

Slobodan Praljak

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**Development of political  
and military preparations  
regarding the attacks of  
ABiH on HVO in Central  
Bosnia and the Valley of the  
Neretva River in the period  
from 1992 to 1994**

**Mostar**

**ABiH offensive against  
HVO “Neretva 93”**

**Volunteers from Croatia  
(HV) in ABiH and HVO**

**And other truths**

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**Facts**

2<sup>nd</sup> edition

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Zagreb, March 2014

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free sample

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## Comment

This book, in its two mutually connected parts, provides facts of war waged between ABiH and HVO.

The first part of the book offers comments by General Praljak while its second part provides materials in support to these comments such as documents, maps, graphic tables and other.

Amount the material in this book could have been much larger, but it has been shortened due to understandable technical reasons and due to the fact that many more of these materials had already been published on [www.slobodanpraljak.com](http://www.slobodanpraljak.com)

Translations and transcriptions of original documents, contained in this book, were compiled from a variety of sources. In order to preserve the authenticity of original documents, only the most necessary linguistic adaptations were made in translations.

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ovjnih formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d teritoriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika. Težište dejstava se nalazi na Mostar i pravci: s. Crnobilje - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubrovačkom rejonima Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuški, Greda, Popovo Polje i o. Šibenik.

Artiljerjsku vatrenu podršku izvodi različiti grupisanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa. Najefikasnijem 5-10 projektila i brzim prenošenjem efekta vatre uglavnom je postignuo slučajnim preletat izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenje vatre.

Avijaciju je koristio za izviđanje ključnih težišta u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati - Nevesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska Lje, s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa izbiti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanske odbrane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u povoljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritorije.

2. Od 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru objedinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovine: 23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mbr - Trebinjska, 13.mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mgosp, 13.13.enb, 13.ath, PZ Kude NK i PuB, OTO Borci, i OTO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO. Odlučio sam: nastaviti sa odlučnom odbranom Salakovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji održavati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mbr na liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. Greda - s. Kalđerdevići - Visočnik. Cilj: sprečiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu istočne Hercegovine.

3. U PZO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a

### D-1

SEFER HALILOVIĆ: „CUNNNG STRATEGY“ – SARAJEVO

Sefer Halilović, chief of the Main staff of the BH Army, former employee and associate of KOS, writes about when and where Alija Izetbegović and Ejup Ganić talk about their negotiations and plans of exchange of territory and people of Sandžak for the territory and people of East Herzegovina.

A part of Serbia for a part of BiH.

Sefer was already then appointed to the “Presidency of BiH”, as if the “Presidency of BiH” was a village fire patrol unit, and not a group of people elected in free elections.

In negotiations in Geneva, a place where discussions took place about how to REGULATE THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE of BiH, a delegation led by Izetbegović, Sefer Halilović considers as BOSNIAN, instead of BOSNIAN-HERZEGOVINIAN, while the delegations of Croats and Serbs are considered as delegations of Ustashas and Chetniks; therefore the situation is terrifying because the “UN palace is packed with Chetniks and Ustashas”.

Only Sefer Halilović and his company from the BASIC NATION of BiH constitute the real, original and democratic delegation of BiH.

We, from HVO (Croatian Defence Council) should have formed a joint command and efficient and joint army with this man, with his opinions and views formed in the classrooms of the KOS (Counterintelligence Service). How much effort and vain attempts went down the drain? How much damage is caused to the Croatian people?

In document number 1 is listed what was, while returning from Switzerland, in an airplane, Izetbegović saying about Arafat’s advices, how should one take his piece of land and make his own state.

Halilović disagrees with the views of his chief commander because Sefer “does not withhold any right to anyone who respects the Bosnian state”.

The supreme mind of Sefer Halilović will evaluate who respects what and how much respect is shown, especially which people or individuals respect the BOSNIAN STATE.

And if Halilović evaluates that some people don’t show respect for his Bosnia, he will defeat them with his PATRIOTIC LEAGUE and his BH Army, and they will have to go to Croatia (Ustashas) or to Serbia (Chetniks).

Reader, don’t you, in all this, recognize the FOUNDATION OF AGGRESSION OF BH ARMY AGAINST THE HVO?

### D-2

Isn’t it all clear in that speech of Mr. Okun?

Who was the first to be organized in BiH (Croats-HVO)

and who successfully defended BiH (HVO) and who saved BiH (Tuđman – referendum, recognition, refugees, armament, training of policemen sent by SDA (Democratic Action Party), training of army and pilots, schools, wounded combatants). How on earth would Izetbegović kindly ask the YNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) to leave the BiH when it didn’t want to become his state army, as he offered and proposed, this is known only to Croatian analysts.

### D-3

Tuđman said to General Klein that Izetbegović offered him West Herzegovina, and Klein verified that assertion by asking Izetbegović about its accuracy.

Alija responded that it was true because Croats in BiH are a “huge problem”, so he wants to get rid of them.

He already made an agreement with the Serbs how to divide what would be left once he gets rid of West Herzegovina.

The Serbs have already got rid of Croats and the BH Army wanted to cleanse what was left of Croats in Central Bosnia, Sarajevo and Neretva Valley, up to Neum, even up to Ploče.

Tuđman and Croats are an obstacle.

So, my dear reader, in this proposition it is not about the internal territorial structure of the BiH, certainly NOT. Mr. Alija Izetbegović offers West Herzegovina to Mr. Franjo Tuđman; let him annex it to Croatia.

### D-4

Mr. Galbraith speaks here about the humanitarian aid.

Signatures on each proposition of the international community, even the one in Dayton, harmful, unjust and unacceptable for Croats in BiH; what about refugees, armament, manpower for the BH Army, units, wounded combatants, schools with Bosnian Language program...

### D-5

The perception of “ISLAMIC DECLARATION” in Croatian “intellectual” circles is an impressive example of moral and intellectual cowardice and distorted communist awareness.

This social and religious programmatic idea matured in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since the World War II, especially on relation Sarajevo-Zagreb; many people were imprisoned for that idea for a long time; it was finally completed in the 80’s of the 20th century when Alija Izetbegović and other of the same opinion, mature, intellectual, serious, imprisoned people, put that idea in its form and publish it in 200 000 free copies as a certain COMMUNIST MANIFESTO.

And just before the FIRST free, democratic elections in BiH.

Those people, future leadership of SDA, a party which significantly forms political and national aspirations of the MUSLIMS, publicly and clearly, urbi et orbi say that;

“There is no peace and co-existence between Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions”.

“That the first and the most important conclusion is a conclusion about impossibility to join Islamic and non-Islamic systems”.

“The Islamic movement should and can access the takeover of the power as soon as it is morally and massively powerful enough that it can ruin the present non-Islamic power and build a new Islamic one.”

PUNKTUM.

Well, intellectual gentlemen of all types, these views are pure fascism, sublime Nazism, communism, genuine fundamentalism, a religious one, in this case a Taliban-like fundamentalism.

SANU /Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art/ memorandum is nothing in comparison to this part.

Islamic Declaration by Alija Izetbegović and his associates who pursued the Muslim policy in BiH is the same as “MEIN KAMPF”, a fundamentally radical, intolerant, dangerous, militant idea and program.

Citations should be followed by my paragraphs of apologies and an explanation that all this is “not directed towards ISLAM AND BOSNIAKS”, all of it on behalf of something that should be an inexistent guilt and on the trace of false loves and reconciliation.

It will never happen.

“ISLAMIC DECLARATION” IS WHAT IT IS.

ISLAM is a great religion whereas Bosniaks are a people just like all other people.

We felt the development of ideas from “Islamic Declaration” in the aggression of the BH Army against the HVO in the war in BiH; how it will continue depends, amongst other things, on the quantity of silence, quantity of delusion in heads of those who write and speak about ideas on the territory of BiH.

Development of each pernicious idea, fascistic, communistic, Islamic-fundamentalist is directly proportionate to the silence and cowardice that follow its development.

See Bergman’s “Snake egg”.

## **D-6, D-7**

Why this ultimatum of “a civil state or a civil war” of Mr. Alija Izetbegović? We had much better situation in the SFRY

/Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ and nobody was satisfied and it all ended in aggression and bloodshed.

This gentleman again offers “brotherhood and unity” and, this time, the majority of his people.

What about Switzerland, Canada and Belgium...?

Nothing.

It will be either a civil state or we will get into the fight. In the backgrounds there are ideas from the “Islamic declaration” and evaluations of Sefer Halilović about who is a good Bosnian.

Have you ever heard that someone renounced his positions from this program? That someone offered an apology?

All precondition for war were fulfilled if we add to it Serbian pretensions to the territory.

The Croats defended themselves and it remains unclear why do you call the aggression of BH Army against HVO an “unfortunate conflict” when that conflict is based on the views of the Muslim leaders: “Ustashes”, “Chetniks”, “civil state”, “its territory”, “to compensate what Serbs conquered by their army”....

## **D-8**

I have no idea what kind of the “first session” of the BH Assembly this was, on 8th of October 1992, but I do read what the first soldier of the BH Army is saying. He says that PATRIOTIC LEAGUE and MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ stopped the enemy and “saved the existence of the Muslim people on this territory”. There are no Croats, there is no HVO if we do not consider it as “organized and unorganized groups”.

BiH is again a “democratic state of citizens”. This is not true because the disproportion of the common sense and words of that gentleman is grandiose. HVO stopped the breakthrough of the YNA across Neretva river towards the West and Croatia, liberated Stolac and MOSTAR, HVO stopped the breakthrough of the tank brigade of YNA (VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/) near Livno, HVO fought in Kupres, HVO fight in Posavina, Jajce, Rama and Bugojno.

With many Muslims among its ranks. We had no nationally colored programs. And Sefer is sitting in surrounded Sarajevo, 73% of the BiH is controlled by VRS and he talks about “crossing to strategic offensive”.

Dear Lord!

## **D-9**

Alija Izetbegović did authorize, delegate and designate Adil Zulfikarpašić and Muhamed Filipović to make the “Historical agreement” with the Serbs on behalf of the Muslims.



What about Croats in BiH?

They are invited to stay in Yugoslavia, “fully equal to other nations”.

At the same time, the army of that state attacks Croatia from the BiH territory.

If BiH is a state and it is – it has a democratically elected government – it is the aggressor too.

The matter is simple; stay in Yugoslavia and there will be no war; you will be equal in this Yugoslavia, with joint unique army, unique monetary policy and foreign affairs.

Let’s put aside the fact that LATER on, Izetbegović outwitted Filipović and Zulfikarpašić (M. Filipović; “I was Alija’s diplomat”), this was a miserable attempt to trade with destiny of one people - the Croats in BiH.

Later it was the fault of the Croats for not being completely and uniquely subordinated to the Muslim team from Sarajevo when YNA attacked them; they are to be blamed for being organized and for fighting back; it is their fault for not having stayed in Yugoslavia.

They have never denied BiH as an integral state.

Not a unique one but an integral state.

## D-10

Who is “the father of the Patriotic League”?

Is the “Patriotic League” a secret military organization?

Is the P.LEAGUE formed within the SDA, political party of the Muslims in BiH?

When was it established?

Who will those fighters defend?

Who do the fighters of the “Patriotic League” take an oath to?

All of this is alright, the Muslims organize themselves, they will defend themselves, they swear to Allah j.sh. /jalla shanuhu/, the only thing being awkward here is that three nations live in BiH and that “Islamic Declaration” and “SANU memorandum” are behind the whole story.

Much later, when they establish the HVO and the HZ-HB (Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia), the Croats will become the GUILTY ONES, permanent culprits even neither more nor less than for the “DIVISION OF BiH”. Those Croats could have placed themselves “under the hat” of one or another idea and it would all be fine; they wouldn’t be guilty and presidents of the RH (Republic of Croatia) shouldn’t have to apologize to everyone for decades.

This logic is as pathetic as it can be.

## D-11

It is quite difficult to understand such confusion.

Helas!

Forces of SDS – 80 - 120 000 people – the enemy.

Extreme forces of HDZ – 1-2 brigades – the enemy.

Patriotic League – 120 000 fighters – the true and only force of BiH plus the Muslim forces outside of BiH – 30000 fighters.

This document, “a handicraft of Sefer Halilović” is the official document from Mehurići (later, the permanent location of Mujahidin).

Therefore, Sefer, along with his armada, will protect the Muslim people, defeat both enemies, liberate Croats and Serbs and enable them to live in BiH peacefully.

Croatian people will help there without HDZ extremists and their brigades.

What does that mean to him, “in cooperation with the neighbors”?

Which neighbors, where and how?

“Progressive world public” in order to complete this joke, made of small communist, KOS-like ideological platitudes.

## D-12

Let me mention one of the hundreds of documents about the views and attitudes of Croats from BiH. We all know how it ended; the following documents will show what everybody’s game was in BiH.

However, the lesson remains:

NEVER EVER AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT YIELD TO ANYONE IN THE MATTER OF BASIC RIGHTS OF A NATION.

That is, if you are not defeated and we were not defeated.

The referendum had to be supported; the referendum question was a fraud.

## D-13a, D-13b

Izetbegović talks how and why he lied and cheated in Lisbon.

What he signed there – the constitutional establishment of the BiH – was a condition to recognize BiH and the only reason why Croats went out to referendum on independence of BiH.

