus the talks in Dayton (US) resulted in the so-called Dayton Peace Agreements⁵⁶³ – adopted on 21 November 1995 in Dayton and finally signed on 14 December in Paris – which stopped the war in BH and verified the situation as it was at the time (*status quo*), which was the result of the Serbian armed aggression and numerous Serbian war crimes committed in the R BH. Thereby, with the international verification, the notorious Republika Srpska also survived.

The Dayton Peace Agreements also somewhat amended the Washington Agreements, so that in relations between the RH and the R BH the provisions regarding the establishment of a confederation were not kept in, rather the Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Council for Cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶² See *Kronologija rata...*, p. 530 (*Primirje spasilo Banja Luku /Truce Saved Banja Luka/*) and p. 535 (*Zakulisne igre oko Daytona /Backstage manoeuvring around Dayton/*).

⁵⁶³ See documents in M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 628-690; (3D00320).

⁵⁶⁴ *Večernji list*, 15 December 1995; document taken from M. Tudman, *Istina...*, pp. 689-690; (3D00320).

III – 2 REFUGEES

III – 2.1. Introductory Remarks

Among the numerous negative effects caused by Serbian armed aggression against the RH and BH (1990 – 1995) one which is especially negative is the problem of expelled persons and refugees, who appeared in vast numbers and to a particularly large extent in relation to the total population of the RH. The cause of such a large number of expelled persons and refugees in the RH lies primarily in the fact that Serbian armed aggression relied on systematic implementation of ethnic cleansing in large parts of the territory of the RH and the R BH.

Thus all the numerical data on the expelled persons and refugees from the area of the RH and the R BH, and their temporal pattern, spatial arrangement, stratification and the care provided for them represent one of the most exact factual and interpretative indicators of the events in that area from 1990 to 1995.

In other words, these indicators clearly show the war objectives of individual participants (state, nation, institutions, leaderships) and the methods used to implement them. Also, what with the existing stereotypes, confusion and ignorance regarding the provision of the basic answers to the question – who was the aggressor and who was the victim in the area of the former Yugoslavia? – the indicators referring to expelled persons and refugees are the least susceptible to subjective interpretation and therefore the least questionable.

On the other hand, the humanitarian crises involving expelled persons and refugees in the RH and the R BH required years of the greatest possible financial and organisational efforts, first of all on the part of the RH and then international humanitarian organisations (especially UNHCR). Also, since the effects of this crisis still have not nearly been repaired (restored to their initial state), the effects regarding expelled persons and refugees represent the greatest and longest-lasting negative consequence of Serbian armed aggression against the RH and the R BH, and thereby also the greatest failure of all the international and domestic institutions which have a humanitarian and humanistic purpose.

Finally, the indicators regarding expelled persons and refugees also have the greatest possible value, in every respect, for objective understanding of the basic theme of this work and the entire expert report.

III – 2.2. Refugees and Expelled Persons⁵⁶⁵ in the Republic of Croatia

The first large groups of refugees in the RH, resulting from Serbian armed aggression, appeared in the first half of 1991 and around the middle of that year there were around 30,000 of them.

In January 1992 the number of expelled persons in the RH was approximately at 700,000 (including the expelled persons who left Croatia as refugees and went to

⁵⁶⁵ The term “expelled persons” implies expelled persons who remained in the territory of the same (their own) state, while refugees are expelled persons who have left the territory of their state. The information and numerical indicators regarding expelled persons and refugees in the RH listed in this part of the expert report were taken from *Progonstvo i povrataak*, Ivan Rogić *et al.*, Zagreb, 1995; *cf.* *Narodne novine* (Official Gazette of the RH), 92/1998, Zagreb, 7 July 1998, pp. 2120-2127.

other countries). This means that by the end of 1991 over 15% of the population of Croatia (in accordance with the census of 1991) were expelled persons.

A list of all expelled persons in the RH was compiled in April 1992 and it included 247,278 persons, which means that the number of expelled persons had decreased in a few months because after the truce for the territory of the RH was signed (2 January 1992) a large part of the expelled persons returned to the unoccupied parts of the RH.

In April 1992, in addition to the existing crisis involving expelled persons, a refugee crisis also started in the RH because by that time 187,000 persons arrived in the RH as refugees from the R BH. In as early as May 1992 around 100,000 new refugees arrived in the RH from the R BH. The number of refugees from the R BH continued to grow and in August 1992 the Government of the RH “appealed to the European countries to receive Bosnian refugees because it is no longer able to accommodate them on its own”.⁵⁶⁶

Although part of the refugees from the R BH who were accommodated in Croatia (together with the new refugees from the R BH who were passing through Croatia) were going to third countries, nevertheless in late 1992 the number of refugees from the R BH accommodated in Croatia grew to 402,000. In addition, since 260,705 expelled persons were also accommodated in Croatia at the time, this was the culmination of the humanitarian crisis (involving refugees and expelled persons) in the RH.

During the first half of 1993 the wave of refugees from the R BH was less strong, and a part of the refugees from the R BH accommodated in Croatia were leaving for third countries, together with a part of the new refugees who were also passing through Croatia on their way from the R BH to third countries. A part of the refugees from the R BH returned to the R BH. The list of refugees in April 1993 established that 269,005 of them were accommodated in Croatia at the time.

In the second half of 1993 the wave of refugees from the R BH in Croatia increased (mostly Croats from the central R BH) as a result of clashes between Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats. At the end of 1993 these refugee movements resulted in around 270,000 refugees from the R BH being accommodated in Croatia.

In addition, in 1992 and 1993 a total of as many as 700,000 refugees from the R BH passed through Croatia on their way to third countries.

In 1994 the number of refugees from the western parts of BH in Croatia increased. At the same time, a part of the refugees who were accommodated in Croatia returned to the R BH or went to third countries. According to a census taken in July 1994, 183,038 refugees (and 196,870 expelled persons, totalling 379,809 refugees and expelled persons accommodated in Croatia at the time – or 9% in relation to the entire population of the RH) were accommodated in Croatia at the time.

Refugee movements in all directions continued throughout 1995, and a census taken in late July 1995 established that 190,772 refugees (and 198,230 expelled persons, which means that a total of 389,002 refugees and expelled persons were being accommodated in Croatia) were accommodated at the time in Croatia.

In total, around 600,000 refugees from the R BH were accommodated in Croatia from 1992 to 1995. Of this number, around 425,000 were Muslims/Bosniaks and around 175,000 were Croats from the R BH.

When these indicators are compared with some other data in Croatia, then one can fully realise to what a vast extent refugees and expelled persons represented social, economic, security and other types of burden for the RH.

⁵⁶⁶ *Progonstvo i povratak*, Ivan Rogić *et al.*, Zagreb, 1995, p. 51.

In 1994 in the RH there were around 817,000 retired persons, 243,408 (or 17%) unemployed and only 1,156,000 employed persons. In addition, 300,000 persons in the RH lived in households which had been issued with a welfare card.⁵⁶⁷

III – 2.3. Care Provided by the RH for the Refugees from BH

Under pressure from the growing number of expelled persons, on 23 July 1991 the Government of the RH issued a Decision establishing the Republican Centre for Provision of Care and Aid for Expelled Persons, and on 30 August 1991 the Office for Refugees was established pursuant to a Decision issued by the Government of the RH.⁵⁶⁸ However, the problem of expelled persons and refugees was becoming bigger and bigger, and on 22 November 1991 the Government of the RH organised a special body, the Government Office for Expelled Persons and Refugees, and issued a Decree on the Status of Expelled Persons and Refugees.⁵⁶⁹

The Government Office was placed “in charge of accommodation, building and additionally constructing accommodation units, sorting, transporting and distributing humanitarian aid, financing accommodation in various buildings and collecting and registering information”.⁵⁷⁰ In addition, the Office coordinated its activities with all the institutions of the RH dealing with expelled persons and refugees and cooperated with the relevant international non-governmental and government organisations.

In Croatia the Office directly controlled its territorial network which comprised 21 regional offices and associates in 99 social centres. While its was active, the Office produced and collected a vast number of documents and information on expelled persons and refugees. This material is kept in folders, herbaria and files, which are stored on shelves totalling as much as 921 metres in length.⁵⁷¹

Due to their large number, refugees and expelled persons in the RH were accommodated in all the available accommodation units in various areas throughout Croatia; in hotels, sports halls, army barracks, welfare institutions, huts used by construction companies to accommodate their workers, rest homes, kindergartens, schools, hospitals, nuclear shelters, railroad cars, camp grounds, etc. “In 19/9/2 new settlements were built for expelled persons and refugees and buildings were reconstructed to improve the standards for old expelled persons and refugees or to accommodate new arrivals ... In late 1994 there are (were, *author's note*) 612 buildings in Croatia where accommodation and/or food for expelled persons and refugees was organised”.⁵⁷²

However, in all the listed joint accommodation units in the RH there was room for about 20% of the refugees and expelled persons. Therefore, according to the information from 1994, around 80% of the refugees and expelled persons in the RH were placed in private accommodation (houses, flats, holiday cottages, etc) with families “which showed the highest degree of humanity and solidarity by receiving most of the expelled persons and refugees into their homes”.⁵⁷³

⁵⁶⁷ Data in this paragraph was taken from I. Rogić, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁵⁶⁸ *Narodne novine*, Zagreb, 45/91.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 64/91.

⁵⁷⁰ I. Rogić, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁵⁷¹ See S. Praljak, *Pomoć Republike Hrvatske Muslimansko-Bošnjačkom narodu i Armiji Bosne i Hercegovine tijekom 1991.-1995. godine – činjenice*, Zagreb, 2007, pp. 367-370; (3D02633).

⁵⁷² I. Rogić, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Provision of care for the expelled persons in the RH was based on laws which had been issued for that purpose, and care for the refugees was provided “in accordance with international conventions on refugees”.⁵⁷⁴ Both expelled persons and refugees in the RH were entitled to provisional accommodation, food, help with social adaptation, children’s education, health care, humanitarian aid and aid for covering the other bare necessities (transport, funeral fees, etc.).

The costs of the care provided for a huge number of refugees and expelled persons from 1991 to 1995 were mostly borne by the RH. “The King Zvonimir Fund, a central institution for covering the costs of providing care for the expelled persons and refugees receives over 70% of its funds from the Croatian budget, while the other funds come from donations”, and in 1994 “the costs of accommodation alone for the expelled persons and refugees ... amounted to around 360 million DM, 78% of which came from the Croatian national budget”.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55. In addition to everything listed, the vast war damage which the RH sustained during Serbian armed aggression must also be taken into account: *see* Slobodan Praljak, *Procjena ratnih šteta u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb, 2006.

III – 3 ARMING AND EQUIPPING OF BH ARMY UNITS

III – 3.1. Arming and Equipping

Even when the war in the area of the R BH ended, the BH Army was an armed force which was, in every respect and while the war was ongoing, in the process of being established. Due to this the BH Army was constantly faced with a number of basic and atypical problems, and the main problem within this was the “lack of weapons, ammunition and all materiel and technical equipment”.⁵⁷⁶ Due to the geopolitical position of the R BH, generally the only way to resolve this problem was through or from the territory of the RH, and that is what happened.

Throughout the war in the area of the R BH, the institutions of the RH, particularly the Ministry of Defence of the RH (MORH), were intensively and directly involved in and assisted and approved the process of arming and equipping the BH Army. This cooperation between the institutions of the RH and the R BH in the process of arming the BH Army was also active during the period of partial armed conflicts between Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats. The reasons for this uninterrupted cooperation on part of the RH lie in its strategic interests, one of the main being to defeat Serbian aggression militarily in the area of the R BH because without this defeat it most probably would not be possible to reintegrate the Croatian occupied areas, which was the principal issue for the survival, security and stability of the state of the RH.

A vast number of documents at all levels and of various bilateral origin bears evidence to the facts showing cooperation between the states of the RH and R BH regarding the arming of the BH Army (and its predecessors).⁵⁷⁷

For example, the RH government bodies organised the transport of weapons for the BH Army, from the RH to the R BH, by land and air (helicopters and airplanes).⁵⁷⁸ Throughout the RH there were as many as 26 points where weapons were loaded for the BH Army and then sent to 12 destinations in the R BH controlled by the BH Army.⁵⁷⁹

Numerous MORH documents signed by the highest officials, including those from the period of partial armed conflicts between Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats in the R BH (from the final months of 1992 to the initial months of 1994), indicate that weapons, military equipment and food for the BH Army were being sent from the RH. For example, in mid-December 1992 HV Colonel General Ivan ČERMAK (Assistant Minister of Defence of the RH) issued an order for the Maintenance and Transport Administration of the MORH “to issue materiel for the needs of the armed forces of BH, Visoko Logistics Centre”.⁵⁸⁰ In March 1993 Croatian Army (HV) Major General Ivan BASARAC (Chief of Services Administration at the Main Staff of the RH), Mladen VRGOTUK (Chief of Maintenance and Transport Administration of the MORH), HV Colonel General Ivan ČERMAK and others issued a number of Orders

⁵⁷⁶ J. Divjak, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

⁵⁷⁷ See web page www.slobodanpraljak.com where around 2,000 documents referring to this topic have been published in digital form; or see around 60 documents published in S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, pp. 8-89; (3D02633).

⁵⁷⁸ See S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, pp. 10-12; (3D02633).

⁵⁷⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 13; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16; (3D02633).

and other documents regarding delivery of weapons and equipment for the needs of the BH Army.⁵⁸¹

III – 3.2. Logistics Bases for the BH Army in the Territory of the RH

There were a large number of BH Army logistics bases in the area of the RH which also sent weapons and other equipment to BH Army units. In addition, in cooperation with the authorities of the RH or without it, other institutions of the R BH (for example, the Embassy of the R BH in Zagreb) and different organisations and individuals in the area of the RH also sent weapons and military equipment to BH Army units in different areas of the R BH.

For example, the document sent on 6 March 1993 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, BH Army, Zagreb Logistics Centre, and addressed to the “Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, to Colonel Vladimir ZAGORAC personally”, includes the following statement: “Dear Sir, we hereby send you the list of trucks and drivers who are to collect materiel and technical equipment ... The materiel and technical equipment under paragraph 1 will be sent to Pazarić and those under paragraph 2 to Gradačac for the needs of the 1st and 2nd BH Army Corps and the 106th and 107th HVO units.” The document is signed “BH Army, Zagreb Logistics Centre, Coordinator, Azem KARAMEHMEDOVIC”,⁵⁸²

A few days later the BH Army, Zagreb Logistics Centre, sent a letter to the MORH stating as follows: “Please allow transport of materiel and technical equipment for the needs of the BH Army – Visoko Logistics Centre for the following vehicles.”⁵⁸³ Documents of the same type were also routinely sent in the following period, which shows that there was systematic cooperation between the BH Army and the MORH regarding the arming and equipping of the BH Army.⁵⁸⁴

A document of 14 January 1993 bearing the title “List of MTS (materiel and technical equipment, *author’s note*) in depots of Lučko Air Base (near Zagreb, *author’s note*) belonging to the BH Army – 5th Corps, and under supervision of the Bihać District Office based in Zagreb”, and a stamp of the Office at the end of the document (“Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bihać District, Zagreb Office”) sufficiently illustrates the relationship of the government institutions of the RH towards the BH Army and the state of the R BH.⁵⁸⁵

A number of documents issued by the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia, from May 1993 to March 1994 (during the fiercest conflicts between Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats), indicate that the Embassy also intensively and freely participated in the arming and equipping of the BH Army from the territory of the RH.⁵⁸⁶ According to the information in these documents, weapons and ammunition generally arrived in the area of Bihać hidden in UNHCR trucks which were transporting humanitarian aid. Some documents indicate that weapons and equipment were sent by the BH Embassy Military Economic Mission, which was based in Zagreb, Savska cesta 62 E/V. Also, some documents are signed “For the Military Attaché, Hajrudin OSMANAGIĆ”, and some documents bear the following

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33; (3D02633).

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26; (3D02633).

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 29; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁶ See *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 69, 70, 71, 75, 77, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88; (3D02633).

stamp at the end: “Military Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia”.⁵⁸⁷

In mid-July 1993, “at the request of the Supreme Command Staff of the BH armed forces”, the Ministry of Defence of BH appointed (employed) six persons to the Zagreb Military Economic Mission, 21 persons to the Logistics Department of the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of the R BH in Zagreb and two persons to the Logistics Department of the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of the R BH in Split.⁵⁸⁸ The Embassy of the Republic of BH in Zagreb informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RH of this.⁵⁸⁹ However, another strictly confidential document from the R BH shows that eight persons had been actually appointed by “Order of the Intelligence Administration Strictly Confidential number...”, and one can only speculate about the reasons.⁵⁹⁰

The subject of the logistics centres of the R BH in the territory of the RH is still very much open to investigation, and it is therefore not possible to fully reconstruct either the scope of the logistics network of the R BH in the RH or the scope and methods of its operation.⁵⁹¹ Some documents show that the Main Staff for Support of BH was also active in the RH, which had Regional Staffs subordinate to it. In a document bearing the coat of arms of the R BH, the Main Staff for Support of BH, Split Regional Staff, sent a letter to the Rijeka Main Staff which reads only as follows: “I hereby send for you to see the stamp of the Split Regional Staff and my signature”, and bears the signature “Staff Commander Senad BIŠČEVIĆ” and the Staff stamp.⁵⁹²

In addition, numerous Muslim or Islamic humanitarian (“”) /as printed/ organisations⁵⁹³ and individuals invested with “powers”,⁵⁹⁴ who were sent to the RH for that purpose by a number of BH Army units and other government institutions of the R BH were also semi-legally active in the RH and involved in different types of logistics and “logistics” for the BH Army and the Muslim/Bosniak leadership in the R BH.

A particularly significant (according to the place of origin indicated) confidential document is one written in Zagreb on 18 February 1993 by the institution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, OS Supreme Command Staff, RV and PVO Administration⁵⁹⁵ and sent to the Chief of the BH Army Supreme Command Staff. It is evident from item 5 of the document that the Chief of the BH Army RV and PVO Administration, and probably also the Administration itself, were based in Zagreb for months.

This document includes the following statement: “Two medium-sized Mi-8T transport helicopters were purchased for the needs of the BH Army ... our crews flew them to Visoko a. (airfield, *author’s note*) ... The purchase of two more Mi-8T helicopters is under way.”⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁸⁷ See *Ibid.*, pp. 70 and 89; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158; copy of the document *Rješenje /Decision/*; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163; (3D02633).

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-179, 182, 183-184, 185; (3D02633).

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 188; (3D02633).

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 180, 189-197; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 186, 187; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35; OS = Armed Forces; RV = Air Force; PVO = Anti-Aircraft Defence ; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*; (3D02633).

III – 3.3. HZHB and the HVO and Arming of the BH Army

Due to the territorial development of Serbian armed aggression against the R BH, by far the most secure supply routes from Croatia to central and eastern parts of the R BH (and thereby also of military supply for the BH Army) went through the area of the HZHB (HRHB). A number of documents indicate that this supply for the BH Army went through the area and with the cooperation of the HZHB (HRHB), even at a time when there were armed conflicts going on between Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats at certain localities.

A document of the HVO Main Staff of 26 June 1992 issued in Grude (in Herzegovina) shows that in the period before these conflicts the supply for the BH Army through the area of the HZHB went on according to standard procedure. The document is short, bears an “HZHB – HVO” letterhead and the title Permit for Transport of Equipment and Weapons, and reads as follows: “Transport of equipment for Pazarić is hereby allowed by this Command ... Colonel Mustafa POROBIĆ is responsible for the transport. All police units must let this transport through.” It is signed “HVO Commander, Brigadier Milivoj PETKOVIĆ”.⁵⁹⁷

A document dated 6 November 1992, a report of the HVO Main Staff issued in Grude, first lists the “distribution of equipment sent to BH Army units (Foča, Goražde)”, and then provides a record of “equipment transported for the needs of the BH Army (1st Krajina Brigade and Jajce HVO)”.⁵⁹⁸

A document dated 1 March 1993 issued by the Logistics Sector of the HVO Main Staff, a “List of MS (materiel, *author’s note*) seized by the BH Army, which was sent to Central Bosnia OZ /Operations Zone/”, was sent to the Minister of Defence of the RH, “Minister Gojko ŠUŠAK personally”. In addition to indicating problems in the relationship between the BH Army and the HVO, this document also shows that the MORH and the HVO cooperated in the process of arming the BH Army units.

On 7 April 1993 the HVO Main Staff issued a Permit for free passage of a large quantity of materiel and technical equipment “which is being transported by trucks from Grude to Srebrenica”.⁵⁹⁹ The document is signed “Ante JELAVIĆ, Assistant Chief of the HVO GS /Main Staff/ for Logistics”.

In addition to those already listed, a number of other MORH documents show that shipments of weapons, ammunition and military equipment for the needs of the BH Army and the HVO were frequently sent from the RH to Grude, and from there on to various regions in BH. For example, the frequency of shipments of weapons and military equipment to Grude, by order of the MORH, is also evident from a number of documents referring to March 1993.⁶⁰⁰

Documents issued by the BH Army also bear evidence of the same. For example, on 22 March 1993 Commander Rasim DELIĆ sent the following document to the Chief of the SSVK OS R BH /Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, Sefer HALILOVIĆ: “Proposal for unloading of TMS (materiel and technical equipment, *author’s note*) which will (maybe) leave Zagreb tomorrow. The total amount of TMS is reduced by 25% which is supposed to be taken by Croatia or in Grude.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 59; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14-15; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34; (3D02633).

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 39, 55; (3D02633).

Upon arrival the equipment for Tuzla would be partially returned to Visoko to be distributed for the 3rd Corps and other units.

This would be done in agreement with Hazim, and in Pazarić the equipment would be divided between the 1st and 8th Corps (as agreed).⁶⁰¹

⁶⁰¹ www.slobodanpraljak.com

III – 4

ESTABLISHMENT AND TRAINING OF BH ARMY UNITS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

III – 4.1. Establishment of BH Army Units in the Republic of Croatia

Civilian and military authorities of the states of the R BH and the RH cooperated in establishing BH Army units in the territory of the RH and dispatching them to a number of fronts in the R BH. Units were established through mobilisation and volunteer intake. Among other things, volunteer intake was based on the earlier mentioned Instruction of the Defence Minister (of the RH, *author's note*) to all Croatian Army commanders pursuant to which HV commanders could not prevent volunteers from HV units who are originally from BH and wanted to go to the front in BH.⁶⁰² In addition, the RH helped to equip BH Army units and enabled their partial military training.

Due to the existence of ungrounded stereotypes, it is important to point out that it is evident from the available documents that the state institutions of the RH more systematically helped the BH Army than the HVO, which is also evident from the fact that BH Army units were established and trained in the territory of the RH, while (according to the documentation available) this was not the case with HVO units. One of the reasons for this is also the strategic interest of the state of the RH to have the state of the R BH defend itself from Serbian armed aggression, and this was not possible without the BH Army, which was more numerous and covered a larger territory of the R BH than the HVO.

It is particularly important to point out the fact that numerous parts of civilian and military authorities of the R BH and other organisations were present and freely active in the territory of the RH, and were even helped by the RH government bodies.

In late January 1993 the Military Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia, which was active within the Office of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia, sent a letter to the Croatian Army Main Staff requesting the following: “Continue talks and establish a collection centre – camp ... and later also establish large centres and groups up to battalion-brigade size, break through into the zone of responsibility of the BH Army 5th Corps”.⁶⁰³

Even earlier, in early June 1992, the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a letter from Sarajevo to “General STIPETIĆ” (member of the Croatian Army Main Staff), which clearly displays one of the typical methods of cooperation between the R BH and the RH in the establishment of BH Army units in the area of the RH. The letter reads as follows: “... we have been informed that organised activities are under way to form units that would join the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In connection with this, we ask for your help in receiving these men at the *Borongaj* barracks in Zagreb (there are 300 men from Rijeka, 300 from Ljubljana and around 5,500 from Germany). These men should rally at the *Borongaj* barracks and be provided with uniforms and prepared for movement to Bosnia and Herzegovina by Saturday (6 June 1992).

⁶⁰² See the chapter of this expert report entitled “Croatian Defence Council (HVO)”.

⁶⁰³ S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, p. 92; (3D02633).

The men who have already rallied in Zagreb have made a request for the units to be manned with military personnel. As we are unable to transfer men from Sarajevo to Zagreb, we ask you, if you can, to man this unit with 10 officers, if possible those who were born in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (because of their familiarity with the territory).⁶⁰⁴

The letter sent to the MORH by the Secretary for Military Matters with the Office of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia (Colonel Hasan EFENDIĆ) in early January 1993 bears clear evidence of the continuity and method of engaging HV officers for the needs of the BH Army. The letter states that the BH Military Mission “would like to express its high esteem” for the MORH “and would ask that ... you permit engagement of the following HV officers for the needs of the OS R BH ... (names of three HV officers and their personal details are listed, *author’s note*) ... We ask that the status of these officers be resolved as previously, by suspension (so that they have all the entitlements as HV officers), and upon completion of task to enable them to renew their engagement in the HV”.⁶⁰⁵

A similar indication is given in the Request sent to the Department for Establishment of the MORH by the Bihać District Office, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (based in Zagreb) on 21 May 1993, requesting the following: “Please demobilise or relieve of duty in the HV Mr Senad PALIĆ, mobilised to NG (National Guard, *author’s note*) unit 9158, because as of 1 January 1992 he has been engaged in the 5th Corps Command, in accordance with the document you received for your inspection.”⁶⁰⁶ This means that Senad PALIĆ was formally a member of the HV, although he in fact spent almost 16 months at the BH Army 5th Corps Command.

The Ministry of the Interior (MUP) of the RH was also involved in the implementation of mobilisation for the needs of the BH Army in the area of Croatia, and the clearest indication of this cooperation is a letter sent to the MUP of the RH, City of Zagreb Police Administration, by the Sarajevo Main Staff of the Armed Forces of BH, Zagreb Mission for Croatia, on 23 September 1992. The letter includes the following statement: “...when bringing in and deporting conscripts-nationals of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are currently in Croatia, tasks which are carried out by the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia at the request of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina...”⁶⁰⁷

On 18 October 1992 the Crisis Staff for Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in the RH, in the town of Split, Tolstojeva 28, submitted a Strictly Confidential “Report on the work ... from 6 April until 18 October 1992”, which contains substantial information which is very important for understanding the relationship of the government institutions of the RH towards the state of the R BH and its Muslim/Bosniak structure. The Report includes the following statement: “The Crisis Staff for Bosnia and Herzegovina – Split was established on 6 April 1992 as part of the Split branch of the Party of Democratic Action of Croatia ... very brisk activity ensued in the following sectors: mobilizing volunteers, Muslims and Croats born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, registering them, equipping and sending them to the fronts throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, collecting humanitarian aid, technical equipment and materiel and other kinds of aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina ... Once the Crisis Staff for BH – Split was established they immediately started summoning and receiving volunteers, Muslims and Croats born in BH, with the help

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 100; (3D02633).

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114; (3D02633).

⁶⁰⁶ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 118; (3D02633), (3D01651).

of all the mass media (Radio Split, TV Marijan, *Slobodna Dalmacija* and others). The help of the 6th Split Operations Zone was significant during these activities ... A plan and programme of the Crisis Staff were drawn up and approved by the military and civilian authorities of the town of Split and the Republic of Croatia. Close cooperation was established which is evident to this day.

By 18 April 1992 the 1st Split independent company was established as the first military formation to help the BH Armed Forces ... The 6th Split Operations Zone helped us directly in its establishment and supply with weapons, ammunition, military outfits and daily rations ... After the departure of the 1st Split Company all the volunteers who had signed up, and later also the conscripts, were entered and registered in proper lists and sent to the following OS BH units, following the wishes of each volunteer:

- OS BH, Visoko volunteers' admission camp – 142 volunteers;
- OS BH, Livno – Tomislavgrad – 89 volunteers;...
- OS BH, Northern Bosnia, Zagreb – Borongaj barracks – 34 volunteers;...
- OS BH, 1st Bosnia and Herzegovina *Kralj Tomislav* Corps – Baško Polje – 157 volunteers;
- OS BH, 1st Mostar Independent Battalion – 118 volunteers;
- HVO Grude – 22 volunteers;...
- OS BH, Tešanj, Čapljina and Stolac – 56 volunteers;
- OS BH, Tuzla – 31 volunteers;
- Other towns and villages in BH – Bugojno, Jajce, Zenica, Doboj, Zavidovići and Bihać – over 70 volunteers and conscripts;
- HRM/Croatian Navy/ - Northern Bosnia – Bihać and Cazin – 120 volunteers ...

A total of 862 volunteers were registered and sent to the fronts to units in BH. (By the end of 1992 over 2,000 OS BH and HVO volunteers were sent and registered.)⁶⁰⁸

Volunteers registered and mobilised in Pula, Rijeka, Varaždin and Zadar were transferred through this KŠ /Crisis Staff/. This was a significant number of soldiers.

Among the volunteers sent through the KVŠ Split were also women and foreign citizens from Algiers, France and Turkey who were sent to the volunteers' admission camp of the OS BH ... Cooperation with the military and civilian organs of Split and the RH is maintained daily and is beneficial to both sides.”⁶⁰⁹

In the end, this extensive document is signed: “President of the Crisis Staff for BH, Split, Alija DŽAFO”, and states that the Report was sent to the Government of the Republic of BH, Military Attaché Hasan EFENDIĆ, the Office of the Republic of BH in Croatia and the Archives.⁶¹⁰

The “brief report” compiled in Zagreb on 17 May 1993 by the Commander of the 1st Berbir Battalion of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and sent to the Embassy of BH, Zagreb Military Economic Mission (“to the Deputy Military Attaché Hajrudin OSMANAGIĆ” and “Commander for Security Dževad TOPIĆ”) includes the following information: “The 1st Berbir Battalion was established in Zagreb on 30 May 1992, as part of what was the TO R BH /Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ at the time ... and currently, without the wounded and convalescents, numbers 120 soldiers.”⁶¹¹

⁶⁰⁸ The text in the brackets was obviously subsequently added to the document and is handwritten, unlike the rest of the text in the document which is typewritten.

⁶⁰⁹ S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, pp. 93-95; (3D02633).

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 99; (3D02633).

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 103; (3D02633).

A document with the heading reading *Rijeka Municipality, Secretariat of National Defence*, contains 20 pages with a list of about 700 members of the 77th Brigade, which was most probably established for the needs of the BH Army. For each member of the 77th Brigade, the document lists full name, rank, status (for example, “commander”, “signals operator”, etc.), “employment” (for example, “unemployed”, “HV”, “shipyard”, etc.) and date of joining the Brigade.⁶¹² It is evident from this information that members of the 77th Brigade lived and worked in the RH at the time.

A document of the Main Staff for Support of BH, issued in Rijeka on 21 September 1992, contains a “List of men for the 7th Brigade of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁶¹³

A document (memorandum) of 12 November 1992 with the BH Army coat of arms at the top of the page and the heading reading “Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zagreb, Radnička cesta 228, telephone: 041/232-482” shows the broadness of institutional methods used and the RH government bodies which were involved in helping the BH Army. The document includes the following statement: “Pursuant to the Decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia no. ... and the power of attorney no. ... of the Office of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia, on transfer of jurisdiction,” the following Order was issued: “A group of 25 men and 3 guides (with weapons and equipment) will be sent from the sector of Sljeme near Zagreb to the Bihać region on the Zagreb-Karlovac-Ogulin road for the purpose of infiltrating the Bihać region.”⁶¹⁴

On 10 February 1993 the Military Mission of the Office of the Republic of BH in the Republic of Croatia sent the following stamp order from Zagreb to the Zagreb Stamp-Cutter’s Shop: “Please make a round stamp for the needs of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 cm in diameter, with the following text: THE ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, *KOBRA* SPECIAL ANTI-TERRORIST BRIGADE.

Make a coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the centre of the stamp, with lilies and crossed swords. We will pay in cash for the costs of making the stamp.”⁶¹⁵

Another document, labelled strictly confidential, indicates that the Military Mission of BH in the RH was in charge of project *Kobra /Cobra/*, and that the project was orally approved by the President of the Presidency of BH (Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ) and “in writing by the NŠ VK /Chief of the Supreme Command Staff/, Mr HALILOVIĆ”. The document then states that “reliable sponsors have promised funds” for the project, “of which you (Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, *author’s note*) have been personally informed, that professional personnel has been found, and the location for the establishment has also been partially arranged, which depends on your (IZETBEGOVIĆ’s, *author’s note*) decision”. Based on the above stated, one can conclude with great certainty that the arrangement regarding “professional personnel” and the “location for the establishment” of the brigade has been made with an institution of the RH.

III – 4.2. Training of BH Army Units in the Republic of Croatia

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, p. 105; (3D02633).

⁶¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 112; (3D02633).

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 118; (3D02633).

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 121; (3D02633).

Cooperation between the states of the RH and the R BH in training BH Army units in the territory of the RH is a completely unexplored and very rarely mentioned theme, but the case is similar to other types of bilateral cooperation between the RH and the R BH which are discussed in this expert report. However, based on the documents currently available, it is absolutely clear that cooperation in training BH Army units in the territory of the RH proceeded very systematically, and with full and very committed participation on part of the institutions of the Croatian state, which is understandable given the fact that carrying out military training is an extremely complex and demanding work. It is even more important to point out that the RH and the R BH started this cooperation very early on, and that elite and special units of the armed forces of the R BH were particularly systematically trained in the RH. Also, it must be pointed out in particular that the RH started and intensely trained special and elite BH Army units in very difficult circumstances, when a large part of the units of the RH were made up of volunteers with no military training, and Serbian aggression against the RH was in full force.

The earliest currently available and very important document, which fully shows the features and extent of this cooperation, but also the overall characteristics of the situation in the RH and the R BH at the time, is dated 8 July 1991 and was issued by the "Party of Democratic Action, Sarajevo, Maršala Tita Street no. 7-a/IV". The document is entitled "List of candidates for training special forces at the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ of the Republic of Croatia", followed by personal details for 463 persons from different parts of BH, and a final note: "...You will get more entries for this list in seven days". On the first and last page the document bears the stamp "Party of Democratic Action", and (on page one) a registry number on the relevant Party stamp.⁶¹⁶

Other documents also directly show that cooperation was agreed between government institutions of the RH and the Muslim/Bosniak leadership from the R BH. For example, on 11 July 1991 the Party of Democratic Action sent a letter (Dispatch for candidate Sulejman KADRIĆ, signed by the Secretary of the SDA, Hasan ČENGIĆ) to the MUP of the RH, stating as follows: "In accordance with the joint agreement between the authorised representatives of the MUP of the SR BH /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and the MUP of the RH, and the instruction on the method of employment of candidates for the post of policemen-interns at the Education Centre of the MUP of the Republic of Croatia, the Party of Democratic Action – Sarajevo nominates the above named candidate for a course at your Centre."⁶¹⁷

Among other things, these documents also indicate the high level of influence exerted by the SDA Party in the establishment of a new security structure for the state of the (S) R BH, after the first parliamentary multi-party elections held in BH.

In the 1991-1992 period members of the R BH armed forces were undergoing training in at least 15 localities in the RH, which were based in all the unoccupied parts of the RH (from Eastern Slavonia, through central Croatia, to Istria and Dalmatia).⁶¹⁸

For example, requisition slips from July 1992 have been kept in which the MUP RH permits the issuing of weapons, which were then taken over by the Bosanska Krupa Crisis Staff, with a note that the "location of costs is Borongaj –

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 127-129; (3D02633), (3D02837).

⁶¹⁷ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁶¹⁸ Đakovo, Kutina, Sisak, Zdenčina, Zagreb (3), Velika Gorica, Jastrebarsko, Plješivica, Delnice, Rijeka, Pula (2), Vrgorac.

Jaska". Another requisition slip bearing the stamp of the party taking over the goods – the Bosanska Krupa Crisis Staff, indicating that a small sum of money was taken over, shows much more because it states that the money was intended “for the financial needs of the *Behar* Brigade stationed in Žažini (Žažini, near the town of Sisak in the RH, *author’s note*) and intended for BD (combat operations, *author’s note*) in Bosnian Krajina”.⁶¹⁹ In the absence of more important documents, this source is also very important because it shows that a BH *Behar* Brigade was present in the RH, and it was most probably in training (mobilisation establishment) in the RH (Žažini) for the purpose of going to the front in the western R BH. It is an open question whether parts of this brigade or some other unit were in training in Jastrebarsko and Borongaj, as indicated by two other requisition slips.

In a similar way, a very brief but clear illustration is given in a document from Plješivica (a hill in the RH, near Zagreb) of 22 September 1992 registering materiel and technical equipment (mostly weapons and ammunition) which remained “after the stay of a group from Slovenia (165) – The group’s stay at Plješivica from 8 September – 22 September 1992”. The document states that the weapons registered must be transported “to the Bihać Regional Staff (based in Zagreb, *author’s note*), to Commander Hajrudin OSMANAGIĆ ... The Rijeka Staff must also be informed of this”. This document also implies that the training of “the group from Slovenia” at Plješivica and then its deployment to the front in BH was most probably organised by the “Bihać Regional Staff”.

A convincing illustration in favour of this conclusion is a brief but informative report written on 16 November 1992 in Zagreb stating that on that day “the quarters of the JPN (Special Purpose Unit, *author’s note*) for the Bihać District were cleaned. They were stationed at the hospital for TB at Plješivica near Jastrebarsko (near Zagreb, *author’s note*). We used the facility for accommodation and training of the JPNs which were then sent to this field. The facility was used in the period from 4 August 1992 to 16 November 1992, by approval of the 3rd Zagreb OZ /Operations Zone/. An HV truck was used for transport of MTS /Materiel and Technical Equipment/ and equipment, in two rounds”.⁶²⁰

Regarding the training of military pilots and technicians for maintenance of BH Army military aircraft (and helicopters), there are several documents available which offer credible evidence of this successful and specific form of help which the RH provided for the state of the R BH in circumstances when both states had a minor, but very necessary, air force.

The significance of this help is also illustrated by the fact that on 9 August 1992 the President of Presidency of BH (Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ) personally sent a letter to the MORH co-signed by the Defence Minister of BH (Jerko DOKO), stating as follows: “Please allow the following persons to stay and undergo training in the Republic of Croatia for the needs of the Armed Forces.” This is followed by personal details for 22 persons (military pilots and technicians) and a closing note: “As you can see from the information, most of the men listed were members of the former JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/. We have carried out preliminary checks and selection.”⁶²¹

However, the RH was helping to train R BH military pilots even before that (in July 1992). A letter sent to the Defence Minister of the RH by the HV Main Staff reads as follows: “In accordance with an oral agreement, three pilots and one technician arrived in an HRZ PZO (Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence,

⁶¹⁹ S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, pp. 137-138; (3D02633), (3D02273).

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 132; (3D02633), (3D01650).

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141; (3D02633).

author's note) unit for retraining on an AN-2 aircraft. These pilots would fly in the territory of BH for the needs of defence of that Republic. This task is very urgent due to the constant need for evacuation and supply of the TO BH /Territorial Defence of BH/. Please give very urgent approval for this training.”⁶²²

The help provided by the RH for training BH Army pilots was systematic and became routine. On 8 March 1993 the Chief of the RV and PVO (Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence) Administration with the Supreme Command Staff of the OS BH /Armed Forces of BH/ sent the following Order for training “pilots and technicians in the Republic of Croatia”: “In accordance with the demonstrated needs and agreements reached with the Command of the RZ and PZO of the Republic of Croatia, the following pilots and technicians from the RV and PVO of the OS of the Republic of BH shall be sent to the Republic of Croatia for training and task implementation.” This is followed by a list of 13 pilots and three technicians, and the following note: “The group is to be trained according to the training plans agreed on between the HRZ and PZO /Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence/ and the RV and PVO OS R BH /Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/.”⁶²³ In addition, we should reiterate that that the RV and PVO OS BH Administration was based in Zagreb at the time.

The training of BH Army military pilots was carried out in Zagreb, Velika Gorica (near Zagreb) and Pula (Istria, western part of the RH),⁶²⁴ and airports in the RH. RH military aircraft and crews were also used for flights to/from the R BH, according to the needs of the BH Army and other government bodies of the R BH.⁶²⁵

According to a report of the HRZ PZO for the second half of December 1992 “the following tasks were carried out from Pleso and Pula a. (airports, *author's note*): transport of weapons, uniforms and medical supplies” to the R BH, and mainly the wounded and other persons were transported from the R BH to the RH. In this half a month there were 32 flights in total: of this number, six flights were “for the needs of the HVO BH”, and 26 flights “for the needs of the TO BH”. Specifically, 4 hours and 40 minutes of flight time were accumulated and “6 t of cargo, 28 passengers + 11 wounded” were transported “for the needs of the HVO BH”, and a total of 22 hours and 40 minutes of flight time were accumulated and “21.5 t of cargo, 90 passengers + 35 wounded” were transported “for the needs of the TO BH”.⁶²⁶

In accordance with an agreement between the HRZ and PVO Commander and the Chief of the RV and PVO OS BH Administration, in early April 1993 a permit was issued for two BH Army members allowing them to “take over information wave frequencies at the HRZ and PVO Command each month for the needs of the Information Centre in the Republic of BH and distribute them at the Information Centre in the Republic of BH”.⁶²⁷

However, quite a while before that, “in early 1992, a logistics centre was established in Zagreb, controlled by the Service (Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order – SZUP RH, *author's note*), which was tasked with equipping the Armed Forces of BH, i.e. HVO and TO BH units (the beginning of establishment of the BH Army), and training them in the use of radio-communications equipment, and forming a flexible communications network. ... The task of the Logistics Centre

⁶²² *Ibid.*, p. 146; (3D02633), (3D01684).

⁶²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145; (3D02633), (3D01860).

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 148; (3D02633), (3D01857).

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 147; (3D02633), 151 (3D02633) (3D01658). 153-154 (3D02633) (3D01867).

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 153; (3D02633), 151 (3D01867).

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 155; (3D02633).

was to arrange, programme and coordinate components of the radio-communications system which, after being stored for a brief period, were promptly sent to destinations in BH. ... In addition to the above mentioned telecommunications equipment, JRC satellite phones were also sent to BH through the Logistics Centre. Their subscription and use had been arranged through British Telecom and they were used by top government officials of BH.

In the course of the first years of the war in BH the system surpassed its initial role of military-logistics communication and also covered economic and humanitarian segments.

Thus the purpose of equipping and training the OS BIH at that point was to strengthen the fight against Greater-Serbian aggression, give it a new logistics and technical component, link up the HVO and the TO BIH at information and command level, and thereby facilitate Croatia's position. ... At the beginning of the conflict between the HVO and the BH Army, the HVO stopped using the system, while the BH Army continued using it with other cryptographic data protection algorithms and keys".⁶²⁸

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-50; (3D02633), (3D00795).

III – 5
MEDICAL TREATMENT RECEIVED BY
THE WOUNDED BH ARMY SOLDIERS
AND MUSLIM/BOSNIAK CIVILIANS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA FROM 1992 UNTIL 1995

In the 1992-1995 period, due to a very difficult health-care and humanitarian situation in the R BH, a large number of wounded BH Army soldiers and Muslim/Bosniak civilians did not have even the minimal requirements for provision of care and treatment in the area of the R BH. This was the main reason why they constantly arrived in large numbers and in different ways in the available hospitals and other health-care institutions in the area of the Republic of Croatia, which were filled beyond capacity with the sick and wounded from the Republic of Croatia as it was. However, reception, provision of care and medical treatment for the BH Army wounded and R BH civilians was not called into question for a single moment: neither by the RH government leadership nor administration and staff of hospitals and other health-care institutions in the RH.

However, this example of enormous solidarity shown by the institutions and in particular the medical staff in the Republic of Croatia, has unfortunately remained completely unexplored, and the materials on it are scattered in the archives of medical institutions, which readily responded in 1998 and sent the requested individual copies and collective statistical indicators to the Office of the Government of the RH for Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal.

A particular difficulty for the Croatian medical institutions in providing the information on hospitalised R BH nationals, i.e. military personnel and civilians of Muslim/Bosniak nationality, in 1992 and 1993 was the fact that “there is no entry for nationality in our medical documentation, so we selected the sick and wounded who came from the area of BH or who were refugees from BH in Croatia with typical (Muslim) names.”⁶²⁹

“A record of treatment was kept for each individual patient, and they were registered in the admission record books with all the relevant indicators ... (personal details, time of admission and release, diagnosis, the state of the patient at the time of release, etc.).”⁶³⁰

Thus information was obtained for a very approximate number of BH Army soldiers and R BH civilians of Muslim/Bosniak nationality who received care and treatment in medical institutions in five towns in the RH, which were assumed to be most accessible from the area of the R BH.

The number of wounded and sick soldiers and civilians of Muslim/Bosniak nationality, R BH nationals who received care and treatment in some hospitals in the RH in the 1992-1995 period is as follows:⁶³¹

Split.....	3,991
Zagreb.....	2,982

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 337; (3D02633).

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*; (3D02633).

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 326; it must be noted that due to an error of addition, the total number was reduced by ten; (3D02633). In addition, cf. a book of documents: Slobodan Praljak, *Ratno zdravstvo HVO - činjenice*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2008.

Slavonski Brod.....	2,730
Karlovac.....	849
Vinkovci.....	<u>81</u>
TOTAL.....	10,633

Another type of medical help provided from 1992 until 1995 by the medical institutions of the RH for the medical institutions throughout the R BH, including the areas where Muslims/Bosniaks are a majority, was in sending medicines, medical supplies and equipment, baby food, vitamins, etc. This is evident from the numerous requisition slips with attached specifications which medical institutions in Croatia have from that time.

Also, at the time, medical institutions in the RH received a vast number of written expressions of gratitude from the individuals treated and their institutions from the R BH, as well as written expressions of gratitude from hospitals and medical institutions in the R BH to which they sent help.

For example, the Firule Clinical Hospital Centre in Split received, among other things, a number of Letters of Gratitude from different units, staffs and medical services of the Armed Forces of BH “for the aid given in medicines and medical supplies which you have sent us for the treatment of civilians and BH Army members.”⁶³²

One Letter of Gratitude arrived at Firule in Split from the President of the Presidency of BH (Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ) for “providing care for Ejup GANIĆ (member of the Presidency of BH, *author’s note*) and his escorts injured in a serious traffic accident”.⁶³³

⁶³² *Ibid.*, pp. 344-345; (3D02633).

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, p. 339; (3D02633).

III – 6

HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA FOR COLLECTION OF AID FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Serbian armed aggression, one of whose main goals was ethnic cleansing, very quickly caused vast demographic, economic and communication disorders in the R BH, and in as early as mid-1992 the R BH, which was poorly developed as it was, was also facing a humanitarian catastrophe, in which people's basic existential survival was threatened, even in parts of the R BH which were not directly hit by armed aggression. In such circumstances, basic survival in the R BH mostly depended on humanitarian aid supply which in various ways arrived in the R BH from all over the world.

Since the security situation in the RH at the time was much more favourable than in the R BH, and since practically the only way for humanitarian aid to reach the R BH was through the RH, numerous humanitarian organisations (and individuals) which were focused on the R BH established their headquarters or offices in Croatia.

As many as 234 offices of foreign humanitarian organisations were registered in the RH at the time.⁶³⁴ In the procedure for registration, taxes and customs duty and particularly in their relationship to the activities of humanitarian organisations, the authorities of the RH were practically liberal in the extreme, and only one organisation was banned from working, although "41 humanitarian organisations were cautioned that there were irregularities in their work".⁶³⁵

Of 234 foreign humanitarian organisations which had offices in the RH, as many as 114 were active in the area of the R BH, and 117 more which also provided care for the refugees from the R BH were active in the area of the RH, which means that only three (out of 234) foreign humanitarian organisation in the RH were not active in the R BH or did not deal with the refugees from the R BH. These humanitarian organisations came from as many as 34 states from all the continents except South America, and humanitarian aid for the R BH arrived in the offices in the RH from 32 countries around the world.⁶³⁶

The governments of the RH and the R BH signed a Protocol on Cooperation pursuant to which the RH allowed "the establishment of Offices of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for humanitarian matters and aid in the Republic of Croatia with warehouses in Zagreb, Split and Ploče", and it was agreed that other warehouses and other facilities would be opened according to demonstrated needs. In addition to the fact that humanitarian aid for the R BH was exempt from all customs duties and taxes in the RH, the RH also took on the obligation of providing "land corridors for convoys for humanitarian and other aid from warehouses of the Offices in the Republic of Croatia to the state border between" the RH and the R BH.⁶³⁷

A total of 601,133 t of humanitarian aid arrived only in the port of Ploče during the war.⁶³⁸ For the sake of comparison, a total of 120,000 t of food arrived in Croatia from the EU from 1992 to 1994.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 204-225; *Popis predstavništava stranih pravnih osoba koje se bave humanitarnom djelatnošću* /List of Offices of Foreign Legal Entities Involved in Humanitarian Activities/; (3D02633).

⁶³⁵ I. Rogić, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁶³⁶ S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, pp. 199-200; (3D02633).

⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 229; (3D02633).

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 249-288; (3D02633).

⁶³⁹ I. Rogić, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

However, despite the enormous quantities of humanitarian aid which was entering the R BH, and a great amount of help invested by the RH in the provision of care for a huge number of refugees from the R BH and waves of refugees from the R BH going to third countries, the humanitarian crisis in the R BH was not ceasing, both due to the persistent brutality of Serbian aggression and the constant shortage of humanitarian aid. An additional burden to all this was the crime and lack of social awareness in the handling of humanitarian aid in the area of the R BH, because the central government of the R BH was not able to successfully establish control over the authorities subordinate to them.

This was probably just one of the reasons that prompted the military and civilian leadership of the R BH to briefly and objectively assess the situation in late May 1993, and issue a specific and in many ways problematic decision on the manner of distribution of humanitarian aid. The Military Economic Mission at the Embassy of BH in Zagreb also wrote the following note about this: "Organised help for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of vital interest both for its people and its Armed Forces.

For the purpose of a more just and better distribution and allotment of humanitarian aid for BH Army units, the government administration organs and the military command classified municipalities by territory and towns within the zones of responsibility of the five BH Army Corps".⁶⁴⁰ Thus the BH Corps headquarters (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar and Bihać) also became centres for distribution of humanitarian aid, with the primary motive of enabling the BH Army military units to have as much impact as possible on the distribution of humanitarian aid, so they could keep the part needed for themselves.

In the second half of 1993 the ungrounded stereotypes linked to the partial armed conflicts between Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats most probably also caused great damage in the humanitarian field in the R BH and the RH, and therefore in mid-September 1993 the Croatian Caritas, the Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Croatia and Slovenia and the Merhamet issued a joint Declaration which includes the following statement: "...we would like to publicly declare that the Croatian Caritas, Merhamet and Meshihat cooperate in many different ways despite all those who are constantly trying to dispute the existence of this cooperation.

Since the beginning of the war the Merhamet, Meshihat and Croatian Caritas have been investing joint efforts to alleviate the suffering of numerous victims, thus successfully performing their duties.

Given that the international political interests are conflicting and malevolent, we firmly stand behind the obligation of alleviating this tragic suffering of innocent individuals, whether they are of the Orthodox, Muslim or Catholic religion.

This declaration is addressed to those intending to crush the good will among people of different origins ... Therefore, in the end, we wish to reiterate our deep concern over such actions, which only make this holocaust which involves the innocent even more difficult. We again call upon all those to whom this refers to re-examine the damaging effects of such actions."⁶⁴¹

⁶⁴⁰ S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, pp. 233-234; (3D02633).

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 236; (3D02633), (3D02047).

III – 7
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCHOOL SYSTEM
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA FROM 1992 UNTIL 1994

The activity of the extraterritorial school system of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the territory of the RH from 1992 until 1994 is also an unexplored topic, and an additional problem is that there are very few documents on that topic currently available in Croatia.⁶⁴² Therefore, it is currently not possible to render a more comprehensive reconstruction of the establishment and activity of the extraterritorial school system of the R BH, whose activity in the RH from 1992 until 1994 was clearly very extensive, but it is only possible to give indications from the available documents.

It is certainly important to point out that even before Serbian armed aggression on Croatia the capacities of primary and secondary schools in the RH were insufficient and the number of pupils in many classes in Croatian schools was too large, and although they could not resolve the problem in this way either, schools were introducing an addition shift. With the appearance of large waves of expelled persons in 1991, the school system in unoccupied parts of the RH was increasingly entering into an emergency situation. In 1992, with a large increase of refugees coming from the R BH, which included many school-age children, the situation in the school system of the RH was becoming even more dramatic.

As early as late April 1992 the Government of the RH issued a Mandatory Instruction “on including expelled and refugee children of pre-school age, /and those of/ primary and secondary schools from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the appropriate education programmes in the Republic of Croatia ... so that everyday life and classes would be organised for expelled and refugee children as soon as possible”. Due to this the Government of the RH decided to compile a “preliminary bill of costs for provision of care for over 70,000 children” (probably assessing that that many refugee children from BH had arrived in the RH at the time).⁶⁴³

In the following period, the Primary Education Fund of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport of the RH “received requests (invoices) for payment of costs incurred by expelled and refugee pupils of primary schools” for the period covering the first half of 1992, totalling 97,745,135 of what were Croatian dinars at the time.⁶⁴⁴

The school child-refugees from the R BH were joining the education system of the RH in two basic ways: one, by joining the existing school system of the RH, and two, by joining the specially organised (extraterritorial) schools of the Republic of

⁶⁴² On 11 July 2007 (through the Administration for International Cooperation, International Legal Aid and Cooperation with International Criminal Tribunals of the Government of the RH) the author of this expert report requested the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport to allow him to examine their files for the topic of the extraterritorial school system in the RH (1992-1995) for the purpose of writing an academic article on the subject. More than 14 months later (on 17 September 2008) a contradictory reply arrived, stating that the Ministry “was unable to grant your request due to relocation, and it is visible from your request that the Ministry ... is not in possession of the requested documentation”. The second part of the explanation is inaccurate because it is absolutely not visible from the request that the Ministry is not in possession of the documentation, and it is evident from individual documents used in this expert report that the Ministry is (was) in possession of a certain amount of the requested documentation.

⁶⁴³ S. Praljak, *Pomoć...*, p. 400; (3D02633), (3D00317).

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 404; (3D02633).

Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of the Republic of Croatia. In both cases, joining was on a voluntary basis, according to the decision of the pupil or his parents.

In accordance with a Report of the relevant Ministry of the RH of January 1994, which was compiled at the request of the Embassy of BH in Zagreb, child-refugees from the R BH were joining “the school system of the Republic of Croatia (voluntarily and at their own request), subject to the current capacities of schools in terms of space and staff, where they are educated according to the curricula of the Republic of Croatia, which covers all the costs of their education (pays the teachers and covers other expenses, the same as for children from Croatia). In this way, 32,006 refugee children from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are receiving education in schools of the Republic of Croatia in the 1993/1994 school year. Of that number, 25,012 are in primary schools and 6,994 in secondary schools. There are 2,800 children from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in pre-school institutions (the figures are dynamic and constantly changing)”.⁶⁴⁵

Responding to the request of the Embassy of BH, this Report denies having any information on the extraterritorial school system of the R BH in the territory of the RH, stating as follows: “A part of the children are joining specially organised schools of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of the Republic of Croatia, for which this Ministry does not have any systematic information due to the spontaneous way in which these schools are organised. The Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, probably, the humanitarian organisations involved have the information on these schools and pupils.”

The Ministry most probably did not have any systematic and comprehensive information on the extraterritorial school system, but it undoubtedly had a number of official and other sorts of information on it, because it itself provided support for the extraterritorial school system of BH in the area of the RH. For example, in February 1993 the Ministry of Culture and Education of the RH officially received, “for reference, the curriculum used by self-organised primary schools for refugees from the R BH. A new version is currently being compiled which will be adapted to the schools which are yet to start working. When we receive this version we will send it to your Ministry for reference”, and the Ministry is then thanked for “the support you offered us”.⁶⁴⁶

The curriculum sent at the time (February 1993) for “extraterritorial primary schools of the R BH” in the Republic of Croatia shows that this was a “reduced curriculum”, and that its content was formed according to the needs of (and by) the institutions of the state of the R BH. For example, a basic subject, the mother tongue, is called Bosnian language, and most of the material covered under the subject of History refers to the history of the area of the R BH.

Based on the documents currently available and mostly incomplete, we can establish that in the period from 1992 to 1994 at least 33 extraterritorial schools of the state of the R BH were active in different parts of the territory of the RH.⁶⁴⁷

Individual available documents (mainly letters from individual schools sent to the relevant ministry of the RH) show that the problem of education of child-refugees from the R BH (and expelled persons and other pupils in the RH) during wartime in the RH was practically rather variable, dramatic and often depended on a number of local circumstances and on how enterprising the school staff was. This and the entire wartime situation in the RH is accurately illustrated by the Report on a School for

⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 408; (3D02633), (3D00316).

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 423; (3D02633).

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 399; (3D02633).

Expelled Persons which was sent to the Government (RH) Office for Expelled Persons and Refugees in February 1993 by “the first school for expelled persons”.

The Report includes the following statement: “The *Vladimir Nazor* Primary School from Topusko – school for expelled children – has been active in Veli Lošinj since 1 September 1991. ... Last school year as many as 1,200 pupils attended the school. In addition to the pupils from Topusko, pupils from Vukovar and its surroundings, Petrinja, the Zadar hinterland, Dubrovnik and its surroundings ... (and) refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina were also present at the school. Today the school numbers 250 pupils, 52 of whom are from Bosnia and Herzegovina ... Our school was established and located here by a Decision of the Crisis Staff of the Ministry of Education ... and we are the first independent school for expelled persons in Croatia. The teachers working in this school are also expelled persons ... Back in the summer of 1991, when Topusko was attacked, with the help of the Croatian Army and police we managed to save the school teaching files ... and basic teaching aids and we transported it all to Lošinj ... In addition to regular classes, the school also provided care for the pupils in their spare time... We are not only teachers, we are counsellors, doctors, nurses, psychologists, mothers and fathers to these unfortunate children. Our living conditions are really difficult. We were not accommodated in hotels, instead from day one we have been staying in children’s holiday centres, where often two families live in one room, without the basic requirements for a normal life...”⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 419-421; (3D02633).

III – 8

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE AREA OF SPORT AND CULTURE

III – 8.1 Sport

War, uncertainty and poverty which dominated all areas of the R BH fully prevented preparation and competition for all, but particularly the top athletes, thus extensively disrupting that form of social life in the R BH. A number of sports competitions and leagues in the R BH were discontinued, a large number of athletes stopped training, and a part of them went to Croatia and through Croatia to third countries.

Government institutions, sports clubs and individuals in the RH showed a very great degree of solidarity towards athletes and clubs from the R BH, as well as towards other refugees from the R BH, helping them with accommodation, athletic preparation and participation in various competitions.

In that respect, the help provided in 1992 for ten members of the national team of the state of BH (in six different sports) figures prominently. At the expense of the government budget of the RH, they prepared in Croatia for the Olympic Games in Barcelona, where their participation greatly contributed to the overall public affirmation of the newly established state of the R BH. In addition, Croatian officials and athletes who were lobbying for Croatia, as a newly established state, to be allowed to participate in the Olympic Games in Barcelona, did the same for the state of the R BH.⁶⁴⁹

A similar thing happened again regarding the preparation and participation of athletes from the R BH at the Mediterranean Games which were held in France in the summer of 1993, where the R BH was introduced as a Mediterranean country with the smallest territorial contact with the Mediterranean.

Numerous very young athletes who were absolutely publicly unknown at the time, who had arrived in Croatia as refugees, continued their sports careers in Croatian clubs, and years later some of them became top world-renowned athletes: for example, the tennis player Ivan LJUBIČIĆ and the basketball player Damir OMERHODŽIĆ-MARKOTA.

III – 8.2 Culture

In the beginning and during Serbian armed aggression on the R BH, and particularly during the long and brutal Serbian siege of Sarajevo, numerous prominent figures from Bosnia and Herzegovina's culture, writers, actors, directors, artists, architects, film-makers, entertainers and others temporarily or permanently took refuge in the Republic of Croatia, where they received all sorts of help from government and social institutions, so they could continue their professional and creative activity. No difference was made between them in Croatia based on their view of life and political convictions, or religious, ethnic and other affiliation.

Thus the following prominent writers from Bosnia and Herzegovina came to Croatia and continued working there: Mile PEŠORDA, Miljenko JERGOVIĆ, Dževad KARAHASAN and Darko LUKIĆ. Actors: Hasija BORIĆ, Jasna BERI,

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 548; (3D02633).

Daria LORENČI, Tarik FILIPOVIĆ and Sandra BAGARIĆ. Actor and director Zijah SOKOLOVIĆ, film director Antonio NUIĆ, film producer Boris T. MATIĆ, painters Mersad BERBER i Ljubo PERČINLIĆ, architects Sejo i Lejla KURTIĆ, entertainers Kemal MONTENO, Senad od Bosne, Indexi, Edo Maačka and many others.⁶⁵⁰

Zlatko VITEZ, who was the Minister of Culture in the Government of the RH at the time, received refugee artists and prominent figures from culture and also personally helped them in various ways.

As a sign of solidarity with the people of the besieged Sarajevo, in 1994/1995 a Croatian director (Tomislav DURBEŠIĆ), with the support of the Ministry of Culture of the RH, directed the play *There Will Be no Trojan Horse /Trojanskog konja neće biti/* which was simultaneously (on the same day and at the same time) performed in Sarajevo and Zagreb. The Ministry of Culture of the RH led by the Minister (Zlatko VITEZ) accepted the invitation to see the play in Sarajevo. However, “due to fierce shelling of Sarajevo, the UNPROFOR aircraft flight was cancelled and the delegation did not make it to the premiere”.⁶⁵¹

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 522; (3D02633).

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 522; (3D02633).

ABBREVIATIONS

APZB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BD	combat operation
BIF	Benevolence International Foundation
BH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BH Army	Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
F BH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut
GIA	Group Islamique Armé
G7	Group of Seven – the seven most developed countries in the world
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HDZ BH	Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HIC	Croatian Information Centre
HINA	Croatian News Agency
HKU	Croatian Catholic Union
HNZ	Croatian People's Union
HOS	Croatian Defence Forces
HR HB	Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna
HRM	Croatian Navy
HRZ	Croatian Air Force
HRZ PZO	Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence
HSLŠ	Croatian Social Liberal Party
HSP	Croatian Party of Rights
HV	Croatian Army
HVO	Croatian Defence Council
HZ HB	Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna
ICFY	International Commission on Former Yugoslavia
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ID	Islamic Declaration
i.e.	<i>id est</i> (in other words)
JAZU	Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts
JMO	Yugoslav Muslim Organisation
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
JPN	Special Purpose Units
JRC	Japan Radio Corporation
KBC	Clinical Hospital Centre
KI	Communist International
KOS	Counter-intelligence Service
KPJ	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
KS	Contact Group
KŠ	Crisis Staff
MKBJ	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
MORH	Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia
MTS	Materiel and Technical Equipment

MUP	Ministry of the Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDH	Independent State of Croatia
NFJ	People's Front of Yugoslavia
NG	National Guard
NOR	National Liberation War
NŠ VK	Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command
op. cit.	<i>opere citato</i> (the work cited)
ONO i DSZ	All-People's Defence and Social Self-Protection
ONOR	All-People's Defence War
OS	Armed Forces
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OS (R)BiH	Armed Forces (of the Republic) of Bosnia and Herzegovina
OS SAOK	Armed Forces of the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina
OZ	Operations Zone
PL	Patriotic League
PZO	Anti-Aircraft Defence
R BH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RH	Republic of Croatia
RS	Republika Srpska
RV PVO	Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence
RZ PVO	Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence
SANU	Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
SAO	Serbian Autonomous District
SAOK	Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SDS (SDB)	State Security Service
SDS BH	Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SFRY	Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
SHS	of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
SIV	Federal Executive Council
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SPC	Serbian Orthodox Church
SPO	Serbian Renewal Movement
SR	Socialist Republic
SR BH	Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SRJ	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SRPJ(k)	Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (of communists)
SRVJSJ	Alliance of Reserve Army Officers of Yugoslavia
SS	<i>Schutzstaffel</i> (protection squads)
SSNO	Federal Secretariat of National Defence
SSRNJ	Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia
SUBNOR	Federal Association of WWII Veterans
SZUP	Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order
ŠVK	Supreme Command Staff
TB	tuberculosis
TMS	Materiel and Technical Equipment
TO	Territorial Defence
TO (R)BH	Territorial Defence (of the Republic) of Bosnia and Herzegovina

TO RH	Territorial Defence of the Republic of Croatia
TO SAOK	Territorial Defence of the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina
TWRA	Third World Relief Agency
UDBA	State Security Administration
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPA	United Nations Protected Areas
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Forces
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VKBMI	Council of the Congress of Bosnian Muslim Intellectuals
VRS	Army of Republika Srpska
ZP	Military District

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Ekspertiza za potrebe MKSJ:

BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
1990. – 1995. GODINE

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Uvodna napomena

Ova ekspertiza je izrađena na traženje obrane Generala Slobodana Praljka u vezi sudskog postupka koji se protiv njega i drugih osoba vodi pred *Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom za prostor bivše Jugoslavije* (MKSJ). Obrana je okvirno zatražila izradu ekspertize koja će obraditi sljedeće:

- a) povijest prostora BiH i razvoj ključnih događanja do 1995. godine, s posebnim osvrtom na proces raspada bivše Jugoslavije i događaje u BiH u razdoblju od 1990. – 1995. godine.
- b) odnos RH prema BiH sa posebnim osvrtom na različite ključne pojavne oblike koji primjereno prikazuju i objašnjavaju bitne oznake odnosa države Republike Hrvatske prema državi Republici Bosni i Hercegovini u razdoblju 1991. - 1995. godine.

Autor ekspertize je s obranom Generala Slobodana Praljka dogovorio navedeni osnovni (vremenski, prostorni i tematski) okvir, a autoru ekspertize je u cijelosti prepuštena izrada koncepcije istraživanja, metodološki postupci, struktura sadržaja, kauzalna interpretacija i način prezentacije istraživačkih rezultata.

Ekspertiza je izrađena prema metodološkim standardima historijske znanosti. Naznačeni standardi su primjenjeni u svim fazama nastanka ekspertize; od prikupljanja povijesnih izvora i *heuristike*, do rekonstrukcije jednostavnih i složenih povijesnih činjenica te njihove kauzalne dijakronijske interpretacije.¹ Osnovni cilj ekspertize je, na znanstveno objektivna način prikazati povijesne uzroke, tijek i posljedice ključnih događanja na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine u razdoblju 1990. do 1995. godine. Stoga je opće znanstveno načelo – «činjenicama do istine» - bilo temeljno spoznajno polazište pri nastanku ekspertize.

Ovo je važno uvodno naglasiti jer su u dosadašnjem javnom (i «znanstvenom») govoru o nedavnim političkim i ratnim događanjima na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije uglavnom prevladavali veoma različiti i kontradiktorni stereotipi, koji su neprihvatljivi sa znanstvenog motrišta. Naime, stereotipi su veoma često predstavljani kao povijesne činjenice ili «povijesne istine», te se tako nastojao nametnuti opći legitimitet nelogičnoj i neznanstvenoj tezi kako postoji veći broj međusobno različitih i kontradiktornih «povijesnih istina».

¹ Gross, *Mirjana, Historijska znanost*, Zagreb, 1976.

Nastanak ovih naizgled uvjerljivih stereotipa omogućen je primjenom niza neznanstvenih postupaka, kojima je osnovno polazište da cilj opravdava sredstvo. Odnosno, najprije su zadani stereotipi, a potom su neznanstvenim metodama traženi, proizvođeni i prezentirani selektivni izvori koji su afirmirali stereotipe. Nastanku stereotipa svakako je pogodovala i činjenica što o događanjima najnovije povijesti postoji golema količina materijalnih izvora (pisanih, slikovnih, video, audio i trodimenzionalnih), aktera i očevidaca, te su se neznanstvenim odabirom mogli izgrađivati neobjektivni i međusobno kontradiktorni stereotipi, tj. pogrešne predodžbe o stvarnim događanjima.

Nasuprot tome stoji historijska znanost koja raspolaže razrađenim sustavom metoda koje omogućuju znanstveno legitimnu, istraživačku, rekonstrukciju povijesnih činjenica i povijesnih procesa. Pritom se podrazumijeva da su svi istraživački postupci, izvori i rezultati istraživanja – prema znanstvenim standardima - jasno i razgovijetno prezentirani i provjerljivi. Na taj znanstveni način utvrđena povijesna saznanja (jednostavne i složene povijesne činjenice te interpretacije) mogu biti vjerodostojna i primjerena podloga za postupke objektivnih vrednovanja povijesnih događanja (činjenica, aktera) s civilizacijskog, svjetonazorskog, moralnog, pravosudnog, povijesnog i svakog drugog motrišta.

I.**BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
DO RASPADA DRUGE JUGOSLAVIJE
(1991. GODINE)**

I.-1

POVIJEST PROSTORA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

(od starog vijeka do 1989. godine)

I.-1.1 Osnovne značajke

Država Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (R BiH), koja je međunarodno priznata 1992. godine, smještena je u jugoistočnom dijelu Europe, na sjeverozapadnom dijelu Balkanskog poluotoka. Prema površini državnog teritorija (51.129 km²) i broju stanovnika (4,365.000 prema popisu 1991. g.) R BiH pripada u skupinu manjih i slabije nastanjenih europskih država. Na sjeveru, zapadu i jugu, država R BiH graniči s državom Republikom Hrvatskom, a na istoku s državama Srbijom i Crnom gorom.²

R BiH je pretežito brdovita zemlja s brojnim unutarnjim i graničnim rijekama, čiji glavni smjerovi idu prema sjeveru (Una, Vrbas, Bosna i Drina, koje se ulijevaju u rijeku Savu, koja je granica s Hrvatskom) i jugu (Neretva, koja se ulijeva u hrvatski dio Jadranskog mora). Isto tako, i većina glavnih prometnih smjerova (u prošlosti i suvremenosti) kretala se u smjeru sjevera i juga. U BiH su u različitim razdobljima otkrivana i korištena brojna bogata nalazišta različitih ruda i sirovina (željezo, ugljen, srebro, zlato, olovo, sol itd.).³

Osim navedenog, umjereni klima, konfiguracija i sastav tla, biljni pokrov, raznolikost životinjskih vrsta, raspored vodenih tokova, polja i oborina te druge zemljopisne značajke veoma su pogodne za život ljudi,⁴ pa je stoga prostor BiH od davnina bio nastanjen.

Prepoznatljivi dvojni naziv (Bosna i Hercegovina) - od zemljopisnog do geopolitičkog značenja – koristi se sustavno tek od tzv. austro-ugarskog razdoblja, tj. od sedmog desetljeća 19. stoljeća. Prema dosadašnjim spoznajama, geo-politički naziv Bosna (za određeno područje u središnjim dijelovima današnje R BiH) prvi put se spominje u 10. stoljeću, u tekstu bizantskog cara Konstantina Porfirogeneta. Taj geo-politički naziv potiče od starijeg naziva istoimene rijeke (Bosna), koja to ime (kao i većina rijeka na prostoru BiH) nosi još iz starorimskog razdoblja ili iz razdoblja doseljenja južnih Slavena (početak 7. stoljeća).

² Podaci preuzeti iz: *Atlas Europe*, Zagreb, 1997, str. 102-103, 305.

³ Isto, str. 306 i 310.

⁴ Isto, str. 305-6.

Geopolitički naziv Hercegovina ili «hercegova zemlja» koristi se od 15. stoljeća, uglavnom za južne dijelove današnje R BiH.

Mnogi aspekti, razdoblja i problemi povijesti prostora BiH su ostali nedovoljno ili nestručno istraženi, a ono što je istraživano učestalo je prilagođavano različitim interesima, koji su se – tijekom cijele povijesti na prostoru BiH – veoma dinamično i složeno (a najčešće nasilnim putem) mijenjali. Zbog geopolitičkih i drugih važnosti prostora BiH, na njemu su se tijekom cijele povijesti događali intenzivni međuodnosi različitih svjetskih, regionalnih i lokalnih silnica (političkih, vojnih, kulturnih, vjerskih itd.), koje su ostavljale duboke tragove u svim vidovima društvenog života.

Ovi međuodnosi su imali izuzetno složene vremenske, prostorne i kvalitativne dimenzije koje su podrazumijevale (čak i istovremene) dodire, sukobljavanja, suživote i sinteze različitosti. Tako su, primjerice, mnogi politički i vojni sukobi - koji su se tijekom povijesti događali na prostoru BiH - imali naglašenu povijesnu, vjersku i međunarodnu dimenziju, ali su se isto tako na prostoru BiH istovremeno događali i specifični oblici svakodnevnice i identitetske multikulturalnosti i transkulturalnosti.

Na taj način, već i najopćenitiji uvid svjedoči kako jedno od glavnih povijesnih obilježja društvenog života na prostora BiH predstavlja njegova izuzetna složenost i nestabilnost, što se očitovalo i u najnovijoj povijesti. Stoga će uvažavanje naznačenog povijesnog kontinuiteta bitno pridonijeti objektivnijem prepoznavanju i prosuđivanju događanja u razdoblju 1990.- 1995. godine.

I.-1.2 Bosanskohercegovački prostor od pretpovijesti do sredine 12. stoljeća

U BiH postoje brojna arheološka nalazišta iz svih razdoblja ljudske povijesti. Manji dio nalazišta je temeljitije istražen, a veći dio je istražen djelomično ili je samo lociran. U pećini Badanj (kod Stolca u Hercegovini) otkriven je crtež paleolitskog čovjeka koji je star približno 10 tisuća godina, što predstavlja europsku rijetkost. Među nalazištima iz mlađeg kamenog doba ističe se Butmir (kod Sarajeva). Iz razdoblja bronce i željeza istraženo je više naselja (Glasinac, Donja Dolina, Golubić i dr.). Arheološki nalazi i drugi povijesni izvori svjedoče da su tijekom starog i ranog srednjeg vijeka na području BiH (kao i okolnim područjima) živjela brojna i različita plemena; Iliri, Kelti, Grci, Rimljani, Avari i Slaveni.

U stoljećima prije nove ere na području BiH (kao i na okolnim područjima) najbrojnija su bila starosjedilačka ilirska plemena (Delmati, Breuci, Japodi itd.). Od 4. st. prije nove ere i na područje današnje BiH prodirala su keltska plemena. U 2. st. prije nove ere, uglavnom na područjima današnje BiH i Hrvatske postojala je *Ilirska kraljevina* koja se sve češće sukobljavala sa državom starog Rima, koja je širila svoju moć diljem mediteranske obale i njenog zaleđa.

Na prijelazu između stare i nove ere Rimljani su trajnije zavlada li ilirskim prostorom, kojeg su nazvali *Ilirik*, te ga upravno organizirali u dvije ili tri rimske provincije. Prostor današnje BiH je tada većim dijelom pripadao rimskoj provinciji *Dalmacija*, a sjeverni dijelovi današnje BiH pripadali su provinciji *Panonija*. Godine 395. izvršena je podjela Rimskog Carstva na Istočno i Zapadno, a cijeli prostor BiH pripao je zapadnoj polovici Carstva.



Prilog 1: *Bosnaskohercegovački prostor od 3.-5. stoljeća, kao dio Rimskog Carstva*
(Preuzeto iz: *Hrvatski povijesni zemljovidi*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1996, str. 3)

U stoljećima rimskog upravljanja i prostor BiH je bio izložen sustavnoj romanizaciji. To se očitovalo u brojnim vidovima; od velikih infrastrukturnih zahvata (naselja, ceste, rudnici), do provođenja pokrštanja stanovništva. Tako je, primjerice, za postojanja

Zapadnog Carstva i jedan dio BiH vjerski pripadao nadbiskupiji u Saloni (kod grada Splita, u današnjoj Hrvatskoj), a drugi dio nadbiskupiji u Sirmiumu (kod grada Sremska Mitrovica, u današnjoj Srbiji).

Nakon propasti Zapadnog Rimskog Carstva (476. g.), većina područja BiH došla je pod različite vrste i intenzitete dominacije Istočnog Carstva, zatim Istočnih Gota te Bizanta.⁵

U drugoj polovici 6. st., tijekom velikih seoba europskih naroda, na područje BiH (i okolna područja) sve češće su prodirala plemena Avara i Slavena, koji su u svakom pogledu postupno potiskivali i asimilirali starosjedilačke Ilire i druge romanizirane narodne skupine. Razdoblje seobe naroda, i nekoliko narednih stoljeća povijesti prostora BiH, je veoma slabo istraženo, te su poznati samo fragmenti i neke posredne činjenice.

Prema malobrojnim poznatim povijesnim izvorima saznaje se da su od sredine 9. stoljeća nad pojedinim većim ili manjim područjima BiH, nestabilno i s različitim vremenskim trajanjem, vladali hrvatski knezovi, a od 925. godine hrvatski kraljevi. Isto tako, u to vrijeme na pojedinim područjima BiH i u kraćim razdobljima vladali su pojedini srpski i crnogorski knezovi, a bizantski carevi su neprekidno nad područjem BiH (i okolnim područjima) nastojali ostvariti feudalnu seniorsku vlast. Tako je bizantski car i kroničar Konstantin Porfirogenet, oko 950. godine u svom spisu *O upravljanju carstvom (De administrando Imperio)* prvi put spomenuo «zemljicu Bosnu» kao posebnu oblast uz izvorište rijeke Bosne i njenih gornjih pritoka.⁶

Hrvatska je 1102. g. ušla u personalnu uniju s Ugarskom, a na čelu zajedničke države smjenjivali su se vladari ugarskih dinastija. Teritorij jake ugarsko-hrvatske države je s tri strane okruživao prostor BiH, što su ugarsko-hrvatski vladari koristili za učestale vojne i političke akcije nastojeći područje BiH staviti pod svoju dominaciju i što više ga odvojiti od

⁵ O najstarijem razdoblju povijesti na prostoru BiH: 1. Anđelić, Pavao, *Marginalije o tragovima starog rudarstva u srednjoj Bosni*, u «Glasnik zemaljskog muzeja», 38, Sarajevo, 1983; 2. *Arheološki leksikon Bosne i Hercegovine*, 1-3, Sarajevo, 1988; 3. Benac, Alojz, *Mlađe kameno i prelazno doba*, u «Kulturna istorija BiH», Sarajevo, 1984; 4. Bojanovski, Ivo, *Bosna i Hercegovina u antičko doba*, Sarajevo, 1988; 5. Pašalić, Esad, *Antička naselja i komunikacije u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1960; 6. Pašalić, Esad, *Period rimske vladavine do kraja III vijeka naše ere*, u «Kulturna istorija BiH», Sarajevo, 1966; 7. Škegro, Ante, *Gospodarstvo rimske provincije Dalmacije*, Zagreb, 1999; 8. Zaninović, Marin, *Ilirsko pleme Delmati*, I i II dio, (Politička povijest i rasprostranjenost Delmata), u «Godišnjak Centra za balkanološka ispitivanja Akademije nauka i umjetnosti BiH», IV/2 i V/3, Sarajevo, 1966 i 1967; 9. Zirdum, Andrija, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

⁶ Manojlović, Gavro, *Studije o spisu «De administrando imperio» cara Konstantina VII Porfirogeneta*, u «Rad Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti», 182, 186, 187, Zagreb, 1910 i 1911.

bizantskog utjecaja. S tim ciljem su u dijelu Bosne za bana postavili Boriča koji je bio prvi značajniji vladar tog područja (1150.-1163).⁷

I.-1.3 Srednjovjekovna bosanska država (1180.-1463. g.)⁸

Nasuprot stranim političkim i vjerskim utjecajima (Ugarsko-hrvatska država protiv Bizanta, te *Rimokatolička* protiv *Istočne* crkve) koji su se tada prelamali i na područjima BiH, unutar BiH su postojali politički i vjerski otpori vanjskim utjecajima. U takvim okolnostima nastala je i srednjovjekovna bosanska država, koja je bila samostalna prema tadašnjim feudalnim kriterijima. Isto tako, u BiH se tada oblikovala autohtona *Crkva bosanska*⁹, koja je smatrana heretičkom s rimokatoličkog i istočnog crkvenog motrišta. U ovom povijesnom razdoblju, na temelju navedenih suprotstavljenih interesa, na prostoru BiH su se događali veoma česti politički, vojni i vjerski sukobi, koji su taj prostor držali u trajnoj teritorijalnoj, upravljačkoj i vjerskoj nestabilnosti.