With help from Franjo Tuđman who wanted once again to protect, secure and define the borders of RH.

Alija says; “Unwillingly, but we reached an agreement”.

Why did he say yes?

Reply: “If the Croatian community (he doesn’t say “Croatian people”?) does not come out to referendum, the referendum goes down. Bear that in mind. Do not gamble with it. We have to pass at the referendum; if we don’t, we

remain down and there is no way for us to go up within the next 30 years.”

Izetbegović further says something about the stone and the hill but cannot remember Sisyphus and concludes with: “The referendum cannot be lost!” So he will receive recognition and then, “whatever happens on the inside, I cannot do anything about it”.

On October 8th 1992 the war is already raging and Izetbegović has talks differently. A bit more indulgent.

The situation is grave so we might consider changing our mask again.

HVO has military successes, each HZ-HB document says that we are in the state of BiH, it says that all regulations are temporary, that we don't have our own assembly, our own Constitution, we have no ministers but heads of offices, we have no president of the government but...

We provide our own funds (mostly through contributions from Croats who work abroad, a great number of such people come from this region), we buy weaponry by ourselves, transport and accommodate refugees and displaced Croats and Muslims by using oil that we allegedly “nicked”; we transport 10 000 wounded BH Army combatants in cars that we (and that we “certainly” “have stolen”), Croatia helps us with money from the joint bag, that consists of contributions from Croats from BiH too, we provide armament and logistic help to the BH Army and Muslims in HVO... (later they will turn the guns against their army in the highest manner of treason).

From all those billions of dollars provided as aid to BiH from Islamic states we got shit.

Et cetera and similar.

For all that a Croat must apologize, because the servant is always GUILTY; he should apologize because that is the right thing to do, it is a humane gesture, a historically conciliatory gesture.

Apologize to the Sir even if he stepped onto your foot, you have to be GUILTY because the real question is what was your foot doing at that place at the time.

## D-14

It was in the spring of 1992 when general Kukanjac “captured”, “held” Alija Izetbegović, whatever the interpretation was, at the airport in Sarajevo in order to pull out the YNA from the town. On the phone Mr. Izetbegović then says to Kljuić and Ganić, members of the Presidency of the BiH: “If anything happens to me, Ganić you take over”.

Take over the power, the position of the chairman of the Presidency.

As if there was no regulation, as if the rules of procedure on chairman rotation of the did not exist, as if there was

no Constitution; it was something like- Ejup, my son, I'm leaving you the Pašalić, it's all yours and you Kljuić, you wait for better times although it is your turn, if something happens to Alija.

A classic coup d'état, a clear violation of the BH Constitution.

Nobody paid any attention to that.

In late 1992 as Izetbegović's second mandate as chairman of the BH Presidency expired, Alija himself prolonged the duration of his position and threw into garbage all provisions of the Constitution.

NOBODY paid any attention to that.

The document D-14 shows how members of the BH Presidency are elected.

By emperor's decree, party directive or sultan's mercy?

On the street, according to the will and evaluation of the Chairman.

Where, when, at which elections and on behalf of who was Dr. Tatjana LJUJIĆ-MIJATOVIĆ nominated as candidate?

Who voted for her?

Nobody has ever seriously addressed this mockery of law and constitutional provisions.

Because we all know who is the CULPRIT.

Along with the YNA and the Serbs, those who have always been GUILTY will become culprits, the “Ustashes”, Croats, HVO, HZ-HB, Franjo Tuđman.

Top it off as you wish.

## D-15

This document can show you the relations between commander of the BH Army (Izetbegović) and his first soldier (Halilović).

Sefer claims the following:

- a) Izetbegović claims there will be no war in BiH
- b) Izetbegović is neutral when Dubrovnik and other parts of Croatia are being destroyed from the territory of his state
- c) “This is not our war” – that is what Izetbegović is saying when Ravno in BiH was destroyed (Croats live there and it is logical for the author of “Islamic Declaration” that “this is not his war”)
- d) On March 10th, 1992 to Izetbegović the aggression against Croatia is a “filthy war that ravaged Croatia” and after such war “the Yugoslav people wakes up from a nightmare”.

When such Yugoslav people, according to Alija, wakes up from a nightmare, he will not wage war in BiH. Then, on March 17th, in the newspapers “Danas” he explains

to journalists of the same intellectual level that the YNA nowadays is different in its “quality, quantity, psychology, even intentions and goals. The Army will not occupy BOSNIA (again there is no Herzegovina in the state title) and will not execute the coup d’état.

Shortly and briefly, “with due consideration” and “smartly” “he advocates peace” and “he does not spread the ideas of war”, “his policy is conciliatory” and when someone tells me that history is life’s teacher it makes me throw up.

e) On March 5th, 1992 the “situation is under control and it’s safe to walk around town (of Sarajevo)”

Izetbegović, what about Mostar, Široki Brijeg and Ljubuški, Čapljina and Ravno...?

f) Sefer states that “BiH, along with Vojvodina, practically became a basis for carrying out operations against Croatia”.

Later we will see what is the LAW saying about the use of army against attackers, what a battlefield is and what is a theatre of war and whose army could and was allowed to wage war and where.

g) Eventually on April 26th when there are already 1000 dead people (according to Halilović) in Sarajevo, Izetbegović believes that the YNA will “turn into the Bosnian Army”!

(Again BOSNIAN, probably because it will certainly not turn into the Herzegovinian army).

Please comment on this, my supremely noetic readers.

## D-16

A clear as the sky in a sunny summer day, Jevrem Cokić writes about the task of YNA and its units. What they should take, with which forces and which political goal.

That is the reason why the 4th battalion of the 4th Guards brigade (counting 160 young men) filled the “hole” on April 10th 1991 and took positions on direction Tepčići-Slipčići near Čitluk.

They remained there and participated in liberating the left bank of Neretva River and afterwards liberating Buna and Blagaj on the right bank of Neretva River.

Terrific guys and terrific commander Krstičević.

The same aim of the aggressors and the joint defense of the attacked ones.

Look at the maps marked I - XIVA.

## D-17

Everybody in Herzegovina knew that the tank brigade of YNA heads towards Croatia and the tank brigade of YNA was stopped.

Just like that, “those Dinarics in peasant shoes”!

Izetbegović, whose pondering on the possibility of war we are already familiar with, came and begged Croats to release the tanks to go their way, because...

For the sake of a peaceful home, we listened to him and to Kljuić, the blessed peacemakers.

Later, in April of 1992, the same tanks severely defeated HVO in Kupres, but they were stopped in Livno and from direction of Glamoč, as well as from direction of Livanjsko Polje.

All this happened, according to those who pull the wool over somebody’s eyes, from the company for that produces “HORNES and HOOVES”, and after Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić agreed on everything in Graz.

Ask Livno, Duvno and Kupres inhabitants how the attack looked like (two big attacks); also ask the rest of them from HVO and Ante Gotovina.

If my memory and intellect serve me well, he was there.

Ask Glasnović and all the others!

Bear in mind the battles for Stolac, Mostar, Jajce, Bugojno, Posavina,...

All this happened after the “AGREEMENT” in Graz.

## D-18

Ravno is not Sarajevo; where is this Ravno after all and who lives there in order to make killing people in Ravno somebody’s war?

No “intellectual” was killed there, significant enough for further ordinary development of world history.

However, if any of those remaining communist intellectual jury members can calculate 3,2% out of 17,8% from 560 KUNAs or solve an equation with unknown variable, come and get me. In a real world they wouldn’t have anything to eat; that is why creation of a society of chaos, chaos of sense and truth is their only sinecure.

## D-19

JNA “is defending” MOSTAR

## D-20, D-21, D-22, D-23, D-24, D-25

Honest chroniclers of events should be read in order to reduce the possibility that each semi-literate nobody thinks that world and history are only possible as his “will and perception”, hence for those purposes he also reduces events and people to the measure of his own contemptibility.

It is easy to imagine a meeting, sitting in an armchair in an air-conditioned premise and rule the world.

What about the pain of a mother from Široki Brijeg, whose

child was killed by a bomb from MIG aircraft, what about pain, desperation and hatred, fear and defiance; what to do with such “banalities”?

To great minds, which swamp the post-communist Croatia, people who experience this are irrelevant mathematical numbers, a 5th or 6th place behind a decimal comma of their great ideas. After reduction, derivation, neglect, here We come, great and powerful, humane and misunderstood; when they did not listen to Us – THEY ARE GUILTY! The only problem is that such GREAT MINDS never participate in the event. They are always just observers, adjusted to every system and up to a certain pleasant limit of a good life; as such they are the worst type of PEACE PROFITEERS.

I recommend a book from a priest Mr. Radoslav Zovko, entitled “MOSTAR DIARY 1991-1996”.

## D-26

Imagine that some architects and constructors build your houses, bridges and towns for a period of 45 years and then imagine it all gets destroyed in blood and fire; soon after that they tell you they would make new projects because they know best; imagine physicians with sick or dead patients after a long treatment whereby the same physicians tell you they would treat them again because they know best; imagine the same situation with jurists and doctors of self-governing socialism, economist of bankrupted economies-it is all a recycled social intellect defending the positions from communism.

Please see a genius animated movie “The Wall” by Dragić.

## MAPS I-XIVa

- I - SFRY ARMED FORCES 1985.
- II - OPERATIONALIZATION OF YNA 1987.
- III - OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SFRY ARMED FORCES 1992.
- IV - MILITARY DISTRICTS 1992.
- V - DEPLOYMENT OF YNA FORCES IN BiH ON MARCH 20, 1992
- VI - AGGRESSION OF SERBIA, MONTENEGRO AND BiH AGAINST CROATIA
- VII - TOTAL STRENGTH OF YNA AND VRS FORCES 1992 AND 1993
- VIII - STRUCTURE OF 10. AND 4. VRS CORPS
- IX - STRUCTURE OF 5. AND 9. VRS CORPS
- X - STRUCTURE OF 17. VRS CORPS
- XI - PLAN OF THE ATTACK AGAINST CROATIA 1991
- XII - PLAN OF THE ATTACK OF YNA ON BiH AND CROATIA ACCORDING TO THE BOOK OF ADMIRAL COKIĆ

- XIIIA - PLAN OF THE ATTACK AND ATTACK OF YNA AND VRS ON SOUTH PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA FROM THE TERRITORY OF BiH (1991.-1992., FIRST HALF)
- XIII - INITIAL GENERAL IDEA OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST CROATIA AND SLOVENIA – FROM THE BOOK OF MARTIN ŠPEGELJ
- XIV - PLAN OF THE ATTACK ON CROATIA AFTER RETREAT OF YNA FORCES FROM SLOVENIA (JULY 1991) – FROM THE BOOK OF MARTIN ŠPEGELJ
- XIVA - SOUTH OF CROATIA (1992-1993)

## D-27

The international warfare rule clearly defines theatre of war and aggression, whether the aggression is declared or not. I hope you will read this document and understand that Croatia, if it had been able to, had the right to attack all military potential of the YNA wherever they were located - in Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro or BiH...

YNA attacks Croatia from BiH, starting from Slavonki Brod all the way to Dubrovnik; that state is the aggressor against the RH.

The RH has the right to strike back.

However, new interpretation of the warfare rules from the heads of certain Croatian political ignoramuses says that “BiH is not attacking Croatia but that YNA is attacking from the BiH territory”; when several hundreds of Croatian soldiers cross the BiH border while liberating Stolac and Dubrovnik they say that “the Croatian army must not cross the border because this is an aggression against the other state”.

What do the graves of dead children and civilians say about that, stretching from Slavonki Brod all the way to Dubrovnik, having been killed by the YNA heavy artillery - who cares?

And that perfidious game by Mr. Izetbegović who cannot control 73% of his country a Croatia is being attacked at the same time - he does not want to sign the military agreement with Franjo Tuđman and he is not controlling the aggressor - he is doing all this just to beg some mercy from the Serbs in order to get some charity for his own people.

Why did Tuđman even need a military agreement when he was allowed by the warfare rule to send troops against the aggressor wherever he was?

It is a blabber of a native ignoramuses and a pressure of carpetbagger creators of war.

By the way, Alija signed the military agreement with Croatia when his army was about to break into pieces - Srebrenica and Bihać.

Offensive against Croats in Central Bosnia and Neretva valley up to Neum and Ploče failed, Sarajevo cannot be unblocked, they killed people in Srebrenica and Bihać awaits the same destiny.

Only then..

Whose fault is it, my reader?

Croats and their slave and serving nature, the Croats.

Apologize, please.

## **D-28, D-28a**

Why isn't Izetbegović turning that powerful army of "Patriotic League" into the BH Army or something similar? Why is he trying to reanimate the TO (Territorial Defense), a bankrupted deadweight of the YNA, disarmed and in hands of the retired YNA officers?

Why is he doing it not earlier than on May 27, 1992, when it is too late for something like that?

Why isn't there, among all those appointed candidates, a single Croat? How to explain it?

What kind of a joint fight is that?

How can such man and such policy be trusted?

How is it possible for him to rename the Croatian regiment of the HV /Croatian Army/ "KRALJ TOMISLAV", commanded by Mato Šarlija Daidža, into a BH TO unit?

Is it because Mato Šarlija is actually NIJAZ BATLAK, a Croat of Islamic religion and Alija usurps him pursuant to religious belief?