Utemeljitelj srednjovjekovne bosanske države bio je ban Kulin (1180.-1204.), koji je vladao većim, sjevernim, dijelom prostora BiH. Kulin se pod pritiscima sa zapada javno odrekao «krivovjerja» i prihvatio katoličko učenje, ali u stvarnom životu se gotovo ništa nije promijenilo. Nakon Kulina slabila je bosanska država, pa je u nju veoma često ulazila


⁷ Za povijest BiH i okolnih prostora u razdoblju ranog srednjeg vijeka osnovna literatura je: 1. Ančić, Mladen, *Hrvatska u karolinško doba*, Split, 2001; 2. Grafenauer, Bogo, *Slovanski naselitveni valovi na Balkanski poluotok*, Zgodovinski časopis, XVIII, Ljubljana, 1964; 3. *Historija naroda Jugoslavije I*, Zagreb, 1953; 4. Klaić, Nada, *Povijest Hrvata u ranom srednjem vijeku*, Zagreb, 1971; 5. Ostrogorski, Georgije, *Povijest Bizanta*, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2006; 6. Zirdum, Andrija, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

⁸ Osnovna literatura za ovo razdoblje povijesti BiH je: 1. Anđelić, Pavao, *Doba srednjovjekovne bosanske države*, u «Kulturna historija BiH»; 2. Babić, Anto, *O pitanju formiranja srednjovjekovne bosanske države*, Radovi naučnog društva BiH, III/2, Sarajevo, 1955; 3. Ćirković, Sima, *Historija srednjovjekovne bosanske države*, Beograd, 1964; 4. *Historija naroda Jugoslavije I*, Zagreb, 1953; 5. Klaić Nada, *Srednjovjekovna Bosna*, Zagreb, 1989; 6. *Kršćanstvo srednjovjekovlje Bosne*, zbornik radova, Sarajevo, 1991; 7. Raukar, Tomislav, *Hrvatsko srednjovjekovlje*, Zagreb, 1977; 8. Zirdum, Andrija, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

⁹ Čošković, Pejo, *Ustrojstvo Crkve bosanske*, u «Zbornik radova o fra Anđelu Zvizdoviću», Sarajevo-Fojnica, 2000; *Fenomen «krstjani» u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu*, zbornik radova, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2005; Šanjek, Franjo, *Bosansko-humski krstjani u povijesnim vrelima (13-15. stoljeće)*, Zagreb, 2003; Šidak, Jaroslav, *Studije o «Crkvi bosanskoj» i bogumilstvu*, Zagreb, 1975.

ugarsko-hrvatska vojska vodeći tzv. *križarske ratove* protiv «krivovjeraca», a rezultat je bio zauzimanje dijelova bosanske države od strane hrvatskih i ugarskih velikaša.

Bosanska država ponovno je ojačala u vrijeme bana Stjepana 2. Kotromanića (1314.-1353.), koji je – koristeći politička, vojna i diplomatska sredstva – zavladao i južnim dijelovima prostora BiH i dijelom Dalmacije. Za vlasti Stjepana 2. u BiH se znatno povećao i učvrstio utjecaj *Katoličke crkva*, naročito preko djelovanja crkvenih redova, osobito franjevac koji su prvi put u Bosnu došli 1291. g. i mali su presudan značaj u očuvanju katoličanstva (te hrvatskog etničkog i nacionalnog identiteta) i u osmanlijskom razdoblju bosanskohercegovačke povijesti.



Prilog 2: Srednjevjekovna bosanska država

(Preuzeto iz: Pavličević, Dragutin, *Kratka politička i kulturna povijest Bosne i Hercegovine*, Hrvatski informativni centar, Zagreb, 2000, str. 43)

Bosanska država je dosegla vrhunac moći u doba Stjepana Tvrtka 1. (1353.-1391.), koji je vojnim pohodima još više proširio državni teritorij. Tvrtko 1. se proglasio kraljem «Srbijem i Bosni», a titulu mu je priznao Ludovik 1., jer je i Bosna, prema feudalnom

poimanju, potpadala pod ugarsku «krunu sv. Stjepana». Godine 1388. Tvrtko 1. je porazio osmanlijsku vojsku, a 1390. g. je osvojio hrvatsku obalu do Zadra te se proglasio «kraljem Bosne, Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Primorja».

Nakon smrti Tvrtka 1. bosanska država je naglo oslabila i doživjela je teritorijalno rasulo, zbog brojnih unutarnjih sukoba te osvajačkih pohoda Osmanlija s jugoistoka i ugarsko-hrvatskih sa sjeverozapada. Na koncu (1463. g.) osmanlijska vojska je zauzela Bosnu i pogubila njenog posljednjeg kralja, Stjepana Tomaševića. Njegova supruga, kraljica Katarina pobjegla je u Rim, gdje je prije smrti svoju bivšu kraljevinu Bosnu ostavila Svetoj Stolici. Dva desetljeća kasnije (1482. g.) Osmanlije su zauzele i Humsku zemlju, koja se od 1448. g. nazivala Hercegovinom.

I.-1.4 Osmanlijsko razdoblje bosanskohercegovačke povijesti (1463.-1878. g.)¹⁰

Četiri stoljeća osmanlijskog upravljanja prostorom BiH ostavilo je u svakom pogledu goleme posljedice na BiH, ali i na susjedna i udaljenija europska područja. Naime, prostor BiH je bio najzapadnija i stoga iznimno važna osmanlijska pokrajina, iz koje je tadašnja dugotrajna svjetska sila – Osmanlijsko Carstvo – nastojala ratovanjem širiti svoju moć u smjeru europskog zapada i sjevera. Ovu opću činjenicu je nužno uvažavati za objektivno razumijevanje niza političkih, vojnih, gospodarskih, kulturnih, nacionalnih, migracijskih, vjerskih i ostalih povijesnih i suvremenih procesa koji su se događali unutar BiH, u njenom okruženju i na euroazijskom prostoru.

Prostor BiH je bio izložen sveobuhvatnom procesu islamizacije, jer je islam bio ne samo vjera, nego i ideologija i način života, odnosno civilizacija koja je bila duhovna struktura Osmanlijskog Carstva. Stoga je osmanlijska država sustavno provodila islamizaciju i

¹⁰ Osnovna literatura za ovo razdoblje povijesti BiH je: 1. Džaja, Srećko, *Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine. Predemancipacijsko razdoblje 1463-1804*, Mostar, 1999; 2. Imamović, Mustafa, *Historija Bošnjaka*, Sarajevo, 1977; 3. Hadžijahić, Muhamed, *Porijeklo bosanskih Muslimana*, Sarajevo, 1990; 4. Hammer, Joseph von, *Historija Turskog/Osmanskog Carstva*, Zagreb, 1979; 5. Handžić, Adem, *O islamizaciji u sjeveroistočnoj Bosni u XV i XVI vijeku*, u «Jugoslavenski historijski časopis», 4, Beograd, 1969; 6. Handžić, Muhamed, *Islamizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1940; 7. *Historija naroda Jugoslavije II*, Zagreb, 1959; 8. Marić, Franjo, *Hrvati-katolici u BiH između 1463. i 1995. godine*, Sarajevo, 1998; 9. Zirdum, Andrija, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007.

u BiH, sukladno svojim osvajačkim ciljevima, nastojeći prostor BiH pretvoriti u što pouzdaniju utvrdu za daljnja osvajanja na europskom kontinentu.

Islamizacija se odvijala prema imperijalnoj koncepciji, te se kretala sveobuhvatno, od kulturološke i vjerske do upravljačke razine, a provodila se različitim metodama; od nasilnog nametanja do pridobivanja različitim materijalnim povlasticama i nuđenja mogućnosti objektivnog statusnog napredovanja na razini cijelog Carstva. Tako su većinu čelnih upravljačkih položaja i na BiH prostoru dobivale osobe iz BiH koje su prešle na islam i bile vjerne Carstvu, a nerijetko su islamizirani pojedinci s prostora BiH imali i izuzetno visoke položaje u upravljanju cijelim Carstvom. Stoga je tijekom četiri osmanlijska stoljeća prostor BiH doživio duboke preobrazbe koje su ostavile različite političke, kulturološke, identitetske i druge učinke, koji su opstali i razvijali se i nakon 19. stoljeća.

Na prostoru BiH je uveden osmanlijski feudalni (poluvojni) ustroj, u kojem su najbrojniju temeljnu vladajuću strukturu činili niži vojni plemići (*spahije*) koji su zbog vojnih zasluga od vladara Carstva (sultana, koji je bio vlasnik cjelokupne zemlje) dobivali zemljišni posjed (*timar*). U prvim stoljećima osmanlijske vlasti plemićki status *spahije* nije bio nasljedan, niti je nasljedan bio zemljišni posjed (*timar*), nego je ovisio o ratnim, osvajačkim uspjesima. Tada su *timare* i status *spahije* dobivale i neislamizirane osobe koje su bile vojnički zaslužne u teritorijalnom širenju Carstva. Međutim, veće zemljišne posjede i titule dobivali su samo islamizirani feudalci.

Nakon osmanlijskog poraza kod hrvatskog grada Siska (1593. g.) i postupnog slabljenja osvajačke moći Carstva, bio je sve veći pritisak provođenju nasilne islamizacije u svim društvenim slojevima na prostoru BiH; kmetovi kršćani su bili u sve nepovoljnijem položaju, a *spahiluk* je postao nasljedan i oduzimao se *spahijama* kršćanima.

No, u razdoblju vojnih uspjeha Osmanlijskog Carstva u Europi (15., 16. i 17. stoljeće) prostor BiH je već bio trajno islamiziran: zaživjela je islamska feudalna struktura, a značajan dio običnog puka (kmetovi) također je prihvatio islam zbog različitih motiva (uglavnom zbog povoljnijeg društvenog statusa).

Osmanlijska država je osvojeno bosansko kraljevstvo ustrojila kao posebnu upravnu cjelinu – *sandžakat* (okrug) koji je bio u sastavu Rumelijskog pašaluka. Ugarsko-hrvatska država je tada uz granicu sa Bosanskim sandžakatom osnovala Jajačku, Srebreničku i Mačvansku banovinu kao obrambena područja (od rijeke Une do Beograda), koja su trebala zaustaviti daljnja osmanlijska osvajanja.

Međutim, zbog snage Osmanlijskog Carstva i kriza u odnosima među europskim državama, Osmanlije su tijekom 16. stoljeća zauzele dio Ugarske (Beograd, 1521. g.) i velike

dijelove Hrvatske (Knin 1522. g., zatim Jajce, Požegu, Klis, Viroviticu, te Bihać 1592. g.), s čime je Hrvatska svedena na «ostatke ostataka» («reliquie reliquiarum»). To je bio vrhunac teritorijalnog širenja Osmanlijskog Carstva u Europi, i stoga je 1592. ustrojen novi, Bosanski Pašaluk koji je imao osam *sandžaka*.



Prilog 3: *Bosanski Pašaluk krajem 16. i početkom 17. stoljeća*
(Preuzeto iz: Pavličević, D., n. dj., str. 45)

Već slijedeće godine (1593.) golema osmanlijska vojska je doživjela teški i presudni poraz kod grada Siska (u Hrvatskoj), nakon čega su Osmanlije sve više iz osvajačkog rata prelazile u obrambeni. Ovu godinu su osmanlijski kroničari nazivali «godinom propasti».

U narednih stotinjak godina osmanlijska vojska je pokušavala nizom većih i manjih prodora i bitaka izvršiti daljnja osvajanja na prostoru srednje Europe. U tom razdoblju su i različite – udružene i pojedinačne – vojske europskih država upadale na područja koja su

zauzele Osmanlije, nastojeći potisnuti Osmanlije iz Europe i tako riješiti tzv. *Istočno pitanje*.¹¹ U tim iscrpljujućim sukobima, osmanlijska država je bila teško poražena u najvećim bitkama i ratovima, te je 1699. bila prinuđena potpisati mir u Srijemskim Karlovcima, tj. napustiti sva područja na lijevim obalama rijeka Une, Save i Dunava. Tako su i granice Bosanskog Pašaluka vraćene na desnu obalu Save i Dunava.¹² Bosanski pašaluk je nakon toga dobio novo strateško značenje, jer je postao najjistureniji dio Osmanlijskog Carstva u Europi, te se na njemu branio položaj Carstva u Europi.

Ratovi europskih država (uglavnom Austrije i Rusije) protiv Osmanlija u 18. stoljeću nisu znatnije izmijenili granice uspostavljene 1699. godine. Krajem 18. i u početnim desetljećima 19. stoljeća, europske države su se međusobno sukobljavale te su izostali veći vojni pohodi protiv Osmanlijskog Carstva.

Međutim, golemo Osmanlijsko Carstvo je zapadalo u sve veću unutarnju političku i socijalnu krizu, u kojoj su na Balkanu – zbog autohtonih razloga te poticaja europskih sila (pretežito uz pomoć Rusije) - uslijedili protuosmanlijski ustanci Srba, Grka, Rumunja i Crnogoraca. Tako se Grčka osamostalila, a Srbija je 1830. g. dobila autonomiju. Na taj način je - zbog nepovoljnog okruženja i slabosti osmanlijske države – prostor BiH postao u svakom pogledu još nestabilniji.

U tom razdoblju je Osmanlijsko Carstvo svoj opstanak i duboku unutarnju krizu pokušalo riješiti provođenjem niza temeljitih reformi koje su išle prema znatnoj modernizaciji upravljačkog modela i društvenih odnosa. Reforme su trebale pogodovati širokim slojevima stanovništva, a dokidale su povlastice razgranate osmanlijske feudalne strukture. No, islamsko plemstvo na području BiH se suprotstavilo reformama središnje vlasti Osmanlijskog Carstva.

Zbog toga i niza drugih razloga reforme koje je nastojalo provoditi Osmanlijsko Carstvo nisu zaživjele ni promijenile situaciju na prostoru BiH, pa je prostor BiH zapadao u sve dublju krizu, koja je vodila prema još većoj unutarnjoj dezintegraciji po različitim osnovama, te sve brojnijim i sve većim oružanim sukobima u BiH.

U toj složenoj situaciji na području BiH, nastao je 1831./2. g. pokret i ustanak za autonomiju Bosne. Predvodnik je bio kapetan Husein beg Gradašćević, koji je okupio pristaše iz različitih socijalnih, etničkih i vjerskih slojeva. Ustanak je slomljen vojnom silom Carstva, a uz pomoć i dijela plemstva unutar BiH.¹³

¹¹ Pavličević, Dragutin, *Hrvati i istočno pitanje*, Zagreb, 2007.

¹² Kovačević, Ešref, *Granice Bosanskog pašaluka prema Austriji i Mletačkoj republici po odredbama Karlovačkog mira*, Sarajevo, 1973.

¹³ Aličić, Ahmed, *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832*, Sarajevo, 1996.

Potpuni slom protureformskog bosanskog plemstva dogodio se 1850./51. kada je većina nemilosrdno pogubljena u vojnoj akciji koju je prema nalogu Carstva proveo Omer paša Latas. No, tada su (1852., 1857., i 1862. g.) u istočnoj Hercegovini zaredali ustanci pokorenih i nezadovoljnih kršćana (*raja*). Ustanke su poticali i pomagali Crna gora, Srbija, Rusija i Austrija; svaka radi ostvarenja svojih interesa. Najveći ustanak, u izravnoj organizaciji Srbije, započeo je 1875. g. u Hercegovini, a uskoro se proširio i na velike sjeverozapadne dijelove Bosne. Već 1876. u rat na ustaničkoj strani izravno su se uključile Srbija i Crna Gora.

Kad su ustanici i Srbija pretrpjeli poraz od Osmanlijskog Carstva, u rat se uključila Rusija koja je porazila Osmanlijsko Carstvo i prisilila ga 1878. na mir koji je sklopljen u San Stefanu. No, odredbama mira nisu usklađeni interesi europskih sila, pa se iste godine održao *Berlinski mirovni kongres*. Na njemu je Austro-ugarskoj dodijeljeno pravo okupacije (*protektorata*) nad BiH, s tim što je BiH i nadalje nominalno ostala pod suverenitetom Osmanlijskog Carstva.¹⁴

I.-1.5 Bosna i Hercegovina pod Austro-ugarskom (1878.-1918. g.)¹⁵

Prema osnovnim zamislima *Berlinskog kongresa*, okupacija (*potektorat*) Austro-ugarske trebao je uspostaviti mir i uvesti novi sustav uprave u BiH. Austro-ugarska je u BiH ušla s 80-ak tisuća vojnika, kojima se tri mjeseca uspješno oružano suprotstavljao uglavnom muslimanski dio stanovništva. Tada je Austro-ugarska poslala višestruko veće vojne snage koje su uvele novu upravu. No, na poticaj iz Srbije, novoj upravi su se oružano i na druge načine 1881. i 1882. g. suprotstavljali Srbi u Hercegovini, pa je Austro-ugarska vojska ponovno primjenom sile uspostavila mir.

Hrvatska, koja je bila dio Austro-ugarske monarhije, imala je očekivanje da će se okupacija BiH i njeno integriranje u dvojnu Monarhiju događati preko državnog zajedništva Hrvatske i BiH, te da će to pridonijeti da se dvojna Monarhija pretvori u trojnu, što je tada općenito bio glavni cilj hrvatske vladajuće političke strukture. Zbog toga je *Hrvatski sabor* već 1878. istaknuo *povijesna prava* Hrvatske na BiH. No, Austrija je bila čvrsta u odluci da

¹⁴ Ekmečić, Milorad, *Ustanak u Bosni 1875-78*, Sarajevo, 1973.

¹⁵ Osnovna literatura za ovo razdoblje: 1. Džaja, Srećko, *Bosna i Hercegovina u austrougarskom razdoblju (1878-1919)*, Mostar-Zagreb, 2002; 2. Imamović, Mustafa, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnji politički razvitak BiH od 1878 do 1914*, Sarajevo, 1997.

sama upravlja s BiH i postupno je izravno uključi u Monarhiju, te da Monarhija ostane dvojna, pa je hrvatskom saboru jednostavno odgovorila da je prekoračio svoje ovlasti.¹⁶

S druge strane, Srbija je već nekoliko desetljeća (od sredine 19. stoljeća) na različite načine sustavno djelovala na pripajanje BiH, što je postavila kao svoj glavni strateški interes.

U takvoj situaciji – u kojoj su, očekivano, uglavnom Srbi u BiH bili potpora interesima Srbije, a uglavnom Hrvati u BiH potpora interesima Hrvatske – austrougarski upravitelj BiH (B. Kallay) je poduzimao niz mjera s kojima je nastojao neutralizirati ove srbijanske i hrvatske težnje. Između ostalog, oslanjao se na muslimansko plemstvo, te stoga nije riješio iznimno važno agrarno pitanje, a u javnom životu nastojao je ustrojiti novu, *bosansku naciju* i nametnuti bosansko ime za jezik. No, zbog niza razloga, Kallay nije imao trajnijih uspjeha u svojoj politici. Desetak godina prije Kallaya, propao je sličan pokušaj Topal-paše, koji je namjeravao oblikovati integralnu *bosansku naciju* u okviru interesa Osmanlijskog Carstva.¹⁷

Nova kriza austrougarskog upravljanja u BiH dogodila se nakon pobjede *mladoturske revolucije* u Osmanlijskom Carstvu, kada je (zbog očekivanja da će to dovesti do zahtjeva Turske prema BiH) Austro-ugarska (1908. g.) izvršila *aneksiju* BiH, što je produbilo europsku krizu uoči Prvog svjetskog rata. Srbija i Crna Gora su zbog *aneksije* prijetile ratom.

Sigurnosni položaj BiH postao je još gori nakon *Balkanskih ratova* (1912.-1913. g.), u kojima je Turska potisnuta s europskog kontinenta, a Srbija se proširila i sve otvorenije iskazivala osvajačke namjere prema BiH. To se posebno očitovalo u još intenzivnijem djelovanju prosrbijskih javnih i tajnih društava i organizacija u BiH. Tako su pripadnici organizacije *Mlada Bosna* (koje je uvijek bavala i naoružala Srbija) u ljeto 1914. g. u Sarajevu ubili austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika, što je bio povod početku Prvog svjetskog rata.¹⁸

Zanimljivo je spomenuti, da je u skupini iz *Mlade Bosne* koja je pripremala sarajevski atentat bio i mladi Vasa Čubrilović, koji je u nizu narednih desetljeća, kao znanstvenik i akademik, zastupao velikosrbijansku koncepciju, a bio je član *Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti* (SANU) i u vrijeme donošenja zloglasnog *Memoranduma SANU* (1986. g.).

¹⁶ Šidak, Jaroslav; Gross, Mirjana; Karaman, Igor; Šepić, Dragovan, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda (1860-1914)*, Zagreb, 1968.

¹⁷ Redžić, Enver, n. dj., str. 117-132.

¹⁸ Štedimlja, Savić Marković, *Zavjere protiv svjetskog mira*, Zagreb, 2005.



Prilog 4: *Bosna i Hercegovina u Austro-ugarskoj (1878.-1918. g.)*
(Preuzeto iz: Pavličević, D, n. dj., str. 46)

Austro-ugarska država je tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata u svoju vojsku mobilizirala i brojne stanovnika BiH, svih triju konfesija, koji su odvođeni ratovati na različitim europskim bojištima. Tijekom rata, austro-ugarske vlasti su (zbog atentata u Sarajevu i sudjelovanja brojnih bosansko-hercegovačkih Srba u prosrbijanskim djelovanjima u BiH) provodili niz posebnih represivnih mjera prema bosanskohercegovačkim Srbima i mreži njihovih prosrbijanskih organizacija.

I.-1.6 Bosna i Hercegovina u prvoj Jugoslaviji (1918.-1941. g.)¹⁹

Pri kraju Prvog svjetskog rata, političke skupine na južnoslavenskim dijelovima Austro-ugarske (Slovenija, Hrvatska, BiH, Banat, Bačka) ustrojile su svoje zasebne oblike vlasti (tzv. *Narodna vijeća*) i zajedničko središnje *Narodno vijeće* u Zagrebu. Uskoro potom (29. listopada 1918.) prekinuti su svi odnosi s Austro-ugarskom i proglašena je Država Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba (Država SHS) sa sjedištem u Zagrebu, a obuhvaćala je teritorij Slovenije, Hrvatske, BiH, Banata i Bačke. Osnovni cilj osnivanja Države SHS je bio što prije se ujediniti se državama Srbijom i Crnom Gorom, što je i učinjeno 1. prosinca 1918. godine, te je tako stvorena prva Jugoslavija, koja je tada nazvana Kraljevstvo Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Kraljevstvo SHS).²⁰

Do 1921. g. u zemljama prve Jugoslavije (u BiH, Hrvatskoj i dr.) postojali su određeni oblici samouprave, a 1921. g. je nametnut *Ustav* kojim je provedena stroga upravna centralizacija i nacionalna unitarizacija, pod dominacijom srbijanske kraljevske dinastije Karađorđević. Država je upravno podijeljena na 33 oblasti koje nisu poštivale ni povijesne ni etničke kriterije. Na čelu oblasti su se nalazili veliki župani koji su bili podređeni ministru unutarnjih poslova. Šest upravnih oblasti bilo je i na području BiH, a sjedišta su im bila u Bihaću, Banja Luci, Travniku, Sarajevu, Tuzli i Mostaru.

Režim nije priznavao etničke i nacionalne posebnosti, nego je propisana koncepcija da postoji jedan, jugoslavenski narod koji se sastoji od tri *plemena* (Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci), a ostalim narodima (Muslimani, Albanci, Crnogorci, Makedonci) nije bio priznat ni *plemenski* status. Kod provođenja popisa pučanstva nije bilo predviđeno etničko ili nacionalno opredjeljivanje, nego samo konfesionalno.

Za jugoslavenski *Ustav* je glasovala i stranka bosanskih muslimana *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija* (JMO), čijim je članovima (uglavnom muslimanskom plemstvu) za uzvrat obećana nadoknada za zemlju koju im je država oduzela agrarnom reformom.

U pragmatičnom vladanju, režim prve Jugoslavije je vodio represivnu i izrazito prosrbijsku politiku sa širim socijalnim i kadrovskim osloncem uglavnom na etničke Srbe. Tako je bilo, primjerice, i pri provođenju agrarne reforme, pa su (prema istom modelu kao i na drugim područjima) na području BiH, uz slabo izvršavanje obećanja koje je dobila JMO,

¹⁹ Osnovna literatura za ovo razdoblje: 1. Petranović, Branko, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, I, Beograd, 1988; 2. Purivatra, Atif, *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija*, Sarajevo 1974; 3. Redžić, Enver, *Jugoslavenski radnički pokret i nacionalno pitanje u BiH (1918-1941)*, Sarajevo, 1983.

²⁰ Krizman, Bogdan, *Raspad Austro-Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslavenske države*, Zagreb, 1977.

oduzimana imanja islamskoj vlasteli i dijeljena većinom Srbima.²¹ Uz to prosrbijski režim je vršio posebno velika nasilja (ubojstva, zatvaranja, progoni) nad muslimanima u BiH, zbog njihove navodne krivnje za nepovoljan položaj bosansko-hercegovačkih Srba u vrijeme austro-ugarske vlasti.

Zbog niza socijalnih i političkih problema i kriza, režim prve Jugoslavije je 1929. g. uveo otvorenu diktaturu. Država je promijenila ime u Kraljevina Jugoslavija, ukinut je i formalni parlamentarizam, zabranjeno je političko i drugačije organiziranje na *plemenskoj* (etničkoj i nacionalnoj) i vjerskoj osnovi, a zabranjeno je i bilo kakvo korištenje *plemenskih* naziva. Jugoslavenski državni teritorij je upravno podijeljen na devet banovina, opet bez uvažavanja povijesnih i etničkih kriterija. BiH je bila razdvojena na nekoliko banovina, koje su obuhvaćale teritorij BiH i neka druga područja.



Prilog 5: Upravna podjela prve Jugoslavije na devet banovina (1929.-1939 g.)
(Preuzeto iz: Jurčević, Josip; Raić Marija, *Povijest VIII*, Alfa, Zagreb, 2003, str. 37)

²¹ Erić, Milivoje, *Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941*, Sarajevo, 1958; Purivatra, Atif, *Političke partije prema agrarnoj reformi u Bosni i Hercegovini neposredno poslije 1918*, u «Prilozi», Sarajevo, 1968.

Vrbaska banovina (sjedište u Banja Luci) je obuhvaćala bivšu banjalučku, bihaćku i dio travničke oblasti. Drinska banovina (sjedište u Sarajevu) obuhvaćala je istočnu Bosnu, Srbiju do rijeke Kolubare, dio bivšeg hrvatskog Srijema i istočne Slavonije. Primorska banovina (sjedište u Splitu) je, pored ostalog, uključivala zapadnu Hercegovinu i dio Bosne do Travnika. Zetska banovina (sjedište u Cetinju) je, pored ostalog, uključivala i istočnu Hercegovinu.

Dvije godine kasnije (1931.) izvršena je upravna promjena, kojom su Srijem i istočna Slavonija izdvojeni iz Drinske i dodijeljeni Dunavskoj banovini (sjedište u Novom Sadu).

I.-1.6.1 Banovina Hrvatska (1939.-1941. g.)²²

Represivnost režima prve Jugoslavije nije uspijevala stavljati pod nadzor različite oblike socijalnog, nacionalnog i drugačijih nezadovoljstava, koja su sve više iznutra destabilizirala prvu Jugoslaviju. Pritom je najkrupniji unutarnji neriješeni problem bilo tzv. *hrvatsko pitanje*. Uoči Drugog svjetskog rata, opstanak druge Jugoslavije sve više je ugrožavan i razvojem međunarodnih događaja, osobito zbog sve agresivnije politike i postupaka totalitarnih država Njemačke i Italije.

U takvim predratnim okolnostima – nakon njemačkog anektiranja Austrije i razbijanja Čehoslovačke – beogradski režim je bio prinuđen povući daljnje poteze koji umanjuju prijetnje opstanku države. Osim sve većeg političkog i gospodarskog vezivanja Jugoslavije za Njemačku (od 1935. g.), nakon dužeg pregovaranja, a nekoliko dana prija početka Drugog svjetskog rata (u Europi), potpisan je tzv. *Sporazum Cvetković-Maček* (26. kolovoz 1939).²³ Glavna točka *Sporazuma* bila je odluka o stvaranju *Banovine Hrvatske* kao nove upravne cjeline unutar Jugoslavije.

U sastav *Banovine Hrvatske* (sa sjedištem u Zagrebu) ušle su dotadašnje Savska i Primorska banovina, zatim Hercegovina od Stolca na zapad, dio Bosne između Livna i Travnika, te tri posavska kotara (Derventa, Gradačac i Brčko).

²² Osnovna literatura: Boban, Ljubo, *Sporazum Cvetković-Maček*, Beograd, 1965; Isti, *Maček i politika HSS-a 1928.-1941*, Zagreb, 1974.

²³ Dragiša Cvetković je tada bio predsjednik jugoslavenske vlade, a Vlatko Maček predsjednik *Hrvatske seljačke stranke*, koje je bila uvjerljivo najjača među Hrvatima.



Prilog 6: Banovina Hrvatska, u trećoj upravnoj podjeli prve Jugoslavije (1939.-1941. g.)
(Preuzeto iz: *Historical maps of Croatia*, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, str. 20)

Sa *Sporazumom* gotovo nitko nije bio zadovoljan. Mnogobrojne političke i druge grupacije (srbijanske, hrvatske i muslimanske) koje nisu sudjelovale u pripremi *Sporazuma* osuđivale su ga s većom ili manjom žestinom, a i strukture koje su ga pripremile, također, nisu bile zadovoljne. Srbijanska vladajuća strana je opstruirala punovažnu ustavnu potvrdu promjena nastalih *Sporazumom*, a hrvatski potpisnici su, temeljem postignutih dogovora, *Sporazum* smatrali tek prvim korakom reorganizacije Jugoslavije, očekujući daljnja teritorijalna i druga postignuća u korist *Banovine Hrvatske*.

Naime, «sam Sporazum počivao je na slabim pravnim temeljima» jer je tu ustavnu reviziju trebalo «naknadno podnijeti na suglasnost Narodnom predstavništvu, što nikada nije bilo učinjeno. Stoga je Namjesništvo ili kralj nakon stupanja na prijestolje mogao u svakom

pogodnom trenutku Sporazum poništiti».²⁴ Zbog toga i niza drugih razloga, zakonodavni organ *Banovine Hrvatske (Hrvatski sabor)* nije nikada bio izabran, te je *Banovina* cijelo vrijeme svog postojanja (19 mjeseci) zapravo bila samo državno-pravni provizorij.²⁵

I.-1.7 Bosna i Hercegovina u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj (1941.-1945. g.)²⁶

Nekoliko dana nakon napada Njemačke na Jugoslaviju (06. travnja 1941), u Zagrebu je (10. travnja 1941.) proglašena Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH), koja je obuhvaćala teritorij Hrvatske i BiH. Međutim, budući je NDH u svakom pogledu bila najviše podređena njemačkim i nešto manje talijanskim interesima, i pitanje njenih granica se rješavalo između Njemačke i Italije.

U samom početku (12. travnja 1941.) Hitler je u svojoj zapovjedi priopćio da Bosnu i Hercegovinu prepušta Italiji²⁷, ali je desetak dana poslije na *Bečkoj ministarskoj konferenciji* (sudjelovale Njemačka i Italija) dogovoreno da BiH bude dio NDH, a Italija je to konačno priznala *Rimskim ugovorima* (18. svibnja 1941.).²⁸ Cijeli prostor NDH je – između Njemačke i Italije – bio podijeljen na interesno-okupacijske zone u smjeru zapad-istok, a crta razgraničenja išla je i preko središnjih dijelova BiH.

U unutarnjem upravnom pogledu NDH je podijeljena na 22 županije (tzv. *Velike Župe*), koje su uglavnom imale nazive iz doba srednjovjekovnih hrvatskih i bosanskih kraljevina. Totalitarni režim NDH je bosanskohercegovačke muslimane smatrao *Hrvatima islamske vjeroispovijesti* (nazivani su čak i *cvijećem hrvatstva*), te su brojni muslimani imali visoke položaje u strukturi vlasti i vladajućem *Ustaškom pokretu*.

²⁴ Sirotković Hodimir, *Vladko Maček i pravna izgradnja Banovine Hrvatske*, u «Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci», br. 1, Rijeka, 2001., str. 280.

²⁵ v. Isto, str. 280-283.

²⁶ Osnovna literatura: 1. Jelić-Butić, Fikreta, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, Zagreb, 1978; 2. Redžić, Enver, *Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu*, Sarajevo, 1998.

²⁷ Krizman, Bogdan, *Pavelić i ustaše*, Zagreb, 1978, str. 398.

²⁸ Brčić, Rafael, *Njemačko-italijanske suprotnosti oko Bosne i Hercegovine u svjetlu okupacije 1941*, u «Prilozi», 3, Sarajevo, 1967.



Prilog 7: Upravna podjela Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941.-1945. g.)
(Preuzeto iz: Pavličević, D., n. dj., str. 49)

Na prostoru BiH je bila najsloženija ratna sigurnosna, vojnička i politička situacija, te su se tu vodile i najteže oružane borbe i odmazde nad civilnim pučanstvom. Na području BiH, njemačke, talijanske i NDH-aške vojske su nastojale provoditi interese svojih režima, pa su veoma slabo surađivale. Osim toga, na području BiH su intenzivno oružano i politički djelovali jugoslavenski komunisti i srbijanski četnici.

Stoga je BiH za vrijeme cijelog Drugog svjetskog rata bila područje najveće opće nesigurnosti i nestabilnosti. Već 1941. g. četničke i komunističke partizanske postrojbe su u istočnoj BiH počinile masovna pogubljenja nezaštićenih muslimanskih civila. Tijekom rata, u BiH su se vodile učestale oružane borbe različitog intenziteta; provodila su se različita masovna nasilja; sve vojske vršile su nasilnu mobilizaciju i uspostavljale povremene oblike

vlasti; stanovništvo se lokalno samoorganiziralo ili bježalo u *sigurnije krajeve* itd. Posebno velika stradavanja civilnog pučanstva (pogubljenja, progonstva, masovno bježanje) događala su se krajem rata i neposredno nakon njegova završetka, kad su komunisti najtežim oblicima represije trajno uspostavljali vlast.

I.-1.8 Bosna i Hercegovina u drugoj Jugoslaviji (1945.-1990. g.)²⁹

Druga Jugoslavija je bila jedna u nizu istočnoeuropskih država u kojima su gotovo pola stoljeća (od kraja Drugog svjetskog rata do 1990-ih godina) vladali totalitarni komunistički režimi. Država se sastojala od šest republika: Slovenija, Hrvatska, BiH, Srbija, Crna Gora, Makedonija, te dvije autonomne pokrajine (Vojvodina i Kosovo) koje su bile istovremeno konstitutivni dio i Srbije i Jugoslavije. U svakoj republici, osim u BiH, je živio jedan matični većinski narod (nacija), kojem je režim priznao državnu konstitutivnost. Na taj način je druga Jugoslavija bila država šest republika i pet konstitutivnih naroda.

BiH je bila jedna od šest jugoslavenskih federalnih republika. No, prije određivanja tog statusa za BiH i njenog teritorijalnog opsega, unutar *Komunističke partije Jugoslavije* – KPJ (na razinama BiH, Srbije, Hrvatske i Jugoslavije) su postojali veoma različiti interesi i prijedlozi, a na koncu je – o tim, kao i drugim pitanjima - bila presudna odluka vrha KPJ. Isto tako, sve političke, društvene i nacionalne promjene koje su se događale u BiH tijekom trajanja druge Jugoslavije, prvenstveno su prilagođavane potrebama komunističkog režima.

BiH je - u odnosu na druge jugoslavenske republike – imala niz posebnosti. Položajem je BiH bila središnja jugoslavenska republika, pa je i stoga imala poseban jugoslavenski sigurnosni značaj, što se očitovalo u državnoj obrambenoj strategiji i rasporedu vojnih resursa. BiH je prema povijesnom naslijeđu i neriješenim pitanjima bila najsloženija jugoslavenska republika, što se očitovalo u činjenici da je BiH bila jedina republika u kojoj su - odlukom režima - najprije dvaipol desetljeća postojala dva konstitutivna naroda (Srbi i Hrvati), a potom dva desetljeća tri konstitutivna naroda (Srbi, Hrvati, Muslimani). Zbog toga, kao i zbog niza političkih, gospodarskih, kulturnih i drugih postupaka koje je komunistički režim provodio na prostoru BiH, ta republika je u javnom životu često nazivana *Jugoslavija u malom*.

²⁹ Osnovna literatura: 1. Bilandžić, Dušan, *Historija SFRJ*, Zagreb, 1985; 2. Nešović, Slobodan, *Temelji nove Jugoslavije*, Beograd, 1973; 3. Petranović, Branko, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, II-III, Beograd, 1988.



Prilog 8: *Bosna i Hercegovina u drugoj Jugoslaviji (1945.-1990. g.)*
(Preuzeto iz: *Historical maps of Croatia*, str. 22)

U prva dvaipol desetljeća postojanja Jugoslavije, odlukom te različitim prinudama i poticajima režima, bosanskohercegovački muslimani su se u popisima pučanstva i drugim prigodama mogli nacionalno izjašnjavati kao ili Srbi ili Hrvati ili Jugoslaveni-neopredijeljeni. Krajem 60-ih godina (1968. g.), pod pritiskom različitih vidova socijalnog nezadovoljstva, režim je prvi put «promovirao muslimansku naciju pod imenom Muslimani»³⁰, te je uskoro nakon toga bosanskohercegovačkim pripadnicima islamske vjeroispovijesti (muslimanima) dopušteno da se javno i pri popisima pučanstva (od popisa 1971. g.) mogu nacionalno izjašnjavati i kao Muslimani, a nova nacija – Muslimani – dobila je i republički konstitutivni status.

Međutim, ovakvo rješenje režima je već tada izazvalo potpuno različite reakcije i daljnje koncepcijsko i drugačije raslojavanje unutar društvenih elita bosanskohercegovačkih

³⁰ Redžić, Enver, *Sto godina muslimanske politike*, Sarajevo, 2000, str. 82.

Muslimana. Konceptijsko i političko raslojavanje kretalo se u tri osnovna smjera, prikaz kojih bitno pomaže razumijevanju događanja i društvenih procesa i nakon 1990. godine.

Prvo, većina je (dijelom zbog očuvanja društvenog statusa, a dijelom iz uvjerenja) za vrijeme postojanja Jugoslavije javno zagovarala režimski oblikovanu naciju Muslimana,³¹ a u procesu raspada Jugoslavije i nakon toga, znatan dio ovih zagovaratelja prilagođavao se različitim novonastalim situacijama.³²

Drugo, ugledni pojedinci iz islamskog korpusa u BiH su se već tada javno suprotstavljali režimskom rješenju nove nacije Muslimana, pritom zagovarajući ideju posebnog etničkog i nacionalnog identiteta *bosanstva* (*bošnjaštva*).³³ Protiv zagovornika *bosanstva* jugoslavenski režim je pokrenuo kampanju javnih osuda, odnosno «ideološko političku aktivnost koja je zatim orkestrirano prenesena u štampu i organe» partijske vlasti.³⁴

Treće, dio istaknutijih pripadnika islamske vjeroispovijesti djelovao je na radikalnom zagovaranju islama kao svjetskog pokreta, u kojem je nebitna etnička, nacionalna ili drugačija pripadnost, nego je jedino bitna pripadnost svjetskom islamu, kao vjeri te načinu osobnog i socijalnog života. Tako je u BiH 1969./1970. g. napisana i *Islamska deklaracija* kojoj je autor Alija Izetbegović, koji je nakon 1990. g. postao *Predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH*, tj. pojedinac na položaju najveće institucijske političke moći u BiH.

³¹ Isto, str. 89-100.

³² Isto, str. 6: E. Redžić opravdano tvrdi kako su «propagatori» jugoslavenske režimske koncepcije nacije Muslimana «promjenom društveno-političkog poretka, postali euforični zastupnici nacionalne ideje bošnjaštva, koju su godinama uporno odbacivali ... ova pojava svjedoči da su neki aktualni Bošnjaci, prethodni propagatori nacionalnog muslimanstva u znaku 'M', i prije i sada istorijsku nauku tretirali kao služavku političke vlasti.»

³³ Primjerice, Enver Redžić je svoje motrište tada javno izlagao i opširno objavio u Sarajevu 1970. godine u knjizi «Tokovi i otpori», smatrajući da je režimsko proglašavanje muslimanske nacije «neprihvatljivo iz više razloga. Prvo izjednačavanjem vjerske zajednice sa nacijom samo se privremeno odlaže politička praksa nacionalnog opredjeljivanja ... i drugo ... nema muslimanskog naroda, nacije, iako su postojali i postoje brojni muslimanski narodi koji pripadaju raznim etničkim i nacionalnim zajednicama» (Redžić, E., *Sto godina muslimanske politike*, str. 86). Isto tako, Muhamed Filipović smatra da režimskim priznavanjem nacije Muslimana «nije uistinu dovršeno niti osigurano priznavanje tog entiteta, niti je omogućeno da se on razvije ... Muslimani su dovedeni u situaciju da, jedini u svijetu, religijsko ime upotrebljavaju za nacionalno ime», tj. tako određen identitet bosanskohercegovačkih Muslimana «nije povijesno uvjetovan i vezana za bosansku povijest ... nije mogao izazvati konstituciju političke volje» (Filipović, M., *Bošnjačka politika*, Sarajevo, 1996, str. 88-91). Usp. Sućeska, Avdo, *Istorijske osnove nacionalne posebnosti bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana*, u «Jugoslavenski istorijski časopis», br. 4, Beograd, 1969, str. 47-53.

³⁴ Redžić, E., n. dj. str. 87.

Budući je A. Izetbegović u *Islamskoj deklaraciji* zagovarao radikalnu panislamističku angažiranost («da se sa ideja i planova pređe na organiziranu akciju za njihovo ostvarenje», da «Musliman može ginuti samo sa imenom Allaha i u slavu islama» itd.³⁵), te je na različite načine sustavno djelovao na njezinu ostvarenju, jugoslavenski režim je 1983. sudski procesuirao (tzv. *Sarajevski proces*) A. Izetbegovića i veću skupinu osoba pod kaznenom optužbom «udruživanje radi neprijateljske djelatnosti» i «neprijateljske propagande».³⁶

Među većim brojem tada istraživanih i/ili optuženih osoba koje su «na sebe skrenuli pažnju po privrženosti izvornom tumačenju islama»³⁷, bilo je više osoba koje su nakon 1990. g. bile veoma istaknuti (A. Izetbegović, Hasan Čengić, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić) ili istaknuti akteri događanja u BiH.

Nekoliko godina prije raspada druge Jugoslavije, na području Cazinske krajine, u sjeverozadnom dijelu BiH, započela je jedna od najvećih jugoslavenskih političko-gospodarskih afera (tzv. *Afera Agrokomerc*) u kojoj su se događali politički i pravosudni obračuni s dijelom istaknutih muslimanskih političara i gospodarstvenika iz BiH. U montiranom sudskom procesu koji je započeo 1988. godine, prvooptužena osoba bio je Fikret Abdić, dotadašnji član *Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista BiH*, zastupnik u *Skupštini SFRJ* i predsjednik *Poslovnog odbora kombinata Agrokomerc*.

Optužnica ja Abdića i dio optuženika, teretila - između ostalog - da su poslovanjem vezanim za *Agrokomerc* «kontrarevolucionarno ugrožavali društveno uređenje» druge Jugoslavije.³⁸ Javni, politički i gospodarski potresi *afere Agrokomerc* prenijeli su se i u razdoblje nakon 1990. godine, a F. Abdić je također postao jedan od istaknutih aktera novih događanja u BiH.

³⁵ Izetbegović, Alija, *Islamska deklaracija*, Sarajevo, 1990. *Islamska deklaracija* je bila namjenjena svjetskom islamu te je do tada (prema iskazu A. Izetbegovića danom 1983. g.) bila «objavljena u Kuvajtu (100.000 primjeraka) i, koliko sam obaviješten, u Pakistanu, Maleziji i Alžiru» - iz knjige *Sarajevski proces*, Zürich, 1987, str. 60.

³⁶ *Sarajevski proces*, Zürich (izdavač «Bosanski institut»), 1987, str. 51.

³⁷ Isto, str. 11.

³⁸ Šošić, Hrvoje, *Treće pokriće Agrokomerca*, Zagreb, 1989, str. 43.

I.-2

POVIJESNI KONTEKST RASPADA BIVŠE JUGOSLAVIJE

Cjeloviti proces raspada druge Jugoslavije može se analitički promatrati s dva osnovna motrišta: međunarodnog i unutarjugoslenskog. S međunarodnog motrišta je očigledno da su se kriza i propast jugoslenskog komunističkog režima događali – vremenskim slijedom i sadržajno - usporedo sa sličnim procesima u ostalim europskim komunističkim državama.

U vremenu prije sloma europskih komunističkih režima - kao i u vrijeme njihove propasti, te u procesu tranzicije - vrijednosni, sigurnosni, politički i drugačiji interesni odnos međunarodnih institucija i država zapadnog građanskog svijeta prema svim komunističkim državama je bio istovjetan ili veoma sličan. Razlog tome nije samo u golemoj razlici pragmatične (političke, sigurnosne, gospodarske) strukturiranosti interesa između komunističkih i građanskih država i društava, nego u potpunom diskontinuitetu između ta dva svijeta koja je na svim razinama (od svjetonazora do svakodnevnog života) nakon Drugog svjetskog rata dijelila *željezna zavjesa*.

Taj potpuni diskontinuitet i nepomirljivost dvaju svjetova, teoretski i praktički je proklamiran od strane komunista, a najjednostavnije je izrečen u paroli «komunizam kao svjetski proces». Naime, komunizam je građanski svijet, tj. njegove vrednote, upravljački sustav i društvene elite proglasio najgorim, *kontrarevolucionarnim* neprijateljem kojeg treba doslovno uništiti primjenom neograničenog komunističkog revolucionarnog nasilja i *diktature proletarijata*.³⁹

«U minulim stoljećima, malo je naroda i država bilo pošteđeno od pojedine vrste masovnog nasilja ... Sve to ne slabi konstataciju da se čini kako je naše stoljeće (20., op. a.) u tom pogledu nadmašilo sva prethodna ... Komunizam se u takvom toku povijesnog vremena pojavljuje kao tragično izlivanje iz korita. Dapače, on predstavlja jedan od najsilovitijih i najznačajnijih trenutaka našeg stoljeća. Komunizam, najveći fenomen ovoga "kratkog" 20. stoljeća, koji počinje 1914. i završava 1991. godine u Moskvi, stoji u samom središtu slike. Komunizam koji je nastao prije fašizma, prije nacizma, i oba nadživio zahvativši četiri velika

³⁹ Lenjin, Vladimir Iljić, *Dječja bolest ljevičarstva u komunizmu*, Zagreb, 1973, str. 121-2: *Diktatura proletarijata* je «najžešći i najnemilosrdniji rat nove klase protiv moćnijeg neprijatelja, protiv buržoazije ... pobjeda nad buržoazijom nije moguća bez dugog, upornog, ogorčenog rata na život i smrt ...».

kontinenta ... komunistički su režimi, kako bi učvrstili svoju vlast, masovni zločin doista uzdigli u sustav vladavine.»⁴⁰

Druga, komunistička Jugoslavija je u svakom pogledu bila tek dio svjetskog komunističkog pokreta i poretka. Već 1919. godine na osnivačkom kongresu *Komunističke partije Jugoslavije* (KPJ) je odlučeno «da novoosnovana Partija pristupi Komunističkoj internacionali»⁴¹, kojoj je sjedište bilo u Moskvi. KPJ je bila «sekcija» (podružnica) *Komunističke Internacionale* (KI). Do 1943. g. (kad je formalno ukinuta KI) sve bitne doktrinarne, organizacijske i kadrovske promjene u KPJ događale su se prema direktivama iz KI, a nakon toga (do sukoba *Informbiroa* i KPJ, 1948. g.) po direktivama Sovjetskog saveza.

Totalitarna vlast koju je KPJ, tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata i nakon njega, uspostavila u Jugoslaviji bila je modelski ista kao i u drugim europskim komunističkim državama. Osnovna obilježja upravljačkog modela bila su: ukidanje temeljnih ljudskih prava i sloboda, zabrana bilo kakvog političkog i društvenog pluralizma, ukidanje privatnog poduzetništva i privatnog vlasništva nad sredstvima za proizvodnju, sustavni državni teror svih vrsta.⁴²

Stoga je objektivna zaključak kako «nijedno od komunističkih iskustava na trenutak popularnih na Zapadu nije izbjeglo toj zakonitosti»⁴³, pa tako ni jugoslavensko iskustvo o kojem su nakon 1948. g. - radi *hladnoratovskih* interesa - u dijelu zapadnog svijeta stvarani pozitivni stereotipi. I u načelima posljednjeg jugoslavenskog *Ustava* (iz 1974. g.) je naglašeno da u Jugoslaviji «radnička klasa i svi radni ljudi razvijaju socijalističku samoupravnu demokratiju kao poseban oblik diktature proletarijata i to obezbeđuju.»⁴⁴

Na taj način su i u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji kontinuirano postojali različiti oblici pojedinačnog, skupnog, nacionalnog i drugačijeg socijalnog nezadovoljstva, te trajne upravljačke i gospodarske neuspješnosti. Mnogobrojne krize nisu rješavane, nego je njihova kulminacija odgađana primjenom nasilja, propagandne retorike i najavom «novih, uspješnih reformi».

⁴⁰ Courtois, Stéphane, *Zločini komunizma*, u «Crna knjiga komunizma», Zagreb, 1999, str. 10-11.

⁴¹ *Povijest Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, Beograd, 1985, str. 63. KPJ je osnovana pod nazivom *Socijalistička radnička partija (komunista)* – SRPJ(k), a već naredne, 1920. godine promijenila je ime u KPJ, te 1952. u *Savez komunista Jugoslavije* – SKJ, «po ugledu na Marxov Savez komunista» - Isto, str. 379.

⁴² v. Jurčević, Josip, *Bleiburg – jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima*, dio «Povijesne okolnosti nastanka totalitarne vlasti u drugoj Jugoslaviji», Zagreb, 2005.

⁴³ Courtois, n. dj., str. 11.

⁴⁴ *Ustav SFRJ*, 1974. g., «Osnovna načela», 1.1.4 IV.

No, od sredine 70-ih godina mnogobrojni egzaktni gospodarski pokazatelji (dramatični rast cijena i nezaposlenosti, smanjivanje plaća, *galopirajuća* inflacija, sve veći vanjski dug, nestašica osnovnih proizvoda široke potrošnje, nemogućnost ostvarenja prihoda u državnom proračunu itd.) bjelodano su svjedočili o sve većoj spirali unutarnje krize koja je vodila prema općem kaosu i rastrojstvu jugoslavenskog komunističkog upravljačkog sustava.

Od sredine 80-ih godina - osim sve masovnijih štrajkova nezadovoljnih radnika (diljem Jugoslavije) te demonstracija i pobuna na Kosovu koji su gušeni oružanom silom - već se i u jugoslavenskim medijima te na sjednicama partijskih i državnih tijela moglo pratiti sve intenzivnije i raznolikije koncepcijsko i stvarno raslojavanje i raspadanje unutar komunističkih upravljačkih struktura, koje su se dotad barem prividno javno predstavljale monolitnima.

Uvažavanje ovih činjenica je osobito važno za objektivnije razumijevanje niza na prvi pogled kontradiktornih događanja u *tranzicijskom procesu* na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije nakon 1990. godine. Između ostalog je posebno očigledna i znakovita činjenica da su – u svim republikama – brojni pojedinci i dijelovi državnog jugoslavenskog komunističkog sustava zauzeli ključne pozicije moći u strukturama novonastalih pluralnih građanskih država, tržišnih gospodarskih subjekata i civilnog društva.

Mnogobrojni aspekti ovog preseljenja struktura (motivacija, identifikacija, stručnost, spontanost, organiziranost itd.) su dosada veoma slabo znanstveno istraženi na razini cjelovitog društvenog fenomena.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Među rijetke uspješnije znanstvene pokušaje istraživačkog rasvjetljavanja nekih cjelovitijih aspekata objavljeni su u zbornicima *Privatizacija i javnost*, Zagreb, 1999., te *Upravljačke elite i modernizacija*, Zagreb, 2001.

I.-3

GLAVNI AKTERI NA PROSTORU BIVŠE JUGOSLAVIJE KRAJEM 80-IH I POČETKOM 90-IH GODINA 20. STOLJEĆA

I.-3.1. Institucije Socijalističke federativne republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ)

I.-3.1.1 *Savez komunista Jugoslavije - SKJ*

SKJ je politička organizacija koja je od 1945. godine totalitarno upravljala drugom jugoslavenskom državom. Pod njezinom izravnom vlašću nalazio se cjelokupni državni i društveni institucijski ustroj u drugoj Jugoslaviji; od državne do lokalne razine, te od državnih tijela, gospodarskih subjekata i sindikata do medija i različitih obrazovnih, znanstvenih, kulturnih i športskih organizacija. Svugdje i na svim razinama, o svim idejnim, organizacijskim i kadrovskim promjenama odlučivao je SKJ.

Istaknuti partijski povjesničar iz Srbije opisao je situaciju u Jugoslaviji nakon Drugog svjetskog rata na slijedeći način: «Jednpartijski sistem revolucionarne demokratije imao je po završetku rata sve elemente diktature proletarijata, koju je u ime radničke klase ostvarivala KPJ kao njena avangarda ... KPJ je ispunjavala celokupan politički prostor, neposredno odlučivala o pravcu razvitka, ostvarivala svoju volju posredstvom državnog aparata, zakonodavstva i masovnih političkih organizama, čiji su programi izražavali partijski program».⁴⁶

Sličan opis je dao i istaknuti partijski povjesničar iz Hrvatske: «Gotovo na svim rukovodećim mjestima u svim institucijama državne uprave i vlasti nalazili su se članovi KPJ ... KPJ nije dijelila vlast ni s jednom grupacijom suprotne političke ili ideološke orijentacije ... rukovodstvo KPJ imalo je gotovo neograničenu mogućnost da utvrđuje politiku društvenog razvoja Jugoslavije. U povijesti se rijetko stječe tako čvrsta i nepodijeljena vlast u rukama jednog revolucionarnog pokreta; svi organi vlasti – zakonodavni i izvršni, vojska i milicija, sigurnost i sudstvo – bili su bez izuzetka čvrsto u rukama KPJ».⁴⁷

Unutarpartijski odnosi u SKJ (KPJ) bili su - stvarno i simbolički – maksimalno centralizirani. Vrh KPJ (SKJ) je (nakon 1948. g. kad su prekinuti odnosi sa Sovjetskim

⁴⁶ Petranović, Branko, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, II, Beograd, 1988, str. 481.

⁴⁷ Bilandžić, Dušan, *Historija SFRJ*, Zagreb, 1985., str. 101.

savezom) osmišljavao i donosio odluke, a ostali u strukturi vlasti i drugim vidovima upravljanja državom i društvom morali su vjerno i odano provoditi odluke. Organizacijska struktura SKJ je bila paralelni sustav koji je pokrивao cjelokupni ustroj državne uprave i svih drugih institucija i organizacija. Posebna mreža *partijskih* organizacija (svaka organizacija u svojoj djelatnosti, na svojem području i svojoj razini) je – sukladno direktivama vrha *partije* - kreirala sve odluke državnih i društvenih institucija i organizacija na svojoj razini te nadzirala njihovo provođenje, iako su na sve više i veliku većinu nižih upravljačkih položaja u državi i društvu postavljeni članovi SKJ.

Odnosno, zasebna mreža *partijskih* organizacija se protezala od savezne državne razine, preko republičkih organizacija do najniže teritorijalno upravne razine. Isto je bilo i u gospodarskom, te u ostalim sustavima (kulturnom, obrazovnom, znanstvenom, medijskom, športskom). Ovdje je važno naglasiti da je zasebna mreža SKJ pokrivala vojsku, tj. *Jugoslavensku narodnu armiju* (JNA), koja je popularno nazivana *Sedmom republikom*.

Najistaknutiji i najodaniji članovi SKJ istovremeno su obnašali više različitih dužnosti u *partiji*, državnoj, upravi, gospodarstvu i drugim organizacijama. U tom pogledu najistaknutiji primjer je Josip Broz Tito, koji je istovremeno bio na čelnom mjestu *partije*, doživotni predsjednik države s golemim ovlastima, vrhovni zapovjednik vojske, službeno višestruki heroj i nedodirljiva kult-osoba.

O izuzetnoj moći J. B. Tita u jugoslavenskoj komunističkoj strukturi svjedoči i činjenica da je samo on imenom i prezimenom bio čak ustavna institucija. Naime, *Ustavom* je predviđeno da «polazeći od istorijske uloge Josipa Broza Tita ... Skupština SFRJ može ... izabrati Josip Broza Tita za Predsednika Republike bez ograničenja trajanja mandata»⁴⁸. Uz to, Ustav je J. B. Titu dao goleme diktatorske ovlasti,⁴⁹ a *Ustavom* je predviđeno da nakon njegove smrti više nema institucije «Predsednika Republike».

Zbog svega toga, SKJ (KPJ) je u svakom pogledu (pravnom, stvarnom i simboličkom) bio uvjerljivo najvažnija, tj. ključna institucija komunističke Jugoslavije. Ta činjenica se očitovala ne samo u praktičnom funkcioniranju sustava, nego i - naglašeno deklarativno i propagandno - u svim vidovima javnog života (kulturi, obrazovanju, medijima) te u *Ustavu* i zakonima.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *Ustav SFRJ*, 1974, čl. 333.

⁴⁹ Isto, čl. 333-345.

⁵⁰ Primjerice, već u prvom stavku preambule *Ustava* (iz 1974.) naglašava da se KPJ nalazi «na čelu», a u VIII dijelu *Osnovnih načela Ustava* navodi se SKJ kao «pokretač i organizator ... svjesni nosilac težnji i interesa radničke klase ... vodeća idejna i politička snaga radničke klase i svih radnih ljudi» itd.

I.-3.1.2 *Jugoslavenska narodna armija (JNA)*

JNA se postupno, tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata, ustrojavala kao oružana sila komunističke Jugoslavije. U ratu je JNA (koja je više puta mijenjala nazive) bila odlučujući čimbenik pomoću kojega je KPJ revolucionarnim nasiljem uspostavila svoju totalitarnu vlast, a u desetljećima nakon rata JNA je bila glavni jamac u čuvanju i osiguravanju vlasti jugoslavenskih komunista.⁵¹ Cijelo vrijeme svojeg postojanja JNA je bila tipična stranačka, tj. komunistička revolucionarna vojska.

Već na početku osnivanja komunističke partizanske vojske, 1941. g., propisano je da su to «vojne udarne formacije naroda Jugoslavije pod rukovodstvom Komunističke partije»,⁵² a *Centralni komitet KPJ* je «budno motrio i oštro intervenisao da se vojska ne odvoji od pokreta».⁵³ Organizacijski, a naročito zapovjedni ustroj jugoslavenske komunističke vojske bio je u cijelosti podređen KPJ, te su osim vojnih zapovjednika koji su bili komunisti, unutar vojske osnivane različite partijske institucije koje su vršile «političko-propagandni rad na ideološkoj izgradnji boraca»,⁵⁴ a uvedeno je i *dvostarešinstvo* (dvostruko zapovijedanje) u kojem je *politički komesar* čak i u operativnim vojnim akcijama bio nadređen vojničkom zapovjedniku postrojbe (koji je također bio član partije).

«Stvaranje i jačanje nove armije, stvaranje i razvijanje njene ratne veštine bilo je neposredno zasnovano na političkoj liniji KPJ. Ta vojska je bila glavni faktor u rješavanju revolucionarnih zadataka – to je bila vojska revolucije. Njeni borci i starješine bili su najuzdignutiji i najsvjesniji dio naroda – nosioci i tumači linije KPJ ... organizatori masovnog političkog rada u narodu i inicijatori stvaranje revolucionarne vlasti ...».⁵⁵ «Disciplina je u brigadama gvozdена. Ova disciplina nije slična disciplini u kapitalističkim armijama. To je samodisciplina koja je zasnovana na svesti i političkom uverenju svakog pojedinog borca...».⁵⁶

⁵¹ v. *Osnovne značajke jugoslavenske vojske*, u Jurčević, J., n. dj., str. 163-196.

⁵² *Statut proleterskih narodnooslobodilačkih brigada*, objavljeno u Geršković, Leon, *Dokumenti o razvoju narodne vlasti*, Zagreb, 1983, str. 38.

⁵³ Stanišić, Milija, *Osnovni principi izgradnje oružanih snaga revolucije 1941-1945. godine*, u časopisu «Vojno delo», 1969, br. 2, str. 126.

⁵⁴ *Statut...*, Geršković, L., n. dj., str. 40.

⁵⁵ Morača, Pero, *Moralni faktor u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu*, u časopisu «Vojnoistorijski glasnik», 1955, br. 2-3, str. 268.

⁵⁶ *Statut...*, str. 38.

Naznačeni konceptijski temelji, te stvarni i simbolički značaj JNA nije se bitnije promijenio sve do sloma komunizma i raspada druge Jugoslavije, a brojne moćne političke, vojne, gospodarske i druge položaje u Jugoslaviji desetljećima su zauzimale vojne osobe koje su u Drugom svjetskom ratu prošle duboke procese komunističke indoktrinacije. Zbog toga je JNA, osim što je u Jugoslaviji bila realna oružana sila, bila cijelo vrijeme (uz Tita) nedodirljiva i najnjegovanija kult institucija, te se iz propagandnih razloga veoma često u javnom životu druge Jugoslavije za JNA koristio zamjenski naziv *Titova vojska*.

Nizom zakonskih i ustavnih promjena u razdoblju od 1969. do 1974. godine u Jugoslaviji je uspostavljena obrambena koncepcija tzv. *Općenarodne obrane i društvene samozaštite*, (ONO i DSZ), kojom je (pored postojeće JNA) ustrojena i *Teritorijalna obrana* (TO) kao dio oružanih snaga. Cilj je bio – «u duhu Marxove koncepcije o naoružanom narodu» - zakonski i stvarno omogućiti «da se u oružanu borbu uključi čitavo sposobno stanovništvo zemlje i da se ona vodi u svim ratnim uvjetima i u svim dijelovima zemlje: da svaki dio Jugoslavije bude fronta, a svaki njen stanovnik ratnik.»⁵⁷

Na taj način, «od početka 70-ih godina organiziraju se – od republika i pokrajina do osnovnih organizacija udruženog rada i mjesnih zajednica – štabovi teritorijalne obrane: istovremeno umnožavaju se oblici i načini povezivanja komandi, jedinica i ustanova Jugoslavenske narodne armije».⁵⁸ Iako je u *Ustavu* (iz 1974. g.) načelno određeno da oružane snage Jugoslavije «čine jedinstvenu celinu i sastoje se od Jugoslavenske narodne armije, kao zajedničke oružane sile svih naroda i narodnosti i svih radnih ljudi i građana, i od teritorijalne obrane kao najšireg oblika organizovanog oružanog opštenarodnog otpora»⁵⁹, ipak su druge ustavne i zakonske odredbe te naročito stvarnost učinile da TO organizacijski budu prvenstveno republičke i pokrajinske vojske (te vojske još manjih «društveno-političkih zajednica») unutar Jugoslavije.

Primjerice, ovo proizlazi i iz ustavne odredbe koja kaže: «Pravo i dužnost opština, autonomnih pokrajina, republika odnosno drugih društveno-političkih zajednica je da ...svaka na svojoj teritoriji uređuje i organizuje narodnu odbranu i da rukovodi teritorijalnom odbranom, civilnom zaštitom i drugim pripremama za odbranu zemlje, a u slučaju napada na zemlju – da organizuje opštenarodni otpor i njime rukovodi.»⁶⁰ Uz to, *Ustavom* je bilo određeno da «niko nema pravo da prizna ili potpiše kapitulaciju, niti da prihvati ili prizna

⁵⁷ *Povijest Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, str. 449.

⁵⁸ Isto, str. 450.

⁵⁹ *Ustav SFRJ, 1974*, čl. 240, stavak drugi.

⁶⁰ Isto, čl. 239, st. drugi.

okupaciju», te «niko nema pravo da spreči građane ... da se bore protiv neprijatelja koji je napao zemlju.»⁶¹

Oružje i vojna oprema TO kupovani su novcem republika, pokrajina, općina, poduzeća itd., a štabovi TO su (u suradnji sa strukturom JNA ili bez nje) organizirali različite vrste vojnih vježbi, natjecanja i drugih vrsta priprema stanovništva za *općenarodnu obranu i društvenu samozaštitu – ONO i DSZ*. Isto tako, na sveučilištima su obrazovane različite vrste stručnjaka za ONO i DSZ, a ONO i DSZ su bili obvezni nastavni predmet na svim razinama i vrstama sustava obrazovanja; od osnovnih škola do sveučilišta.

Za potpunije razumijevanje uzroka mnogobrojnih zločina koji su – pod operativnom organizacijom i nadzorom strukture koja je školovana u JNA – sustavno počinjeni nakon 1990. g. na prostorima RH i BiH (te potom na Kosovu) važno je naglasiti vrijednosna uputstva na kojima se i nakon 1980. g. zasnivala *Škola narodne odbrane*, tj. *Centar visokih vojnih škola "Maršal Tito"*.

Centar je godine 1981. objavio *Nacrt uputstva*, u obliku opsežne knjige, pod naslovom *Priprema i izvođenje operacija oružanih snaga u ONOR-u*,⁶² koja je služila kao obvezni nastavni «teoretski materijal u kojem se vrši dalja razrada koncepcije i doktrine opštenarodne odbrane i društvene samozaštite i strategije oružane borbe u oblasti priprema i izvođenja operacija, odnosno upotrebe strategijskih i operativnih grupacija i operativnih sustava.»⁶³ Na početku knjige je naglašeno: «Svi kandidati polažu ovo uputstvo u celini».⁶⁴

U ovoj knjizi, u poglavlju «Uloga i zadaci organizacija SKJ i SSOJ (Savez socijalističke omladine Jugoslavije, op. a.) u grupacijama i sastavima», između ostalog je navedeno: «Organizacije SKJ u stratergijskim i operativnim grupacijama i operativnim sastavima su vodeća idejno-politička snaga u tim jedinicama i nosilac odgovornosti za ostvarivanje politike SKJ u njihovoj celokupnoj borbenoj i moralno-političkoj izgradnji i nagažovanju na konkretnim zadacima.

U pripremama i izvođenju operacija komunisti, organizacije i organi SKJ angažuju se, pre svega, na: jačanju svesti vojnika i starešina o opravdanosti borbe koju vodimo ... objašnjavaju aktuelne vojno-političke situacije, klasne suštine i perspektive odbrane zemlje;

⁶¹ Isto, čl. 238, st. prvi.

⁶² *Priprema i izvođenje operacija oružanih snaga u ONOR-u*, Centar visokih vojnih škola JNA "Maršal Tito" – Škola narodne odbrane, Beograd, 1981.

⁶³ Isto, «Uvod», na početku knjige – nepaginirana stranica.

⁶⁴ Isto, početna nepaginirana stranica.

razobličavanju ciljeva i postupaka neprijatelja, u prvom redu njegove propagande i razvijaju mržnju prema njemu...».⁶⁵

Za organizaciju SSOJ-a je isto tako određeno da se u oružanim snagama njena «aktivnost zasniva na programskim i statutarnim dokumentima SKJ i SSOJ.

Organizacija i organi SSOJ neprekidno se angažuju na: doslednom ostvarivanju politike, stavova i zadataka organizacije SKJ ... razvijanju masovnog heroizma, borbenosti i revolucionarnog žara; učvršćivanju vere u pobjedu, produblivanju mržnje prema neprijatelju...».⁶⁶

I.-3.1.3 *Predsjedništvo Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ)*

U jugoslavenskom komunističkom upravljačkom sustavu institucija *Predsjedništva* prvi put se počela uvoditi 1966. g., i to unutar *partijske* strukture SKJ. Potom je na isti način postupno vršena i reorganizacija upravljanja državom, te je ustavnim amandmanima i konačno *Ustavom* iz 1974. g. etablirana institucija *Predsjedništva SFRJ*, a ta institucija je uvedena i na razinama republika i pokrajina.

Predsjedništvo SFRJ je zapravo bilo kolektivni poglavar države, s veoma širokim ovlastima. Između ostalog, *Predsjedništvo SFRJ* je bilo «najviši organ rukovođenja i komandovanja oružanim snagama ... u ratu i miru»,⁶⁷ «postavlja, unapređuje i razrešava generale i admirale, kao i druge vojne starešine koje savezni zakon odredi, postavlja i razrešava predsjednike, sudije, sudije-porotnike vojnih sudova i vojne tužioce»,⁶⁸ «utvrđuje osnove planova i pripremnih mera za odbranu zemlje ... utvrđuje postojanje neposredne ratne opasnosti ... naređuje upotrebu oružanih snaga u miru»,⁶⁹ te u određenim slučajevima donosi uredbu sa zakonskom snagom i obustavlja primjenu pojedinih odredbi Ustava.⁷⁰

«Predsjedništvo SFRJ sačinjavaju po jedan član iz svake republike i autonomne pokrajine koga bira skupština republike, odnosno skupština autonomne pokrajine».⁷¹ To znači, *Predsjedništvo SFRJ* je imalo osam članova. Članovi *Predsjedništva SFRJ* birani su na mandat od pet godina. Prema *Ustavu*, na čelu *Predsjedništva SFRJ* je bio *Predsjednik*

⁶⁵ Isto, str. 13.

⁶⁶ Isto, str. 14.

⁶⁷ *Ustav SFRJ*, 1974, čl. 313, st. treći.

⁶⁸ Isto, čl. 315, točka 6.

⁶⁹ Isto, čl. 316.

⁷⁰ Isto, čl. 317, te Amandman XLI, točka 3., g. 1988.

⁷¹ Isto, Amandman XLI, točka 1., g. 1988.

Predsjedništva SFRJ, koji je na tom položaju ostajao godinu dana, a potom je na taj položaj automatizmom (*rotacijom*) dolazio slijedeći član *Predsjedništva SFRJ* prema unaprijed određenom redoslijedu. *Predsjednik Predsjedništva* je istovremeno bio i *Predsjednik Savjeta za narodnu obranu*.⁷²

Predsjedništvo SFRJ je djelovalo na ovaj način tek nakon smrti J. B. Tita (1980. g.), koji je prema *Ustavu SFRJ* doživotno, istovremeno, obnašao i dužnost *Predsjednika Republike* i dužnost *Predsjednika Predsjedništva SFRJ*.⁷³ Tito je (kao *Predsjednik Republike*, tj. Jugoslavije) prema *Ustavu* imao sve ovlasti kao i *Predsjedništvo SFRJ*, te je tako stvarno i vladao, pa tada (do 1980. g.) *Predsjedništvo SFRJ* praktično nije konzumiralo svoje ustavne ovlasti, a sastajalo se prema nahodenju Tita.⁷⁴

I.-3.1.4 Službe sigurnosti

Tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata KPJ je ustrojila službe sigurnosti,⁷⁵ koje su svoje djelovanje nastavile i nakon rata, kad je izvršeno nekoliko reorganizacija (podjela na vojnu i civilnu službu sigurnosti, podjela prema vrsti posla i nadležnosti) i promjena naziva pojedinih službi.⁷⁶ Službe sigurnosti komunističke Jugoslavije imale su izuzetan značaj za očuvanje totalitarnog komunističkog režima, te stoga i ogromne ovlasti i veoma razgranatu mrežu zaposlenika i suradnika. Službe sigurnosti su u svom djelovanju, često vršile i ubojstva nepoželjnih osoba na teritoriju Jugoslavije i u inozemstvu, a o tome su - nakon raspada druge Jugoslavije – pojedinci iz tih službi i drugi autori objavljivali niz dokumenata i podataka.⁷⁷

U povjerljivoj rekonstrukciji jugoslavenske, civilne, *Službe državne sigurnosti* – SDS (koju rekonstrukciju su 1997. g. za potrebe službi sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske napravili istaknuti djelatnici SDS koji su, od 1990. g., preuzeli još istaknutije sigurnosne položaje u Republici Hrvatskoj)⁷⁸ nalazi se niz detalja o ustroju i djelovanju SDS. Primjerice, SDS je kao «unutarnje neprijatelje» kontinuirano sigurnosno «pokrivao» - između ostalog - i sve vjerske

⁷² Isto, čl. 327-332.

⁷³ Isto, čl. 335, stavak drugi.

⁷⁴ Isto, čl. 335-345.

⁷⁵ v. Jurčević, J., *Bleiburg....*, poglavlje «Glavni represivni organi».

⁷⁶ v. Lopušina, Marko, *Ubij bližnjeg svog*, Beograd, 1996.; Vukušić Bože, *Tajni rat Udbe protiv hrvatskog iseljništva*, poglavlje «Nastanak, ustroj i rad jugoslavenskih tajnih službi», Zagreb, 2002.

⁷⁷ v. Isto; te Rullman, Hans Peter, *Mordauftrag aus Belgrad*, Hamburg, 1990; Spasić, Božidar, *Lasica koja govori*, Beograd, 2000.

⁷⁸ Perković, Josip; Gabriš, Jan, *Služba državne sigurnosti*, Zagreb 1997.

zajednice, sveučilišta i studentske domove, a u stranim državama «pokrivani» su iseljenici iz Jugoslavije.

Prema *Zakonu o osnovama sistema državne sigurnosti*, «Predsjedništvo SFRJ i SIV (Savezno izvršno vijeće, vlada SFRJ, op. a.) bili su nadležni za političko i sigurnosno usmjeravanje rada Službi državne sigurnosti».⁷⁹

Službe sigurnosti bile su 80-ih godina na niz načina veoma djelatne u kriznim političkim, vojnim i gospodarskim situacijama u drugoj Jugoslaviji. Tako su sigurnosne službe bile intenzivno uključene u intervenciju na Kosovu početkom 80-ih godina.⁸⁰ Od sredine 80-ih godina, kad je dolazak pluralne demokratizacije postajao sve izgledniji, službe sigurnosti su sve sustavnije čistile arhivske fondove koji su u novim okolnostima mogli kompromitirati komunističke upravljačke elite.⁸¹

U procesu raspada druge Jugoslavije, veliki broj djelatnika i suradnika SDS-a je napuštao sigurnosni sustav jugoslavenske države i zauzimao niz istaknutih sigurnosnih i drugih upravljačkih položaja u novonastalim državama.⁸² Koliko je taj prijelaz bio organiziran od strane jugoslavenskih službi kao dio njihovog *sigurnosnog* djelovanja u novim okolnostima, a koliko spontan, ostaje otvoreno pitanje.

Znakovito je da je o jugoslavenskim civilnim sigurnosnim službama i njihovim pripadnicima, nakon 1990. g. javno objavljen (knjige, mediji, internet) veliki broj podataka i dokumenata, a nasuprot tome, i nadalje su izuzetno rijetko javno dostupni podaci o jugoslavenskim vojnim sigurnosnim službama, koje su očigledno veoma intenzivno i sustavno djelovale i prije i poslije 1990. godine.⁸³

O značaju i moći vojnih i civilnih jugoslavenskih sigurnosnih službi - kao akteru prije i naročito nakon 1990. g. - na deduktivan način svjedoči činjenica da ni u jednoj novonastaloj državi na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije nisu pokrenuti procesi suočavanja s njihovim djelovanjem (ni znanstveno, ni društveno, ni pravosudno, ni lustracijski). S druge strane,

⁷⁹ Isto, str. 14.

⁸⁰ Isto, str. 13-14.

⁸¹ v. Jurčević, J., n. dj., str.138-139.

⁸² O tome svjedoče brojni slučajevi opisani u knjigama i medijima. Najbjelodaniji primjeri u Republici Hrvatskoj su: a) Manolić Josip, bivši pripadnik jugoslavenskih službi sigurnosti, (od 1989.-1994. g. jedan od najmoćnijih članova vladajućg HDZ-a), koji je u Republici Hrvatskoj bio predsjednik vlade i šef Službe za zaštitu ustavnog poretka te četiri početne i ključne godine glavni državni kadrovik; b) Perković Josip, bivši pripadnik jugoslavenskih sigurnosnih službi, a potom dugogodišnji šef vojne sigurnosne službe u Republici Hrvatskoj.

⁸³ v. 1. iskaz Halilović Sefera i ostalih o njihovom djelovanju za jugoslavensku vojnu sigurnosnu službu; 2. Kadrijević Veljko, *Moje viđenje raspada*, Beograd, 1993.

dogadaju se različiti oblici suočavanja čak i s ulogama najistaknutijih političkih i vojnih aktera, ali to i nadalje izostaje za strukturu pripadnika jugoslavenskih sigurnosnih službi. Ta svojevrsna zaštita sigurnosnih službi i njenih pripadnika očituje se i na nekim sadašnjim istaknutim primjerima iz Hrvatske.⁸⁴

I.-3.1.5 Skupština SFRJ

Prema *Ustavu SFRJ*, *Skupština SFRJ* je bila «najviši organ vlasti»,⁸⁵ te je sukladno *Ustavu* i saveznom zakonima imala cijeli niz formalnih ovlasti: «odlučuje o promeni Ustava ... utvrđuje osnove unutrašnje politike i spoljne politike ... odlučuje o promeni granica ... odlučuje o ratu i miru ... bira Predsednika Republike», bira i razrješava članove savezne vlade itd.⁸⁶ Međutim, zbog niza razloga, u stvarnosti *Skupština* nije imala ni približnu moć koju je propisivao *Ustav*. Prvi razlog tome je svakako u činjenici što je Jugoslavija bila tipična totalitarna država u kojoj su skupštinski sustav i njegov stvarni utjecaj bili uglavnom formalni.

Drugi razlog je u načinu, propisanih ovlasti i funkcioniranju *Skupštine*. Ona se sastojala od dva vijeća, koja su se temeljila na specifičnom jugoslavenskom *delegatskom* načelu, u kojem su za donošenje odluka predviđene složene procedure *konsenzusa* između delegacija iz republika i ostalih organizacija.⁸⁷

Stvarna nemoć *Skupštine* se sve više očitovala u razdoblju rasta jugoslavenske krize i procesu njena raspada, kad je uloga *Skupštine* ubrzano postajala sve marginalnija.

I.-3.1.6 Savezno izvršno vijeće (SIV)

Prema *Ustavu SFRJ* iz 1974. g., SIV je «izvršni organ Skupštine SFRJ», odnosno savezna jugoslavenska vlada koja je odgovorna «Skupštini SFRJ za stanje u svim oblastima

⁸⁴ Nedavno je Vrhovni sud Njemačke optužio vlasti Republike Hrvatske (koje inače dosljedno surađuju s međunarodnom zajednicom) za odbijanje bilo kakve suradnje u sudskom procesu glede razotkrivanja uloge Josipa Perkovića (visokog dužnosnika jugoslavenskih i potom još višeg dužnosnika hrvatskih službi sigurnosti) u ubojstvu jednog hrvatskog iseljenika u Njemačkoj 1980-ih godina.

⁸⁵ *Ustav SFRJ*, čl. 282.

⁸⁶ Isto, čl. 283-290.

⁸⁷ Isto, čl. 283-312 i Amandmani I i III iz g. 1981, te XXXVII iz g. 1988.

društvenog života».⁸⁸ Određeno je da pri izboru članova SIV-a «vodi se računa o nacionalnom sastavu».⁸⁹

Ovlasti SIV-a bile su vezane većinom za provođenje politike i odluka *Skupštine* te *Predsjedništva SFRJ*. U vrijeme procesa raspada druge Jugoslavije, a zbog marginalizacije *Skupštine* i blokade *Predsjedništva SFRJ*, SIV se u pojedinim trenucima pojavljivao kao samostalan akter na poticaje iz međunarodne zajednice ili na poticaje različitih unutarnjih interesa.

I.-3.1.7 Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije (SSRNJ)

Prema *Ustavu*, SSRNJ «stvoren je u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i socijalističkoj revoluciji kao demokratski i dobrovoljni front radnih ljudi i građana i svih organizovanih socijalističkih snaga, s Komunističkom partijom na čelu».⁹⁰ Ustvari, radilo se o najvećoj i najmasovnijoj organizaciji koja je okupljala sve masovne organizacije (sindikata, omladina, žene itd.) koje je osnovala i nadzirala KPJ. SSRNJ je 1953. g. proistekla reorganizacijom i promjenom imena dotadašnje masovne organizacije *Narodne fronte Jugoslavije* (NFJ).

Članstvo u većini ovih masovnih organizacija je bilo automatsko i obvezujuće; zapošljavanjem se postajalo član sindikata, polaskom u školu se postajalo *Titovim pionirima*, u određenoj dobi se postajalo članom omladine itd. Na taj način, NFJ je već 1947. g. imao približno čak 7 milijuna članova. KPJ je preko svojih rukovodećih struktura u NFJ (SSRNJ) i njenim članicama-organizacijama provodila različite masovne akcije te propagirala legitimitet totalitarnog režima.⁹¹

Uoči provođenja prvih višestranačkih parlamentarnih izbora (1990. g.) u republikama bivše Jugoslavije, nove stranke su osnivane u polulegalnim – zakonski nedorečenim – uvjetima, a formalno su bile registrirane kao članice SSRNJ.

I.-3.1.8 Savez rezervnih vojnih starešina Jugoslavije (SRVSJ)

SRVSJ je masovna organizacija koja je okupljala rezervne vojne zapovjednike, ali i aktivne vojne osobe i građane koji su se nalazili na rukovodećim mjestima u obrambenoj

⁸⁸ Isto, čl. 346.

⁸⁹ Isto, čl. 348, stavak drugi.

⁹⁰ *Ustav SFRJ*, Osnovna načela, dio VIII, stavak treći.

⁹¹ «Nema gotovo nijedne političke, ekonomske ili kulturno-prosvjetne akcije u kojoj se Narodna fronta nije javljala kao organizator ili izvršilac, popularizator i aktivna agitaciono-propagandna snaga.», *Povijest SKJ*, str. 329.

strukturi Jugoslavije. Organizacija je osnovan 1952. godine i djelovala je u okviru programa KPJ, a bila je ustrojena na teritorijalnom načelu i imala je približno pola milijuna članova.

U pripremi i vođenju ratnih događaja na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije od 1990. g., mnogobrojni članovi ove organizacije su – na različitim stranama – bili aktivni sudionici.

I.-3.1.9 *Savez udruženja boraca Narodnooslobodilačkog rata Jugoslavije (SUBNOR)*

Organizacija je nastala 1961. g. udruživanjem nekoliko organizacija: *Saveza boraca narodnooslobodilačkog rata* (osnovan 1947. g.), *Saveza ratnih vojnih invalida* i SRVSJ. Godine 1969. SRVSJ je izašao iz sustava SUBNOR-a i opet postao samostalna organizacija.

Članom SUBNOR-a mogao je postati svaki građanin koji je sudjelovao u ratu na komunističkoj partizanskoj strani, kao vojnik ili pomagač, te građani koji su bili pripadnici stranih pobjedničkih vojski u Drugom svjetskom ratu. U članstvo su primani članovi obitelji poginulih boraca i invalida. Na taj način SUBNOR je postao jedna od najmasovnijih organizacija koja je sredinom 70-ih godina imala približno 950.000 članova.

SUBNOR je bio organiziran na teritorijalnom načelu, a od 1969. g. *Savezi udruženja boraca pojedinih republika i pokrajina* su bili samostalne organizacije koje su udružene u jugoslavenski SUBNOR.⁹² Budući su bili vojnici KPJ, borci i monolitna mreža boračkih organizacija su bili veoma značajna politička i društvena potpora totalitarnom jugoslavenskom režimu u propagandnom i stvarnom pogledu. Naime, bivši borci su nakon rata u velikoj mjeri - po načelu odanosti partiji unatoč nestručnosti - popunjavali cjelokupni sustav novonastale upravljačke strukture komunističke države.

U procesima promjena, uoči i nakon 1990. g., SUBNOR je bio veoma aktivan. Postupno je među organizacijama i članovima SUBNOR dolazilo do raslojavanja po različitim osnovama te su nastajale nove organizacije, koje su sačuvale monolitnost i ideološku radikalnost. Mnogi članovi SUBNOR-a, iako u visokoj životnoj dobi, postali su 90-ih godina utjecajni pripadnici novonastalih političkih i vojnih struktura.

I.-3.2 Institucije u republikama bivše Jugoslavije

Institucijski upravljački ustroj u jugoslavenskim republikama u svakom je pogledu oponašao ustroj savezne države. Stoga je - i u pripremi i u početnim godinama procesa

⁹² *Šesti kongres Saveza udruženja boraca NOR Jugoslavije*, Beograd, 1969.

raspada komunističke Jugoslavije te u oblikovanju novih institucija i odnosa - ključno bilo postupanje komunističkih republičkih institucija. Odnosno, iz općeg uvida u djelovanje institucija u pojedinim republikama uoči 1990. g., može se objektivno spoznati razina sustavnosti i institucijske pripremljenosti pojedine republike za ključna događanja u 90-im godinama. Ovaj uvid je posebno značajan i za objektivnije pravosudno prepoznavanje i vrednovanje razine osmišljenosti, organiziranosti i odgovornosti pojedinih institucija i istaknutih pojedinaca-aktera novonastalih država na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.

I.-3.2.1 Srbija

Sredinom 1985. g. *Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti* (SANU) donijela je odluku o izradi elaborata «o aktualnim društvenim pitanjima», a 24. listopada 1986. g. beogradske *Večernje novosti* (najnakladnije novine u Jugoslaviji) objavile su opsežni *Memorandum SANU*, u kojem se tvrdi da su Srbi u Jugoslaviji diskriminirani i trajno ugroženi (demografski, gospodarski i politički), te se zahtijevala revizija unutarnjih jugoslavenskih granica i provođenje centralizacije države u korist Srba.

U travnju 1987. g. grupe kosovskih Srba «pod okriljem srpske tajne službe sustavno stvaraju napetost na Kosovu», te Slobodan Milošević kosovskim Srbima javno izriče poruku «Niko ne sme da vas bije! Ta rečenica poslužila je kontroliranim medijima za početak stvaranja kulta Miloševića kao "zaštitnika Srba". Njegov uspon otad je sve brži.»⁹³

U studenom 1987. održana je *Osma sjednica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Srbije*, na kojoj su Milošević i njegova struktura preuzeli potpunu kontrolu nad republičkom partijom, što je bilo ključno za daljnje uspostavljanje velikosrbijanske strukture u državnom i društvenom ustroju Srbije, kako bi se provodio plan kojim se nastojalo pod dominacijom srpskih vlastodržaca zadržati južnoslavenske narode i saveznu državu.⁹⁴

Krajem lipnja 1988. g., na blagdan *Vidovdana*, *Srpska pravoslavna crkva* (SPC) je započela nošenje *moštiju (relikvija)* srednjevjekovnog srpskog kneza Lazara. Cilj je bio da se u godinu dana «obiđe što veći dio Srbije i tako Srbi "potaknu na povratak vjerskim i nacionalnim korijenima".⁹⁵ Ova radikalna masovna akcija uskoro je proširena i na dijelove Bosne i Hercegovine.

⁹³ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini*, (grupa autora), Zagreb-Sarajevo, 1999, str. 371.

⁹⁴ v. 1. Jurčević, Josip, *Srbijanska oružana agresija na Hrvatsku 1990.-1995. godine*, u zborniku «Jugoistočna Europa 1918.-1995.», Zagreb, 1995, str. 216-217; 2. *Izvori velikosrpske agresije*, (grupa autora), Zagreb, 1991.

⁹⁵ *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, str. 372.

U ljeto 1988. g. srpske obavještajne strukture organizirale su masovne pohode (tzv. *antibirokratska* ili *jogurt revolucija*) militantnih kosovskih i drugih Srba na područje Vojvodine, s čime je srušena vlast autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine i na vlast su dovedeni promiloševićevski političari. Model masovne *antibirokratske* ili *jogurt revolucije* te drugih vrsta masovno-medijskih pritisaka učestalo je tada korišten u Srbiji za *čišćenje* svih državnih i društvenih institucija (politika, državna uprava, gospodarstvo, mediji itd.) od osoba (*kadrova*) koji nisu pristajali na plan koji je simbolizirao S. Milošević.

U siječnju 1989. g. «u nizu koordiniranih mitinga, s kulminacijom u Titogradu/Podgorici (50.000 ljudi), Milošević svrgava vlast u Crnoj Gori i postavlja sebi odane ljude.»⁹⁶

Krajem veljače 1989. organizirane su demonstracije Srba u Kninu (u Hrvatskoj), koji su dali «potporu Beogradu u "obračunu s kontrarevolucijom na Kosovu".»⁹⁷

Krajem ožujka 1989. godine *Skupština Srbije* je proglasila amandmane republičkog ustava, s kojima dokida autonomiju Kosova i Vojvodine. To je bilo u izravnoj suprotnosti s *Ustavom SFRJ*, koji je Kosovu i Vojvodini jamčio autonomiju i konstitutivni položaj u jugoslavenskoj federaciji. Na temelju te konstitutivnosti pokrajine su imale svoje predstavnike u svim saveznim tijelima vlasti (*Predsjedništvo*, *Skupština* itd.). Znakovito je to što je Srbija pokrajinama ukinula autonomiju, ali je u saveznim tijelima vlasti i nadalje zadržala mjesta koja su pokrajine imale upravo na temelju autonomije.

Krajem lipnja 1989. g., na Gazimestanu (na Kosovu) je održan najveći masovni srpski nacionalni i vjerski skup (procjene iz Srbije govore i do milijun nazočnih osoba). Glavni govornik bio je S. Milošević koji je poručio: «...danas, opet smo u bitkama i pred bitkama. One nisu oružane, premda i takve još nisu isključene.»⁹⁸ U prigodnom broju časopisa *Srpske pravoslavne crkve (Glas Crkve)* objavljen je *Predlog srpskog crkvenonacionalnog programa* «koji daje potporu ukinuću pokrajinskih autonomija te od vodstva Srbije zahtijeva da "štiti i čuva prava, slobodu i integritet svoga naroda na čitavom jugoslovenskom teritoriju".»⁹⁹

Koncepcijski i scenarijem sličan masovni srpski skup održan je uskoro (09. srpnja 1989. g.) i u Hrvatskoj (u selu Kosovo kod Knina), a na njemu se okupilo «oko 50.000 osoba, pretežno iz Srbije, pristiglih u više od 1.500 autobusa.»¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Isto, str. 372.

⁹⁷ Isto, str. 372.

⁹⁸ *Večernji list*, (dnevna novina), Zagreb, 29. 06 1989.

⁹⁹ *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, str. 373.

¹⁰⁰ *Kronologija rata 1989.-1998.*, Zagreb, 1998, str. 7.

Početak prosinca 1989. g., Milošević je bio izabran za *Predsjednika Predsjedništva Socijalističke Republike Srbije*.

U veljači 1990. g. «na Kosovu je uvedeno izvanredno stanje; tenkovi i oklopne postrojbe na ulicama, ubijena 33 albanska demonstranta».¹⁰¹

Početak ožujka 1990. g. održan je «velikosrpski miting na Petrovoj Gori (Hrvatska): umirovljeni general JNA Dušan Pekić zahtijeva hapšenje nekomunističkih političara u Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji, a masa uzvikuje "Hoćemo oružje!"»¹⁰²

Već i na temelju ovog kratkog pregleda je očigledno da se većina srbijanskih znanstvenih, političkih, vojnih i crkvenih¹⁰³ institucija i struktura barem od sredine 80-ih godina sustavno operativno i sve intenzivnije pripremala za radikalni i nasilan zahvat unutar druge jugoslavenske države. O tome svjedoči i činjenica da su na prvim višestranačkim izborima u Srbiji (prosinac 1990. g.) uvjerljivo pobijedili (zadržali vlast) reformirani komunisti na čelu sa S. Miloševićem, što znači da se jedino u Srbiji (i Crnoj Gori) cjelovito očuvao institucijski kontinuitet iz jugoslavenskog razdoblja. Odnosno, na taj način je u Srbiji ostala u cijelosti sačuvana upravljačka struktura koja se pripremala za događaje u 90-im godinama.

Tragičnost događaja na prostoru druge Jugoslavije krajem 20. st. bitno je uvećala činjenica da je koncepcija velikosrbijanskog projekta bila zastarjela u svakom pogledu, a pogotovo s motrišta suvremenih europskih standarda.

«Naime, većina europskih nacija (posebno razvijene zemlje) samu naciju ne poistovjećuju s etničkim podrijetlom, a nacionalne interese ne ostvaruju vojnim osvajanjem i etničkim čišćenjem, nego gospodarskim, tehnološkim, znanstvenim, političkim, diplomatskim i sličnim sredstvima. Srbijanska agresija je idejnu i političku osnovu postavila na etničkovojskoj identifikaciji ("Svi Srbi u jednoj državi", vjerska ornamentika, pozivanje na grobove, sudjelovanje Srpske pravoslavne crkve itd.), a nacionalne interese planirala je i pokušala ostvariti vojnom okupacijom, etničkim čišćenjem nesrpskog stanovništva i naseljavanjem pripadnika svoje etničke skupine (o tome najbolje mogu svjedočiti bivši okupirani dijelovi Republike Hrvatske i još postojeća "Republika Srpska" na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine.)

¹⁰¹ Isto, str. 374.

¹⁰² Isto, str. 374.; usp. *Kronologija rata*, str. 19.

¹⁰³ v. Tomanić, Milorad, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, Beograd, 2001.

Srbijanska agresija se odvijala bez objave rata, korištenjem niza zabranjenih oružja, a osim službene vojske u značajnoj mjeri su korištene najrazličitije paravojne i dragovoljačke postrojbe i skupine. Etničko čišćenje provodilo se svim vrstama zastrašivanja i zlostavljanja, masovnim ubojstvima, zatvaranjem u logore i progonstvom. Glavne mete razarajućih napada – bez vojnih razloga – bili su civilni objekti (stanovi, bolnice, škole itd.), naročito kulturna baština (naselja, dvorci, muzeji, crkve, groblja) sa svrhom uništavanja povijesnog identiteta prostora.»¹⁰⁴

I.-3.2.2 *Hrvatska*

U početnim godinama druge polovice 80-ih, u institucijskom životu u Hrvatskoj prevladavale su uglavnom teme koje su se bavile sve većom gospodarskom krizom u Jugoslaviji (i Hrvatskoj) te socijalnim i političkim problemima koji iz toga proizlaze. U javnom govoru (koji je uglavnom bio pod nadzorom *partije*) prevladavali su uobičajeni komunistički propagandni stereotipi o «teškoćama koje će biti prevladane», te se u institucijama u Hrvatskoj uopće nije dovodio u pitanje ustavni i teritorijalni integritet Jugoslavije.

Postupno, približavanjem 90-ih, u Hrvatskoj sve veću medijsku pozornost i zabrinutost dobivala je radikalizacija političkih događanja u Srbiji, te problemi koje su hrvatski *partijski* i državni predstavnici imali tijekom boravka u Beogradu na saveznom sastancima. Uz to, sve veću javnu pozornost zaokupljale su i učestale propasti komunističkih poduzeća i sve češći i masovniji štrajkovi nezadovoljnih radnika na ulicama hrvatskih gradova.

U srpnju 1989. g. *partijska* i državna tijela Hrvatske su sa vremenskom zadržkom i birokratski suzdržanim priopćenjima osudile «iskazivanje srpskog nacionalizma i mitingašku atmosferu pri proslavi kosovske bitke u Kninskoj krajini.»¹⁰⁵

Sredinom svibnja 1989. g. u Zagrebu je, u polulegalnim uvjetima, osnovan *Hrvatski socijalno-liberalni savez* (HSLS), kao prva nekomunistička stranka u Hrvatskoj.

Sredinom lipnja 1989. g., u prostorijama malog nogometnog kluba na rubu Zagreba, osnovana je *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* (HDZ), stranka koja je deset mjeseci kasnije pobijedila na prvim višestranačkim izborima u Hrvatskoj. U pripremama za osnivanje stranke bila su velika neslaganja o programu, nazivu i čelnoj osobi stranke. Tako je, na koncu, grupa

¹⁰⁴ Jurčević, J., *Vukovar 91 – Međunarodno pravo i europska sigurnost*, u zborniku «Vukovar 91 – Međunarodni odjeci i značaj, Zagreb, 2004, str. 24-25.

¹⁰⁵ *Kronologija rata*, str. 7.

koja je podržavala Franju Tuđmana - u bojazni pred jugoslavenskom policijom, ali i skrivajući se od većinske skupine inicijatora HDZ-a koji nisu podupirali F. Tuđmana na čelnom mjestu stranke u nastajanju – osnivački skup stranke održala u nejavnom prostoru na rubu grada, a ne u hotelu za koji je bio napisan i javni poziv.¹⁰⁶

Tek krajem 1989. i početkom 1990. godine tijela republičke i *partijske* vlasti u Hrvatskoj počela su načelno i zakonski otvarati proces političkog pluralizma. Stoga su tek početkom veljače 1990. g. (dvaipol mjeseca prije prvih višestranačkih izbora u Hrvatskoj) dotad polulegalno osnovane stranke registrirane u hrvatskom, republičkom *Sekretarijatu za pravosuđe i upravu*.

U prosincu 1989. g. građani Zagreba su - po uzoru na slične akcije u drugim istočnoeuropskim komunističkim državama – masovno palili svijeće i potpisivali peticiju kojom su zahtijevali raspisivanje višestranačkih izbora. U drugoj polovici travnja i početkom svibnja 1990. g. održani su (dvokružno) prvi višestranački izbori u Hrvatskoj, na kojima je protivno tadašnjim očekivanjima i istraživanjima, uvjerljivo pobijedio HDZ.

Na temelju velikog broja do sada dostupnih dokumenata i povijesnih izvora te objavljenih knjiga i radova, očigledno je da su državne i društvene institucije i strukture u Hrvatskoj gotovo potpuno nespremljene dočekale 1990. godinu, tj. proces sloma komunizma i raspada Jugoslavije. Isto tako, ovi izvori i literatura ne pokazuju da su u Hrvatskoj do 80-ih i početkom 90-ih godina sustavno institucijski pripremani ili postojali planovi i organizacije za vođenje bilo koje vrste unutarjugoslavenskog oružanog sukoba ili radikalne politike razbijanja Jugoslavije.

Osim toga, u Hrvatskoj je na izborima 1990. g. došlo do smjene stranke na vlasti i promjene koncepcije vladanja, te velikog institucijskog i kadrovskog restrukturiranja, iako su pozicije moći u novoj vladajućoj stranci (HDZ) zadržali brojni pripadnici stare komunističke (naročito obavještajne) strukture.

I.-3.2.3 Bosna i Hercegovina

Tijekom druge polovice 80-ih godina, opća situacija u BiH bila je veoma slična situaciji u Hrvatskoj. U javnom životu su prevladavale, za ono vrijeme, tipične komunističke unutarepubličke političke, gospodarske i socijalne teme, uključujući i dugotrajni sudski proces *afere Agrokomerc*. Približavanjem kraja 80-ih godina, javnu pozornost i u BiH sve više su zaokupljali radikalni događaji u Srbiji.

¹⁰⁶ *Deset godina Hrvatske demokratske zajednice*, Zagreb, 1989, str. 43-65.

U listopadu 1989. g. – nakon što su srbijanske službe sigurnosti izvršile upad u sigurnosni sustav BiH - vrh komunističke *partijske* organizacije u BiH je to ocijenio «napadom na suverenitet Republike i pokušajem kosovizacije BiH». ¹⁰⁷ No, u javnom ozračju u BiH krajem 80-ih i početkom 90-ih godina bilo je veoma malo sigurnosne bojazni (čak manje nego u Hrvatskoj) i nevjerice u opstanak Jugoslavije, iako su povijesna iskustva i tada aktualna događanja upućivala na suprotno. Posebno je zanimljiv fenomen da se u BiH - čak i 1991. g. kad je srbijanska agresija na Hrvatsku bila na vrhuncu - održavalo javno uvjerenje kako rat neće doći u BiH.

Proces postupne legalizacije političkog pluralizma u BiH i osnivanja novih stranaka odvijao se sporije nego u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj, te su i prvi višestranački izbori u BiH održani (dvokružno) tek u drugoj polovici studenog i početkom prosinca 1990. godine.

Na temelju do sada raspoloživih izvora i drugih saznanja, očigledno je da je BiH prije 1990. g. – prema institucijskoj pripremljenosti – bila gotovo potpuno nespremna za slom komunizma i raspad Jugoslavije. Isto tako, dosad poznati izvori ne pokazuju da su u službenim institucijama vlasti BiH do 90-ih godina postojali republički institucijski planovi i organizacije koje su pripremale unutarjugoslavenski oružani sukob i raspad Jugoslavije. Pretpostavke za, možebitno, takvo institucijsko djelovanje u BiH su bile načelno manje nego u drugim jugoslavenskim republikama, zbog konstitutivnosti tri naroda i njihove demografske i paritetne upravljačke izmiješanosti te niza drugih povijesnih razloga i interesa.

Osim toga, i u BiH su na izborima 1990. g. uvjerljivo pobijedile novoosnovane stranke, promijenjena je koncepcija vlasti i vršeno je veliko institucijsko i kadrovske restrukturiranje.

I.-3.3 Institucije međunarodne zajednice

Općenito, promatrajući na svjetskoj razini, djelovanje i učinkovitost institucija međunarodne zajednice u kriznim, predratnim, ratnim i poratnim situacijama bili su određeni nizom različitih čimbenika. Na prvom mjestu su bile obveze međunarodnih institucija koje proizlaze iz njihovih nadležnosti. Na drugom mjestu su bile njihove stvarne mogućnosti djelovanja, koje su ovisile o percepciji, svekolikoj moći organizacije, dostupnosti i težini

¹⁰⁷ *Kronologija rata*, str. 10.

problema, te nizu različitih interesa koji su bili izravno ili posredno vezani za određeni problem.

Sukladno tome, povećanjem vremenskog odmaka povećava se broj i kvaliteta analiza, procjena i interpretacija koji se odnose na djelovanje institucija međunarodne zajednice u kriznom (i ratnom) razdoblju na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.¹⁰⁸

U svakom slučaju ostaje nedvojbeno činjenica, da najmoćnije svjetske i europske međunarodne institucije nisu održale mir na jugoistoku Europe, a neriješene geopolitičke i druge posljedice tog rata ugrožavaju i nadalje europsku sigurnost i stabilnost, iako je prošlo već 20-ak godina od početka tzv. *jugoslavenske krize*.

I-3.3.1 Ujedinjene nacije (UN)

UN je najveća i najmoćnija svjetska organizacija, koja je već prema prvom članku *Povelje UN-a* u kojem se određuju ciljevi i načela organizacije («Održavati međunarodni mir i sigurnost i u tu svrhu: poduzimati djelotvorne kolektivne mjere radi sprečavanja i otklanjanja prijetnja miru...») nedvojbeno bila nadležna i za događaje na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.

UN su se prvi put ozbiljnije uključile u tzv. *jugoslavensku krizu* tek krajem rujna 1991. g. donošenjem rezolucije *Vijeća sigurnosti o embargu* uvoza oružja na prostor cijele Jugoslavije. Budući je srbijanska agresija (koja je imala obilje oružja) tada vodila totalni rat protiv nenaoružane Hrvatske i uskoro protiv isto nenaoružane BiH, motivi i ispravnost te odluke UN-a su jednako osporavani u vrijeme donošenja *embarga*, kao i danas. Na jednak način je ostalo otvoreno i pitanje zbog čega se UN nije znatno ranije angažirala na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, te zbog čega nije bila učinkovitija nakon uključivanja u krizu.

I-3.3.2 Europska zajednica (EZ)

EZ je prva međunarodna institucija koja je preko svog *promatračkog mehanizma* bila izravno nazočna na jugoslavenskom teritoriju. No, ovo se dogodilo tek u srpnju 1991. g., i to na području Slovenije u kojoj više nije bilo vojnih sukoba. U rujnu 1991. g. EZ je osnovala *Mirovnu konferenciju o Jugoslaviji*, koja nije uspjela zaustaviti srbijansku oružanu agresiju.

Prije toga, u prvoj polovici 1991. g., predstavnici EZ-a su u više navrata obećavali novčanu pomoć Jugoslaviji i isključivo zagovarali njen opstanak, iako je Jugoslavije već tada stvarno bila u nepovratnom stupnju raspada.

¹⁰⁸ v. Hodge, Carole, *Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas*, Zagreb, 2007; Jurčević, Josip, *Međunarodno pravo i europska sigurnost*, u zborniku «Vukovar 91 – međunarodni odjeci i značaj», Zagreb, 2004.

I.-3.3.3 Konferencija o europskoj sigurnosti i suradnji (KESS)

KESS je od početka svog ustrojavanja (1972. g.) imao veliku ulogu u uspostavljanju sigurnosne suradnje između blokovski podijeljene Europe, te je pridonio neoružanom okončanju *hladnog rata* u Europi u vrijeme sloma komunističkih režima. Tu ulogu KESS je obavljao kao *ad hoc* organizacija, a 1990. g. je preoblikovan u međunarodnu organizaciju sa stalnim institucijama.

Međutim, KESS se tada nije značajnije angažirao na rješavanju tzv. *jugoslavenske krize*, koja se pretvorila u prvi (i dugogodišnji) rat u Europi nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, što se u svakom slučaju može smatrati i golemim neuspjehom KESS-a kao organizacije kojoj je osnovni zadatak očuvanje mira, odnosno očuvanje europske sigurnosti i suradnje. Pritom se naročito misli na niz odredbi i obveza koje je KESS usvojio u *Helsinškom završnom dokumentu* (Helsinki, 1975. g.) i *Kopenhaškom završnom dokumentu* (Kopenhagen, 1990. g.), a koje su sustavno i drastično kršene na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.

I.-4

RASPAD INSTITUCIJSKOG SUSTAVA DRUGE JUGOSLAVIJE

Institucijski upravljački sustav totalitarne Jugoslavije izgrađivan je desetljećima planski, na znanstvenim temeljima, sukladno marksističkoj paradigmi o «naučnom socijalizmu/komunizmu». Neprekidno su, između ostalog, vršene različite strukturne i kadrovske promjene i prilagodbe, s osnovnim ciljem uspostavljanja što veće institucijske stabilnosti države i njenog komunističkog režima.

Pritom je glomaznost, složenost (kompliciranost) i međuvjetovanost svih jugoslavenskih državnih i društvenih institucija bila u funkciji stvaranju privida monolitnosti i neograničenosti trajanja, te prikrivanja koncepcijskih slabosti i praktične neuspješnosti totalitarnog komunističkog upravljačkog modela.

Navedeno primjereno ilustriraju slijedeći podaci. *Savez komunista Jugoslavije* je 1981. g. imao 2,120.000 članova, što je bilo 9,5% ukupnog stanovništva države. To znači da je svaki sedmi punoljetni stanovnik bio član SKJ. Postotak članova SKJ u ukupno zaposlenom stanovništvu države bio je čak 28,6%.

Između pojedinih republika postojale su velike razlike u postotku broja članova SKJ u odnosu na broj stanovnika republike. Najmanji postoci članova SKJ u odnosu na broj stanovnika bili su u Sloveniji (6,6%) i Hrvatskoj (7,6%), a najveći u Crnoj Gori (12,5%), Srbiji (10,5%) i BiH (9,5%).

Međutim, monolitnost jugoslavenske upravljačke strukture, usprkos glomaznosti, postupno je dolazila u sve veću krizu prvenstveno zbog goleme gospodarske neuspješnosti državnog režima koji je gotovo u cjelosti upravljao s gospodarstvom. Godine 1981. vanjska zaduženost Jugoslavije prešla je 20 milijardi američkih dolara, a te godine je samo za kamate na vanjski dug isplaćeno 2 milijarde dolara. Tadašnju situaciju čak se i u *partiji* posvećenim knjigama opisivalo na slijedeći način: «Strukturni nesklad u privredi, deficit platne bilance i stupanj zaduženosti zemlje postat će bitni ograničavajući faktori privrednog razvoja i ugrožavati će same samoupravne osnove privrednog i političkog sistema.»¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ *Povijest SKJ*, str. 469; navedeni brojevi pokazatelji preuzeti su iz iste knjige.

Ove procjene partijskih stručnjaka, o pretpostavkama urušavanja osnova privrednog i političkog sistema komunističke države, predstavljaju polazišni okvir za razumijevanje osnovnih unutarnjih razloga raspada druge Jugoslavije.

Usporedo s rastom gospodarske krize, u Jugoslaviji su se zaoštravali i politički odnosi na različitim interesnim osnovama. Niz stručnjaka s vojnog područja,¹¹⁰ smatra kako su se ključne institucijske destruktivne promjene počele događati reorganizacijom JNA od sredine do kraja 80-ih godina. Ove promjene – koje su ukinule republičkim granicama sukladne *armijske oblasti* i uspostavile tri *vojišta* - bile su protivne ustavnoj federalističkoj obrambenoj koncepciji jugoslavenske države i vodile su centralizaciji države i političkog vođenja vojske,¹¹¹ te su pogodovale kasnijem ostvarivanju srbijanske oružane agresija na Hrvatsku, BiH i Kosovo.

Motivi armijskog vrha za te poteze tumače se s dva osnovna interesa. Prvi je golema materijalna moć JNA (golema proizvodnja i prodaja oružja u zemlji i inozemstvu, golemi prinosi vojsci iz proračuna), te politička moć (smještanje umirovljenih i aktivnih vojnih kadrova u civilnu institucijsku strukturu, kult komunističke vojske) koju je imala JNA. Zbog te moći, JNA je samu sebe popularno nazivala *sedmom republikom* - te se sustavnim promjenama i u kriznom vremenu nastojala, između ostalog, očuvati materijalna i politička moć armijske strukture. Drugi interes (motiv) je proizlazio iz naglašene srbiziranosti armijskog vrha. Stoga su oba interesa bila potpuno sukladna *Memorandumu SANU* i politici koju je provodila srbijanska struktura na čelu sa S. Miloševićem.

Na tim temeljima se krajem 80-ih i početkom 90-ih godina događalo, javno sve očiglednije (deklarativno, političko i vojno), objedinjavanje djelovanja srbijanske političke strukture i srbiziranog vrha JNA.¹¹²

Drugi, izravni udar na temelje *Ustava SFRJ* i opstanka Jugoslavije zbio se u ožujku 1989., kad je Srbija ukinula autonomiju Kosova i Vojvodine. Na tu protuustavnost nisu uopće reagirala savezna državna tijela koja su to morala učiniti na temelju svoje ustavne i zakonske nadležnosti. Jedan od razloga njihova nereagiranja – tada i kasnije na druge protuustavne

¹¹⁰ Domazet, Davor, *Hrvatska i veliko ratište*, Udruga Sv. Juraja, Zagreb, 2003; Halilović, Sefer, *Lukava strategija*, Sarajevo, 1997; Špegelj, Martin, *Prva faza rata: pripreme JNA za agresiju i hrvatski obrambeni planovi*, u knjizi «Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995», Zagreb-Sarajevo, 1999.; Kadijević, Veljko, *Moje viđenje raspada*, Beograd 1993.

¹¹¹ Paradoksalnost načina protuustavnog, a zakonskog legaliziranja reorganiziranja JNA objašnjava M. Špegelj u n. dj., str. 40-46.

¹¹² V. Kadijević – tadašnja čelna osoba JNA - to izravno obrazlaže u svojoj knjizi objavljenoj 1993. godine.

poteze Srbije – bila je blokada saveznih tijela, jer je Srbija (zadržavanjem predstavničkih mjesta Kosova i Vojvodine u saveznim tijelima te nadzorom nad predstavnicima Crne Gore koja je pokorena masovnim mitinzima) izravno upravljala s polovicom mjesta u najvažnijim tijelima savezne vlasti.

I-4.1 Odlučujuća 1990. godina

S dosadašnjim odmakom je razvidno kako su se svi najvažniji događaji, koji su raspad institucijskog sustava druge Jugoslavije doveli do razine s koje više nije bilo povratka, desili 1990. godine.

U drugoj polovici siječnja 1990. g. u Beogradu je održan trodnevni *14. izvanredni kongres SKJ*. Sjednica se održavala u dramatičnom javnom i medijskom ozračju u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji, ali se glavna drama događala na samom *Kongresu*. Najveći nesklad bio je između delegacija komunista iz Slovenije i Srbije, te je situacija na *Kongresu* pretvorena u sukob na nacionalnoj osnovi. Delegacija Srbije je nadzirala većinu nazočnih delegata na *Kongresu* te je nadglasavanjem odbacivala sve (brojne) slovenske prijedloge.

Nakon takve trodnevne isključivosti, slovenska delegacija je prosvjedno napustila *Kongres*, te su slovenski komunisti najavili da zamrzavaju svoje odnose sa SKJ. Srbijanska delegacija je nastojala – protivno statutu - nastaviti *Kongres* bez slovenskih komunista i potpuno ovladati sa SKJ. No, na to nije pristala delegacija komunista iz Hrvatske, koja je uskoro, također otišla iz Beograda, s najavom da će se vratiti kad se u partiji prevladaju problemi.

Međutim, problemi nisu bili prevladani, i desetak dana kasnije *Savez komunista Slovenije* je zaključio da je *Kongres SKJ* završen, te da je *SK Slovenije* nadalje samostalna politička organizacija.

Na taj način se već u siječnju 1990. g. raspao SKJ, kao jedina politička organizacija u drugoj Jugoslaviji, koja je držala cijelu upravljačku strukturu države i društva. Zbog toga su pojedini analitičari već tada opravdano procjenjivali da raspad SKJ istovremeno znači i raspad Jugoslavije,¹¹³ što su daljnji događaji u potpunosti i potvrdili.

¹¹³ Događaje na *14. kongresu SKJ* i procjene objavljivali su gotovo svi tadašnji mediji; v. npr. *Večernji list*, 24. 01. 1990.

Drugi ključni događaj (proces) bili su prvi višestranački izbori koji su u svim republikama bivše Jugoslavije provedeni 1990. godine.¹¹⁴ Najznačajnije je što su izbori u svakoj pojedinoj republici održani prema potpuno samostalnim (novodonesenim) republičkim zakonima i ustroju stranaka, bez ikakve povezanosti ili usklađenosti sa jugoslavenskom saveznom razinom ili drugim republikama.

Na temelju ovih samostalnih unutarrepubličkih izbora, samo su u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori na vlasti ostale stare komunističke (formalno preimenovane) stranke, a u ostale četiri republike vlast su preuzele novoosnovane stranke. Nakon izbora 1990. g., vlasti (upravljačke strukture) u svim jugoslavenskim republikama postupale su sve suverenije, tj. sa sve bržim dovršavanjem bilo kakvih veza s donedavno zajedničkom državom i njenim institucijama.

Nakon izbora, u svim - praktično i formalno - novim osamostaljenim državama (republikama) upravljački život se odvijao suvereno. Sudjelovanje u saveznim institucijama i različito povremeno pozivanje pojedinih republika na tzv. savezne obveze i zakone događalo se samo do razine ostvarivanja republičkih (državnih) interesa, a sve preko toga proglašavano je nelegitimnim i nelegalnim, ili se na različite načine izbjegavalo izvršavati.

Savezna skupština praktično nije više ni postojala, kao ni SKJ. *Predsjedništvo SFRJ* je bilo u unutarnjoj blokadi odnosa 4:4, a kad su i donesene neke odluke, nisu ih poštivale ni republike, a sve češće ni preostala savezna tijela. *Savezno izvršno vijeće* (SIV), bolje je reći predsjednik SIV-a (Ante Marković) je pokušavao biti općejugoslavenski akter, no bezuspješno.¹¹⁵

Vrh JNA i veliki dio zapovjedne strukture (uglavnom srpskog etničkog podrijetla), kao jedina stvarna savezna snaga koja se tada mogla republikama nametnuti silom, prestala je 1990. g. biti - stvarno i ustavno - institucijski dio savezne države, jer se do 1990. g. potpuno podredila velikosrbijanskom projektu: operativno je pripremila srbijansku oružanu agresiju i sudjelovala u njoj od početka, tj. napadom na Hrvatsku 17. kolovoza 1990. godine i okupacijom dijela njena teritorija. Tada se ubrzava i raslojavanje unutar JNA: iz zapovjedne strukture - svojevolumeno ili pod pritiskom – otpadale su uglavnom osobe nesrpske

¹¹⁴ U Sloveniji u travnju; u Hrvatskoj početkom svibnja; u Makodoniji u studenom; u BiH početkom prosinca; u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, odvojeno ali istovremeno, u drugoj polovici prosinca.

¹¹⁵ Marković je u ljetu 1990. g. čak osnovao i vlastitu stranku, s kojom je namjeravao sudjelovati na preostalim izborima u republikama, ali je taj projekt potpuno propao. U jesen 1990, vrh JNA je također osnovao stranku koja je doživjela potpuni neuspjeh. Ova dva pokušaja također svjedoče o tadašnjoj općoj situaciji i o izuzetno visokom stupnju raspadnutosti jugoslavenske države.

nacionalnosti, koje su pristupale novonastalim državnim strukturama u Sloveniji, Hrvatskoj, BiH i Makedoniji.

U vojničkom (*regrutnom*) sastavu JNA – pod bitnim utjecajem sve radikalnije etničke homogenizacije koju su nametale srbijanske strukture – dolazilo je do sve oštrije podjele prema etničkoj pripadnosti, a među srpskim regrutima i rezervistima do podjele na one koji hoće i one koji neće ratovati za velikosrbijanski osvajački projekt.¹¹⁶

Na taj način, do kraja 1990. g. postojanje i funkcioniranje institucija savezne države bilo je obezglavljeno i rastrojeno, a njihova objektivna moć svedena je na minimum. Pojedine najvažnije savezne institucije (SKJ i *Skupština*) uglavnom su stvarno prestale postojati. Druge najvažnije savezne institucije (*Predsjedništvo SFRJ* i SIV) su djelovale bez plana i pojedinačno, te su ubrzano ostajale bez stvarnih uporišta i moći.

S druge strane, na kraju 1990. g., u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj su procesi institucijskog osamostaljenja države bili čvrsto uobličeni. Krajem prosinca 1990. u Sloveniji je već održan referendum na kojem je za samostalnost glasovalo 86% birača, a u Hrvatskoj je donesen novi *Ustav* koji je utemeljio državnu samostalnost. Srbija i njoj podređena Crna Gora su se i prije 1990. g. praktično izdvojile iz savezne države, te su izborni rezultati (krajem 1990. g.) bili samo potvrda njihove državne, institucijske samostalnosti. Visoki stupanj samostalnosti u ove četiri države i rezultati izbora u BiH i Makedoniji, nametali su i u BiH i u Makedoniji veliko unutarnje institucijsko i kadrovsko restrukturiranje koje je vodilo prema potpunoj samostalnosti.¹¹⁷

Na temelju naznačenih osnovnih događaja i procesa, već krajem 1990. g. je bilo nerealno i izuzetno teško očekivati obnovu jugoslavenske države na konceptijskim temeljima druge Jugoslavije. Pored toga, mogućnost ostvarivanja zajedničke jugoslavenske države na temelju novog, drugačijeg političkog dogovora bila je krajem 1990. g. bitno otežana srbijanskom oružanom agresijom i okupacijom dijela teritorija Hrvatske, jer u takvim okolnostima svako političko pregovaranje s pozicija vojne moći nije sadržavalo potrebno povjerenje.

Odnosno, Srbija - kao ključni akter koji je jedini raspolagao golemom oružanom silom, za razliku od ostalih republika koje nisu uopće imale oružanu silu – odlučila je iskoristiti tu svoju jedinu i golemu prednost, te unutarjugoslavenske dvojbe riješiti primjenom

¹¹⁶ O procesima raslojavanja u JNA v. Špegelj, M., n. dj.

¹¹⁷ *Sobranje (Skupština)* Makedonije je već pri kraju siječnja 1991. donijelo *Deklaraciju* o suverenosti i neovisnosti Makedonije.

oružane sile u svoju korist. Tako je već 17. kolovoza 1990. okupiran dio Hrvatske, a na drugim dijelovima Hrvatske su sve češće i intenzivnije vršene oružane i drugačije provokacije. Tada je i praktično postalo potpuno jasno da se savezna (zajednička) vojska JNA opredijelila za velikosrbijanski projekt, jer je JNA spriječila legitimni i legalni pokušaj intervencije hrvatske policije na okupiranom području.¹¹⁸

Stoga, kad su Slovenija i Hrvatska sredinom rujna 1990. g. predložile novi politički dogovor kojim bi se Jugoslavija mirnim putem preustrojila u konfederaciju, taj prijedlog «predstavnici vlasti i štampa u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori ismijavaju.»¹¹⁹

I.-4.2. Godina 1991.

Učvršćivanje opredjeljenja srbijanske strukture (uključujući i JNA) isključivo za oružanu opciju nastavljeno je i u siječnju 1991. g. kad se vršio pritisak na *Predsjedništvo SFRJ* da donese odluku o vojnoj intervenciji u Hrvatskoj, a usporedno je *Vojni sud JNA* izdao nalog za uhićenje hrvatskog ministra obrane (M. Špegelja). Krajem veljače 1991. g. srbijanske vlasti na okupiranim područjima Hrvatske donijele su *Deklaraciju* o odvajanju od Hrvatske, a sredinom ožujka proglasile su nezavisnost.

Destabilizacija Hrvatske oružanim putem se neprekidno povećavala. Početkom ožujka 1991. g. to se nadalje događalo u zapadnoj Slavoniji (područje Pakraca), krajem ožujka u središnjim dijelovima Hrvatske (Plitvice), a početkom svibnja u Podunavlju kod Vukovara (Borovo Selo).¹²⁰

U prvih šest mjeseci 1991. g. održano je čak nekoliko desetaka sastanaka na kojima su o načinima rješavanja tzv. *jugoslavenske krize* razgovarala republička izaslanstva i/ili predsjednici republičkih predsjedništava. Sastanci su bili u različitim sastavima i kombinacijama (dvostrani, trostrani i šestostrani), a održavani su u nizu mjesta po svim novonastalim državama.

Najprije je - od kraja siječnja do kraja ožujka 1991. g. - održana serija dvostranih razgovora republičkih izaslanstava i/ili predsjednika predsjedništava po načelu «svatko sa svakim», a potom je – od kraja ožujka do početnih dana lipnja – održano šest sastanaka na

¹¹⁸ Pregled niza drugih važnih događaja 1990. vidi u: Jurčević, J., *Srbijanska oružana agresija...*, poglavlje «1990. godina – priprema i početak agresije».

¹¹⁹ *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, str. 376.

¹²⁰ v. Jurčević, J., *Srbijanska oružana agresija...*, str. 220-221.

kojima su sudjelovali svi predsjednici republičkih predsjedništava. Svaki od ovih šest sastanaka održan je u drugoj državi nastaloj raspadom Jugoslavije.¹²¹

Na svim sastancima predstavnici svake republike su uglavnom iznosili svoje viđenje problema i svoj prijedlog načina rješavanja krize. Razgovori su bili dugi, opširni i površni, te bez konačnih zaključaka ili donošenja konkretnog plana. Deklarativno, svi su zastupali opstanak Jugoslavije i politički dogovor, ali su koncepcijska polazišta bila ili potpuno nespojiva ili veoma različita. Osnovne teze Srbije i Crne Gore bile su *memorandumske*: opstala Jugoslavija ili se raspala, svi Srbi moraju živjeti u jednoj državi. Odnosno, u slučaju raspada, iz pojedinih republika (BiH i Hrvatske) izdvojiti će se područja na kojima žive Srbi. Osnovne teze Slovenije i Hrvatske bile su: novi, konfederalni dogovor samostalnih država, a u slučaju raspada Jugoslavije republičke granice, sukladno međunarodnom pravu i Ustavu SFRJ, postaju državne. BiH i Makedonija su na razgovorima zagovarale svoju cjelovitost, a nisu imale čvrst prijedlog načina rješenja jugoslavenske krize.

Sveukupno, razgovori nisu pokazali nikakav napredak prema zajedničkom političkom rješenju, odnosno, pokazali su nemogućnost postizanja zajedničkog dogovora o opstanku bilo kakve Jugoslavije. Stoga je upitno koliko su sudionici razgovora bili iskreni, te jesu li zaista imali motiva i interesa za postizanje takvog dogovora. Odnosno, vjerojatno je svaki od sudionika imao neke druge motive i interese. No, nedvojbeno je da su razgovori i njihovo medijsko praćenje znatno pridonijeli afirmaciji samostalnosti novonastalih država i samih pregovarača.

S druge strane, to je drastično potvrdilo raspad savezne države i stvarnu nemoć preostalih saveznih institucija. Tako su *Predsjedništvo SFRJ* i SIV u drugoj polovici 1991. potpuno prestali biti akteri događanja, pa su njihovi čelnici prije kraja godine podnijeli ostavke.¹²²

Sredinom svibnja 1991. g. održao se referendum u Hrvatskoj, na kojem je 93% birača glasovalo za samostalnost, a 25. lipnja 1991. g. parlamenti Slovenije i Hrvatske su proglasili samostalnost svojih država. Tada su postrojbe JNA, koje su se otprije nalazile u Sloveniji, pokušale izvesti državni udar i pritom su koristile najtežu ratnu tehniku i borbene zrakoplove. *Teritorijalna obrana Slovenije* (koju JNA nije uspjela razoružati 1990. g.) uspješno je vršila blokadu JNA, te je – posredovanjem *Europske zajednice* (EZ) – sukob prekinut nakon

¹²¹ 28. ožujka u Splitu (Hrvatska); 04. travnja u Beogradu (Srbija); 11. travnja na Brdu kod Kranja (Slovenija); 18. travnja na Ohridu (Makedonija); 29. travnja u Cetinju (Crna Gora); 06. lipnja u Sarajevu (BiH).

¹²² *Predsjednik Predsjedništva SFRJ*, Stjepan Mesić podnio je ostavku 18. studenog, a predsjednik SIV-a, Ante Marković, to je učinio 20. prosinca 1991. g..

nekoliko dana. Nakon toga (07. srpnja 1991. g.), pod pritiskom EZ-a, Slovenija i Hrvatska su uvele tromjesečni *moratorij* na svoje odluke o samostalnosti, a EZ je jamčila da će se pronaći mirni put rješenju tzv. *jugoslavenske krize*.

Međutim, tada srbijanske strukture svoje oružane napade pojačavaju u totalni rat protiv Hrvatske, vršeći masovna pogubljenja civila, etničko čišćenje i golemo razaranja nevojnih ciljeva, naročito identitetske baštine prostora. Hrvatska je tada bila tek na početku procesa ustrojavanja vojske i naoružavanja, te su otpor agresoru na osam bojišta uglavnom pružale samoorganizirane dragovoljačke postrojbe i pričuvni sastavi policije.¹²³ U toj, na prvi pogled, bezizglednoj situaciji za Hrvatsku, presudna je bila *Vukovarska bitka*, koja predstavlja vojni fenomen, jer je u izuzetno nepovoljnom odnosu snaga, potpuno neočekivano, trajala tri mjeseca i srbijanskom agresoru nanijela goleme vojne gubitke, te je hrvatskoj državi dala vremena za naoružavanje i ustrojavanje vojske.¹²⁴

Nakon *Vukovarske bitke* je postalo očigledno da srbijanska agresija više nema snage vojno pokoriti Hrvatsku,¹²⁵ te je Srbija poticala sklapanje primirja, koje je posredovanjem međunarodne zajednice potpisano u Sarajevu na samom početku 1992. godine.

Prvi rezultat *Sarajevskog sporazuma* je bio, da je četvrtina hrvatskog teritorija ostala pod okupacijom, a na granice okupiranog teritorija su uskoro došle zaštitne snage UN-a. Drugi rezultat sporazuma bio je prenošenje većine srbijanskih snaga iz Hrvatske na prostor BiH, te početak totalne srbijanske agresije na BiH.

Važno je naglasiti da su u srbijanskoj agresiji na Hrvatsku 1991. g. sudjelovale i velike snage JNA s prostora BiH, te pojedine postrojbe *Teritorijalne obrane BiH* u čijem sastavu su osim Srba bili i Bošnjaci/Muslimani.¹²⁶ Pri tome je također važno imati u vidu da su, za koncepciju i provedbu srbijanske agresije, prostor Republike Hrvatske i prostor BiH bili jedno, cjelovito bojište. Odnosno, srbijanske snage (JNA, dio Srba iz Republike Hrvatske i BiH, te različite postrojbe iz Srbije i Crne Gore) samo su *de iure* bile na prostoru dviju

¹²³ v. Jurčević, J., *Srbijanska oružana agresija...*, str. 221-225 i 228-229; Špegelj, M., n. dj., str. 58-63; Tus, Anton, *Rat u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj do Sarajevskog primirja*, u knjizi «Rat u Hrvatskoj...»

¹²⁴ v. Jurčević, J., *Vukovarski otpor srbijanskoj oružanoj agresiji na Hrvatsku 1991*, u časopisu «Društvena istraživanja», br. 4-5, Zagreb, 1993, str. 479-499.

¹²⁵ *Hrvatska vojska* je u studenom i prosincu 1991. g. čak poduzela i prvu ofenzivnu vojnu operaciju u kojoj je oslobodila dio zapadne Slavonije.

¹²⁶ O tome posebno zorno svjedoče video zapisi koje su napravili sami agresori. Dio tih zapisa je objavljen u dokumentarnom filmu *Komšije*, autora Pavla Vranjicana.

republika (država), a *de facto* za srbijansku agresiju su Republika Hrvatska i BiH bile jedan prostor i jedno bojište.¹²⁷

Međunarodna zajednica je tek sredinom 1991. g. počela pokazivati veći interes za tzv. *jugoslavensku krizu* podupirući opstanak Jugoslavije koja tada stvarno više nije postojala.¹²⁸ Vršeni su otvoreni pritisci na Sloveniju i Hrvatsku da u parlamentima ne provode referendumske odluke o samostalnosti, a kad su one ipak proglasile samostalnost, tada su pod pritiskom međunarodne zajednice uvele tromjesečni *moratorij* na provođenje tih odluka.

U srpnju 1991. g., EZ je uvođenjem *embarga* na uvoz oružja u Jugoslaviju pokazao u najmanju ruku nerazumijevanje situacije, jer je s *embargom* bitno otežana obrana žrtava agresije. U kolovozu se pojavljuju prva javna međunarodna očitovanja da bi u Jugoslaviju trebalo poslati međunarodne snage.

Tek početkom rujna 1991. uspostavljena je *Mirovna konferencija o Jugoslaviji*, koja je odmah istakla dva osnovna načela za pregovore: nepromjenjivost unutrašnjih jugoslavenskih granica silom i zaštita ljudskih prava.¹²⁹ Potom krajem rujna 1991. g., *Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a* je donijelo *Rezoluciju 713* kojom je uveden *embargo* na uvoz oružja u Jugoslaviju, s čime je također bitno otežana obrana žrtava agresije.

Tijekom jeseni 1991. g. posredovanjem međunarodne zajednice potpisan je veći broj sporazuma i dogovora o primirju, ali svako primirje korišteno je za pojačavanje i prostorno širenje srbijanske oružane agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku. Sredinom listopada, na *Mirovnoj konferenciji* u Haagu, EZ je predstavila plan da Jugoslavija bude zajednica suverenih država.

Percepcija međunarodne zajednice počela se značajnije formalno mijenjati tek sredinom prosinca nakon što je *Arbitražna* (tzv. *Badinterova komisija*) u svom službenom izvješću zaključila da se Jugoslavija nalazi u završnoj fazi raspadanja (*dissolution*). Tada EZ

¹²⁷ To ne proizlazi samo iz operativnog, oružanog izvođenja srbijanske agresije, nego i iz niza drugih činjenica. Primjerice, i «Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780...», «potvrđuje da je srbijanska oružana agresija bila cjelovit (integralan) projekt. Naime, sustav logora je predstavljao jednu cjelinu, što potvrđuje i *Izvješće Povjerenstva* u kojem se navodi da su internirane osobe iz Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine bile bez ikakvih zapreka raspoređivane i preseljavane u logore koji su se nalazili na području sve tri države (okupirani dijelovi R. Hrvatske te Bosne i Hercegovine te teritorij Srbije i Crne Gore). U *Izvješću* se također navodi da su srpski civili i vojnici s područja jedne države posjećivali logore i u drugim dvjema državama kako bi "sudjelovali u zlostavljanju" interniranih osoba.» - Jurčević, Josip; Ivanda Katica, *Vukovar 91 – Ženevske konvencije i logoraška iskustva*, u zborniku «Vukovar 91 – Međunarodni odjeci i značaj», Zagreb, 2004, str. 63.

¹²⁸ v. *Kronologija rata...*, str 68-69.

¹²⁹ Isto, str. 90.

upućuje poziv svim jugoslavenskim republikama, koje to žele, da u narednih sedam dana podnesu zahtjev za međunarodno priznanje.¹³⁰ Pozivu su se odazvale četiri republike i pokrajina Kosovo, a Srbija i Crna Gora su to odbile učiniti tvrdeći da Jugoslavija nije u procesu raspada, nego da se radi o *secesiji*, te su za sebe zatražile isključivo pravo sljedništva države Jugoslavije.

Međutim, međunarodna zajednica je preko svojih mehanizama nametnula svoja rješenja. Uskoro je EZ priznala samostalnost Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj. Priznavanje Makedonije je odgođeno zbog protivljenja Grčke, a za BiH se tražilo prethodno provođenje referenduma. Osim toga, UN su također uspostavile provođenje svog tzv. (*Vanceova*) *mirovnog plana*.

Iz navedenoga proizlazi zaključak da se međunarodna zajednica, unatoč kašnjenju, veoma brzo (do kraja 1991. g.) nametnula kao glavni akter događanja na prostoru druge Jugoslavije. Ovo postaje još razvidnije ako se detaljnije promatra proces ispunjavanja međunarodnih zahtjeva od strane država (i njihovih dijelova) nastalih raspadom Jugoslavije. Naime, tada su Slovenija, Hrvatska, Makedonija te muslimansko/bošnjačka i hrvatska struktura u BiH u cijelosti ispunjavale kompromisne zahtjeve međunarodne zajednice.

To što su Srbija i Crna Gora te njihove okupacijske strukture u Hrvatskoj i BiH samo jednim dijelom tada prihvatile zahtjeve međunarodne zajednice također svjedoči o glavnoj ulozi međunarodne zajednice na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, već krajem 1991. i početkom 1992. g., jer ni približno toliko nisu kod agresora mogli postići sami lokalni akteri koji su bili žrtve srbijanske agresivnosti.

¹³⁰ Isto, str. 122.

II.**BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
1990. – 1995. GODINE**

II.-1

BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA: DRŽAVA TRI KONSTITUTIVNE NACIJE

Proces oblikovanja tri identitetski različite nacije – Bošnjaci/Muslimani, Srbi, Hrvati - na prostoru BiH može se sustavno pratiti od približno sredine 19. stoljeća, od kada se u BiH i njenom okruženju (prvenstveno u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji) počinju usporeno i s nizom poteškoća oblikovati građanske institucije i građanski društveni odnosi. O tada pa do danas traju mnogobrojne i različite rasprave – političke, znanstvene itd. - o etničkim i drugim povijesnim temeljima i genezi ovih triju nacija, te njihovom identitetu.

Većina rasprava nije se zasnivala na objektivnim polazištima, nego je – u različitim razdobljima i okolnostima – prilagođavana političkim i drugačijim interesima koji su postojali ili su se pojavljivali u BiH te u njenom užem i širem okruženju. Intenzitet rasprava i stupanj neslaganja bitno je bio ovisan o općoj (geopolitičkoj, sigurnosnoj i institucijskoj) nestabilnosti koja je nedvojbeno bila i ostala glavno obilježje cijele povijesti prostora BiH.¹³¹

Interesi (politički, vjerski, gospodarski, kulturni, civilizacijski) koji su se tijekom povijesti pokušavali ili se još uvijek pokušavaju ostvarivati u BiH redovito su se, između ostalog, pozivali na tzv. *historijsko pravo*, pomoću kojega se nastojao dokazivati legitimitet djelovanja u korist postizanja učinaka u BiH. U tom pogledu, posebno je bilo važno dokazivati i pokazivati povijesni etnički i nacionalni identitet stanovništva na prostoru BiH.

No, pritom se i u znanosti veoma rijetko isticala važna činjenica da golema većina stanovnika BiH tijekom gotovo cijele povijesti nisu imali prigodu sudjelovati u političkom i drugačijem organiziranom odlučivanju o svojoj sudbini, nego su to radile malobrojne upravljačke elite ili tzv. *politički narod*. Ovu činjenicu zorno ilustrira podatak, da je uoči austrougarske okupacije (1878. g.) u BiH čak 97% stanovnika bilo nepismeno.¹³²

¹³¹ v. Redžić, Enver, *Istorijski pogledi na vjerske i nacionalne odnose u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1993, str. 7: «... Bosna je mogla i morala da prihvati sudbinu male zemlje osuđene da se održava na rubu političke egzistencije ... neizvjesnost položaja predstavlja glavnu značajku u njenom istorijskom kretanju»; Zirdum, Andrija, *Povijest kršćanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Plehan, 2007, str 13: U povijesti BiH su «rijetka razdoblja mirnoga života a ratovi i razaranja su česti; nesigurnost gotovo trajna.»

¹³² Ovaj i niz drugih podataka v. u Papić, Mitar, *Školstvo u BiH za vrijeme austrougarske okupacije*, Sarajevo, 1973, str. 84 i nadalje.

Zbog niza povijesnih razloga, geneza etničkih i nacionalnih identiteta u BiH u golemoj je mjeri isprepletena i određena s vjerskim institucijama i identitetima. Odnosno, etničko i nacionalno poistovjećivanje i razlikovanje u BiH i danas (u 21. stoljeću) je u neuobičajeno visokom stupnju povezano s vjerskom pripadnošću. Pritom se vjerska pripadnost ne odnosi samo na načelnu religijsku ili etničku nacionalnu posebnost, nego i na posebnost do razine detalja svakodnevnog načina života.

II.-1.1 Muslimani/Bošnjaci¹³³

Većina istraživača – iz muslimanskog/bošnjačkog, srpskog i hrvatskog korpusa - suglasna je da su korijeni muslimansko/bošnjačke nacije vezani za četiri stoljeća osmanlijske vlasti (15.-19. st.), kad je prostor BiH bio izložen dugotrajnoj sustavnoj i strukturiranoj islamizaciji.¹³⁴ U tom razdoblju, nedvojbeno je, nastali su društveni slojevi koji su postali trajni nositelji islamskog, muslimansko/bošnjačkog identiteta, koji se razlikovao od identitetskog okruženja kršćanskih naroda.¹³⁵

Pojedini zagovornici muslimansko/bošnjačke nacije nastoje njene povijesne korijene pomaknuti što dalje u povijest ističući kako je i prije osmanlijskog razdoblja, u BiH postojao zasebni *etnikum* - *bošnjačko/bosanski* narod – koji je vjerski pripadao *Crkvi bosanskoj*. Međutim, razdoblje ranog srednjeg vijeka na prostoru BiH je slabo istraženo i oskudijeva

¹³³ Termin *Muslimani* (s početnim velikim slovom «M») u smislu naroda prvi put je uvela komunistička Jugoslavija 60-ih godina, a do tada je korišten termin *muslimani* (s početnim malim slovom «m») u smislu vjeroispovjesti. Termin *Bošnjaci*, kao formalni naziv za jedan od tri konstitutivna naroda u BiH, učestalije se počinje koristiti od 1994. godine. U ovoj ekspertizi se – zbog izbjegavanja mogućih nejasnoća - dosljedno koristi dvojni nacionalni naziv Muslimani/Bošnjaci, jer se u većini izvora i literature te u svakodnevnom govoru u razdoblju 1990.-1995. g., koristio ili naziv *Muslimani* (češće) ili naziv *Bošnjaci* ili dvojni naziv.

¹³⁴ v. navedena djela Redžić E., Hadžijahić M., Handžić A. Handžić M., Imamović M., Filipović M., Ćirković S., Džaja S., Zirdum A.

¹³⁵ «Jedna od prvih posljedica islamizacije na bosanskom selu ogledala se u stvaranju posebnih skupina, nastajanju muslimanskih i hrišćanskih mahala koje su se zatvarale jedne prema drugima ... Podvajanje prema vjeri bilo je još izrazitije u gradovima ... "Svi su živjeli jedni pored drugih u uzajamnom dodiru samo pri poslu i na ulici, njihove kuće i njihove duše bile su zatvorene za one koji nisu bili njihova (vjero)-zakona" ... Vjerska podjela, na primjer, dolazila je do izražaja i u izboru zanata ... Pripadnost vjerskoj zajednici ogledala se i u odijevanju ... Primjena kazne smrti takođe je slijedila razlike prema vjerskoj pripadnosti osuđenog ... Vjerska podjela bosanskog stanovništva imala je i druge izraze ...» - Redžić, E., *Istorijski pogledi*..., str. 26-27.

izvorima, što je otvorilo prostor i suprotnim tumačenjima (koja zagovaraju i s njima se poistovjećuju i pojedini pripadnici islamske vjeroispovijesti s prostora BiH) koja tvrde da su stanovnici srednjevjekovne bosanske države uglavnom bili etnički Hrvati i/ili Srbi, koji su kasnije bili islamizirani.

No, za potrebe ove ekspertize, daleko je značajnije razdoblje BiH povijesti od austrougarskog razdoblja (1878. g.), u kojem se jasno mogu prepoznavati situacije, okolnosti i akteri koji su sudjelovali u složenom procesu oblikovanja sadašnje muslimansko/bošnjačke nacije. Taj proces je bio na niz načina nepovoljan, kako za odnose pripadnika islamske vjeroispovijesti prema druge dvije najbrojnije vjerske i nacionalne zajednice (pravoslavci/Srbi i katolici/Hrvati) u BiH, tako i za odnose među samim pripadnicima islamske vjeroispovijesti u BiH.

Iako je temeljna *europska* zadaća Austro-ugarske bila na sve načine vratiti BiH u europski (kršćanski) civilizacijski okvir, ipak su i u austro-ugarskom razdoblju BiH (1878.-1918. g.) – zbog koncepcije državnih interesa dvojne monarhije – zadržane iz osmanlijskog razdoblja naslijeđene osnovne poluge društvene neravnopravnosti kršćanskih naroda (Hrvata i Srba). Ponajprije nije provedena agrarna reforma te je zemlja (90% stanovnika je živjelo od poljoprivrede) uglavnom ostala u vlasništvu muslimanskog plemstva. Zatim, Austro-ugarska uprava je – zbog neutralizacije srbijanskih i hrvatskih državnih težnji prema BiH – forsirala institucijsko ustrojavanje *bosanske* (uglavnom muslimanske) nacije, koja je bila potpuno neprihvatljiva Srbima i Hrvatima, a dijelom neprihvatljiva čak i muslimanima.

Na taj način je austrougarska politika – dubinskim održavanjem naslijeđenog stanja - ostala temelj suvremene međuvjerske i međunacionalne nesnošljivosti između islamskog i kršćanskog svijeta u BiH, kao i drugih oblika socijalnog raslojavanja. Tu osnovnu činjenicu nisu bitnije promijenili ni uvođenje formalnopravne ravnopravnosti, industrijalizacija, izgradnja infrastrukture i drugi značajni materijalni pomaci koje je u četiri desetljeća vladanja u BiH napravila Austro-ugarska.

S druge strane, dolazak neislamskog (austrougarskog) upravljačkog modela u BiH izazvao je višestruko raslojavanje i u muslimanskom korpusu. Dio plemstva i obrazovanih elita je zbog svojih interesa prihvatio novu vlast. Ali dijelu stare, osmanlijske feudalne, strukture i značajnom dijelu muslimanskog puka je nova vlast - načelno i drugačije - bila uglavnom neprihvatljiva, te su se suprotstavili oružano i/ili su se masovno iseljavali u Tursku. Zatim, dio muslimanskih elita i puka se zbog različitih interesa i motiva priklonio ili hrvatskoj

(većinom) ili srpskoj nacionalnoj ideji.¹³⁶ Dio muslimanskih elita, nastojao je iskoristiti različite krize i druge prigode za afirmaciju ili postizanje različitog stupnja autonomije BiH unutar Austro-ugarske monarhije.

Na taj način je opravdan zaključak da krajem austrougarskog razdoblja «politički život u Bosni i Hercegovini ... stoji u znaku dubokog vjersko-etničkog rascjepa», u kojem je nestabilnost i neodređenost muslimansko/bošnjačkog nacionalno-identitetskog problema bila posebno teška, a «dominantni pravac muslimanske politike zastupao je historijski, geopolitički i nacionalno apsurdnu formulu – integraciju Bosne i Hercegovine u sastav Mađarske.»¹³⁷

Najsnažnija muslimanska organizacija u prvoj Jugoslaviji bila je *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija* (JMO), u kojoj su najutjecajniji bili predstavnici bivšeg muslimanskog feudalnog plemstva koje je prvenstveno nastojalo štititi svoje uske interese.¹³⁸ U takvom pragmatizmu, JMO je mijenjao politička stajališta i savezništva sukladno promjenama situacije u državi, te je stranka najčešće imala svoje predstavnike u vladi, a rjeđe je surađivala s oporbom.

Stoga se JMO većinom uklapao u režimsku tezu o integralnom jugoslavenstvu, ističući da «Muslimani imaju neophodne "preduvjete da postanu jezgra pravog i potpunog jugoslavenstva ... najbolja baza jugoslavenske ideje"», odnosno, muslimani pripadaju «"jugoslavenskom narodu", kao njegov "muslimanski dio".»¹³⁹ Samo povremeno, opet iz pragmatičnih potreba, JMO je prelazio u oporbu «aktiviranjem autonomističkih opredjeljenja». No, JMO se brzo vraćao suradnji s režimom, pridonoseći tome da se dio muslimanske inteligencije svrstavao u hrvatski nacionalni korpus.¹⁴⁰

Kad je došlo do stvaranja *Banovine Hrvatske* (1939. g.) među muslimanima u BiH je jačao autonomistički pokret. «Uporedo s pozivima "Srbi na okup" i "Hrvati na okup", u Bosni i Hercegovini je cirkulirala i parola "Muslimani na okup". Jedna nacionalna

¹³⁶ Redžić, E., *Sto godina muslimanske politike*, str. 152: «... znatan broj muslimanskih političara ispoljavao hrvatsku nacionalnu pripadnost»; usp. Isto, str. 150-152.

¹³⁷ Redžić, E., *Istorijski pogledi...*, str. 57.

¹³⁸ v. Purivatra, Atif, *Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija*, Sarajevo, 1974.

¹³⁹ Redžić, E., *Sto godina...*, str. 97.

¹⁴⁰ Redžić, E., *Historijski pogledi...*, str. 69; usp. Boban, Ljubo, *Maček i politika Hrvatske seljačke stranke 1928-1941*, Zagreb, 1974.

homogenizacija podsticala je drugu. Nacionalno-konfesionalna konfrontacija u Bosni i Hercegovini težila je da postane potpuna.»¹⁴¹

U Drugom svjetskom ratu na jugoslavenskom prostoru (1941.-1945. g.) BiH je bila sastavni dio Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH). *Ustaški* režim je muslimane smatrao *Hrvatima islamske vjere*, te su oni stoga zauzimali visoke upravljačke položaje u cijelom totalitarnom državnom ustroju i *Ustaškom pokretu*. Značajan dio muslimanske elite prihvaćao je takvu nacionalnu koncepciju i odgovarajući državni i društveni status. O čvrstoći ove osobne identifikacije svjedoči i činjenica da su, desetljećima nakon rata, u hrvatskom iseljeništvu djelovali brojni *Hrvati islamske vjere* i mreža *Hrvatskih islamskih centara*.

U NDH, «Hakija Hadžić i Alija Šuljak, koji su uživali posebno povjerenje Pavelića i, kao njegovi delegati za BiH, bili (su) organizatori političkih institucija i organizacija ustaškog pokreta.»¹⁴²

No, u teškim i nestabilnim ratnim okolnostima, dio muslimanskih elita iz BiH nije bio lojalan režimu NDH, nego je u različitim prigodama bezuspješno pokušavao, izravno od Nijemaca, dobiti autonoman status za BiH.¹⁴³ Isto tako, dio muslimana iz BiH je pristupao komunističkom partizanskom pokretu.

U komunističkoj Jugoslaviji, veći dio muslimanskih (i Muslimanskih) elita je – zbog različitih motiva i interesa - bio uglavnom lojalan totalitarnom režimu; i u razdoblju kad muslimanima nije priznat nacionalni individualitet, kao i u razdoblju kad je režim – zbog svojih interesa – priznao nacionalnu posebnost i konstitutivnost Muslimana. Međutim, i u ovom razdoblju je došlo do već navedenog raslojavanja u muslimanskom nacionalnom korpusu, s kojim se ušlo u proces raspada Jugoslavije.

Prema tome, uvid u povijesnu genezu muslimansko/bošnjačke nacije svjedoči o izuzetno složenim i nestabilnim povijesnim okolnostima u kojima mnogi procesi i institucije na prostoru BiH nisu mogli imati kontinuiran razvoj, nego se radilo o prekidima, nedovršenosti i učestalom započinjanu ispočetka. Tako je i proces nastanka muslimansko/bošnjačke nacije bio neujednačen, isprekidan i okrenut u veoma različitim, gotovo nespojivim smjerovima. Zbog toga su i u razdoblju nakon 1990. g., unutar

¹⁴¹ Redžić, E., *Historijski pogledi...*, str. 75.

¹⁴² Redžić, E., *Sto godina...*, str. 149.

¹⁴³ v. Sulejmanpašić, Zija, *13. SS divizija Handžar. Istine i laži*, Zagreb, 2000; Redžić, Enver, *Muslimansko autonomaštvo i 13. SS divizija*, Sarajevo, 1987; Dizdar, Zdravko, *Prva pobuna u nacističkoj vojsci: Pobuna Trinaestog pionirskog bataljuna 13. SS divizije «Croatia» u Villefranche-de-Rouergueu 17. rujna 1943. godine*, u »Časopis za suvremenu povijest«, Zagreb, 1993.

muslimansko/bošnjačkih elita i institucija, postojale veoma suprotstavljene koncepcije o muslimansko/bošnjačkoj naciji; njenom identitetu, imenu, te opsegu i ustroju države u kojoj trebaju živjeti.¹⁴⁴

II.-1.2 Srbi u BiH

Nacionalni identitet Srba u BiH - kako krajem 20. st. tako i u 19. stoljeću – bitno je institucijski povezan sa *Srpskom pravoslavnom crkvom* (SPC) i državom Srbijom. Geneza te povezanosti seže u srednji vijek.

Pokrštavanje Srba događalo se iz Bizanta u 9. stoljeću, tj. u razdoblju kad je kršćanstvo bilo jedna crkva. Nakon velikog crkvenog raskola (1054. g.), katoličanstvo je ostalo jedinstvena nadnacionalna crkva na čelu s papom, a pravoslavlje je rastrojeno na pojedine samostalne (*autokefalne*) državne crkve, u kojima je carigradski patrijarh imao samo simboličnu ulogu.

Srpska pravoslavna crkva je postala *autokefalna* 1219. g., u vrijeme kad je Stefan Nemanjić postao prvi srpski kralj, a njegov brat (Sava Nemanjić) crkveni poglavar i svetac. Od tada traje uska i neraskidiva veza između srpske države i *Srpske pravoslavne crkve*. Srpstvo je postalo dio religije, religija je postala dio državnosti, a kult tzv. *svetosavlja* neprekidno je simbolizirao ovu *simbiozu*. U pragmatičnom smislu, to se u srednjem vijeku očitovalo u činjenici da se vlast SPC teritorijalno širila ili sužavala usporedo sa širenjem ili smanjivanjem srpske države.¹⁴⁵ Glavni oslonac srbijanskih srednjevjekovnih vladara bili su manastiri i viši kler SPC-a.

Nakon što je Osmanlijsko Carstvo 1459. g. potpuno osvojilo Srbiju, uništilo srbijansku srednjevjekovnu državu i dinastiju, te u Srbiji uspostavilo svoj sustav vlasti (isti model kao i na području BiH), SPC je narednih stoljeća (do 19. st.) ostala jedina značajna institucija koja je održavala identitet srpskog naroda i mit o srbijanskoj državnosti (carstvu). Iako je SPC u osmanlijskom razdoblju bila u nepovoljnoj i teškoj situaciji, ipak su nove okolnosti (osvajački uspjesi i neuspjesi Osmanlijskog Carstva te s time povezana migracijska kretanja) otvorile mogućnost širenja vjerskog i političkog utjecaja SPC-a.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Ovo će biti detaljnije prikazano u nastavku ove ekspertize.

¹⁴⁵ Ćirković, Sima, *Pravoslavna crkva u srednjevjekovnoj srpskoj državi*, u «*Srpska pravoslavna crkva 1219-1969*», spomenica povodom 750-godišnjice autokefalnosti, Beograd, 1969.

¹⁴⁶ Mirković, Mirko, *Pravni položaj i karakter srpske crkve pod turskom vlašću (1459-1766)*, Beograd, 1965.

Pravoslavne crkve su u Osmanlijskom Carstvu bile dio osmanlijskog feudalnog sustava, s pravima i obvezama koji su bili slični *spahijama*. Tako je i SPC, preuzimala jurisdikciju i nad dijelovima osmanlijskog teritorija zapadno od bivše srednjovjekovne srpske države (tj. i u BiH), kao i jurisdikciju nad dijelom stanovništva (Vlasi i dr.) koje je tu stizalo progonima, kolonizacijom i drugačijim migracijskim kretanjima. Na taj način je SPC dio ovog stanovništva postupno pretvarala u svoje vjernike, a kasnije (tijekom 19. st.) i u dio srpskog naroda.¹⁴⁷

Tijekom 19. stoljeća Srbija je postupno povećavala stupanj samostalnosti u odnosu na Osmanlijsko Carstvo. Sredinom tog stoljeća, Srbija je stvarno bila uglavnom samostalna država, a formalno priznanje samostalnosti dobila je na *Berlinskom kongresu* (1878. g.). Usporedo s povećavanjem stupnja samostalnosti Srbije, povećavala se svekolika kriza u BiH. To je pogodovalo sve većem uplitanju srbijanskih struktura u događanja na prostoru BiH, te iskazivanju sve većih i otvorenijih ambicija države Srbije za priključivanjem teritorija BiH.

Bitni čimbenici srbijanskih djelovanja na prostoru BiH bili su slijedeći: dijelovi institucije SPC-a u BiH, te sve veći broj različitih umreženih srpskih organizacija i društava (tajnih i javnih) koje su na prostoru BiH osnivane i radi djelovanja u svrhu pripajanja teritorija BiH državi Srbiji.¹⁴⁸ Takvim sustavnim djelovanjima u 19. st. je – povećanjem intenziteta i broja pripadnika – učvršćivana identitetska svijest srpskog naroda u BiH, koji se institucijski gotovo potpuno opredijelio za pripajanje Srbiji cijele BiH.¹⁴⁹

Taj proces je dobio još veće ubrzanje i snagu nakon okupacije BiH od strane Austro-ugarske, iako je austrijska uprava u BiH poduzimala niz mjera na njegovu suzbijanju. Između ostalog, austrijska uprava je ulagala ogromna sredstva u ustanove i kadrove SPC-a u BiH,

¹⁴⁷ Valentić, Mirko, *O etničkom korijenu hrvatskih i bosanskih Srba*, u «Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 24, Zagreb, 1992; Veselinović, Rajko, *Srpska pravoslavna crkva u BiH*, u «Srpsak pravoslavna crkva 1219-1969», Beograd, 1969; Ivić, Aleksa, *Migracije Srba u Hrvatskoj tokom XVI, XVII i XVIII stoljeća*, u «Naselja i poreklo stanovništva», 16, Subotica, 1923.

¹⁴⁸ v. Savić, Marković Štedimlija, *Zavjere protiv svjetskog mira*, Zagreb, 2005.

¹⁴⁹ «Bosna je bila u središtu propagande i planova srpske državne politike ... Garašaninovo "Načertanije" postalo je doktrina i ideologija srpske nacionalne politike više od jednog stoljeća sa programom postepenog širenja Srbije, kojoj prvenstveno treba da budu prisajedinjene tzv. "srpske zemlje" Bosna i Hercegovina i druge oblasti naseljene srpskim stanovništvom.» - Redžić, E., *Sto godina...*, str. 135-136; usp. Čubrilović, Vasa, *Historija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka*, Beograd, 1982.

očekujući «lojalnost pravoslavnog klera i prihvaćanje austrougarske vlasti među srpskim življem, ali tu nije bilo naročitog uspjeha.»¹⁵⁰

Osnivanjem prve jugoslavenske države (1918. g.) – u koju je država Srbija prenijela većinu svoje upravljačke strukture (uprava, vojska, diplomacija) – stvorene su institucijske pretpostavke za provođenje još radikalnije nacionalne homogenizacije, «da bi se obrazovala centralistička država u kojoj bi prestiž i prevlast pripala Srbiji.»¹⁵¹ Zatim, «srbijanski političari žurili su se da pravoslavne Crkve izvan Srbije uvrste u novi patrijarhat, jer su bili svjesni da im je Crkva najjači činitelj zbližavanja svih Srba.»¹⁵² Tako je već 1920. g. obnovljen srpski patrijarhat (koji je bio ukinut u vrijeme Osmanlijske vlasti), a odluku «episkopa SPC da se ujedine proglasio (je) ... regent Aleksandar.»¹⁵³

U razdoblju prve Jugoslavije osnivane su i različite nove organizacije i društva koji su podupirali prosrbijsku politiku režima, a osnovan je i četnički pokret koji je tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata bio «nosilac nacionalne ideologije četničkog velikodržavlja.»¹⁵⁴ Idejno politički program četničkog pokreta je «formulirao banjalučki advokat Stevan Moljević u spisu "Homogena Srbija" ... Moljević traži da se pristupi čišćenju srpske zemlje od nesrpskih elemenata – Hrvata i Muslimana», te u Drugom svjetskom ratu «istočna Bosna, kao i drugi krajevi BiH, predstavljali su masovna stratišta, na kojima su četnici ... poklali i poubijali desetine hiljada Muslimana.»¹⁵⁵

Srbijanske institucije u drugoj Jugoslaviji, te prevlast Srba u jugoslavenskoj upravljačkoj strukturi održavali su nadprosječnu homogenost svih Srba u Jugoslaviji te njihovu svijest o nadmoći. Izbijanje goleme krize komunističke Jugoslavije (80-ih godina 20. st.) pogodovalo je institucijskom provođenju radikalne homogenizacije u srpskom nacionalnom korpusu diljem Jugoslavije, uključujući i prostor BiH. U tom smislu, «velikosrpska agresija na Bosnu i Hercegovinu (1992) trebalo je da označi istrebljenje bosanskih Muslimana.»¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ Zirdum, A., n. dj., str. 366. U prvih desetak godina austrijske okupacije u BiH je čak «nanovo izgrađena 151 pravoslavna crkva i manastir a obnovljeno 54 crkava» - Isto, str. 365, bilješka 51.

¹⁵¹ Redžić, E., *Sto godina ...*, str. 139.

¹⁵² Zirdum, A., n. dj., str. 370.

¹⁵³ Isto, str. 371.

¹⁵⁴ Redžić, E., *Sto godina ...*, str. 140.

¹⁵⁵ Isto, str. 140.

¹⁵⁶ Isto, str. 141.

Prema tome, nacionalni identitet Srba u BiH ima duboke etničke i vjerske korijene, koji su gotovo isključivo povezani s idejom svesrpske države i *svetosavskim* srpskim pravoslavljem. Povijesne okolnosti u 19. stoljeću, te mreža prosrbijskih institucija na prostoru BiH već su tada oblikovali u visokom stupnju homogenu nacionalnu svijest Srba u BiH, koja je i politički bila isključiva; BiH mora biti sastavni dio države Srbije. Održavanju i daljnjem učvršćivanju ove svijesti pogodovale su i opće okolnosti i niz događanja u 20. stoljeću. Ponajprije, obje jugoslavenske države su bile gospodarski nerazvijene te upravljački represivne i neuspješne u rješavanju nacionalnih, socijalnih i drugih problema. Stoga je neprekidna unutarnja jugoslavenska kriza bila stanje iz kojeg su srbijanske strukture – koje su institucijski i kadrovski bile dominantne u obje Jugoslavije - jednostavno prelazile u radikalne zahvate. Događaji na jugoslavenskom prostoru pri kraju 20. stoljeća bili su načelno ponavljanje sličnih iskustava iz prethodnih stotinjak godina.