Whom did he ask?

And then he orders DAIDŽA (MATO ŠARLIJA, NIJAZ BATLAK), regardless of the uniform he is wearing and the unit he is in command of, as well as the payroll that Croatian Army is giving to those people or the supreme commander, Franjo Tuđman.

There is your answer about engagement of the Croatian Army in BiH; more will be said about that.

## **D-29**

After bringing his people into a catastrophic situation by series of wrong decisions, Alija Izetbegović invited fighters from Islamic states to help. As M. Frisch says in one of his books, speaking about foreign workers: "We invited workers and the people came"; so was the situation with Mujahedins.

They came to fight for Islam, not for the BiH, whether it was civil or differently structured BiH. They came with identification of humanitarian organizations.

When we tried to stop their convoy full of fighters with

worthless goods they were driving casually, half of the "humane" world would have jumped on our back.

You are familiar with the consequences.

## **D-30**

We were rather swamped with such and similar messages, flyers in BiH, in the spring of 1993.

You will see, my readers, that such intentions should have been realized through offensive operation of A BiH, "Neretva 93".

## **Documents that are all filed under D-31**

All documents marked D-31 are about how many of volunteering combatants from RH went to A BiH and how many to HVO.

If we count in the Mujahedins, 20 times more volunteers FROM CROATIA went to A BiH than to HVO.

Hence, I repeat, at least 20 times more volunteers from Croatia were equipped and sent to A BiH than to HVO.

## **D-31a**

The announced unit from Brod did not arrive, whereas Milićević and Mandić brought slightly less volunteers than quoted.

## **D-31b**

There are 230 volunteers from 5th Guards Brigade, 130 infantry-men. It is the situation "in the field", probably more of them went; however some people always change their mind along the way.

We are grateful to those who came; all respect to them.

## **D-31c**

Those who came as volunteers, unorganized and having different motives were sent off from the territory of the HZ-HB.

## **D-31d**

When Rommel arrived to Africa, British and Americans sent their troops against him; when Wehrmacht docked in Norway, the British sent their units there as well; when the Germans rolled over The Netherlands, the British sent couple of thousands of soldiers to help the Frenchmen, etc, etc.

It is the logic of war and so it is interpreted by the rules of war.

All those who, God knows on the basis of which logic and common sense shouted that a Croatian Army soldier cannot

pass the Croatian border to confront the aggressor, let them look at the faces of killed children and civilians in Slavonski Brod and let them answer the question whether it was smarter to stop the YNA and VRS away from the borders of Croatia and hold their heavy artillery at a distance that we all call the tactical depth?

Isn't it better to send 160 men to help HVO near Tepčići and Slipčići (Čitluk municipality) then fight in the suburbs of Split later and flee to Italy with children?

Isn't it so, my good Horatius?

### **D-31e**

Mr. Tihčić asks himself why and how could "Posavina go down".

It is a groundless and exaggerated euphoria after initial successes, which has nothing to do with the army but with many local politicians whose brain grew from a plain alphabet and Little Red Riding Hood up to the philosophy of Kant, Hegel, Planck and Weber and a general final cognition on the essence of history in a rather short period; arrogance, quarrels, capitalizing their own positions in currency amounts, escape to reality of those who pretend "as if they have a clue"; brains "who know how to do it", instead of going to a fight, copying command formalities from the YNA to an emerging volunteering army, reading "precise" military maps and moving led soldiers far away from the battlefield like a game without any insight into the essence of the situation "on the field", misunderstanding, indecisiveness as a consequence of misunderstanding and ignorance, inability to sort the problems according to their importance and meaning and many, many matters, Mr. Tihčić.

The power and organization of VRS and the significance of that corridor for Banja Luka and others places in BiH that this army already had under its control should not be underestimated; Martić's brigade that came to help "their brothers" (and for UNPROFOR in UNPA zones in CROATIA THIS WAS NORMAL) should not be underestimated; the absence of "LAW" that the Croatian Army, pursuant to an order, without afterword, crosses the BH border because Alija Izetbegović does not allow it (there is no military agreement) should not be neglected, etc.

Eventually, those who fought in a right way, Đuro Matuzović and the rest of the HVO members managed to keep ORAŠJE.

All this and even more than mentioned, as long as the nonsense on betrayal of Bosnian Posavina or exchange of Bosnian Posavina for the SOUTH OF CROATIA or nonsense about weaponry that went to Herzegovina or some guilt of a certain Praljak are not mentioned.

Noise and screaming, more noise and screaming of incompetent, and much more than that, irresponsible participants. There was no good management of excellent

fighters, as well as pathetic nonsense, wisdom after the event as justification.

### **D-31f**

The document says that I kindly ask the addressee to help me out with two HV battalions.

I have never received any help.

The BH Army, after Konjic, Bugojno, Mostar and Central Bosnia, as well as after the attack against the HVO and Croats moves towards the sea and "western borders of the BiH" which results in awful situation for HVO and GS /Main Staff/ commanders of HVO.

The difference in number of "military effectives" between BH Army and HVO is too big, whereas I keep asking myself why they pounced on us, why don't they go in direction of Banja Luka, why don't they lift the blockade of Sarajevo, why don't they go towards Srebrenica, why this and that. It is a rhetorical question, whereas the real reasons are clear – pound the weaker one, conquer the territory and go to some international conference at which the world sharers of justice will recognize the situation they found there and stop the war. They have been doing it until that very moment therefore the BH Army leadership's decision to attack the HVO is "entirely logical".

Let's not lie about the facts.

### **D-31g**

In Split, when I was speaking about the situation in BiH (5 November 1993) and whereas the offensive of the BH Army was still broken along with the dead and wounded on both sides (as it is in the war), I again requested two battalions of the HV.

I didn't get them.

Three days later I was dismissed of duty of the commander of the HVO Main Staff (at my personal request).

As long as somebody isn't telling me that this long time prepared, both politically and rationally, attack against the HVO and Croats is an "unfortunate war with the Muslims", it will be fine.

HVO was not attacking, HVO was attacked, and HVO was defending.

Like the war with the Serbs was a "fortunate war"? Whoever attacks me is an aggressor.

Period!

Explanation along with the map - positions of the HVO "TG-2" /Terroristic Group/ south from Stolac.

We struggled with the HV – whether they should defend the area regarding Metković and Ploče from VRS or should HVO defend that area regarding Čapljina.

We shifted on several occasions, followed by remarks of some

foreign forces why is Croatian Army on the territory of BiH, along with remarks of us from HVO that Croatia can defend itself from the depth or on the border itself, while the latter, in terms of the military, is not the smartest solution.

### D-32

On 7th of July 1993 HVO was already attacked by BH Army in Travnik, Konjic, Kakanj and Mostar- Petković goes to the agreed meeting in Kiseljak and he can come to Kiseljak only if UNPROFOR drives him there, whereas Halilović “is not eager to go”. Izetbegović tells him that this meeting “isn't that important anyway”, he tells him actually to let Petković go, to let go the HVO and let go the truce, as well as agreed joint command because it is all irrelevant, along with the Vance-Owen plan that we signed.

First, we shall erase them and then we will talk.

That book says that Sefer snapped back at Morillon and this pitiful organization UNPROFOR that if he, Sefer had had the weaponry, he would have quickly “agreed” both with Ustashas and Chetniks.

Later he writes about this army of his that would erase Ustashas and Chetniks in a blink of an eye, also saying that Juka Prazina is a “known Sarajevo criminal”, “commander of the reserve special police” in this army and then “Juka was promoted – the Presidency of the state appointed him commander of special units of the ARMY”.

Again it says that Sarajevo was pillaged and “no Chetnik entered the town”.

A question – where are the “Chetniks” and what happened to them?

A possible conclusion – probably “Ustashas” ravaged it because the BH Army units did not, they are led by Izetbegović and Halilović and they would erase people, etc, etc. Besides, they are not criminals of “Ustasha” or “Chetnik” type.

Then again he talks about the work of Alija Delimustafić and Aleksandar Vasiljević and says that Alija knows everything about it.

Further he writes about KOS (that he worked for, it remains unknown for how long) and Halilović writes that “our MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ was worse than KOS in Patriotic LEAGUE, “because here you never know who you are going to run into”.

With which army does he want to beat VRS when Mladić knows what is he having for breakfast? He writes again about Fikret Muslimović, chief of KOS in the 4th corps of the YNA, whereas that same Muslimović later became chief of security in BH Army. Later we shall see what Muslimović thinks of Sefer, but all Croats are Ustashas to both of them, which is also in their KOS genetic structure and unfortunately not only in theirs.

Dear reader, keep reading on that document, and you shall find out that “Ustasha” and “Chetnik” units “did not wage war against each other anywhere” and then he goes on about the story of Stolac and Mostar.

“The Ustashas” retreated from the town, of course “pursuant to the agreement” and “Chetniks” entered town without a bullet being fired.

What happened after that?

“After that”, according to Halilović, struggling to activate the three brain cells of his, “they made another agreement”. Chetniks retreated from Stolac and the Ustashas marched right in. THEY ARE STILL THERE TODAY”.

“USTASHAS”, OF COURSE.

Before this play “we go out and you come in” in Mostar and Stolac, everything was agreed; Sefer Halilović knows this and his a “Short Course” of SKPb /The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)/ i was a tough literature. Please be patient, read until the end and I hope you shall understand with which people we should have and wanted to execute defense in BiH.

### D-33

This document says what Mr. Muhamed Filipović thinks about who is to be BLAMED for such policy of the Muslims and what was Franjo Tuđman (and Slovenian leadership) offering to Alija Izetbegović back on April 8th 1990.

However, Franjo Tuđman who is well above these reserve provincial political players and who raises above by his deep comprehension of social and political powers, not only in the former Yugoslavia but also “in such a world”, Franjo Tuđman knows that “Alija Izetbegović is far more impressed and, in a certain sense, prepped by the YNA”.

Mr. Tuđman estimated and knew that Alija “was surrounded by agents of KOS and DBJ /State security of Yugoslavia/ and that he, Izetbegović, will not have the strength to free himself from this and to risk the conflict with this force”.

Wasn't it like that?

Further in the document it says that it was Alija and that Alija sent M. Filipović to agree on the “historical agreement” with Serbs.

Without Croats.

And then he tricked M. Filipović – Alija Izetbegović tricked him.

### D-34

On the basis of what is Izetbegović (a fortune teller?) convinced that HE (MILOŠEVIĆ) will suggest to Tuđman some “partial solutions that would partially be realized at costs of the Muslims in BiH”?

What are these “certain information” and who gave them to him?

Was it KOS, which he is surrounded with or the DBJ which he is surrounded with or a third party, fourth maybe out of many who modeled the conflict?

The goal is more than clear and I shall analyze no longer because I want to save paper.

It is always interesting how a lie can become “an accepted event” and how many “shit drawn flies” can gather around such lie?

Producers of such stories are top experts and know very well how it functions, what we call a “HUMAN BEING” in such exalted manner.

### D-35

Miroslav Tuđman writes extensively about the meeting in Karadorđevo, the story, the saga and myth that emerged later as well as about conveyers of the story from generation to generation and its sense and purpose.

Please read, please deny.

### D-36

On January 24th 1991 Tuđman writes to the UN Security Council; Tuđman knows what would happen and seeks help to avoid the later casualties and enumerates republics as states...

What kind of a statement did BAKER make after that in Belgrade?

America wants to preserve Yugoslavia!

And the YNA departed to execute the task! Unsuccessfully!  
You know the consequences!

### D-37

On December 11th 1992 Tuđman writes to the Security Council and among others, in item 2 he states that UNPROFOR, according to the Resolution of the Security Council 769 (1992) should urgently introduce a strict regime of control over the international borders of the Republic of Croatia towards Serbia and BiH in order to prevent and especially to control the passing of armed troops or weaponry and war equipment supply.

What division of BiH, what Banovina and annexation to Croatia, what nonsense, what “historical agreements”?

Gentlemen, stand on the borders of Croatia and protect the state that you recognized from aggression from:

- a) Serbia
- b) BiH

Games continued for a long time; who cares about Peruća, Maslenica, highway and 600 murdered Croats in UN and UNPA zones?

“The Storm” solved the problem!

HVO still managed to defend itself.

### D-38

What about Fikret Muslimović’s writing, former CHIEF OF KOS in the 4th corps of the YNA, later with the same position in BH Army.

Fikret says that the tank brigade that Croats stopped near Polog – that the “movement of this brigade served to protect the Chetnik para-military on the territory of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ , especially in the region KNIN-ZADAR-SPLIT”.

Ok, he knows that, he was in the YNA while it destroyed Croatia, whereas of course at that time he was not “Chetnik”.

Since his cerebellum of a KOS officer does not allow him to use the noun “CROAT”, it is people who stopped the tanks, “THE HERZEGOVINIAN PEOPLE”.

Further he writes that the tank brigade of YNA was passed through because the “LEADERSHIPS of the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ from Zagreb, Sarajevo and Mostar insisted to put the people aside and that the convoy passes”.

You, “brother” Fikret, are lying, lying like a dog; Izetbegovic asked, begged and swore “that he cannot betray”, so the people (that welcomed him with applause) yielded. Alija did that for his interests and for the policy that you are well familiar with through the documents, my good readers.

Truth be told, some things came from Kljuić’s mouth as well.

Fikret further writes about who drove Serbs and Croats away from the BH Army ranks.

He states: “A conclusion that there is not a building in Sarajevo which isn’t more or less pillaged and that there is no citizen who more or less is not harmed by such actions of the criminals is entirely realistic”.

It’s not quite clear to me how will they wage war if they are not able to introduce minimal law and order in Sarajevo.

Here is what Sefer Halilović, chief of the BH ARMY MAIN STAFF thinks and speaks about Alija Izetbegović, his superior joint commander?

“Here he is, a fool! I have no idea what to do with this old guy. I keep telling him one thing and he keeps doing another.”

“He is the traitor of BiH and Bosniak people”. (Sefer about Alija. HE is ALIJA.)

“He is the grave-digger of BiH.”

“There he is, a notorious fool. I was with him just now and told him something else and he again is talking rubbish.”



My dear deceased Alija, what army? What state?

Please, it is all Croats' fault, I tell you.

Further Muslimović writes about Delalić – Čelo and Topalović – Caco and ORIĆ????? And “about shooting right into the flesh”, as well as taking hostages on July 3rd 1993 and Izetbegović's blackmail, who negotiates with those criminals and yields to blackmails.

I only hope that those who want to talk and who have been talking about the problems of the war in BiH so far read all this in peace and with attention.

### D-39

God knows what Alagić was doing until January 13th 1993 when he reported to the personnel officer in the barrack in Travnik, however it is sure that he reported late and that all that is rather vague.

Since he came there Alagić was being quite clear:

“Ambassador Thebault visited me at that time and Vance-Owen plan was current.” And then Alagić quotes himself: “here is where this plan is going to go down the drain, Mr. Thebault, here is where the Herzeg-Bosnia will go down”.

Being even clearer, he continues; “We even shared the barrack in Travnik with HVO” and again quotes himself: “Two armies cannot be in one barrack, neither can two flags” – I said to Gašo, actually Alagić, general of BH Army said to Gašo, commander of HVO.

“YOU WILL LEAVE THE BARRACK!” in such commanding, military tone, shortly and clearly was Alagić setting things in new order.

Forget Geneva, forget negotiations, forget Alija Izetbegović, Vance, Lord Owen – to Alagić it was all bollocks.

He decides, after he dragged himself around YNA and other Serbian troops and cover-up organizations until January 13th 1993, when he came as instructed by Tolimir or Mladić, I guess.

Alagić also writes the following:

“I find the creation of the operational group of Bosnian Krajina the embryo of our army”.

IN SPRING 1993

There it is.

Forget about Patriotic League, Sefer and everything else in Tuzla and Sarajevo... when there comes Alagić from somewhere, an embryo, just like when a slightly bigger spermatozoid swims ashore and then our Army is conceived.

After he chased away HVO from the barracks in Travnik, waiting for the “enemy” (that is, the HVO) attack “we have already secretly deployed our forces and had forces on Vilenica, behind HVO's back and they didn't know about it.”

Alagić also writes the following:

“After a certain meeting in Visoko I wrote an order, with my own hand, for the operation of Vareš” and then he continues to explain who and with which units should have liberated VAREŠ.

Forget VRS, Mladić, Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Bihać... Alagić and his men are liberating Vareš, after they have liberated Travnik, Konjic, Kakanj, Bugojno...

Let's finish with citations from Alagić's book, shall we?

### **On the occasion of the first meeting with Izetbegović, I said - Mr. President, we must move to offensive war**

Time passes in the meantime, you are waging battle after battle. When did you enter Sarajevo for the first time?

At the end of summer of 1993. I met the president Alija Izetbegović at the time.

How did you envisage the Army leadership and high officers?

I didn't know who the people in the leadership are; I had no idea about internal relations neither about what was going on among officers in Sarajevo. I wasn't receiving any orders from them at the time, or instructions, directives, assistance, nothing. I spoke to president Izetbegović. It was a talk between two human beings. I told him I had contacts with Bosniaks in Zagreb and I have just conveyed Selam from Hasan Čengić. I explained him that Krajišniks have traditionally good fighters and that we have to move into offensive war.

So they did, of course, moreover they continued offensive war against Croats and HVO because Alagić and company have worked according to their ideas because “until now (END OF SUMMER 1993) I haven't received any orders, instructions, directives, assistance, anything from them (from Sarajevo and from BH Army Main Staff).

Due to all what he writes and the clear facts, do not change your mind about what BH Army was like and whom it defended, what political ideas it represented, what their high officers were like, what relations they had among themselves, what their discipline and order were like and against whom that army fought... if you want to be consistent “intellectual” of “a la Croatia” type don't let the facts influence your position:

The Croats are the GUILTY ones, they divided the BiH, they were the HVO and they attacked the Muslims, poor and unprotected Muslims...

The facts are either way vulgar or unworthy of any communist-scholastic mind.

### D-40

SITUATION OVERVIEW OF R BiH IN MAY AND JUNE 1992.

### D-41, 42, 43

While sitting in a warm and comfortable room, if you by chance, dear reader, feel it is not that simple to transfer 15,000 people and 3,000 cars across Neretva river on a raft and accommodate them in Čitluk and Međugorje, along with constant shooting by certain fools from some weaponry, do not believe your quick judgment. If you were, by chance, a member of some humanitarian team and if you saw a certain group in the night, on a fallow ground waiting for morning because they are still not sheltered; and night aren't that cold and earlier many refugees already came to the area, well in that case, you should write a harsh letter, a protesting letter on the inhumane conduct of local powers and commanders because they are mean, inhumane and in violation of war rules and regulations, etc.

Add spices as you wish, humanely inspired.

### D-44

That was more or less the situation in Mostar and vicinity in 1992.

### D-45

A document, an extract from Franjo Boras' book, legally elected member of BH Presidency from the corps of Croatian people about another crime of the Croatian policy - talks between Boban and Karadžić in Graz.

At those meetings with the opposite side methods similar to those used for proving the GUILT of WITCHES were applied.

If a person accused of being possessed by devil, Satan or the Evil One does not admit guilt, a part of his body will be immersed into the hot oil, for example, the arm.

If a person, firm in his beliefs holds up the pain all the way and remains silent under that pain, he is GUILTY because no one can endure that kind of pain without help by the devil- as to judges and justice sharers.

If a person screams in pain and natural weakness of a human being, he is GUILTY because devil stated his statement through a screaming pain because, if the devil hadn't possessed a person, the person would have endured the temptation – as to judges and justice sharers.

It was the same situation with these meetings – if you don't go to a meeting you are not in favor of a peaceful solution, you are not working on establishment of peace, you merely want war and similar shit; if you do go to a meeting, it will be much worse, you talk to the enemy, you must be up to some monkey business and vague trading – it is all a fuss, same types and similar shit – as to judges.

It was necessary to participate at the meeting in Graz!

Nothing was arranged at the meeting in Graz and no

agreement was signed, neither did parties agree upon a thing.

Desire and instruction were satisfied as well as a request of a powerful player, Lord Carrington, therefore in item 5 of the communication from the meeting the following is being stated; "This agreement erases reasons to interrupt the conference of the European Community about the BiH, and therefore both sides request an urgent continuation of the conference".

Then comes the moment of orchestrated shouting, lies, gibberish and nonsense.

The war between "agreeing parties" continued in Stolac, Mostar, Livno, Jajce, Bosnian Posavina, Bugojno, Rama, etc...you can check all that in the forthcoming documents and maps as well as in many other documents on the WEBSITE, all with the same topic – TO ESTABLISH THE FACTUAL TRUTH.

### D-46

Who is defending Mostar? Who is in the Crisis Staff of Mostar?

When and under which circumstances was the left side of Mostar – the left bank of Neretva River abandoned?

What about Uborak and Sutina?

What was destroyed in total and who did it?

How did the Patriotic League arm itself and how much weaponry they received from Daidža, Croatian Army general and where did he get the weaponry?

What about the liberation action of Mostar, left and right bank?

What about preparations to liberate Sarajevo and Nijaz Batlak's role or Mato Šarlija's role or Daidža's role, general of the Croatian Army?

Why my proposition to Izetbegović in Mostar was refused, and we talked for a while in a certain apartment about HVO and BH Army's joint efforts to lift Sarajevo blockade?

"A great general and warrior, Sefer Halilović, shall not be "liberated by Ustashas"!

Yes, gentlemen, in that relic of YNA's counter intelligent service we have been Ustashas from the beginning till the end of this Odyssey ("Iliad").

All of them, TUTTI COMPLETTI.

For that action alone we gave them one T-130 cannon (later known as "Sultan"), one tank, several hundreds of guns, all what they asked for and, of course, the ammo.

The action itself was an amateurish fiasco.

They have never given that weaponry back, moreover they pounded us with it later.

All that for the brotherhood and unity, eternal love among nations.

In this “unfortunate conflict between Croats and Muslims”.  
It sounds stupid.

### **D-47, 48, 49, XV, 50**

Forget about actions, war, dead people; it is all an agreement between “Ustashas and Chetniks”, according to Sefer Halilović while sipping coffee in his den in Sarajevo because, according to Muslimović’s words “he does not tour the units” and according to Alagić “he neither sends orders to Alagić, nor this and that”.

MAPS XVI-XX

### **D-51**

Look at those requests.

### **D-52**

Examine this request!

The war presidency of Gacko municipality requests that the regional board of SDA solves the problem of 1707 apartments, which are needed in Mostar.

In former “normal” Yugoslav times bestowing 3 apartments used to be a problem, while these refugees and displaced people ask from their party to solve the problem in their country, not more or less to make solution for 1707 apartments needed.

### **D-53**

Have the apartments, abandoned by the former YNA officers, been properly distributed and who gained the most?

### **D-54**

What does the gazette of the 4th Corps of the BH Army, from Mostar, write about in February 1993?

Is VRS shelling Mostar, Stolac and Konjic? Are there any infantry fighting?

What is Mr. Mirsad Zuhrić saying? His unit is composed of Muslims whereas in the HVO it is the matter of formation.

Do they wear lilies as their insignia from the beginning of the war?

Does that bother someone in the HVO?

It says in that gazette (I cannot print it all) that first lilies were brought and distributed by the commander in Čapljina, Luburić.

We shall skip the name of the man who decided this and had it custom made, a name of some general.

Where are those dead Muslims coming from, when, according to Sefer Halilović, “Ustashas” and “Chetniks” agreed on division of BiH and then played “you come out, I shall come in and vice-versa”.

### **D-55**

Throughout the entire time, the time of events that mentioned facts talk about, the Constitutional Court of the BiH, in God knows what composition, initiates the procedure of evaluating the constitutionality of the HZ-HB on a paper with a star in its header –with a single political aim that the BiH must be unitarian state.

Unitarian state.

### **D-56**

Who was in command of HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/?

### **D-57**

Are BH Army and HVO a constituent part of the armed forces of BiH?

What is President of BH Presidency, Alija Izetbegović saying?

### **D-58**

The BH armed forces have a supreme commander which is a collective body – the presidency of the BiH instead of Sefer Halilović, but let us leave that aside and let’s look at the DIRECTIVE of September 10th 1992.

Apart from the BH Army that significantly withstands the aggressor, there are “other armed forces”. Sefer cannot mention the HVO; how can he be defended by Ustashas in BiH?

Russian, Greek and Israeli lobby are against him.

He does not mention who defends the BiH in Mostar region and in the area of Tomislavgrad-Livno if those are not our forces and we don’t know which our forces are.

Halilović says the following: “Armed forces of the Republic of Croatia, by carrying out offensive activities to liberate the Croatian territory and a part of its forces which are engaged in the area of Dubrovnik, cooperate in the most immediate manner with our forces in liberation of East Herzegovina, especially the towns of Trebinje and Stolac.

By activities in Posavina, especially in the area of Derventa and Odžak, Brčko and Orašje, a part of these forces cooperates with our forces in breaking the aggressor and preventing their breakthrough on direction Brčko-Derventa-Banja Luka” (from Sefer Halilović’s directive dated September 10th 1992; see entire document D-58).

The author of this text and a participant as well doesn’t

quite know whether the HV or the HVO wanted to liberate Trebinje, however if Sefer says differently...

Further great plans are developed on a sheet of paper, strategic strikes on various directions and similar blah-blah military ideas.

For the 4th corps of the BH Army Sefer determines an offensive on direction Mostar-Nevesinje-Trebinje-Bileće, Tomislavgrad-Kupres-Šipovo, Livno-Glamoč (execute the latter with reserve forces) and then Glamoč-Drvar and Livno-Grahovo.

A man lost his senses, hallucinates, talks rubbish, walks in his sleep, lies, quibbles and talks nonsense.

Such actions are dangerous in peace; in war on the other hand, it leads to disaster...

### D-59

At the same time Jadranko Prlić calmly and clearly explains what is a temporary executive and administrative body of the HZ-HB and why they were forced to pass regulations in some areas of social community, "followed by a remark that all regulations were passed as temporary regulations and that they are limited to the period of war and immediate war danger".

I hope you will read the document (as well as hundreds of others) with attention and entirely.

### D-60

Again only Muslims, again only Muslims are victims, again only Patriotic League put up resistance and grew to be a force of 150 000 combatants.