II.-1.3 Hrvati u BiH

Nacionalni identitet Hrvata u BiH u 19. i 20. stoljeću također je, kao i kod druga dva konstitutivna naroda, bitno povezan s pripadnošću crkvi. Hrvati u BiH se u golemoj većini poistovjećuju s *Rimokatoličkom crkvom*, koja je nadnacionalna crkva, te je bitno drugačije utjecala i na povijesni identitet svojih vjernika i drugačije se odnosila prema pojedinačnim nacionalno-državnim pitanjima.. Odnosno, *Rimokatolička crkva* se zbog svoje nadnacionalne strukturiranosti ne poistovjećuje s pojedinom državom. To se na prostoru BiH jasno prepoznaje i u srednjem vijeku, kad je *Rimokatolička crkva* – nastojeći i u BiH ustrojiti stabilnu crkvenu organizaciju – koristila moć različitih država, te u BiH slala niz svojih uglednika koji su uglavnom bili podrijetlom iz zapadnoeuropskih država.¹⁵⁷

U osmanlijskom razdoblju BiH, položaj kršćana (katolika i pravoslavnih) bio je načelno isti, tj. nepovoljan u odnosu na islam kao državnu ideologiju i vjeru. Međutim, praktično postupanje prema katolicima (Hrvatima) bilo je lošije nego prema pravoslavcima (Srbima), jer katolički poglavari (papa) nije bio podređen osmanlijskoj vlasti, nego njen izravni protivnik. Zbog toga je, u osmanlijskom razdoblju, u BiH bilo onemogućeno djelovanje katoličke hijerarhije, a iz pragmatičnih razloga (da ne bi pobjegli i kmetovi

¹⁵⁷ v. Zirdum, A., n. dj., str. 183-231.

katolici) osmanlijska vlast je dopustila djelovanje samo katoličkom redu franjevaca, uvjetujući to lojalnošću vlastima.¹⁵⁸

Isto tako, u osmanlijskom razdoblju položaj Hrvata-katolika u BiH bio je dodatno nepovoljan jer je susjedna hrvatska država bila dio Habsburške monarhije koja je bila u višestoljetnom sukobu s Osmanlijskim Carstvom. Zbog toga, Osmanlije «hrvatsko su ime smatrali neprijateljskim i politički neprikladnim», pa su se u BiH, Hrvati «izobraženi ljudi, svećenici ili trgovci» u komunikaciji s drugima predstavljali «kao Slovini, Iliri ... Hrvaćani, Slavonci, Bosanci, Dalmatinci ... pojedini franjevci ponekad su se izjašnjavali kao Bosanci, a svoj jezik nazivali "bosanskim jezikom".»¹⁵⁹

Tijekom 19. stoljeća u Hrvatskoj su se postupno oblikovale građanske institucije (politika, kultura, znanost). Međutim, to se događalo u izrazito nepovoljnoj situaciji, jer hrvatske pokrajine (iako su bile dio Habsburške monarhije) nisu bile ni politički ni upravno objedinjene. Situacija se još više pogoršala 1867. g. preustrojem monarhije u dvojnu, Austro-ugarsku monarhiju, s čime su hrvatske pokrajine još više politički i upravno razdvojene, a središnja banska Hrvatska je bila podređena ugarskom dijelu monarhije i izgubila je financijsku samostalnost.

Upravljačke elite u Hrvatskoj i građanske institucije koje su nastajale imale su tada drastično suprotstavljene koncepcije o rješavanju tzv. *hrvatskog pitanja*. Jedni su bili za postojeće stanje; drugi su zagovarali preustroj dvojne monarhije u trojnu; treći su zagovarali stvaranje nove, jugoslavenske državne zajednice; četvrti su zagovarali nastanak samostalne hrvatske države.¹⁶⁰ Sukladno tome, nacionalni identitet Hrvata institucijski se oblikovao u dva osnovna (međusobno suprotstavljena) smjera; prvo – Hrvati su posebna nacija, drugo – Hrvati su dio južnoslavenske nacije.¹⁶¹

Unutar ovih koncepcija postojala su i različita viđenja rješavanja problema koji su se razvijali u BiH. Međutim, najvažnija je činjenica, što Hrvatska tada nije uspijevala ni riješiti niti popraviti svoj položaj unutar dvojne monarhije (što je bio uvjerljivi prioritet), a pogotovo nije imala objektivne snage nimalo značajnije utjecati na događanja u BiH.

¹⁵⁸ v. *Sedam stoljeća bosanskih franjevaca 1291-1991*, zbornik, Samobor, 1994; Barun, Anđelko, *Svjedoci i učitelji - povijest franjevaca Bosne Srebrene*, Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2003.

¹⁵⁹ Zirdum, A., n. dj., str. 331-332.

¹⁶⁰ V. Šidak, Jaroslav; Gross, Mirjana; Karaman, Igor; Šepić, Dragovan, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda 1860-1914*, Zagreb, 1968.

¹⁶¹ U tom pogledu je znakovito, što 1966. g., kad se Hrvatskoj prvi put osniva akademija kao najuglednija intelektualna institucija – ona dobiva naziv *Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti (JAZU)*.

S druge strane, zbog niza razloga, svekoliki položaj Hrvata u BiH je bio znatno nepovoljniji nego položaj drugih Hrvata u Austro-ugarskoj monarhiji, pa su se i institucijski procesi među Hrvatima u BiH odvijali znatno usporenije i teže. U takvoj situaciji, Hrvati u BiH su i tada (19. st.) identitetski i politički bili uglavnom orijentirani prema Hrvatskoj. Na to je utjecala i činjenica što je katolika (uglavnom Hrvata) u BiH bilo brojčano znatno manje nego pravoslavnih (uglavnom Srbi) i muslimana.

Nakon 1878. g. dodatna poteškoća za identitet i političko djelovanje Hrvata u BiH bio je i duboki sukob koji se pojavio u strukturi katoličke crkve na prostoru BiH. Naime, na početku austro-ugarske okupacije BiH, započelo je uspostavljanje redovite hijerarhije *Rimokatoličke crkve* u BiH, koja je tražila da se franjevci vrate u samostane i trajno uklone sa svih župa koje su stoljećima posjedovali. Rimska *Kurija* je donijela kompromisno rješenje. Međutim, biskup u BiH je franjevce «i dalje nastojao ukloniti ... Franjevačka je provincija pružala ogorčen otpor», te se unutarcrkveni sukob u BiH nastavio i «taj konflikt do danas još nije posve završen».¹⁶²

Budući je struktura katoličke crkve u BiH tada bila gotovo jedini nositelj organiziranog hrvatskog javnog (laičkog) djelovanja, unutarcrkveni sukob se prenio i u društveni i politički život Hrvata u BiH.

U takvim okolnostima, tek 1908. g. Hrvati u BiH su osnovali svoju nacionalnu organizaciju, *Hrvatsku narodnu zajednicu* (HNZ), u koju se već prve godine učlanilo nekoliko desetaka tisuća Hrvata. Međutim, na tragu navedenih unutarcrkvenih podjela, već 1910. g. osnovana je druga organizacija *Hrvatska katolička udruga* (HKU). To je dovelo do sukoba i rascjepa i unutar hrvatskog nacionalnog pokreta, te je 1912. g., nakon intervenciju rimske *Kurije*, raspuštena HKU.¹⁶³

Iako su hrvatske institucije u BiH (naročito struktura katoličke crkve) poduprle nastanak prve Jugoslavije i izrazile lojalnost režimu, prosrbijska koncepcija i centralizam države se nisu mijenjali, te je bilo kakvo zastupanje i izražavanje hrvatstva u BiH također bilo izloženo posrednoj i izravnoj represiji. Na taj je način otežavana ili onemogućavana

¹⁶² Zirdum, n. dj., str. 361; usp. Gavranović, Berislav, *Uspostava redovite katoličke hijerarhije u BiH 1881. godine*, Beograd, 1935; Džaja, Srećko, *Bosna i Hercegovina u austrougarskom razdoblju (1878-1918)*, Mostar-Zagreb, 2002.

¹⁶³ Karamatić, Marko, *Katoličanstvo u BiH u doba Austrougarske (1878-1918)*, u «Katoličanstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini», Sarajevo, 1997.

institucijska artikulacija nacionalnog identiteta Hrvata u BiH, što je poticalo porast očekivanja i njihovu upućenost prema Hrvatskoj.¹⁶⁴

U kratkotrajnom razdoblju Drugog svjetskog rata, većina Hrvata u BiH se raslojavala prema ideološko-političkom kriteriju; jedni su podupirali ili bili lojalni vladajućem režimu Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, a drugi su pristupali komunističkim partizanima. Na taj način, Hrvati u BiH (i cijeloj NDH) su međusobno ratovali i politički se sukobljavali.¹⁶⁵

U razdoblju komunističke Jugoslavije, Hrvati u BiH su se raslojavali na sličan način kao i muslimani (ili Muslimani). Manji dio Hrvata je sudjelovao u vladajućem režimu zbog interesa i/ili uvjerenja, veći dio je živio politički pasivno, a veliki dio Hrvata je (zbog političkih i gospodarskih razloga) iselio u zemlje zapadnog svijeta (uglavnom u Europi) ili je preselio u druge dijelove Jugoslavije (uglavnom u Hrvatsku).

Prema tome, nacionalni identitet Hrvata u BiH se čvrsto oblikovao sa zakašnjenjem, krajem 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća. Njihova osnovna identitetska uporišta bila (i ostala) su: privrženost prostoru BiH kao domovini, te katoličanstvo i svijest o zajedničkoj nacionalnosti s Hrvatima u Hrvatskoj i na drugim prostorima.

II.-1.4 Demografski pokazatelji

Popisi stanovništva na području BiH redovito su vođeni od 1895. godine. Međutim, mnogi demografski procesi i aspekti u BiH, u 20. stoljeću, ostali su slabo istraženi ili potpuno neistraženi. Među slabo istražene demografske teme pripadaju i one ekoje se odnose na etničke i nacionalne značajke pučanstva BiH. Razlozi tome su brojni,¹⁶⁶ a «tek su popisi 1971-1991. usporedivi prema jedinstvenoj klasifikaciji nacionalno izjašnjenog stanovništva.»¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ v. Boban, Lj., *Maček i politika...*; Goluža, Božo, *Katolička crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini 1918-41*, Mostar, 1995.

¹⁶⁵ v. Redžić, E., *Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu*, Sarajevo, 1998; Jelić Butić, F., *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941-1945*, Zagreb, 1978.

¹⁶⁶ Pokos, Nenad, *Hrvati u Bosni i Hercegovini 1895-1991 (demografski aspekti)*, Magistarski rad, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 1996, str. 1-13.

¹⁶⁷ Isto, str. 6.

Godina	Ukupno	Hrvati		Muslimani		Srbi	
		aps.	rel.(%)	aps.	rel.(%)	aps.	rel.(%)
1895.	1,566.781	(304.000)	19,4	548.631	35,0	669.311	42,7
1910.	1,894.829	393.168	20,7	606.306	32,0	819.868	43,3
1921.	1,890.325	416.516	22,0	587.316	31,1	822.710	43,6
1931.	2,324.255	523.983	22,5	715.233	30,8	1,023.383	44,0
1948.	2,564.308	614.123	23,9	788.403	30,7	1,135.147	44,3
1953.	2,847.459	654.227	23,0	891.798	31,3	1,264.045	44,4
1961.	3,277.948	711.665	21,7	842.248	25,7	1,406.057	42,9
1971.	3,746.111	772.491	20,6	1,482.430	39,6	1,393.148	37,2
1981.	4,124.256	758.140	18,4	1,630.033	39,5	1,320.738	32,0
1991.	4,377.033	760.852	17,4	1,902.956	43,5	1,366.104	31,2

Prilog 9: Kretanje apsolutnog broja ukupnog stanovništva, te apsolutnog i relativnog broja Hrvata, muslimana i Srba u Bosni i Hercegovini u razdoblju 1895. – 1991. godine.


(Preuzeto iz: Pokos, N., n. dj., str. 14.)

«Podaci za 1910, 1921 i 1931. godinu izvedeni su prema materinskom jeziku i vjeroispovijedi, a za 1895. godinu za Muslimane i Srbe prikazan je broj osoba islamske i pravoslavne vjeroispovijedi, dok je prikazani broj Hrvata procijenjen».¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Isto, str. 14.

Godina	Ukupno	Hrvati	Muslimani	Srbi
1895.	100	100	100	100
1910.	120,9	129,4	110,5	122,5
1921.	120,7	137,0	107,1	122,9
1931.	148,3	172,4	130,4	152,9
1948.	163,7	202,1	143,7	169,6
1953.	181,7	215,3	162,5	188,9
1961.	209,2	234,1	153,5	210,1
1971.	239,1	254,2	270,2	208,1
1981.	263,2	249,4	297,1	197,3
1991.	279,4	250,3	346,9	204,1

Prilog 10: Relativna promjena ukupnog stanovništva, te Hrvata, Muslimana i Srba u Bosni i Hercegovini u razdoblju 1895.-1991. g. (1895=100)



Prilog 11: Kretanje udjela Hrvata, Muslimana i Srba u ukupnom stanovništvu BiH 1895-1991. g.

(Prilozi 10 i 11 preuzeti iz: Pokos, N., n. dj., str. 15 i 18)

II.-2

GLAVNE POLITIČKE KONCEPCIJE STRUKTURA KONSTITUTIVNIH NARODA

U vrijeme naglog rasta jugoslavenske krize i etabliranja velikosrbijanskog projekta (krajem 80-ih godina) komunističke vlasti u BiH nisu poduzimale učinkovita politička i sigurnosna djelovanja. Na taj način se struktura totalitarnog komunističkog sustava i u BiH zapravo nalazila u procesu ubrzanog raspada, a politički, društveni i javni prostor postupno je zauzimala nova, građanska pluralna paradigma. U tom procesu u BiH (slično kao i u većini drugih jugoslavenskih republika i komunističkih zemalja u Europi), u novu paradigmu veoma intenzivno - strukturirano i pojedinačno – uključivali su se dotadašnji predstavnici komunističke paradigme.

Zbog povijesnog naslijeđa i niza drugih razloga, uspostavljanje novih građanskih struktura, institucija i odnosa u BiH, 1990-ih godina, događalo se na nacionalnoj osnovi, te su u BiH postupno oblikovane odgovarajuće političke koncepcije konstitutivnih nacija. Glavnu ulogu u svakoj od nacija imale su strukture novoosnovanih nacionalnih stranaka, koje su pobijedile na prvim višestranačkim izborima (održani su dvokružno 17./18. studeni 1990. g. i 1./2. prosinca 1990. g.), te su tako stekle politički legitimitet zastupati interese svojih birača, odnosno nacija, jer su za svaku od tri najistaknutije stranke gotovo isključivo glasovali birači «njihovih» nacija. Druge političke stranke u BiH, koje se nisu temeljile na etničkoj pripadnosti, doživjele su veliki neuspjeh na izborima te su ostale na margini utjecaja na događanja i ubrzo su postale javno gotovo potpuno neprimjetne.

II.-2.1 Muslimani/Bošnjaci

Krajem svibnja 1990. g. u Sarajevu je osnovana *Stranka demokratske akcije* (SDA), kojoj je za predsjednika izabran Alija Izetbegović, što je stvarno i simbolički bitno odredilo političku koncepciju koju je zastupala i provodila SDA. Zanimljivo je da u nazivu ove stranke nema nacionalne oznake (zbog tadašnjih formalnih razloga u BiH), iako je SDA od svog osnivanja nedvojbeno bila stranka muslimansko/bošnjačke nacije.

Na izborima za bosansko-hercegovački parlament, SDA je (s relativnom većinom) postala izborni pobjednik. SDA je u parlamentu zauzela 86 od ukupno 240 zastupničkih mjesta, a Alija Izetbegović je izabran za *Predsjednika Predsjedništva Socijalističke Republike (SR) BiH*, odnosno za šefa kolektivnog predsjednika države Socijalističke Republike BiH, iako je F. Abdić na izborima dobio više glasova od njega.¹⁶⁹

Unutar muslimansko/bošnjačkih elita i struktura došlo je do neslaganja glede političke koncepcije koju treba provoditi u BiH. Jedan dio muslimanskih elita je zagovarao državnu cjelovitost BiH, u kojoj će ravnopravno živjeti sve tri konstitutivne nacije, dok je drugi dio zastupao islamski radikalizam koji se kretao od hegemonije Muslimana/Bošnjaka u cjelovitoj BiH do osnivanja samostalne muslimanske (islamske) države na dijelu teritorija BiH.

Proces unutarmuslimanskog neslaganja u BiH može se – koncepcijski, strukturalno i kadrovski - pratiti od ljeta 1990. pa do sadašnjeg vremena. Tako je već u ljeto 1990. g. u Sarajevu održan simpozij *Bosna i Bošnjaštvo* na kojem je sudjelovala «elita naučnika, filozofa, historičara, sociologa, književnika»¹⁷⁰, a 1991. g. «dva naučna skupa», kako bi se «široko iskazale mogućnosti reafirmacije nacionalnog bošnjaštva.»¹⁷¹

U ljeto 1991. g. objavljen je srpsko-muslimanski politički sporazum (tzv. *Historijski sporazum*) kojeg su priredili, sa srpske strane Radovan Karadžić a s muslimanske strane Muhamed Filipović. Sporazum je polazio od svijesti o teškoćama koje su postojale na jugoslavenskom prostoru i u BiH, te sadrži načelne odluke da se «založimo za ostvarenje historijskih i političkih interesa naša dva naroda ... osiguranje punog teritorijalnog integriteta i političkog subjektiviteta naše Republike Bosne i Hercegovine» itd.¹⁷²

U prosincu 1992. g. održan je *Kongres bosansko-muslimanskih intelektualaca* koji je «donio odluku o osnivanju Vijeća kongresa bosansko-muslimanskih intelektualaca (VKBMI), čiji je zadatak da sačini "program temeljnih interesa i zadataka bosansko-muslimanskog (bošnjačkog) naroda u svim oblastima društvenog života" ... tokom rata Vijeće će se afirmirati obimnom i plodnom djelatnošću.»¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ *Predsjedništvo* je imalo sedam članova: trojicu iz SDA, dvojicu iz *Srpske demokratske stranke* i dvojicu iz *Hrvatske demokratske zajednice*. Osim A. Izetbegovića, iz SDA su članovi *Predsjedništva* postali Fikret Abdić i Ejup Ganić (na listi tzv. ostalih naroda) – v. *Kronologija rata...*, str. 36.

¹⁷⁰ Redžić, E., *Sto godina...*, str. 167.

¹⁷¹ Isto, str. 169.

¹⁷² Navodi iz *Sporazuma; Oslobođenje* (dnevna novina), Sarajevo, 02. kolovoza 1991; tekst *Sporazuma* preuzet iz Tuđman, Miroslav, *Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini*, Zagreb, 2005, str. 64-65.

¹⁷³ Redžić, E., n. dj., str. 169.

Na tom tragu je krajem rujna 1993. g. održan *Sabor Bošnjaka*, čiji je završetak bio «praćen kontroverzama o planu njegovog organizatora da se posebnim dokumentom proglasi osnivanje bošnjačke države na dijelu teritorije BiH.»¹⁷⁴ *Sabor* nije donio taj dokument, no jedan od najistaknutijih aktera *bošnjaštva* i član *Vlade BiH* do kraja 1993. g., Rusmir Mahmutćehajić «smatra da zamisao o komadu Bosne za Bošnjake, kao način razbijanja države BiH, predstavlja dio ukupnog plana za uništavanje Bošnjaka.»¹⁷⁵

Međutim, unatoč raspravama, nakon izbora 1990. g. u BiH, prevladavajuća politička koncepcija u muslimansko/bošnjačkoj institucijskoj strukturi, zasnivala se na programskom tekstu A. Izetbegovića, *Islamskoj deklaraciji* koja je 1990. objavljena u Sarajevu, u nakladi od čak 200.000 primjeraka. Ova radikalna panislamistička koncepcija koju je zastupao vrh vodeće muslimansko/bošnjačke stranke (SDA) i njen lider bila je potpuno neprihvatljiva narodima koji nisu pripadali islamskom kulturnom krugu, a bila je neprihvatljiva i dijelu muslimansko/bošnjačke nacije, uključujući i dio muslimansko/bošnjačkih društvenih elita.

Neprihvatljivost koncepcije koju je zagovarala *Islamska deklaracija* imala je u BiH nekoliko razina. Ponajprije, *Islamska deklaracija* se pojavila u BiH, tj. na «periferiji islamskog svijeta», u njoj «nema ni traga od izvjesne bosanske komponente», deklaracija je «islamski čista, kako po inspiraciji tako i po porukama. Ona je "bosanska" samo činjenicom što je nastala u Bosni, što je njen autor bosanski Musliman», u njoj se «nikako ne čuje njen bosanski glas, već samo i totalno islamski glas».¹⁷⁶

Zatim, pragmatične političke poruke *Islamske deklaracije* su krajnje radikalne i nedvojbene. Između ostalog u deklaraciji se kaže: «... mi objavljujemo prijateljima i neprijateljima da su Muslimani odlučili sudbinu islamskog svijeta uzeti u svoje ruke i taj svijet urediti po svojoj zamisli ... deklaracija ne sadrži ideje koje bi se mogle smatrati potpuno novima ... njena novost je u tome što se traži da se s ideja i planova pređe na organiziranu akciju za njihovo ostvarenje.»¹⁷⁷

Nadalje, «... princip islamskog poretka, kao jedinstva vjere i politike, vodi i drugim važnim zaključcima ... Prvi i najvažniji takav zaključak svakako je zaključak o nespojivosti islama i neislamskih sistema. Nema mira ni koegzistencije između "islamske vjere" i neislamskih društvenih i političkih institucija ... Islam jasno isključuje pravo i mogućnost

¹⁷⁴ Isto, str. 170.

¹⁷⁵ Isto, str. 170; usp. Mahmutćehajić, Rusmir, *Živa Bosna*, Sarajevo, 1994, str. 199-200.

¹⁷⁶ Isto, str. 102-103.

¹⁷⁷ Izetbegović, Alija, *Islamska deklaracija*, Sarajevo, 1990, str. 2.

djelovanja bilo koje strane ideologije na svom području. Nema, dakle, laičkog principa, a država treba da bude izraz i da podržava moralne koncepcije religije.»¹⁷⁸

Zbog toga su i umjereni Bošnjaci/Muslimani opravdano zaključili da «Islamska deklaracija proklamuje ideološki totalitarizam kao fundamentalni princip svjetskog islama u građenju islamskog poretka»,¹⁷⁹ i to u vrijeme dok «totalitarizam na europskom zapadu i istoku propada da bi oslobodio put civilizaciji, kulturi, napretku, demokratiji».¹⁸⁰ U tom kontekstu je izražena i zabrinutost što «od 1990. do sada bošnjačka SDA uporno teži za hegemonijom u BiH.»¹⁸¹

Nakon nekoliko mjeseci priprema, uglavnom unutar SDA, «desetog lipnja 1991. održan je sastanak 365 vodećih muslimanskih političkih, kulturnih i humanitarnih djelatnika iz cijele Jugoslavije, na kojem je osnovano Vijeće nacionalne obrane», kao civilna i vojna bošnjačko/muslimanska nacionalna organizacija.¹⁸²

II.-2.2 Srbi u BiH

Sredinom srpnja 1990. g. u Sarajevu je osnovana *Srpska demokratska stranka* (SDS) BiH, na čelu s Radovanom Karadžićem. Stranka istog osnovnog naziva (SDS) osnovana je prije toga (veljača, 1990.) u Republici Hrvatskoj. Na prvim višestranačkim izborima 1990. g. u BiH, SDSBiH je dobio 72 zastupnička mjesta u parlamentu (od ukupno 240). U *Predsjedništvo BiH* iz SDSBiH su izabrani Biljana Plavšić i Nikola Koljević. Na taj način SDS je 1990. g. postao legitimni politički predstavnik Srba u BiH.

Koncepcija, javni govori i organizacijsko djelovanje SDSBiH u BiH bili su sukladni velikosrbijanskoj koncepciji, te su učestalo prezentirani javno i masovno. Primjerice, po uzoru na događaje u Srbiji, SDSBiH je u BiH – zajedno sa *Srpskom pravoslavnom crkvom* (SPC) i političarima iz Srbije – godinu dana provodio masovne «komemoracije srpskim žrtvama iz drugog svjetskog rata, za kojih se iz kraških jama vade kosti i eksplicite poziva na osvetu

¹⁷⁸ Isto, str. 22.

¹⁷⁹ Redžić, E., *Sto godina...*, str. 109.

¹⁸⁰ Isto, str. 106.

¹⁸¹ Isto, str. 195.

¹⁸² Hoare, Marko Atilla, *Civilno-vojni odnosi u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992-1995*, u «Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...», str. 210; o datumu osnivanja *Vijeća nacionalne obrane* (tj. *Patriotske lige*) postoje nesuglasja, a o tome i općenito o *Patriotskoj ligi* bit će više rečeno u narednim poglavljima ove ekspertize.

(temeljna poruka glasi kako "potomci žrtava" Srbi "ne žele i ne mogu živjeti s potomcima krvnika", Hrvata i Bošnjaka). U jednu jamu teatralno se spušta i Karadžić.»¹⁸³

Krajem ožujka 1991. g. održana je osnivačka skupština *Udruženja Srba iz BiH u Beogradu*, na kojoj «ovacije dobivaju izjave Karadžića i episkopa SPC Amfilohija Radovića o stvaranju "sjedinenih srpskih država"».¹⁸⁴

U drugoj polovici 1991. g., zbog različitih aktivnosti velikosrbijanskih institucija, i u BiH su bile sve veće političke i sigurnosne napetosti. U takvim okolnostima, SDSBiH «sprečava izglasavanje skupštinskih dokumenata i vrši destrukciju» legalne vlasti u BiH «sve u vezi s vladom Srbije».¹⁸⁵ Usklađeno s ovim, uspostavljane su zasebne srpske teritorijalne organizacija u BiH, koje je SDSBiH – ovisno o okolnostima - proglasio u travnju i studenom 1991. godine.¹⁸⁶

Sredinom listopada 1991. g. *Skupština Socijalističke Republike (SR) BiH* je objavila *Memorandum* u kojem polazi od niza događaja i odluka koje su «nepovratno promijenile konstituciju Jugoslavije i stvorili novo pravno i činjenično stanje», te je stoga naglašeno da je BiH prema *Ustavu* «demokratska suverena država ravnopravnih građana, naroda Bosne i Hercegovine» te da se u BiH mogu ostvarivati različiti interesi «uz uvjet da se isti ostvaruje bez primjene sile i na legalan i demokratski način.»¹⁸⁷

No, nekoliko dana kasnije u dramatičnom ozračju - na prijedlog SDA i uz potporu *Hrvatske demokratske zajednice* BiH (HDZBiH) – *Skupština SRBiH* je bez zastupnika SDSBiH donijela *Platformu o položaju Bosne i Hercegovine i budućem ustrojstvu jugoslavenske zajednice*.¹⁸⁸ Srpski zastupnici, na čelu s predsjednikom *Skupštine SRBiH* Momčilom Krajišnikom, su tijekom rasprave u znak prosvjeda napustili sjednicu, a prije toga je Karadžić – «koji nije bio zastupnik niti je imao ikakvu državnu funkciju, ali je redovito prisustvovao skupštinskim raspravama» - došao za govornicu i zaprijetio: «...Nemojte misliti da nećete odvesti BiH u pakao, a muslimanski narod možda u nestanak».¹⁸⁹

¹⁸³ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, str. 377.

¹⁸⁴ Isto, str. 378.

¹⁸⁵ Divjak, Jovan, *Prva faza rata 1992-1993: borba za opstanak i nastanak Armije BiH*, u «Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...», str. 182.

¹⁸⁶ O tome se u ovoj ekspertizi detaljnije govori u poglavlju «Republika Srpska».

¹⁸⁷ HINA (novinska agencija), Zagreb, baza EVA, Vijesti HNA0121, 16. listopada 1991/1714,; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 70-71; (3D00320).

¹⁸⁸ Isto, str. 72-74; (3D00320).

¹⁸⁹ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 182, b. 2.

Desetak dana kasnije, 24. listopada 1991. «Poslanici Kluba Srpske demokratske stranke i Kluba Srpskog pokreta obnove u Skupštini Bosne i Hercegovine» donijeli su nelegalnu «Odluku o osnivanju Skupštine srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini», koja je člankom I. označena «kao najviši predstavnički i zakonodavni organ srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini.»¹⁹⁰ Za razumijevanje situacije u BiH posebno je znakovito što je ovu odluku (kao i niz narednih) potpisao predsjednik ove nelegalne (tzv. *srpske*) skupštine, M. Krajišnik, koji je formalno i dalje bio predsjednik legalne, zajedničke, Skupštine *SRBiH*.

Na temelju ovdje navedenih činjenica je razvidno, kako je nacionalna koncepcija strukture srpskog naroda u BiH bila sastavni dio (veliko)srbijanskog projekta, te da je već tijekom 1991. g. bila u visokoj fazi operativnog političkog ostvarivanja.

II.-2.3 Hrvati u BiH

Sredinom kolovoza 1990. g. u Sarajevu je osnovana *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* BiH (HDZBiH),¹⁹¹ koja je pri osnivanju i u cjelokupnom kasnijem djelovanju bila u, više ili manje, bliskim odnosima s istoimenom strankom u Republici Hrvatskoj.¹⁹²

Na čelu stranke (HDZBiH) je samo nekoliko tjedana bio Davorin Perinović, koji je u rujnu 1990. smijenjen zbog sukoba interesa unutar HDZBiH, a predsjednik je postao Stjepan Kljuić. Kljuić je bio na čelu HDZBiH do početka veljače 1992. g., a tada je smijenjen i na njegovo mjesto, kao privremeno rješenje, došao je Miljenko Brkić. Krajem listopada 1992. g. za predsjednika stranke izabran je Mate Boban. Početkom veljače 1994. g. Bobana je na čelu HDZBiH zamijenio Krešimir Zubak.

Na prvim izborima u BiH, HDZBiH je dobio 44 zastupnička mjesta u parlamentu BiH (od ukupno 240). U *Predsjedništvo SRBiH* izabrani su Franjo Boras i Stjepan Kljuić. Na taj način HDZBiH je postao legitimni politički predstavnik Hrvata u BiH.

U odnosu na bošnjačko/muslimansku i srpsku nacionalnu strukturu u BiH, unutar hrvatske nacionalne strukture, tj. unutar HDZBiH je bila najveća heterogenost i glede političke koncepcije i glede praktičkog postupanja. To se, između ostalog, očitivalo i u

¹⁹⁰ Čekić, Smail, *Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima 1991-1993*, Sarajevo, 1994, str. 270-272; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 83-84; **(3D00320)**.

¹⁹¹ Stranka istog naziva (HDZ) osnovana je 1989. g. u Hrvatskoj i pobijedila je na prvim izborima u Republici Hrvatskoj.

¹⁹² v. *Deset godina Hrvatske demokratske zajednice – Spomenica*, Zagreb, 1999.

činjenicama, što je HDZBiH osnovan nakon SDA i SDSBiH, te što je u HDZBiH bilo učestalih i najvećih nesuglasica, sukoba i kadrovskih smjena na čelnim mjestima.

Zbog toga, kao i zbog činjenice da su Hrvati u BiH bili znatno malobrojniji u odnosu na Muslimane/Bošnjake i Srbe u BiH, HDZBiH je u svakom pogledu bio znatno slabiji u odnosu na SDA i SDSBiH. U takvoj situaciji, stranka je svoje djelovanje nastojala prilagođavati razvoju događaja u BiH, a pritom je osnovni cilj i koncepcija HDZBiH bila uopćeno određena kao zaštita interesa hrvatskog naroda unutar države SRBiH. Pritom, ta koncepcija – zbog nekvalitetne i heterogene strukture HDZBiH – nije bila dubinski osmišljena, nego se površno prilagođavala složenim tekućim događanjima u BiH, nastojeći ostvarivati ciljeve koji su često bili međusobno kontradiktorni.

Stoga je, cijelo vrijeme nakon 1990. g., politika HDZBiH bila (teoretski i praktički) gotovo isključivo *reaktivna*, bez inicijative i jasno određenog plana. To se očitovalo u čestom nedosljednom, heterogenom ili kontradiktornom postupanju HDZBiH, koje je bilo *reakcija* (posljedica) događanja u BiH, koja su se odvijala veoma složeno i u različitim kontradiktornim smjerovima. Stoga su i unutar HDZBiH bila velika neslaganja i potpuno različito postupanje pojedinih skupina, osobito obzirom na regionalnu pripadnost.¹⁹³

Krajem veljače 1991. g., kada je SDA u *Skupštini SRBiH* predložio *Deklaraciju o državnoj suverenosti i nedjeljivosti Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, HDZBiH je glasovao «za», ali *Deklaracija* nije izglasana jer su protiv bili zastupnici SDSBiH.¹⁹⁴ Slično je bilo i u listopadu 1991. g., kada je SDA u *Skupštini SRBiH* predložio navedenu *Platformu* o položaju BiH.¹⁹⁵

Isto tako – nakon što je bošnjačko/muslimanska struktura u lipnju (ili ožujku) 1991. g. osnovala *Vijeće nacionalne obrane muslimanskog naroda*, a srpska struktura u BiH povukla niz političkih i vojnih poteza, uključujući i u listopadu 1991. g. proglašenu *Skupštinu srpskog naroda u BiH* – hrvatska struktura je postupila *reaktivno*, te je tek 12. studenog 1991. u Bosanskom Brodu proglasila *Hrvatsku zajednicu Posavine*, a 18. studenog 1991. g. donesena je *Odluku o uspostavi Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne*. Nakon što je (9. siječnja) formalno proglašena *Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina*, hrvatska struktura je, 27. siječnja 1992. g., proglasila i *Hrvatsku zajednicu Središnje Bosne*.

¹⁹³ v. Marinčić, Anto, *Općina Žepče ili ključ za funkcioniranje Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine*, Zagreb, 2000.

¹⁹⁴ Dokument i događaj su objavljeni u Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 53-54; (3D00320).

¹⁹⁵ v. tekst u ovoj ekspertizi na koji se odnose bilješke 187 i 188.

I tada, kao i kasnije, izbijala su velika politička i drugačija nesuglasja, sukobi i raskoli između samih *hrvatskih zajednica*, kao i unutar struktura koje su im formalno bile zajedničke.

Prema tome, nacionalna struktura Hrvata u BiH nije uspjela oblikovati ni jedinstvenu nacionalnu koncepciju, niti je u svom djelovanju uspostavila i pokazivala potrebnu strukturalnu povezanost, te su stoga *reaktivnost*, nestalnost, heterogenost i kontradiktornost bila glavna obilježja postupanja hrvatskih struktura u BiH.

II.-3

OSNIVANJE NACIONALNIH POLITIČKIH ENTITETA

II.-3.1 Patriotska liga (PL)

Prvi počeci zasebnog nacionalnog političkog i vojnog organiziranja Muslimana/Bošnjaka nisu potpuno istraženi, jer je SDA u sigurnosno neizvjesnoj i opasnoj situaciji na prostoru BiH i u okruženju, u tajnosti postupno ustrojavala političko-vojnu organizaciju, «za čije postojanje i rad nisu znali ni svi članovi SDA.»¹⁹⁶ Unutar SDA je vjerojatno i tada bilo razlika u procjeni razvoja situacije u BiH i na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, te razlika u procjeni političkih i sigurnosnih mjera koje treba poduzimati, što je, između ostalog, utjecalo i na kasnije duboke raskole među vojnom i političkom bošnjačko/muslimanskom strukturom pod vodstvom SDA.¹⁹⁷

(Polu)tajna organizacija, kasnije nazvana *Patriotska liga*, najvjerojatnije je osnovana 31. ožujka 1991. godine.¹⁹⁸ «Otac Patriotske lige je osnivač SDA i Predsjednik Predsjedništva R BiH gospodin Alija Izetbegović», a naziv *Patriotska liga* «nastao je u okrilju SDA, u dogovoru gospode Hasana Čengića, dr. Rasmira Mahmutćehajića, kao i drugih».¹⁹⁹ *Patriotska liga* je bila «podijeljena između civilnog krila, kojemu je na čelu bio Izetbegović, i vojnog krila, što su ga činili časnici Muslimani koji su istupili iz JNA», no *Patriotska liga* će usprkos neslaganjima «ostati usidrena u strukturu SDA. Tijela koja su izrasla u bosansko civilno odnosno vojno vodstvo na taj su način izvorno bila dvije polovice jedne te iste muslimanske nacionalne organizacije.»²⁰⁰

Čelništvo SDA, koje je istovremeno bilo i čelništvo nove državne vlasti SRBiH, djelovalo je u kontradiktornim okolnostima. S jedne strane, «vodstvo SDA stajalo je na vrhu

¹⁹⁶ Halilbegović, Nihad, *Činjenice o Patriotskoj ligi Bosne i Hercegovine*, Sarajevo, 1994, str. 10; Halilbegović korijene *Patriotske lige* datira s krajem 1990. g. (Isto, str. 9 i 16), a Hoare s veljačom 1991. g. (Hoare, n. dj., str. 210).

¹⁹⁷ v. Mahmutćehajić, R., *Kriva politika*, Tuzla-Sarajevo-Zagreb, 1988; Halilović, Sefer, *Lukava strategija*, Sarajevo, 1997.

¹⁹⁸ v. Halilbegović, N., n. dj., str. 5 i 9.

¹⁹⁹ Isto, str. 9-10.

²⁰⁰ Hoare, M. A., n. dj., str. 210.

državnog aparata koji je jedva nadziralo», a s druge strane, nova vlast je «otkrila da su njeni najopasniji progonitelji sigurnosne službe baš te republike. Jugoslavenska vojna kontraobavještajna služba (KOS) imala je svoje agente na svim razinama bosanske države».²⁰¹

U takvoj situaciji, čelništvo SDA, predvođeno s A. Izetbegovićem, izabralo je pragmatičnu politiku. U državi koja je politički, sigurnosno i nacionalno rastrojena, pokušalo se u što većoj mjeri stvarno preuzeti institucije vlasti prihvaćanjem pojedinaca i skupina iz postojećeg državnog ustroja, koji žele biti lojalni novoj vlasti. Na taj način, u BiH dio policajaca, činovnika, časnika JNA i ostalih «koji su služili pod komunističkom vlašću prilagodili su se novim vremenima i ušli u orbitu SDA ... vodstvo SDA nastojalo je pregovorima ishoditi mirno rješenje s Beogradom, JNA i SDS-om.»²⁰²

«Izetbegović se naivno nadao da će se postrojbe JNA na bosanskom teritoriju bilo pretvoriti u bosansku vojsku bilo povući iz zemlje bez krvoprolića – sam će kasnije priznati kako nije vjerovao da će se nakon pedeset godina propovijedanja "bratstva i jedinstva" jugoslavenska vojska upustiti u genocid.»²⁰³

Iako su i pojedini osnivači *Patriotske lige*, vjerojatno i tada uviđali da je «formiranje paradržavnih i paravojnih struktura izravan interes razaratelja BiH» te su nastojali opstanak cjelovite BiH «štiti kroz institucije ... na temelju patriotskog saveza svih njenih ljudi»²⁰⁴, ipak su se državne institucije BiH, djelovanjem *Patriotske lige*, stvarno sve više pretvarale u isključivu nacionalnu organizaciju Muslimana/Bošnjaka.

Proces pretvaranja državnih institucija R BiH u muslimansko/bošnjačku strukturu i njihova opća islamizacija poprimili su radikalne razmjere tijekom 1993. godine. «Sve više je rastao utjecaj SDA kao vodeće bošnjačke stranke ... Sve to kao i uplitanje verskih službenika i uopšte unos religije u oružane snage u toku 1993. godine, doveli su do nastanka jednonacionalne strukture i političkog opredelenja».²⁰⁵ Ovaj proces se - zbog niza utjecaja, razloga i interesa - nastavio i tijekom 1994. i 1995. g., iako su tada potpisivani formalni sporazumi o političkoj i vojnoj integraciji muslimansko/bošnjačke i hrvatske strane, a njihova vojna suradnja (uz pomoć Republike Hrvatske) nanosila je strateške poraze srbijanskoj agresiji.

²⁰¹ Isto, str. 210.

²⁰² Isto, str. 211.

²⁰³ Isto, str. 211.

²⁰⁴ Mahmutćehajić, R., *Put u rat*, u «Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...», str. 175.

²⁰⁵ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 191.

Potrebno je imati u vidu da se, tijekom procesa sve veće islamizacije ARBiH, ipak *Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom* (06. kolovoza 1992. g.) utvrdilo: «Sastavni dio Armije čine postrojbe Hrvatskog vijeća obrane...».²⁰⁶

S radikalnog muslimansko/bošnjačkog motrišta «zajedničke institucije bosanske državnosti smatrale su se nepouzdanima, pa su razorene, dok je bošnjački nacionalni interes poistovjećen isključivo s Predsjednikom, vladajućom strankom i Armijom, usljed čega su te tri institucije sve više srastale. Visoki bosanski dužnosnici, generali i političari koji su se protivili tome srastanju ... bili su smijenjeni ili gurnuti u kut.»²⁰⁷

U kojoj mjeri je taj proces bio planiran i od koga, a koliko potaknut složenim događajima i različitim čimbenicima, ostaje otvoreno pitanje. No, nedvojbeno je, da je iz komunizma naslijeđeni a raspadajući državni i društveni sustav u BiH bio prožet «dvostrukim agentima svih nacionalnosti koji su bili skloni surađivati s naporima Beograda i JNA da se bosanska država iznutra potkopa i potčini.»²⁰⁸

U svakom slučaju, proces pretvaranja državnih institucija R BiH u institucije Muslimana/Bošnjaka olakšavao je provođenje velikosrbijanske koncepcije i imao je velike stvarne učinke na tromjenu nacionalnu homogenizaciju u BiH, a s time i na dugoročnu identitetsku i organizacijsku dezintegraciju prostora BiH. S jedne strane, zbog toga je čak i unutar muslimansko/bošnjačke strukture došlo do podjele, u kojoj je zaključeno da je bošnjaštvo «instrumentalizirano u skladu sa interesima i zahtjevima vodeće bošnjačke stranke»,²⁰⁹ a A. Izetbegović je čak izravno optužen da (zajedno sa S. Miloševićem i F. Tuđmanom) pripada u «stožer razaranja bosansko-hercegovačkog jedinstva.»²¹⁰

S druge strane, taj proces je (veliko)srbijanskim strukturama služio za propagandno opravdavanje oružane agresije na BiH i istovremeno je socijalno-psihološki pridonosio još dubljoj homogenizaciji Srba u BiH. S treće strane, nacionalno političko i vojno organiziranje Muslimana/Bošnjaka pridonosilo je rastu općeg nepovjerenja, podjelama i izbijanju

²⁰⁶ «Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o izmjeni i dopuni uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o oružanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine», Predsjedništvo R BiH, 6. kolovoza 1992; usp. *Magnetofonski snimak 153. sjednice Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, održana 6. avgusta 1992. godine*, u «National Security and the Future», vol. 8, nr. 1, 2007, str.7-9; (4D00410).

²⁰⁷ Hoare, M. A., n. dj., 228.

²⁰⁸ Hoare, M. A., n. dj., str. 209.

²⁰⁹ Redžić, E., *Sto godina...*, str. 171.

²¹⁰ Isto, str. 177.

djelomičnih oružanih sukoba između Hrvata i Muslimana/Bošnjaka, te je pogodovalo sličnom procesu političkog i vojnog organiziranja u hrvatskom nacionalnom korpusu u BiH.

Ukupno, (gledajući odnos snaga i događajno ostvarivanje različitih interesa na prostoru BiH u razdoblju 1990.-1995. g.) proces nacionalnih podjela i homogenizacija u BiH koristili su (politički, vojno i percepcijski) samo srbijanskoj agresiji na BiH, a nacionalni interesi Muslimana/Bošnjaka i Hrvata u BiH zbog toga su imali goleme i dugoročne štete.

Navedene činjenice posredno se potvrđuju i u kasnijim iskazima veoma istaknutih aktera na muslimansko/bošnjačkoj strani, koji su se distancirali od procesa isključivog nacionalnog organiziranja i homogeniziranja tek kad je on ostavio negativne posljedice. Tako i jedan od osnivača *Patriotske lige* te član *Vlade RBiH*, R. Mahmutćehajić, nastojeći opravdati svoje istaknuto sudjelovanje u negativnim procesima, naknadno kontradiktorno svjedoči: «Kad se danas govori o Patriotskoj ligi i drugim organizacijama koje smo stvarali, nitko ne može pokazati ni dokazati da je ona bila paradržavna ili da je postojala izvan državnih institucija. Ima ih koji u tome smislu pišu, ali nitko to ne množe dokazati! Pojedini dijelovi tog sustava bili su čvrsto vezani za patriotski dio političkog vodstva i služili su kao neka vrsta foruma u kojem se u povezanosti s državnim organima analizirala i pripremala stabilna jezgra očuvanja Bosne i Hercegovine.»²¹¹

II.-3.2 Republika Srpska (RS)

Institucijska struktura Srba u BiH, koja je bila politički izražena u SDSBiH, nije imala koncepcijsko političkih i organizacijskih dvojbi kao muslimansko/bošnjačke i hrvatske strukture, nego je sustavno provodila velikosrbijanski plan, kojeg je bila sastavni dio. Politička, sigurnosna i propagandna velikosrbijanska djelovanja na svim razinama – u jugoslavenskoj institucijskoj strukturi, u Srbiji, u Hrvatskoj i u BiH - bila su cijelo vrijeme sinkronizirana i međusobno povezana. Isto tako, ona su bila sadržajno i vremenski prilagođavana međunarodnim okolnostima, naročito zasjedanjima i odlukama međunarodne *Mirovne konferencije o (bivšoj) Jugoslaviji* i drugih međunarodnih aktera.

U svim varijantama raspleta tzv. jugoslavenske krize, glavni cilj velikosrbijanske strukture bilo je postizanje teritorijalnog jedinstva svih tzv. *srpskih* područja u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, te etničko čišćenje tih područja kako bi na njima Srbi bili uvjerljiva većina. Tome

²¹¹ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, str. 280.

su bila podređena i sva njihova politička i vojna djelovanja. Na taj način su glavna politička i vojna događanja u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i na prostoru BiH bila jasno određena i javno obznanjena od strane velikosrbijanske strukture, i to prije nego je započela njihova praktična operacionalizacija na teritoriju BiH.

Zbog toga, a radi objektivnosti, spoznavanje i razumijevanje događanja u BiH (1990. – 1995. g.) je nužno povezano s poznavanjem događanja u Republici Hrvatskoj, jer su ta događanja kauzalno (uzroci, tijek, posljedice, akteri) cjelovita i neodvojiva, bez obzira što su između BiH i Republike Hrvatske postojale republičke (državne) granice.

Ostali *unutarjugoslavenski* akteri, koji su u svakom, a naročito vojnom pogledu bili slabiji te općenito institucijski nepripremljeni, uglavnom su samo slijedili događaje (nastojeći im se što više prilagoditi), koje su kreirali i nametali velikosrbijanska struktura i/ili kasnije međunarodna zajednica.

Prema scenariju koji je ranije primjenjivan u Republici Hrvatskoj, SDSBiH je u travnju i svibnju 1991. g. osnivala nelegalne *Zajednice općina* u pojedinim dijelovima BiH. Najprije je u travnju 1991. g. proglašena *Zajednica opština Bosanske Krajine*, a potom u svibnju *Zajednica opština Istočne i Stare Hercegovine* i *Zajednica opština Romanije*.²¹²

Sredinom lipnja 1991. g. čelnik SDS-a u Hrvatskoj (Jovan Rašković) osnovao je *Otađbinsku frontu* «koja objavljuje da joj je cilj ujedinjenje SAO Krajine (okupiranih dijelova Republike Hrvatske, op. a.) i Bosanske krajine "u jednu federalnu jedinicu ako dođe do raspada Jugoslavije"»²¹³ Nekoliko dana prije toga, u Splitu je održan sastanak A. Izetbegovića, S. Miloševića, i F. Tuđmana na kojem «posebno je bilo riječi o BiH»,²¹⁴ no «bez rezultata; na konferenciji za novinstvo Milošević daje potporu srpskoj paravlasti u Kninu».²¹⁵

Sredinom rujna 1991. g. SDSBiH je proglasio (jednu za drugom) tri *Srpske autonomne oblasti* (SAO): *SAO Istočna Hercegovina*, *SAO Bosanska krajina* i *SAO Romanija*. Poslije su stvorene još dvije SAO (*Semberija*, te *Ozren* i *Posavina*). Na općinskoj razini u BiH također su osnivane zasebne srpske vlasti, prvenstveno radi uspostavljanja sigurnosnog nadzora, uključujući i nadzor nad lokalnom policijom. Na obje razine (regije i općine) to je učinjeno

²¹² *Glas*, (novine, Banja Luka), 27. i 28. travnja 1991; *Javnost* (službeno glasilo SDS-a, Sarajevo), 11. svibanj i 1. lipanj 1991.

²¹³ *Rat u Hrvatskoj*..., str. 379

²¹⁴ *Kronologija rata*..., str. 67.

²¹⁵ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni*..., str. 379.

na isti način kao i u Republici Hrvatskoj 1990. g., i bilo je pretpostavka i sastavni dio oružane agresije i okupacije.²¹⁶

U prvoj polovici studenog 1991. g. SDSBiH je u BiH organizirao nelegalni referendum samo srpskog naroda u BiH, na kojem je «Srbima ponuđeno da biraju između nezavisne BiH i ostanka u sastavu Jugoslavije, pa je na osnovu krivotvorenih rezultata objavljeno da je druga varijanta dobila većinu.»²¹⁷ Na temelju ovog nelegalnog referenduma, nelegalna «Skupština srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini, na sjednici od 21. novembra 1991. godine donijela je Odluku o verifikaciji proglašanih srpskih autonomnih oblasti u Bosni i Hercegovini».²¹⁸

Na istoj sjednici, *Skupština srpskog naroda u BiH* je donijela i *Odluku* kojom se priznaje «Republiku Srpsku Krajinu, kao federalnu jedinicu Jugoslavije».²¹⁹ Ova *Odluka* - koja je formalno višestruko besmislena jer nelegalna skupština iz dijela BiH priznaje okupacijske vlasti na dijelu susjedne države Republike Hrvatske, i to kao dio treće države (Jugoslavije) - prvenstveno svjedoči o međusobnoj sinkroniziranosti dijelova velikosrbijanskog projekta i njihovom prilagođavanju za učinke na razini međunarodnih institucija.

U drugoj polovici prosinca 1991. g., *Skupština srpskog naroda u BiH* donijela je «Odluku da se pristupi pripremama za formiranje "Republike Srpske Bosne i Hercegovine"», te da će se ona formirati «najkasnije do srpske nove 1992. godine.»²²⁰

Sukladno tome, 09. siječnja 1992. g., *Skupština srpskog naroda u BiH* donijela je *Deklaraciju o proglašenju Republike srpskog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine*, u kojoj je određeno: «Republika se nalazi u sastavu savezne države Jugoslavije, kao njena federalna jedinica». Ovo određenje je u izravnoj suprotnosti s tada važećim *Ustavom SFRJ* i *Ustavom SRBiH*. *Deklaracija* je, između ostalog, trebala djelovati na sprječavanje međunarodnog priznanja BiH, što se prepoznaje iz članka X *Deklaracije* u kojem se navodi: «Uvođenje Deklaracije u život odložiće se na neodređeno vrijeme pod uslovom da zahtjev za priznanje nezavisnosti Bosne i Hercegovine njegovi podnosioci povuku do 15. januara 1992.

²¹⁶ v. Barić, Nikica, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995.*, Zagreb, 2005.

²¹⁷ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 182.

²¹⁸ *Odluka...*, u Čekić, S., n. dj., str. 275-276; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 101-102; (3D00320).

²¹⁹ *Odluka...*, u Čekić, S., n. dj., str. 277; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 103; (3D00320).

²²⁰ *Odluka...*, u Čekić, S., n. dj., str. 278; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 117; (3D00320).

godine.»²²¹ *Deklaracija* je postigla ovaj učinak, jer SRBiH – na temelju mišljenja *Arbitražne komisije br. 4* - nije međunarodno priznata od strane zemalja *Europske zajednice* (EZ), istovremeno s priznanjem Hrvatske i Slovenije (15. siječnja 1992. g.).

Nakon provođenja referenduma u SRBiH (prema međunarodnim uputama i nadzorom) te nakon pojavljivanja mirovnog plana *Europske unije* - EU²²² (tzv. *Cutillierov plan*) za BiH, *Skupština srpskog naroda u BiH* je, krajem veljače 1992. g., donijela *Odluku o proglašenju ustava Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*. U drugoj polovici ožujka 1992. g., «Skupština srpskog naroda BiH na Palama (u Sarajevu, op. a.) izjašnjava se protiv neovisne i suverene BiH.»²²³

BiH je 06. travnja 1992. g. međunarodno priznata od strane EU i SAD (s tim što priznanje teče od 07. travnja). Istog dana, «srpski teroristi pucaju na sudionike mirnih proturatnih demonstracija pred Skupštinom BiH u Sarajevu (4 mrtvih, 6 ranjenih).»²²⁴ Dan kasnije «na zasjedanju Skupštine srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini ... donesena je odluka o proglašenju Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine nezavisnom republikom.»²²⁵

Deset dana kasnije, *Vlada Srpske Republike BiH* izdala je u Beogradu javno priopćenje u kojem optužuje EU da je «preuranjenim priznanjem ... doprinijela da se situacija u ovoj Republici (BiH, op. a.) pogorša», te «pogoršanju situacije u Bosni i Hercegovini u najvećoj mjeri je doprinijela uloga muslimansko-hrvatskog dijela Predsjedništva» SRBiH. U priopćenju se, zbog propagandnih razloga prikrivanja srbijanske oružane agresije i već počinjenih masovnih zločina nad Muslimanima/Bošnjacima u istočnoj BiH, navodi kako «se ne radi ni o kakvoj borbi za proširenje Srbije. Srpski narod u BiH želi da odbrani svoj goli opstanak...». Prije toga se, s istom svrhom, navodi kako je oružane sukobe u BiH «otpočela vojska Republike Hrvatske» te da međunarodna zajednica «nije ništa učinila da se hrvatska agresija zaustavi.»²²⁶

Sredinom kolovoza 1992. g. *Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina* promijenila je naziv u *Republika Srpska* (RS).

²²¹ *Borba* (dnevni list), Beograd, 10. siječnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 119-121; (3D00320).

²²² Jednom odlukom iz *Ugovora* u Maastrichtu (07. veljače 1992. g.) promijenjen je naziv EZ u EU.

²²³ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, str. 386.

²²⁴ Isto, str. 386.

²²⁵ *Večernje novosti* (dnevna novina), Beograd, 08. travnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 169-170; (3D00320).

²²⁶ Isto, str. 171-172; (3D00320).

U drugoj polovici rujna 1992. g., donesen je *Protokol o saradnji između Republike Srpske i Republike Srpske Krajine*, koji je praktično predvidio ustrojavanje jedne države. Naime, *Protokolom* je predviđena «saradnja dvije republike u svim oblastima ekonomskog i društvenog života» te da će se «izanalizirati sva postojeća ustavna i zakonodavna rješenja i predložiti Skupštinama potrebna usaglašavanja», radi uspostavljanja «istog oblika vladavine i političkog sistema ... određivanje istih državnih simbola ... Obje republike su se složile da granice i graničnih prelaza između republika neće biti ... zajednički će se organizovati i vršiti odbrana suverenosti ... formiranjem zajedničkih snaga ... i uspostavljanjem jedinstvene komande». Zatim, suradnja je podrazumijevala «uspostavljanje jedinstvenog obrazovnog sistema ... punovažnost zdravstvene dokumentacije i ličnih zdravstvenih isprava u obje republike ... uspostavljanje jedinstvenog informativnog sistema ...».²²⁷

U narednom koraku, krajem listopada 1992. g., dvije skupštine (RSK i RS), «na zajedničkoj sjednici» održanoj u Prijedoru, usvojili su tzv. *Prijedorsku Deklaraciju* u kojoj «objavljuju da će pravni sistemi u Republici Srpska Krajina i Republici Srpskoj biti identični», da «stupaju u obrambeni savez ... u monetarnu i carinsku uniju ... zadužuju nadležne organe dviju republika da odmah formiraju odgovarajuća zajednička tijela radi postizanja objavljenih ciljeva», te: «Svi vidovi saradnje će se ponuditi i drugim srpskim državama ... Pokrenuće se inicijativa za sazivanje svesrpske skupštine (Republike Srpska Krajina, Republike Srpske, Republike Srbije i Republike Crne Gore) ... Skupština Republike srpske i Republike Srpska Krajina objavljuju opredjeljenje srpskog naroda u ovim republikama za državno ujedinjenje.»²²⁸

II.-3.3 Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna (HRHB)

Odlukom o uspostavi *Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne (HZHB)* od 18. studenog 1991. g., HZHB je određena «kao politička, kulturna, gospodarstvena i područna cjelina», a čine je područja općina koje su poimenice nabrojane u članku 2. *Odluke*. U članku 5. navodi se: «Zajednica će štovati demokratski izabranu vlast Republike Bosne i Hercegovine dok

²²⁷ *Protokol...*, Hrvatski informativni centar (HIC), Zagreb, dokumentacija, dokument br.: L-A002/041; dokument preuzet iz M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, str. 245-248; (3D00320).

²²⁸ U Radulović, Srđan, *Sudbina Krajine*, Beograd, 1996, str. 154-155; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 290-292; (3D00320).

postoji državna nezavisnost Bosne i Hercegovine u odnosu na bivšu ili svaku drugu Jugoslaviju.»²²⁹

U ovoj kratkoj *Odluci* je navedeno i slijedeće: »Vrhovništvo zajednice je Predsjedništvo koje čine predstavnici hrvatskog naroda u općinskoj vlasti, prvi po funkciji ili predsjednici općinskih odbora Hrvatske demokratske zajednice. Predsjedništvo bira predsjednika, dva potpredsjednika i tajnika.»

Međutim, zbog niza različitih događaja u prvoj polovici 1992. godine (sukobi u stranci, referendum, međunarodno priznanje BiH, pojačavanje srbijanske oružane agresije), HZHB se mjesecima nije gotovo uopće institucijski ustrojavala.

Važno je naglasiti da su članovi HDZBiH sudjelovali u institucijama središnjih vlasti (S)R BiH, kako tada, tako i u narednim godinama.

U prvoj polovici travnja 1992. g. *Predsjedništvo HZHB* - «suočeno s agresijom na prostoru» HZHB te «svjesno nemoći legalne vlasti Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, posebno raspada njenog obrambenog sustava» - donijelo je veoma kratku (nekoliko redaka) *Odluku o formiranju Hrvatskog vijeća obrane (HVO)*.²³⁰

Određeno je da se HVO uspostavlja «kao vrhovno tijelo obrane hrvatskog naroda u» HZHB, te da će se brinuti «o obrani suvereniteta prostora» HZHB «i o zaštiti hrvatskog naroda, kao i drugih naroda u ovoj zajednici napadnutih od bilo kojeg agresora.» *Odluku* je potpisao «Predsjednik HVO i HZHB mr. Mate Boban.»²³¹

Sredinom svibnja 1992. g. *Predsjedništvo HZHB* je donijelo *Statutarnu odluku o privremenom ustrojstvu izvršne vlasti i uprave na području HZHB*.²³² *Odluka* je dopunjena i izmijenjena početkom srpnja 1992. godine. U prvom članku je određeno: «Ustanovljava se Hrvatsko vijeće obrane ... kao najviše tijelo izvršne vlasti i uprave» na području HZHB, s tim da je to «privremeno tijelo koje će svoje ovlasti obavljati do momenta uspostave redovite izvršne vlasti i uprave».²³³ HVO HZHB je imao šest odjela: obrana, unutarnji poslovi, gospodarstvo, financije, društvene djelatnosti, te pravosuđe i uprava), a mogla su se osnivati i samostalna stručna i druga tijela.²³⁴ HVO HZHB je obavljao «nadzor nad radom svojih odjela

²²⁹ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 99-100; (3D00320).

²³⁰ *Odluka...*, dokument objavljen u *Narodnom listu HZHB*, broj 1, rujan 1992, str. 4; (P00151). To što prvi broj *Narodnog lista HZHB* izašao tek u rujnu posredno ukazuje na tadašnju nisku razinu ustrojenosti HZHB.

²³¹ Isto; (P00151).

²³² *Narodni list*, br. 1, str. 5-7. (1D00156).

²³³ Isto, str. 5; (P00290).

²³⁴ Isto, str. 7; (P00290).

i općinskih HVO», s tim što je imao «pravo i dužnost raspustiti općinski HVO» ako je on kršio «temeljne odredbe HZHB».²³⁵

Sredinom lipnja 1992. g. HVO HZHB je donio *Statutarnu odluku* kojom je određeno da «poslove izvršne vlasti na općinskoj razini u HZHB «obavlja općinsko Hrvatsko vijeće obrane».²³⁶

Tek početkom srpnja 1992. g. *Predsjedništvo HZHB* je donijelo niz odluka, uredbi i propisnika s kojima se formalno donekle reguliraju osnovni odnosi u HZHB. Tako je, nakon sedamipol mjeseci još jedanput donesena (izmijenjena i dopunjena) *Odluka o uspostavi HZHB*. U odnosu na prvobitnu *Odluku*, u novu inačicu uvršten je novi dio - «Razlozi uspostave» - u kojem se između ostalog kaže: «Suočeni s bezobzirnom agresijom Jugoslavenske armije ... ogromnim brojem žrtava, patnji i stradanja ... kao i rušenjem Bosne i Hercegovine i njenih legalno izabranih tijela».²³⁷ U novoj *Odluci* uvedena je i dužnost *Predsjednika HZHB* koje prije nije bilo, a *Predsjedništvo HZHB* je određeno kao «zakonodavno tijelo».²³⁸

Najviša tijela vlasti HZHB nisu donosila zakone, nego uredbe, odluke itd., u kojima su prihvaćali postojeće zakone ili dijelove zakona države RBiH, s najčešćom napomenom da se propisi primjenjuju na području *Hrvatske zajednice Herceg-Bosne* za vrijeme neposredne ratne opasnosti ili ratnog stanja.

Veoma je važno je naglasiti da su sve formalne odluke, uredbe dokumenti, koje su od srpnja 1992. g. donosila najviša tijela HZHB, u institucijskom potpisu na prvom mjestu imali naziv «REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA» a ispod toga «HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA».


Isto tako, ova državno upravna hijerarhijska razina se dosljedno poštivala i kod službenih obrazaca, školskih svjedodžbi, uvjerenja, vojnih iskaznica i drugih dokumenata koji su bili u opticaju na području HZHB. Propisani grafički izgled ovih dokumenata i u slikovnom obliku je objavljivao u *Narodnom listu*, službenom glasilu HZHB (HRHB).

²³⁵ Isto, str. 6; (P00290).

²³⁶ Isto, str. 8; (P00250).


²³⁷ Isto, str. 2; (P00302).

²³⁸ Isto, str. 2-3. (P00302).


REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA		OSOBNNA ISKAZNICA	
JMBG		BR.	
	Ime		
	Prezime		
	Datum rođenja		
	Mjesto i država rođenja		
	Prebivalište i adresa stanovanja		
Izdala		Datum izdavanja	
Vlastoručni potpis		Vrijedi do	

Prednja stranica


Prilog 12: Propisani izgled prednje stranice osobne iskaznice u HZHB
(Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 12/93, str. 328)



Prilog 13: Propisani izgled prednje stranice vojne iskaznice u HZHB
(Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 7/92, str. 36)



Prilog 14: Propisani izgled prednje stranice prometne dozvole u HZHB (gornji dio)
 (Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 1/93, str. 16)



Prilog 15: Propisani izgled svjedodžbe o završenoj osnovnoj školi (gornji dio)
 (Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 10/93, str. 256)



Prilog 16: Propisani izgled prednje stranice Matične knjige srednjih škola u HZHB (gornji dio)
 (Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 10/93, str. 264)

Republika Bosna i Hercegovina HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA	
Općina	
Izvadak iz matične knjige rođenih	

Prilog 17: Propisani izgled izvotka iz matične knjige rođenih u HZHB (gornji dio)
 (Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 13/93, str. 393)

Republika Bosna i Hercegovina HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA	
Općina	
Izvadak iz matične knjige vjenčanih	

Prilog 18: Propisani izgled izvotka iz matične knjige rođenih u HZHB (gornji dio)
 (Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 13/93, str. 394)

Republika Bosna i Hercegovina HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA	
Općina	
Izvadak iz matične knjige umrlih	

Prilog 19: Propisani izgled izvotka iz matične knjige rođenih u HZHB (gornji dio)
 (Izvor: Narodni list HZHB, 13/93, str. 395)

Naziv, status i ustroj HZHB nije se bitnije mijenjao do pred kraj kolovoza 1993. godine. Tada je donesena *Temeljna odluka o uspostavi i proglašenju Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosne* (HRHB).²³⁹ Na donošenje ove odluke - i ostalih odluka koje su iz nje proizlazile – utjecao je niz čimbenika, no svakako je daleko najznačajniji bio tzv. *Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan*,²⁴⁰ koji je BiH predvidio kao zajedničku državu (*uniju*) koja se sastoji od «tri konstitutivne republike», te da će sporazum legitimnih predstavnika republika (nacija) u BiH «stupiti na snagu kada se postigne suglasnost oko zemljovida i privitaka koji se odnose na striktno garancije prava čovjeka.»²⁴¹

Ovaj *mirovni plan*, kao i slični planovi prije i poslije njega, bio je više mjeseci u središtu pregovaračke, političke i vojne pozornosti; prihvaćan je i odbacivan, nekoliko puta je mijenjan i dopunjavao.

Općenito, na temelju već ranije razbuktanih nacionalnih očekivanja i bojazni, *mirovni planovi* međunarodne zajednice su bitno utjecali na vojna i politička događanja u BiH i u njenom okruženju.²⁴² Pored ostalog, na pojedinim lokalitetima BiH izbijali su politički i oružani sukobi između dijelova hrvatskih i muslimansko/bošnjačkih političkih i vojnih struktura, a na više mjesta su počinjeni različiti zločini nad civilnim stanovništvom koje je bilo drugačije vjere i nacionalnosti.

Iako je i *Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan* na koncu propao, struktura vlasti HRHB je postupala kao da je plan prihvaćen te je nastavila donositi odgovarajuća politička i zakonska rješenja koja su trebala uspostaviti HRHB kao jednu od konstitutivnih republika koje čine zajedničku državu BiH. Osim *Temeljne odluke*, doneseni su: *Odluka o konstituiranju Zastupničkog doma HRHB*, *Ukaz o proglašenju Zakona o Vladi HRHB* itd.²⁴³

Takvo postupanje strukture HRHB (kao i prije HZHB) uklapalo se u produblјivanje postojećeg međunacionalnog nepovjerenja i nesnošljivosti na prostoru BiH i pridonosilo je daljnjim dezintegrirajućim procesima u BiH. To sigurno nije bio nacionalni interes Hrvata u BiH, jer (između ostalog) veći dio Hrvata živio je na drugim područjima BiH, koja nije obuhvaćala HRHB.

²³⁹ *Narodni list HRHB*, br. 1, listopad 1993, str. 5-6; (P04611).

²⁴⁰ R. Owen i T. Stoltenberg bili su tada supredsjedatelji *Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji*, koji su kao mirovni posrednici, na temelju pregovora s akterima s područja bivše Jugoslavije, ponudili mirovni plan za BiH; (3D00320).

²⁴¹ Detalji o dokumentu preuzeti iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 414-415 i 429-431; (3D00320).

²⁴² O tome vidi dokumente u Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 410-490; (3D00320).

²⁴³ Za ove i sukladne dokumente vidi *Narodni list HRHB*, 1, listopad 1993; (P04589).

Pritom, kao i u vrijeme HZHB, u formalnom pogledu je na svim službenim dokumentima HRHB u potpunosti poštivana hijerarhija državnih naziva, što znači da je na prvom mjestu redovito stajao naziv «Bosna i Hercegovina», a ispod toga «Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna».

Međutim, usprkos velikoj normativnoj produkciji, struktura HRHB – kao i ranije pod nazivom HZHB – nije na nijednoj razini (unutar hrvatskog korpusa u BiH, u odnosima s muslimansko/bošnjačkom strukturom, u odnosima sa Republikom Hrvatskom i u odnosima s međunarodnom zajednicom) uspijevala stabilizirati situaciju. Odnosno, u cijelom razdoblju 1990.-1995. g. (a i nakon toga) – unutarnja sinergija hrvatske strukture u BiH, kao i njen opći položaj u odnosu na srpsku strukturu u BiH i muslimansko/bošnjačku strukturu, bili su uvjerljivo nekvalitetniji, slabiji i neuspješniji.

Istraživački je otvoreno pitanje o uzrocima i čimbenicima koji su doveli do toga, no to se sigurno ne može objasniti samo malobrojnošću Hrvata u BiH, jer je ta malobrojnost, sama po sebi, olakšavala kvalitetnije strukturiranje hrvatskih nacionalnih interesa u BiH. Tako su hrvatske strukture u BiH u cijelom predratnom, ratnom i poratnom razdoblju ostale nejedinstvene prema različitim osnovama; regionalnoj pripadnosti, političkim uvjerenjima i ciljevima, skupnim i osobnim interesima itd.

Stoga je opće stanje i postupanje hrvatskih struktura u BiH bilo načelno veoma slično stanju i postupanju muslimansko/bošnjačke strukture, a slični su bili i konačni učinci. Odnosno, i hrvatske strukture su bile (još i više od muslimansko/bošnjačkih) unutar sebe heterogene, ali je prevladavao dio koji se zatvarao u površno i usko određene nacionalne interese, u ime kojih su zapravo ostvarivani interesi malih skupina koje su – stjecajem okolnosti – uspjele doći do velike institucijske i materijalne moći, s kojom su asocijalno raspolagale.

Među tri vodeće nacionalne stranke u BiH, HDZBiH je bio u najvećem unutarnjem rasulu, što se na prvi pogled očitovalo u brojnim dramatičnim smjenama kako na čelu stranke (predsjednici i tajnici) tako i u civilnim (HZHB i HRHB) i vojnim (HVO) upravljačkim strukturama.

Neuspostavljanje brze i pune političke i vojne suradnje između hrvatske i muslimansko/bošnjačke strukture, te djelomični oružani sukobi i zločini koji su se – na pojedinim lokalitetima - međusobno događali ne mogu se nikako opravdati, te su jednak i golemi neuspjeh i hrvatskih i muslimansko/bošnjačkih struktura, jer su u krajnje jasnom odnosu snaga u BiH bili upućeni na punu zajedničku obranu od srbijanske agresije (što se počelo u punoj mjeri ostvarivati tek nakon ožujka 1994. g., tj. nakon potpisivanja

Washingtonskih sporazuma). No, na cjelokupnu situaciju u BiH bitno su utjecali i krugovi čimbenika, interesa i aktera koji su bili izvan prostora BiH, te ih se također mora primjereno uvažavati pri objektivnom razumijevanju i prosuđivanju događanja u BiH.²⁴⁴

Strukture HDZBiH, HZHB i potom HRHB su - zbog niza razloga - bile u određenoj mjeri materijalno, vojno i politički ovisne o Republici Hrvatskoj, kao što je sigurnost i stabilnost (naročito južnih dijelova) Republike Hrvatske ovisila i o razvoju situacije u BiH. No, jedna dimenzija tog međudnosa je što su kontinuirano nestabilno i kaotično stanje hrvatskih struktura u BiH slabili i poziciju Republike Hrvatske u odnosu prema međunarodnoj zajednici (od koje je Hrvatska očekivala pomoć za povratak dijela okupiranoga teritorija) i u odnosu prema državi BiH (koju je Hrvatska pomagala u golemim razmjerima radi svojih strateških interesa),²⁴⁵ jer se i u dijelu međunarodne zajednice i u BiH oblikovao i prevladao neosnovani stereotip da Republika Hrvatska tajno radi na propasti i podjeli države BiH.²⁴⁶

Za objektivno razumijevanje ove teme važno je naglasiti da je HZHB (i HRHB), u studenom 1992. g., veoma jasno normativno regulirala i prekogranične odnose sa RH donošenjem *Odluke o graničnim prijelazima prema Republici Hrvatskoj*,²⁴⁷ te potom u veljači 1993. g. donošenjem *Odluke o izmjenama i dopunama...*²⁴⁸ prve *Odluke*, i donošenjem, u lipnju 1993. g., nove *Odluke o graničnim prijelazima prema Republici Hrvatskoj*.²⁴⁹

I na koncu, nekvaliteta i drugi nedostaci institucijske strukture Hrvata u BiH bitno su pridonijeli da su - u procesu uspostavljanja mira od strane međunarodne zajednice na prostoru BiH – jedino hrvatske nacionalne institucije u BiH u velikoj mjeri dekonstruirane, s čime je dugoročno dovedena u pitanje konstitutivnost Hrvata u BiH.

HRHB je prestala postojati 31. kolovoza 1996. g. «u skladu s daytonskim Općim okvirnim sporazumom», te sporazumom o *Federaciji BiH* u kojem je određeno da će tog datuma prestati postojati «ustrojstvo na teritoriju Federacije pod kontrolom HVO-a».²⁵⁰

²⁴⁴ v. Hodge, Carol, *Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas*, Zagreb, 2007.

²⁴⁵ Podaci o tome nalaze se u trećem dijelu ove ekspertize.

²⁴⁶ usp. *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*; i Tuđman, Miroslav, *Vrijeme krivokletnika*, Zagreb, 2006.

²⁴⁷ *Narodni list*, 6/92, str. 42.

²⁴⁸ Isto, 4/93, str. 88.

²⁴⁹ Isto, 10/93, str. 239.

²⁵⁰ *Vjesnik* (dnevna novina), Zagreb, 16. kolovoza 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 697-698; (3D00320).

II.-4

REFERENDUM

Događanja na prostoru BiH, u razdoblju 1990.-1995. g., opterećena su mnogobrojnim i različitim interesima, nestabilnim povijesnim nasljeđem te neizgrađenim institucijama. Uz to, i ove nestalnosti su se značajno mijenjale tijekom rata, što - sve skupa - znatno otežava nastanak objektivnih spoznaja o cjelini, pojedinim dijelovima i akterima tog procesa.

U takvoj situaciji, referendum koji se održao u BiH predstavlja posebno značajan događaj, zbog dva osnovna razloga. Prvo, referendum je jedan od najvažnijih instrumenta neposredne demokracije, kojim se utvrđuje volja građana o bitnim pitanjima. Drugo, u složenoj i promjenjivoj situaciji u BiH, iz odnosa upravljačkih struktura pojedinog konstitutivnog naroda BiH prema referendumskom pitanju o državno-političkoj budućnosti BiH s velikom jasnoćom se mogu prepoznavati temelji njihove političke koncepcije.

Sredinom prosinca 1991. g. *Ministarsko vijeće Europske zajednice (EZ)* je izradilo i prihvatilo *Smjernice za formalno priznavanje novih država u istočnoj Europi i Sovjetskom Savezu*²⁵¹ i *Deklaraciju o Jugoslaviji*.²⁵² Na temelju određenja u ovim dokumentima država SRBiH je zatražila međunarodno priznanje, a *Arbitražna komisija Mirovne konferencije o Jugoslaviji* je, 11. siječnja 1992. g., donijela *Mišljenje broj 4* u kojem navodi da - prema uvidu u izjave i obveze koje je preuzela BiH – država BiH ispunjava uvjete za priznanje, osim što se «srpski članovi Predsjedništva nisu pridružili navedenim izjavama i obvezama.»²⁵³

Zaključeno je: «U tim okolnostima Arbitražna komisija drži da se izrazi volje pučanstva Bosne i Hercegovine da SR BiH konstituiraju kao suverenu i neovisnu državu ne mogu smatrati potpuno utvrđenima.» Međutim, «ovo mišljenje se može promijeniti ako republika koja je podnijela zahtjev za priznanje donese jamstva u tom pogledu putem referenduma na koji bi bili pozvani svi građani Bosne i Hercegovine, bez ikakvih razlika i pod međunarodnom kontrolom.»²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ U Milardović, Anđelko, *Dokumenti o državnosti Republike Hrvatske*, Zagreb, 1992, str. 136; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 11-112; (3D00320).

²⁵² *Slobodna Dalmacija* (dnevna novina), Split, 18. prosinca 1991; dokument je preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 113-114; (3D00320).

²⁵³ *Vjesnik*, 23. siječnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 126-128; (3D00320).

²⁵⁴ Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 128; (3D00320).

Skupština SRBiH je 25. siječnja 1992. g. donijela *Odluku o raspisivanju referenduma o nezavisnosti Bosne i Hercegovine*. Za *Odluku* su glasovali zastupnici svih stranaka osim SDSBIH i *Srpskog pokreta obnove* (SPO), koji su prije glasovanja napustili zasjedanje *Skupštine*. Referendum je zakazan za 29. veljače i 1. ožujka 1992. godine.

Sukladno glasovanju u *Skupštini SRBiH*, muslimansko/bošnjačke strukture i hrvatske strukture u BiH te institucije Republike Hrvatske su, u razdoblju do referenduma, javno zagovarale izlazak građana BiH na referendum i glasovanje za neovisnu državu BiH. Određene nesuglasice odnosile su se na dio formulacije referenduskog pitanja, jer je HDZBiH predlagao da se u referenduskom pitanju naglasi da je BiH državna zajednica «konstitutivnih i suverenih naroda hrvatskog, muslimanskog i srpskog u njihovim nacionalnim područjima (kantonima).»²⁵⁵

Dok se čekalo provođenje referenduma, srpske strukture u BiH sve žešće su ga osuđivale i najavljivale da Srbi na njega neće izaći. Prije održavanja referenduma, u organizaciji srpskih struktura, diljem BiH «osvanule su barikade i odjekivale eksplozije bombi, a noć uoči referenduma obilovala je pucnjavom i zastrašivanjem građana.»²⁵⁶ U vrijeme održavanja referenduma, «SDS postavlja barikade u Sarajevu s namjerom da se omete prikupljanje glasačkih kutija.»²⁵⁷

Republičko izborno povjerenstvo BiH je, 09. ožujka 1992. g., proglasilo konačne i službene rezultate referenduma. Od ukupno, približno, 3.250.000 glasača na referendum je izašlo i glasovalo 64,3% građana s pravom glasa. Od toga je čak 99,4% glasovalo za suverenu i neovisnu državu BiH. Referendum je proveden na približno 5.000 glasačkih mjesta i uspješno je «proveden u 107 od 109 bosansko-hercegovačkih općina. Nije proveden jedino u Drvaru i Bosanskom Grahovu i djelomično u bosanskom Brodu.»²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ U Čekić, S., n. dj., str. 312; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 133; (3D00320). O političkom postupanju muslimansko/bošnjačke i hrvatske strukture vezano za referendum, te o ulozi međunarodne zajednice, značajan je i dokument koji govori o zatvorenoj (tajnoj) sjednici *Glavnog odbora SDA*, održanoj 25. veljače 1992. g. u Sarajevu; v. tjednik *Dani* (Sarajevo), 07. ožujka 2008.

²⁵⁶ *Kronologija rata...*, str. 142.

²⁵⁷ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, str. 385.

²⁵⁸ *Kronologija rata...*, str. 147.