50 000 combatants of the 1st BH Army Corps in Sarajevo alone cannot lift the blockade for God knows how many years or do not want to; they cannot defend Srebrenica, Bihać was being saved by the HV but they do liberate Kakanj (from Croats), Konjic (from Croats), Travnik, Bugojno (again from Croats) and move towards the Adriatic Sea.

### D-61

Prkačin (HOS) brought a unit of 260 men from Croatia; 70% of the unit were Muslims dressed in uniforms, armed and equipped in the HVO barrack in Čaplina (Grabovina) and moved to help Jajce.

Prkačin's report should be read in order to understand when and how the conflict in Central Bosnia was established.

The Herzegovinian also went to help Jajce.

It is autumn of 1992 and the Muslim army stops assistance to Jajce?!

### D-62

This record by Stjepan Šiber will help to better understand the previous document.

Remark: I am not quite clear why is Šiber talking about Herzegovinian HVO as a special part, neither I am clear why did he write that no one could have entered Sarajevo, "walk in just like that"; UNPROFOR had to be begged to transport people by helicopter or by an APC. Besides, if my memory serves me well, there were some severe fights down there in this Herzegovina that lasted for months, which is exactly what Šiber mentioned on previous pages of his book.

Whatever, it doesn't matter; Petković and others (Blaškić, Koštroman, Keža and Bandić) arrived. However, Sefer doesn't want to attend talks with "Ustashas" because "they are all Ustashas except you" Stjepan, my friend.

Petković, a colleague from YNA is also "Ustasha"; God knows about those who have never been in YNA?

HENCE - TO SEFER HALILOVIĆ ALL CROATS ARE USTASHAS.

It was the same for many other officers of his, as well as for many Muslim politicians.

Stjepan Šiber did not slap that commander asshole and did not take off the uniform of the army whose commander talks like a classic communist fascist.

Nothing.

It is an immoral, opportunistic frame-up my dear friend Stjepan Šiber!

Do you really think that no one felt the atmosphere of such thoughts and that the HVO combatants were not aware?

Such position is a TOUCHSTONE of the BH Army aggression against the Croats since late 1992 and on, getting stronger and more aggressive.

### D-63

The operation "Bura" /Tempest/ is another example of the cooperation between HVO and VRS after the "agreement" in Graz and "in accordance" with views of Sefer Halilović.

MAPS XXI-XXII

### D-64

After agreeing upon the joint action I personally went twice to reconnoiter before the action was planned. When everything was ready and as I arrived to Konjic to implement the agreed operation (I guess this is how it's said), BH Army gave up pursuant to somebody's instruction "from above."

## D-65

Document that speaks about what HVO wanted to do and what it was doing, and how, as well as why those efforts were unsuccessful eventually, having weakened our military and political positions regarding to views of the “partner” side.

Even then and views should have been clearly stated significantly earlier and substantial moves should have been made in accordance to interests of a sovereign and constituent nation in the BiH – the Croats.

When it comes to principles, yielding always leads to something bad.

## D-66

If you were part of those events or if you are at least an honest and impartial observer, it must be clear to you that those who signed the Vance-Owen plan still haven't changed their positions, and that all except Croats signed without meaning it; that's why the plan will go down and the war will go on.

Even today I wouldn't change a thing in the analysis of the situation in BiH that I presented to high French delegation (along with general Tus) on January 13th 1992.

## D-67

To all those who knew about the sentence of the 3rd BH Army Corps commander that he wrote to the command of Bugojno defense staff and 307th BH Army brigade on January 20th 1993.

It is perfectly clear and it should be read carefully and clearly.

“Write reports in a manner to reflect the combat situation, instead of being political lessons.

IT IS TOO EARLY FOR CONFLICTS IN ALL TOWNS OF HERZEG-BOSNIA ALTHOUGH THAT OPTION IS ENVISAGED, TOO”.

January 20th 1993 is a date when the ATTACK option AGAINST CROATS (HVO) was already envisaged.

Please, continue with apologies for a “mistaken” Croatian policy in BiH which “with certainty” prepared conflicts with BH Army.

You are not lacking brains, knowledge, not even sycophantic submissiveness for that kind of work.

Apologize with “dignity” and in a European manner, but please, not on my behalf.

## D-68

Just to be clear:

- a) On February 12th 1993 when Jasmin Jaganjac writes this letter, he is a military adviser of Alija Izetbegović
- b) For the Croats in BiH there wasn't even a slightest

dilemma that, with signing the Vance-Owen plan, reasons of HZ-HB existence ceased and that the implementation of the signed plan should start, and that a transitional period is necessary.

c) That Praljak kindly asks Izetbegović to appoint one or two prominent Muslim politicians, who would, along with Praljak, go to Central Bosnia, work and influence further calming down of the situation.

Did Praljak go? Yes.

Did anyone of the Muslims join him?

No.

Jaganjac was the only one who wholeheartedly and honestly worked on that project.

But we continued to arm the BH Army.

## D-69, 70

Mile Akmadžić is the Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What a miracle, he is not an “illegal” Croat from HZ-HB or HVO or any military or political part.

Please read what Akmadžić is writing, to whom and why.

## D-71

This document shows how it looks in practice when each agreement and signed proposition of the international community on the internal structure of the BiH is being reduced to its components.

BH Army pursues a certain policy, to be more accurate, the BH Ministry of Defense makes certain districts operational when the Vance-Owen plan has just been signed and it should be implemented.

What districts, where do those districts come from, where and when did talks about districts take place, what republic committees for those districts and how is that related to the Ministry of defence?!

A man must be polite and due to this politeness he cannot ask: “Who is fooling whom around and to which end?!”

Munib Bisić and those similar to him should be asked about those things.

## D-72

HVO HZ-HB, being the political part of HVO, answers to such and similar documents within this one.

## D-73

Who will “urgently take steps in order to make district of Mostar and Livno operational?”

Arif Pašalić, commander of the 4th Corps of the BH Army, in cooperation with some others.

So much from Lagumdžija.

Where is the BH Prime Minister?

He writes letters worldwide, brethren do not give a shit about him, he plays his game and they make fools of us Croats.

An apology should be offered.

## D-74

How does it look like in the BH Army, government, SDA headquarters in Zagreb, when it comes to money and other issues, please read.

## D-75

What kind of a military document was signed in New York and between whom?

What about March 10th 1993?

It's important what Sefer thinks about the document and Sefer doesn't think well about the document.

This continues, sign a document and then think about what you have just signed and then one gives up from what was signed.

Sefer proposes items 2, 4, 5 and 6.

4 - The Republic of Croatia –this “Ustasha” state should finally be dealt with; logistics for the needs of BH Army.

5 – RH – all friendly states (which ones?) must put pressure to this country to “give up on supporting the Herzeg-Bosnia and actively work on its abolition.

It has already started, dear Sefer, in Konjic with aggression against Croats and it continues severely because...

6. Secure that PORT OF PLOČE and direction PLOČE-MOSTAR-SARAJEVO-ZENICA is constantly operational for the needs of the BH state.

And he continues with content and style that only few people in Zagreb think about it. Neither they cared, nor they knew or understood. The majority minds its own business in self-governing papers persistently and boringly.

Until nowadays.

And SEFER CONTINUES:

” If it's necessary, engage international forces, if necessary secure the space to our forces as well”.

IN CASE YOU FORGOT, PLOČE IS IN CROATIA.

So BH Army moved towards Ploče and Neum because, save for Mujahedins, Sefer Halilović didn't manage to engage other international forces, American or French army, for example.

Every semi-literate idiot was accusing Croats and, pissing by their own ignorance on the entire nation with imperial supremacy of ideological judgment.

Pathetic.

## D-76

It is best to read the entire book, but here it is little something about problems that emerge when war disturbs a sensitive national balance in a certain place or area.

The same topic is being discussed by M. Thatcher in a way where a great mind understands the problem.

MAPS 1.-20.

1. SITUATION IN BiH IN APRIL-MAY 1992
2. SITUATION IN HERZEGOVINA UNTIL AND AROUND APRIL 10th 1992
3. JOINT ACTIVITY OF HVO AND BH ARMY, SITUATION FROM APRIL 10th 1992-JUNE 7th 1992
4. JOINT ACTIVITY OF HVO AND BH ARMY FROM JUNE 1992 UNTIL OCTOBER 29th 1992
5. JOINT ACTIVITY OF HVO AND BH ARMY OCTOBER 29th 1992, VRS TAKES JAJCE
6. RELATIONS BETWEEN HVO AND BH ARMY - JANUARY 1993
7. ATTACK OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO - APRIL 1993
8. ATTACK OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO - MAY 1993
9. ATTACK OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO - JUNE 1993
10. RELATIONS BETWEEN HVO AND BH ARMY - JUNE 30th 1993
11. ATTACKS OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO -JULY 1993
12. SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER CONTROL OF BH ARMY AND HVO ON JULY 30th 1993
13. RELATIONS BETWEEN HVO AND BH ARMY - NOVEMBER 8th 1993
14. RATIO OF FORCES BH ARMY AND HVO, MARCH 1993, STRUCTURE AND ARRANGEMENT OF OZ SB /Operative Zone of Central Bosnia/, APRIL 1993
15. SCHEME SHOWING SEPARATION LINES WITH AGGRESSOR FORCES AND DEPLOYMENT OF HVO FORCES IN CENTRAL BOSNIA ON APRIL 1st, 1993
16. CENTRAL BOSNIA - FRONTLINES AND DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES
17. DEFENCE OF VITEZ AFTER APRIL 20th, 1993
18. HVO POSITIONS IN VITEZ, MAY 1993
19. HVO POSITIONS IN VITEZ FROM JULY 1993
20. ORGANISATION OF FORCES AND ATTACK OF THE BH ARMY ON VAREŠ, NOVEMBER 5th 1993

## D-77

### ORDER BY SEFER HALILOVIĆ THAT CANCELS THE COOPERATION BETWEEN BH ARMY AND HVO

In the document D-67, signed by Enver Hadžihasanović, commander of the 3rd Corps of BH Army we saw this at that time (January 1993) it is too early for the attacks against HVO in urban areas.

Assumptions for attack should have been made, which means, to remove all those Muslims that cooperate with Croats and political and military part of HVO.

Those Muslims, legally and democratically elected representatives of a nation, which in many places (Mostar, Konjic, Jablanica, Rama, Bugojno...) set up an administration together with Croats, became an obstacle in realization of already made plans on the "liberation" of those areas from Croats.

BH Army and SDA policy plan; in spring 1993 Alija Izetbegović, without a legal stronghold and by imposed will, dismisses elected Muslims in Jablanica, Konjic and Rama and appoints Dr. Safet Čibo.

## D-78, 79

BH Army in Konjic started with a general reckoning "with Ustahas", according to firm words of Sefer Halilović.

The political leadership of SDA prepared a field and the propaganda will do its thing –HVO always attacks.

Muslims are victims in Sarajevo and since they once became victims - a victim cannot be guilty.

How and why would 20% of Croats in Konjic, with a military power equal to one HVO battalion in town (on lines towards the VRS) and one battalion from Kostajnica (in total 600-700 soldiers) attack 4 times stronger BH Army forces?

But who cares about logic and facts?!

Let's continue reading the documents.

## D-80

April 16th 1993, Esad Ramić puts together a combat report:

- a) Zlatar establishment is surrounded and HVO seeks help; they are "on the ropes"
- b) Babin Nos is blocked
- c) "It is interesting that HVO Konjic screams for help through the radio-communication"

There you have it: it is "interesting" that HVO seeks help.

At the end, a clear message how long will BH Army do this: "UNTIL THE FINAL VICTORY!"

But not in Sarajevo, or Srebrenica or Bihać ... they should try to break the weaker one, while the entire armament was provided to them from Croatia and from HVO.

Please do not forget that this aggression was hiding under a mask of "Unfortunate Muslim-Croatian conflict in the BiH".

Who are you screwing with, you makers of that lie, nonsense, deception and for long are you going to keep doing it?

Who are you trying to trick?

## D-81/1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

Forget about signed agreements in Geneva, Vance-Owen, agreements on cessation of fights when Arif Pašalić on April 17th 1993 gives out the following order:

Item 3: "In respect to all other issues, adhere to previous orders and instructions."

On the same day, April 17th 1993 Esad Ramić reports to his commander Pašalić (4th Corps of BH Army);

"WE SHALL INTEND TO FINISH THE WORK IN KONJIC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THEN MOVE TO COUNTER ATTACK WITH ALL BRIGADES IN TWO DIRECTIONS".

1. Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar
2. Konjic-Prozor-Rama

What kind of an attack was that on HVO, against whom and from which direction, with which effects and from which army? HVO WAS NOT ATTACKING!

Pathetic, seedy lies.

They went on endlessly and both buyers and sellers were redundant for many reasons.

It is hence correct that HVO paid VRS in oil to pull out civilians and saved them from a massacre, to accommodate wounded combatants and save them from death but VRS shelled Konjic for its own military reasons.

What is contestable about that "oil", what is contestable in that "trade" – to give oil to save people, for that was the only possibility?

When human lives are being saved, "the only possibility" is the best possibility.

Do you, readers, think this shouldn't have been done?

If your son had been there, if he had been wounded, would you have done that?

Despise those criticize something when it's not their concern - in the name of your stupid and idiotic ideas, principal ones, of course.

Forthcoming documents will show that the strategic agreement between Muslims and Serbs regarding the movement towards the sea starts at that time.

Regarding to this topic you shall read Mladić's diaries.

### **D-82**

Žarko Kežić's report from April 23rd 1993 will provide you the results and success of the Muslim aggression against Croats in Konjic.

### **D-83/1**

Look at it! Please read!

AGGRESSION – ATTACK OF BH ARMY UNITS AGAINST HVO

### **D-83/2**

REMAINING POCKETS OF HVO DEFENCE – AFTER BH ARMY ATTACK

### **D-84**

Look at it and examine it.

Refute if it is untrue.

Refute with facts instead of repeating lies like a parrot and confirming it with excuses.

### **D-85**

WAR DEVELOPMENT IN BiH, ATTACK OF BH ARMY AGAINST HVO

### **D-85/1**

PLAN TO CONQUER CENTRAL BOSNIA AND BREAKING INTO NEUM AND PLOČE

### **D-86/1**

And now, about Mostar.

What is Mr. Hadžiosmanović writing about?

What is he writing about the joint announcement of Croats and Muslims and joint coming out on the streets of commanders of both armies?

I shall write a page or two about the topic later.

For the moment, please read about the Islamization of BH Army, "a partial one" (how partial)? And how this army defends BiH by acclaiming Allah's name j.sh. /Jalla Shanuhu/

Crusade wars?

### **D-86/2**

At the same time, while walking "friendly" through the streets of Mostar together with Mića Lasić, commander of HVO in that zone of operations and with Slobodan Praljak, on April 16th 1993 the very same Pašalić writes an order:

1. Continue with b/d /combat actions/ in your zone of responsibility...
2. Balance and combine joint combat actions for successful fights and BREAKING HVO FORCES

### **D-87, 88, 89**

Photograph; GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK; BY HIS SIDE ARIF PAŠALIĆ AND GENERAL MIĆA LASIĆ

It is April in Mostar and the spring is warm.

No, it is not June and lime-trees in Mostar are not fragrant like the previous year (1992) when we were liberating the town.

A group of fellows, 20-30 from BH Army, well dressed, well-armed and as far as I can remember, well-developed took the positions on RONDO.

Just like that; what are they doing on RONDO?

Besides, it is also Mate Boban's headquarters. Since the armies (BH Army and HVO) became well divided already and Rondo is way on the west side, the situation is "very close to shooting start".

I came on Rondo, invited the guys over, talked to them, convinced them and asked them to take a walk with me.

At the time they still trusted me from before; they knew I wasn't making difference among soldiers.

Arif Pašalić also came, invited, as well as Mića Lasić, invited too and so we took a walk, had a coffee and talked.

The situation calmed down for a short while.

Was HUKA with us?

A double game, a double policy, too much pressure from above.

Later I went to the premises of SDA in Mostar on the left bank and talked, convinced and explained; Pašalić and Hujka joined me. Of course, soon they dismissed Hadžiosmanović and people like him.

Forces that conducted war against Croats already became too important; it was worth trying to oppose to those powerful fields.

In vain.

But I knew that from before.

Too many various players were heating up the flame.



### D-90

Arif Pašalić had already cleansed Konjic from Croats, issued orders on “BREAKING HVO FORCES”, sent guys on Rondo to provoke an incident, took a walk, had coffee with me and then he writes to UNPROFOR that HVO was preparing the attack against him and his army under my supervision and the supervision of the HV /Croatian Army/ brigades and HVO.

The man is deceased but he is a liar par excellence.

A bit later you will see a document, an order on the attack against HVO which was already drafted at the time.

### D-91

Who can cross the bridge over Neretva River in Mostar?

Who determines that?

### D-92

Preparations for attack of the 4th BH Army Corps against HVO in Mostar started.

### D-93

Deployment of BH Army forces in the town of Mostar.

Preparations for attack against HVO.

### D-94

Who is in control of the Bijela Bridge?

Who is blocking the main road?

Why? Against whom?

In order to give to all this ado an even greater significance of danger to Muslims “that are being attacked by two types of fascism” – “Ustashas and Chetniks” – HV must always follow HVO.

### D-95

Army members mined the Bijela Bridge; they had control over that bridge and took it down, I think, in October 1993. In the meantime, they took journalists through some mountain paths in order to convince them they were being blocked.

It is a good, false story, accepted by many.

### D-96

BH Army and SDA policy did the work in Konjic.

In order to reinforce all this they brought Zulfikar Ališpaćo – Zuka and gave him jurisdiction outside Pašalić's (in order

to keep all possible arrangements between those involved secret).

The Spanish battalion was indeed impotent.

Also they will not be able to guarantee safety to multi-party delegation of the RH Parliament that wanted to visit Konjic several days later.

Read their report on the website.

### D-97

Bajro Pizović, commander of BH Army brigade deployed in the area of Stolac – Dubrava Plateau prepares attack against HVO of Stolac and Čapljina. “Secure control on direction Buna – Gubavica, control the area of Stanojevići village, control and close direction Žitomislići – Pijesci – Bivolje Brdo – Pijesci”.

“Control the following directions with forces deployed in villages on direction Čapljina – Domanovići; Tasovčići – Domanovići, Počitelj – Muminovače, Ševač Polje – Bivolje Brdo”.

Where are the positions of VRS?

What are the units doing in villages 20 km away from positions of VRS?

The “plan to use units of brigades for combat activities... and a deadline to carry out the said tasks is April 19th 1993 until 12:00” when the documents should be brought to commander Bajro Pizović to be inspected and attested.

### D-98

On the same day, April 19th 1993, an order on the attack of BH Army against HVO was written in Mostar.

All is set and “at signal – CANCER 625 – commence the general attack on all locations and on given directions”.

Signed by commander Midhad Hujdur.

On which direction they attack and who they attack you may read in the order and see on the map, given to your disposal.

### D-99, 100, 101

And then, general Bo Pellnas appeared in Mostar.

Through great efforts and huge energy invested, with help of the UN Spanish battalion and with complete cooperation of HVO, a solution on division of forces was reached.

I also was an important contributor to it.

Document D-101 speaks about obstruction of the agreement from the BH Army side.

It postponed the realization of the attack PLAN.

### D-102

Several documents under this number, my dear readers, will clearly show you what Arif Pašalić, commander of the 4th BH Army Corps, requisitioned in the town of Mostar with his signature.

What right and whose right?

What civil power and whose civil power?

That isn't all what this military dictatorship took, but it is far enough for you to understand the work this is all about.

HVO was, more or less, silently accepting it because it would have been far greater "aggressor" against the unprotected Muslim people.

Look at the map which I enclose which is drawn according to the documents.

### D-103

As soon as general Bo Pellnas left Mostar, convinced that he achieved something, Arif Pašalić and company from BH Army continue with their plans.

It has all been planned much earlier on higher political and military levels and it cannot be stopped.

Item 3.

I indeed ask for your patience and attention while reading this document.

Hence, "at the meeting held on April 17th 1993 at 22:00, the following is orally stated (ordered);

DO NOT START ACTIVITIES WITHOUT AN ORDER  
LINK-UP WITH OUR MEN IN HVO WAS CARRIED  
OUT!!!

What does it say here and what does that mean?

Muslims from BH Army linked-up with Muslim members of HVO, planning to attack Croats and HVO.

Everywhere in the world, in every army and at any given time this was TREASON and HIGH TREASON.

COURT-MARTIAL JUDGMENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN  
SHORT – DEATH BY

a) SHOOTING

b) HANGING

Depending on the tradition of the sentence.

Further on in the text, after they enumerate what must be taken and blocked behind HVO's back, in the background, Arif Pašalić writes:

"Taking of the town of Stolac with our men in HVO".

What about people in HVO that aren't "ours, aren't Muslims?

They should be either captured or killed because the plan cannot be implemented differently.

Documents that follow will present further development of the story.

Yes, and:

"MB 60 1'82 were set for activities against HVO".

I request that some president of RH gives his urgent apology to the Muslims on behalf of Croats, of course.

Please, by the way, let him apologize to the Serbs as well, because we must have done something wrong to them too, nonetheless we did not surrender just like that and we did not move like livestock to be slaughtered, which was rather expected from Croats.

Everything else is either nationalism or Ustasha ideology.

FUCK YOU COMRADES!

### D-104

Read the document under this number.

Deny and refute if something is not correct.

I especially turn your attention to the capturing of MIRO ANDRIĆ.

At that time Colonel Andrić was deputy chief of the HVO Main Staff, general Petković. Colonel Andrić was a member of the joint HVO and BH Army command which is established pursuant to agreed and signed Vance-Owen plan. Colonel Andrić went to the meeting of the joint BH Army and HVO command. Colonel Andrić, for the reasons of common decency and pride, does not accurately write what exactly happened to him and his escort, the way they were mistreated and humiliated.

I will not write about it either.

### D-105

BH Army and units of the 4th Corps attacked HVO troops on May 9th 1993 in Mostar, after long preparations.

Several days before, some sort of psychological demarcation line was agreed (Bo Pellnas) in order to prevent incident turning into a conflict of the armies. The line Bulevar – along Šantićeva street and Carinski Bridge.

Deep on the west side in "Vranica" building, the command of the 4th corps as well as the command of the 41st motorized BH Army brigade and RADIO MOSTAR, Arif's radio and his propaganda remained there and worked without being disturbed.

It is all accurately and truly recorded by Mr. Hadžiosmanović.

### D-106

Documents under this number show reactions of HVO, to be more precise, of general Mića Lasić, commander of the OZ JIH /Zone of Operations of the South-East

Herzegovina/, hence, defense of Mostar , when it came to BH Army attack against HVO on May 9th 1993 in Mostar.

He seeks help in manpower, armament and ambulance.

He writes to UNPROFOR.

HVO managed to defend itself.

### **D-107**

However, the President's statement (read Alija Izetbegović's statement), adopted in the Security Council, reads that "HVO are paramilitary units of Bosnian Croats".

There is nothing about Konjic (the Croats carried out an attack)!

About Mostar – the Croats carried out an attack!

Please, Mile Akmadžić is Prime Minister of BiH and it is his letter to Vorontsov.

The propaganda does its business, there is no truth indeed and the facts are trivial banality.

This has been going on until nowadays!

### **D-108**

A truce, after BH Army attack failed. A truce.

Truce lasts shortly, since no one ever analyses who and why carried out the attack and there is no referee, there are no guarantors and no implementing factors of the signed document.

### **D-109**

What was the purpose of Radio Mostar, who was in charge and what kind of propaganda that was?

### **D-110**

HVO is taking care that humanitarian convoys pass through, that people and the army attacking HVO are fed, let it be fed.

Please read what the international rules of war say about humanitarian help to the opposite side.

### **D-111**

And while the situation in Mostar is "calm" for a short period, BH Army "liberates" the Central Bosnia from Croats.

As to this topic you can review the enclosed maps.

On June 5th 1993 letters are written, not only letters by Bruno Stojić, about what was going on in Central Bosnia.

In enclosed documents please look at BH Army and HVO force deployment in that area; look at the forces ratio within enclosed documents and once again read Alagić's and Hadžihasanović's documents, as well as Sefer Halilović's plans.

What kind of a brain do people have who say that HVO carried attacked BH Army?

### **D-112**

Despite all, HVO remains a multi-national army (unlike VRS and BH Army).

Go through that document.

### **D-113**

In order to capitalize the military victory of BH Army against HVO in Konjic and Jablanica and create better conditions for further attacks against HVO, 6th Corps of the BH Army was established on June 9th 1993 in Konjic.

### **D-114**

This document provides, in a clear, precise, true, intellectual and factually right manner, basic causes of war, reasons of BH Army attacking the Croats and everything else.

Dr. Franjo Tuđman was and remained a supreme man over the hanger-ons around him even after his time, and it is more than clear that they wanted to "detuđmanize" him at any costs. Nonetheless, it is not possible to communicate differently with such people because they, even when speaking about goats (and goats eat leaves and we shall have less fires), talk about historical statement, historical event and historical turning point, which is once-in-a-lifetime significant thought, whereas they alone are the historical turning point; they open and "close" stories and lead people with a contemplative strength of a pathogen virus.

They are turned to the future where a light above their heads awaits us.

For the name of God, all indicators tell us that history becomes worse and worse.

And by the way, pissing against the wind is also a historical phenomenon.

### **D-115**

BH Army had in its Main Staff leadership two generals, YNA officers, a Croat Stjepan Šiber and a Serb Jovan Divjak.

Two tiny ornaments that waved in front of the very nose of the international community with a statement on the multinational composition of BH Army.

It is the same Šiber to whom Sefer Halilović is saying that general Petković was Ustasha as well, as all those down there in HVO, except Šiber who is not Ustasha.

Šiber is quiet, does not respond, does not react and adjusts because it is not a small thing when Sefer grants amnesty to USTASHA IDEOLOGY.

What does On June 25th 1993, Stjepan Šiber write FOR THE ATTENTION of Alija Izetbegović and Sefer Halilović.

The meeting takes place in Zenica and president of the municipal government Ramiz Đaferović is speaking (if I misspelled the name, I apologize):

- as a citizen I am disappointed in 3rd corps; the leadership of the corps is involved in pillaging and crime

- there are seniors that erase people after pillaging.