II.-5

ORUŽANE SNAGE NACIONALNIH ENTITETA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

II.-5.1 Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS)

Ključna institucija za nastanak VRS bila je JNA, koja je bila jedna od najvažnijih institucijskih sastavnica cijelog velikosrbijanskog projekta. JNA je imala sve pretpostavke za oružano organiziranje Srba i na teritoriju BiH, jer je na njemu – sukladno jugoslavenskoj obrambenoj koncepciji - imala raspoređene veoma jake snage. Tako je JNA na prostoru BiH već 1990. g. «u skladu s naređenjem Generalštaba Oružanih snaga SFRJ, te političkih i vojnih subjekata Srbije i Crne Gore ... planski i organizovano naoružavala članove i simpatizere SDS.»²⁵⁹

Iz dokumenata koji su se nalazili u zapovjedništvu jugoslavenske *Druge* (sarajevske) *vojne oblasti* «vidi se da je JNA do 19. marta 1992. godine srpskim dobrovoljačkim jedinicama podělila oko 51.900 komada streljačkog naoružanja, a posebno su članovi SDS dobili 23.298 komada.»²⁶⁰

Vojne snage JNA u BiH značajno su pojačane od ljeta do listopada 1991. g., kad je veći dio postrojbi i opreme JNA povučen iz Slovenije i uglavnom smješten na prostor BiH. U studenom 1991. g. sklopljen je sporazum JNA s Republikom Hrvatskom o povlačenju JNA iz četrdesetak vojarni koje su u blokadi držale hrvatske snage, te je narednih mjeseci «JNA iz Hrvatske izvukla 310 tenkova, 210 oklopnih transportera, 260 topova, 210 zrakoplova i 40 helikoptera, kao i 4 podmornice, 4 fregate i 38 manjih ratnih brodova.»²⁶¹

Na taj način je na području BiH početkom 1992. g. došlo do goleme koncentracije srbijanskih vojnih snaga, a tadašnja čelna osoba JNA, general Veljko Kadijević je jasno naveo

²⁵⁹ Divjak, j., n. dj. str. 183.

²⁶⁰ Isto, str. 183; «Jedan od trojice snajperista koje su specijalci MUP-a uhapsili dok su iz hotela Hollidy Inn 6. aprila 1992. pucali na masu okupljenu pred Skupštinom BiH bio je Branko Kovačević, zamenik sekretara za narodnu obranu Sarajeva, a pre toga lični sekretar Radovana Karadžića.»

²⁶¹ Kulenović, Tarik, *Pripreme za rat i početak rata u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992. godine*, u «Polemos», 1, Zagreb, 1998, str. 104.

razloge: «Procjenjujući daljnji razvoj događaja, smatrali smo da nakon napuštanja Hrvatske, u BiH treba imati jake snage JNA. To je odgovaralo svakoj realnoj mogućoj opciji razvoja događaja u BiH».²⁶²

Sukladno tome, na samom kraju 1991. g. *krnje* (prosrbijsko) *Predsjedništvo SFRJ* je donijelo odluku o reorganizaciji JNA. Plan reorganizacije izradili su – početkom 1992. g. – *Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu obranu* (SSNO) i *Ministarstvo obrane Republike Srbije*, pod nazivom *Koncept formiranja jugoslavenskih obrambenih snaga*.

U planu je JNA pozvana da «nastavi sa zaštitom srpskog stanovništva izvan Srbije transferom svojih zapovjednih struktura u postrojbe Teritorijalne obrane i opskrbom tih snaga osobnim naoružanjem, topništvom, oklopnim postrojbama i raketnim lansirnim sustavima. Ministarstva obrane SAO-a u Hrvatskoj i BiH bila su potčinjena Ministarstvu obrane Srbije s kojim su trebala koordinirati svoje obrambene planove, zajednički štiti vanjske granice i ustavni poredak. SAO su trebale organizirati svoje oružane snage i novačiti vojne obveznike, uz prethodno dopuštenje Beograda. Operativno zapovjedništvo nad svim snagama imao je Generalštab JNA».²⁶³

U prvoj polovici siječnja 1992. g., usporedo s proglašenjem *Republike srpskog naroda u BiH*, «Milošević izdaje tajnu naredbu da se u BiH vrate svi oficiri JNA rođeni u toj republici.»²⁶⁴

Nakon međunarodnog priznanja BiH (07. travnja 1992.) i usprkos tome što je JNA već prije postala nositelj srbijanske oružane agresije na BiH, *Predsjedništvo RBiH* je, na svojim sjednicama u drugoj polovici travnja 1992. g., najprije pozvalo «snage JNA na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine da se stave pod komandu legalnih vlasti ove republike i da osujete snage agresora na svim poljima.»²⁶⁵

Međutim, na sjednici održanoj pred kraj travnja 1992., *Predsjedništvo RBiH*, polazeći od činjenice da je BiH «suverena i međunarodno priznata država i da je proglašena Savezna Republika Jugoslavija, donijelo je Odluku o povlačenju jedinica JNA sa teritorije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.»²⁶⁶

²⁶² Kadrijević, V., *Moje viđenje raspada*, Beograd, 1993, str. 147.

²⁶³ Vego, Milan, *The Yugoslav Ground Forces*, u «Jane's Intelligence Review, 5, 6, 1993, str. 250.; navod preuzet iz Kulenović, T., n. dj., str. 107-108.

²⁶⁴ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, str. 384.

²⁶⁵ *Zapisnik 69. sjednice Predsjedništva BiH, održane 13. i 14. aprila 1992. godine*, objavljeno u «National Security and the Future», vol. 7, nr. 3, 2006, str. 136.

²⁶⁶ *Zapisnik 79. sjednice Predsjedništva BiH ...*, objavljeno u «National Security...», vol. 7, nr. 3, 2006, str. 178.

Uskoro iza toga, 04. svibnja 1992. g., «Generalštab JNA je objavio povlačenje vojnog osoblja i njihovih obitelji iz BiH, koji nisu stanovnici BiH ... dok su pripadnici saveznih snaga, stanovnici BiH transformirani u Teritorijalnu obranu Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (kasnije VRS).»²⁶⁷ Sredinom svibnja 1992. g. pukovnik JNA Ratko Mladić, zapovjednik *Kninskog korpusa JNA*, postavljen je «za komandanta srpske vojske u BiH, odnosno Vojske Republike Srpske (VRS).»²⁶⁸

«Organizacijski, VRS je bio podijeljen u pet korpusa: 1. krajiški korpus (Banja Luka), 2. krajiški korpus (Drvar), 3. sjevernobosanski korpus, 4. istočnobosanski korpus (sarajevsko-romanijski) i 5. hercegovački korpus.»²⁶⁹

U tom razdoblju, ukupna snaga svih korpusa VRS «iznosila je između 90.000 i 100.000 dobro naoružanih vojnika, pitomaca i starešina, 750-800 tenkova, oko 1.000 oklopnih transporterata i drugih oklopnih vozila, više od 4.000 minobacača i artiljerijskih oruđa, te do 100 aviona i 50 helikoptera.»²⁷⁰

Prema tome, VRS je nastala od velikih dijelova JNA, dijelova *Teritorijalne obrane* s područja BiH i od različitih paravojnih postrojbi.

No, Kadijević je s pravom zaključio: «Komande i jedinice JNA su činile kičmu vojske Republike Srpske sa kompletnim naoružanjem i opremom. Ta vojska je, uz puni oslonac na srpski narod ... stvorila vojničke pretpostavke za adekvatna politička rešenja, koja će odgovarati njegovim nacionalnim interesima i ciljevima, razume se, u meri koju to sadašnje međunarodne okolnosti dozvoljavaju.»²⁷¹

II.-5.2 Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (ARBiH)

Začetak ARBiH nalazio se u (polu)tajnom vojnom dijelu *Patriotske lige* (PL), koje je krajem 1990. ili početkom 1991. g. osnovano pod okriljem SDA. Vojni dio PL radio je na

²⁶⁷ *Zapisnik 79. sjednice...održane 27. aprila 1992. godine*, u Isto, str. 177.

²⁶⁸ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 184.

²⁶⁹ Kulenović, T., n. dj., str. 108.

²⁷⁰ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 184.

²⁷¹ Kadijević, V., n. dj., str. 148; usp. Domazet, Davor, *Uloga JNA kao srpske imperijalne sile u bosanskohercegovačkom ratu*, Hrvatski vojnik, Zagreb, 1998. (teksta je preveden i na engleski jezik: «The Role of JNA as Serbian imperiale force in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina»); v. odgovarajuće grafičke prikaze na www.slobodanpraljak.com

organiziranju oružanog otpora, a civilni dio PL je - kroz SDA i strukturu vlasti BiH koju su činili članovi SDA - nastojao pregovorima pronaći političko rješenje na razini Jugoslavije ili na razini BiH.

Prve postrojbe PL osnivane su u konspirativnim uvjetima, na dragovoljačkoj osnovi, bez jasnog vojničkog ustroja i hijerarhije. Zbog toga je postojalo i mnoštvo naziva postrojbi (*Bosna-1, Bosna-2, Zelene beretke* itd.), bez prepoznatljivosti o vrsti i brojnosti postrojbi. Zapovjednik PL-a bio je Sefer Halilović, koji je bio časnik JNA i suradnik *Kontraobavještajne službe* (KOS) JNA.

PL je postupno postajala sve brojnija i organiziranija, te je «na vojnom savjetovanju u Mehurićima kod Travnika (7.-8. 2. 1992.) ... ustanovljeno da Patriotska liga raspolaže sa 60 do 70.000 naoružanih članova. Sustav je pokrивao cijelu BiH, a sastojao se od Glavnog stožera PL-a na razini Republike, devet regionalnih stožera, 103 općinska stožera i velikog broja različitih postrojbi, organiziranih u formacije od voda do brigade.»²⁷²

Dan nakon međunarodnog priznanja BiH, 08. travnja 1992. g., *Predsjedništvo RBiH* donijelo je «uredbu sa zakonskom snagom ... o ukidanju dosadašnjeg Republičkog štaba teritorijalne odbrane i obrazovanju Štaba teritorijalne odbrane Republike Bosne i Hercegovine» (*Štab TORBiH*), a za komandanta je imenovan pukovnik Hasan Efendić. «Odlučeno je da o upotrebi teritorijalne odbrane odlučuje ... Predsjedništvo Republike.» Na istoj sjednici je donesena i odluka «o proglašenju neposredne ratne opasnosti», te odluka «o izmjeni naziva Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina u naziv Republika Bosna i Hercegovina.»²⁷³

«Toga (08. travnja 1992. g., op. a.) i narednoga dana lojalnost novom štabu TO napismeno je izrazilo 40 od 48 pripadnika ranijeg Republičkog štaba TO ... 1990. u BiH je bilo devet okružnih štabova TO, a toga ih je dana (08. travnja 1992. g., op. a.) sedam napismeno potvrdilo da prihvataju odluku ... što su učinila i 73 opštinska štaba od ukupno 109.»²⁷⁴

Na slijedećoj sjednici (09. travnja 1992.) *Predsjedništvo RBiH* je donijelo *Odluku o objedinjavanju svih naoružanih snaga na teritoriji Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, prema kojoj «su svi naoružani sastavi i pojedinci, osim snaga JNA i snaga MUP-a, dužni da se»

²⁷² Kulenović, T., n. dj., str. 105; usp. Halilović, S., n. dj., str. 120.

²⁷³ *Zapisnik 65. sjednice Predsjedništva Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, u «National Security...», 7, 3, 2006, str.126.

²⁷⁴ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 187.

prijave mjesno nadležnom štabu TO «radi stavljanja pod jedinstvenu komandu i dobivanja jedinstvenog obilježja.»

To je značilo da su i sve postrojbe *Patriotske lige* trebale ući u sustav novog TO-a u BiH. «Glavni štab Patriotske lige priključio se Štabu TORBiH odmah 12. aprila.»²⁷⁵ Tada je započelo postupno preustrojavanje i ujednačavanje dotadašnjih postrojbi: «pristupa se u maju i junu organizovanju štabova i jedinica TO – vodova, četa i bataljona, u junu i julu stvaraju se brigade, a od septembra do kraja 1992. godine korpusi.»²⁷⁶ Međutim, veliku objektivnu teškoću - koja je bitno usporavala te dovodila u pitanje ujednačenost i postojanost navedenog procesa integracije oružanih snaga R BiH – predstavljala je vojna i komunikacijska izoliranost Sarajeva, koje je bilo formalno središte vojne i političke vlasti, koja je otežano vodila komunikaciju i još teže nadzirala djelovanje podređenih struktura.²⁷⁷

U ustrojavanju *Oružanih snaga R BiH* pojavili su se i mnogi drugi problemi, a neki su potrajali «i do kraja rata».²⁷⁸ Dva velika «tehnička» problema bila su nedostatak vojno obrazovanih stručnjaka,²⁷⁹ te nedostatak oružja i municije, a «oko 75% pripadnika oružanih snaga prvu je godinu rata provelo u civilnoj odeći i obući ... I oznake su bile različite – od amblema TO i Patriotske lige preko grbova raznih gradova (Tuzla, Mostar) do traka oko rukava.»²⁸⁰

Druge vrste problema bilo je puno teže prevladavati. Radilo se o činjenici da je *Patriotska liga* «zadržala svoj stožer, koji je bio odvojen od TO, a suparništvo koje je iz toga neizbježno proizlazilo nije okončano ni kada je ... Republički štab TO formalno preuzeo zapovjedništvo nad svim postrojbama u BiH koje su bile osnovane na političkoj platformi PL.»²⁸¹ Osim toga, na nejedinstvenost *Oružanih snaga R BiH* je bitno utjecala i činjenica da je trebalo objediniti i druge veoma različite vojske i postrojbe: «Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (HVO),

²⁷⁵ Isto, str. 187.

²⁷⁶ Isto, str. 189.

²⁷⁷ v. Šimić, Tomo, *Djelovanje Predsjedništva BiH u uvjetima bitno smanjene komunikacije između Sarajeva i drugih dijelova BiH...*, u «National Security and the Future», vol. 7, nr. 1-2, 2006, str. 115-161.

²⁷⁸ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 189.

²⁷⁹ Isto, str. 189: «U mnogim brigadama na dužnostima komandanata bili su ljudi koji čak nisu bili odslužili ni vojni rok, a u jednoj su se brigadi, koja je imala više od 5.000 pripadnika, čak hvalili kako nemaju nijednoga oficira ili podoficira».

²⁸⁰ Isto, str. 189.

²⁸¹ Hoare, M. A., n. dj., str. 213.

Hrvatske obrambene snage (HOS), Zelene beretke kao stranačku miliciju SDA i druge grupe otpora koje su nastajale u raznim krajevima širom Bosne i Hercegovine.»²⁸²

Na najvišim i visokim zapovjednim razinama poseban problem je bio u tome što su u strukturi civilne i vojne vlasti presudnu «važnost zadobivali osobni odnosi među pojedinim političarima, dužnosnicima i zapovjednicima»,²⁸³ pa je utjecaj «političkih i vojnih vođa na vojna pitanja ovisio o njihovoj vlastitoj mreži patronske-klijentskih odnosa, što je pak dalo poticaja borbama za moć».²⁸⁴ «Sve je to bilo dio šireg procesa u sklopu kojeg su se čelnici i dužnosnici SDA te birokrati i sigurnosni časnici bivšega komunističkog režima stapali u novu bošnjačku elitu.»²⁸⁵

U takvoj uglavnom nekontroliranoj situaciji, nije uopće zanemarivo što su u različitim dijelovima BiH i «kriminalni elementi u bosanskim oružanim snagama također ... imali vlastite sebične interese». Primjerice, kad se radi o opsadi Sarajeva, interes kriminalnih skupina koje su bile dio obrane bio je «u tome da se zadrži opsada i unosno crno tržište ... pri čemu su djelovali u suradnji s kolegama kriminalcima među srpskim vojnicima koji su držali opsadu i onima u HVO-u. Zapovjednik bosanskog prvoga (sarajevskog) korpusa ... tvrdi da je crte bojišnice na Igmanu kontrolirala mafija svih nacionalnosti.»²⁸⁶

Već u drugoj polovici svibnja 1992. g., s mjesta zapovjednika *Štaba TORBiH* je smijenjen H. Efendić, a postavljen je S. Halilović. Dana 04. srpnja 1992. g. oružane snage BiH su službeno dobile naziv *Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* (ARBiH).²⁸⁷

Sukobi interesa unutar SDA-ovske muslimansko/bošnjačke strukture, očitovali su se i u sukobima za prevlast nad ARBiH. Tako, «Halilovićeva se smjena razmatrala već u srpnju 1992.», ali on je tek u lipnju 1993. g., provođenjem reorganizacije *Vrhovne komande ARBiH*, najprije «degradiran na četvrto mjesto u armijskoj hijerarhiji»,²⁸⁸ a tijekom *Operacije Trebević* (započela pri kraju listopada 1993. g.) «Halilović je smjesta skinut s mjesta načelnika Štaba i stavljen pod istragu.»²⁸⁹

²⁸² Isto, str. 213.

²⁸³ Isto, str. 213.

²⁸⁴ Isto, str. 215.

²⁸⁵ Isto, str. 216.

²⁸⁶ Isto, str. 217.

²⁸⁷ Isto, str. 215.

²⁸⁸ Isto, str. 219.

²⁸⁹ Isto, str. 221; Otvoreno je pitanje koliko je na procese u ARBiH od kraja 1992. g. (kao i na druge procese u BiH) utjecala činjenica što je u prosincu 1992. g. Aliji Izetbegoviću isticao mandat na čelu *Predsjedništva RBiH*, a *Ustav* je predviđao smjenu (na redu je bio predstavnik Hrvata, tj. HDZ-a). No, do smjene nije došlo, jer se to

Kada je u lipnju 1993. g. na čelno mjesto ARBiH postavljen Rasim Delić započeo je proces dubljih, radikalnih, kadrovskih i ideoloških preobrazbi u ARBiH, s kojima je ona sve više «postajala stranačka vojska SDA, neovisna o nadzoru formalnih državnih tijela. U skladu s time, osoba predsjednika Izetbegovića sve će izrazitije zadobivati središnju ulogu u armijskoj propagandi».²⁹⁰ Od procesa reorganizacije ARBiH tijekom 1993. g. «pojačalo se i islamsko usmjerenja armije».²⁹¹ Simbolički izraz tog procesa očitovao se u listopadu 1994. g. kada je Izetbegović «proglašen "počasnim zapovjednikom" Sedme muslimanske brigade»,²⁹² koja se isticala radikalnom vjerskom indoktrinacijom.

Snaga ARBiH se neprekidno povećavala. Godine 1993. ona je imala približno «200.000 ljudi iako nisu svi bili naoružani, a 1994. došli smo do 250.000. Osnovni problem bio je u tome što nismo imali ni po jednu pušku na jednoga vojnika.»²⁹³

Tijek rata i povećavanje snage ARBiH pratile su i odgovarajuće promjene vojnog ustroja. Osnovni problem postrojbi bila je njihova slaba manevarska sposobnost, pa su početkom 1994. g. formirane operativne grupe, a u brigadama su ustrojavani manevarski bataljoni. U proljeće 1995. g. «rasformiraju se operativne grupe, te formiraju manevarske brigade i divizije.»²⁹⁴

Tijekom cjelokupnog ratnog razdoblja ARBiH je na različite načine (logistički, ustrojbeno, obučavanjem, zajedničkim djelovanjima) bila ovisna i o pomoći institucija države RH, a to je zasebno obrađeno u trećem dijelu ove ekspertize.

II.-5.3 Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (HVO)

Korijeni nastanka HVO-a nalaze se najprije u činjenici da je veliki dio Hrvata (procjene govore o 10 do 20.000)²⁹⁵ iz BiH sudjelovao 1990. i 1991. g. u obrani Republike Hrvatske od srbijanske oružane agresije. Stoga je, tijekom 1991. g., na različite načine – a

(problematično) opravdavalo ratnim stanjem, te je Izetbegović do kraja rata bio *Predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH*.

²⁹⁰ Isto, str. 223.

²⁹¹ Isto, str. 222.

²⁹² Isto, str. 223.

²⁹³ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 191.

²⁹⁴ Isto, str. 194.

²⁹⁵ Kulenović, T., n. dj., str. 106.

vezano za sve otvorenije srbijanske oružane prijetnje prostoru BiH – i među Hrvate u BiH stizalo oružje za obranu te su stvarane lokalne, međusobno nepovezane dragovoljačke skupine. Potrebno je naglasiti da je u obrani RH sudjelovao i, za sada, neutvrđeni broj Muslimana/Bošnjaka iz BiH i RH, koji su također sudjelovali u nastanku i djelovanju HVO-a.

Zatim, prostor BiH je intenzivno korišten za srbijansku oružanu agresiju na Hrvatsku, te su naročito južni dijelovi BiH u drugoj polovici 1991. g. postali sastavni dio bojišta u Hrvatskoj. Na taj način su i među Hrvate u BiH postupno, osim oružja, počeli pristizati (vraćati se) skupine i pojedinci koji su već bili dragovoljci u Republici Hrvatskoj.

U neuobičajeno složenim (ili čak kaotičnim) političkim i vojnim okolnostima koje su prevladavale naročito u početnim godinama rata na prostoru BiH, proces uključivanja tadašnjih pripadnika *Hrvatske vojske – HV* (iz Republike Hrvatske) u obranu BiH, tj. u oružane postrojbe na prostoru BiH (HVO, HOS, ARBiH) predstavlja jedno od otvorenih istraživačkih pitanja. No, nedvojbeno je taj proces bio brojan i događao se na najrazličitije načine, a u prilog tome je išla i opća situacija u RH, koja je bila neizvjesna a ustrojavanje institucijske strukture u RH bilo je u početnom razdoblju i bilo je bitno opterećeno tzv. *tranzicijskim* problemima. O dijelu tog procesa govori se u trećem dijelu ove ekspertize.

S druge strane, vitalni državni interesi RH bili su vezani i za obranu BiH od srbijanske oružane agresije, te je stoga RH na brojne načine intenzivno pomagala obranu opstanka BiH.²⁹⁶ U tom kontekstu je već 07. srpnja 1992. g. izdana kratka *Uputa Ministra obrane* (RH) *svim zapovjedništvima Hrvatske vojske*, kojom je jasno oblikovan odnos i interes države RH prema obrani države RBiH.

Uputa glasi: «Nije dozvoljeno ni jednom zapovjedniku slanje ili upotreba Hrvatske vojske izvan granica Republike Hrvatske. Svi koji to učine bez izričite zapovjedi Vrhovnog zapovjednika snosit će posljedice za svoje postupke. Ukoliko dobrovoljci iz hrvatskih postrojbi koji su rodom iz Bosne i Hercegovine žele ići na ratište i braniti svoje domove, zapovjednici ih ne smiju u tome zaustavljati.»²⁹⁷

Prilikom procesa okupljanja različitih naoružanih grupa i postrojbi u sustav *Hrvatskog vijeća obrane* (HVO), kao dijela oružanih snaga HZHB (kasnije HRHB) i dijela *Oružanih snaga BiH*, poseban problem je bilo pitanje *Hrvatskih obrambenih snaga* (HOS), čije je nastajanje u Republici Hrvatskoj inicirala i kasnije dijelom nadzirala *Hrvatska stranka prava* (HSP). *Stožer HOS-a za Hercegovinu* «osnovan je 03. siječnja 1992. g.», a procjenjuje se da

²⁹⁶ O tome se posebno govori u trećem dijelu ove ekspertize («Odnos RH prema BiH 1990.-1995. g.»).

²⁹⁷ Pismohrana Slobodana Praljka, POS-2-113.

je «HOS u BiH imao do 5000 pripadnika ... HOS je odigrao značajnu ulogu u oslobađanju Mostara, Čapljine, Neuma i Stoca».²⁹⁸

U postrojbama HOS-a bio je i veliki broj Muslimana/Bošnjaka. Zapovjednik HOS-a bio je Blaž Kraljević, iseljeni Hrvat koji je kao dragovoljac došao iz Australije i koji je zagovarao suradnju Hrvata i Muslimana/Bošnjaka. Početkom kolovoza 1992. g., «Vlada u Sarajevu imenovala (je) generala Kraljevića članom Glavnog stožera AR BiH.»²⁹⁹ Zbog niza neslaganja koja su postojala između dijelova HVO i HOS-a, Kraljević je uskoro ubijen u zasjedi kod Mostara. Tada je - sporazumom koji su 23. kolovoza 1992. potpisali Mate Boban i načelnik *Glavnog stožera HOS-a* (Ante Prkačin) - jedva spriječen opći oružani sukob između HOS-a i HVO-a. Nakon toga, HOS je postupno rastrojen, skupnim ili pojedinačnim prijelazima u HVO ili u ARBiH.

Prema procjenama koje su veoma različite, HVO je - u politički i vojno najkritičnijem razdoblju 1992.-1993. g. – vjerojatno imao između «35 i 37.000 pripadnika, organiziranih u 40 do 45 postrojbi veličine bataljuna i 20 postrojbi veličine voda. Teritorijalno, u zapadnoj Hercegovini bilo je oko 20.000 pripadnika HVO-a, 10-12.000 u sjevernoj Bosni, 3000 u središnjoj Bosni i 2000 ljudi u sjeverozapadnoj Bosni.»³⁰⁰

No, višestruki su razlozi zbog kojih su još uvijek naglašeno otvoreni problemi glede utvrđivanja snage, djelovanja i drugih obilježja HVO-a.

Prvi razlog su (ranije naznačena) nesređenost i kaotičnost (nekvaliteta) hrvatskih struktura u BiH, pa su te slabosti bile još izraženije u oružanim postrojbama koje su se zbirno nazivale HVO, tako da je problematična i evidencijska pouzdanost, kao i podaci koji iz toga proističu. U simboličkom pogledu je zanimljivo da je i najviše tijelo izvršne uprave i vlasti na području HZHB također nazvano HVO,³⁰¹ što je i tada i danas izazivalo zabunu kod manje upućenih u zbivanja.

Najviša tijela vlasti HZHB i HRHB su tijekom 1992. i 1993. g. donijele veliki broj različitih propisa koji su se odnosili na oružane snage, te rat i neposrednu ratnu opasnost.³⁰²

²⁹⁸ Kulenović, T., n. dj., str. 106.

²⁹⁹ Isto, str. 106.

³⁰⁰ Isto, str. 102 i 106. U sudskom procesu koji se pred MKSJ vodi protiv Prlića i drugih navodi se: «... što se tiče HVO-a ukupan broj vojnika bio je 36.797, podijeljeno kao što slijedi, 20.841 Hrvat i 15.956 Muslimana.» (preuzeto iz Praljak, Slobodan, *Financiranje HVO-a*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2008, str. 97).

³⁰¹ *Narodni list*, 1, 1992, str. 5.

³⁰² *Narodni list*, 1992. g.; br. 1 («Uredba o oružanim snagama», «Uredba o preuzimanju sredstava JNA i SSNO...», «Uredba o postupanju s osobama zarobljenim u oružanim sukobima», «Odluka o plaćama i drugim

No, praktično, oružane snage (tj. HVO) su i nadalje opstajale s nizom osnovnih slabosti. Zanimljivo je što se u često veoma opsežnim obrambeno-vojnim propisima, izuzetno rijetko koristi naziv HVO (u vojnom smislu), nego uglavnom «oružane snage» itd.

Temeljni dokument svakako je opsežna *Uredba o oružanim snagama HZHB* koja je donesena 03. srpnja 1992. g., a objavljena je u rujnu 1992. godine. *Uredba* je donekle izmijenjena sredinom listopada 1992. g. i objavljena je u studenom 1992. godine. U članku 2. je određeno: «Obrambeni sustav HZ H-B jedinstveni je oblik ustrojstva oružanih snaga, tijela uprave i pravnih osoba u svrhu pravodobnog i organiziranog sprječavanja od napada i drugih opasnosti ... oružane snage i druga tijela imaju pravo i dužnost odmah započeti s oružanom borbom i drugim oblicima otpora protiv napadača».³⁰³

Gotovo sve važnije ovlasti nad oružanim snagama dodijeljene su predsjedniku HZHB, koji je «vrhovni zapovjednik Oružanih snaga», te «utvrđuje ... Osnove ustrojstva Oružanih snaga ... Donosi plan uporabe i nalaže uporabu Oružanih snaga ... Daje smjernice za poduzimanje mjera pripravnosti i mobilizacije ... Utvrđuje osnove kadrovske politike ... Propisuje opća i osnovna pravila ... Imenuje i razrješava dužnosti vojne zapovjednike».³⁰⁴

Međutim, praktično, u nesređenim okolnostima, nije se mogla uspostaviti značajnija i cjelovitija koordinacija između hrvatske političke i vojne komponente u BiH, a slično je bilo i unutar vojnih odnosa u HVO-u. Zapovjedna struktura u HVO-u, pogotovo postrojbama, bila je uglavnom bez osoba s vojnim obrazovanjem, vojnici su uglavnom bili vojnički nepripremljeni, hijerarhija i stega uglavnom nisu postojale, postrojbe nisu bile cjelovite po strukturi i popuni, nastajale su na teritorijalnom načelu te su uglavnom tako djelovale i bile opskrbljivane.

Zbog svega toga, subordinacija, komunikacija i međusobna suradnja postrojbi je bila veoma slaba, a onemogućavale su je i druge okolnosti; potpuna nepovezanost ili slaba povezanost područja koja su nadzirali pojedini dijelovi hrvatskih struktura ili postrojbe HVO-a (Hercegovina, srednja BiH, Posavina, zapadna BiH). U takvim okolnostima, u kojima su postrojbe bile uglavnom općinski organizirane i zatvorene, jedan od većih problema HVO-a

novčanim naknadama pripadnika oružanih snaga HZHB, Odluka o činovima...», «Propisnik o vojnoj stezi»); br. 4 («Uredbu o utvrđivanju ratnih šteta»); br. 5 («Odluka o statusu izbjeglica i prognanih osoba...»), «Pravilnik o uvjetima i postupku za prevođenje, dodjelu činova i promaknućima...»); br. 7 («Pravilnik o izvršavanju vojne obveze i civilne službe»); *Narodni list* 1993. g.; br. 4 («Pravilnik o vojnoj iskaznici»); br. 11 («Odluku o sprovedbi i izvođenju mobilizacije...»).

³⁰³ *Narodni list*, 6, 1992, str. 9.

³⁰⁴ Isto, str. 12, čl. 29.

bio je i u znatnom utjecaju lokalne (općinske) civilne strukture te zavičajnih interesa i odnosa na lokalne postrojbe HVO-a. To je još više narušavalo ionako slabu zapovjednu hijerarhiju, te je u vojne poslove, odluke i djelovanja unosilo devijacije *amoralne familijarnosti*.

Naznačeni problemi i nepoznanice glede nastanka, brojnog stanja, načina djelovanja i drugog što se odnosi na HVO, jasno se prepoznaju i iz dostupnih dokumenata koji se odnose na financiranje HVO-a.³⁰⁵ Struktura vlasti HZHB (HRHB), uključujući vojnu i civilnu komponentu HVO-a, financirala se na nekoliko glavnih osnovnih načina: središnji vlastiti prihodi (porezi, ratni porez, kompenzacije itd.), lokalni vlastiti prihodi (ratni porezi itd.), posudbe kod RH, donacije hrvatskog iseljništva. Zajednička značajka ovih načina bila je njihova velika međusobna i pojedinačna nekvaliteta (formalna i stvarna neizgrađenost, neujednačenost ili kontradiktornost itd.).

Primjerice, u siječnju 1994. g. u ministarstvu obrane HRHB napravljeno je godišnje izvješće, tj. *Zaključni račun* za 1993. godinu,³⁰⁶ a osnovnu «poteškoću u sačinjavanju Zaključnog računa su nam pričinjavale sve postrojbe i Zborna područja koji nam nisu dostavili svoje Zaključne račune ... Izuzetak je ZP Orašje, koje nam je dostavilo svoj obračun.»³⁰⁷

Zatim, u dokumentu je naglašeno da se materijalno financijsko poslovanje Ministarstva obrane HRHB u 1993. g. odvijalo uz čak 18 bitnih «ograničavajućih okolnosti», među kojima su i slijedeće: «Nepostojanje sustava jedinstvenog financiranja ... Samofinanciranje postrojbi HVO preko općinskih organa ... Nepostojanje cjelovitog vojnog ustroja ... Stalno formiranje i preformiranje postrojbi - ustanova ... Nepostojanje ratnih rezervi ... Nepostojanje uvjetnog skladišnog prostora ... Netipiziranost materijalnih sredstava ... Nepostojanje stalnih izvora financiranja».³⁰⁸

U *Izješću o transferu fin. (financijskih, op. a.) sredstava Hrvatskoj Republici Hercegovini, odnosno Federaciji BiH*, kojeg je 2000. godine Sektor za financije i proračun Ministarstva obrane RH dostavio Državnom uredu za reviziju RH, precizno i detaljno se navode podaci o financijskim sredstvima koje je RH, u razdoblju od 1992. do 1998. g. transferirala «u korist proračuna Hrvatske Republike Hercegovina, odnosno, hrvatske komponente Federacije BiH ... za slijedeće namjene:

³⁰⁵ v. dio dokumentacije objavljene u Praljak, S., *Financiranje HVO-a*, Zagreb, 2008, te opsežniju dokumentaciju na www.slobodanpraljak.com.

³⁰⁶ Praljak, S., *Financiranje HVO-a*, str. 79-88.

³⁰⁷ Isto, str. 84.

³⁰⁸ Isto, str. 81-82.

- osnovne plaće pripadnika HVO,
- ratni dodatak pripadnika HVO,
- skrb o stradalnicima rata (pomoć obiteljima poginulih branitelja i ratnim vojnim invalidima,
- dotacije za materijalne izdatke institucija i javnih ustanova Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosna, odnosno, hrvatske komponente Federacije BiH.»³⁰⁹

Iz tog dokumenta se također saznaje: «... transferi financijskih sredstava bili su planirani kao posebna proračunska pozicija u Proračunu MORH-a (Ministarstva obrane RH, op. a.) za cijelo promatrano razdoblje ... Sabor Republike Hrvatske svake je godine u redovitoj proceduri usvajao narečene Proračune Ministarstva obrane.»³¹⁰ Iz drugih dokumenata se nedvojbeno utvrđuje da je MORH transfer sredstava prema HZHB (HRHB) upućivao kao posudbu koja je išla na teret proračuna HZHB (HRHB).³¹¹

Lokalne općinske vlasti (Predsjedništva skupština općina, Ratna predsjedništva općina, Izvršni odbori općina itd.) na području HZHB (HRHB), kao i na drugim područjima BiH pod nadzorom hrvatskih i/ili muslimansko/bošnjačkih struktura, donosile su svoje *Odluke* ili *Naredbe* o ratnom porezu, koji su u korist općinskih proračuna morali plaćati radnici uposleni u inozemstvu i umirovljenici koji su mirovine ostvarili u inozemstvu. Iznos tog ratnog poreza i njegovog trošenja bio je neujednačen među općinama, a pojedine općine su ga mijenjale prema svojim procjenama i potrebama.³¹²

Za stvarnu situaciju na području HZHB posebno je ilustrativan dopis kojeg je, 20. veljače 1993. g., lokalni (općinski) *HVO Tomislavgrad* uputio središnjem *HVO-u HZHB*, u kojem se od HVO HZHB zahtjeva da preuzme daljnje financiranja troškova lokalne brigade HVO-a («Kralj Tomislav»),³¹³ te da se općini isplati naknada «do sada stvorenih troškova». Navodi se: «Od početka rata pa do danas općina Tomislavgrad nije imala financijske pomoći ni od HZ HB, niti od bilo koje druge općine. Sve troškove rata morala je snositi sama ... Pouzdano znamo da da financijski teret i svaki drugi teret rata – ni u ljudstvu, tehnicima ni mehanizaciji niti u financijama – nije objektivno raspoređen po općinama.

U sastavu brigade "Kralj Tomislav" nalazi se jedna bojna iz Kupresa i jedna bojna iz Posušja. Od općine Kupres bilo je teško i očekivati da može preuzeti sama troškove svoje

³⁰⁹ www.slobodanpraljak.com

³¹⁰ Isto.

³¹¹ Praljak, S., *Financiranje HVO-a*, str. 77 i 78.

³¹² Isto, str. 11, 39, 40, 41, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71, 72, 73, 74.

³¹³ Isto, str. 69.

vojske i izbjeglica ali niti općina Posušje nije preuzela troškove svoje bojne ... Pored toga na teret općine Tomislavgrad organizirana je i obučavana jajačka bojna, koja je nakon pada Jajca ponovno zajedno sa izbjeglicama smještena na području općine Tomislavgrad ... O svim navedenim troškovima postoji uredna dokumentacija ... vidljivo je da su troškovi postrojbi izvan općine Tomislavgrad koštali općinu Tomislavgrad u 1992. godini 1.479.550 DEM ... zato tražimo od HZ HB da:

- preuzme financiranje svih troškova obrane,
- ravnomjerno rasporedi teret rata na sve općine HZ HB po svim osnovama,
- iznađe načina da općini Tomislavgrad kompenzira dosad učinjene troškove». ³¹⁴

Drugi osnovni problem HVO-a bio je ambivalentan politički i vojni odnos između hrvatskih struktura u BiH i državnih vlasti BiH i ARBiH (koje su uglavnom bile muslimansko/bošnjačke). Znalo se istovremeno događati, da pojedine postrojbe HVO-a i ARBiH na pojedinim lokalitetima vode međusobne oružane sukobe (srednja BiH, Mostar), a na drugim lokalitetima su se zajednički borile protiv srbijanske agresije (Orašje, Tuzla, Sarajevo). ³¹⁵

Prema svemu navedenome, kada se namjerava objektivno spoznavati cjelovito djelovanje HVO-a kao vojne snage, od ustrojavanja do 1994. g., svakako je potrebno imati u vidu i bitne razlike koje su postojale u pojedinim periodima, te bitne razlike koje su postojale u pojedinim područjima i zavičajnim cjelinama BiH. Primjerice, u prvom periodu je u pograničnom (naročito južnom) području bila značajnije nazočna i djelovala je HV (sukladno *Sporazumu o prijateljstvu i suradnji* kojeg su 21. srpnja 1992. g. potpisale R BiH i RH, te *Dodatku* od 23. rujna 1992. g. ³¹⁶), koja je – zbog jedinstvenosti bojišta i zajedničkog neprijatelja (srbijanskog agresora) – tada imala i veći utjecaj na HVO.

Zatim, na pojedinim područjima (bojištima) je HVO (i Hrvati) tijekom cijelog rata zajednički djelovao s ARBiH i njenim pretečama (i Muslimanima/Bošnjacima), a na nekim područjima je to zajedničko djelovanje trajalo do sredine 1993. godine. Uz sve to, treba imati u vidu složenost opće situacije u BiH i promjene koje su se događale na političkoj razini (od lokalne, preko BiH, do međunarodne), te promjene na vojnoj razini (odnos snaga u BiH, preustroji itd.).

³¹⁴ Isto, str. 69-70.

³¹⁵ v. Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 201-203; Hoare, M. A., n. dj., str. 217-218.

³¹⁶ Detaljnije se o tome govori u trećem dijelu ekspertize, poglavlje «Sporazum o prijateljstvu i suradnji R BiH i RH». Usp. i dokumente u: Praljak, Slobodan, *Pad Bosanske Posavine 1992. godine*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

II.-6

MEĐUNARODNA ZAJEDNICA I BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA

II.-6.1. Do međunarodnog priznanja BiH (07. travnja 1992.)

Tijekom 1990. g. u svakoj od republika bivše Jugoslavije su održani potpuno samostalni parlamentarni izbori, na temelju kojih su u republikama ustrojavani novi suvereni sustavi državnih vlasti. Usporedno s time, glavne institucije savezne države Jugoslavije ili su prestale postojati (SKJ) ili su bile u visokom stupnju formalnog i stvarnog raspada.

Međunarodna zajednica je značajniji interes za problem krize i raspada druge Jugoslavije počela pokazivati tek sredinom 1991. g., što je bilo prekasno, jer je tada kriza bila u visokom stupnju, a proces raspada zajedničke države bio je stvarno i formalno nepovratan. Zbog kašnjenja, međunarodna zajednica nije uvažavala zatečeno stanje (postojeći raspad), te je imala potpuno pogrešan pristup, koji se svodio na podupiranje nečeg što ne postoji (Jugoslavija) i što više nitko, od dominantnih institucijskih aktera na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, nije htio.

Druga višestruka pogreška međunarodne zajednice je u tome što se u početku svog uključivanja bavila Slovenijom i Hrvatskom, pokušavajući ih vratiti u nepostojeći državni okvir, iako su Slovenija i Hrvatska sredinom 1991. g. praktički bile samostalne države (održani referendum i parlamenti proglasili samostalnost). Tada međunarodna zajednica nije pokazivala gotovo nikakav izravni interes za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, iako se u njoj već događala unutarnja politička i sigurnosna drama, a prostor BiH i njeni resursi su bili ključni za srbijansku oružanu agresiju koja se tada intenzivno vodila protiv Republike Hrvatske.

Dva dana nakon proglašenja samostalnosti Slovenije i Hrvatske, 27. lipnja 1991. g., *Skupština SRBiH* je raspravljala o «Šest točaka predsjednika predsjedništva Alije Izetbegovića o budućnosti SFRJ»,³¹⁷ u kojima je bilo najavljeno održavanje referenduma i u BiH. Izetbegović je tom prigodom naveo kako je «Državnog sekretara SAD (J. Baker je nekoliko dana prije toga bio u posjetu Jugoslaviji, op. a.) zamolio "da međunarodna zajednica fokusira BiH", jer bi građanski rat koji je realna opasnost najpre izbio u ovoj republici. "Bejker se složio s tim, dodao je Izetbegović".»³¹⁸

³¹⁷ *Borba* (dnevna novina), Beograd, 28. lipnja 1991; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 55-56; (3D00320).

³¹⁸ Isto, str. 56; (3D00320).

«Očekujući nacionalnu podjelu republike, Izetbegović se 12. srpnja 1991. pismom obratio predsjedništvu *Europske zajednice* i zatražio "misiju dobre volje", a taj su zahtjev podržali i bosanskohercegovački Hrvati Stjepan Kljuić i Ivan Markešić, čelnici Hrvatske demokratske zajednice Bosne i Hercegovine.»³¹⁹ «Vlada BiH zatražila je ponovno, 11. rujna, slanje promatrača EU u BiH.»³²⁰

Međutim, to je ostalo bez učinaka, a međunarodna zajednica prvi put, i to usput, spominje BiH u prosincu 1991. g., u *Mišljenju broj 1 Arbitražne komisije Mirovne konferencije o Jugoslaviji*, navodeći rezoluciju BiH «o suverenosti što ju je Skupština usvojila 14. listopada 1991.» kao jednu od činjenica za izvođenje važnog mišljenja Arbitražne komisije da se Jugoslavija «nalazi u procesu raspada.»³²¹

Potom je uslijedio već opisani zahtjev BiH za međunarodnim priznanjem koje je odgođeno i uvjetovano referendumom.

II.-6.1.1 *Cutilleirov mirovni plan*

Sredinom veljače 1992. g. ministri vanjskih poslova zemalja *Europske unije* (EU) objavili su kratku tzv. *Lisabonsku izjavu o Jugoslaviji* s kojom se nastojala prevladati kriza u koju je još u listopadu 1991. g. zapala EU-ova *Mirovna konferencija o Jugoslaviji*, kad je Srbija odbila njene ponuđene prijedloge. U *Lisabonskoj izjavi* se između ostalog navodi da EU podržava «sadašnje napore u sklopu Konferencije, za promicanje dijaloga zainteresiranih strana u Bosni i Hercegovini, kojima je cilj ustavno rješenje i koje će trebati uzeti u obzir legitimne težnje svih naroda, unutar nepovredivih granica te republike.»³²²

Izjava je bila uvod u objavljivanje prvog međunarodnog mirovnog plana (nositelj EU) za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, koji je javno poznatiji pod nazivom *Cutilleirov mirovni plan* ili *Lisabonski sporazum*.³²³ Osnove ovog plana predstavljene su 22. veljače 1992. g. na

³¹⁹ Hodge, Carole, *Velika Britanija i Balkan od 1991. do danas*, Zagreb, 2007, str. 64.

³²⁰ Isto, str. 65.


³²¹ U Degan, Vladimir Đuro, *Hrvatska država u međunarodnoj zajednici*, Zagreb, 2002, str. 334-336; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 108-110; (3D00320).

³²² *Večernji list* (dnevna novina), Zagreb, 20. veljače 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str.134-135; (3D00320).

³²³ U siječnju 1992. g. Portugal je preuzeo predsjedanje EZ-om, a portugalski ministar vanjskih poslova Jose Cutilleiro preuzeo je predsjedanje Vijećem ministara EZ. Carol Hodge navodi da je *Cutilleirov plan* razradio lord Carrington «blisko surađujući s Beogradom» - Hodge, C., n. dj., str. 69-70.

konferenciji za tisak u Sarajevu, nakon što su se iz Lisabona vratile delegacije triju konstitutivnih naroda, predvođene A. Izetbegovićem, R. Karadžićem i Mirom Lasićem.

Objavljeno je da je «u Lisabonu postignut sporazum o "rekonstrukciji" Bosne i Hercegovine», na način da BiH «ostane u postojećim granicama, ali da se izvrši temeljita decentralizacija tako što će se osnovati (tri, op. a.) nacionalne jedinice, koje će imati određenu samoupravu.»³²⁴



Prilog 20: tzv. *Cutileirov mirovni plan*
 (Preuzeto iz knjige: Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 734)

³²⁴ *Večernji list*, 24. veljače 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 136-137; (3D00320).

Predstavnici sva tri naroda izrazili su zadovoljstvo postignutim sporazumom, a Karadžić je pozvao «da se puške stave u šoške», te rekao: «SDS će zaustaviti proces koji bi mogao ometati dogovor, nema potreba za proglašavanje krajina» i «Ne pretendiramo na pripajanje niti jednog komadića Bosne i Hercegovine Srbiji.»³²⁵

Nekoliko dana kasnije HDZBiH je izdao priopćenje u kojem se očitovao o sporazumu u Lisabonu: «Osnovni zahtjev HDZ-a jest očuvanje Bosne i Hercegovine u njezinim povijesnim granicama, koje su i današnje granice kao neovisne i suverene države tri konstitutivna i suverena naroda i građana koji žive na ovom tlu.»³²⁶ Uz to, navedeno je da je model takvog državnog uređenja poznat u svijetu (SAD, Švicarska, Belgija), te da HDZBiH «ne traži za hrvatski narod u Bosni i Hercegovini ništa više prava nego što drži da i drugim konstitutivnim narodima u Bosni i Hercegovini pripada.»³²⁷

U narednih 30-ak dana (do kraja ožujka 1992. g.), održano je više sastanaka na kojima su vođeni daljnji pregovori, a zainteresirane strane iz BiH su iznosile prijedloge i primjedbe. Na petom krugu pregovora, pod pokroviteljstvom EU, u Sarajevu je usvojena 18. ožujka 1992. g. *Izjava o načelima za novo ustavno ustrojstvo Bosne i Hercegovine*,³²⁸ u kojoj se u točki 1. navodi: «Bosna i Hercegovina biti će država sačinjena od tri sastavne jedinice, temeljene na nacionalnim načelima i vodeći računa o gospodarskim, zemljopisnim i drugim kriterijima.»³²⁹ Razrađen je niz načela o općim pravnim standardima, te o nadležnostima i ustrojstvu tijela BiH i njenih «sastavnih jedinica».

Na šestom krugu pregovora, održanih «u Bruxellesu 30. i 31. ožujka pod predsjedanjem Ambadora J. Cutilleira, koordinatora Mirovne konferencije» usuglašen je *Dodatak izjavi o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine*.³³⁰ «Sa sjednice je odaslan zahtjev svima u Bosni i Hercegovini da se suzdrže od nasilja i svih drugih djelatnosti kojima bi se moglo ugroziti mirno rješenje problema».³³¹ U *Dodatku*, je između ostalog, «dogovoreno da se ustanovi radna skupina koja će, pod predsjedanjem nekog predstavnika EU, definirati teritorije konstitutivnih jedinica», te koja će svoje preporuke «podnijeti Predsjedavajućem

³²⁵ Isto, str. 137; (3D00320).

³²⁶ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 141-143; (3D00320).

³²⁷ Isto, str. 143; (3D00320).

³²⁸ *Vjesnik* (dnevna novina), Zagreb, 16. ožujka 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 156-159; (3D00320).

³²⁹ Isto, str. 156; (3D00320).

³³⁰ Ddokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 160-162; (3D00320).

³³¹ Isto, str. 160; (3D00320).

ovih razgovora, do 15. svibnja 1992. ... Radna skupina izradit će kartu konstitutivnih jedinica. Temeljit će svoj rad na nacionalnom kriteriju.»³³²

Međutim, međunarodni *Cutilleirov mirovni plan* je propao jer ga (daljnjim nastavkom vojnog i političkog djelovanja te izravnim odustajanjem) nije htjela prihvatiti srpska struktura u BiH, kojoj su pregovori očigledno služili kao taktičko sredstvo (na isti način je velikosrbijanska struktura postupala 1991. g. u Republici Hrvatskoj, te nadalje u BiH). Odnosno, «srpski vođe ... očito su procijenili kako mogu ratom postići više nego za pregovaračkim stolom.»³³³ Muslimansko/bošnjačka struktura je također, ali na oprezniji i sporiji način odustajala od međunarodnog *Cutilleirovog mirovnog plana*. Dublji motivi i interesi ovih dviju struktura, te drugi interesi i čimbenici koji su utjecali na odustajanje od tog plana do sada su istraženi tek djelomično.³³⁴

Jedino je hrvatska strana plan shvatila krajnje ozbiljno, te bila s njim u cjelosti suglasna.

Najvažnija posljedica međunarodnog *Cutilleirova mirovnog plana* za daljnja događanja na prostoru BiH bila je u tome, što je s njim veoma rano (u veljači 1992. g.), za rješavanje problema BiH, «u međunarodni mirovni proces uvedena koncepcija teritorijalne podjele po nacionalnim kriterijima», te što je «to poslije toga utjecalo na sve mirovne planove, uključujući i Daytonski sporazum».³³⁵

S druge strane, djelovanje svih aktera na prostoru BiH i bivše Jugoslavije bilo je pod većim ili manjim utjecajem pristupa međunarodne zajednice, budući je svim akterima bilo jasno da će prije ili kasnije konačnu odluku donijeti institucije međunarodne zajednice. U tom kontekstu je poseban međunarodni problem (koji dugoročno nadilazi prostor bivše Jugoslavije) što je međunarodnim planom «ipak stvoren presedan kroz posredno odobravanje i podržavanje "etničkog čišćenja" kojim se počelo nekoliko mjeseci prije toga».³³⁶

³³² Isto, str. 160-162; (3D00320).

³³³ Hodge, C., n. dj., str. 71.

³³⁴ v. Isto, str. 70-81. O motivima, interesima i političkom postupanju muslimansko/bošnjačke strukture u odnosu prema *Cutilleirovom mirovnom planu* i uopće rješavanju problema BiH značajno je uvažavati i dokument koji se navodi u tjedniku *Dani* (Sarajevo), 07. ožujka 2008.

³³⁵ Isto, str. 70.

³³⁶ Isto, str. 71.

**II.-6.2. Od međunarodnog priznanja BiH do propasti Vance-Owenovog mirovnog plana
(07. travnja 1992. – 19. svibnja 1993. g.)**

Tijekom travnja 1992. g. srbijanska oružana agresija na BiH je dostigla puni intenzitet; u istočnoj i sjeverozapadnoj BiH se – masovnim progonima, zatvaranjima u logore i pokoljima - provodilo etničko čišćenje Muslimana/Bošnjaka. Naoružani pripadnici SDSBiH silom su preuzeli vlast u Banja Luci, napadao se prostor između Kupresa i Neretve. Kao posljedica toga, krajem travnja, «Visoko povjerenstvo UN za izbjeglice procjenjuje da u BiH već ima više od 400.000 raseljenih osoba»,³³⁷ od toga, prema istom izvoru, u BiH je ostalo 122.000 prognanika, a u Republiku Hrvatsku je stigla 201.000 izbjeglica iz raznih dijelova BiH.

EU je 12. svibnja 1992. g., donijela *Deklaraciju o BiH*, u kojoj se kaže da EU prati «s velikom zabrinutošću stanje u BiH, potvrđujući svoje stanovište da političko rješenje može biti zasnovano samo na principima utvrđenim tijekom razgovora o ustavnom ustrojstvu vođenim između Srba, Hrvata i Muslimana, a pod okriljem Mirovne konferencije.»³³⁸

U *Deklaraciji* je bila jasno označena i odgovornost: «Iako su sve strane, svaka na svoj način, pridonijele sadašnjem stanju stvari, daleko najveću krivnju snose vlasti u Beogradu koje kontroliraju armiju i izravno, i neizravno – pomažući paravojne snage. Ubijanje i protjerivanje pučanstva ... opsada i sistematsko bombardiranje Sarajeva ... akcije su što zaslužuju sveopću osudu.» Zbog toga su EU i njene članice, između ostalog zatražile «potpuno povlačenje JNA i njezinog naoružanja iz BiH ili raspuštanje njezinih snaga i stavljanje njezinih snaga pod djelotvorni međunarodni nadzor.»³³⁹

Krajem svibnja 1992. g. *Vijeće sigurnosti UN* je donijelo *Rezoluciju 757*, kojom su uvedene sankcije Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji, u koju su se nekoliko dana ranije službeno udružile Srbija i Crna Gora. No, srbijanska oružana agresija na BiH je nastavljena nesmanjenom snagom.

³³⁷ *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, str. 387.

³³⁸ *Večernji list*, 13. svibnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 178-179; (3D00320).

³³⁹ Isto, str. 178; (3D00320)

U prvoj polovici lipnja 1992. g. *Vijeće sigurnosti UN* je dopustilo mirovnim snagama preuzimanje kontrole nad sarajevskom zračnom lukom radi dopremanja humanitarne pomoći. Zračnu luku su do tada držale srpske snage.

Predsjednik *Mirovne konferencije o Jugoslaviji* (lord Carrington), uputio je sredinom svibnja 1992. g. (više od mjesec dana nakon međunarodnog priznanja BiH) *Arbitražnoj komisiji* pitanje, može li se smatrati da je dovršen proces raspada Jugoslavije. U *Mišljenju broj 8*, koje je doneseno 04. srpnja 1992. g., zaključeno je «da je proces raspada SFRJ ... završen i da valja ustanoviti da SFRJ više ne postoji.»³⁴⁰

Za razumijevanje goleme složenosti svekolike (tadašnje i sadašnje) situacije u BiH potrebno je naglasiti da se u razdoblju od sredine lipnja do pred kraj srpnja 1992. g. pred *Višim sudom u Sarajevu* vodio izuzetno znakoviti sudski proces. Naime, *Više javno tužilaštvo u Sarajevu* (tj. *Viši javni tužioc* Ivica Stanić) podnio je, 15. lipnja 1992. g., *Višem sudu u Sarajevu* «Prijedlog za zabranu rada Srpske demokratske stranke, Stranke demokratske akcije i Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, zbog vršenja djelatnosti na način koji nije u skladu sa zakonom, programom i ciljevima radi kojih su osnovane.»³⁴¹

Viši javni tužioc je u obrazloženju *Prijedloga* detaljno opisao tadašnju katastrofalnu sigurnosnu, gospodarsku, političku, društvenu i međunacionalnu situaciju u BiH, te je za to izravno i potpuno optužio tri vladajuće stranke u BiH. Posebna točka optužbe trima strankama odnosila se na: «Saglašavanje sa time da se preduzmu razgovori u pogledu podjele teritorije Republike BiH na nacionalnoj osnovi, nametanje te opcije predstavnicima Evropske zajednice, učešće u razgovorima o takvoj podjeli i prihvatanje principa te podjele...»³⁴²

Na kraju opširnog *Prijedloga*, *Viši javni tužioc* je iznio zaključak koji je tipičan za brojne političke sudske procese u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji: «Sve naprijed iznesene razloge potvrđuje niz NOTORNIH ČINJENICA, tako da drugi dokazi nisu za sada potrebni.»³⁴³

Nakon nekoliko sudskih rasprava, *Vijeće višeg suda u Sarajevu* (pod predsjedanjem suca Sulje Babića) je, 24. srpnja 1992. g., «odbilo prijedlog višeg javnog tužioca da se zabrani rad HDZ BiH ... Ovakav ishod mogao se i očekivati, jer je isto ovo vijeće, prije nekoliko dana, za gotovo iste grijehе odbilo prijedlog višeg javnog tužioca o zabrani rada SDA.»³⁴⁴

³⁴⁰ U Degan, V. Đ., n. dj., str. 357-362; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 188-194; (3D00320).

³⁴¹ *Prijedlog Višeg javnog tužilaštva*, Broj: UT 65/92, od 15. lipnja 1992, str. 1. Preslik dokumenta je u posjedu autora ekspertize.

³⁴² Isto, str. 2.

³⁴³ Isto, str. 6.

³⁴⁴ *Oslobođenje* (dnevna novina), Sarajevo, 25. srpnja 1992.

Početak srpnja 1992. g., Velika Britanija je preuzela predsjedanje EU-om, «u kritičnom trenutku za rat u Bosni i Hercegovini.»³⁴⁵ Kad se radi o problemu BiH, razdoblje predsjedanja V. Britanije je karakteristično po proizvodnji velikog broja neučinkovitih međunarodnih dokumenata (i napose *Vance-Owenovog mirovnog plana*), koji su bitno utjecali na kulminaciju sigurnosne i humanitarne katastrofe u BiH.³⁴⁶

U tom razdoblju su kreirani i osnovni stereotipi (pogrešne predodžbe o stvarnosti) o događanjima u BiH, koji su bitno utjecali na međunarodnu percepciju, te daljnje političko i pravosudno postupanje prema događajima u BiH i njenom okruženju.

Naime, u ljeto 1992. g., pored intenzivnog djelovanja srbijanskih lobističkih organizacija, čak je i Radovan Karadžić na konferenciji za tisak «održanoj u Donjem domu (britanskog Parlamenta, op. a.) 15. srpnja pod vodstvom Henyja Bellingtona osobnog parlamentarnog tajnika ministra obrane Malcolma Rifkinda predstavio ... dokument pod naslovom *Concentration Camps in the New Europe 1992*, u kojemu su nabrojene navodne lokacije "koncentracijskih logora i sabirnih centara korištenih za zatočenje i pogubljenje bosanskohercegovačkih Srba".»³⁴⁷

Na taj način, «iz sjemenki što su ih posijali srpski lobisti uzgojen je mit o "građanskom ratu" toliko presudan za britansku strategiju, a tim je mitom stvorena podloga za zaključak o simetriji krivnje. Platforma, pak odabrana za lansiranje toga mita – Donji dom britanskog Parlamenta – cijelom je tom pothvatu dala sjaj vjerodostojnosti.»³⁴⁸

O razvoju situacije u BiH svjedoči i podatak da je «na redovitu godišnjem okupljanju skupine G-7 na vrhu, u srpnju 1992. g., posebno ocijenjeno kako rat u Bosni i Hercegovini znači veliku opasnost po stabilnost Europe.»³⁴⁹ Međutim, situacija u BiH se i nadalje ubrzano pogoršavala, a djelotvornost međunarodne zajednice je izostajala.

Primjerice, 17. srpnja 1992. g. «Predsjednik konferencije EZ o Jugoslaviji lord Carrington pročitao je novinarima cijeli tekst sporazuma kojeg su u Londonu potpisali predstavnici triju nacionalnih zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini.»³⁵⁰ Prva točka sporazuma glasi: «Dogovorili smo prekid vatre koji će stupiti na snagu u nedjelju u 18 sati po mjesnom

³⁴⁵ Hodge, C., n. dj. str. 83.

³⁴⁶ v. Isto, str. 83-112.

³⁴⁷ Ist, str. 85-86.

³⁴⁸ Isto, str. 86.

³⁴⁹ Isto, str. 84.

³⁵⁰ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 209; (3D00320).

vremenu na cijelom teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine.»³⁵¹ Ali, samo tri dana kasnije (20. srpnja 1992. g.) *Ministarsko vijeće EU* je donijelo *Deklaraciju o bivšoj Jugoslaviji* u kojoj prva točka glasi: «Europska unija i države članice iskazuju svoju duboku zabrinutost zbog toga što sporazum što su ga strane u BiH potpisale u Londonu 17. srpnja pod okriljem EU, još nije proveden.»³⁵²

U narednih 40-ak dana, različite strane su donijele nekoliko načelnih dokumenata koji su bili priprema za najavljenju tzv. *Londonsko konferenciju*, koja je potom održana 26. i 27. kolovoza 1992. godine. Na *Konferenciji* je usvojen i dokument nazvan *Nacrt izjave o načelima i Program akcije*³⁵³, u kojem se nabraja veći broj načela i najavljuje osnivanje *Upravnog komiteta* i šest radnih grupa te još neka tijela, a određeno je da će «konferencija trajati sve dok se ne postigne konačno rješenje problema bivše Jugoslavije».³⁵⁴

Tako je nakon nekoliko dana, početkom rujna 1992. g. započela s radom nova, stalna *Međunarodna konferencija o bivšoj Jugoslaviji* (MKBJ, ICFY), čije je sjedište postala Ženeva. MKBJ je veoma brzo počela proizvoditi opširne, komplicirane i uglavnom načelne, a neučinkovite dokumente. Istovremeno, dok su velikosrbijanske strukture, u Srbiji i BiH, deklarativno pozdravljale osnivanje i rad nove međunarodne mirovne konferencije, srbijanska agresija se nastavila, provođenjem etničkog čišćenja i razaranjem te okupacijom sve većeg dijela BiH.

MKBJ je u rujnu 1992. g. donijela nekoliko dokumenata.³⁵⁵ U dokumentu *Povjerenje, izgradnja sigurnosti i verifikacija*, u ambiciozno naslovljenom poglavlju «Trenutačne odluke konferencije» između ostalog je neprimjereno navedeno: «Najvažnija zadaća je olakšati patnje u BiH kroz kontinuirano izvješćivanje o mjestu stožera i imenima zapovjednika za sve vojne jedinice, uključujući i one paravojne».³⁵⁶

Sredinom rujna 1992. g. *Vijeće sigurnosti UN* je donijelo *Rezoluciju 776* kojom je bilo odobreno slanje međunarodnih mirovnih snaga u BiH, a u prvoj polovici listopada,

³⁵¹ Isto, str. 209; (3D00320).

³⁵² *Vjesnik*, 22. srpnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 210-211; (3D00320).

³⁵³ *Vjesnik*, 26. kolovoza 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 225-230; (3D00320).

³⁵⁴ Isto, str. 226; (3D00320).

³⁵⁵ Dokumenti u knjizi Tuđman, M., *Istina...*; «Povjerenje, izgradnja sigurnosti i verifikacija» (str. 236-238); «Cjelovit tekst zajedničkog priopćenja – Vance, Owen, Čosić, Panić» (str. 240-242); «Tekst zajedničke izjave predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana i predsjednika SRJ Dobrice Čosića» (str. 249-250); (3D00320).

³⁵⁶ Isto, str. 236; (3D00320).

Rezolucijom 781 Vijeća sigurnosti UN, zabranjeni su letovi borbenih zrakoplova u prostoru BiH.

Tijekom tri završna mjeseca 1992. g. MKBJ je još više povećala produkciju dokumenata – svoju ili pod svojim pokroviteljstvom.³⁵⁷ Najvažniji dokument svakako je (28. listopada 1992. g.) *Nacrt ustavnog ustrojstva za BiH radne skupine ženevske konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji*, koji je glavna osnova kasnije (početkom 1993. g.) službeno predstavljenog novog međunarodnog ili tzv. *Vance-Owenovog mirovnog plana*. U *Nacrtu* je predložena i najvažnija (najspornija) odredba općeg ustrojstva: «BiH bi bila decentralizirana država» koja «bi bila podijeljena na 7 do 10 autonomnih provincija».³⁵⁸

Pojava *Nacrta*, koji je najavio neodređenu podjelu (7-10 pokrajina ili provincija) i nejasne etničke, geografske, povijesne, prometne i gospodarske kriterije podjele, uz dugi pregovarački proces, stvarno je predstavljao mamac zainteresiranim stranama, koje su političkim, vojnim i drugačijim sredstvima nastojale doći u što povoljniju poziciju kod konačnog međunarodnog presuđivanja o teritorijalnoj podjeli.

Napokon, početkom 1993. g. (02. siječnja) u Ženevi je predstavljen *Nacrt dogovora o Bosni i Hercegovini* ili *Vance-Owenov mirovni plan*. Prvi dio plana (s naslovom «Određivanje granica pokrajina») je imao samo jednu, veoma jasnu rečenicu: «Podjela Bosne i Hercegovine na pokrajine bit će sukladna priloženome zemljovidu» (radilo se o 10 pokrajina).

Drugi dio *Wance-Owenovog mirovnog plana* (naslova «Ustavni okvir za Bosnu i Hercegovinu») predviđao je da će se tripartitni pregovoripredstavnik tri naroda iz BiH «nastaviti kontinuirano u Ženevi», pod okriljem MKBJ, «sa zadaćom dovršenja ustrojstva Bosne i Hercegovine, sukladno sljedećim principima:

1. Bosna i Hercegovina bit će decentralizirana država, a većinu funkcija vlasti imat će njezine pokrajine.»³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ v. Isto, str. 252-303; (3D00320).

³⁵⁸ Isto, str. 261; (3D00320).

³⁵⁹ *Slobodna Dalmacija* (dnevna novina), Split, 15.-18. siječnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 309-314; (3D00320).



Prilog 21: tzv. *Vance-Owenov mirovni plan*
(Preuzeto iz: Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 737)

Međutim, službeno objavljivanje međunarodnog *Vance-Owenovog mirovnog plana* izazvalo je daljnje povećavanje i produbljivanje političkih i vojnih sukoba u BiH i njenom neposrednom okruženju,³⁶⁰ te novu krizu u međunarodnoj zajednici glede problema BiH.³⁶¹ U ovoj ekspertizi se ne može ulaziti u dublja kauzalna raščlanjivanja ove činjenice, nego je dostatno na fenomenološkoj razini naglasiti osnovni, očigledni, problem. A taj je: ovaj

³⁶⁰ Ovo se jasno prepoznaje i iz niza dokumenata objavljenih u Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 315-387; (3D00320).

³⁶¹ v. Hodge, C., n. dj., str. 118-155.

međunarodni mirovni plan o BiH (kao i ostali), bez obzira na osnovne namjere, nije se mogao provesti bez odgovarajućih mehanizama nametanja (koje međunarodna zajednica do 1994. g. nije koristila), te je stoga nužno – zbog situacije u BiH i njenom okruženju - proizvodio negativne učinke.

Na tragu ovoga treba promatrati i reagiranje SAD-a, koje su već u prvoj polovici veljače 1993. g. iskazale «rezervu prema Vance-Owenovu planu upravo zbog aspekta koji *de facto* nagrađuje politiku "etničkog čišćenja"»,³⁶² najavljujući kako je *Predsjednik SAD-a* (Bil Clinton) odlučio poduzeti «šest koraka», a prvi je da će se SAD «aktivno uključiti u Vance-Owenove pregovore punom težinom američke diplomacije.»³⁶³

U narednom razdoblju *Vijeće sigurnosti UN* je donijelo nekoliko rezolucija koje su se odnosile na prostor BiH; *Rezolucija 816* (od 31. ožujka 1993. g.) kojom je NATO-u odobrena ovlast rušenja zrakoplova koji krše zabranu leta; *Rezolucija 819* (od 16. travnja) koja je Srebrenicu proglasila "zaštićenom zonom"; *Rezolucija 820* (od 27. travnja) kojom je Savezna Republika Jugoslavija izložena najstrožim sankcijama. Međutim, zbog brojnih razloga, srbijanska agresija se nastavila bez zadržke.

Nakon niza prijedloga s različitih strana, te pregovora i određenih izmjena, 25. ožujka 1993. g., u New Yorku su čelnici muslimansko/bošnjačke i hrvatske strukture u BiH (A. Izetbegović i M. Boban) potpisali međunarodni *Vance-Owenov mirovni plan*, s tim što je Izetbegović postavio i uvjete da je ugovor (potpisani plan) nevažeći ako i treća (srpska) strana ne potpiše dokumente «unutar razumnog roka, «ako međunarodna zajednica ubrzo ne poduzme djelotvorne korake za primjenu potpisanih dokumenata» i «ako se nastavi agresija».³⁶⁴

Niti jedan od tih uvjeta se nije ostvario. Srpska strana u BiH, je nakon svog provedenog «referenduma», 19. svibnja 1993. g.³⁶⁵ proglasila da glasači «nisu prihvatili Vence-Owenov plan.» To je bila i konačna propast ovog međunarodnog mirovnog plana.

Prema tome, i međunarodni *Vance-Owenov mirovni plan* je odbacila srpska struktura u BiH, a muslimansko-bošnjačka struktura je od njega *mekano* odustajala, postavljanjem opravdanih uvjeta.

³⁶² *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, str. 391.

³⁶³ *Vjesnik*, 12. veljače 1993; dokument «Šest točaka...» preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 330-331; (3D00320).

³⁶⁴ *Vjesnik*, 26. i 27. ožujka 1993; dokumenti preuzeti iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 336-338; (3D00320).

³⁶⁵ v. dokument u Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 386-387; (3D00320).

I ovaj put, jedino je hrvatska struktura u BiH prihvatila međunarodni (*Vance-Owenov*) *mirovni plan* bez ikakvih uvjeta, i po tome mu je bila vjernija od njegovih međunarodnih kreatora, što svjedoči o (ne)kvalitativnim značajkama te strukture koje su ranije navedene.

II.-6.3. Od 20. svibnja 1993. g. do srpnja 1994. godine

II.-6.3.1 *Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan*

Prema *Izvjescju*³⁶⁶ samih supredsjedatelja, još iz studenog 1992. g., *Vance-Owenov mirovni plan* je polazio od svojih potpuno jasno navedenih *Temeljnih pretpostavki*: «Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine nerazdvojno je pomiješano. Prema tome, nema načina da se stvore tri teritorijalno odvojene države utemeljene na etničkim ili vjerskim načelima ... Takvim bi se planom jedinstvenost i koherentnost granica mogla postići jedino procesom prisilnoga preseljenja pučanstva – što je već osudila Međunarodna konferencija, kao i glavna Skupština ... i Vijeće sigurnosti» UN-a, pa «prema tome g. Vance i lord Owen procijenili su da se mora odbaciti svako model koji bi se temeljio na tri zasebne države utemeljene na etničkom/vjerskom načelu.»³⁶⁷

Međutim, mjesec dana nakon propasti međunarodnog *Vance-Owenova mirovnog plana*, 20. lipnja 1993. g., *Ministri vanjskih poslova zemalja članica EU* postigli su suglasnost o novim *Temeljnim načelima* novog međunarodnog mirovnog plana za BiH.³⁶⁸ Ministri EU su «ustvrdili da prijedlog stvaranja tri teritorijalne jedinice ne mora voditi do raspada republike i proširenja Srbije i Hrvatske na račun Muslimana», što je bilo u potpunoj suprotnosti s *temeljnim načelima* prethodnog mirovnog plana.

Prije toga, 22. svibnja 1993. g. (samo tri dana nakon propasti *Vance-Owenova mirovnog plana*), pet članica *Vijeća sigurnosti UN* (Francuska, Ruska Federacija, Španjolska, Velika Britanija i SAD) dale su zajedničku *Izjavu* o BiH, u kojoj kažu da su «duboko zabrinute zbog nastavka sukoba u Bosni i Hercegovini, unatoč gorljivim nastojanjima međunarodne zajednice i supredsjedatelja Međunarodne konferencije»,³⁶⁹ te «Nastavit ćemo žurno raditi kako bismo obustavili taj užasan rat i postigli trajno i pravedno rješenje».


³⁶⁶ Dokument «Izvjescje supredsjedatelja o izradi nacрта ustavnog ustrojstva Bosne i Hercegovine», preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 272-289; (3D00320).

³⁶⁷ Isto, str. 275; (3D00320.)

³⁶⁸ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 396-397; (3D00320).

³⁶⁹ Isto, str. 388; (3D00320).

To novo međunarodno «pravedno rješenje» bio je tzv. *Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan*. «Na sjednici Ženevske konferencije 16. lipnja, kojom su predsjedali lord Owen i Thorvald Stoltenberg, predsjednici Srbije i Hrvatske (S. Milošević i F. Tuđman) obznanili su dogovor i suglasnost o uspostavi nove bosanskohercegovačke države, koju bi činile tri republike utemeljene na etničkom načelu.»³⁷⁰



Prilog: 22: tzv. *Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan*
 (Preuzeto iz: Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 742)

³⁷⁰ Hodge, C., n. dj. str. 155.

Novinska agencija *France presse* to je, 23. lipnja 1993. g., objavila kao *povjerljiv* dokument, o kojem između ostalog navodi: «Bosna i Hercegovina bit će konfederacija republika. Ustav će priznati tri konstitutivna naroda, a većinu funkcija vlasti obnašat će same republike.»³⁷¹

Potom, 30. srpnja 1993. g., objavljeno je da je «sporazum o Uniji Republika Bosne i Hercegovine zaključen», te da «predviđa državu od tri konstitutivne republike koja će imati zajedničku vladu ali sa ograničenim ovlastima ... Jedna od promjena u odnosu na prvotni tekst Owen-Stoltenbergova plana odnosi se na pravo veta koje će imati svaka od republika.»³⁷²

Međutim, već sutradan, 31. srpnja 1993. g., «čelnik muslimanskog izaslanstva na ženevskim pregovorima, Alija Izetbegović povukao je ... svoje prihvatanje mirovnog plana ... Izetbegović je u pismu mirovnim posrednicima ... naglasio kako njegovi savjetnici vjeruju da tekst plana ostavlja nedoumice glede pravnog statusa nove "unije" ... Usprkos sporenjima, Izetbegović je nastavio pregovore s Radovanom Karadžićem i Matom Bobanom o zemljovidima kojima bi se odredio teritorij svake od triju republika.»³⁷³

Daljnje pregovaranje odvijalo se dvostrano i trostrano, a svaka od strana je povremeno – izravno ili posredno – objavljivala svoje prijedloge. Na temelju toga je 01. rujna 1993. g., u Ženevi, nastala nova inačica «Sporazuma o miru i o Uniji republika BiH koji nije potpisan».³⁷⁴ No, 14. rujna 1993. g., u Ženevi su Izetbegović i Tuđman potpisali *Zajedničku Deklaraciju* u kojoj su se, između ostalog sporazumjeli: «1. Osigurati hitan prekid svih neprijateljstava i vojnih sukoba između postrojbi Armije BiH i HVO ... 2. Osigurati obostrano i bezuvjetno raspuštanje svih zatočeničkih logora i oslobađanje zatočenika».³⁷⁵ Sličnu *Deklaraciju* su 16. rujna 1993. g. potpisali Izetbegović i Momčilo Krajišnik (predstavnik Srba iz BiH).³⁷⁶

Još jedna inačica međunarodnog *Owen-Stoltenbergova mirovnog plana* nastala je, 20. rujna 1993. g., na britanskom nosaču zrakoplova (*Invincible*) koji se nalazio u međunarodnim vodama Jadranskog mora. Ali ni ovaj nacrt *Sporazuma* nije potpisan, iako je u njemu temeljem dogovora bilo predviđeno da će «Ustavni sporazum ... stupiti na snagu tjedan dana

³⁷¹ *Vjesnik*, 26. lipnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 400-401; (3D00320).

³⁷² Dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 414-415; (3D00320).

³⁷³ Dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 416; (3D00320).

³⁷⁴ *Vjesnik*, 04. rujna 1993; dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 429-431; (3D00320).

³⁷⁵ *Večernji list*, 15. rujna 1993; dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 436-438; (3D00320).

³⁷⁶ *Večernji list*, 17. rujna 1993; dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 440-442; (3D00320).

pošto Vijeće sigurnosti uzme k znanju ovaj sporazum, potvrdi da Unija republika BiH nastavlja svoje članstvo u UN».³⁷⁷

Krajem rujna 1993. g. nastala je «nova izmijenjena verzija» ovog mirovnog plana, koji je sadržavao *Mirovni sporazum* i sedam dodataka, te se na taj način radilo o cjelovitom *mirovnom paketu*. On nema bitnih razlika u odnosu na prethodne inačice tzv. *Owen-Stoltenbergovog mirovnog plana*», jer polazi od slijedećeg: «Savez republika Bosne i Hercegovine sastavljen je od tri konstitutivne republike i obuhvaća tri konstitutivna naroda: Muslimane, Srbe i Hrvate».³⁷⁸

Međutim, pri kraju rujna 1993. g. *Skupština RBiH*, odnosno većinska muslimansko/bošnjačka struktura trajno je odbacila ovaj *mirovni paket*, što je istovremeno bila i konačna propast tzv. *Owen-Stoltenbergova mirovnog plana*. U to vrijeme došlo je do još jednog velikog raskola u muslimansko/bošnjačkoj strukturi, te je F. Abdić otišao u zapadne dijelove BiH i proglasio *Autonomnu pokrajinu Zapadnu Bosnu* (APZB), u kojoj je započeo i oružani sukob unutar samih Muslimana/Bošnjaka. Sve to je dodatno zakompliciralo političku i vojnu situaciju u BiH.³⁷⁹

Do kraja 1993. g. tzv. *Owen-Stoltenbergov mirovni plan* je još postojao samo kao taktičko političko i propagandno sredstvo na koje su se u različitim prigodama povremeno pozivali pojedini akteri događanja na prostoru BiH. U tom smislu treba promatrati površni, kratki i neuspješni pokušaj EU da u svom tzv. *Akcijskom planu* ponovno oživi neke inačice propalog *Owen-Stoltenbergovog mirovnog plana*.³⁸⁰

Prema tome, prevladavajuća muslimansko/bošnjačka struktura je cijelo vrijeme bila rezervirana prema međunarodnom *Owen-Stoltenbergovom mirovnom planu*, a na koncu ga je nedvosmisleno i odbacila. Srpska struktura u BiH je s ovim planom taktizirala.

Jedino je hrvatska struktura HRBH prihvatila i ovaj međunarodni mirovni plan, na sličan način kao i dotadašnje planove, s tim što su protiv plana bili različiti predstavnici velikog broja Hrvata u BiH koji su bili isključeni iz pregovora, kao i Hrvati s područja koja nisu bila uključena u planom predviđenu hrvatsku republiku u BiH.

³⁷⁷ *Vjesnik*, 23. rujna 1993; dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 444-447; (3D00320).

³⁷⁸ *Večernji list*, 30. rujna 1993; dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 450-477; (3D00320).

³⁷⁹ v. *Kronologija rata*, str. 309, 311, 315 i 317.

³⁸⁰ Isto, str. 333 i 338.

II.-6.3.2 *Washingtonski sporazumi*

U vrijeme pregovora o tzv. *Owen-Stoltenbergovom mirovnom planu*, kao i u mjesecima nakon njegove propasti, neprekidno se pogoršavala svekolika sigurnosna situacija u BiH. Uz to, mirovni pokušaji EU bivali su sve bezizgledniji. Na temelju toga se otvorio prostor za intenzivnije i izravnije uključivanje SAD-a u rješavanje krize na prostoru druge Jugoslavije. Odnosno, u prvim mjesecima 1994. g. SAD je po, svemu sudeći, na različite načine učinkovito djelovao, jer je to, pri kraju veljače 1994. g., dovelo do završetka oružanih sukoba između muslimansko/bošnjačkih i hrvatskih postrojbi, te do novog kruga muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih mirovnih pregovora u Washingtonu, pod pokroviteljstvom SAD-a.³⁸¹

Na temelju toga je, već 1. ožujka 1994. g., potpisan tzv. *Washingtonski sporazum* s kojim je napokon započelo razdoblje uspostavljanja pune vojne i političke suradnje između muslimansko/bošnjačkih i hrvatskih struktura u BiH, te razdoblje posebno bliskih strateških odnosa BiH i Republike Hrvatske.