Who is saying that and who is he saying it to?

TO ŠIBER, KARIĆ AND VRANJ.

Read again.

The meeting takes place in Zenica and the district president Hodžić and the president of the municipal government HARAČIĆ says:

- Merdan is the chief in charge of religious units

- Severe criminals are in command of Zenica and 3rd BH Army corps units who do not wish to do so, because they are not comfortable with the victory against Chetniks, but they are comfortable with the conflicts involving HVO.

Who is saying that, where and what is that all about; who is familiar with the situation? Izetbegović, Halilović?

FOR THE ATTENTION OF!

What changed?

In which village and when were 35 Croats killed and in which village and when were 30 Croats shot and who did it?

Read Šiber's report entirely in order to find an answer.

What is bothering Mr. Divjak, Delić's deputy on August 28th 1993?

Delić is now commander of BH Army.

Divjak is bothered with the fact that he is just a STATIONARY FIGURE, however he will continue to practice it quite persistently.

We shall protest a bit, politely, just to satisfy tiny moral doubts, however not even Šiber as Croat shall respond powerfully and consistently, like a "woman".

I shall not write down he should have reacted like a man because it is actually very rare among men.

It is a type of human being who is, in order to keep a certain position, adaptable to the point of obnoxiousness.

## **D-116, 117, 118, 119, 120**

June 30th 1993 BH Army again attacked HVO in Mostar, Stolac, Dubrava Plateau, Bijelo Polje and Livno.

This time, even Muslims in the HVO turned their arms against their fellow combatants.

Pathetic!! Treason!!

Do not get excited, for another decade and a half Haris Silajdžić will tell you a different story and mess up with your brain until you go crazy. Fed-up with his "spices" you shall come to him and apologize to him and his army and his obnoxious arrogance.

Bravo, bravissimo!

## **D-121**

The documents clearly show that the terrorist groups of the BH Army and the former members of the HVO – Muslims attacked the HVO by treason.

In a single day they killed 23 HVO soldiers outside of battlefield line and without a fight; allies, the same ones that, while running before the YNA and the VRS, were located in Međugorje, the very same, trained by the HVO, armed and equipped.

It was not a battle for BiH, it was a battle, assault, attack, aggression against the HVO and CROATS in order to conquer space, a territory for the Muslim state from "Islamic Declaration".

## **D-122, a, b, c**

a) Units of the 1st BH Army Corps extract units from Sarajevo are transported to Mostar.

(Please, don't you ever forget that Sarajevo and Mostar are in encirclement according to continuous propaganda).

A task should have been completed until 15th of August 1993; they indeed felt powerful and sure about a great victory after treason and initial successes.

b) After Bugojno, the 3rd BH Army corps should "successfully drive away the remaining forces of HVO". Nonetheless, in Bugojno as well, the forces of BH Army carried out an attack against HVO forces from the back and in a perfidious manner while they were located on positions towards VRS.

c) IN MOSTAR – attack towards the south – let's go to Neum, let's go to Ploče.

## **D-123**

I give you 6 documents of HVO to examine them in order to see who is attacking, where and whom, what is going on with the truce, who adheres to it, who does not, who deceives and executes huge propaganda that HVO is attacking BH Army.

They successfully launched the story.

There were many of those (and there still are such people) to whom the guilt of Croats represents a lucrative occupation, regardless of political or personal aspect; it is all under one single motto: let's break them, demoralize them, make them feel guilty, let's mix up their language so they wouldn't have

any idea what they are talking about, let's make them unable to differ moral from the lack of it...

IN A SINGLE WORD – LET'S MAKE THAT GOOD CHEAPER AND ADVERTISE SALES.

## D-124

In my opinion it is the right thing to do if we put documents of the aggressors, rivals and attackers in front of the reader.

Read what is Šefko Hodžić saying about the aggression against HVO because he follows the operation "Neretva 93" directly; he hangs with Sefer Halilović and company and reports to the public daily.

I shall quote several paragraphs:

1. "We spoke about battles and commanders. I asked Delić whether he believed that those peace talks would indeed bring peace or they were merely "the war ornaments".

- I think they are merely ornaments and that the war would go on – he responded.

- Only damage comes from negotiations – Sefer added – the moral of combatants is decreasing...

- What are you saying there, Sefer: "We shall reach Ploče too" – says Delić, smiling to Sefer, making allusion to a recent Sefer's statement that our army would "reach Ploče". Huge waves were made in Croatian press after his statement.

Also smiling, Sefer explains to us how did this faux pas of his come into being?

- I spoke on the gathering of Podrinje inhabitants – he told us – I said that we would liberate each part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that our army will reach Bosnian borders and reach Neum too. At that moment someone from the first row shouted: "We will reach Ploče too!". And I said, "Well, so be it, we will reach Ploče too"!

2. "So far this is our biggest operation – says Sefer. – If it succeeds, we shall completely change the strategic situation in our country. So shall President Izetbegović have strong aces in negotiations for the first time."

3. "In front of the Prozor battalion command Sefer again held a speech to the combatants of Prozor and Neretva. He spoke about the significance of this "first offensive of ours". And then he added that this offensive that starts tomorrow "coincidentally corresponds to the date when I, two years ago, on September 13th 1991 secretly started to organize the Patriotic League."

This coincidence with the date of our first offensive and the date of establishing the Patriotic League was also effective. However, Sefer was not saying the truth, because, later, in that huge interview with them, he stated that he left YNA on 18th, 19th or 20th of September 1991 and after several days of checks, he joined the work with the Patriotic League. Hence "it is not quite the date when the first offensive starts".

When Sefer finished his speech, everyone remained silent for a short while. And then one of the combatants screamed: "Long live comrade Tito!". We all laughed. The combatants were pleased that Sefer was with them, and so was Sefer, for being among them. Sefer tells them:

"This is the real thing – to be on the field with the combatants! I want to take the brigade and command it.

He was thrilled with the combat motivation of the fighters.

"We will free entire Bosnia, isn't that right, Čibo? – He addresses Čibo who was standing next to us. – There is no division of Bosnia. We shall wage war for ten years but we shall liberate it entirely.

– Not a chance! What division?! – says Čibo.

4. "So far there hasn't been any bigger operation since the beginning of the war – says Sefer. – This is, actually, our first offensive, because in the morning, the front from Bugojno to Mostar shall burst into flames."

5. "Since the front length in operation "Neretva" was some 200 kilometers, I decided to follow battles from the forwarded command posts where information flow in, in order to send them to the redaction immediately. It was completely different to follow battles on Žuča where the commanders managed battles from the first lines."

6. "BH Army Main Staff reported on the battles. On Tuesday, September 21st, BH Army Main Staff reported more than I did; apart from liberation of Medved, they reported on liberation of Velika Vlainja and Vratnice village.

Of course, there were also reports on liberation of Hum, Raštani and Semovac in Mostar, as well as on pushing away HVO forces from Vojno mountain, which was one of the strongholds "of HVO extremists on the left bank of Neretva River, from Drežnica to Blagaj".

However, immediately after we returned to Sarajevo, on Wednesday, September 22nd, at 13:00 hrs Radio BiH broadcasted information that a truce was signed between BH Army and HVO in Vrđi, as well as that fighting in Herzegovina is stopped. It was also mentioned that present Zagreb Mufti, Šefko Eff. Omerbašić took part in those truce negotiations in Herzegovina.

That news confused us. Having that information, the command of the 4th Corps on the same day requested from the Main Staff an explanation "what does that mean regarding further activities in the zone of responsibility of the 4th corps". It has never been determined who launched that false news.

On that exact day, in the evening I met Dr. Safet Čibo. He went to see Sefer Halilović. Dr. Čibo tells me that he spent 4 hours with president Izetbegović yesterday. "The president is eager to fight", says Čibo and adds that president Izetbegović yesterday said the following to him: "Liberate Stolac as soon as possible!". He also added several times "hurry, hurry!".

Ćibo went along to see Sefer in order to inform him about the conversation he had with president Izetbegović.

So, there is no question about some truce that was, allegedly, signed.

7. "I asked Ćilić and Zajka whether they stick to this order and whether they would attack HVO on Pisvir the day after.

– We do not believe that HVO would respect the truce. Do you? – says Ćilić.

I went to the command of Zulfikar unit in Donja Jablanica to ask Sefer, who probably got the order on cessation of combat actions between BH Army and HVO, whether we go back to Sarajevo. Sefer, however, was not in Zuka base. Nihad Bojadžić was there though. He tells me that they prepared "a severe war trick" for this new battle towards Vrđi and Mostar.

– What kind of trick? – I ask. – The one that Tito prepared here in the 4th offensive – says Nihko.

8. "Indeed, how did the truce between BH Army and HVO come into force last night at 18:00 hrs, what the radio reported constantly yesterday and this morning. I guess I should start my report with HVO attacking first. Besides, the rule of war reporting was in force at the moment – that "they always attack first and we always defend ourselves."

9. "And while the two of them talked, "Zoka" interrupted the communication and informed Sefer that Haris Silajdžić wanted to talk to him, being at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs. "Zoka" put Silajdžić and Sefer through.

Silajdžić said: Please Sefer, reduce the activities down there, because they are not in accordance with president Izetbegović's peace initiative. You know that president is in peace talks with president Tuđman...

-But HVO stroke first and we had to strike back –Sefer interrupted him. We laughed."

Reader! Think on your own, make your own conclusions!

I will merely say that their OFFENSIVE went to hell.

I will show you how many men they have lost in one of the forthcoming documents.

And I again kindly ask you to forget about stories about an "unfortunate conflict between Muslims and Croats"!

## D-125

The document is about the following aim of the BH Army, Sefer and others:

"Definitive break of Chetnik-Ustasha fascism and liberation of BiH".

Doesn't it say so for the umpteenth time?

So it is being said at the military counseling of the BH Army in Zenica on August 21st and 22nd 1993, isn't that right?

## D-126

Documents under this number are the documents of BH Army and show us that BH Army is attacking, that BH Army is attacking HVO and that the forces of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th BH Corps are engaged - heavy artillery, helicopters and that the aim is Neretva Valley, Mostar, Neum, etc.

This is just to make sure we learned the lesson in a proper manner in order to start to "make peace".

## D-127

How does HVO behave regarding to wounded BH Army combatants and Muslim civilians, despite the aggression?

Again, I kindly ask you, read carefully!

## D-128

In the course of the aggression of BH Army against HVO from Bugojno onwards, many crimes against Croatian civilians were committed in its conquering movement towards the sea.

The documents are here.

There is no Central Bosnia here, whereas those crimes against Croats, committed by someone from BH Army were published by me in another book.

Well, now, who committed those crimes, individuals, units, groups, according to an order (oral or written), or by encouraging, approving, in a planned manner, or by covering up or keeping it secret...

I HAVE NO IDEA.

However, in the name of God, look at the data, look at the numbers, names and last names and ask yourselves where the processes are, where the culprits are and who should apologize to whom and on behalf of which policy and ethnicity?

If you care about the truth!

## D-129

"A secret agreement on the confederation" was signed in Geneva on September 14th 1993 between Dr. Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović. It says what it says there and it is all well written in that agreement. However, it is necessary to read the next document as well.

## D-130

Two days later the same Izetbegović in that same Geneva on September 16th 1993, in the same year and month, prepares a completely different story with Serbs and Momčilo Krajišnik.

a) Cease with all hostilities between BH Army and VRS “IN ACCORDANCE with agreement from July 30th 1993”.

Hence, you have, my dear gentlemen, already on July 30th agreed to refrain from carrying out an attack – so that the Army can easily go against HVO.

b) What is with the territory under control of HVO; you already share the Neretva Valley and who cares about the Croats.

You, my BH Army gentlemen, have already counted on the victory against HVO.

A BIT TOO EARLY!

c) You divide BiH, talk about a Union, anticipate a referendum, whereas the Muslim state, when it all goes to hell, would keep all international rights of the BiH, for example a membership in the UN.

Now, you can go on with feasts (symposiums) and discuss the topic who and how divided BiH, continue with blabbering, monkey business, stammering and sell your damned ideas around.

So many deceptions, political lies and quick-buck schemes in this BOSNIAN stew.

Please, produce one single deception and lie from the Croatian side!

### D-131

Do you remember document D-125 (counseling, military, BH Army) and thundering Sefer Halilović (he looks like an Olympic God) screaming about “the definitive break of Chetnik-Ustasha fascism...”

It remained a secret where Sefer broke “Chetniks” until today, however, his first big offensive being (to him and Alagić) the attack against HVO, which is what they are saying, that it is true.

And now, not even a month later, on September 17th 1993 and in accordance with the AGREEMENT dated July 30th 1993, Stjepan Šiber ORDERS.

Why do you sign it, my dear Stjepan, why not Delić, you decorative plant of the multi-national character of BH Army?

### D-132

Documents of BH Army with orders to attack HVO show it all clearly, like on a clear summer day at noon.

The formula is simple, we sign the agreement with VRS (Serbs), liberate the units for the attack against HVO; let’s even sign truce and confederation with Croats and please the international community which can further on be proud of its peaceful success, let’s continue to “defend” ourselves

from HVO (because “as it is known”) HVO always strikes first, let’s conquer the territory and then we will again sit around the negotiating table, now with completely different military and political conditions.