Radi se zapravo o nekolicini potpisanih dokumenata (sporazuma). Najprije su (1. ožujka) potpisani: *Izjava o suglasnosti uz Okvirni sporazum o federaciji BiH*,³⁸² *Nacrt o Konfederaciji između Republike Hrvatske i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine*,³⁸³ *Sporazum između Republike Hrvatske i Federacije BiH o pristupu Jadranskom moru preko područja Republike Hrvatske*.³⁸⁴ Potom je, tijekom ožujka,³⁸⁵ potpisano još nekoliko dokumenata, te – 30. ožujka 1994. g. – *Odluka o proglašenju Ustava i Ustav Federacije BiH*.³⁸⁶

II.-6.3.3 *Mirovni plan Kontaktne skupine*

Potpisivanjem *Washingtonskog sporazuma* napokon je odumrla i MKBJ, a ključni međunarodni akter na prostoru BiH postala je tzv. *Kontaktna skupina* (KS) koju su činile SAD, Ruska Federacija, V. Britanija, Francuska, Njemačka, Belgija i Grčka. Prvi sastanak KS održan je u Londonu 25. travnja 1994. godine.

Mirovni plan Kontaktne skupine predstavljen je 13. svibnja 1994. g. u Ženevi, a temeljio se na podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine «na uglavnom posve autonomne entitete, s time da

³⁸¹ v. *Kronologija rata...*, str. 350.

³⁸² *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 05. ožujka 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 528-537; (3D00320).


³⁸³ *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 05. ožujka 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 538-539; (3D00320).

³⁸⁴ *Vjesnik*, 04. ožujka 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 540-542; (3D00320).

³⁸⁵ v. *Dokumente u Tuđman, M., Istina...*, str. 548-554; (3D00320).

³⁸⁶ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 555-570; (3D00320).

bi se 51% teritorija prepustilo hrvatsko-bošnjačkoj federaciji, a 49% Srbima. Sukobljenim su stranama 5. srpnja predloženi konačna verzija zemljovida i radni dokument po načelu "uzmi ili ostavi", u kojem su bile predviđene oštre mjere za slučaj nepoštivanja odredaba.»³⁸⁷



Prilog 23: Mirovni plan Kontaktne skupine
(Preuzeto iz: Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 747)

³⁸⁷ Hodge, C., str. 201.

Mirovni plan Kontaktne skupine prihvaćen je odmah i u cijelosti od strane muslimansko/bošnjačke i hrvatske strukture u BiH. Međutim, srpska struktura u BiH, koja je do tada okupirala približno 70% teritorija BiH, odbila je prihvatiti plan. «Kontaktna je skupina još jednom odustala od prethodno najavljenih mjera prisile i vratila se diplomaciji»,³⁸⁸ što je otvorilo novi krug još žešćeg rata u BiH, rata između srpske strane s jedne strane, i s druge strane udruženih muslimansko/bošnjačkih i hrvatskih snaga te snaga RH.

³⁸⁸ Isto, str. 202.

II.-7

ZNAČAJNE RATNA TEME

II.-7.1 Bosna i Hercegovina u ratu protiv Republike Hrvatske

Tijekom priprema i izvođenja srbijanske oružane agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku, agresor je prostor Republike Hrvatske i prostor Bosne i Hercegovine smatrao i koristio kao jedan cjelovit teritorij, koji nema međurepubličkih ili (nakon međunarodnog priznanja) međudržavnih granica.

Takav pristup očitovao se i u predratnim vojnim reorganizacijama JNA, jer «čitava priča o tzv. modernizaciji oružanih snaga svela se na to da se ukinu armije, čije su komande bile u republičkim centrima i koje su se približno podudarale s republičkim granicama ... te da se na ratištu SFRJ uspostave tri vojišta kopnenih snaga i jedno vojnopomorsko vojište.»³⁸⁹



Prilog 24: Prostorni preustroj JNA na tri vojišta (nakon 1988. g.)
(Preuzeto iz: *Rat u Hrvatskoj...*, karta 2, na kraju knjige)

³⁸⁹ Špegelj, M. n. dj., str. 44; o toj temi još govore Domazet, D., n. dj.; Kulenović, T., n. dj.; Praljak Slobodan, *Agresija Bosne i Hercegovine na Republiku Hrvatsku*, - činjenice, Zagreb, 2007.

U toj koncepciji, sjeverozapadno *vojište* i vojnopomorsko *vojište* velikim dijelom se preklapalo s tradicionalnim kartama zamišljenih granica Velike Srbije, a kasnije (1990.-1995. g.) to se u visokoj mjeri podudaralo s ratnim osvajačkim pohodima srbijanske vojske te je dosljedno zagovarano i zastupano u političkoj koncepciji na različitim vrstama pregovora. O tome zorno svjedoče i karte objavljene u nizu knjiga i radova.³⁹⁰

Naime, «JNA je koristila teritorij BiH kao osnovicu za vojne operacije protiv Republike Hrvatske i pomaganje pobune dijela srpskog stanovništva u Hrvatskoj»,³⁹¹ a kasnije, sve komunikacije prema okupiranim dijelovima Hrvatske (osim istočne Slavonije) išle su preko teritorija BiH.

O tome da je srbijanska oružana agresija teritorije RH i BiH promatrala i koristila kao jednu cjelinu potpuno očigledno svjedoči i detaljni operativni *Elaborat o mogućim varijantama upotrebe u zoni odgovornosti* kojeg je u lipnju 1991. g. odobrila «Komanda 10. motorizovane Brigade» JNA (u potpisu je «Komandant pukovnik Milojko Pantelić»)³⁹²

Zatim, u agresiji na Republiku Hrvatsku su, osim postrojbi JNA s područja BiH, sudjelovale i pojedine postrojbe republičke vojske - *Teritorijalne obrane (TO) BiH*.³⁹³ Pritom je važno naglasiti da je *Skupština SRBiH*, 15. listopada 1991. g., u završnoj točki dokumenta *Platforma o položaju Bosne i Hercegovine*, između ostalog, zaključila i slijedeće: «Snage Teritorijalne obrane u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini su pod kontrolom Predsjedništva Republike. U slučaju vanjskog napada na jugoslavensku zajednicu iste snage se stavljaju pod zajedničku komandu.»³⁹⁴

Na početku srbijanske oružane agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku, 17. kolovoza 1990. g., intervenciju helikoptera hrvatske policije spriječili su zrakoplovi JNA koji su bili smješteni u Bihaću (na području BiH). Isto tako, 07. listopada 1991. g., kad je u Zagrebu raketirano sjedišta Franje Tuđmana, *Predsjednika Predsjedništva Republike Hrvatske*, ratni zrakoplov JNA poletio je iz Bihaća.

U povjerljivom *Izvjestaju* od 19/20. 09. 1991. g. pod brojem 301/1, kojeg je *Glavni štab TO SAOK (Teritorijalna obrana Srpske autonomne oblasti Krajina, op. a.)* uputio «Vrhovnom k-dantu OS SAOK (*Oružane snage SAOK*)», između ostalog se navodi: «Poslije

³⁹⁰ v. *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...*, prilozi na kraju knjige – Karte 1, 2, 5 i 7; Praljak, S., *Agresija...*, karte i podaci na str. 5-9.

³⁹¹ Kulenović, T., n. dj., str. 93.

³⁹² www.slobodanpraljak.com

³⁹³ v. izvorne video snimke korištene u dokumentarnom filmu Vranjican, Pavla, *Komšije*, Zagreb, 2003.

³⁹⁴ *Vjesnik*, 16. listopada 1991; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 72-74; (3D00320).

inicijative Krajišnika iz Grahova, Drvara i Petrovca (gradovi na teritoriju BiH, op. a.) koji žele aktivno da se uključe u odbranu SAO Krajine i da pomognu našem narodu, na tom području je boravio predsjednik Milan Babić i sekretar Milan Martić koji su prihvatili saradnju i dogovorili prihvat ljudstva.»³⁹⁵

Iz izuzetno značajnog dokumenta *Obavijest o prolasku vojnih kolona* JNA, «Broj: 04-32/92, Sarajevo, 13. 01. 1992. godine», kojeg je izdala JNA, a *Ministarstvo za narodnu odbranu BiH* prosljedilo tijelima vlasti u BiH, vidi se da su i institucije novih vlasti u BiH povremeno izravno surađivale sa srbijanskim strukturama pri izvođenju oružane agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku, ali i pri agresiji na «svoj» grad Mostar. Naime, u *Obavijesti* se između ostalog navodi: «Obavještavamo vas da će jedinice, u toku odlaska radi preuzimanja obaveza na frontu ili odlaska u matične garnizone biti upućene na pravce koji iz zapadne Srbije, Crne Gore i istočne Hercegovine vode ka Dubrovniku, Stonu (oba grada su na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske, op. a.) i Mostaru (grad u BiH, op. a.)»³⁹⁶

Zatim niz dokumenata iz 1992. i 1993. godine, svjedoči da su srbijanske postrojbe i logistika, koji su bili smješteni u BiH, kontinuirano (1992. i 1993. g.) sudjelovali u agresiji i okupaciji dijelova teritorija Republike Hrvatske.³⁹⁷

II.-7.2 Zarobljavanje Alije Izetbegovića

Krajem travnja 1992. g. povećavala se ratna drama u BiH. EU je u toj situaciji pozvala na novi krug pregovora u Lisabonu. Uoči odlaska A. Izetbegovića u Lisabon, održana je (28. travnja 1992.) sjednica *Predsjedništva RBiH* na kojoj se «upozorava domaću i međunarodnu javnost» da se «dijalog ne može voditi pod okupacijom kada se razaraju gradovi i naselja i masovno ubija nedužno civilno stanovništvo i uz potpunu blokadu saobraćaja.»

Na istoj sjednici, *Predsjedništvo RBiH* se prvi put jasno očitovalo o situaciji u BiH zaključkom «da su agresiju na Bosnu i Hercegovinu izvršile četničko-terorističke oružane formacije iz Srbije potpomognute rezervnim sastavima bivše JNA iz Srbije i Crne Gore, te oružane formacije SDS potpomognute snagama bivše JNA iz BiH. Predsjedništvo ne prihvata

³⁹⁵ Dokument preuzet iz Praljak, S., *Agresija...*, str. 28-29.

³⁹⁶ Isto, str. 39.

³⁹⁷ Isto, str. 48-92.

ocjenu po kojoj su sve stranke odgovorne za sadašnju situaciju u BiH. Ove stavove Predsjedništvo je usvojilo jednoglasno.»³⁹⁸

Tada se događala i «presudna politička i vojna bitka za nadzor nad bosanskim glavnim gradom ... *Zelene beretke* i građani Sarajeva spriječili su 2. svibnja JNA da odveze dokumentaciju iz Doma JNA ... Kao odgovor na tu opstrukciju, zapovjednik Sarajevskog korpusa JNA general Kukanjac naredio je opći napad na grad i zauzeće zgrade bosanskog Predsjedništva. Čini se da je to trebalo da bude koordinirano s otmicom Izetbegovića na sarajevskom aerodromu i pokušajem državnog udara od strane Abdića i Delimustafića.»³⁹⁹

Međutim, Kukanjac nije uspio u svojoj namjeri, te je ostao blokiran u svojoj sarajevskoj vojarni. Na povratku iz Lisabona, Izetbegović i njegova kćer su uhićeni od strane Kukanjca. Tada se odigravala prava javna drama, jer je, između ostalog i televizija izravno prenosila tonsko javljanje Izetbegovića iz zatočeništva. *Predsjedništvo RBiH* je, 3. svibnja 1992. g., održalo «vanrednu sjednicu» na kojoj se raspravljalo što poduzeti glede oslobađanja Izetbegovića, ali u paničnoj situaciji nije postojalo suglasnosti za određenu akciju, nego je svaki član *Predsjedništva RBiH* imao svoju zbrkanu procjenu, a nitko nije htio ići na pregovore s JNA, opravdano se bojeći da će biti također zarobljen.⁴⁰⁰

U međuvremenu je Izetbegović, pod donekle nerazjašnjenim okolnostima, pušten iz zarobljeničtva te je uz pomoć UNPROFOR-a prevezen u dijelove Sarajeva pod nadzorom legalnih vlasti, a zauzvrat iz okruženja je pušten Kukanjac s 20 kamiona opreme i vojnika. Slijedećeg dana, 04. svibnja, održana je sjednica *Predsjedništva RBiH*, u čijem službenom zapisniku je samo veoma kratko navedeno: «»Predsjedništvo je usvojilo Izvještaj o aktivnostima koje su članovi Predsjedništva obavljali u vrijeme odsustva i zarobljavanja predsjednika Predsjedništva JNA Alije Izetbegovića od strane bivše JNA na povratku iz Lisabona.»⁴⁰¹

Međutim, *Magnetofonski snimak 81. sjednice...* je veoma opsežan i svjedoči o golemom rasulu i nekontroliranoj događanja u BiH od strane legalnih vlasti. Izetbegović je, između ostalog, vezano za UNPROFOR rekao: «Oni su nam još jedino oko ovdje kroz koji gledamo svijet. Nema telefona, nema ničega više ... Mi smo otkinuti, pošta nam ne radi, mi

³⁹⁸ *Zapisnik 80. sjednice Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, održane 28. aprila 1992. godine*, dokument preuzet iz «National Security...», vol. 7, nr. 3, 2006, str.179-181.

³⁹⁹ Hoare, M. A., n. dj. str. 215.

⁴⁰⁰ *Magnetofonski snimak vanredne sjednice Predsjedništva....*, dokument preuzet iz «National Security...», vol. 7., nr. 3, 2006, str. 183-194.

⁴⁰¹ *Zapisnik 81. sjednice...*, dokument preuzet iz «National Security...», vol. 7, nr. 3, 2006, str. 195-196.

nemamo više veze sa svijetom. Telefoni ne rade, nemamo veze sa Zagrebom, Bečom ni sakim veze.»⁴⁰²

I niz drugih izvora (od kojih je dio korišten i u ovoj ekspertizi) nedvojbeno potvrđuju da su, u proljeće 1992. g., srpske postrojbe uspostavile nad Sarajevom gotovo potpunu izolaciju, te da je *Predsjedništvo RBiH* bilo prometno i komunikacijski uglavnom odsječeno od ostalih regija BiH i ostalog svijeta. «Agresor je oko Sarajeva imao 35 komada oruđa kalibra većeg od 12,7 mm na kilometar fronta ... ilustrativno je znati da je najveću koncentraciju artiljerije u drugom svjetskom ratu ostvarila Crvena armija pred Berlinom – 25 artiljerijskih oruđa na kilometar fronta.»⁴⁰³

Primjerice, u takvoj situaciji, A. Izetbegoviću nije bilo «moguće otputovati iz Sarajeva» na sastanak s F. Tuđmanom, te su stoga, sredinom lipnja 1992. g., bez sastanka a nakon telefonskog razgovora objavili *Zajedničku izjavu*.⁴⁰⁴

II.-7.3 Oružani napadi na Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1991. godine

Složenost političke i vojne situacije u BiH prepoznaje se u mnogobrojnim dvojabama i neznanjima koji postoje o nizu tema vezanim za ratno i predratno vrijeme. Između ostalog, postoje velike razlike u datiranju početka srbijanske oružane agresije na BiH. Uglavnom prevladava mišljenje da je ta oružana agresija započela u proljeće 1992. g., s tim što i tu postoje nesuglasja o događajima i datumima koji su označili početak.

Zbog različitih interesa i razloga, izuzetno rijetko se spominju tri događaja iz 1991. g., koji pokazuju da su se srbijanski oružani napadi (agresija) na BiH događali već 1991. godine.

Prvi događaj, 10. svibnja 1991. g., bio je oružani napad koji su, s okupiranih dijelova Republike Hrvatske, izvršile postrojbe *Milicije SAO Krajina* na mjesto Uništa u zapadnom dijelu BiH.⁴⁰⁵ Stanovnici Uništa, Hrvati iz BiH, našli su se «u bezizglednoj situaciji, nakon što su ih opkolili Martićevi odmetnici, te selu zatvorili vodu i presjekli dovod električne energije.»⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰² *Magnetofonski snimak 81. sjednice...*, dokument preuzet iz «National Security..., vol 7, nr. 3, str. 199-245; navod je na str. 199 i 203.

⁴⁰³ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 193.

⁴⁰⁴ v. *Vjesnik*, 16. lipnja 1992; ili Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 181; (3D00320).

⁴⁰⁵ v. Praljak, S., *Agresija...*, str. 10.

⁴⁰⁶ *Kronologija rata...*, str. 57.

Drugi događaj, 08. lipnja 1991. g., bio je «upad 200 Martićevih specijalaca iz tzv. SAO krajine u Bosansko Grahovo i Titov Drvar (gradovi u zapadnoj BiH, op. a.)». Dok «su se martićevci postrojivali za smotru u Titovom Drvaru ... MUP (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova, op. a.) BiH ostao je potpuno nemoćan i razjedinjen.»⁴⁰⁷ Na to se, 09. lipnja 1991. g., oglasila «Vlada BiH i priopćila da je upad nelegalnih oružanih snaga iz tzv. SAO krajine besprimjerno kršenje ustavnog poretka Bosne i Hercegovine.»⁴⁰⁸

Međutim, dan kasnije, 10. lipnja 1991. g., povodom navedenog događaja A. Izetbegović se putem nacionalne televizije za BiH (*Televizija Sarajevo*) obratio javnosti «u svoje lično ime i u ime Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine», s veoma nekonzistentnom izjavom u kojoj je izrekao krajnje problematičnu zaključnu poruku: «Zapamtite, ovo nije naš rat. Neka ga vode oni koji žele da ga vode.»⁴⁰⁹ Naime, u izuzetno teškim sigurnosnim okolnostima u BiH i njenom okruženju, javna poruka s razine *Predsjednika Predsjedništva SR BiH* imala je višestruko negativne socijalno psihološke učinke. S jedne strane, poruka je bila poticajna za agresore, a s druge strane, građanima BiH je jasno rečeno da ih institucije države BiH ne namjeravaju braniti te da su prepušteni sami sebi.

Treći događaj su oružani napadi na selo Ravno (u jugoistočnoj BiH) u kojem su živjeli Hrvati, a u okolnim selima u istočnoj Hercegovini živjeli su uglavnom Srbi. Napadi su počeli 15. rujna 1991. g. i s prekidima su trajali do 06. listopada 1991. godine. Selo Ravno je bilo meta napada u sklopu širih srbijanskih oružanih operacija kojima je cilj bio okupacija južnih dijelova Republike Hrvatske od ušća Neretve, preko Dubrovnika do Prevlake, te okupacija zapadne Hercegovine.

Sredinom rujna 1991. g. je zabilježeno da se cijela Hercegovina nalazila «pod općom opasnošću s obzirom da jedinice JNA iz Bileće i Trebinja idu prema Čapljini, gradu s većinskim hrvatskim stanovništvom ... Trideset i pet autobusa, te stotinu oklopnih vozila, kamiona i osobnih automobila prevozili su JNA vojnike i civile pod punom ratnom spremom, koji su pucali iz svih oružja prolazeći kroz Stolac ... Osam tisuća crnogorskih rezervista stacionirano je na dubrovačkom području, a svoj su napad započeli razaranjem sela Ravno u Hercegovini, da bi nastavili s razaranjem Dubrovnika.»⁴¹⁰

Na koncu, 6. listopada 1991. g. selo Ravno je «spaljeno do temelja, a svi stanovnici, koji nisu uspjeli pobjeći, masakrirani su. JNA nije dopustila niti republičkom premijeru, a ni

⁴⁰⁷ Isto, str. 65.

⁴⁰⁸ Isto.

⁴⁰⁹ Obraćanje javnosti A. Izetbegovića putem TV Sarajevo, 10. lipnja 1991. g.; www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴¹⁰ *Kronologija rata...*, str. 95.

promatračima EZ smještenim tamo, a kamoli novinarima, da uđu u selo dok je trajala istraga.»⁴¹¹

II.-7.4 Djelomični muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatski oružani sukobi

Zbog niza razloga i interesa, objektivno razumijevanje i promatranje djelomičnog muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskog sukoba još uvijek je veoma opterećeno stereotipima. Stoga je potrebno na nekoliko razina prikazati osnovne razmjere i posljedice tog sukoba, te vrste uzroka koji su do njega doveli.

Najvažnije je naglasiti da je muslimansko/bosansko-hrvatski oružani sukob, u odnosu na cjelinu ratnih događanja u BiH, bio stvarno marginalan. Prostorno, taj sukob se događao na pojedinim lokalitetima i to uglavnom na području srednje BiH i pojedinih dijelova zapadne Hercegovine. Vremenski, sukob nije bio kontinuiran, nego se u svim slučajevima (osim donekle u Mostaru), radilo o kratkotrajnim oružanim okršajima. Ukupni vremenski intervali pojavljivanja ovih pojedinačnih sukoba trajali su od kraja listopada 1992. g. do prvih mjeseci 1994. godine. Intenzitet tih pojedinačnih oružanih sukoba je bio niske razine.

Najvažnije je naglasiti kako se u nijednom trenutku nije radilo o općem muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskom ratu. Odnosno, sukobi na pojedinim lokalitetima nisu bili strateški, organizacijski i vremenski povezani. O tome najzornije svjedoči činjenica što se - za trajanja ovih pojedinačnih sukoba - kao i tijekom ukupnog vremenskog trajanja njihovih pojavljivanja – na drugim područjima i bojištima BiH događala neprekinuta suradnja između oružanih postrojbi ARBiH i HVO-a. To doslovno tvrdi i jedan od najviših zapovjednika ARBiH: «Veoma je značajno pomenuti da je u toku najžešćih sukoba ARBiH i HVO-a postojala neprekidna suradnja te dve vojske na brojnim zajedničkim ratištima, od Orašja na severu Bosne preko tuzlanske regije ... do sarajevskog ratišta...»⁴¹²

Uostalom, u razdoblju kad su se događali muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatski oružani sukobi, ni jedna strana nije bila sposobna voditi složene (cjelovite) napadačke vojne operacije, zbog niza razloga. Ponajprije, tada su ARBiH i naročito HVO bile u procesu ustrojavanja, koji je bio divergentan, kako ukupno tako i na pojedinim područjima. Zatim, na većini prostora

⁴¹¹ Isto, str. 101; usp. Praljak, S., *Agresija...*, str. 11. Također, v. dokumente u: Praljak, Slobodan, *Zločini koje su počinili neki pripadnici JNA/VRS (srpske postrojbe) nad Hrvatima u BiH 1991.-1995.*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

⁴¹² Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 203.

BiH, tijekom 1992. i 1993. g., snažni srbijanski agresor je bio u najvećoj osvajačkoj progresiji, te je obrana nužno bila glavno opredjeljenje daleko slabijih i ARBiH i HVO-a.

U razdoblju druge polovice 1994. i tijekom 1995. g., kada su ARBiH i HVO bile najsnažnije i sposobne za napadačka djelovanja, događala se njihova puna i ratno veoma uspješna suradnja, što je (uz političku i vojnu pomoć Republike Hrvatske i međunarodne zajednice) srbijanskog agresora na koncu prisililo na politički sporazum.

Pored niza okolnosti koje su pogodovala ili utjecale na izbijanje muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih oružanih sukoba, jedna očigledna se ističe; prije izbijanja sukoba, na područje srednje BiH pristigao je veliki broj Muslimana/Bošnjaka koje je srbijanski agresor protjerao s drugih područja BiH, što je samo po sebi izazvalo velike demografske, humanitarne, socijalne i sigurnosne poremećaje na području srednje BiH, na kojem je inače postojala povijesna tradicija naglašeno uspješnog suživota Muslimana/Bošnjaka i Hrvata.

Odnosno, zbog etničkog čišćenja kojeg je u BiH provodio srbijanski agresor, veliki broj proganih Muslimana/Bošnjaka došao je na mali prostor srednje BiH, te je «žurna potreba da im se nađe životni prostor»⁴¹³ također utjecala na izbijanje muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih sukoba u srednjoj BiH. O tome je svjedočio i jedan od aktera događanja u srednjoj BiH koji je pojednostavljeno objasnio kako «lokalni Hrvati i Muslimani nikada ne bi ušli u sukob da nije bilo priljeva tih izbjeglica koji su za sebe tražili prostor, nakon što su svoj izgubili u zapadnoj i istočnoj Bosni».⁴¹⁴ Navedena situacija je nedovjbeno pogodovala izbijanju sukoba između pojedinaca i manjih skupina, te se na taj način – u krajnje nesređenim okolnostima – otvaralo daljnje umnožavanje različitih vrsta negativnih događaja.

Isto tako, neuspješni međunarodni mirovni planovi, koji su nudili različite vrste spornih unutarnjih teritorijalnih razgraničenja na etničko-vjerskoj osnovi, predstavljali su stalni opći okvir koji je pogodovala usmjerenosti uglavnom upravljački nekvalitetnih - središnjih i lokalnih - muslimansko/bošnjačkih i hrvatskih struktura u BiH na međusobno političko i vojno sukobljavanje na etničko-vjerskoj osnovi.

Na taj način, gledajući cjelovito, djelomični muslimansko/bosansko-hrvatski oružani sukobi zapravo predstavljaju paradoks, jer su se događali u vrijeme kad su i Muslimani/Bošnjaci i Hrvati u BiH bili gotovo nezaštićene žrtve vojnički uvjerljivo

⁴¹³ Shrader, Charles R., *Muslimansko-hrvatski građanski rat u srednjoj Bosni*, Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 2004, str. 27.

⁴¹⁴ Isto, str. 27; iskaz Franje Nakića (*Načelnik stožera Operativne zone Srednje Bosne HVO-a*, od prosinca 1992. do prosinca 1996. g.), 13. travnja 2000. g., u Haagu na suđenju Kordiću i Čerkezu.

nadmoćnog srbijanskog agresora, a kasnije - u vrijeme kad su ARBiH i HVO bili jači i napadački sposobni – događala se njihova puna suradnja.

Upravo zbog toga je potrebno s velikim oprezom istraživati i utvrđivati uzroke i okolnosti izbijanja svakog pojedinog muslimansko/bosansko-hrvatskog oružanog sukoba.

Na općoj logičkoj razini, kao i na konkretnoj događajnoj razini je nedvojbeno da su muslimansko/bosansko-hrvatski oružani sukobi isključivo i višestruko donosili korist srbijanskom agresoru. Ponajprije, to je znatno olakšalo srbijanski osvajački pohod i okupaciju dvije trećine teritorija BiH. Zatim, djelomični muslimansko/bosansko-hrvatski oružani sukobi su iskorišteni od Srbije i nekih drugih interesa da se u međunarodnoj zajednici stvori i održi potpuno neobjektivna i neselektivna percepcija o *građanskom ratu i ravnoteži odgovornosti* (moralne, političke, pravne, povijesne) srbijanskih, hrvatskih i muslimansko/bošnjačkih struktura za događaje u BiH.

To je također bio strateški interes srbijanskog agresora, jer je ta percepcija o događajima u BiH bitno utjecala na istu percepciju i za druge dijelove bivše Jugoslavije na kojima je Srbija bila agresor.⁴¹⁵ Znakovito je da se stereotipi o *građanskom ratu i ravnoteži odgovornosti* počinju oblikovati u razdoblju kad je međunarodna zajednica Srbiju opravdano i jasno označavala agresorom i zbog toga joj nametnula sankcije. U konačnici, postojanje ovih stereotipa je omogućilo nastanak i dosadašnje održavanje međunarodne verifikacije teritorijalnih učinaka srbijanske agresije u BiH, koji su postignuti najgorom vrstom zločina koje poznaje međunarodno humanitarno pravo.

Međutim, na sekundaran način, muslimansko/bosansko-hrvatskim oružanim sukobima je pogodovao niz okolnosti koje su postojale i unutar muslimansko/bošnjačkih i hrvatskih struktura. Općenito, radilo se o nepripremljenosti, a s time i nekvaliteti jednih i drugih, što je dovelo do poremećaja u razumijevanju hijerarhije općecivilizacijskih i nacionalnih vrijednosti i interesa, te su se sukladno tome veoma često donosile odluke o konkretnom postupanju. A zapravo se radilo prvenstveno o sukobu za moć između skupina na središnjoj (državnoj), regionalnoj i lokalnoj razini u BiH.

Taj proces se najsuštavnije može pratiti na najvažnijoj razini u BiH – *Predsjedništvu (S)RBiH*, koje je u ratnim uvjetima praktično preuzelo svekoliku središnju vlast. Iz dostupnih zapisnika i magnetofonskih snimaka sjednica *Predsjedništva* u razdoblju 1991. do 1994.

⁴¹⁵ v. Hodge, C., n. dj.; Cigar, Norman, *Srpski ratni napor i okončanje rata*, u «Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni...», str. 229-254.

godine⁴¹⁶ može se jasno pratiti proces podjele i sukoba interesa između muslimansko/bošnjačkih i hrvatskih predstavnika u *Predsjedništvu (S)R BiH*, te isti zasebni procesi unutar jednih i unutar drugih. Iz ove izvorne građe je očigledno da su se procesi svih naznačenih podjela i sukoba stvarno temeljili na interesima manjih skupina (struktura) i pojedinaca, iako su se oni povremeno formalno pozivali na zajedničke državne, nacionalne i etničke interese.

Takva situacija u *Predsjedništvu (S)R BiH*, prenosila se u političku i vojnu strukturu o kojoj je u ratnim uvjetima odlučivalo *Predsjedništvo*, s tim što taj utjecaj (zbog agresije te izoliranosti, neustrojenosti i drugih slabosti strukture legalnih vlasti BiH) općenito nije bio snažan i bio je veoma različit ili se potpuno gubio na nižim razinama, ovisno o okolnostima. No, nedvojbeno je da je stanje u formalno najmoćnijim muslimansko/bošnjačkim i hrvatskim strukturama pridonosilo općem ozračju netrpeljivosti i neodgovornosti na nižim razinama.

S druge strane, takve ukupne okolnosti, radi objektivnosti, zahtijevaju veoma pozorna istraživanja i procjenjivanja svakog pojedinačnog slučaja djelomičnog muslimansko/bosansko-hrvatskog oružanog sukoba, bez metodološki pogrešnog mehaničkog generaliziranja.

II.-7.5 Rušenje Starog mosta u Mostaru

Rat koji se pri kraju 20. stoljeća događao u BiH još uvijek je u velikoj mjeri neistražen s motrišta uzroka, tijeka događaja i posljedica. Neistraženost je bitno utjecala, s jedne strane, na neznanje, a s druge strane, na nastanak ili proizvodnju iskrivljenih ili potpuno krivotvorenih «znanja». Isto tako, rat u BiH je na niz načina bio veoma složen događaj, te stoga ima malo pojedinačnih ratnih događaja u BiH koji mogu poslužiti kao ilustracija te sveukupne složenosti.

Rušenje *Starog mosta* u Mostaru jedan je od događaja koji na više načina ilustrira i neistraženost i složenost ratnih i poratnih događanja vezanih za BiH.

Gledajući statistički, *Stari most* u Mostaru, koji je srušen 09. studenog 1993. g., predstavlja tek jedan od niza mostova koji su tijekom rata srušeni u BiH. Prije i nakon rušenja *Starog mosta* rušeni su, u Mostaru i BiH, drugi mostovi koji su imali puno veću vojnu

⁴¹⁶ Veliki broj *Zapisnika* i prijepisa iz magnetofonskih snimki objavljen je u šest knjiga (časopisa) «National Security and the Future», 2006. i 2007. godine.

važnost. Još prije ljeta 1992. g., srbijanski agresor je samo u Mostaru srušio sve mostove, osim *Starog mosta* koji je bio znatno oštećen. Općenito, daleko najveće objektivno značenje *Starog mosta*, koji je služio samo pješacima, je povijesno-spomeničko, jer se radilo o starom remek-djelu otomanske arhitekture iz 16. stoljeća.

Do rušenja, *Stari most* je bio izravni materijalni izvor za znanja o ratnim događajima u Mostaru, a posredni izvor i za prostor BiH, jer je Mostar imao strateško značenje za sve aktere na prostoru BiH, te su se na njemu – dugo i intenzivno - ogledali politički i vojni odnosi na mostarskom području i u cijeloj BiH.

Prva oštećenja *Stari most* je dobio već u lipnju 1992. g., od srpskog granatiranja tijekom napada na Mostar, i to je slikom i tekstom zabilježeno u tadašnjim lokalnim novinama.⁴¹⁷ Zbog toga, u lipnju 1992. g. «HVO je izvršio improviziranu privremenu zaštitu mosta postavljanjem dasaka ... Ta je zaštita pravljena pod stalnom prijetnjom srpskih granata».⁴¹⁸ U listopadu 1992. g., ponovno srpsko granatiranje je još više oštetilo *Stari most*, i to su također slikom i tekstom zabilježile lokalne novine.⁴¹⁹

U narednom razdoblju, most je bio u središtu muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih oružanih sukobljavanja u Mostaru. *Stari most* se nalazio u zoni pod kontrolom ARBiH, par stotina metara od crte razdvajanja, dakle u području relativno intenzivnih oružanih sukoba. Preko njega se s velikim rizikom prelazilo. Pripadnici ARBiH su preko *Starog mosta* učestalo prenosili ratni materijal (uključujući oružje i streljivo), a prelazile su i popune ARBiH upućene na crte razdvajanja. Stoga je nedvojbeno da je *Stari most* u to vrijeme bio vojni objekt.

U više navrata most su sve sukobljene strane oštećivale iz različitih vrsta oružja. U ratnim okolnostima i velikom stradavanju ljudi i objekata, donekle je razumljivo što sve veće oštećivanje *Starog mosta* nije izazivalo posebnu javnu pozornost. Međutim, unatoč oštećenjima most je opstajao, jer najvjerojatnije nije bio meta rušenja, sve do 9. studenog 1993. godine.

Znakovito je što je čin rušenja *Starog mosta* snimljen video kamerama s nekoliko mjesta i kasnije su «objavljeni albumi i videokaseta s naslovom *Rat u Mostaru*, proizvod BBC

⁴¹⁷ Goluža, Božo, *Tko je uistinu srušio Stari most?*, Motrišta 28, Matica Hrvatska, Mostar, 2003, str. 74. Osim toga, v. dokumente u: Praljak, Slobodan, *Urbicid koji su počinile postrojbe JA pod vodstvom Momčila Perišića nad Mostarom u ljeto '92.*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

⁴¹⁸ Isto, str. 65.

⁴¹⁹ Isto, str. 74.

Production, koja je bila u prodaji 2000. god.»⁴²⁰ Nakon rušenja, *Stari most* je u narednih 12 godina – sustavnim političkim, medijskim i drugačijim djelovanjima – pretvoren u jedan od ključnih i navodno neupitnih pokazatelja, dokaza i simbola koji su «svjedočili» o navodnom negativnom ratnom i negativnom drugačijem identitetu i karakteru hrvatskih struktura u BiH i Republici Hrvatskoj.

Markentiška osnova ovog stereotipa je bila jednostavna: hrvatska strana je navodno zapovjedila topničko gađanje i srušila vojnički navodno nevažni *Stari most*, te s time prokazala dubinu svog navodnog zločinačkog plana. Navodni zapovjednik rušenja *Starog mosta* bio je general Slobodan Praljak, dotadašnji zapovjednik *Glavnog stožera HVO-a*.

Markentiška moć širenja stigmatizirajućeg stereotipa bila je golema, te su potpuno bez uvažavanja ostajale čak i naglašeno očigledne najosnovnije činjenice.⁴²¹ Proizvođenje javne uvjerljivosti stereotipa o rušenju *Starog mosta* je bila toliko velika, da je u međunarodnom i domaćem prostoru nanosila golemu političku i drugačiju štetu hrvatskim strukturama u BiH i Republici Hrvatskoj, koje su također i same uglevnom povjerovala u stereotip, i to u tolikom razmjeru da je *Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske* odbio uopće i primiti generala Praljka, koji je imao namjeru upoznati ga s činjenicama.⁴²²

Tek kada je 2006. g. objavljena knjiga *Kako je srušen Stari most – činjenice*, u kojoj je, pored niza dokumenata, objavljena i detaljna *Analiza rušenja Starog mosta* - koju su izradila trojica vrhunskih znanstvenika i koja dokazuje da je most srušen podmetnutim eksplozivom a ne topničkom granatom - najedanput je posve prestalo dotadašnje sustavno i intenzivno markentiško djelovanje, a tema *Starog mosta* i njegove sudbine otišla je na još veću javnu marginu nego što je bila prije rušenja mosta. Još je znakovitije, što su zatim onemogućena javna propitivanja o uzrocima, interesima i akterima proizvođača stereotipa o rušenju *Starog mosta* u Mostaru. Isto tako, istovremeno je potpuno potisnuto istraživanje i javni interes za odgovor na još uvijek otvoreno pitanje: Tko je, zaista, i zašto je srušio *Stari most*?

⁴²⁰ Isto, str. 65.

⁴²¹ v. Praljak, Slobodan, *Kako je srušen Stari most*, Zagreb, 2006.

⁴²² Isto, str. 47.

II.-7.6 Mudžahedini i Al-Qa'ida u BiH

Usporedo s brzim širenjem i jačanjem srbijanske oružane agresije na BiH, u prvoj polovici 1992. godine, može se pratiti i sve veća nazočnost islamskih humanitarnih organizacija i radikalnih islamskih dragovoljaca (*mudžahedina*) koji su pristizali u BiH iz islamskih dijelova svijeta. I islamske humanitarne organizacije i *mudžahedini* su bili isključivo usmjereni na pružanje pomoći samo Muslimanima/Bošnjacima. Ta isključivost je u tadašnjim, složenim i teškim okolnostima u BiH, izgledala, na neki način, samorazumljiva, te se to nije posebno ni problematiziralo niti istraživalo. Tim više, jer je već i prije (u Republici Hrvatskoj) i tada u BiH na svim stranama bio nazočan veliki (a neutvrđeni) broj humanitarnih organizacija, skupina i pojedinaca, te dragovoljaca iz svih dijelova svijeta, bez posebnog propitivanja o njihovim motivima, interesima i svrhama.

Međutim, nakon šokantnog terorističkog napada koji se dogodio u SAD-u 11. rujna 2001. godine, te drugih terorističkih napada i trajnih sigurnosnih prijetnji koje su nakon toga jasno upućene državama zapadnog svijeta, započela su veoma sustavna policijska, obavještajna, znanstvena, medijska i drugačija istraživanja tog problema. U tom kontekstu, mnogi tragovi su doveli i do prostora BiH u ratnom razdoblju, te posve drugačijeg razumijevanja nazočnosti islamskih humanitarnih organizacija i *mudžahedina* na prostoru BiH.

Utvrđilo se da nazočnost islamskih humanitarnih organizacija i *mudžahedina* u BiH uglavnom nije bio spontani čin solidarnosti, nego cjelovita, temeljito planirana i visoko sofisticirana operacija radikalne islamske terorističke organizacije - *Al-Qa'ida* (baza, mreža).⁴²³ «Prema tome, važnost sukoba na Balkanu se nažalost dosad često umanjivala. Amerikanci i Europljani često se pitaju kako se Al-Qa'ida tako uspješno uvukla u Europu i na Zapad, stvarajući terorističke ćelije ... Neki od najvažnijih odgovora mogu se naći u Bosni, gdje je krema afganistanskih Arapa vježbala svoje ratničke vještine ... i unovačila novu generaciju okorjelih gerilskih pristaša.»⁴²⁴

«Iz afganistanskih brda i saudijske pustinje lako se uspostavljala veza sa Sudanom ... simpatizerima u Kanadi i – Bosnom ... Kada su u BiH počeli stizati prvi "mudžahedini" sa sobom su doveli za njih na prvi pogled netipičnu opremu: limene kovčege sa satelitskim

⁴²³ v. Kohlmann, Evan F., *Al-Qa'idin džihad u Europi, afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, Zagreb, 2005; Evan F. Kohlmann je savjetnik američkog Ministarstva pravosuđa i FBI-ja za područje međunarodnog terorizma.

⁴²⁴ Isto, str. 14.

telefonima i antenama, te računalne zaslone i tipkovnice. Čitavo vrijeme rata u BiH (1992-1995.) Bin Ladenovi ljudi i povjerenici držali su na taj način pod kontrolom islamističke borbe bez obzira na formalno podređivanje Armiji BiH.»⁴²⁵

«Bosna je Al-Qa'idi poslužila za infiltraciju na pet razina. U propagandnom smislu organizacija je dobila idealni teren za promociju svojih ideja o čistim islamskim državama ... U tim propagandnim radionicama u potpunosti je korištena računalna tehnologija». Promidžbene spotove napravljene u BiH, *Al-Qa'ida* je «podjednako pokazivala i zainteresiranim Bošnjacima koje je željela zavrbovati kao i simpatizerima u arapsko-islamskim zemljama ... pa su svježe autentične video-snimke o novomu "svetom ratu" bili često dovoljna injekcija za neodlučne.»⁴²⁶

Osobe diljem svijeta koje su odlučile pristupiti *Al-Qa'idi* bile bi poslone u BiH «na tzv. "živu obuku na terenu". Primjerice, ključni ljudi u alžirskom zabranjenim islamističkim organizacijama FIS i GIA prošli su kroz obuku i žestoke borbe upravo u BiH ... Bosna je Al-Qa'idi bila potrebna i zbog pranja novca ne samo preko raznih humanitarnih i kulturnih udruga nego i putem rubnih dijelova administrativnog aparata kojeg su gradili i održavali Bošnjaci i vlast Alije Izetbegovića.»⁴²⁷

Već u travnju 1992. g., nakon što su *mudžahedini* zauzeli Kabul (u Afganistanu), «šaik Abu Abdel Aziz otputovao je s četiri iskusna arapsko-afganistanska zapovjednika u Bosnu i Hercegovinu da "provjeri teren"», te je «brzo zaključio da je to doista pravedan sveti rat. "Svi muslimani trebaju sudjelovati ", predložio je, "bilo novcem, bilo brigom za udovice i siročad, bilo primanjem izbjeglica, bilo borbom za džihad ... Ima mnogo organizacija koje to mogu. Mi donosimo ljude"»⁴²⁸

Čelništvo *mudžahedina* u BiH i Afganistanu «imenovalo je šeika Abu Abdela Aziza za prvog *emira*, tj. vrhovnog zapovjednika, bosanskih Arapa iz Afganistana», a on je uskoro «podignuo svoj prvi stožer na vježbalištu Mehurići, blizu Travnika u srednjoj Bosni.»⁴²⁹

Istodobno, u proljeće 1992. g., «ratoborni egipatski šaik Anwar Shaaban dodijelio je samom sebi epsku ulogu ... biti politički vođa i glavni glasnogovornik stranih pripadnika

⁴²⁵ Višnar, Fran, *Al-Qa'idin put: od Afganistana preko BiH do mekanog trbuha Europe*, pogovor u Kohlmann, E. F., n. dj., str. 290.

⁴²⁶ Isto, str. 293.

⁴²⁷ Isto, str. 293.

⁴²⁸ Kohlmann, E. F., n. dj., str. 34-35.

⁴²⁹ Isto, str. 35.

džihada u Bosni»⁴³⁰, te je uskoro u Milanu (Italija) otvoren novi *Islamski centar* koji se «brzo razvio u glavnu osovinu mreže afganistansko-arapske djelatnosti u cijeloj južnoj Europi.»⁴³¹ Već u ljeto 1992. g. A. Shaaban «je poveo prvu "službenu" afganistansko-arapsku delegaciju u Bosnu», a nakon toga je «radio više od tri godine kao duhovni i politički šaik stranih mudžahedina na Balkanu.»⁴³²

Ratnici su bili jedan dio *Al-Qa'idine* složene djelatnosti koja je imala široku, raznoliku i veliku financijsku potporu. U američkom obavještajnom izvješću iz 1996. g. je zaključeno da «je gotovo jedna trećina islamskih nevladinih organizacija na Balkanu potpomagala djelovanje islamskih skupina koje se bave terorizmom».⁴³³ Tako je i «Međunarodna zaklada dobre volje ili BIF, korištena da se "presele sredstva u područja gdje Al-Qa'ida vrši operacije"», pa je «njihov stožer u Hrvatskoj osnovan za "operacije pomoći i potpore džihadu u Bosni i Hercegovini"».⁴³⁴

Isto tako, «Agencija za pomoć Trećem svijetu (Third World Relief Agency – TWRA), osnovana 1987. u Beču (s uredima u Sarajevu, Budimpešti, Moskvi i Istanbulu) brzo je izbila na loš glas zbog navodnog financiranja – i šverca oružja – za paravojne muslimanske vojnike i mudžahedine u Bosni uz izravno kršenje međunarodnog embarga na oružje.»⁴³⁵

U svibnju 1992. g. osnovana su prva dva vojna logora za pripremanje ratnika za *džihad* (sveti rat): u Zenici i Mehurićima kod Travnika. Potom su vojni logori osnivani i na drugim lokalitetima, uglavnom u srednjoj Bosni: na brdu Igman, te u «Turbetu, Radini i drugdje u Lašvanskoj dolini». Ovi logori su bili uređeni «potpuno u skladu s afganistanskim modelom: intenzivno, agresivno novačenje i poučavanje u vojnoj taktici, ali i nasilnom, napadačkom obliku islamskog fundamentalizma».⁴³⁶

Od rujna 1992. g. mogu se pratiti oružana djelovanja *mudžahedina* u srednjoj BiH,⁴³⁷ a prema nekim procjenama, pri kraju 1992. g. u BiH je bilo približno «700 ljudi iz Irana, Turske, Sjeverne Afrike, Afganistana i Palestine.»⁴³⁸ Zanimljivo je što su do rujna 1992. g.

⁴³⁰ Isto, str. 37.

⁴³¹ Isto, str. 39.

⁴³² Isto, str. 40.

⁴³³ Isto, str. 55-56.

⁴³⁴ Isto, str. 57-58.

⁴³⁵ Isto, str. 69.

⁴³⁶ Isto, str. 43.

⁴³⁷ Isto, poglavlje «Počinje bitka», str. 75-94.

⁴³⁸ Isto, str. 92.

«muslimanski borci obično mogli prelaziti Hrvatsku i prevoziti oružje prema Bosni bez incidenata», a u rujnu je «Hrvatska odjednom zatvorila putove šverca oružja preko svog teritorija.»⁴³⁹

Tijekom 1993. i prvih mjeseci 1994. g., na nizu lokaliteta oružanih muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih sukoba sudjelovali su i *mudžahedini*, bilo samostalno bilo u suradnji s postrojbama Armije RBiH.⁴⁴⁰ Osim sudjelovanja u oružanim sukobima, *mudžahedini* su u pojedinim dijelovima srednje BiH bili «zaduženi za "posebne operacije", prvenstveno da ubijaju i otimaju hrvatske "vođeće ličnosti"»,⁴⁴¹ te da vrše različite vrste zločina i zastrašivanja radi progona Hrvata iz pojedinih dijelova srednje BiH – «međunarodni su promatrači izvijestili kako "građani bježe od bošnjačkih dragovoljaca pod vatrom strojnica. Ima jakih dokaza o zvjerstvima ... Nema svjedoka pokolja, ali našli smo velik broj mrtvih građana" .»⁴⁴²

Opisana je i slijedeća situacija: «Krajem lipnja (1993. g., op. a.), arapski su ekstremisti krenuli od Guče Gore (kod Travnika u srednjoj BiH, op. a.) do obližnje škole u mjestu Metrovići, gdje je bio 231 hrvatski civilni prognanik. Bez ikakva povoda, ratnici džihada odjednom su uzeli prognanike kao taoce i zaprijetili da će ih sve poklati. Na kraju su mjesni vojnici Armije BiH silom otjerali Arape iz Metrovića i dogovorili prihvatljivi kompromis s njima tako što su se složili da će sve Hrvate iseliti iz muslimanskog teritorija.»⁴⁴³

Mudžahedini su se sukobljavali i s postrojbama međunarodnih mirovnih snaga. Tako se u prvoj polovici lipnja 1993. g. zaoštrio «sukob između mudžahedina i britanskih snaga UN-a koje su nastojale zaštititi civile na putevima između Zenice i Travnika». Ratnici džihada su «odmah okrenuli bacače raketa i puške prema vozilima UN-a», a «nazočni se mudžahedinski zapovjednik, nepoznat muškarac britanskog porijekla s afganistanskom kapom i plavom maramom preko lica, na savršenom engleskom obratio britanskom časniku ... i hladno mu rekao: "Smirite se, ovi ljudi neće pucati ako im ja ne zapovjedim" .»⁴⁴⁴ Na koncu, kad je postignut dogovor *mudžahedin* se odbio rukovati s britanskim časnikom rekavši da «neće dotaknuti meso nevjernika».⁴⁴⁵

⁴³⁹ Isto, str. 107.

⁴⁴⁰ Isto, poglavlje «Sukob s Hrvatima (1993-4.)», str. 95-136.

⁴⁴¹ Isto, str. 110.

⁴⁴² Isto, str. 116.

⁴⁴³ Isto, str. 117.

⁴⁴⁴ Isto, str. 119.

⁴⁴⁵ Isto, str. 120.

Iako je tema o ulozi *Al-Qa'ide* u političkim i ratnim događajima u BiH još uvijek značajnim dijelom neistražena, na temelju dosadašnjih saznanja opravdana je nekolicina zaključaka. Prvi je: «...odluka Al-Qa'ide da se bori u ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini doprinijela je da veći dio Srednje Bosne postane humanitarna noćna mora.»⁴⁴⁶ Drugi zaključak je na činjenicama utemeljena logična pretpostavka: «Vlada Alije Izetbegovića, njegov vojni kadar i narod (muslimansko/bošnjački, op. a.) dočekali su mudžahedine s oduševljenjem i olakšanjem u nadi da će se uz njihovu pomoć ratna sreća konačno okrenuti u korist bošnjačke strane.»⁴⁴⁷

Približno «5000 dragovoljaca iz arapsko-islamskog svijeta» stiglo je ukupno u BiH «pridruživši se Armiji BiH»⁴⁴⁸ te su u BiH situaciji predstavljali značajnu vojnu snagu, napose zbog obučenosti i fanatizma, kao i koncentriranog djelovanja uglavnom na malom prostoru srednje BiH.

O ratnom, ali i političkom i identitetskom značaju ratnika *džihada* za dio najmoćnije muslimansko/bošnjačke strukture u BiH svjedoči i slijedeća činjenica: «Vlada (RBiH, op. a.) je 13. kolovoza (1993. g., op. a.) službeno zasnovala Kateebat al-Mujahideen ("Odred svetih ratnika")» na temelju osobne zapovijedi bosanskog predsjednika Alije Izetbegovića, kojem je jedinica bila izravno odgovorna.»⁴⁴⁹

Za zaključke o ritmu i načinima provođenja, te dužini i širini impregniranosti vladajuće muslimansko/bošnjačke vojne, političke i društvene upravljačke strukture s radikalnim islamizmom potrebno je provesti niz istraživanja. No, nedvojbeno je da je ta impregniranost bila nazočna te da je utjecala na ratna i poratna ukupna događanja u BiH, o čemu svjedoče i činjenice navedene u ovom i nekolicini ostalih poglavlja ove ekspertize.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁶ Isto, str. 76.

⁴⁴⁷ Višnar, F., n. dj., str. 291.

⁴⁴⁸ Isto, str. 291.

⁴⁴⁹ Kohlmann, E. F., n. dj., str. 126.

⁴⁵⁰ npr.: *Islamska deklaracija*, raslojavanje unutar muslimansko/bošnjačkih elita, proces islamizacije ARBiH itd.

III.

ODNOS REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE PREMA BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI (1991.-1995. GODINE)

Uvodna napomena

Za cjelovito razumijevanje i procjenjivanje odnosa Republike Hrvatske (RH) prema Bosni i Hercegovini u razdoblju 1990.-1995. godine nužno je poznavati i uvažavati ključne probleme s kojima se u tom razdoblju suočavala RH. Uoči srbijanske oružane agresije, RH i BiH su bile u veoma sličnom položaju. Teritoriji RH i BiH su u tadašnjim srbijanskim planovima bili jedna cjelina koja je jasno označena kao cilj osvajanja. Sukladno tome, srbijanske strukture su na teritorijima RH i BiH djelovale propagandno, politički i naoružavanjem dijela srpskog stanovništva u RH i BiH. Već 1990. g. prosrbijanska JNA je protuzakonito oduzela veliku većinu oružja TO RH i TO BiH, te su ove dvije države – koje su bile u procesu ustrojavanja – bile bez vojske i oružja.

U takvom krajnje neravnopravnom vojničkom odnosu snaga, temeljni interes RH i BiH (kao i Slovenije i Makedonije, te Kosova) bio je pronaći politički put za rasplet tzv. jugoslavenske krize. Odnosno, RH i BiH, da su i htjele, nisu imale ni najosnovnije pretpostavke za sudjelovanje u vojničkom (oružanom) načinu rješavanja jugoslavenske krize. Na taj način su RH, BiH, Slovenija i Makedonija nužno bile upućene na svekoliku međusobnu suradnju.

Međutim, organizirana, sustavna strategijska suradnja između njih nije uspostavljena (do 1994. g.), nego su se pojavljivali određeni – uglavnom spontani i povremeni – oblici međusobnog suglasja. Takva vrsta «suradnje» se najviše institucijski očitovala na (ranije navedenim) sjednicama jugoslavenskog *Predsjedništva* tijekom 1990. i 1991. godine. Suglasja su se u manjoj mjeri očitovala na (ranije navedenim) međurepubličkim sastancima 1991. godine.

Iako je nelogično, pa čak i paradoksalno, na tada najznačajnijem – sigurnosnom - području nije u početnom (najvažnijem) razdoblju uopće bilo suradnje među žrtvama srbijanske oružane agresije, što je bitno olakšalo srbijansko ratovanje i osvajanja u RH i BiH, te kasnije na Kosovu.

I do sada je istraživački veoma otvoreno pitanje koji su čimbenici (na koji način i koliko pojedini čimbenik) utjecali na izostanak ukupne, a naročito sigurnosne suradnje među državama žrtvama srbijanske agresije. Kasniji određeni i veoma uspješni oblici političke i sigurnosne suradnje između RH i BiH najbolje su pokazali, koliko je ta suradnja mogla biti

korisna i u početnom ratnom razdoblju, te kako je golema strateška pogreška bio izostanak te suradnje.

U tom općem kontekstu treba promatrati i odnos RH prema BiH (kao i odnos BiH prema RH). Prema tome, gledajući cjelovito, taj odnos nije bio ni sustavan, ni bilateralno dogovoren, niti recipročan. Odnosno, on je (i kad se radi o RH) ovisio o procjenama i odlukama institucija vlasti RH (*Sabor, Predsjednik, Vlada*) koje su se prvenstveno ravnale prema svojoj percepciji interesa RH.

Glavni interes RH u razdoblju od 1990. do sredine 1992. sastojao se od tri međusobno isprepletena dijela: ustrojavanje države (u znatno otežanim uvjetima s približno 1/3 okupiranog teritorija), obrana od srbijanske oružane agresije, međunarodno priznanje.

U razdoblju od sredine 1992. do 1998. g., uvjerljivo primarni interes RH bio je načelno jednostavniji: reintegrirati (vratiti) okupirane dijelove teritorija u ustavnopravni poredak RH. Naime, nakon 1991. g. približno četvrtina teritorija RH bila je okupirana, s tim što su okupirani dijelovi - teritorijalno i sigurnosno – i nadalje dovodili u pitanje opstanak RH, jer su okupirani dijelovi na tri pravca gotovo onemogućavali integritet slobodnih dijelova države. Najkritičnije je bilo to, što je veliki južni dio RH bio kopneno odsječen te se komunikacija između sjevernih (i središnjih) i južnih dijelova RH odvijala preko otoka. Sigurnosno i komunikacijski je bilo tek nešto manje kritično na okupiranim dijelovima u smjerovima prema Sloveniji i Mađarskoj.

Cjelokupni državni i društveni život u RH do kraja 1995. g. (kada je većina okupiranih dijelova reintegrirana; osim *Podunavlja*) bio je gotovo u cijelosti podređen i zaokupljen rješavanjem navedenih problema. To se, primjerice, jasno prepoznaje iz strukture državnog proračuna i vanjskopolitičkog djelovanja, kao i iz političko-medijskog govora i svakodnevnog života u RH.

Ovi glavni problemi RH su do 1995. g. bili bitno i višestruko povezani s prostorom BiH. I prije srbijanske agresije, i nevezano za nju, bilo je na prvi (zemljopisni i povijesni) pogled jasno da su RH i BiH izuzetno međuovisni prostori u svakom pogledu (sigurnosnom, gospodarskom, komunikacijskom itd.), te da je teško zamisliti bilo kavu stabilnost jednog prostora bez stabilnosti drugog prostora.

Srbijanska oružana agresija na RH se – logistički, oružanim djelovanjima, postrojbama i popunom – u velikoj mjeri koristila prostorom BiH i njegovim resursima. Zatim, većina okupiranih dijelova RH je teritorijalno graničila s BiH. Budući je srbijanska agresija u smjeru zapada bila jedan cjeloviti plan i operativna izvedba, okupirani dijelovi RH su nakon 1991. g. postali dio srbijanskog osvajačkog procesa u BiH. Dostatno je ovdje naznačiti da se – od

1992. do 1995. g., cjelokupna (vojna i civilna) opskrba okupiranih dijelova RH (osim *Podunavlja*) odvijala preko prostora BiH. Na taj način je zapravo sudbina reintegracije okupiranih dijelova RH bitno i izravno ovisila o raspletu ratnih događaja u BiH.

I napokon, gledajući cjelovito - zbog političke i vojne nepripremljenosti Hrvatske za događaje 1990-ih godina, kao i nekvalitete velikog dijela struktura koje su svoju institucijsku moć prenijele iz komunizma u sustav RH, te niza drugih *tranzicijskih* problema – RH je u većini prijelomnih događaja 1990.-1995. g. bila akter koji je postupao uglavnom *reaktivno*, što se naročito očitivalo u odnosu prema promjenjivim i kontradiktornim zahtjevima koje je pred RH postavljala međunarodna zajednica.

Primjerice, RH je u lipnju 1991. g. prihvatila nepovoljnu *Brijunsku deklaraciju*; na početku 1992. g. prihvatila je nepovoljni *Sarajevski sporazum*, radi kojeg je prekinula veoma uspješnu osloboditeljsku akciju za zapadnoj Slavoniji i čak je napustila dio oslobođenog teritorija; višestruko je prihvaćano produžavanje mandata UNPROFOR-a u RH, iako on nije izvršavao preuzete obveze; 1992.-1995. g. (i nadalje) RH je slijedila sva promjenjiva ili kontradiktorna postupanja međunarodne zajednice prema BiH; 1995. g. RH je prihvatila izuzetno nepovoljni međunarodni *Plan Z-4* koji je okupiranim dijelovima RH nudio gotovo sve atribute države.

Naznačene činjenice su okvir bez kojeg nije moguće objektivno saznati kauzalnost (uzroci, tijek i posljedice) odnosa RH prema BiH u razdoblju 1990.-1995. godine.

U ovom dijelu ekspertize, prikaz odnosa RH prema BiH je – zbog analitičkih razloga i preglednosti - podijeljen na osam tematskih poglavlja koja zajedno čine jednu cjelinu, u kojoj se na znanstveno standardiziran način daje objektivna i cjelovita rekonstrukcija institucijskog odnosa države RH prema državi BiH u razdoblju 1991. – 1995. godine.

III.-1 DRŽAVNO POLITIČKA RAZINA

III.-1.1 RH priznaje samostalnu državu BiH (07. travnja 1992. g.)

O konkretnoj državno političkoj razini odnosa RH prema državi BiH najpouzdanije i najobjektivnije se može govoriti ako se polazi od odnosa čelnih državnih institucija (*Sabor, Predsjednik, Vlada*) i to u razdoblju nakon međunarodnog priznanja BiH (7. travnja 1992. g.). U razdoblju prije toga (od 1990. g.) postoji cijeli niz tema i činjenica (osnivanje stranaka i prvi višestranački izbori u BiH u drugoj polovici 1990. g.; međurepublički razgovori i pregovori u prvoj polovici 1991. g. itd.) koje imaju svoj historiografski značaj i zanimljivost, no nisu u središtu pozornosti ovog dijela ekspertize, nego su – kao i ostala ranija povijesna razdoblja – primjereno obuhvaćeni u prethodnim poglavljima..

Posebno veliku državno političku težinu ima činjenica što je RH priznala BiH kao samostalnu državu istovremeno kad i EU i SAD, s tim što je odluka EU bila odluka zajednice, a pojedine države EU su to provele naknadno. Na taj način su EU, SAD i RH – koje su prve priznale BiH – jasno iskazale da je njihov najveći interes postojanje BiH kao samostalne države. To međunarodno priznanje nije se dogodilo najedanput, nego je konkretni proces priprema trajao približno pola godine, tijekom kojih je donesen cijeli niz međunarodnih odluka, mišljenja i preporuka, te je u BiH sukladno tome proveden i referendum pod međunarodnim nadzorom.

U tom cijelom međunarodnom procesu, RH je čvrsto stajala na opredjeljenju da BiH bude samostalna država, te je u okviru svoje utjecajnosti izravno poticala Hrvate BiH da na referendumu glasuju za samostalnost BiH. Tome su se žestoko i na niz načina protivile Srbija i srpske strukture u BiH.

Sam čin međunarodnog priznanja BiH imao je svoju neposrednu međunarodnu uvertiru, u zajedničkoj *Deklaraciji* EU i SAD-a «o priznanju jugoslavenskih republika» (10. ožujka 1992. g.)⁴⁵¹, te kulminaciju u odluci o međunarodnom priznanju BiH, koju su EU i SAD donijeli 06. travnja, s tim da priznanje teče od 07. travnja 1992. godine.

Najviše državne institucije RH su usporedo pratila taj međunarodni proces, te se *Odluka Predsjednika RH* (Franjo Tuđman) «o priznanju Socijalističke Republike Bosne i

⁴⁵¹ v. *Vjesnik*, 12. ožujka 1992; dokument se nalazi i u Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 151-152; (3D00320).

Hercegovine kao suverene i samostalne države» temeljila na odgovarajućem zaključku «Sabora Republike Hrvatske od 27. ožujka 1992.» i prijedlogu «Vlade Republike Hrvatske od 06. travnja 1992.»⁴⁵² godine. U *Odluci* je, između ostalog ponuđeno «dvojno državljanstvo pripadnicima hrvatskog naroda koji to žele, te predlažemo da to pitanje uredimo bilateralnim ugovorom», kao i «da vlade naših zemalja u što skorije vrijeme povedu razgovore o uspostavi diplomatskih odnosa i svekolike suradnje između Bosne i Hercegovine i Hrvatske.»⁴⁵³

III.-1.2 Sporazum o prijateljstvu i suradnji između R BiH i RH (21. srpnja 1992. g.)

Međutim, obostrano načelno željena konkretizacija međudržavnih odnosa između R BiH i RH bila je znatno usporavana, jer - zbog srbijanske oružane agresije na BiH - «Izetbegoviću nije (bilo, op. a.) moguće otputovati iz Sarajeva». Stoga su A. Izetbegović i F. Tuđman, izražavajući «nadu da će se moći uskoro sastati», 15. lipnja 1992. g. i bez susreta odlučili dati *Zajedničku izjavu* u kojoj između ostalog BiH «izražava zahvalnost Republici Hrvatskoj za pruženu humanitarnu pomoć i prihvata i zbrinjavanje velikog broja izbjeglica, građana Bosne i Hercegovine», a RH «podržava napore Bosne i Hercegovine za očuvanje samostalnosti i suzbijanje agresije, i u tome joj pruža i nastaviti će pružati pomoć.»⁴⁵⁴

Potom je u *Zajedničkoj izjavi* navedeno kako «oba Predsjednika izražavaju punu suglasnost da nakon okončanja rata treba tražiti političko rješenje za odnose u Bosni i Hercegovini, na načelu ravnopravnosti tri konstitutivna naroda», te da *Predsjednik RH* «podržava napore međunarodne zajednice za prestanak agresije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu i zahtjev koji je Bosna i Hercegovina uputila međunarodnoj zajednici za pomoć i djelotvornu akciju za sprečavanje daljnje agresije».⁴⁵⁵

Početkom srpnja 1992. g. *Predsjednik RH* (F. Tuđman) je odgovorio na pismo *Predsjednika Predsjedništva R BiH* (A. Izetbegović) u kojem mu pojašnjava da se hrvatski narod u BiH «suočen sa srpskom agresijom ... morao samoorganizirati» ta da organiziranje HZHB i HVO «tumačimo kao inicijative u okviru Republike Bosne i Hercegovine pa ih samo kao takve i podupiremo.»⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵² Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 167-168; (3D00320).

⁴⁵³ Isto; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁴ *Vjesnik*, 16. lipnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 181-182; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁵ Isto, str. 183; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁶ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 195-196; (3D00320).

Čelnici R BiH i RH napokon su se susreli «prigodom vrhovnog skupa Konferencije o europskoj sigurnosti i suradnji (KESS, op. a.)» 8. srpnja 1992. godine u Helsinkiju, te su nakon razgovora kojem su nazočili i njihovi suradnici dali još jednu *Zajedničku izjavu*.⁴⁵⁷ U njoj su, između ostalog, naveli da obje države imaju «zajedničke interese u obrani svoje nezavisnosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti od srpske i crnogorske agresije», te da su suglasni «da se taj zajednički interes treba ostvariti naporima i sredstvima koje predviđa Povelja» UN-a i dokumenti KESS-a.⁴⁵⁸

Nakon toga se naglasilo kako BiH «cijeni napore međunarodne zajednice i Republike Hrvatske u pružanju pomoći, posebno prihvat i zbrinjavanje velikog broja izbjeglica», te da «oba predsjednika još jedanput naglašavaju privrženost svojih država načelu da se ... unutarnje uređenje» BiH «uredi demokratski na temelju ravnopravnosti tri konstitutivna naroda».⁴⁵⁹

U Helsinkiju je, 09. srpnja 1992. g., na plenarnoj sjednici KESS-a govorio i F. Tuđman,⁴⁶⁰ koji je naglasio: «Pristupajući KESS-u Republika Hrvatska je usvojila sva načela i vrijednosti KESS-a ... U tom kontekstu dopustite mi da još jednom vrlo jasno iznesem stajalište moje zemlje prema susjednoj državi Bosni i Hercegovini. Hrvatska je bila među prvim zemljama koje su priznale suverenitet i neovisnost Bosne i Hercegovine i u potpunosti poštuje teritorijalni integritet Bosne i Hercegovine. Hrvatska podupire napore Bosne i Hercegovine i međunarodne zajednice za očuvanje njezine neovisnosti i njezin otpor zajedničkom neprijatelju.»

Uskoro iza toga, 21. srpnja 1992. g., *Predsjednik Predsjedništva R BiH i Predsjednik RH* su u Zagrebu potpisali međudržavni *Sporazum o prijateljstvu i suradnji*,⁴⁶¹ koji je najvažniji međudržavni dokument do 1994. g., jer su se na njemu (do 1994. g.) temeljili gotovo svi odnosi između dvije države, a naročito neoubičajeno široki spektar pomoći koju je RH institucijski pružala BiH u obrani od srbijanske agresije i saniranju teških posljedica koje je srbijanska agresija proizvodila na prostoru BiH.

Na početku ovog *Sporazuma* polazilo se od zajedničkih interesa R BiH i RH «u zaštiti njihove nezavisnosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti» i ozbiljne zabrinutosti «zbog nastavka agresije

⁴⁵⁷ *Novi Vjesnik* (dnevna novina), Zagreb, 07. srpnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. Str. 197-198; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁸ Isto, str. 198; (3D00320).

⁴⁵⁹ Isto; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁰ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 199-202; (3D00320).

⁴⁶¹ *Novi Vjesnik*, 22. srpnja 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 212-214; (3D00320).

ostataka Jugoslavenske narodne armije bivše SFRJ i srpskih i crnogorskih vojnih regularnih i neregularnih snaga na njihova područja».⁴⁶² Potom se utvrdilo da se prihvaća niz dokumenata i mišljenja koje su za prostor bivše Jugoslavije donijele međunarodne institucije i skupine.

Iza toga, u deset točaka *Sporazuma* navode se dogovori koji su postignuti o različitim pitanjima. Između ostalog, u točki prvoj *Sporazuma* utvrđeno je da će «buduće državno uređenje» BiH «polaziti od načela pune jednakopravnosti triju konstitutivnih naroda», te da će se ustavno-političko uređenje BiH temeljiti «na konstitutivnim jedinicama, pri osnivanju kojih će se voditi računa o nacionalnim, povijesnim, kulturnim, gospodarskim, prometnim i drugim elementima.»⁴⁶³

U drugoj točki *Sporazuma* navedeno je da će R BiH i RH «suradivati i međusobno se sporazumijevati, polazeći od poštivanja svojih posebnih interesa i svjesni povezanosti interesa njihovih zemalja».⁴⁶⁴

U posebnoj (trećoj) točki *Sporazuma* «državna delegacija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine izražava zahvalnost Republici Hrvatskoj na prihvatu u zbrinjavanju izbjeglica iz Republike Bosne i Hercegovine iznad njenih mogućnosti.»⁴⁶⁵

U točki šest *Sporazuma* određeno je: «Oružani dio Hrvatskog vijeća obrane sastavni je dio jedinstvenih oružanih snaga Republike Bosne i Hercegovine ... Privremena civilna vlast, nastala u ratnim uvjetima u okviru Hrvatskog vijeća obrane, uskladit će se što prije s ustavnopravnim poretkom Bosne i Hercegovine, o čemu će se odmah povesti razgovori u duhu načela iz točke 1. ovog Sporazuma.»⁴⁶⁶

Posebno je značajna, a ujedno i najopširnija, točka 8. *Sporazuma*, na kojoj su se temeljili naredni složeni međudržavni vojni odnosi, uključujući vojnu pomoć koju je RH pružala ARBiH i HVO te povremena djelovanja HV-a na graničnim područjima BiH. U ovoj točki *Sporazuma* pošlo se «od činjenice da se nastavlja agresija srpskih i crnogorskih vojnih snaga na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu, ali velikim dijelom i na Republiku Hrvatsku, s graničnih područja Republike Bosne i Hercegovine» te se pozvalo institucije međunarodne zajednice (UN i EU) i SAD «da poduzmu stvarne i djelotvorne mjere za energično

⁴⁶² Isto, str. 212; (3D00320).

⁴⁶³ Isto, str. 213; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁴ Isto, str. 213; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁵ Isto, str. 213; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁶ Isto, str. 214; (3D00320).

zaustavljanje agresije ... za sprečavanje daljnjih ljudskih žrtava, proganjanja i iseljavanja ... i uništavanja materijalnih dobara.»⁴⁶⁷

Pored toga, u točki 8. *Sporazuma* je zaključeno da će – u cilju zaustavljanja srbijanske agresije – RBiH i RH «nastaviti dosadašnju uspješnu suradnju i stalnu koordinaciju svojih obrambenih djelatnosti u graničnim zonama između njih. Svjesni činjenice da ako se hitno ne zaustavi agresija na njih, objema državama prijete daljnja razaranja i uništavanja njihovog državnog bića i cjelovitosti, one će, u slučaju da naponi međunarodne zajednice ostanu bezuspješni, razmotriti i poduzeti sve potrebne oblike široke suradnje na vojnom polju i usklađenje vojnih operacija radi definitivnog odbijanja opasnosti koja im prijete.»⁴⁶⁸

Pri kraju kolovoza 1992. g., u Međugorju su se sastale skupine čelnika SDA i HDZBiH koje su donijele *Zaključke* koji su «u funkciji provedbe Sporazuma o prijateljstvu i suradnji».⁴⁶⁹ U *Zaključcima* je predloženo «stvaranje četiriju konstitutivnih jedinica, koje bi se sastojale od više regija», te «da u BiH zakonodavnu vlast ima Ratno predsjedništvo, a izvršnu Ratna vlada» koja bi se sastavila «na paritetnim načelima». Predloženo je i da bi se na razini države ustrojile «jedinstvene oružane snage od pripadnika HVO i Armije BiH sa paritetnim zajedničkim zapovjedništvom.»⁴⁷⁰

Međutim, 12 dana kasnije (09. rujna 1992. g.) *Ured predsjednika Predsjedništva BiH* je objavio priopćenje za javnost u kojem se posredno ograđuje od *Zaključaka* iz Međugorja navodeći da *Predsjedništvo BiH* «nije iniciralo rad tih komisija niti ima bilo kakve veze s tim.»⁴⁷¹

Tijekom zasjedanja *Generalne skupštine UN-a*, 21. rujna 1992. g., u New Yorku su se sastale delegacije RBiH i RH, na čelu s A. Izetbegovićem i F. Tuđmanom, te su «polazeći od Sporazuma o prijateljstvu i suradnji», od 21. srpnja 1992. g., «suglasili su se da potpišu» *Dodatak Sporazuma o prijateljstvu i suradnji*.⁴⁷² U *Dodatku* se pošlo od činjenice da «dosadašnji diplomatski, politički i humanitarni naponi međunarodne zajednice nisu zaustavili agresiju na Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Republiku Hrvatsku», pa su stoga, BiH i RH ,

⁴⁶⁷ Isto, str. 214; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁸ Isto, str. 214; (3D00320).

⁴⁶⁹ *Večernji list*, 09. kolovoza 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 234-235; (3D00320).

⁴⁷⁰ Isto, str. 234; (3D00320).

⁴⁷¹ *Večernji list*, 10. rujna 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 239; (3D00320).

⁴⁷² Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 243-244; (3D00320).

između ostalog, odlučile (sukladno *Sporazumu o prijateljstvu i suradnji*) osnovati «zajednički Odbor radi usklađivanja obrambenih napora, sve dok agresija u potpunosti ne prestane».⁴⁷³

III.-1.3 Pokušaji uspostave pune suradnje (listopad 1992.-travanj 1993. g.)

Na temelju toga, A. Izetbegović je, 16. listopada 1992. g., dopisom obavijestio Ministra obrane RH (Gojko Šušak) o svojoj odluci (imenovanju): «U skladu sa Sporazumom o prijateljstvu i suradnji između Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i Republike Hrvatske, u komisiju za koordiniranje vojnih aktivnosti ispred Republike Bosne i Hercegovine imenuju se:

1. BILAJAC RIFAT,
2. BENO FABIJAN,
3. ČENGIĆ HASAN (zamjena ŠABIĆ SALEM).»⁴⁷⁴

Istoga dana A. Izetbegović je, «na osnovi odgovornosti i ovlaštenja koja imam kao predsjednik Savjeta za narodnu obranu i predsjednik Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine», donio i slijedeću Naredbu: «1. Oružane snage Bosne i Hercegovine (Armija BiH i HVO) pristupiće odmah pripremama akcije za deblokadu grada Sarajeva vojnim sredstvima ... Akciju pripremiti i izvršiti u najkraćem mogućem roku ... Za zapovjednika akcije, s punim ovlaštenjima, imenuje se JASMIN JAGANJAC».⁴⁷⁵

Međutim, unatoč iskazane svijesti i namjera država RBiH i RH, koje su posebno jasno očitovane u točki 8. *Sporazuma o prijateljstvu i suradnji* i njegovom *Dodatku*, pojavili su se događaji koji su usporavali i otežavali punu suradnju dviju država-žrtava (RBiH i RH) srbijanske oružane agresije. Iako je potpuno razvidno da je usporavanje i otežavanje pune suradnje RBiH i RH bio temeljni interes srbijanskog agresora, istraživački je otvoren odgovor na historiografsko pitanje o dubinskim mehanizmima, akterima i interesima koji su konkretno upravljali procesom pokušaja razbijanja i odgađanja pune suradnje RBiH i RH.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷³ Isto, str. 244; (3D00320).

⁴⁷⁴ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁷⁵ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁷⁶ O određenom aspektu specijalnoratovskog djelovanja svjedoči dokument «Izvešće za gospodina Matu Bobana», kojeg je 23. prosinca 1992. g. uputio brigadir Milivoj Petković, *Načelnik Glavnog stožera HVO*; www.slobodanpraljak.com.

No, na razini pojavnosti je nedvojbeno da je, umjesto uspostave žurne strateške suradnje između R BiH i RH, došlo u srednjoj R BiH do nekoliko djelomičnih, lokalnih oružanih sukoba između postrojbi AR BiH i HVO-a, koji su – neprimjereno svom objektivnom značaju - utjecali na tadašnji (i dosadašnji) proces suradnje između R BiH i RH, te svekoliku neobjektivnu (uglavnom negativnu) percepciju tog odnosa.

Naime, u srednjoj R BiH (na prostoru Novog Travnika, Viteza i Prozora) došlo je do prvih djelomičnih lokalnih oružanih sukoba između postrojbi AR BiH i HVO-a. Ovi sukobi su prestali nakon nekoliko dana.

Povodom tog prvog sukoba na nekim lokalitetima u srednjoj BiH, *Predsjednik Predsjedništva R BiH* je 27. listopada 1992. g., uputio pismo *Predsjedniku RH*, u kojem iznosi najteže optužbe na račun «hrvatske strane» u BiH, te donekle i na račun međunarodne zajednice. Između ostalog u pismu je navedeno: «Jedinice HVO planirano su izazvale sukobe u Novom Travniku, Vitezu i Prozoru. U sukobima je bilo žrtava i razaranja. Zatvoreni su svi putovi kroz zapadnu Hercegovinu, čak i za humanitarnu pomoć. Istovremeno u hrvatskom medijima vodi se propagandni rat protiv Bosne i Hercegovine i njene legalne vlasti.»⁴⁷⁷

Nadalje, Izetbegović u pismu navodi: «U Ženevi se pregovara o budućem uređenju Bosne i Hercegovine. Istovremeno se silom sprovodi politika svršenog čina, čime se pregovori u Londonu obezvređuju i čine bespredmetnim.»⁴⁷⁸

Tri dana kasnije, *Predsjednik RH* je u svom pismu odgovorio: «Hrvatska je priznala Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu ... i djelatno se zalaže da Bosna i Hercegovina opstane kao jedinstvena država ... budući da se povijesno, prostorno i gospodarski međusobno prožimamo, to je za Hrvatsku, a uvjeren sam i za Bosnu i Hercegovinu dugoročni strateški interes. ... Ja sam vođe tog hrvatskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini, pa i Vas i Vaše suradnike, koji vodite muslimanski narod, neprestano poticao, pa to i sada činim, da se sporazumijete i povežete ... Uvjeravam Vas da ćemo od strane Republike Hrvatske dosljedno provoditi sve odredbe našeg sporazuma ... Puno prijateljstvo te iskrena i djelatna suradnja, životni su, vitalni interesi naših obiju država, pa je i obveza, moja i Vaša, da na tome intenzivno radimo.»⁴⁷⁹

Za razumijevanje složenosti pozadine početka navedenih oružanih sukoba znakovita je i činjenica da je A. Izetbegović već 04. studenog 1992. g., obavijestio Ministra obrane RH

⁴⁷⁷ *Vjesnik*, 30. listopada 1992; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 259-260; (3D00320).

⁴⁷⁸ Isto, str. 260; (3D00320).

⁴⁷⁹ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 270-271; (3D00320).

kako je u sastavu predstavnika BiH u *Komisiji za koordinaciju vojnih aktivnosti između BiH i RH* došlo «do izmjene i umjesto Bene Fabijana, imenujemo Milivoja Petkovića, što je u skladu s prijedlogom HVO.»⁴⁸⁰

Predsjednik RH uputio je, 27. siječnja 1993. g., još jedno pismo *Predsjedniku Predsjedništva RBiH* navodeći: «Nemili događaji koji se zbivaju ovih dana, u kojima muslimanski ekstremisti u središnjoj Bosni, organizirano zločinački i brutalno napadaju hrvatska naselja, pucajući na civile i branitelje prisiljavaju me da Vam se obratim ... Koristim ovu priliku da se obratim neposredno hrvatskom i muslimanskom narodu u BiH da obustave sva međusobna neprijateljstva i ostvare punu suradnju u obrani od zajedničkog agresora i u pronalaženju rješenja za skladan suživot».⁴⁸¹

Uskoro, 11. veljače 1993. g., glavni stožeri ARBiH i HVO-a potpisali su dogovor kojem je cilj spriječavanje «daljih nesuglasica i sukoba između Armije BiH i HVO radi organiziranja zajedničke borbe protiv agresora».⁴⁸² Dogovorom je, između ostalog, određeno da će se u srednjoj RBiH formirati «zajednički koordinacijski tim» koji će «izdavati zajedničke zapovijedi ... da jedinice-postrojbe odmah napuste položaje između HVO i Armije BiH ... da se sve jedinice-postrojbe koje su dovedene s drugih prostora hitno povuku».⁴⁸³

Predsjednik RH i *Predsjednik Predsjedništva RBiH* su, nakon razgovora u Zagrebu, 27. ožujka 1993. g. dali *Zajedničku izjavu* u kojoj «Republika Hrvatska pozdravlja potpisivanje Vance-Owenovog plana od strane gospodina Alije Izetbegovića i gospodina Mate Bobana».⁴⁸⁴ U drugoj točki F. Tuđman i A. Izetbegović «zahtijevaju od međunarodne zajednice da se Vance-Owenov plan učinkovito i dosljedno provede, imajući u vidu loša iskustva sa nedjelotvornom provedbom Vanceovoga plana u Republici Hrvatskoj», a potom u točki 5. «izražavaju spremnost za daljnjom najužom suradnjom između Republike Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, te ističu nužnost za svekolikom suradnjom između hrvatskog i muslimanskog naroda u BiH».⁴⁸⁵

ARBiH i HVO su, 21. travnja 1993. g., u Zenici potpisali *Sporazum o prekidu vatre*, u kojem se najprije navodi: «Armija BiH i HVO su legalne vojne snage Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i tretiraju se jednako» a zatim je određeno da «svi zapovjednici, na svim

⁴⁸⁰ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁸¹ *Vjesnik*, 28. siječnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 322-323; (3D00320).

⁴⁸² *Vjesnik*, 12. veljače 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 328-329; (3D00320).

⁴⁸³ Isto, str. 328; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁴ *Vjesnik*, 28. ožujka 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 339; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁵ Isto; (3D00320).

razinama, moraju poštovati i provesti potpuni prekid vatre na čitavom teritoriju Republike.»⁴⁸⁶



Prilog 25: Doseg srbijanskog osvajanja u zimi 1992/1993
(Preuzeto iz: *Rat u Hrvatskoj*..., karta 5, na kraju knjige)

Potom su A. Izetbegović i M. Boban u Zagrebu, 25. travnja 1993. g., u nazočnosti brojnih međunarodnih (D. Owen, P. Hall, H. Okuna, G. Ahrens, J. Wilson, Messervy-Whiting, F. Eckhard, D. Ludlow, G. Brade), BiH (E. Ganić, S. Halilović, B. Turković, M. Šaćirbegović, K. Trnka, M. Petković) i RH (J. Radić, V. Šeks, G. Šušak, Z. Škrabalo, J.

⁴⁸⁶ *Vjesnik*, 22. travnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina*..., str. 343; (3D00320).

Bobetko, Z. Sančević, Ž. Matić, I. Jarnjak, B. Jakšić, M. Ćuk) predstavnika potpisali *Zajedničku izjavu* (uz potpis svjedočenja F. Tuđmana) o prekidu sukoba između ARBiH i HVO te «o ustanovljenju zajedničkog zapovjedništva tih snaga sastavljenog od predstavnika oba stožera.»⁴⁸⁷

Osim toga, potpisnici su naveli kako «ponovno potvrđuju da su sukobi snaga HVO i Armije BiH u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini suprotni politici koju vode predstavnici ta dva naroda», te da «najoštrije osuđuju kršenje pravila međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, bez obzira na to tko ih je učinio.»⁴⁸⁸

Zajednička izjava je imala i *Dodatak I* u kojem je, između ostalog, određeno: «Armija BiH i HVO će zadržati svoje zasebne identitete i ustrojstvo zapovjedništava ... Oni će formirati Zajedničku komandu ... Zajednička komanda će se sastojati od dva vrhovna zapovjednika, generala Halilovića i generala Petkovića ... Oni će osnovati zajednički glavni stožer ... Dva vrhovna zapovjednika će formirati vojne okruge pod zajedničkim stožerom ... Svako vojni okrug imat će operacijsku kontrolu nad svim postrojbama Armije BiH i HVO u svojim područjima.»

U proces pokušaja prekida djelomičnih sukoba i obnove muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatske suradnje na područjima sukoba u BiH uključio se i *Zastupnički dom Sabora RH* (pod predsjedanjem Stjepana Mesića), koji je, 30. travnja 1993. g., donio *Zaključak*, u kojem je navedeno: «Pozivaju se Muslimani i Hrvati, sukobljene strane u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini ... da odmah obustave sve oružane sukobe», te «da se zajedničkim snagama odupru srpskoj imperijalističkoj agresiji koja je usmjerena na zatiranje oba naroda». Potom je zaključeno: «U cilju pružanja podrške mirnom rješenju postojećih nesporazuma i očuvanja suvereniteta i teritorijalne cjelovitosti prijateljske susjedne države Bosne i Hercegovine, Zastupnički dom Sabora Republike Hrvatske uputit će svoju višestranačku delegaciju u misiju mira i dobre volje.»⁴⁸⁹

Istog dana, *Sabor* je odredio sedam članova višestranačke delegacije, a *Zamjenik Ministra vanjskih poslova RH* (Ivo Sanader) uputio je dopis *Zapovjeniku snaga UNPROFOR-a* (L. F. Wahlgren), u kojem ga je upoznao s namjerama i sastavom saborske delegacije, te mjestima u BiH koja će delegacija posjetiti, istovremeno tražeći za saborsku delegaciju

⁴⁸⁷ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 348-349; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁸ Isto, str. 349; (3D00320).

⁴⁸⁹ *Narodne novine* (službeni list RH), Zagreb, br. 43/1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 351; (3D00320).

pomoć i zaštitu snaga UNPROFOR-a.⁴⁹⁰ *Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova RH* je sličan dopis uputilo i *Ambasadi BiH*, u kojem «moli vlasti Republike Bosne i Hercegovine da pruže potrebnu pomoć za vrijeme boravka spomenute delegacije na teritoriju Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.»⁴⁹¹

S istom nakanom i istog dana, 30. travnja 1993. g., u Ankari su državne delegacije Turske i Republike Hrvatske (predvođene turskim premijerom Suleymanom Demirelom i *Predsjednikom RH* F. Tuđmanom) potpisale *Zajedničku deklaraciju o krizi na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije*.⁴⁹² U *Deklaraciji* je, između ostalog, navedeno: «Turska i Hrvatska su dvije zemlje u regiji s posebnim interesom za očuvanje mira i stabilnosti i promiču duh suradnje. Turska i Hrvatska dijele isto gledište da su uzroci krize u regiji militantni nacionalistički ekspanzionizam i rasistička politika koja ima za cilj stvaranje velike Srbije. Obje zemlje snažno osuđuju nastavak agresije SR Jugoslavije ... odlučno osuđuju užasnu praksu genocidnog etničkog čišćenja».⁴⁹³

Isto tako, «obje su zemlje dogovorile da će osnovati zajedničku vladinu misiju dobre volje koju će poslati u Bosnu i Hercegovinu», no vjeruju da «međunarodna zajednica neće imati izbora već nametnuti mir vjerodostojnim i učinkovitim vojnim mjerama o čemu treba odlučiti Vijeće sigurnosti UN.»⁴⁹⁴

III.-1.4 Nova nesuglasja (svibanj-listopad 1993. g.)

Usprkos pokušajima različitih aktera i određenom smirivanju situacije, uskoro su ponovno na pojedinim lokalitetima izbili muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatski sukobi. Zbog toga je *Predsjednik RH*, 10. svibnja 1993. g., uputio javnim putem *Poruku A*. Izetbegoviću i M. Bobanu. U *Poruci* se najprije navode sporazumi koji su potpisani, te aktivnosti koje je poduzela RH radi smirivanja sukoba. Istaknuto je da višestranačkoj delegaciji Sabora RH «još uvijek nije omogućeno da posjeti krizna žarišta», te: «Jučer, 9. svibnja 1993. suglasio sam se s gospodinom Šefkom Omerbašićem, predsjednikom Mešihata Islamske zajednice za Hrvatsku

⁴⁹⁰ www.slobodan praljak.com

⁴⁹¹ www.slobodanpraljak.com

⁴⁹² Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 352-353; (3D00320).

⁴⁹³ Isto, str. 352; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁴ Isto, str. 353; (3D00320).

i Sloveniju, da pođe s grupom hrvatskih djelatnika u BiH također sa zadaćom djelovanja na uspostavi mira i suradnje između Hrvata i Muslimana.»⁴⁹⁵

Potom je u *Poruci* navedeno: «Najoštrije osuđujem oružane sukobe između Hrvata i Muslimana u BiH bez obzira na to tko ih je prouzročio.»⁴⁹⁶ Tuđman je posebno pozvao «sve Muslimane kojima smo tijekom agresije pružali u Hrvatskoj zaštitu i utočište da utječu na svoje sunarodnjake da se suzdrže od sukoba s Hrvatima i da se osigura suradnja», te «i sve Hrvate u BiH da ne nasjedaju provokacijama i da učine sve da se izbjegne ovaj štetni sukob.» Na kraju je pozvao A. Izetbegovića i M. Bobana da odmah naredi «svim svojim zapovjednicima i postrojbama, da neodložno prekinu sve sukobe i započnu suradnju u duhu već potpisanih sporazuma i izjava.»⁴⁹⁷

Dan kasnije i *Predsjedničko vijeće obrane i nacionalne sigurnosti* u RH izdalo je slično priopćenje sa svoje sjednice.⁴⁹⁸ Potom je *Predsjednik RH*, 12. svibnja 1993. g., uputio pismo *Glavnom tajniku UN-a*, u kojem je glavna tema bio problem reintegracije okupiranih dijelova RH, ali se i u ovom dokumentu u posebnoj točki traži «postavljanje međunarodnih promatrača na granice između Republike Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine koja se nalaze uz zone UNPA ... da bi se spriječile vojne aktivnosti protiv tih dviju republika.»⁴⁹⁹

Jedno od najoštrijih pisama koje je od međunarodne zajednice upućeno RH (u vezi s BiH) je pismo koje je, 12. svibnja 1993. g., predsjedavajući *Ministarskog vijeća EU* (Niels Helveg) uputio *Predsjedniku RH*.⁵⁰⁰ U pismu je, između ostalog, navedeno da EU «i njezine države članice zaprepaštene su stalnim hrvatskim napadima i nasiljem nad Muslimanima u Bosni i Hercegovini ... Štoviše, izvještaji o izravnoj hrvatskoj umiješanosti u sukob u Bosni i Hercegovini su uznemiravajući.»⁵⁰¹

Kraj pisma je bio još oštiri i izravniji i u njemu stoji da EU «i njezine države članice traže brzo, jasno i konkretno očitovanje, koje bi jasno pokazalo da hrvatsko vodstvo ne samo da čini sve što može zaustaviti krvoproliće u Bosni i Hercegovini, već da u tome i uspijeva.»⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁵ *Večernji list*, 11. svibnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 359-360; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁶ Isto, str. 360; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁷ Isto, str. 360; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁸ *Vjesnik*, 12. svibnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 364-365; (3D00320).

⁴⁹⁹ *Večernji list*, 13. svibnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 369-372; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁰ *Vjesnik*, 14. svibnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 373-374; (3D00320).

⁵⁰¹ Isto, str. 373; (3D00320).

⁵⁰² Isto, str. 374; (3D00320).

Na ovo pismo F. Tuđman je opširnije odgovorio dan kasnije (13. svibnja 1993. g.). Najprije je navedeno sedam konkretnih akcija (ili dokumenata) u kojima su institucije RH, u okviru svojih mogućnosti, sudjelovale u pokušajima zaustavljanja tadašnjih muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih sukoba u BiH. Potom se N. Helvegu skreće pozornost da u svom pismu «ne razlikuje Republiku Hrvatsku od Hrvata koji žive u BiH», te da RH «ne može niti biti odgovorna za sve događaje i moguća zlodjela počinjena na teritoriju druge suverene države», a «Hrvatska se ne može ni na koji način smatrati odgovornom za djela koja su na stranom teritoriju počinile osobe koje nisu hrvatski državljani.»⁵⁰³

Pri kraju pisma F. Tuđman je također bio oštar navodeći kako je «iznenađen novim pravnim standardom koji je Europska zajednica uvela u međunarodno pravo», odnosno upitao je «kako bilo tko može kriviti Hrvatsku da nije učinila sve da zaustavi krvoproliće u Bosni i Hercegovini, ako je svjestan svih činjenica spomenutih u ovom pismu? Mjerilo prosudbe iskrenosti i primjerenosti poduzetih napora prema njihovoj uspješnosti teško bi se moglo primijeniti na djelovanje Ujedinjenih naroda i Europske zajednice u krizi na području bivše Jugoslavije, a da se ne dođe do vrlo zanimljivih zaključaka.»⁵⁰⁴

Na niz nesporazuma i dvojbi koji su tada pojavljivali u odnosima između RH i BiH odgovorila je opširnije i *Vlada RH*, preko pisma koje je *Ministarstva obrane RH* uputilo *Vladi BiH*. U pismu su navedena načelna polazišta odnosa RH prema BiH i konkretne činjenice koje opovrgavaju sumnje na račun odnosa države RH prema državi BiH, a na kraju je zaključeno: «Iskreno se nadamo da ćete prestati iznositi takve neistinite optužbe kojima se skreće pozornost od rata u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini i Republici Hrvatskoj, odnosno od velikosrpske agresije kojoj vi takvim pristupom idete u prilog. Samo njezin konačni poraz je preduvjet mira na prostoru Republika Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, kao i na čitavom prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.»⁵⁰⁵

Predsjednik RH je, 25. lipnja 1993. g., uputio pismo *Predsjedništvu BiH*, u kojem je naveo: «Hrvatska javnost s velikim ogorčenjem i zabrinutošću prati već duže vrijeme sukobe između HVO i Armije BiH koji su se izrodili u otvorenu agresiju i zlodjela muslimanske vojske ... nad hrvatskim narodom».⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰³ *Vjesnik*, 14. svibnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 375-377.

⁵⁰⁴ Isto, str. 377; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁵ *Glas Slavonije* (dnevna novina), Osijek, 19. svibnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 378-380; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁶ *Vjesnik*, 26. lipnja 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 402-403; (3D00320). Također, v. Praljak, Slobodan, *Zločini koje su počinili neki pripadnici A BiH (muslimanske postrojbe) nad Hrvatima u BiH*

Potom se u pismu podsjeća da, između ostalog, «vlasti Bosne i Hercegovine slobodno zasjedaju u Zagrebu, predstavnici tih vlasti slobodno se kreću na cijelom području Republike Hrvatske ne poštujući osnovna međunarodna pravila o najavljivanju i traženju suglasnosti za svoje djelovanje na teritoriju druge suverene države, a u mnogim mjestima Hrvatske djeluju brojni različiti uredi i logistički centri političkih organizacija i vojske koja vrši zločine i agresiju nad hrvatskim narodom ... Zbog toga će, ako se agresija i zločini odmah ne zaustave, Republika Hrvatska ozbiljno preispitati sveukupnu svoju politiku prema Bosni i Hercegovini.»⁵⁰⁷

Predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH je, 04. kolovoza 1993. g., uputio zanimljivo pismo *Predsjedniku RH*, u kojem mu predlaže na prihvaćanje niz prijedloga glede unutarnjeg ustrojstva BiH za hrvatski narod u BiH.⁵⁰⁸ *Predsjednik RH* je uskoro odgovorio, a najbitnije je slijedeće: «Hrvatska država pozdravlja i podupirat će svaku inicijativu koja se zauzima za ostvarenje najuže suradnje između muslimanske i hrvatske konstitutivne jedinice u budućoj Uniji republika Bosne i Hercegovine, ali taj dogovor trebaju postići vodstva i legitimni predstavnici tih republika.»⁵⁰⁹

Predsjednik RH je, 06. rujna 1993. g., uputio pismo *Predsjedniku HRHB*, M. Bobanu, u kojem je, između ostalog, navedeno: «... snažno apeliram na Vas, da uz najoštriju osudu narušavanja međunarodnog ratnog i humanitarnog prava, učinite sve potrebno na području Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosne da se u zatočeničkim centrima odmah osigura humano postupanje sa zatočenicima u skladu s međunarodnim humanitarnim pravom i ženevskim konvencijama ... da se odmah omogući, tamo gdje to još nije učinjeno, slobodni pristup Međunarodnog komiteta Crvenog Križa ... ponovno apeliram na Vas da ne dopustite bilo kakve zapreke u dostavljanju humanitarne pomoći svim potrebitim ... Ujedno pozivam i sve ostale zaraćene strane u Bosni i Hercegovini da učine isto».⁵¹⁰

Nakon intenzivnog objavljivanja vijesti u svjetskim medijima o zločinu počinjenom nad Muslimanima/Bošnjacima u Stupnom Dolu, i *Predsjednik RH* i *Ministar vanjskih poslova RH* su, krajem listopada 1993. g., oštro osudili sve zločine neovisno o počiniteljima, ali su

1991.-1995., Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2006. Te: Praljak, Slobodan, *Srušene i oštećene katoličke crkve i vjerski objekti u Bosni i Hercegovini u ratu 1991.-1995.*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2007.

⁵⁰⁷ Isto, str., 402 i 403; npr., u to vrijeme (11. srpnja 1993. g.) *Predsjedništvo BiH* održalo je svoju sjednicu u Zagrebu; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁸ *Vjesnik*, 08. kolovoza 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 417-418; (3D00320).

⁵⁰⁹ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 419; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁰ *Večernji list*, 07. rujna 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 432-433; (3D00320).

naveli i da «međunarodna javnost mora biti upoznata da istovremeni zločini nad Hrvatima ne dobivaju takvu medijsku pozornost, a ni zabrinutost političkih krugova», pa bi se iz toga «mogao izvući zaključak da postoje dvostruka mjerila», te «takav pristup utvrđivanju krivnje pojedinih strana u sukobu ne pomaže postizanju pravednog mira na području BiH.»⁵¹¹

Zbog toga, Hrvatska je tražila privođenje «pravdi svih onih koji su počinili zločine u BiH», ali isto tako «očekuje od međunarodne zajednice i Međunarodnog suda za ratne zločine da rasvijetli i sve zločine počinjene na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske».⁵¹²

Iako su se u odnosima između država RH i BiH, u ovom razdoblju, pojavljivala nesuglasja, ni RH ni BiH (državne institucije) nisu – niti u jednom trenutku – izjavile ili na drugi odgovarajući način stavile do znanja da se RH i BiH nalaze u međusobnom oružanom sukobu ili sukobu koji bi se takvim mogao označiti. Nepostojanje oružanog sukoba između RH i BiH još je bjelodanije promatranjem konkretnog odnosa RH prema državi BiH, naročito glede naoružavanja ARBiH, te ustrojavanja i obučavanja postrojbi ARBiH na teritoriju RH, o čemu se detaljnije govori u narednim dijelovima ove ekspertize.

III.-1.5 Proces uspostavljanja pune suradnje (studen 1993.-1995. g.)

Prva naznaka postizanja kasnijih sporazuma o punoj vojnoj i političkoj suradnji između RH i RBiH, pojavila se još sredinom rujna 1993. g. tijekom boravka u Ženevi na zasjedanju MKBJ, kada je između F. Tuđmana i A. Izetbegovića postignut tzv. *Tajni sporazum o konfederaciji* RH i BiH. *Sporazum* je veoma kratak, načelan i u njemu je postignuta suglasnost «da se odnosi između bosansko-muslimanske republike i hrvatske republike u okviru Unije Bosne i Hercegovine razvijaju na svim područjima s ciljem stvaranja zajedničke države koja će istodobno stupiti u konfederalni odnos s Republikom Hrvatskom.»⁵¹³

Početkom studenog 1993. g., kada su *Ženevska konferencija* i drugi međunarodni pokušaji došli u zastoju, *Predsjednik RH* je iznio prijedlog mirovne inicijativa koja je predviđala cjelovito rješavanje problema u RH i u RBiH. Najvjerojatnije je glavni motiv F. Tuđmana bilo rješavanje najvitalnijeg problema RH, tj. reintegracija okupiranog dijela

⁵¹¹ *Novi list* (dnevna novina), Rijeka, 31. listopada 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 489-490; (3D00320).

⁵¹² Isto, str. 490; (3D00320).

⁵¹³ *Večernji list*, 30. siječnja 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 439; (3D00320).

teritorija RH, jer je taj problem za međunarodnu zajednicu tada bio sekundaran u odnosu na problem RBiH. Stoga je u prijedlogu F. Tuđmana najprije i opširnije iznesen prijedlog mirovnog plana za RH, a potom i kraći prijedlog mirovnog plana za RBiH.⁵¹⁴

Obadva mirovna prijedloga nisu sadržavala bitnijih novih rješenja, nego se radilo o obnovi dijelova dotada donesenih ili predloženih mirovnih dokumenata iza kojih je odlučnije trebala stati međunarodna zajednica. Posebna značajka mirovnog prijedlog F. Tuđmana za RH bila je u izuzetno kompromisnom prijedlogu: «Hrvatska Vlada spremna je u roku od 15 dana zaključiti sporazum o prekidu svih neprijateljstava s predstavnicima lokalnih Srba dajući im jamstva za lokalnu i kulturnu autonomiju.»⁵¹⁵

Slijedeći mirovni prijedlog kojeg je F. Tuđman izložio 10. siječnja 1994. u Bonnu, odnosio se samo na RBiH. Radilo se o detaljnom prijedlogu *Ugovornog sporazuma o uspostavljanju trajnog i cjelovitog mira između hrvatskog i bošnjačko-muslimanskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini i osnovama daljnjeg zajedničkog života.*⁵¹⁶ Polazište prijedloga je bilo u tome «da je zajednički život u prijateljskim odnosima hrvatskog i bošnjačko-muslimanskog naroda na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine povijesna nužnost s obzirom na njihovu teritorijalnu vezanost, povijesna iskustva i zajedničke strateške interese».⁵¹⁷

Zastupnički dom Sabora RH donio je, 02. veljače 1994. g., *Rezoluciju o provođenju vanjske politike*, u kojoj je potvrdio «još jednom odlučnost i dosljednost Hrvatske da se do trajnog mira, sigurnosti i stabilnosti na ovim prostorima dođe poglavito političkim sredstvima».⁵¹⁸ U ovoj *Rezoluciji* je izraženo žaljenje što tada aktualni mirovni prijedlozi za RBiH »nisu urodili plodom», te se jasno kaže: «Ako muslimanske snage ne obustave ofenzivu u središnjoj Bosni, Zastupnički dom Sabora smatra da bi Vlada i Predsjednik Republike trebali razmotriti i preispitati trenutno stanje diplomatskih odnosa Republike Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine».⁵¹⁹

Predsjedničko vijeće obrane i nacionalne sigurnosti u RH donijelo je, 05. veljače 1994. g., zaključke koji su se uglavnom odnosili na situaciju u BiH. Između ostalog, «Vijeće ponavlja da je Hrvatska dopustila odlazak do 2000 dragovoljaca iz Republike Hrvatske, koji su podrijetlom iz BiH, kako bi pružili pomoć svojim sunarodnjacima u Bosni, da bi se zaštitili

⁵¹⁴ *Vjesnik*, 03. studeni 1993; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 493-497; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁵ Isto, str. 493; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁶ *Vjesnik*, 11. siječnja 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 503-509; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁷ Isto, str. 504; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁸ *Vjesnik*, 03. veljače 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 512-514; (3D00320).

⁵¹⁹ Isto, str. 513; (3D00320).

od agresije i etničkog čišćenja ... U svezi s navodima da se regularne postrojbe Hrvatske vojske nalaze u središnjoj i južnoj Bosni ... Hrvatska već sada izražava ne samo spremnost već i postavlja zahtjev da se izvrši međunarodna kontrola o stvarnom stanju». ⁵²⁰

U Ženevi, 10. veljače 1994. g., predsjednik *Vlade BiH* i *Ministar vanjskih poslova RH* dali su *Zajedničku izjavu*, u kojoj je, između ostalog, navedeno: «Dvije strane suglasile su se da se zapovjednici HVO i Armije BiH ... sastanu u idućih sedam dana kako bi konkretizirali postignuti dogovor o potpunom prekidu vatre». ⁵²¹ Na temelju toga, glavni zapovjednici HVO i ARBiH potpisali su, 23. veljače 1994. g. u Zagrebu, *Sporazum o prekidu vatre*, s «trenutačnim i potpunim prekidom neprijateljstava koji stupa na snagu 25. veljače». ⁵²²

Nakon toga su održani pregovori pod pokroviteljstvom SAD-a te su 01. ožujka 1994. g. potpisani tzv. *Washingtonski sporazumi*, koji su sadržavali i dokument pod nazivom *Nacrt prethodnog sporazuma o konfederaciji između Republike Hrvatske i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine*. ⁵²³ U *Nacrtu* je navedeno: «Očekuje se da će se uspostaviti Konfederacija između Republike Hrvatske ... i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine ... Koraci prema uspostavi Konfederacije bit će sljedeći: (1) Prethodni sporazum, koji će se zaključiti što je prije moguće; te (2) Konačni sporazum». ⁵²⁴ *Nacrt* je također predvidio da će se u Konfederaciji uspostaviti carinska i monetarna unija te obrambeni dogovor.

U Washingtonu je 01. ožujka 1994. g. potpisan i dokument nazvan *Sporazum između Republike Hrvatske i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine o pristupu Jadranskom moru preko područja Republike Hrvatske* u kojem se navodi da se smatra «poželjnim da Federacija ... ima siguran i neograničen pristup Jadranskom moru», te da će Hrvatska «iznajmiti Federaciji, za vrijeme trajanja ovog Sporazuma, dio zemljišta unutar luke Ploče». ⁵²⁵

Budući su *Washingtonski sporazumi* doneseni iznenada i najvjerojatnije pod diktatom SAD-a, te su bitno mijenjali ustavna određenja položaja RH (za što potpisnici sa strane RH nisu imali ovlaštenja), *Predsjednik RH* se već 03. ožujka 1994. g. preko nacionalne televizije obratio «javnosti u povodu potpisivanja washingtonskog sporazuma». ⁵²⁶ Govor je bio veoma

⁵²⁰ *Vjesnik*, 06. veljače 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 515-518; (3D00320).

⁵²¹ *Vjesnik*, 11. veljače 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 523; (3D00320).

⁵²² *Večernji list*, 24. veljače 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 524-525; (3D00320).

⁵²³ *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 05. ožujka 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 538-539; (3D00320).

⁵²⁴ Isto, str. 538; (3D00320).

⁵²⁵ *Vjesnik*, 04. ožujka 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 540-542; (3D00320).

⁵²⁶ *Vjesnik*, 04. ožujka 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 543-547; (3D00320).

dugačak, a sadržajno prepun neodređenih fraza s kojima se pokušalo neuvjerljivo opravdati način i sadržaj potpisanih sporazuma.

Tako je, između ostalog, navedeno: «... taj sporazum ima dalekosežno, pa i sudbonosno povijesno značenje ... Zbog principijelnosti i dosljednosti naše politike u tom smislu, Hrvatska je postupno sve više zadobivala naklonost ... i puna jamstva najodgovornijih svjetskih čimbenika za sigurnost svoje države i budućnost hrvatskog naroda ... Oživotvorenjem washingtonskog sporazuma osigurat će se opstojnost i budućnost hrvatskog naroda ... Taj konfederalni savez zasnovat će se na zajedničkim interesima u razvijanju svestranih odnosa na svim područjima ... Hrvati trebaju shvatiti da je takvo rješenje povijesno nužno i svrhovito ... a sve svjedoči o pravilnosti i svrhovitosti naše dosljedne državne politike ... Budimo ponosni zbog ostvarenih rezultata i novih otvorenih perspektiva, ali i svjesni obveza i težine zadaća što stoje pred nama i u novim povoljnijim međunarodnim okolnostima!». ⁵²⁷

Na temelju *Washingtonskih sporazuma (Okvirni sporazum o Federaciji u BiH i Nacrt prethodnog sporazuma o Konfederaciji između RH i FBiH)* vojni predstavnici ARBiH i HVO (general Rasim Delić i general Ante Zorislav Roso) su, 12. ožujka 1994. g. u Splitu, potpisali sporazum za «prijelazni period» o načelima koja će biti «temelji budućih vojnih sporazuma». ⁵²⁸ U ovom sporazumu su najprije prihvaćena načela iz *Okvirnog sporazuma* («sadašnje zapovjedne strukture ostaju», «snage će se odmah odvojiti jedni od drugih ...»), a potom je razrađen niz drugih sukladnih načela. Najvažnije točke dogovora odnosile su se na «združivanje Armije BiH i HVO» u *Saveznu vojsku*, a za proces transformacije dogovoreno je stvaranje paritetnog zajedničkog stožera koji će pod svojom nadležnošću ustrojiti vojna područja, od kojih će svako pojedino «imati operativni nadzor nad svim postrojbama Armije BiH i HVO na svom području». ⁵²⁹

Potom su zapovjednici ARBiH («Komandant ŠVK armijski general Rasim Delić») i HVO-a («Načelnik Glavnog stožera HVO general pukovnik Ante Zorislav Roso»), 26. ožujka 1994. g. u Sarajevu, potpisali sporazum za «prijelazni period» o «ustrojstvu združenog stožera» ARBiH i HVO kojeg će činiti po pet časnika sa svake strane, a imenovat će ih u roku pet dana «zapovjednici ARMIJE R BiH i HRVATSKOG VIJEĆA OBRANE». ⁵³⁰

⁵²⁷ Isto.

⁵²⁸ *Hrvatski državni arhiv*.

⁵²⁹ Isto.

⁵³⁰ Dokument se nalazi u *Hrvatskom državnom arhivu* i nosi naslov «USTROJSTVO ZDRUŽENOG STOŽERA I ZADACI».

Sporazumom je, između ostalog, određeno i slijedeće: «Usvaja se dosadašnje ustrojstvo i način zapovjedanja postrojbama» ARBiH i HVO, te «Usvaja se postojeće stanje zona odgovornosti zapovjedništava korpusa ARMIJE R BiH i zapovjednih područja HRVATSKOG VIJEĆA OBRANE»,⁵³¹ s čime je još jedanput verificiran zatečeni vojni ustroj i vojno stanje koje su do tada ostvarile ARBiH i HVO.

Vremensko trajanje prijelaznog sporazuma je određeno opisno, tj. sporazum je na snazi «dok traje prelazni period i ne nastupe promjene ustrojstvom SAVEZNE VOJSKE – ARMIJE FEDERACIJE», koja će se ustrojiti i organizirati «nakon proučavanja Ustava Federacije i donošenja odgovarajućih odluka najviših državnih organa i Ministarstva obrane».⁵³²

Istoga dana (26. ožujka 1994. g.), generali R.Delić i A. Z. Roso su izdali zajedničku zapovijed (od 10 točaka) za *Komande korpusa ARBiH i Zborna područja HVO*.⁵³³ U zapovjedi su pošli od «zagrebačkog i splitskog sporazuma, a imajući u vidu rezultate koji su postignuti u ostvarivanju prekida borbenih djelovanja između jedinica HVO i Armije R BiH», sa ciljem «ostvarivanja slobodnog kretanja nekim komunikacijama, neometanog prolaska humanitarnih konvoja i uspostave normalnijih uvjeta života stanovništva».⁵³⁴

Nekoliko mjeseci kasnije, 17. kolovoza 1994. g., u Hrasnici kod Sarajeva je održan tajni sastanak između najviših predstavnika muslimansko/bošnjačke i hrvatske strukture iz BiH,⁵³⁵ s ciljem «da se sagleda dokle se stiglo u realiziranju dosadašnjih sporazuma i što treba zajednički činiti da se prevaziđu uočene slabosti.»⁵³⁶ Na sastanku je nakon rasprave doneseno i 13 zajedničkih zaključaka. Prvi i osnovni zaključak je bio: «Provedbom dosad potpisanih sporazuma postignuti su uglavnom postavljeni ciljevi a više od ostalog na vojnom planu.»⁵³⁷ U točki osmoj navedeno je: «Suradnju postrojbi HVO i A. (ARBiH, op. a.) sa srbočetnicima odmah prekinuti.»⁵³⁸

⁵³¹ Isto, točke 3. i 5.

⁵³² Isto, točke 3. i 6.

⁵³³ Dokument se nalazi u *Hrvatskom državnom arhivu*.

⁵³⁴ Isto, glava *Zapovijedi*.

⁵³⁵ S muslimansko/bošnjačke strane bili su nazočni A. Izetbegović, H. Silajdžić (Predsjednik Vlade RBiH i Predsjednik Vlade FBiH), E. Ganić (član Predsjedništva RBiH i potpredsjednik FBiH), R. Delić (komandant ŠVK ARBiH) i general Sulejman Vranj. S hrvatske strane bili su nazočni Krešimir Zubak (Predsjednik predsjedničkog vijeća HRHB i Predsjednik FBiH), J. Prlić (Predsjednik Vlade HRHB i Ministar obrane FBiH), general Tihomir Blaškić (Načelnik GS HVO HRHB) i brigadir Ivan Kolak.

⁵³⁶ Dokument se nalazi u *Hrvatskom državnom arhivu*, str. 1.

⁵³⁷ Isto, str. 2.

Posebno je bila važna točka 12 zaključaka u kojoj je navedeno: «Za sada nisu stvoreni uvjeti za zajedničku vojsku, ali se može ići na objedinjavanje bojevih djelovanja protiv srbočetničkog agresora. Na određenim prostorima ići na zajedničke akcije koje će planirati ZS (zajednički stožer) u suradnji s GS HVO i ŠVKA.»⁵³⁹ Pritom je zanimljivo što je u zaključcima također navedeno: «Prijedlog ustroja Vojske Federacije BiH je dostavio GS HVO. Prijedlog ŠVKA će biti dostavljen MO (ministarstvu obrane, op. a.) Federacije nakon rasprave na Predsjedništvu BiH».⁵⁴⁰

U dijelu *Washingtonskih sporazuma* koji su se odnosili na uspostavu Konfederacije između Federacije BiH (FBiH) i RH, vojni i politički događaji su išli drugačijim smjerovima od potpisanih, te su odredbe o Konfederaciji polako odumirale, usprkos tome što je 18. ožujka 1994. g. potpisan novi krug washingtonskih dokumenata,⁵⁴¹ te što je između RH, RBiH i FBiH, 22. srpnja 1995. g. u Splitu, potpisana *Deklaracija o oživotvorenju sporazuma iz Washingtona, zajedničkoj obrani od srpske agresije i postizanju političkog rješenja sukladno naporima međunarodne zajednice*.⁵⁴²

Propast ostvarenja Konfederacije očitovala se stvarno veoma brzo i na bilateralnoj razini odnosa RH i BiH. Primjerice, u pismu koje je A. Izetbegović 30. travnja 1994. g. uputio F. Tuđmanu⁵⁴³, kao i u pismu-odgovoru F. Tuđmana (02. svibnja 1994. g.)⁵⁴⁴, u kojima se ne iskazuje posebna zabrinutost zbog «kašnjenja» provedbe sporazuma o Konfederaciji.

Nadalje, u rujnu 1994. g., u Zagrebu su dva dana zasjedala visoka (i brojem sudionika velika) «izaslanstva Republike Hrvatske, Republike BiH i Federacije BiH na čelu s F. Tuđmanom i A. Izetbegovićem, te su 14. rujna 1994. g. objavili *Zajedničko priopćenje*, u kojem su izaslanstva «izrazila svoju jedinstvenu i neupitnu političku volju da se Washingtonski sporazum dosljedno i u cijelosti provede».⁵⁴⁵ No, u zaključcima o odnosima «između Republike Hrvatske i Republike Bosne i Hercegovine» tek na kraju se samo navodi da «treba imenovati zajedničku grupu» nacionalnih televizija «koja će izraditi zajednički

⁵³⁸ Isto, str. 2.

⁵³⁹ Isto, str. 3.

⁵⁴⁰ Isto, str. 3.

⁵⁴¹ «Sporazum između Federacije BiH i Republike Hrvatske kojim se Hrvatskoj jamči slobodan prolaz područjem Federacije» - v. u Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 553-554; (3D00320).

⁵⁴² *Vjesnik*, 24. srpnja 1995; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 614-616; (3D00320).

⁵⁴³ Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 576-577; (3D00320).

⁵⁴⁴ *Večernji list*, 03. svibnja 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 578; (3D00320).

⁵⁴⁵ *Vjesnik*, 16. rujna 1994; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 598-602; (3D00320).

program ili emisiju putem koje će jednom tjedno obavještavati javnost ... o razvitku međusobnih odnosa i suradnji, te o razvitku Federacije i o uspostavi konfederalnih odnosa».

Općenito, uspješnost *Washingtonskih sporazuma* najbrže i najjasnije se očitovala u vojnim djelovanjima. Na početku studenog 1994. g. HVO je oslobodio veoma važni prostor Kupreške visoravni i okolice ukupne površine približno 600 km², a ARBiH je istovremeno oslobodila prostor jugozapadno od Bugojna. Nakon toga, 13. studenog 1994. g., u Kreševu je održan sastanak između predstavnika HVO i ARBiH «koga su predvodili Predsjednik Federacije BiH gosp. Krešimir Zubak i Potpredsjednik Federacije BiH gosp. Ejup Ganić».⁵⁴⁶ Na sastanku su usvojeni zajednički zaključci, među kojima se ističu prvi i deveti (posljednji).

U prvom je navedeno: «Zajednička djelovanja Armije i HVO u izvođenju operacije za oslobađanje Kupresa imale su krupan vojno politički značaj u smislu podsticanja za brže i efikasnije rješavanje svih drugih pitanja i problema kojih ima u odnosima Armije i HVO. Komandant Armije i Načelnik GS HVO će na posebnom sastanku ostvariti dogovor na operativnotaktičkom objedinjavanju djelovanja Armije i HVO.»⁵⁴⁷ Deveti zaključak glasi: «U planiranju i izvođenju zajedničkih borbenih djelovanja kao i u rješavanju svih ostalih problema i pitanja imati će se u vidu da HVO nakon oslobađanja teritorija Federacije BiH ima interesa za produžetak djelovanja sve do konačnog oslobađanja teritorija Republike BiH.»⁵⁴⁸

Do sredine prosinca 1994. g. HVO je oslobodio dio prostora u smjeru Glamoča i Bosanskog Grahova (zapadni dio BiH). Istovremeno, srbijanske postrojbe s okupiranih dijelova RH (područje pod nadzorom UNPROFOR-a) pomogle su vojsci F. Abdića da potisne 5. korpus ARBiH i zauzme Veliku Kladušu (u sjeverozapadnoj BiH), s čime je područje međunarodne (UN) «zaštićene zone Bihać» krenulo prema kulminaciji humanitarne katastrofe.

Važno je naglasiti da je već sredinom studenog 1994. g. A. Izetbegović putem pisma izvjestio F. Tuđmana o vojnim napadima na UN-ovu «zaštićenu zonu Bihać» s okupiranih područje RH (koja su se nalazila pod nadzorom međunarodnih mirovnih snaga), te je zatražio «da u duhu odredaba međunarodnog prava bez odlaganja poduzmete sve potrebne mjere da se spriječe napadi na Bosnu i Hercegovinu sa teritorija Vaše zemlje.»⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁶ Dokument se nalazi u *Hrvatskom državnom arhivu*.

⁵⁴⁷ Isto, str. 1.

⁵⁴⁸ Isto, str. 2-3; usp. članak «Kupres je samo prvi korak» u *Kronologija rata...*, str. 426.

⁵⁴⁹ Dokument preuzet iz knjige Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 606; (3D00320).

U Sarajevu su, 23. prosinca 1994. g., s jedne strane A. Izetbegović i general R. Delić, s druge strane R. Karadžić i general R. Mladić, potpisali *Sporazum o prekidu vatre u BiH*,⁵⁵⁰ a 12. siječnja 1995. g., također u Sarajevu, generali T. Blaškić, R. Delić i R. Mladić su potpisali *Sporazum o prekidu neprijateljstava u BiH*.⁵⁵¹

Međutim, ovi sporazumi nisu donijeli prekid oružanih sukoba, nego je postajalo sve očiglednije da će mir biti moguće uspostaviti tek nakon vojnog poražavanja srbijanske agresije. U tom smislu treba razumijevati i *Plan od devet točaka za potporu Federacije BiH*,⁵⁵² kojeg su, 05. veljače 1995. g. u Münchenu, donijele zemlje članice *Kontaktne skupine*. Planom je, između ostalog, predviđeno da će SAD «poslati višeg umirovljenog časnika kako bi pomogao u integraciji federalnih vojnih institucija.»⁵⁵³

Tijekom prve polovice 1995. g. vojni i politički događaji na prostoru RH i RBiH postajali su sve više povezani, kako glede vojnih djelovanja, tako i s motrišta političkog pregovaračkog procesa pod vodstvom međunarodne zajednice, s kojim se nastojalo postići cjelovito rješenje za uspostavljanje mira na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.

Početkom svibnja 1995. g. *Hrvatska vojska* (HV) je brzom vojnom operacijom (tzv. *Bljesak*) oslobodila 600 km² teritorija zapadne Slavonije, a potom su HV i HVO, od 04.-11. lipnja 1995. g., oslobodile niz strateških planinskih vrhova na graničnom području između zapadne RBiH i RH. U to vrijeme srbijanska vojska je na prostoru BiH počinila masovni zločin u međunarodnoj (UN) «zaštićenoj zoni Srebrenica», te svom žestinom napadala «zaštićenu zonu Bihać» koju su na izmaku snaga branile okružene postrojbe ARBiH i HVO.

U takvim okolnostima, 20. srpnja 1995. g., «Komandant Armije RBiH armijski general Rasim Delić je u ime Generalštaba ARBiH uputio HV-u i HVO-u «molbu» kojom traži pružanje «neposredne pomoći» 5. korpusu ARBiH «u odbrani slobodne teritorije bihačke regije». Delić je predložio da HVO i HV daju pomoć, između ostalog i na slijedeći način: «nastavkom ofanzivnog djelovanja i eksploatacijom postignutih uspjeha na pravcu prema Bosanskom Grahovu i Glamoču (u BiH, op. a.)», te «eventualnim otpočinjanjem ofanzivnih dejstava na pravcu Sinj-Vrlika-Knin (u RH), op. a.), kao i na pravcu Karlovac-Vojnić-Petrova Gora (u RH, op. a.)».

O težini tadašnje situacije i značaju bihačkog područja na poseban način svjedoči i neuobičajena vrsta pozdrava s kojim je general R. Delić završio «molbu»: «Smrt fašizmu i

⁵⁵⁰ *Vjesnik*, 24. prosinca 1994.: dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 607; (3D00320).

⁵⁵¹ *Večernji list*, 13. siječnja 1995.: dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 608-609; (3D00320).

⁵⁵² Dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 610-611; (3D00320).

⁵⁵³ Isto, str. 611.

četnicima – sloboda Bošnjačkom i Hrvatskom narodu. Živjela Republika/Federacija Bosna i Hercegovina. Živjela Republika Hrvatska.»⁵⁵⁴

Dan kasnije (21. srpnja 1995. g.) na Brijunima (u RH) su se sastali F. Tuđman i Predsednik Republike Turske, Sulejman Demirel, koji su objavili *Zajedničku izjavu*.⁵⁵⁵ U *Izjavi* su, između ostalog, najoštrije «osudili najnovije ofenzive na i invaziju zaštićenih zona Ujedinjenih naroda u BiH od strane bosanskih Srba ... Isto su tako osudili napade hrvatskih Srba na područja BiH ... Dvojica su Predsjednika konsternirani nedostatkom volje međunarodne zajednice da poduzme primjerene mjere za sprečavanje i ublažavanje sadašnjeg vrlo opasnog razvoja događaja ... Ponovili su svoje uvjerenje da Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovina kao žrtve agresije imaju pravo na samoobranu. Ponovno su istaknuli svoje uvjerenje da ozbiljnost situacije potvrđuje potrebu za neposrednim i potpunim provođenjem Washingtonskih sporazuma ... Pozvali su Kontaktnu skupinu da poduzme konkretne i odlučne mjere kako bi spriječili daljnju srpsku agresiju».⁵⁵⁶

Sljedećeg dana (22. srpnja 1995. g.) u Splitu su izaslanstva RH (predvođeni F. Tuđmanom), R BiH (predvođeni A. Izetbegovićem) i F BiH (predvođeni K. Zubakom) usvojili *Deklaraciju o oživotvorenju Sporazuma iz Washingtona, zajedničkoj obrani od srpske agresije i postizanju političkog rješenja sukladno naporima međunarodne zajednice*.⁵⁵⁷ Na temelju ove *Deklaracije* (tzv. *Splitska deklaracija*) uspostavljen je vrhunac vojne i političke suradnje između država RH i R BiH u obrani od srbijanske oružane agresije, te je na temelju vojnih uspjeha, ostvarenih u nekoliko narednih mjeseci, omogućeno potpisivanje tzv. *Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma*.

U *Splitskoj deklaraciji* dogovoren je, između ostalog «nastavak suradnje i stalna koordinacija obrambenih djelatnosti između Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine. Dogovorena je suradnja Glavnog stožera Hrvatske vojske sa Združenim stožerom ARBiH i HVO radi koordinacije obrambenih djelovanja u oblasti zapovjedanja, logistike, vojno-industrijske proizvodnje, komunikacijskih sustava, informacijsko-analitičkih potreba i drugim oblastima.»⁵⁵⁸

Ostvarivanjem pune osigurnosne suradnje između RH i R BiH, već krajem (25.-29.) srpnja 1995. g. HVO je oslobodio strateški važne Bosansko Grahovo i Glamoč, a HV je

⁵⁵⁴ Dokument se nalazi u *Hrvatskom državnom arhivu*.

⁵⁵⁵ *Vjesnik*, 22. srpnja 1995.: dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 612-613; (3D00320).

⁵⁵⁶ Isto.

⁵⁵⁷ *Vjesnik*, 24. srpnja 1995.: dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 614-616; (3D00320).

⁵⁵⁸ Isto, točka 1.

početkom (04.-10.) kolovoza 1995. u najvećoj osloboditeljskoj operaciji (tzv. *Oluja*) munjevito oslobodio približno 11.000 km² okupiranog teritorija RH, te spriječio humanitarnu katastrofu u UN-ovoj «zaštićenoj zoni Bihać».

Već 07. kolovoza 1995. g. «Komandant Generalštaba A RBiH» (general R. Delić) uputio je načelniku *Glavnog stožera HV* (generalu Zvonimiru Červenku) povjerljivi dopis u kojem mu u ime pripadnika ARBiH i u svoje osobno ime čestita «na uspjesima koje postiže Hrvatska vojska na oslobađanju okupiranih prostora Republike Hrvatske» i izražava «zadovoljstvo što je ispoljen visok stepen sadejstva između jedinica A RBiH 5. korpusa, HVO-a i HV», te naglašava kako se još jednom «pokazalo da međusobnim potpunim povjerenjem i sadejstvom možemo vojnički poraziti zajedničkog agresora.»⁵⁵⁹

U daljnjem osloboditeljskom djelovanju, do sredine rujna 1995. g. (tzv. operacija *Maestral*), HV, HVO i ARBiH su oslobodile približno 2.000 km² teritorija u središnjim i zapadnim dijelovima RBiH (Drvar, Šipovo, Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Bosanski Petrovac). Nakon toga, «radni timovi su od 22.-24. 09. 1995. godine utvrdili dostignute pozicije Hrvatskih snaga i Armije, izradili zemljovide i obostrano potpisali», te su se, 25. rujna 1995. g. u Novom Travniku sastali predstavnici Hrvatskih snaga (HV i HVO) i ARBiH, koji su sastavili *Protokol* kojim je, između ostalog, usuglašeno i slijedeće: «Zapovjednici operacija, general-pukovnik Ante Gotovina i brigadni general Vahid Karavelić izradiće prijedlog osnovne zamisli za daljnja b/d (borbena djelovanja, op. a.) i dostaviti Vrhovništvu do 12 sati 30. 09. 1995. godine.»⁵⁶⁰

Na temelju toga je, 05. listopada 1995. g., u Zagrebu održan sastanak između HV-a (ministar obrane RH Gojko Šušak; generali: Z. Červenko, A. Gotovina, Mirko Norac i Mladen Mareković, te pukovnica Dunja Zloić-Gotovina), HVO-a (ministar obrane HRHB Vladimir Šoljić i general T. Blaškić) i ARBiH (ministar vanjskih poslova RBiH Muhamed Šaćirbej; generali: R. Delić, Mehmed Alagić, V. Karavelić te Ferid Buljubašić). Na sastanku su doneseni zaključci o «suradnji u predstojećoj vojnoj operaciji»⁵⁶¹ (tzv. *Južni potez*), u kojoj su HV, ARBiH i HVO, do sredine listopada 1995. g., nanijeli nove velike poraze srbijanskoj vojsci u središnjoj i sjeverozapadnoj RBiH, a okupacijski srbijanski sustav vlasti u RBiH našao se pred potpunim rasulom.

⁵⁵⁹ *Hrvatski državni arhiv.*

⁵⁶⁰ www.slobodanpraljka.com: Dokument «Protokol» kojeg je *Sektor sigurnosti Ministarstva obrane HRHB* (Ur. br. 02-09-95-01-1534/95) 26. rujna 1995. g. kao strogo povjerljivog uputio MORH-u.

⁵⁶¹ Pismohrana generala Slobodana Praljka: MORH (S)-2-431.

Međutim, velika osloboditeljska progresija združenih muslimansko/bošnjačkih i hrvatskih snaga, koja je trebala vojničkim putem poništiti osvajačke rezultate srbijanske oružane agresije na RBiH, zaustavljena je nametanjem brzog primirja i mirovnih pregovora pod međunarodnim pokroviteljstvom.⁵⁶²

Tako su pregovorima u Daytonu (SAD) nastali tzv. *Daytonski mirovni sporazumi*⁵⁶³ - prihvaćeni 21. studenog 1995. g. u Daytonu, a konačno potpisani 14. prosinca u Parizu - koji su prekinuli rat u BiH i verificirali tada zatečeno stanje (*status quo*), koje je nastalo kao posljedica srbijanske oružane agresije i mnogobrojnih srbijanskih ratnih zločina počinjenih u RBiH. Na taj način je s međunarodnom verifikacijom strukturalno opstala i zloglasna Republika Srpska.

Daytonskim mirovnim sporazumima, donekle su izmijenjeni i *Washingtonski sporazumi*, te se u odnosima između RH i RBiH nisu održale odredbe o uspostavljanju Konfederacije, nego je potpisan *Sporazum o uspostavi zajedničkog vijeća za suradnju Republike Hrvatske i Republike i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine*.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶² v. *Kronologija rata...*, str. 530 («Primirje spasilo Banja Luku») i str. 535 («Zakulisne igre oko Dayton»).

⁵⁶³ v. dokumente u M. Tuđman, *Istina...*, str. 628-690; (3D00320).

⁵⁶⁴ *Večernji list*, 15. prosinca 1995; dokument preuzet iz Tuđman, M., *Istina...*, str. 689-690; (3D00320).

III.-2 IZBJEGLICE

III.-2.1 Uvodna napomena

Među brojnim negativnim učincima koje je izazvala srbijanska oružana agresija na RH i BiH (1990.-1995. g.) posebno, najnegativnije mjesto pripada problemu prognanika i izbjeglica, koji su se pojavili u golemom broju i naročito golemom razmjeru u odnosu na ukupni broj stanovnika RH. Uzrok tako velikog broja prognanika i izbjeglica u RH prvenstveno se nalazi u koncepciji srbijanske oružane agresije koja se temeljila na provođenju sustavnog etničkog čišćenja na teritorijalno velikim dijelovima RH i RBiH.

Na taj način, ukupni brojčani podaci o prognanicima i izbjeglicama s područja RH i RBiH, te njihov vremenski ritam, prostorni raspored, zbrinjavanje i stratifikacijska struktura, predstavljaju jedan od najegzaktnijih činjeničnih i interpretativnih pokazatelja o tome što se događalo na tom prostoru 1990.-1995. godine.

Odnosno, iz tih pokazatelja se jasno prepoznaju ratni ciljevi pojedinih aktera (država, nacija, institucija, struktura) te načini njihova ostvarivanja. Isto tako, u postojećim stereotipima, zbrci i neznanjima koji se odnose na prepoznavanje osnovnih odgovora na pitanja – tko je agresor a tko žrtva na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije? – prognaničko-izbjeglički pokazatelji su najmanje podložni subjektivnim interpretacijama i stoga najmanje dvojbeni.

S druge strane, humanitarna prognaničko-izbjeglička kriza u RH i RBiH, iziskivala je najveće višegodišnje materijalne i organizacijske napore prvenstveno RH i potom međunarodnih humanitarnih organizacija (naročito UNHCR). Isto tako, budući učinci te krize nisu do sada ni približno sanirani (vraćeni u prvotno stanje), prognaničko-izbjeglički učinci predstavljaju najveću i najdugoročniju negativnu posljedicu srbijanske oružane agresije na RH i RBiH, a s time i najveći neuspjeh svih međunarodnih i domicilnih institucija koje imaju humanitarnu i humanističku svrhu.

Na koncu, za objektivno razumijevanje osnovne teme ovog dijela i cijele ekspertize, izbjegličko-prognanički pokazatelji također imaju najveću vrijednost, u svakom pogledu.

III.-2.2 Izbjeglice i prognanici⁵⁶⁵ u Republici Hrvatskoj

Prve veće skupine prognanika u RH, kao posljedica srbijanske oružane agresije, pojavile su se u prvoj polovici 1991. godine, te ih sredinom te godine ima približno 30.000.

U siječnju 1992. g., broj prognanika u RH iznosio je približno čak 700.000 (uključujući i prognanike koji su kao izbjeglice otišli iz Hrvatske u druge zemlje). To znači da je u RH do kraja 1991. g. bilo prognano preko 15% stanovnika Hrvatske (prema popisu pučanstva iz 1991. g.)

Popis svih prognanika u RH izvršen je u travnju 1992. g. i on je iznosio 247.278, što znači da se broj prognanika u nekoliko mjeseci smanjio, jer se nakon potpisivanja primirja za teritorij RH (02. siječnja 1992. g.) velik dio prognanika vratio na neokupirane dijelove RH.

U travnju 1992. g., pored postojeće prognaničke krize, započela je i izbjeglička kriza u RH, jer je iz RBiH u RH do tada izbjeglo 187.000 osoba. Već u svibnju 1992. g. u RH pristiže iz RBiH približno 100.000 novih izbjeglica. Broj izbjeglica iz RBiH se i nadalje povećavao, te *Vlada RH* u kolovozu 1992. g. «apelira na europske zemlje da prime bosanske izbjeglice, jer ih više nije u stanju sama smjestiti.»⁵⁶⁶

Iako je dio izbjeglica iz RBiH koji su bili smješteni u Hrvatskoj (zajedno s novim izbjeglicama iz RBiH koje su prolazile preko Hrvatske) odlazili u treće zemlje, ipak se krajem 1992. g. broj izbjeglica iz RBiH smještenih u Hrvatskoj povećao na 402.000. Osim toga, tada je u Hrvatskoj bilo smješteno i 260.705 prognanika, te je to bio vrhunac humanitarne (izbjegličko-prognaničke) krize u RH.

Tijekom prve polovice 1993. g., izbjeglički val iz RBiH je bio slabiji, a dio izbjeglica iz RBiH smještenih u Hrvatskoj odlazio je u treće zemlje, zajedno s dijelom novih izbjeglica koji su preko Hrvatske također iz RBiH prolazili u treće zemlje. Dio izbjeglica iz RBiH vratio se u RBiH. Popisom izbjeglica u travnju 1993. g., utvrđeno je da ih je tada 269.005 bilo smješteno u Hrvatskoj.

U drugoj polovici 1993. g. u Hrvatskoj se povećao val izbjeglica iz RBiH (većinom Hrvata iz srednje RBiH) vezano za muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatske sukobe. Na kraju 1993.

⁵⁶⁵ Prognanicima se smatraju protjerane osobe koje su ostale na teritoriju iste (svoje) države, a izbjeglice su prognanici koji su napustili teritorij svoje države. Podaci i brojčani pokazatelji o prognanicima i izbjeglicama u RH navedeni u ovom dijelu ekspertize, preuzeti su iz Rogić, Ivan i drugi, *Progonstvo i povratak*, Zagreb, 1995; usp. *Narodne novine* (službeni list RH), 92/1998, Zagreb, 07. srpnja 1998., str. 2120-2127.

⁵⁶⁶ Rogić, Ivan i drugi, *Progonstvo i povratak*, Zagreb, 1995, str. 51.

g., ta izbjeglička kretanja su dovela do toga da je u Hrvatskoj bilo smješteno približno 270.000 izbjeglica iz RBiH.

Osim toga, tijekom 1992. i 1993. g. kroz Hrvatsku je ukupno prošlo čak 700.000 izbjeglica iz RBiH, koji su otišli u treće zemlje.

Tijekom 1994. g. povećao se u Hrvatskoj broj izbjeglica iz zapadnih dijelova BiH. Istovremeno, dio izbjeglica koji su bili smješteni u Hrvatskoj vratio se u RBiH ili je otišao u treće zemlje. Prema popisu provedenom u srpnju 1994. g., u Hrvatskoj je tada bilo smješteno 183.038 izbjeglica (i 196.870 prognanika, što je zajedno iznosilo 379.809 izbjeglica i prognanika tada smještenih u Hrvatskoj – ili 9% u odnosu na cjelokupno pučanstvo RH).

Izbjeglička kretanja u svim smjerovima nastavila su se i tijekom 1995. g., tako da je popisom provedenim krajem srpnja 1995. g. utvrđeno da je u Hrvatskoj tada smješteno 190.772 izbjeglice (i 198.230 prognanika, što znači da je u Hrvatskoj tada bilo ukupno smješteno 389.002 izbjeglica i prognanika).

Gledajući ukupno, od 1992. do 1995. g., u Hrvatskoj je bilo smješteno približno 600.000 izbjeglica iz RBiH. Od toga je bilo približno 425.000 Muslimana/Bošnjaka, te približno 175.000 Hrvata iz RBiH.

Kad se ovi pokazatelji usporede s nekim drugim podacima u Hrvatskoj, onda se u punoj mjeri može spoznati u koliko golemoj mjeri su izbjeglice i prognanici predstavljali socijalno, gospodarsko, sigurnosno i drugačije opterećenje za RH.

Naime, u RH je 1994. g. bilo približno 817.000 umirovljenika, 243.408 (ili 17%) nezaposlenih osoba, a zaposlenih je bilo tek 1.156.000. Uz to približno 300.000 osoba u RH je živjelo u kućanstvima kojima je izdana socijalna iskaznica.⁵⁶⁷

III.-2.3 Skrb RH o izbjeglicama iz BiH

Pod pritiskom sve većeg broja prognanika, *Vlada RH* je, 23. srpnja 1991. g., donijela *Odluku* kojom je osnovan *Republički centar za zbrinjavanje i pomoć prognanicima*, a 30. kolovoza 1991. g. *Odlukom Vlade RH* osnovan je *Ured za izbjeglice*.⁵⁶⁸ Međutim, prognanici i izbjeglice su postajali sve veći problem, te je *Vlada RH*, 22. studenog 1991. g., ustrojila

⁵⁶⁷ Podaci u ovom odlomku preuzeti iz Rogić, I., n. dj. str. 50.

⁵⁶⁸ *Narodne novine*, Zagreb, 45/91.

posebno tijelo *Vladin Ured za prognanike i izbjeglice*, te donijela *Uredbu o statusu prognanika i izbjeglica*.⁵⁶⁹

Vladin Ured je preuzeo «brigu za smještaj, za izgradnju i dogradnju smještajnih kapaciteta, sortiranje, transport i distribuciju humanitarne pomoći, za financiranje smještaja u raznim objektima te prikupljanje i evidentiranje podataka.»⁵⁷⁰ Osim toga, *Ured* je koordinirao sa svim institucijama RH koje se bave prognanicima i izbjeglicama, te je surađivao s odgovarajućim međunarodnim nevladinim i vladinim organizacijama.

Ured je u Hrvatskoj izravno raspolagao sa svojom teritorijalnom mrežom koja se sastojala od 21 regionalnog ureda i suradnicima u 99 socijalnih centara. *Ured* je tijekom svog djelovanja proizveo i prikupio golemi broj dokumenata i podataka o prognanicima i izbjeglicama. Ta građa se nalazi u registratorima, herbarijima i kartonima, koji su smješteni na policama čija je ukupna dužina čak 921 metar.⁵⁷¹

Zbog golemog broja, izbjeglice i prognanici u RH bili su smješteni u svim raspoloživim kapacitetima na različitim područjima diljem Hrvatske; u hotelima, športskim dvoranama, vojarnama, ustanovama socijalne skrbi, barakama građevinskih poduzeća za smještaj radnika, odmaralištima, vrtićima, školama, bolnicama, atomskim skloništima, željezničkim vagonima, kamp-naseljima itd. «Tijekom 1922. godine grade se nova naselja za prognanike i izbjeglice te adaptiraju objekti za poboljšanje standarda starih ili smještaj novih prognanika i izbjeglica ... U Hrvatskoj je pri kraju 1994. (bilo, op. a.) 612 objekata u kojima je organiziran smještaj i/ili prehrana za prognanike i izbjeglice».⁵⁷²

Međutim, u svim navedenim zajedničkim smještajnim kapacitetima u RH bilo je mjesta za približno 20% izbjeglica i prognanika. Stoga, prema podacima iz 1994. g., približno 80% izbjeglica i prognanika u RH bilo je smješteno privatno (kuće, stanovi, vikendice itd.) u obiteljima «koje su iskazale najviši stupanj humanosti i solidarnosti prihvativši većinu prognanika i izbjeglica u svoje domove.»⁵⁷³

Skrb o prognanicima u RH temeljila se na za tu svrhu donesenim zakonima, a izbjeglice su zbrinjavane «u skladu s međunarodnim konvencijama o izbjeglicama».⁵⁷⁴ I

⁵⁶⁹ Isto, 64/91.

⁵⁷⁰ Rogić, I., n. dj. str. 16.

⁵⁷¹ v. Praljak, S., *Pomoć Republike Hrvatske Muslimansko-Bošnjačkom narodu i Armiji Bosne i Hercegovine tijekom 1991.-1995. godine – činjenice*, Zagreb, 2007, str. 367-370; (3D02633).

⁵⁷² Rogić, I., n. dj., str. 54.

⁵⁷³ Isto, str 17.

⁵⁷⁴ Isto, str. 52-53.

prognanici i izbjeglice u RH su imali pravo na nužni smještaj, prehranu, pomoć u socijalnoj adaptaciji, školovanje djece, zdravstvenu zaštitu, humanitarnu pomoć i pomoć za podmirivanje drugih nužnih životnih potreba (transportni, pogrebni troškovi itd.).

Troškove zbrinjavanja golemog broja izbjeglica i prognanika, od 1991. do 1995. g., najviše je snosila RH. «U Fond Kralja Zvonimira, središnju ustanovu za podmirivanje troškova zbrinjavanja prognanika i izbjeglica pristiže preko 70% sredstava iz hrvatskog proračuna, dok su ostala sredstva iz donacija», a 1994. g. «samo troškovi smještaja prognanika i izbjeglica ... iznosili su oko 360 milijuna maraka, od kojih je oko 78% pristiglo iz hrvatskog državnog proračuna.»⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷⁵ Isto, str. 55. Uz sve navedeno, potrebno je imati u vidu i goleme ratne štete koje je RH pretrpjela tijekom srbijanske oružane agresije: v. Praljak, Slobodan, *Procjena ratnih šteta u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb, 2006.

II.-3

NAORUŽAVANJE I OPREMANJE POSTROJBI ARBiH

III.-3.1 Naoružavanje i opremanje

ARBiH je bila oružana sila koja je čak i u vrijeme završetka rata na prostoru RBiH, u svakom pogledu i u ratnim okolnostima, bila u procesu nastajanja. Zbog toga se ARBiH cijelo vrijeme rata suočavala s nizom najosnovnijih i netipičnih problema, a unutar toga glavni problem je bilo «pomanjkanje oružja, municije i svih materijalno tehničkih sredstava».⁵⁷⁶ Taj problem se – zbog geopolitičkog položaja RBiH – najvećim dijelom mogao rješavati jedino preko ili sa teritorija RH, i to se događalo.

Institucije RH, naročito *Ministarstvo obrane RH* (MORH), tijekom cjelokupnog trajanja rata na području RBiH, intenzivno su i izravno sudjelovale, pomagale i odobravale proces naoružavanja i opremanja ARBiH. Ova suradnja institucija RH i RBiH u procesu naoružavanja ARBiH trajala je i tijekom razdoblja muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih djelomičnih oružanih sukoba. Razlozi tog neprekinutoj suradnji sa strane RH nalaze su u strateškim interesima RH, prvenstveno u tome da se srbijanska agresija vojnički porazi na prostoru RBiH, jer bez tog poraza najvjerojatnije ne bi bilo moguće reintegrirati hrvatska okupirana područja, što je bio glavni problem opstanka, sigurnosti i stabilnosti države RH.

O činjenicama suradnje država RH i RBiH, glede naoružavanju ARBiH (i njenih preteča) svjedoči golemi broj dokumenata svih razina i različitog bilateralnog podrijetla.⁵⁷⁷

Primjerice, tijela vlasti RH organizirala su prevoženje oružje za ARBiH, iz RH u RBiH, kopnenim i zračnim (helikopteri i zrakoplovi) putem.⁵⁷⁸ Diljem RH je bilo čak 26

⁵⁷⁶ Divjak, J., n. dj., str. 191.

⁵⁷⁷ v. internetsku stranicu www.slobodanpraljak.com na kojoj je u digitalnom obliku objavljeno približno 2.000 dokumenata koji se odnose na ovu temu; ili v. 60-ak dokumenata objavljenih u Praljak, S., *Pomoć...*, str. 8-89; (3D02633).

⁵⁷⁸ v. Praljak, S., *Pomoć...*, str. 10-12; (3D02633).

mjestu na kojima se vršio utovar oružja, koje je upućivano za ARBiH na 12 odredišta koja su bila u RBiH, pod kontrolom ARBiH.⁵⁷⁹

Brojni dokumenti MORH-a s potpisima najviših dužnosnika, i iz razdoblja djelomičnih muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih oružanih sukoba u RBiH (od završnih mjeseci 1992. do početnih mjeseci 1994. g.), svjedoče da je iz RH teklo slanje oružja, vojne opreme i hrane za ARBiH. Primjerice, sredinom prosinca 1992. g. general pukovnik HV-a Ivan Čermak (*Pomoćnik Ministra obrane RH*) izdao je *Tehničko prometnoj upravi MORH-a* «Nalog za izdavanje materijalnih sredstava za potreba oružanih snaga BiH logistički centar Visoko».⁵⁸⁰ Tijekom ožujka 1993. g. general bojnik *Hrvatske vojske* (HV) Ivan Basarac (*Načelnik Uprave za vidove u Glavnom stožeru RH*), Mladen Vrgotuk (*Načelnik Tehničko-prometne uprave MORH-a*), general pukovnik HV, I. Čermak i drugi izdali su više *Naloga* i drugih dokumenata koji se odnose na slanje oružja i opreme za potrebe ARBiH.⁵⁸¹

III.-3.2 Logističke baze za ARBiH na teritoriju RH

Na području RH je postojao veći broj logističkih baza ARBiH koje su se također brinule o upućivanju oružja i druge opreme postrojbama ARBiH. Osim toga, i druge institucije RBiH (npr. veleposlanstvo RBiH u Zagrebu) te različite organizacije i pojedinci na području RH također su, u suradnji s vlastima RH ili bez nje, upućivali oružje i vojnu opremu postrojbama ARBiH koje su se nalazile u različitim područjima RBiH.

Primjerice, u dokumentu kojeg je, 06. ožujka 1993. g., *Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, Armija BiH, Logistički centar Zagreb* uputila na adresu «Republika Hrvatska, Ministarstvo obrane, N/r. g. Pukovnika Vladimira Zagorca», između ostalog se navodi: «Štovani, dostavljamo Vam popis kamiona i vozača za preuzimanje materijalno-tehničkih sredstava ... Materijalno tehnička sredstva pod st. 1 dostavljaju se u Pazarić, a pod st. 2 u Gradačac za potrebe I i II Korpusa Armije BiH i postrojbi 106. i 107. HVO.» U potpisu dokumenta stoji: «Armija BiH, Logistički centar Zagreb, Koordinator, Azem Karamehmedović».⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁹ v. Isto, str. 13; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁰ Isto, str. 16; (3D02633).

⁵⁸¹ Isto, str. 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32,33; (3D02633).

⁵⁸² Isto, str. 25-26; (3D02633).

Nekoliko dana kasnije, *Armija BiH, Logistički centar Zagreb* uputila je dopis MORH-u kojem se navodi: «Molimo Vas da odobrite prijevoz materijalno-tehničkih sredstava slijedećim vozilima za potrebe Armije BiH – Logistički centar Visoko».⁵⁸³ Dokumenti istog tipa rutinski su upućivani i u narednom razdoblju, što svjedoči o sustavnoj suradnji između ARBiH i MORH-a glede naoružavanja i opremanja ARBiH.⁵⁸⁴

Dokument, od 14. siječnja 1993. g., kojem u naslovu stoji «Popis MTS-a (materijalno-tehničkih sredstava, op a.) u skladištima zrakoplovne baze "Lučko" (kod Zagreba, op. a.) koja pripada Armiji R BiH – V korpusu, a pod nadzorom su Ureda Okruga Bihać sa sjedištem u Zagrebu», te pečat *Ureda* na kraju dokumenta («Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, Okrug Bihać, Sjedište Zagreb» dostatan govori sam za sebe o odnosu državnih institucija RH prema ARBiH i državi RBiH.⁵⁸⁵

Niz dokumenata *Ambasade Bosne i Hercegovine u Republici Hrvatskoj*, od svibnja 1993. do ožujka 1994. g. (u razdoblju najžešćih muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatskih sukoba) svjedoči da je i *Ambasada* intenzivno i nesmetano s područja RH sudjelovala u naoružavanju i opremanju ARBiH.⁵⁸⁶ S tim, što je, prema podacima u tim dokumentima, oružje i streljivo na područje Bihaća uglavnom stizalo skriveno u kamionima UNHCR-a koji su prevozili humanitarnu pomoć. Na nekim dokumentima je naznačeno da oružje i opremu upućuje *Vojno ekonomsko predstavništvo* *Ambasade BiH*, koje je bilo smješteno u Zagrebu, Savska c. 62 E/V. Isto tako, neki dokumenti na mjestu potpisa navode «Za vojnog atašea, Hajrudin Osmanagić», a na kraju nekih dokumenata je pečat «Vojno izaslanstvo Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u Republici Hrvatskoj».⁵⁸⁷

Ministarstvo obrane BiH je sredinom srpnja 1993. g., «po zahtjevu Štaba Vrhovne Komande oružanih snaga BiH», imenovalo (zaposlilo) šest osoba u *Vojno ekonomsko predstavništvo Zagreb*», 21 osobu u *Logistički odjel Štaba Vrhovne Komande oružanih snaga RBiH Zagreb* i dvije osobe u *Logistički odjel Štaba Vrhovne Komande oružanih snaga RBiH Split*.⁵⁸⁸ *Ambasada Republike BiH* u Zagrebu, o tome je obavijestila *Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova RH*.⁵⁸⁹ Međutim, iz jednog drugog strogo povjerljivog dokumenta iz RBiH saznaje se

⁵⁸³ Isto, str. 29; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁴ Isto, str. 40; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁵ Isto, str. 51-52; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁶ v. Isto, str. 53, 69, 70, 71, 75, 77, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁷ v. Isto, str. 70 i 89; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁸ Isto, str. 157-158; preslika dokumenta «Rješenje»; (3D02633).

⁵⁸⁹ Isto, str. 159-160; (3D02633).

da je osam osoba imenovano zapravo «Naređenjem obavještajne uprave Str. pov. broj ...», a razlozi se mogu samo pretpostavljati.⁵⁹⁰

Tema logističkih centara RBiH na teritoriju RH je još uvijek istraživački veoma otvorena, te se stoga ne može cjelovito rekonstruirati ni opseg logističke mreže RBiH u RH niti opseg i načini njena djelovanja.⁵⁹¹ Naime, neki dokumenti pokazuju da je u RH djelovao i *Glavni Štab za podršku BiH*, koji je imao sebi podređene *Regionalne Štabove*. U jednom dokumentu s grbom RBiH, *Glavni Štab za podršku BiH*, *Regionalni Štab Split* uputio je dopis *Glavnom Štabu Rijeka* u kojem se samo kaže: «Šaljem Vam izgled pečata Regionalnog Štaba Split, te moj potpis» a u potpisu je «Komandant Štaba Senad Biščević» i pečat *Štaba*.⁵⁹²

Osim toga, različitim vrstama logistike i «logistike», za ARBiH i muslimansko/bošnjačku strukturu u RBiH, na području RH su se polulegalno bavile i brojne muslimanske ili islamske humanitarne (« ») organizacije,⁵⁹³ te pojedinci koji su za tu svrhu s «ovlaštenjima»⁵⁹⁴ upućivani u RH od niza postrojbi ARBiH i drugih institucija vlasti RBiH.

Posebno je (prema označenom mjestu nastanka) znakovit povjerljivi dokument kojeg je 18. veljače 1993. g. u Zagrebu napisala institucija *Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, Štab Vrhovne komande OS, Uprava RV i PVO*⁵⁹⁵ i uputila ga *Načelniku Štaba Vrhovne komande ARBiH*. I iz točke 5. dokumenta je očigledno da su *Načelnik Uprave RV i PVO ARBiH* a vjerojatno i *Uprava* bili mjesecima smješteni u Zagrebu.

U ovom dokumentu se, između ostalog, navodi: «Izvršena je kupovina dva srednja transportna helikoptera Mi-8T za potrebe Armije Republike BiH ... izvršen je prelet sa našim posadama na a. (aerodrom, op. a.) Visoko ... U toku je kupovina još dva helikoptera Mi-8T».⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹⁰ Isto, str. 163; (3D02633).

⁵⁹¹ Isto, str. 177-179, 182, 183-184, 185; (3D02633).

⁵⁹² Isto, str. 188; (3D02633).

⁵⁹³ Isto, str. 180, 189-197; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁴ Isto, str. 174, 186, 187; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁵ Isto, str. 35; OS = oružane snage; RV = ratno vazduhoplovstvo PVO = protuvazduhoplovna obrana; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁶ Isto; (3D02633).

III.-3.3 HZHB i HVO i naoružavanje Armije RBiH

Zbog teritorijalnog razvoja srbijanske oružane agresije na RBiH, daleko najsigurniji putovi opskrbe iz Hrvatske u središnje i istočne dijelove RBiH (a s time i vojne opskrbe za ARBiH) bili su preko područja HZHB (HRHB). Niz dokumenata svjedoči da se ta opskrba ARBiH odvijala preko prostora i uz suradnju HZHB (HRHB) čak i u vrijeme kad su se na pojedinim lokalitetima događali muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatski oružani sukobi.

Dokument *Glavnog stožera HVO-a* od 26. lipnja 1992. g., izdan u Grudama (u Hercegovini), ukazuje da se opskrba ARBiH, preko prostora HZHB, u razdoblju prije navedenih sukoba, odvijala prema standardnoj proceduri. Dokument je kratak i nalazi se na memorandumu «HZHB – HVO», a nosi naziv *Dozvola za transport opreme i naoružanja*, te se kaže: «Od strane ovog zapovjedništva dozvoljen je transport opreme za Pazarić ... Odgovoran za transport pukovnik Porobić Mustafa. Sve policijske postrojbe dužne su propustiti ovaj transport.» U potpisu je «Zapovjednik HVO, Brigadir Milivoj Petković».⁵⁹⁷

U dokumentu, izvješću *Glavnog stožera HVO*, od 06. studenog 1992. g., izdanog u Grudama, najprije se navodi «raspodjela sredstava koja su upućena postrojbama Armije BiH (Foča, Goražde)», a potom se daje pregled «sredstava koja su prevožena za potrebe Armije BiH (1. krajiška brigada i HVO Jajce)».⁵⁹⁸

Dokument *Sektora logistike Glavnog stožera HVO-a*, od 01. ožujka 1993. g., je «Pregled oduzetih MS (materijalnih sredstava, op. a.) od strane Armije BiH, a bila su upućena za OZ Srednja Bosna», poslan je *Ministarstvu obrane RH* «n/r ministra Gojka Šuška». Ovaj dokument, osim što ukazuje na probleme u odnosima ARBiH i HVO, svjedoči da su MORH i HVO surađivali u procesu naoružavanja postrojbi ARBiH.

Glavni stožer HVO-a izdao je, 07. travnja 1993. g., *Dozvolu za nesmetan prolaz veće količine materijalno-tehničkih sredstava koja «se prevoze na relaciji Grude-Srebrenica, a prevoze se kamionima»*.⁵⁹⁹ U potpisu dokumenta je Ante Jelavić, *Pomoćnik Načelnika GS HVO za logistiku*.

Osim već navedenih, i niz drugih dokumenata MORH-a svjedoči da su učestale pošiljke oružja, streljiva i vojne opreme iz RH upućivane u Grude, iz kojih su otpremane dalje u različita područja BiH, za potrebe ARBiH i HVO-a. Primjerice, o učestalosti pošiljki oružja

⁵⁹⁷ Isto, str. 59; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁸ Isto, str. 14-15; (3D02633).

⁵⁹⁹ Isto, str. 34; (3D02633).

i vojne opreme, prema nalogu MORH-a, za Grude pokazuje i niz dokumenata koji se odnose na ožujak 1993. godine.⁶⁰⁰

Na isti način svjedoče i dokumenti ARBiH. Primjerice, 22. ožujka 1993., *Komandant Rasim Delić* uputio je na ruke *Načelnika SSVK OS R BiH* Sefera Halilovića «prijedlog za istovar TMS (tehničko-materijalnih sredstava, op. a.) koja bi sutra (možda) krenula iz Zagreba. Ukupan broj TMS umanjen je za 25% koja bi trebalo da izuzme Hrvatska ili u Grudama.

Sredstva za Tuzlu bi po dolasku tamo bila djelomično vraćena u Visoko radi raspodjele za 3. Korpus i druge jedinice.

To bi bilo urađeno u dogovoru s Hazimom, a sredstva u Pazariću bi podijelili na 1. i 8. Korpus (po dogovoru).»⁶⁰¹

⁶⁰⁰ Isto, str. 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 39, 55; (3D02633).

⁶⁰¹ www.slobodanpraljak.com

III.-4

USTROJAVANJE I OBUKA POSTROJBI «ARBiH» NA TERITORIJU REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE

III.-4.1 Ustrojavanje postrojbi ARBiH u Republici Hrvatskoj

Civilne i vojne vlasti država RBiH i RH surađivale su u ustrojavanju postrojbi ARBiH na teritoriju RH i njihovom upućivanju na niz bojišta u RBiH. Ustrojavanje se događalo mobilizacijom i dragovoljačkim pristupom. Dragovoljački pristup se, između ostalog, zasnivao i na ranije navedenoj *Uputi Ministra obrane* (RH, op. a.) *svim zapovjedništvima Hrvatske vojske*, prema kojoj zapovjednici HV nisu smjeli zaustavljati dobrovoljce iz postrojbi HV-a koji su porijeklom iz BiH i žele ići na ratište u BiH.⁶⁰² RH je, osim toga, pomagala u opremanju postrojbi ARBiH i omogućavala je njihovu djelomičnu vojničku pripremu.

Zbog postojanja neosnovanih stereotipa, važno je naglasiti da je na temelju dostupnih dokumenata očigledno kako su državne institucije RH sustavnije pomagale ARBiH nego HVO-u, što se očituje i u činjenici da su postrojbe ARBiH ustrojavane i obučavane na teritoriju RH, dok to (prema dostupnoj dokumentaciji) nije bio slučaj s postrojbama HVO-a. Jedan od razloga ovome je i strateški interes države RH da se država RBiH obrani od srbijanske oružane agresije, a to se nije moglo postići bez ARBiH, koja je bila brojnija i pokrivala je veći teritorij RBiH nego HVO.

Pritom je posebno važno naglasiti činjenicu, da su brojni dijelovi civilnih i vojnih vlasti RBiH i drugih organizacija postojali i bez zapreka djelovali na teritoriju RH, i to uz pomoć državnih tijela RH.

Pri kraju siječnja 1993. g., *Vojno izaslanstvo Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u Republici Hrvatskoj*, koje je djelovalo unutar *Ureda Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u Republici Hrvatskoj*, uputilo je dopis *Glavnom stožeru Hrvatske vojske*, kojim se traži: «Nastavak dogovora i realizacije formiranja sabirnog centra-Logora ... a kasnije i formiranje

⁶⁰² v. poglavlje ove ekspertize «Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (HVO)».

većih centara i grupa do veličine bataljona-brigade, prodor u zonu odgovornosti 5. Korpusa» ARBiH.⁶⁰³

Još ranije, početkom lipnja 1992. g., *Ministar obrane Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* uputio je iz Sarajeva dopis «generalu Stipetiću» (članu *Glavnog stožera Hrvatske vojske*), iz kojeg se jasno prepoznaje jedan od tipičnih načina suradnje R BiH i RH na ustrojavanju postrojbi ARBiH na području RH. U dopisu se navodi: «... obaviješteni smo da se organizovano radi na formiranju jedinica koje bi se priključile oružanim snagama Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.

U svezi s tim, molimo Vas za pomoć oko prihvata istih u kasarnu "Borongaj" u Zagrebu (radi se o 300 ljudi iz Rijeke, 300 ljudi iz Ljubljane i oko 5500 ljudi iz Njemačke). Ti ljudi bi trebali u kasarni "Borongaj" da se okupe, obuku i spreme do subote (06. 06. 1992.) za pokret ka Bosni i Hercegovini.

Ljudi koji su se već okupili u Zagrebu iznose nam zahtjev za kadrovskom popunom jedinica. U nemogućnosti da iz Sarajeva prebacimo ljude u Zagreb, molimo Vas da, ukoliko ste u mogućnosti, pomenutu jedinicu popunite sa 10 časnika, po mogućnosti onih koji su rođeni u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini (radi poznavanja teritorija).»⁶⁰⁴

Dopis kojeg je, početkom siječnja 1993. g., *Sekretar za vojna pitanja pri Uredu Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u Republici Hrvatskoj* (pukovnik Hasan Efendić) uputio MORH-u, potpuno jasno svjedoči o kontinuitetu i modelu angažiranja časnika HV za potreba ARBiH. U dopisu se navodi da *Vojno izaslanstvo BiH* «izražava svoje visoko štovanje» MORH-u «i preporuča se zamoliti da ... za potrebe OS R BiH dopustite angažiranje časnika HV i to ... (navode se imena trojice časnika HV i podaci o njima, op. a.)... Status ovih časnika molimo da se riješi kao i do sada, zamrzavanjem (da imaju sve prinadležnosti kao časnici HV), a po obavljenoj zadaći da im se omogući dalje angažovanje u HV.»⁶⁰⁵

Na sličan način svjedoči i *Zamolba* koju je, 21. svibnja 1993. g., *Ured okruga Bihać Republika Bosna i Hercegovina* (smješten u Zagrebu) uputio *Odjelu za ustroj MORH-a*, u kojoj se traži: «Molimo da gospodina Senada Palića, mobiliziranog u postrojbu NG (Narodna garda, op. a.) 9158 demobilizirate ili oslobodite dužnosti u HV jer je od 01. 01. 1992 g. angažiran u Zapovjedništvu V Korpusa, temeljem dokumenata koje ste imali na uvid.»⁶⁰⁶ To

⁶⁰³ Praljak, S., *Pomoć...*, str. 92; (3D02633).

⁶⁰⁴ Isto, str. 100; (3D02633).

⁶⁰⁵ Isto, str. 114; (3D02633).

⁶⁰⁶ www.slobodanpraljak

znači da je Senad Palić formalno bio pripadnik HV-a, iako se gotovo 16 mjeseci stvarno nalazio u *Zapovjedništvu V Korpusa ARBiH*.

Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova (MUP) RH također je na području Hrvatske bilo uključeno u provođenje mobilizacije za potrebe ARBiH, a o toj suradnji najjasnije svjedoči dopis kojeg je, 23. rujna 1992. g., *Glavni Štab oružanih snaga BiH Sarajevo, Povjereništvo za Hrvatsku Zagreb* uputio MUP-u RH, *Policijskoj upravi grada Zagreba*. U dopisu je, između ostalog, navedeno: «... prilikom privođenja i deportovanja vojnih obveznika-građana Republike Bosne i Hercegovine koji se nalaze u Hrvatskoj, a koje poslove po zahtjevu vlade Republike Bosne i Hercegovine sprovodi Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske ...».⁶⁰⁷

Krizni štab za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, smješten u RH, u gradu Splitu, Tolstojeva 28, podnio je, 18. listopada 1992. g., strogo povjerljivo «Izvješće o radu ... od 6. 4. do 18. 10. 1992. godine», u kojem se nalazi niz veoma važnih podataka za razumijevanje odnosa državnih institucija RH prema državi RBiH i njenoj muslimansko/bošnjačkoj strukturi. U *Izvješću* se, između ostalog, navodi: «Krizni štab za Bosnu i Hercegovinu – Split osnovan je u okviru Stranke demokratske akcije Hrvatske, Ogranak Split, 6. 4. 1992. godine ... razvio je veoma dinamičnu aktivnost u sljedećim segmentima: mobilizacija dobrovoljaca Muslimana i Hrvata rođenih u Bosni i Hercegovini, njihova evidencija, opremanje i slanje na bojišta diljem Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, prikupljanje humanitarne, tehničko-materijalne i drugih vrsta pomoći za Bosnu i Hercegovinu ... Od osnivanja Kriznog štaba za BiH – Split odmah se prišlo organiziranju sazivanja i prihvata dobrovoljaca, Muslimana i Hrvata rođenih u BiH, uz pomoć svih medija (Radio Split, TV-Marijan, "Slobodna Dalmacija" i dr.), pri čemu je značajnu pomoć dala VI operativna zona Split ... Napravljen je plan i program Kriznog štaba koji su odobrile vojne i civilne vlasti grada Splita i Republike Hrvatske. Stvorena je tijesna suradnja koja se manifestira sve do danas.

Do 18. travnja 1992. godine bila je formirana Prva splitska samostalna satnija kao prva vojna formacija za pomoć Oružanim snagama BiH ... U njenom formiranju i kompletiranju oružjem, streljivom, vojnom odjećom i dnevnim obrocima hrane izravno nam je pomogla VI operativna zona Split ... Po odlasku Prve splitske satnije svi prijavljeni dobrovoljci, a kasnije i obveznici, bili su upisani i registrirani u valjane spiskove i po osobnoj želji svakog dobrovoljca bili upućeni u slijedeće postrojbe OS BiH ...

- OS BiH, Kamp za prihvata dobrovoljaca Visoko – 142 dobrovoljca;

⁶⁰⁷ Isto, str. 118; (3D02633), (3D01651).

- OS BiH, Livno – Tomislavgrad – 89 dobrovoljaca;...
- OS BiH, Sjeverna Bosna, Zagreb – kasarna Borongaj – 34 dobrovoljca;...
- OS BiH, Prvi bosanskohercegovački korpus "Kralj Tomislav" – Baško Polje – 157 dobrovoljaca;
- OS BiH, Prvi mostarski samostalni bataljon – 118 dobrovoljaca;
- HVO Grude – 22 dobrovoljca;...
- OS BiH, Tešanj, Čapljina i Stolac – 56 dobrovoljaca;
- OS BiH, Tuzla – 31 dobrovoljac;
- Ostali gradovi imjesta u BiH – Bugojno, Jajce, Zenca, Doboje, Zavidovići i Bihać – preko 70 dobrovoljaca i vojnih obveznika;
- HRM – Sjeverna Bosna – Bihać i Cazin – 120 dobrovoljaca ...

Ukupno je registrirano i upućeno na ratišta u postrojbe u BiH 862 dobrovoljca. (Do kraja 1992. god. upućeno i registrirano preko 2.000 dobrovoljaca OS BiH i HVO).⁶⁰⁸

Putem ovog KŠ odvijalo se prebacivanje dobrovoljaca registriranih i mobiliziranih u Puli, Rijeci, Varaždinu i Zadru. U pitanju je bio značajan broj branitelja.

Među dobrovoljcima upućenih putem KVŠ Split bilo je žena i stranih državljana iz Alžira, Francuske i Turske koji su upućeni u kamp za prihvatanje dobrovoljaca OS BiH ... Suradnja s vojnim i civilnim organima Splita i RH je svakodnevna i obostrano korisna.»⁶⁰⁹

Na kraju, u potpisu ovog opsežnog dokumenta je navedeno: «Predsjednik Kriznog Štaba za BiH, Split, Alija Džafo», te stoji da je *Izvjешće* dostavljeno *Vladi Republike BiH*, Hasanu Efendiću vojnom atašeu, *Uredu Republike BiH u Hrvatskoj i Arhivi*.⁶¹⁰

Iz «kraćeg izvještaja» kojeg je, 17. svibnja 1993. g. u Zagrebu, sastavio zapovjednik *1. Berbirske bojne Armije Bosne i Hercegovine* i uputio ga *Ambasadi BiH, Vojno ekonomskom predstavništvu Zagreb* («zamjeniku vojnog atašea H. Osmanagiću») i «zapovjedniku za bezbjednost Dž. Topiću»), između ostalog se saznaje: «1. Berbirska bojna je osnovana 30. 05. 1992. g. u Zagrebu, a u okviru tadašnje TO R BiH ... i trenutno broji bez ranjenika i rekonvalescenata 120 boraca».⁶¹¹

U dokumentu kojem u glavi stoji *Općina Rijeka, Sekretarijat narodne obrane* nalazi se 20 stranica s popisom približno 700 pripadnika *77. brigade*, koja je najvjerojatnije formirana

⁶⁰⁸ Tekst u zagradi, u dokumentu je očigledno naknadno dodan i pisan je rukom, za razliku od ostalog teksta u dokumentu koji je pisan strojopisom.

⁶⁰⁹ Praljak, S., *Pomoć...*, str. 93-95; (3D02633).

⁶¹⁰ Isto, str. 99; (3D02633).

⁶¹¹ Isto, str. 103; (3D02633).

za potrebe ARBiH. Za svakog pripadnika 77. brigade navedeno je prezime i ime, čin, status (npr. «zapovjednik», «vezist» itd.), «poduzeće» (npr. «nezaposlen, «HV», «brodogradilište» itd.) i datum pristupanja brigadi.⁶¹² Iz tih podataka je očigledno da su pripadnici 77 brigade tada živjeli i radili u RH.

U dokumentu *Glavnog štaba za podršku BiH*, izdanog u Rijeci 21. rujna 1992. g., nalazi se «Spisak ljudstva za 7. brigadu Armije Bosne i Hercegovine».⁶¹³

Dokument (memorandum), od 12. studenog 1992. g., kojem se na vrhu stranice nalazi grb ARBiH i natpis «Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Zagreb, Radnička cesta 228, Telefon: 041/232-482» svjedoči o institucijskoj širini načina i državnih tijela RH koja su bila uključena u pomaganje ARBiH. U dokumentu je, između ostalog, navedeno: «Na osnovu Odluke ministarstva inozemnih poslova Republike Hrvatske br. ... i punomoći br. ... Ureda Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u Republici Hrvatskoj, o prenošenju nadležnosti» izdana je *Naredba*: «Grupa (sa naoružanjem i opremom) od 25 ljudi i 3 vođa bit će upućena iz rejona Sljeme kod Zagreba u Bihaćku regiju na pravcu Zagreb-Karlova-Ogulin, radi ubacivanja u regiju Bihać».⁶¹⁴

Vojno izaslanstvo Ureda Republike BiH u Republici Hrvatskoj uputilo je iz Zagreba, 10. veljače 1993. g., *Pečatoreznici Zagreb* narudžbu za izradu pečata: «Molimo Vas da za potrebe Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine uradite okrugli pečat, promjera 4 cm, sa slijedećim sadržajem: ARMIJA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, SPECIJALNA ANTITERRORISTIČKA BRIGADA "KOBRA"»

U sredini pečata uraditi grb Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, sa ljljanima i ukrštenim mačevima. Troškove izrade pečata plaćamo gotovinski».⁶¹⁵

Iz jednog drugog, strogo povjerljivog dokumenta, saznaje se da je *Vojno izaslanstvo BiH* u RH nositelj projekta «KOBRA», te da je projekt usmeno odobren od *Predsjednika Predsjedništva BiH* (A. Izetbegovića) «i pismeno od NŠ VK, gosp. Halilovića». Zatim se u dokumentu navodi da su za projekt «obezbježena finansijska sredstva od pouzdanih donatora, sa kojima ste Vi (A. Izetbegović, op. a.) lično upoznati, da je obezbeđen stručni kadar, a djelomično je dogovoren i prostor za formiranje što zavisi od Vaše (Izetbegovićeve, op. a.) odluke.» Iz navedenog se može s velikom pouzdanošću zaključiti da je dogovor glede «stručnog kadra» i «prostora za formiranje» brigade postignut s nekom institucijom RH.

⁶¹² Isto, str. 105; (3D02633).

⁶¹³ Isto, str. 112; (3D02633).

⁶¹⁴ Isto, str. 118; (3D02633).

⁶¹⁵ Isto, str. 121; (3D02633).

III.-4.2 Obučavanje postrojbi ARBiH u Republici Hrvatskoj

Suradnja država RH i RBiH na obučavanju postrojbi ARBiH na teritoriju RH je potpuno neistražena i veoma rijetko spominjana tema, a, uostalom, sličan slučaj je i s drugim vrstama međudržavne RH - RBiH suradnje, kojima se bavi ova ekspertiza. Međutim, prema za sada dostupnim dokumentima je potpuno očigledno da se suradnja na obuci postrojbi ARBiH na teritoriju RH događala veoma sustavno, te uz puno i veoma predano sudjelovanje institucija hrvatske države, što je i razumljivo budući je provođenje vojničke obuke izuzetno složen i zahtjevan posao. Još je važnije naglasiti, da su RH i RBiH veoma rano započele tu suradnju, te da su u RH posebno sustavno obučavane elitne i specijalne postrojbe oružanih snaga RBiH. Isto tako, treba posebno naglasiti da je RH počela i intenzivno obučavala specijalne i elitne postrojbe ARBiH u veoma teškim okolnostima, kada je veliki dio postrojbi RH ratovao dragovoljački i vojnički neobučeni, a srbijanska agresija na RH bila je u punom intenzitetu.

Najraniji, za sada dostupan i izuzetno važan dokument, koji u punoj mjeri svjedoči o značajkama i rasponu navedene suradnje, ali i o ukupnim osobitostima tadašnje situacije u RH i RBiH, datiran je s 08. srpnjem 1991. g., a izdat je od strane «Stranke demokratske akcije, Sarajevo, Ul. Maršala Tita br. 7-a/IV». Naziv dokumenta je «Spisak kandidata za obuku specijalaca u MUP-u Republike Hrvatske», a potom slijede osobni podaci za 463 osobe iz različitih dijelova BiH, sa završnom napomenom: « ... nastavak na ovaj spisak dobit ćete za 7 dana». Dokument, na prvoj i zadnjoj stranici, ima otisnut pečat «Stranka demokratske akcije», te (na prvoj stranici) urudžbeni broj na za to predviđenom štambilju stranke.⁶¹⁶

O dogovorenoj suradnji državnih institucija RH s muslimansko/bošnjačkom strukturom iz RBiH izravno svjedoče i drugi dokumenti. Primjerice, *Stranka demokratske akcije* (u potpisu je *Sekretar SDA*, Hasan Čengić) poslala je, 11. srpnja 1991. g., MUP-u RH dopis (*Uput za kandidata Kadrić Sulejmana*) u kojem je navedeno: «Shodno zajedničkom dogovoru ovlaštenih predstavnika MUP-a SR BiH i MUP-a RH, te uputstvu o načinu prijema u radni odnos kandidata za policajce-pripravnike u Obrazovnom centru MUP-a Republike Hrvatske, Stranka demokratske akcije – Sarajevo preporučuje i gore imenovanog kandidata za kurs u Vašem centru.»⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁶ Isto, str. 127-129; (3D02633), (3D02837).

⁶¹⁷ www.slobodanpralj.com

Ovi dokumenti, između ostalog, svjedoče i o visokoj razini stranačkog utjecaja SDA na uspostavljanje nove sigurnosne strukture države (S)RBiH, nakon prvih višestranačkih parlamentarnih izbora provedenih u BiH.

U razdoblju 1991.-1992. g. pripadnici oružanih snaga RBiH obučavani su na najmanje 15 lokaliteta u RH, koji su se nalazili u svim neokupiranim dijelovima RH (od istočne Slavonije, preko središnje Hrvatske, do Istre i Dalmacije).⁶¹⁸

Primjerice, sačuvane su izdatnice iz srpnja 1992. g., s kojima je MUP RH odobrio izdavanje oružja, a preuzeo ga *Krizni štab Bos. Krupa*, s naznakom da je «mjesto troška Borongaj – Jaska». Jedna druga izdatnica s pečatom preuzimatelja - *Krizni štab Bos. Krupa*, u kojoj se radi o preuzimanju manje svote novca, govori puno više jer je napisano da je namjena novca «za materijalne potrebe "BEHAR BRIGADE" smještene u Žažinama (Žažini, kod grada Siska, u RH op. a.), a namijenjena za BD (borbena djelovanja, op. a.) u BOS. KRAINI». ⁶¹⁹ U nedostatku važnijih dokumenata, i ovaj izvor je veoma važan jer svjedoči da je u RH postojala BiH *Behar brigada*, koja je najvjerojatnije bila na obuci (i mobilizacijskom ustrojavanju) u RH (Žažini) sa svrhom odlaska na bojište u zapadnoj RBiH. Otvoreno je pitanje, jesu li dijelovi te brigade ili neke druge postrojbe bili na obuci u Jastrebarskom i Borongaju, na što upućuju druge dvije *izdatnice*.

Na sličan način, veoma oskudno ali jasno svjedoči i dokument s Plješivice (brdo u RH, nedaleko Zagreba), od 22. rujna 1992. g., koji evidentira materijalno tehnička sredstva (uglavnom oružje i streljivo) koje je ostalo «poslije boravka grupe iz Slovenije (165) – Boravak grupe na Plešivici od 8. 9. - 22. 9. 1992. g». U dokumentu se navodi da evidentirano oružje treba prevesti «u Regionalni štab-Bihać (smješten u Zagrebu, op. a.) komandantu Osmanagić Hajrudinu ... O istome upoznati i Štab Rijeka». Iz ovog dokumenta proizlazi da je «grupa iz Slovenije» najvjerojatnije u organizaciji «Regionalnog štaba-Bihać» bila na obuci na Plješivici, a potom upućena na bojište u BiH.

U prilog tome zaključku uvjerljivo svjedoči kratko ali veoma sadržajno *Izvjешće*, nastalo 16. studenog 1992. g. u Zagrebu, u kojem se navodi da je tog dana izvršeno «čišćenje smještaja JPN (jedinice za posebne namjene, op. a.) za okrug Bihać koji su bili smješteni u bolnici za TBC na Plešivici pored Jastrebarskog (kod Zagreba, op. a.). Objekt smo koristili za smještaj i obuku JPN koje su potom upućene na navedeni teren. Objekt je korišten u periodu

⁶¹⁸ Đakovo, Kutina, Sisak, Zdenčina, Zagreb (3), Velika Gorica, Jastrebarsko, Plješivica, Delnice, Rijeka, Pula (2), Vrgorac.

⁶¹⁹ Praljak, S., *Pomoć...*, str. 137-138; (3D02633), (3D02273).

od 4. 8. 1992 g. do 16. 11. 1992 g. po odobrenju III OZ Zagreb. Za odvoženje MTS i opreme korišten je kamion HV, u dvije ture.»⁶²⁰

Za obučavanje, na teritoriju RH, vojnih pilota i tehničara za održavanja vojnih zrakoplova (i helikoptera) ARBiH, dostupna je nekolicina dokumenata koji vjerodostojno svjedoče o toj uspješnoj i specifičnoj pomoći koju je RH pružila državi R BiH, u okolnostima kad su obje države imale minorno, ali veoma potrebno, ratno zrakoplovstvo.

O značenju te pomoći svjedoči i činjenica da je, 09. kolovoza 1992. g., pismo MORH-u osobno uputio *Predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH* (A. Izetbegović) uz supotpis *Ministra obrane BiH* (Jerko Doko), navodeći: «Molimo da se odobri boravak i obuka u Republici Hrvatskoj za sljedeća lica, a za potrebe oružanih snaga». Potom slijede osobni podaci za 22 osobe (vojni piloti i tehničari) i zaključna napomena: «Kao što se vidi iz podataka većina navedenih bili su pripadnici bivše JNA. Mi smo izvršili prethodno provjeravanje i selekciju.»⁶²¹

No, već i prije toga (u srpnju 1992. g.) RH je pomagala u obuci vojnih pilota R BiH: «Temeljem usmenog dogovora u jedinicu HRZ PZO (Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzračna obrana, op. a.) su stigla 3 pilota i 1 tehničar radi preobuke na avionu AN-2. Radi se o pilotima koji bi na teritoriju BiH letjeli za potrebe obrane te Republike i taj zadatak je vrlo hitan zbog stalne potrebe evakuacije i snabdjevanja TO BiH. Molimo da veoma hitno odobrite navedenu obuku», navodi se u dopisu kojeg je *Glavni stožer HV* uputio *Ministru obrane RH*.⁶²²

Pomoć koju je RH pružala za obuku pilota ARBiH bila je sustavna i prešla je u rutinu, te *Načelnik uprave RV i PVO (Ratnog vazduhoplovstva i protuvazdušne obrane)* pri *Štabu Vrhovne Komande OS BiH*, 08. ožujka 1993. g., upućuje sljedeće *Naređenje* za obuku «pilota i tehničara u Republici Hrvatskoj»: «Na osnovu ukazanih potreba i ostvarenih dogovora sa zapovjedništvom RZ i PZO Republike Hrvatske na obuku i izvršavanje zadataka u Republiku Hrvatsku iz RV i PVO OS Republike BiH upućuju se sljedeći piloti i tehničari». Slijedi popis 13 pilota i 3 tehničara, te napomena: «Obuku grupe provoditi prema dogovorenim planovima obuke između HRZ i PZO i RV i PVO OS R BiH.»⁶²³ Uz to, treba još jedanput naglasiti da je *Uprava RV i PVO OS BiH* tada boravila u Zagrebu.

⁶²⁰ Isto, str. 132; (3D02633), (3D01650).

⁶²¹ Isto, str. 141; (3D02633).

⁶²² Isto, str. 146; (3D02633), (3D01684).

⁶²³ Isto, str. 144-145; (3D02633), (3D01860).

Obuka vojnih pilota ARBiH vršena je u Zagrebu, Velikoj Gorici (kod Zagreba) i Puli (Istra, zapadni dio RH),⁶²⁴ a zračne luke u RH te vojni zrakoplovi i posade RH su korištene i za letove u/iz R BiH, prema potrebama ARBiH i drugih tijela državne vlasti R BiH.⁶²⁵

Prema izvješću HRZ PZO, za drugu polovicu prosinca 1992. g., «sa a. (aerodroma, op. a.) Pleso i a. Pula izvršavane su zadaće – prijevoz oružja, uniformi i sanitetskog materijala» u R BiH, a iz R BiH su u RH dovoženi uglavnom ranjenici i druge osobe. U tih pola mjeseca bila su ukupno 32 leta; od toga «za potrebe HVO BiH» 6 letova, a «za potrebe TO BiH» 26 letova. Pritom, se «za potrebe HVO BiH» ukupno letjelo 4.40 sati i prevezlo ukupno «6t tereta, 28 putnika + 11 ranjenika», a «za potrebe TO BiH» ukupno se letjelo 22.40 sati i prevezlo ukupno «21,5t tereta, 90 putnika + 35 ranj.»⁶²⁶

Na osnovu dogovora između *Zapovjednika HRZ i PVO* i *Načelnika Uprave RV i PVO OS BiH*, početkom travnja 1993. g., dvojici pripadnika ARBiH je izdano *Ovlašćenje* «da za potrebe Centra obavješćivanja u Republici BiH, svakog mjeseca mogu preuzimati frekvencije vala obavješćivanja u Zapovjedništvu HRZ I PZO i iste distribuirati u Centru obavješćivanja u Republiku BiH.»⁶²⁷

Međutim, još dosta prije toga, «početkom 1992. godine u Zagrebu je, pod nadzorom Službe (*Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka* – SZUP RH, op. a.), formiran logistički centar koji je imao zadatak opremiti i obučiti Oružane snage BiH, tj. jedinice HVO i TO BiH (začeci stvaranja Armije BiH), uporabi radiokomunikacijskih sredstava, te formirati fleksibilnu komunikacijsku mrežu ... Zadatak Logističkog centra je bio slaganje, programiranje i usklađivanje komponenata radiokomunikacijskog sustava, koji su se nakon kraćeg skladištenja, žurno upućivali na odredišta u BiH ... Osim gore navedene telekomunikacijske opreme, preko logističkog centra su u BiH poslani satelitski telefoni JRC, čija je pretplata i funkcija ugovorena preko British Telecoma, a čiji su korisnici bile osobe iz najvišeg državnog vrha BiH.

Tijekom prvih ratnih godina u BiH, sustav je prerastao početnu ulogu vojno-logističke komunikacije, i pokrivaio je također gospodarske, te humanitarne segmente.

Dakle, cilj opremanja i obuke OS BiH u tom trenutku je bio osnažiti borbu protiv velikosrpske agresije, dati joj novu logističku i tehničku komponentu, informativno i zapovjedno povezati HVO i TO BiH, i na taj način olakšati položaj Hrvatske ... Na početku

⁶²⁴ Isto, str. 148; (3D02633), (3D01857).

⁶²⁵ Isto, str. 147 (3D02633), 151 (3D02633) (3D01658), 153-154 (3D02633) (3D01867).

⁶²⁶ Isto, str. 153; (3D02633), (3D01867).

⁶²⁷ Isto, str. 155; (3D02633).

sukoba HVO i ABiH, prestalo je korištenje sustava od strane HVO, dok je ABiH nastavila korištenje uz druge kriptozastitne algoritme i ključeve.»⁶²⁸

⁶²⁸ Isto, str. 44-50; (3D02633), (3D00795).

III.-5

LIJEČENJE RANJENIH VOJNIKA «ARBIH»

I CIVILA MUSLIMANA/BOŠNJAKA

U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ 1992.-1995. GODINE

U razdoblju 1992.-1995. g., zbog izuzetno teške zdravstvene i humanitarne situacije u RBiH, veliki broj ranjenih vojnika ARBiH i civila muslimansko/bošnjačke nacionalnosti, nije imao ni minimalne uvjete za zbrinjavanje i liječenje na području RBiH. To je bio osnovni razlog zbog kojeg su oni u velikom broju, na različite načine, pristizali u dostupne bolnice i druge zdravstvene ustanove na području Republike Hrvatske, koje su ionako bile prekapacitirane s bolesnicima i ranjenicima iz Republike Hrvatske. Međutim, primanje, zbrinjavanje i liječenje ranjenika ARBiH i civila-građana RBiH nije dovođeno u pitanje doslovno ni jednog trenutka; ni od strukture državne vlasti RH niti od uprava i osoblja bolnica i drugih zdravstvenih ustanova u RH.

Međutim, nažalost i ovaj primjer goleme solidarnosti koju su iskazale institucije i naročito medicinsko osoblje u Republici Hrvatskoj, ostao je potpuno neistražen, a građa o tome razasuta je po pismohranama medicinskih ustanova, koje su se spremno odazvale, 1998. g., *Uredu Vlade RH za suradnju sa Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom* dostaviti tražene pojedinačne ispise i zbirne statističke pokazatelje.

Pritom je hrvatskim medicinskim ustanovama, za davanje podataka o hospitaliziranim državljanima RBiH, tj. vojnim i civilnim osobama muslimansko/bošnjačke nacionalnosti tijekom 1992. i 1993. g., posebnu teškoću predstavljala činjenica što «u našoj medicinskoj dokumentaciji ne postoji rubrika nacionalnost, pa smo se opredijelili za one bolesnike i ranjenike koji su došli iz područja BiH ili su bili izbjeglice u Hrvatskoj iz BiH s karakterističnim (muslimanskim) imenom.»⁶²⁹

«Za svakog pojedinog pacijenta vođen je protokol o liječenju, odnosno isti su evidentirani u knjigama protokola prijema sa svim relevantnim pokazateljima ... (identifikacijski podaci, vrijeme prijema i otpusta, dijagnoza, stanje pacijenta pri otpustu itd.)».⁶³⁰

⁶²⁹ Isto, str. 337; (3D02633).

⁶³⁰ Isto; (3D02633).

Na taj način se došlo do podataka o veoma približnom broju vojnika ARBiH i civila-gradana R BiH muslimansko/bošnjačke nacionalnosti koji su zbrinuti i liječeni u medicinskim ustanovama pet gradova u RH, za koje se pretpostavljalo da su bili najdostupniji prostoru R BiH.

Broj ranjenih i bolesnih vojnika i civila muslimansko/bošnjačke nacionalnosti, državljana R BiH, koji su zbrinuti i liječeni u nekim bolnicama u RH, u razdoblju 1992.-1995. godine:⁶³¹

Split.....	3.991
Zagreb.....	2.982
Slavonski Brod.....	2.730
Karlovac.....	849
<u>Vinkovci.....</u>	<u>81</u>
UKUPNO.....	10.633

Druga vrsta medicinske pomoći koju su medicinske ustanove RH, 1992.-1995. g., pružale medicinskim ustanovama diljem R BiH, uključujući i područja na kojima su Muslimani/Bošnjaci većinsko stanovništvo, bilo je slanje lijekova, sanitetskog materijala, medicinske opreme, dječje hrane, vitaminskih preparata itd. O tome svjedoče brojne *Izdatnice* s priloženim specifikacijama koje iz tog vremena posjeduju medicinske ustanove u Hrvatskoj.

Isto tako, medicinske ustanove u RH su tada primale ogroman broj pisanih zahvala liječenih pojedinaca i njihovih institucija iz R BiH, te pisanih zahvalnica od bolnica i medicinskih ustanova kojima su slale pomoć u R BiH.

Primjerice, *Klinički bolnički centar "Firule" Split* primio je, između ostalih, i više *Zahvalnica* različitih postrojbi, štabova i sanitetskih službi *Oružanih snaga BiH* «za dodijeljenu pomoć u lijekovima i sanitetskom materijalu koju ste nam isporučili za liječenje građana i pripadnika Armije BiH.»⁶³²

Jedna *Zahvalnica* stigla je na splitske *"Firule"* i od *Predsjednika Predsjedništva BiH* (A. Izetbegoviće) zbog «zbrinjavanja dr. Ejupa Ganića (člana *Predsjedništva BiH*, op a.) i njegovih pratilaca povrijeđenih u teškoj saobraćajnoj nesreći.»⁶³³

⁶³¹ Isto, str. 326; s tim što je u knjizi ukupni broj umanjen za deset, pogreškom u zbrajanju; (**3D02633**). Osim toga, usp. knjigu dokumenata: Praljak, Slobodan, *Ratno zdravstvo HVO – činjenice*, Oktavijan, Zagreb, 2008.

⁶³² Isto, str. 344-345; (**3D02633**).

⁶³³ Isto, str. 339; (**3D02633**).

III.-6

HUMANITARNE ORGANIZACIJE U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ ZA PRIKUPLJANJE POMOĆI BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Srbijanska oružana agresija, kojoj je jedan od glavnih ciljeva bilo etničko čišćenje, veoma je brzo u RBiH izazvala goleme demografske, gospodarske i komunikacijske poremećaje, te se ionako slabo razvijena RBiH, već sredinom 1992. g. našla i pred humanitarnom katastrofom, u kojoj je bio ugrožen osnovni egzistencijalni opstanak ljudi čak i na dijelovima RBiH koji nisu bili izravno pogođeni oružanom agresijom. U takvim okolnostima, osnovno preživljavanje u RBiH je uglavnom ovisilo o dotoku humanitarne pomoći koja je na najrazličitije načine iz cijelog svijeta pristizala u RBiH.

Budući je tada sigurnosna situacija u RH bila značajno povoljnija nego u RBiH, i budući se tada moglo s humanitarnom pomoći doći u RBiH gotovo isključivo preko RH, mnogobrojne humanitarne organizacije (i pojedinci) koje su bile usmjerene na RBiH svoja su sjedišta ili predstavništva osnivale u Hrvatskoj.

U RH su tada bila registrirana čak 234 predstavništva stranih humanitarnih organizacija.⁶³⁴ Pri postupku registracije, poreza, carina i naročito odnosu prema djelovanju humanitarnih organizacija, vlasti RH su bile gotovo do krajnosti liberalne, te je samo jednoj organizaciji zabranjen rad, iako «na nepravilnosti u radu upozorena je 41 humanitarna organizacija.»⁶³⁵

Od 234 strane humanitarne organizacije koje su imale predstavništvo u RH, čak 114 ih je djelovalo na području RBiH, a na području RH djelovalo ih je još 117 koje su skrbile i o izbjeglicama iz RBiH, što znači da samo tri (od 234) strane humanitarne organizacije u RH nisu djelovale u RBiH ili s izbjeglicama iz RBiH. Ove humanitarne organizacije su dolazile iz čak 34 države sa svih kontinenata osim iz Južne Amerike, a humanitarna pomoć za RBiH, u predstavništva u RH, stizala je iz 32 zemlje svijeta.⁶³⁶

⁶³⁴ Isto, str. 204-225; «Popis predstavništava stranih pravnih osoba koje se bave humanitarnom djelatnošću»; (3D02633).

⁶³⁵ Rogić, I., n. dj., str. 56.

⁶³⁶ Praljak, S., *Pomoć...*, str. 199-200; (3D02633).

Vlade RH i RBiH potpisale su *Protokol o suradnji* kojim je RH dozvolila «uspostavu Predstavništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine za humanitarna pitanja i pomoć u Republici Hrvatskoj sa skladištima u Zagrebu, Splitu i Pločama», a ugovoreno je da će se ostala skladišta i drugo otvarati prema ukazanim potrebama. Osim što je humanitarna pomoć za RBiH bila oslobođena svih carinskih i poreznih davanja u RH, RH je preuzela i obveze osiguravanja «suhozemnih koridora za konvoje za humanitarnu i drugu pomoć od skladišta Predstavništva u Republici Hrvatskoj do državne granice između» RH i RBiH.⁶³⁷

Samo u luku Ploče tijekom rata je stiglo ukupno 601.133t humanitarne pomoći.⁶³⁸ Usporedbe radi, od 1992.-1994. g., u Hrvatsku je iz EU stiglo ukupno 120.000t hrane.⁶³⁹

Međutim, unatoč golemim količinama humanitarne pomoći koja je ulazila u RBiH, te velikoj pomoći koju je RH ulagala u zbrinjavanje golemog broja izbjeglica iz RBiH i izbjegličkih valova iz RBiH koji su odlazili u treće zemlje, humanitarna kriza u RBiH nije prestajala, kako zbog uporne okrutnosti srbijanske agresije tako i zbog stalnog nedostatka humanitarne pomoći. Na sve to se nadovezao kriminal i asocijalnost pri baratanju s humanitarnom pomoći na prostoru RBiH, jer središnje državne vlasti RBiH nisu mogle uspostaviti uspješan nadzor nad podređenim strukturama vlasti.

To je vjerojatno bio tek jedan od razloga što je, pri kraju svibnja 1993. g., vrh vojne i civilne vlasti RBiH kratko i objektivno procijenio situaciju, te donio specifičnu i višestruko problematičnu odluku o načinu raspodjele humanitarne pomoći. O tome je obavijest napisalo i *Vojno ekonomsko predstavništvo pri Ambasadi BiH u Zagrebu*: «Organizovana pomoć R Bosni i Hercegovini je od životnog interesa njenih građana, kao i njenih oružanih snaga.

Organi državne uprave i vojna komanda su zbog pravednije i kvalitetnije distribucije i raspodjele humanitarne pomoći naspram jedinica Armije R BiH, teritorijalno svrstali opštine i gradove u okviru zona odgovornosti pet Korpusa Armije BiH».⁶⁴⁰ Tako su sjedišta korpusa ARBiH (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar i Bihać) postala i sjedišta raspodjele humanitarne pomoći, s prvenstvenim motivom da vojne postrojbe ARBiH mogu što više utjecati na raspodjelu humanitarne pomoći, kako bi za sebe zadržale potrebni dio.

U drugoj polovici 1993. g. neutemeljeni stereotipi koji su se vezivali za djelomične oružane muslimansko/bošnjačko-hrvatske sukobe, najvjerojatnije su činili veliku štetu i na humanitarnom području u RBiH i RH, pa su stoga *Hrvatski Caritas, Mešihat Islamske*

⁶³⁷ Isto, str. 229; (3D02633).

⁶³⁸ Isto, str. 249-288; (3D02633).

⁶³⁹ Rogić, I., n. dj. str. 56.

⁶⁴⁰ Praljak, S., *Pomoć...*, str. 233-234; (3D02633).

zajednice Hrvatske i Slovenije te Merhamet, sredinom rujna 1993. g. u Zagrebu, objavili zajednički Proglas u kojem između ostalog navode: «...željeli bismo javno izjaviti da Hrvatski Caritas, Merhamet i Mešihat surađuju na mnogo raznih načina usprkos svima onima koji stalno nastoje poreći postojanje ove suradnje.

Od početka rata, Merhamet, Mešihat i Hrvatski Caritas zajedno ulažu zajedničke napore u olakšavanju patnji nebrojenim žrtvama, obavljajući uspješno svoje dužnosti.

Ako su već svjetski politički interesi sukobljeni i zlonamjerni, mi čvrsto stojimo iza obveza olakšavanja ovog tragičnog stradanja nevinih pojedinaca bili oni pravoslavci, muslimani ili katolici.

Ovaj je proglas upućen onima čije su namjere slomiti dobru volju među ljudima različitog porijekla ... Stoga, bismo na kraju, željeli ponoviti našu duboku zabrinutost nad takvim akcijama, koje samo otežavaju ovaj holokaust koji uključuje nevine. Još jednom pozivamo sve one kojih se to tiče da ponovno razmotre štetne posljedice takovih akcija.»⁶⁴¹

⁶⁴¹ Isto, str. 236; (3D02633), (3D02047).

III.-7

EKSTERITORIJALNO ŠKOLSTVO REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ 1992.-1994. GODINE

Djelovanje eksteritorijalnog školstva Bosne i Hercegovine na teritoriju RH 1992.-1994. g. također je neistražena tema, a dodatni problem je i u tome što je u Hrvatskoj, za tu temu za sada, dostupan veoma mali broj dokumenata.⁶⁴² Stoga, za sada, nije moguća cjelovitija rekonstrukcija ustroja i djelovanja eksteritorijalnog R BiH školstva, koje je nedvojbeno razgranato djelovalo u RH 1992.-1994. g., nego samo naznake koje omogućavaju raspoloživi dokumenti.

Svakako je važno naglasiti, da i prije srbijanske oružane agresije na Hrvatsku, kapaciteti osnovnih i srednjih škola u RH nisu bili dostatni te su mnogi razredi u hrvatskim školama imali prevelik broj učenika, a škole koje ni na taj način nisu mogle riješiti problem uvodile su dodatnu smjenu nastave. Pojavom većih prognaničkih valova 1991. g., školski obrazovni sustav na neokupiranim dijelovima RH sve više je ulazio u izvanrednu situaciju. Tijekom 1992. g., golemim povećanjem broja izbjeglica iz R BiH, među kojima je bio veliki broj djece školske dobi, situacija u školskom sustavu RH postajala je još dramatičnija.

Već krajem travnja 1992. g., *Vlada RH* izdaje *Obvezatni naputak* «o uključivanju prognane i izbjegle djece predškolske dobi, osnovnih i srednjih škola iz Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u odgovarajuće obrazovne programe u Republici Hrvatskoj ... kako bi se za prognanu i izbjeglu djecu što prije organizirao svakodnevni život i nastava.» Zbog toga je

⁶⁴² Autor ove ekspertize je 11. srpnja 2007. g. (preko *Uprave za međunarodnu suradnju, međunarodnu pravnu pomoć i suradnju s međunarodnim kaznenim sudovima* Vlade RH) zatražio od *Ministarstva znanosti obrazovanja i športa* uvid u pismohranu za temu eksteritorijalnog školstva u RH (1992.-1995. g.), radi izrade znanstvenog članka o toj temi. Nakon više od 14 mjeseci (17. rujna 2008. g.) stigao je kontradiktoran odgovor, da *Ministarstvo* «nije bilo u mogućnosti udovoljiti Vašem zahtjevu zbog preseljenja na drugu lokaciju, a iz Vašeg zahtjeva vidljivo je da *Ministarstvo*... ne posjeduje traženu dokumentaciju.» Drugi dio obrazloženja je netočan, jer iz zahtjeva uopće nije vidljivo da *Ministarstvo* ne posjeduje dokumentaciju, a iz pojedinih dokumenata korištenih i u ovoj ekspertizi je očigledno da je *Ministarstvo* (bilo) u posjedu određene količine tražene dokumentacije.

Vlada RH odlučila izraditi «preliminarni troškovnik zbrinjavanja preko 70.000 djece» (vjerojatno procjenjujući da je toliko djece-izbjeglica tada pristiglo u RH iz BiH).⁶⁴³

U narednom razdoblju, u *Fondu osnovnog školstva Ministarstva prosvjete, kulture i športa RH*, «na ime troškova prognanih i izbjeglih učenika osnovnih škola zaprimljeni su zahtjevi (računi)» za razdoblje prve polovice 1992. g., koji su ukupno iznosili 97.745.135 tadašnjih hrvatskih dinara.⁶⁴⁴

Školska djeca-izbjeglice iz RBiH uključivali su se u obrazovni sustav RH na dva osnovna načina: prvi, uključivanje u postojeći školski sustav RH, te drugi, uključivanje u posebno organizirane (eksteritorijalne) škole Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na području Republike Hrvatske. U oba slučaja, uključivanje je bilo dragovoljno, prema izboru učenika, odnosno njihovih roditelja.

Prema *Izvešću* nadležnog ministarstva RH iz siječnja 1994. g., koje je nastalo prema zahtjevu *Ambasade BiH* u Zagrebu, djeca-izbjeglice iz RBiH uključivali su se «(dobrovoljno i na osobni zahtjev) u školski sustav Republike Hrvatske, u okvirima postojećih prostornih i kadrovskih kapaciteta škola, gdje se obrazuju po nastavnim programima Republike Hrvatske koja za njih plaća sve troškove obrazovanja (plaće nastavnika i ostale materijalne troškove kao i za učenike iz Hrvatske). Na ovakav način u 1993/94 školskoj godini obrazuju se u školama Republike Hrvatske 32.006 učenika izbjeglica iz Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, od čega 25.012 u osnovnim školama i 6.994 u srednjim školama. U predškolske ustanove uključeno je 2.800 djece iz Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (Podaci su dinamični i neprekidno s mijenjaju).»⁶⁴⁵

Ovo *Izvešće* se, odgovarajući na zahtjev *Ambasade BiH*, ogradio od raspolaganja podacima o eksteritorijalnom školstvu RBiH na teritoriju RH, s tvrdnjom: «Dio učenika se uključuje u posebno organizirane škole Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na području Republike Hrvatske, o čemu ovo Ministarstvo nema sustavnih podataka zbog spontaniteta u organiziranju tih škola. Podatke o tim školama i učenicima ima Ambasada Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i, vjerojatno, angažirane humanitarne organizacije.»

Ministarstvo, najvjerojatnije, nije imalo sustavnih i cjelovitih podataka o eksteritorijalnom školstvu, ali je o njemu nedvojbeno imalo niz službenih i drugačijih saznanja, jer je i samo pružalo podršku eksteritorijalnom školstvu BiH na području RH.

⁶⁴³ Praljak, S, *Pomoć...*, str. 400; (3D02633), (3D00317).

⁶⁴⁴ Isto, str. 404; (3D02633).

⁶⁴⁵ Isto, str. 408; (3D02633), (3D00316).

Naime, primjerice, u veljači 1993. g., *Ministarstvu kulture i prosvjete RH* je službeno dostavljen «na uvid nastavni program po kome rade samoorganizovane osnovne škole za izbjeglice iz R BiH. U toku je izrada nove verzije koja će biti prilagođena školama koje tek trebaju startati sa radom. Kada dobijemo spomenutu verziju uputićemo je na uvid Vašem ministarstvu», te se *Ministarstvu* upućuje zahvala «na podršci koju ste nam pružili.»⁶⁴⁶

Iz tada (veljača 1993. g.) dostavljenog nastavnog programa za «Eksteritorijalne osnovne škole R BiH» u Republici Hrvatskoj, saznaje se da se radi o «reduciranom nastavnom programu», te da je sadržajno oblikovan prema potrebama (i od strane) institucija države rBiH. Primjerice, temeljni predmet, materinjeg jezika nosi naziv *bosanski jezik*, a u predmetu *historija* većina sadržaja odnosi se na povijest prostora R BiH.

Na temelju za sada dostupnih, uvelike nepotpunih, dokumenata može se utvrditi da su na različitim dijelovima teritorija RH, u razdoblju 1992.-1994. g., djelovale najmanje 33 eksteritorijalne škole države R BiH.⁶⁴⁷

Pojedini dostupni dokumenti (uglavnom dopisi pojedinih škola upućeni nadležnom ministarstvu RH) pokazuju da je problem školovanja djece-izbjeglica iz R BiH (kao i prognanika i drugih učenika u RH), u ratnim okolnostima u RH, praktično bio dosta neujednačen, dramatičan i često ovisan o nizu lokalnih okolnosti i poduzetnosti školskog osoblja. Ovu i cjelokupnu ratnu situaciju u RH vjerodostojno ilustrira *Informacija o školi za prognanike*, koju je, u veljači 1993. g., «prva škola za prognanike» uputila vladinom (RH) *Uredu za prognanike i izbjeglice*.

U *Informaciji* se, između ostalog navodi: «U Velom Lošinj u od 1. 09. 1991. godine djeluje Osnovna škola "Vladimir Nazor" iz Topuskog – škola za prognanu djecu. ... Prošle školske godine školu je pohađalo čak 1200 učenika. Pored učenika iz Topuskog u školi su se nalazili i učenici iz Vukovara i okolice, Petrinje, zaleđa Zadra, Dubrovnika i okolice ... (i) izbjeglice iz Bosne i Hercegovine. Danas škola broji 250 učenika, od čega su 52 iz Bosne i Hercegovine ... Naša škola osnovana je i ovdje locirana Odlukom Kriznog štaba Ministarstva prosvjete ... i prva smo samostalna prognanička škola u Hrvatskoj. Učitelji koji rade u ovoj školi također su prognanici ... Još u ljeto 1991 godine, kada je Topusko napadnuto, uz pomoć Hrvatske vojske i policije uspjeli smo spasiti školsku pedagošku dokumentaciju ... i najnužnija pomagala i sve to smo prenijeli na Lošinj ... Pored redovne nastave škola je preuzela brigu o učenicima i u njihovo slobodno vrijeme ... Mi nismo samo učitelji, mi smo

⁶⁴⁶ Isto, str. 423; (3D02633).

⁶⁴⁷ Isto, str. 399; (3D02633).

odgajatelji, liječnici, medicinske sestre, psiholozi, majke, očevi ovoj nesretnoj djeci. Uvjeti u kojima živimo zaista su teški. Mi nismo bili smješteni u hotelima, nego smo od prvog dana progonstva u dječjim odmaralištima, gdje često u jednoj sobi stanuju po dvije obitelji bez najosnovnijih uvjeta za normalan život ...».⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁸ Isto, str. 419-421; (3D02633).

III.-8

SURADNJA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE I REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE NA PODRUČJU ŠPORTA I KULTURE

III.-8.1 Šport

Rat, nesigurnost i neimaština koji su prevladavali na svim područjima RBiH potpuno su onemogućavali pripremanje i natjecanje svih, a naročito vrhunskih športaša, te je i u tom vidu društvenog života u RBiH došlo do golemih poremećaja. Niz športskih natjecanja i liga u RBiH prestali su se održavati, veliki broj športaša prestao se baviti športom, a dio je otišao u Hrvatsku ili preko Hrvatske u treće zemlje.

Državne institucije, športski klubovi i pojedinci u RH su i prema športašima i klubovima iz RBiH pokazali izuzetno veliki stupanj solidarnosti, kao i prema drugim izbjeglicama iz RBiH, pružajući im pomoć u smještaju, športskom pripremanju i sudjelovanju u različitim natjecanjima.

U tom pogledu posebno se ističe pomoć desetorici reprezentativaca (u šest različitih športova) države BiH, 1992. g., koji su se o trošku državnog proračuna RH pripremali u Hrvatskoj za *Olimpijske igre* u Barceloni, na kojima su sudjelovali i bitno pridonijeli svekolikoj javnoj afirmaciji novonastale države RBiH. Uz to, hrvatski dužnosnici i športaši, koji su lobirali da se Hrvatskoj, kao novonastaloj državi, uopće omogući sudjelovanje na Olimpijskim igrama u Barceloni, isto su činili i za državu RBiH.⁶⁴⁹

Slično se ponovilo i glede pripremanja i sudjelovanja športaša države RBiH na *Mediterranskim športskim igrama*, koje su održane u ljeto 1993. g. u Francuskoj, te je na njima RBiH predstavljena kao mediteranska zemlja, s najmanjim teritorijalnim dodirima sa sredozemnim morima.

Mnogobrojni veoma mladi i tada javno potpuno nepoznati športaši koji su stigli u Hrvatsku kao izbjeglice, u hrvatskim klubovima su nastavili svoje športske karijere, a neki od njih su godinama kasnije postali vrhunski, svjetski poznati športaši; primjerice tenisač Ivan Ljubičić, te košarkaš Damir Omerhodžić-Markota.

⁶⁴⁹ Isto, str. 548; (3D02633).

III.-8.2 Kultura

Na početku i tijekom srbijanske oružane agresije na RBiH, a naročito za dugog trajanja okrutne srbijanske opsade Sarajeva, mnogobrojni bosanskohercegovački kulturni djelatnici, književnici, glumci, režiseri, likovni umjetnici, arhitekti, filmski djelatnici, estradni umjetnici i drugi, privremeno ili trajno su se sklanjali i u Republiku Hrvatsku, u kojoj im je od strane državnih i društvenih institucija pružana svakovrsna pomoć, kako bi mogli i dalje djelovati profesionalno i stvaralački. Pritom u Hrvatskoj nije pravijena nikakva razlika među njima obzirom na njihov svjetonazor i politička uvjerenja, te vjersku, etničku i drugačiju pripadnost.

Tako su u Hrvatsku stigli, i u njoj nastavili djelovati istaknuti bosanskohercegovački književnici Mile Pešorda, Miljenko Jergović, Dževad Karahasan i Darko Lukić. Glumci: Hasija Borić, Jasna Beri, Daria Lorenci, Tarik Filipović, Sandra Bagarić. Glumac i redatelj Zijah Sokolović, filmski redatelj Antonio Nuić, filmski producent Boris T. Matić, slikari Mersad Berber i Ljubo Perčinlić, arhitekti Sejo i Lejla Kurtić, estradni umjetnici Kemal Monteno, Senad od Bosne, Indexi, Edo Maajka, te mnogi drugi.⁶⁵⁰

Tadašnji *Ministar kulture* u *Vladi RH*, Zlatko Vitez, primao je izbjegle kulturne djelatnika i umjetnike te im i osobno pomagao na različite načine.

U znak solidarnosti s građanima opkoljenog Sarajeva, hrvatski redatelj (Tomislav Durbešić, uz potporu *Ministarstva kulture RH*, režirao je 1994./95. kazališnu predstavu *Trojanskog konja neće biti* koja se istovremeno (u isti dan i isti sat) održavala u Sarajevu i Zagrebu. Na predstavu u Sarajevu se odazvalo i izaslanstvo *Ministarstva kulture RH* na čelu s ministrom (Z. Vitez). Međutim, «zbog žestokog granatiranja Sarajeva, let UNPROFOR-ovim zrakoplovom je bio otkazan i delegacija nije stigla na premijeru.»⁶⁵¹

⁶⁵⁰ Isto, str. 522; (3D02633).

⁶⁵¹ Isto, str. 522; (3D02633).

KRATICE

APZB	Autonomna Pokrajina Zapadna Bosna
A(R)BiH	Armija (Republike Bosne i Hercegovine
b.	bilješka
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BD	borbeno djelovanje
BIF	Benevolence International Foundation
BiH	Bosna i Hercegovina
Br. (br.)	broj
c.	cesta
čl.	Članak
dr.	drugi
EU	Europska unija
EZ	Europska zajednica
FBiH	Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut
G. (g.)	godina
GIA	Group Islamique Armé
G-7	Grupa 7 najrazvijenijih zemalja svijeta
HDZ	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica
HDZBiH	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine
HIC	Hrvatski informativni centar
HINA	Hrvatska izvještajno novinska agencija
HKU	Hrvatska katolička udruga
HNZ	Hrvatska narodna zajednica
HOS	Hrvatske obrambene snage
HRHB	Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna
HRM	Hrvatska ratna mornarica
HRZ	Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo
HRZ PZO	Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzračna obrana
HSLŠ	Hrvatski socijalno liberalni savez
HSP	Hrvatska stranka prava

HV	Hrvatska vojska
HVO	Hrvatsko vijeće obrane
HZHB	Hrvatska Zajednica Herceg-Bosna
ICFY	International Commission on Former Yugoslavia
ID	Islamska deklaracija
itd.	i tako dalje
JAZU	Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti
JMO	Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija
JNA	Jugoslavenska narodna armija
JPN	Jedinice za posebne namjene
JRC	Japan Radio Company
KBC	Klinički bolnički centar
KESS	Konferencija europske sigurnosti i suradnje
KI	Komunistička Internacionala
KOS	Kontraobavještajna služba
KPJ	Komunistička partija Jugoslavije
KS	Kontaktna skupina
KŠ	Krizni štab
MKBJ	Međunarodna konferencija o bivšoj Jugoslaviji
MKSJ	Međunarodni kazneni sud za prostor bivše Jugoslavije
MORH	Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske
MTS	Materijalno tehnička sredstva
MUP	Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Sjevernoatlantski savez)
NDH	Nezavisna Država Hrvatska
n. dj.	navedeno djelo
NFJ	Narodni front Jugoslavije
NG	Narodna Garda
NOR	Narodnooslobodilački rat
Npr. (npr.)	naprimjer
Nr. (nr.)	Number
N/r (n/r)	na ruke
NŠ VK	Načelnik štaba Vojne komande
OESS	Organizacija europske sigurnosti i suradnje

ONO i DSZ	općenarodna obrana i društvena samozaštita
ONOR	Opće narodnooslobodilački rat
op. a.	opaska autora
OS	Oružane snage
OS (R)BiH	Oružane snage (Republike) Bosne i Hercegovine
OS SAOK	Oružane snage Srpske Autonomne Oblasti Krajine
OZ	Operativna zona
PL	Patriotska liga
PZO	Protuzračna obrana
RBiH	Republika Bosna i Hercegovina
RH	Republika Hrvatska
RS	Republika Srpska
RV PVO	Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivzračna odbrana
RZ PVO	Ratno zrakolovstvo i protuzračna obrana
SAD	Sjedninjene Američke Države
SANU	Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti
SAO	Srpska autonomna oblast
SAOK	Srpaska Autonomna Oblast Krajina
SDA	Stranka demokratske akcije
SDS	Srpska demokratska stranka
SDS (SDB)	Služba državne sigurnosti (bezbednosti)
SDSBiH	Srpska demokratska stranka Bosne i Hercegovine
SFRJ	Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija
SHS	Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca
SIV	Savezno izvršno vijeće
SKJ	Savez komunista Jugoslavije
SPC	Srpska pravoslavna crkva
SPO	Srpski pokret obnove
SR	Socijalistička republika
SR BiH	Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina
SRJ	Savezna Republika Jugoslavija
SRPJ(k)	Socijalistička radnička partija Jugoslavije (komunista)
SRV SJ	Savez rezervnih vojnih starešina Jugoslavije
SS	Schutzstaffel (Zaštitni odredi)

SSNO	Savezni sekretarijat narodne obrane
SSRNJ	Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije
SUBNOR	Savez udruženja boraca narodnooslobodilačkog rata
st.	stoljeće
Str. (str.)	stranica
Str. Pov. (str. pov.)	strogo povjerljivo
SZUP	Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka
ŠVK	Štab vrhovne komande
TBC	tuberkuloza
tj.	to jest
TMS	Tehničko-materijalna sredstva
TO	Teritorijalna obrana
TO (R)BiH	Teritorijalna obrana (Republike) Bosne i Hercegovine
TO RH	Teritorijalna obrana Republike Hrvatske
TO SAOK	Teritorijalna obrana Srpske Autonomne Oblasti Krajine
TV	Televizija
TWRA	Third World Relief Agency
tzv.	takozvani
UDB-a (Udba)	Uprava državne bezbednosti
Ul. (ul.)	ulica
UN	United Nations (Ujedinjene nacije)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Visoko povjerenstvo Ujedinjenih nacija za izbjeglice)
UNPA	United Nations Protected Areas (Zaštićene zone Ujedinjenih nacija)
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Forces (Zaštitne postrojbe Ujedinjenih nacija)
ur.	urednik
v.	vidi
VKBMI	Vijeće kongresa bosansko-muslimanskih intelektualaca
Vol. (vol.)	Volumen
VRS	Vojska Republike Srpske
VS UN	Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih nacija
ZP	Zborno područje

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ANNEX B

CURRICULUM VITAE OF **DR. JOSIP JURČEVIĆ**

Josip JURCEVIC, PhD

CURRICULUM VITAE

- Personal details

- Date of birth: 19 April 1951
- Place of birth: Studenci (near Imotski), Croatia
- Number of children: seven
- Address:
Remetinečka 119, Zagreb 098 480067

Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences
Marulićev Trg 19/1
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- Education

- 4 June 2001 – appointed as Research Fellow
- Doctoral thesis: 2000, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb
PhD in Humanities, the field of History
(Dissertation: *The Repressiveness of the Yugoslav System in 1945 in Croatia*)
- Master's thesis: 1996, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb
MA in Humanities, in the field of History
(Master's thesis: *Some Issues in Research on the Victims of World War II in the Territory of Croatia*)
- Degree: 1975, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb
History and Philosophy
- Secondary school: 1970, *Ljudevit Gaj* Secondary School, Zagreb
- Primary school: 1966, *Braća Horvat OŠ* /Primary School/, Zagreb

- Specialisation:

- 1970 – 1975 At the same time studied, and completed, four semesters at the Faculty of Economics, the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb and two semesters of Lay Theology at the Faculty of Theology in Zagreb.

- 1975 – 1980 Completed six semesters of Computer Science at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb; graduated from the four-semester study of Marxism and TIPSS /Theory and Practice of Self-Managing Socialism/.
- 1977 – 1978 Enrolled in the post-graduate programme in History at the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb, passed all the exams in first year and then abandoned the studies as it was impossible to conduct free research. Resumed post-graduate studies in 1993.

- Foreign languages

- English (active knowledge)
- German, Italian (passive knowledge)

- Employment

- 1997 - *Ivo Pilar* Institute of Social Sciences, Zagreb.
- 1994 – 1997 Parliament of the Republic of Croatia, Independent Adviser in the Commission for Establishing War and Post-War Victims.
- 1991 – 1992 Ministry of Defence /MO/ of the RH /Republic of Croatia/, founder and Director of the MORH Central Archives.
- 1975 – 1991 No steady employment. Briefly worked on short-term contracts, as a free-lancer, in a number of primary schools, secondary schools, museums and tourist organisations and then for ten or so years engaged in applied arts and various crafts to earn a livelihood.

- Membership

- Croatian Circle 144
- Documentation and Information Centre
- Croatian Homeland War Volunteers Association
- Croatian Homeland War Defenders - Volunteers Association
- Homeland War Civilian Defenders Association
- Croatian Dragon Brethren Society
- *Matica Hrvatska* /Croatian Central Cultural Association/
- Croatian Society for the Investigation of War and Post-War Crimes
- Wounded Croatia

- Alpine Department of the Velebit Mountaineering Club
- *Mladost* Croatian Academic Sport Society

Josip JURČEVIĆ, PhD**RESEARCH WORK AND TEACHING****- Participation in research projects****a) Project leader**

- 2001 - Croatian Homeland War
(RH Ministry of Science and Technology)
- 2001 - Integration Processes between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Emigrants
(RH Ministry of Science and Technology)
- 2005 The Strategy of Supporting and Promoting the Development of Civil Society in the Republic of Croatia
(RH Government Office for Associations)
- 2003 The Possibility of Existence of Unexploded Ordnance on the Route of a Future Istria Highway
(*Bina Istra*)
- 1994 – 1996 Independent Istrian Television
(Independent Istrian Television)
- 1992 – 1994 An Analysis of the Writings of the Serbian Press
(RH Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – one of the project leaders
- 1990 - Yugoslav Crimes Committed After World War II
(Croatian Society for the Investigation of War and Post-War Crimes).

b) Researcher

- 1997 - 2002 Croats in Neighbouring Countries
- a topic as part of the Social Structure and Social Integration scientific research programme of the *Ivo Pilar* Institute of Social Sciences
(RH Ministry of Science and Technology)
- 1999 Organising the Gathering of Data and Expert Services
(Public Relations and Information Administration of the RH Ministry of Defence)
- 1996 – 1997 Socio-Economic, Demographic and Motivational Aspects of the Status of the Croatian Emigrants who Returned after 1990 and the Croatian Emigrants Who Returned to the RH in the

Same Period But Left Again for the Countries to Which They
Had Emigrated
(RH Ministry of Immigration and Repatriation)

- 1996 – 1997 Return of Refugees to the Croatian East
(RH Ministry of Science and Technology)
- 1995 – 1998 Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross – Victims for the Croatian
Future
(RH Parliament)
- 1995 – 1997 Anthropological Research of the Graves of War and Post-War
Victims
(RH Commission for Establishing War and Post-War Victims)
- 1993 – 1996 War Against Croatia: Participants, War Crimes, War Refugees
and Victims
(RH Ministry of Science and Technology)

- Papers presented at international conferences and workshops

- 2006 Social Cohesion – Promoting or Obstructing Development (OSCE and
Osijek Associations Forum), Zagreb.
- 2005 Europe in Croatia – A Challenge to the European Union (Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung and the Society for the Culture of Democracy),
Zagreb.
- 2005 The Bleiburg Tragedy or the Croatian Way of the Cross (Croatian
Parliament), Zagreb/Vienna.
- 2005 Liberation Operation Storm (Karlovac County), Karlovac.
- 2004 *Quo vadis, Croatia?* Identity, Modernisation, European Horizons (*Annales
Pilar*), Zagreb.
- 2004 Sustainable Return to Republika Srpska (Association of Croats Expelled
from BH), Banja Luka.
- 2004 *Krunoslav Draganović* (Vrhbosna Catholic Theology), Sarajevo.
- 2003 Vukovar '91 – Twelve Years Later (*Pilar* Institut), Zagreb.
- 2003 The Prospects of Croatian Emigrants (Croatian World Congress in
Germany), Obertshausen.
- 2003 Modern World and Terrorism (Meshihat of the Islamic Community in
Croatia, the Ibn Sin Institute in Sarajevo, the Islamic Centre in Zagreb),
Zagreb.

- 2002 /in English: Immigrants and Homeland/ (Metropolis and the Centre for Strategic Studies), Dubrovnik.
- 2002 Stigmatisation and the Identity of Marginal Groups in the Culture Globalisation Process (Faculty of Law at the University of Rijeka), Rijeka.
- 2002 Vukovar '91 – Eleven Years Later (*Pilar* Institute), Vukovar.
- 2001 Culture and Conflict (RH Ministry of Culture), Dubrovnik.
- 2001 Vukovar '91 – Ten Years Later (*Pilar* Institute), Zagreb.
- 2001 Journalism and War (World Association of Journalism Students), Dubrovnik.
- 2000 Second International Conference on Jasenovac, Banja Luka.
- 1999 European Integration for the 21st Century (International Centre of the Croatian Universities), Dubrovnik.
- 1997 Croatia in the Year 2000. The Croatian Diaspora Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (*Pilar* Institute and the Centre for Strategic Studies), Zagreb.
- 1995 South-East Europe 1918-1995, Zadar.
- 1995 Bleiburg 1945 – 1995 (RH Parliament), Zagreb.

- Papers presented at domestic conferences and workshops

- 2006 Plitvice 1990 Police Operation (First Policeman Association), Knin.
- 2006 For A Filanthropic Croatia (Centre for a Better World), Zagreb.
- 2006 The Way of the Cross (Schools from Grubišno Polje), Grubišno Polje.
- 2006 Croatian Homeland War in History Curricula (RH Institute for Education, Osijek Office), Orahovica.
- 2005 Secret Societies in Croatia throughout History (Croatian Studies), Zagreb.
- 2005 Croatia and the European Union (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Society for the Culture of Democracy), Metković.
- 2005 Vukovar '91 – Fourteen Years Later, Zagreb.

- 2005 The Hundredth Anniversary of the Primary School in Trviž (The Peasants' Unity Croatian Catholic Youth Society – Trviž 1911), Trviž.
- 2005 Global and Local Challenges to the Identity and Development of Croatia (*Annales Pilar*), Zagreb.
- 2005 Croatian Homeland War in History Curricula (RH Institute for Education, Osijek Office), Vukovar.
- 2005 Father Ferdo Vlašić's Day (Provincialate of the Herzegovina Franciscans, the Franciscan Monastery of Tomislavgrad, Tomislavgrad Municipal Assembly and Our Homes), Tomislavgrad.
- 2005 John Paul II – Mission and Work (*Ivo Pilar* Institute of Social Sciences, Croatian Institute of History, Catholic Faculty of Theology, Centre for the Promotion of the Social Teaching of the Church and the *Glas Koncila* newspaper), Zagreb.
- 2005 Croatia in World War II (HAZU /Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts/), Zagreb.
- 2004 Vukovar '91 – Thirteen Years Later (*Pilar* Institute), Vukovar.
- 2004 Enlivening History Curricula Using Important Anniversaries (Group of History Teachers of the Bjelovar – Bilogora County), Bjelovar.
- 2002 Croatia on the Way to European Integration (Centre for the Promotion of the Social Teaching of the Church), Zagreb.
- 2002 Croatian Historiography of the 20th Century: between Scientific Paradigms and Political Requests (*Annales Pilar*), Zagreb.
- 2001 The Croatian Spring of 1971 (Croatian History Society, *Školska Knjiga*, Croatian Institute of History, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb, and *Pilar* Institute), Zagreb.
- 2001 Establishing a Croatian Entity in BH – Reality or Fiction? (HBH2000 Forum), Zagreb.
- 2000 Management Elites and Modernisation (*Annales Pilar*), Zagreb.
- 2000 Vukovar '91 – Nine Years Later (*Pilar* Institute), Zagreb.
- 1999 Croatia in the Work of Ivo Pilar (*Pilar* Institute), Zagreb.
- 1999 Vukovar '91 – Eight Years Later (*Pilar* Institute), Zagreb and Vukovar.

- 1998 First Croatian Congress of Victimology (Croatian Society for Victimology), Zagreb.
- 1998 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (National Committee for Marking the 50th Anniversary of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights), Zagreb.
- 1998 Vukovar 1991 – Seven Years Later (*Pilar* Institute and the Union of Associations Originating from Homeland War), Zagreb.

- Courses taught

- 1999 – History of the Establishment of the Croatian State; Journalism Studies, /Centre for/ Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb.
- 1997 – General History of the 20th Century; History Studies, /Centre for/ Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb.
- 2001 – 2003 General History of the 20th Century; Pedagogical Faculty, Osijek.
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2. J. Jurčević, /in English: The Black Book of Communism in Croatia/, Zagreb, 2006.
3. J. Jurčević, /in German: The Black Book of Communism in Croatia/, Zagreb, 2006.
4. J. Jurčević, Bleiburg – Post-War Yugoslav Crimes against Croats, Zagreb, 2005.
5. J. Jurčević, The Origins of the Jasenovac Myth, Zagreb, 1998; second unrevised edition, 2005.

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1. J. Jurčević, V. Lay and V. Mihaljević, A Strategy of Support and Promotion of the Development of Civil Society in the Republic of Croatia (proposal), Zagreb, 2006.
2. S. Praljak, How They Tore Down the Old Bridge, Zagreb, 2006; author of Preface.
3. N. Piskač, "Heavenly Serbia" in Croatia, Zaprešić, 2005; author of Preface.
4. Brother Ferdo Vlašić – A Visionary and Sufferer, A Memorial, Tomislavgrad, 2005; author of chapter: The Repressiveness of the Yugoslav Communist System.
5. Politics – A Possible Challenge (edited by J. Jelenić), Zagreb, 2003; author of chapter: Relationship between History and Politics.
6. Studenci – My Native Village (group of authors), Studenci, 2003; author of two parts: Victims of World War II, and Homeland War; co-author of part: History of Studenci.
7. J. Jurčević, B. Esih and B. Vukušić, The Keepers of the Bleiburg Memory, Zagreb, 2003; author of part: The Bleiburg Tragedy.
8. P. Janjić, Bloodthirsty and Hungry for Revenge, Vukovar, 2004; author of prologue: Vukovar Is Still Under Siege.
9. J. Jurčević, B. Esih and B. Vukušić, The Keepers of the Bleiburg Memory, Zagreb, 2005, second, revised edition; author of part: The Bleiburg Tragedy.

10. The Social Future of Croatia (edited by S. Baloban), Zagreb, 2002; author of chapter: National Identity and European Integration.
11. B. Vukušić, UDBA's /State Security Administration/ Secret War against Croatian Emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zagreb, 2002; author of Preface.
12. Ten Years of Hope and Pain: 1991 – 2001 (group of authors, edited by V. Horvat), Zagreb; author of chapter: Croatian Homeland War.
13. J. Jurčević, B. Vukušić, V. Šakić, Bruno Bušić – Defender of Croatian Identity, Zagreb, 2001; author of part: The Significance of Bruno Bušić in Modern Croatian History.
14. B. Vukušić, UDBA's Secret War against Croatian Emigrants, Zagreb 2001; author of Preface.
15. On the Roads of Hell to the 21st Century (through the Serbian Concentration Camps of 1991...), book of documents, Zagreb, 2000; author of chapter: History of Camps.
16. The Vukovar-Srijem County (group of authors, edited by Z. Buljan), Vinkovci, 2000; author of chapter Victims and Suffering in the Homeland War.
17. Through Tears to the Truth, Zagreb (group of authors, edited by V. Horvat), 1999; author of chapter: Serbian Armed Aggression against Croatia, 1990 – 1995.
18. B. Čilić and M. Zlomislić, Croatia on the Cross – the Cross in Croatia; author of Prologue.
19. The Croatian Lexicon, Zagreb, 1996; author of majority of articles on the Homeland War and the article Fights and Battles.
20. Nuštar, Zagreb, 1996; author of chapter: The Homeland War of 1991/92.
21. Vukovar, a Centuries Old Croatian Town on the Danube (group of authors, edited by I. Karaman), Koprivnica, 1994; author of chapter: Socio-Political Relations in 1990/1991, and War Aggression and Heroic Defence in the Summer-Autumn of 1991; co-author of chapter: The Vukovar Reality of 1992-1993.
22. Vukovar, photo-monograph (edited by V. Horvat), Zagreb, 1993; author of chapter: War Chronology of 1991/1992.
23. Jazovka (group of authors), Zagreb, 1990.

Text Books:

1. J. Jurčević and M. Raić, History VIII, text-book for 8th year of primary school, Zagreb (Alfa), 2004.
2. J. Jurčević and M. Raić, A History Workbook, for 8th year of primary school, Zagreb (Alfa), 2004.
3. J. Jurčević and M. Raić, Teacher's Handbook, for History classes in 8th year of primary school, Zagreb (Alfa), 2004.

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1. J. Jurčević and K. Ivanda, Establishing Yugoslav Communist Military Courts During and After World War II (forthcoming), Social Research, Zagreb, 2006.
2. The Activity of the Yugoslav Communist Military Courts in Croatia at the End of and After World War II (reviewed, forthcoming), Social Research, Zagreb, 2006.
3. J. Jurčević, Historical-Political Aspects of the Activity of the Hague Tribunal, in collected papers: The Hague Tribunal – Joint Criminal Enterprise – What Is It? Zagreb, 2006.
4. J. Jurčević, Contribution of Emigrants to the Establishment of the Croatian State, in: Croatian Emigrant Almanac 2006, Zagreb, 2006.
5. J. Jurčević, Prejudices and Facts about the Bleiburg Tragedy, *Kršni zavičaj*, No. 38, Humac, 2005.
6. J. Jurčević, International Law and European Security, in bilingual Croatian-English collection of papers: Vukovar '91 – International Echoes and Significance, Zagreb, 2004.
7. J. Jurčević, K. Ivanda, The Geneva Conventions and the Experiences of Camp Detainees, in bilingual Croatian-English collection of papers: Vukovar '91 – International Echoes and Significance, Zagreb, 2004.
8. J. Jurčević, The Possibility of the Existence of Unexploded Ordnance on the Route of a Future Istrian Highway, Zagreb, 2003.
9. J. Jurčević, The Revolutionary Practice of Yugoslav Communists between the Wars and from 1941 – 1943; in collected papers: *Pro Historia Croatica* No. 1, Zagreb, 2002.
10. J. Jurčević, Ruling Elites in Modern Croatian History; in collected papers: Ruling Elites and Modernisation, Zagreb, 2001.
11. J. Jurčević, /in English: European Integration and Croatian Independence; Proceedings, European Integration for the 21st Century/, Zagreb, 2001.

12. J. Jurčević, The Historical Significance of Vukovar 1991, in collected papers: Vukovar '91 – Significance, Values, Identity, Zagreb, 2000.
13. J. Jurčević, The Origins of the Jasenovac Myth, in: Croatian Emigrant Collection of Papers 2000, Zagreb, 2000.
14. J. Jurčević, Historical and Sociological Evaluation of Developments After the Occupation of the Town of Vukovar, Expert Analysis Report (Findings and Opinion) Following a Request of the Vukovar County Court, Zagreb, 2000.
15. J. Jurčević, From the Jasenovac Myth to the Armed Aggression, in collected papers: The Croatian /?Victimology/, Zagreb, 1998.
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19. J. Jurčević, I. Pletikos, V. Klepac, The Project of Independent Istrian Television – Programmes, Premises, Staff and Finances (the Project won the competition for franchise), Zagreb, 1994.
20. J. Jurčević, Vukovar Resistance to the Serbian Wartime Aggression against Croatia in 1991, Social Research, No. 4 – 5, 1993.
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22. J. Jurčević, Anti-Historical Structuralism of C. Levi Strauss, in: Journal of Contemporary History, No. 1 (26), Zagreb, 1978.

III EDITORIAL WORK

a) Editor:

1. J. Jurčević, V. Lay, and V. Mihaljević, The Strategy of Supporting and Promoting the Development of Civil Society in the Republic of Croatia (proposal), Zagreb, 2006.

2. R. Radoš, *Croatian Emigrants and the Integration of the Republic of Croatia into the EU*, Zagreb, 2005.
3. *Vukovar '91 – International Echoes and Significance* (collected papers), Zagreb, 2004.
4. J. Jurčević, B. Esih and B. Vukušić, *The Keepers of the Bleiburg Memory*, Zagreb, 2003, second, revised edition, 2005.
5. B. Vukušić, *UDBA's Secret War against Croatian Emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Zagreb, 2002.
6. J. Jurčević, B. Vukušić, and V. Šakić, *Bruno Bušić – A Defender of the Croatian Identity*, Zagreb, 2001.
7. B. Vukušić, *UDBA's Secret War against Croatian Emigrants*, Zagreb, 2001.
8. *Vukovar '91 – Significance, Values, Identity* (collected papers), Zagreb, 2000.

b) Member of Editorial Board:

1. *Studenci – My Native Village* (group of authors), Studenci, 2003.
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3. *The Future of Emigrant Croatia* (collected papers), Zagreb, 1998.
4. *The Croatian Lexicon*, Zagreb, 1996.
5. *Vukovar, the Centuries Old Croatian Town on the Danube* (group of authors), Koprivnica, 1994.

IV DOCUMENTARIES

1. *The Bleiburg Tragedy*, HTV /Croatian Television/, Zagreb, 2006 – research assistant.
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3. *Vukovar 1991*, HRT, Zagreb, 2005 - research assistant.
4. *In der gluhenden Lava de Hasses (Nachkriegsverbrechen)*, SPS Wien/Annenheim, 2003 - research assistant (Wissenschaftliche Beratung).

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10. The Demolished Heritage of Croatia, Zagreb (Studio ZNG), 1991 - research assistant.
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V MISCELLANEOUS

- Mentor of forty-five graduation papers at the /Centre for/ Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb.
- Member of fifty or so Expert Commissions for the Defence of Graduation Papers at the /Centre for/ Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb.
- Author of several dozens of feuilletons and scholarly newspaper articles on modern Croatian history.
- Participated in more than two hundred scientific round tables, public discussions and presentations with interdisciplinary subject from modern national and world history.
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- 04. lipnja 2001. – izabran u znanstveno zvanje znanstvenog suradnika
- Doktorat: 2000 Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu
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- Magisterij: 1996 Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu
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- Diploma: 1975 Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu
povijest i filozofija
- Matura: 1970 Gimnazija Ljudevit Gaj, Zagreb
- Osnovna škola: 1966 OŠ Braća Horvat, Zagreb

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- 1970-1975 Paralelno studirao i završio po četiri semestra na Fakultetu ekonomskih nauka, Pravnom fakultetu i Fakultetu političkih nauka u Zagrebu, te dva semestra Laičke teologije na Teološkom fakultetu u Zagrebu.
- 1975 - 1980 Završio šest semestara studija Informatike na Filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu; diplomirao četverosemestralni studij Marksizma i TIPSS-a
- 1977 - 1978 Upisao poslijediplomski studij povijesti na filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu, te položio sve ispite prve godine, a potom – zbog nemogućnosti slobodnog istraživačkog rada - prekinuo studij. Poslijediplomski studij nastavio 1993. godine.

- Strani jezici

- Engleski (aktivno znanje)
- Njemački, talijanski (pasivno znanje)

- Zaposlenja

- 1997- *Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb*
- 1994-1997 *Sabor Republike Hrvatske, samostalni savjetnik u Komisiji za utvrđivanje ratnih i poratnih žrtava*
- 1991-1992 *Ministarstvo obrane RH, osnivač i ravnatelj Središnjeg arhiva MORH-a*
- 1975-1991 Bez stalnog zaposlenja. Kratak period radio na određeno vrijeme, honorarno i sl. u nizu osnovnih škola, gimnazija, muzeja, turističkih organizacija, te desetak godina egzistenciju osiguravao baveći se primijenjenom umjetnošću i raznim vrstama kućne radinosti.

- Članstvo u udrugama

- *Hrvatski krug 144*
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- *Družba Braće Hrvatskog Zmaja*
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- Sudjelovanje u znanstvenoistraživačkim projektima

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- 2001 - *Hrvatski domovinski rat*
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- 2001 - *Integracijski procesi između Republike Hrvatske i hrvatskog iseljništva*
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- 2005 *Strategija potpore i poticanja razvitka civilnog društva u Republici Hrvatskoj*
(Ured Vlade RHG za Udruge)
- 2003 *Mogućnost postojanja zaostalih eksplozivnih sredstava i naprava na trasi buduće istarske autoceste*
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- 1994-1996 *Nezavisna istarska televizija*
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- 1992-1994 *Analiza pisanja srbijanskog tiska*
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- 1990 - *Jugoslavenski zločini počinjeni nakon završetka Drugog svjetskog rata*
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- 2005 *Globalni i lokalni izazovi identitetu i razvoju Hrvatske*, (Annales Pilar), Zagreb.
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13. *Jazovka*, Zagreb, 1990. – koautor

V OSTALO

- mentor četrdesetpet diplomskih radova na Hrvatskim studijima Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
- član pedesetak Stručnih povjerenstava za obranu diplomskih radova na Hrvatskim studijima Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
- autor više desetaka feljtona i stručnih novinskih članaka s temama iz suvremene hrvatske povijesti
- izlagač na više od dvjesto stručnih okruglih stolova, tribina i predstavljanja s interdisciplinarnim temama iz suvremene nacionalne i svjetske povijesti
- sudionik više stotina radijskih i televizijskih emisija

ANNEX C

REFERENCE MATERIAL

17-04-74

PRAJAK
DEFENCE

compact
disc
Recordable
Multi Speed

JOSIP JURČEVIĆ - EXPERT
REPORT, FOOTNOTES,
CV