It is all ok, there are no problems, except that Croats swallow this shitty tricks like oysters, like strawberries and drink that hodgepodge that smells of deceiving odor which has been brought to perfection in these areas throughout centuries; they drink that bad drink like it was a French champagne (whereas champagne can only and exclusively be French), smile like Indian cows and pop their eyes like “Hera the cow-eyed”.

### D-133

And now, again, let’s see what the commanders of BH Army write about?

This time it is Esad Šejtanić, commander of BH Army OG /Operative Group/ “SOUTH” – Mostar, 4th Corps of the BH Army.

Correction; unfortunately they had more than 70 killed combatants in that attack and not because of the truce and retreat. Those are Esad’s excuses for failures. And it is not the same, not at all, my dear reader; HVO “did cooperate” with VRS in order to pull out civilians and wounded combatants and to treat wounded combatants in their hospitals because we couldn’t transport them to our hospitals and in order to defend from Army aggression – Vareš, Konjic (Turija, Zabrđe) but we have never, ever cooperated with VRS in order to attack someone or carried out a certain action together.

Never, ever.

### D-134

Look at the photographs...

### D-135

Documents are at your disposal just to make sure at the end that all what is presented in these comments is stated as an assertion.

a) BH Army attacks HVO

b) Before each attack they write they were attacked by HVO

c) They attack before truce, at the time of truce and they violated EVERY TRUCE.

d) They lie in Geneva, in Sarajevo, Delić lies, Halilović lies, Izetbegović lies, Pašalić and Silajdžić lie as well as others.

Simply, they LIE.

e) When, eventually, they failed in their intention, LET’S REACH THE SEA – NEUM – PLOČE (along with VRS) they blame everybody.

### D-136

A lie about snipers and sniper shooters is a special lie, but that is a rather extensive topic that requests a technical support and we will discuss it some other time more extensively.

### D-137

Yes, Mr. Izetbegović (may Allah j.sh. give you peace), that kind of BiH that you wanted both politically and territorially structured is impossible. It is not even possible with YNA aggression and Mladić's cleansings not even with a desire that Serbs rein 70% of the territory.

In late 1993, you had to again blame Ustashas and Chetniks, Serbian and Croatian fascism which breaks you in half.

You are not fair, you are an ignorant in both political and military sense.

You foraged, made agreements that you broke the day after each time, denying them and betraying them from the beginning to the end.

All this was mostly paid by your people, unfortunately by Croats too and without their help you wouldn't have had BiH long before this speech of yours, whereas sufferings of your people would have been far scarier.

And believe me; you should be grateful to these Croatian people, both in BiH and in Croatia, not to mention how grateful you should be to Dr. Franjo Tuđman.

There are also Šušak and the RH Government, doctors, citizens, Parliament and, and .....

### D-138

Even the BH HSS/Croatian Peasant Party/ the comrade Komšić, felt hurt by Alija's statements and so they reacted. This group reacts just in cases when they are severely pissed at.

### D-139

The penultimate document of this book, and again a certain BH Army general, along with the facts.

It could have been a lie if I would say it; like this, how could you not believe in the accuracy of presented assertions.

1. HAKALOVIĆ, AKA "Homeini" is an Islamic religious official and he became commander of BH Army brigade. Check on the website [www.slobodanpralj.com](http://www.slobodanpralj.com) the line-up of that brigade in Jablanica and tell me whose army this is and what does it fight for and what its fighters will fight for in the future?

Who is more important to Izetbegović, who is he talking to

and who is he leaving in front of the door?

Even back then you didn't want to know, neither can you discern the signs of the time, nor you are interested in hearing the truth. For supreme "communist" minds the facts are a banality which deserves no attention at all.

2. Dreković precisely quotes the power of BH Army 6th Corps, starting from the manpower and finishing with the artillery.

And they were "barehanded"?!

Who gave them or yielded to them heavy artillery, where did they get it from?

3. Same topic!

4. Look at the table of killed and wounded members of BH Army 4th Corps in 1992. They fought against VRS – 103 killed, 99 wounded combatants. In 1993 they attacked HVO – 312 killed and 523 wounded combatants of BH Army.

Who was at the end the main enemy of BH Army 6th Corps –VRS or HVO?

5. Dreković writes about pushing Croats and HVO away from the remaining enclaves around Konjic and offering money, as well as the fact that the Army combatants did not allow the implementation of the agreement on the "great-Serbian" and "great-Croatian" policy on division of the Republic of BiH.

That is the reason why they, after the 1993 spring attack against HVO and Croats (along with crimes they committed which are at your disposal) now expelled the rest of them too from the enclaves that managed to sustain in terms of military.

When the guys from HVO didn't want to receive money and went away bribed "as gentlemen", Dreković found it rather strange and peculiar.

And who was the big boss of that ethnic cleansing of the remaining Croats from Konjic for money?

Haris Silajdžić, the money ruler from Islamic states, billions of money, which had been agreed in Zagreb, Vienna and Graz, the money that was taken and divided exclusively by the MUSLIM state officials of the BiH.

Look at the document D-139-2. Examine those documents and you will understand that you cannot, not ever, apologize to that man or his policy.

Ask the Croats from Konjic whether it makes sense.

When a bomb exploded in Mostar, set by a certain Islamic fundamentalist, on the same day Haris Silajdžić, without and before any investigation, without court and law he publicly accused Croats for blowing their own device up.

That man, an evil spirit of the Bosnian policy towards Croats still sells his ideas as European.



He will never apologize to anyone, because Haris Silajdžić is a PILLAR OF MORALITY.

6. Table; strength of the BH Army 4th Corps.

7. It is very important, after Šejtanić, to read what Dreković is saying about it – does BH Army, 6th and 4th Corps actually have soldiers turned against VRS.

No, they don't, from Konjic to south of Mostar they've got watchtowers (for negotiations, trafficking and others), they have no army.

It is because, my dear reader, they have a joint military and political plan – to divide coast from Ploče to Dubrovnik between themselves.

You find it unusual? There is time, you will find out about it.

International community? Remember the plan Z-4, those players didn't care about anything else except for the termination of hostilities. When it came to principles and conditions for peace, nobody cared about that unless it was the question of one's own skin, instead of some Balkan guys who those humanists see as unable to resist the mutual bloodshed.

Don't they keep doing it from Berlin Congress onwards, being utterly stupid and persistent in it?

To our detriment.

8. Please read, in order to avoid "wrong assumptions" and "reduction" as basic logical errors of every bad judgment in future analyses of the war.

9. Table; losses of BH Army 4th Corps.

579 killed and 1168 wounded combatants in attacks against HVO in 1993.

It is the year when they did not wage war against VRS.

Look at those numbers.

## D-140

No comment!?

And now, at the end I should write something "smart" and "significant" and "round up the topic". But what could that be?

A KIND REQUEST?

Check the facts, please and if they are right, accept them as part of the attitude and speech.

And why is that?

Because, just like in Yugoslav KINGDOM, as well as in SFRY and everywhere else, this quantity of lies, turned into the truth is merely a basis and a cause for repeated bloodshed.

There is no reconciliation on such bases, no understanding and no good future.

No small political expressions of love, hugging and pattering on the back won't change a thing.

Especially false, untrue and ridiculous excuses or convictions of those small gods that they "would close up the historical story" as soon as they appear somewhere. It doesn't work that way; the post-war period is a very, very hard job, responsible, serious, hard, painful, sensitive and sore.

To those who wish to work in this way I say and beg them, do not allow to be silenced, don't allow those illusionists to continue doing what they did in SFRY and which led to aggression and crimes.

And they claimed it for years, everything was the best it could be; it was the best of all the worlds.

An Idyll.

This entire communist phalange ran into democracy in a stampede and continued dictatorship, tyranny of lies and ado.

Dictatorship of liberal democracy, chat-rooms of ignorants, those who found themselves a secure position and careless ones that spit, piss and shit on their ideological rivals, to those who think differently; those who lie and accuse without any efficient legal regulation (which would sanction all that) without a slightest moral responsibility.

My dear reader, to them a "fact" is an obstacle, unnecessary fuss, whereas in the real world of knowledge most of those Ostap Benders wouldn't have anything to eat.

Because of that and exclusively because of that, because of the money they collect without having it earned, they sustain and fight for the society in which it is wrong, unimportant and vulgar to count donkey's teeth if one wants to find out how many teeth does a donkey have.

To talk, discuss and blabber about the number of donkey's teeth at the meetings, symposiums, well paid and air-conditioned meetings for years continuously enables a good life to those scholastic communists.

That work shall continue; they mostly silenced the others – until the final joint social bankruptcy.

In God's name – utter a word and save your soul.

Slobodan Praljak

1. U skladu s izvješćima iz terena, odnosno obavještenjima, utvrđeno je da su se u toku operacija, odnosno u toku napredovanja, izvršile sledeće korekcije, odnosno obaveštavanja:

1. Avijaciju je koristio za izviđanje i napredovanje u daljim naprednim dejstvima u pravcu: Nevesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. 1. lje, s. Blano - s. Izvala - Popovo i izbiti u Siroi rejon Stoca uz pomoć i podršku Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbiti povoljne uslove za dalja dejstva u pravcu: Stolac - Metković.

2. Od 26.05.1992. godine sve snage i jedinice koje su se nalazile u terenu objedinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu: 23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.atbr - Tuzla, 13.atbr - Nevesinjska, 13.mop, 13.mop, 13.enb, 13.atb, PZ Kude NK i PZO, OZ i OTO Ljubinje koji se predpočinje u toku napredovanja.

3. Odlučio sam nastaviti sa odbranom u pravcu: s. Klopai, na sadašnjoj liniji, odnosno u zoni 23.brTO, uz pomoć i podršku, na liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trnava - s. Drebai - s. Kalđerdevići - s. Klopai.

4. Cilj: sprečiti prodor neprijatelja u terenu Hercegovine.

5. U PVO težište izati na organizaciju PVO.

oslobođenja preciznosti i kvalitete

klipnim avionima i helikopterima.

očekivati je na pravcima: Mostar  
Trebilje - s. Ravno - Popovo po-  
polje, sa verovatnim namjerama  
svalinanskog Divlji, raseći zonu  
ljanjem u Popovo polje stvoriti  
dubinsku teritoriju istočne Herce-

na prostoru istočne Hercegovine  
odu Hercegovačkog korpusa, usta-  
rebinijska, 10.mtbr - Mostarska,  
poap, 13. lap PVO, 13.bVP, 13.bv,  
OTO Borci, te OOTO Berkovići-Stolac  
veju 23.brTO i OOTO Trebinje/472.mt  
om odbranom na delu fronta s.  
liniji odbrane 13. korpusa, usta-  
s sa 472.mtbr organizovati odbra-  
ebilje - s. Orahov Do - V. Peći-  
Vlačnik.

kroz zonu odbrane i dalje kroz

iji VOJ-a i preduzimanju mere

### How Bosnia was Divided up

Up to that point, the division of Bosnia was a behind-the-scenes affair: the story about a sovereign and integral state was regarded in public as authoritative. Even I fell for the integral part, and this was actually the fundamental and main reason why IZETBEGOVIĆ and I parted ways. I believed his public declarations even after I had first been presented with the "division" variant. This was as far back as November 1992. On that day I was in my office, planning to visit the units in the afternoon. At some point, the President phoned me in person. I was surprised:

"Oh, it is you Mr President." He said: "My secretary is busy," and he asked me what I was up to. I told him that I was preparing some short orders. "Could you come and see me?" he asked. "Of course," I replied and immediately set off. I found IZETBEGOVIĆ and GANIĆ in IZETBEGOVIĆ's office. When I entered, I greeted them: "Es-selamu alejkum /greetings/, Mr President. Hi, GANIĆ." This was my usual joke with GANIĆ, which GANIĆ was usually cross about in private. Then I would say to him: "But you are a Yugoslav." And that is how it usually finished. But on that occasion, as soon as I greeted them I asked if I was disturbing them, since I got that impression that they were in the middle of a serious discussion. They replied: "No, no, do sit down. You are a member of the Presidency." I sat down, and they continued their discussion:

"What does Suljo say?" GANIĆ asked Alija. The President turned towards me and said:

"It is a good thing that you are listening to this discussion. I spoke on the phone to UGLJANIN and I asked him ..." he turned to GANIĆ, "would the people in Sandžak agree to swap Sandžak for Eastern Herzegovina?"

"And what did Suljo say?" asked GANIĆ, who is all aflutter whenever he speaks to Alija and I constantly have the impression that he will end up any minute in Alija's lap. And IZETBEGOVIĆ, cool and calm, as if he were talking about moving a box of matches from one pocket to another, replied:

"Suljo said that the people in Sandžak would embrace it enthusiastically."

I was so disturbed that I lit a cigarette. At the time Alija was trying not to smoke, so all of us around him tried to control ourselves and not light up until he lit up himself. I lit up and they continued the discussion. GANIĆ said:

"That would be great."

"Of course it would be great. To get the people together, sort out the country and to get on with our business," the President contentedly replied. I had the impression that they had completely forgotten about me while they were considering this idea, when GANIĆ turned towards me and said:

"What do you think of this?"

"I do not think anything. The first thought that came to mind was that I was very surprised, Mr GANIĆ," I replied seriously and continued: "because this will have several consequences that will need a head that is much cleverer than the head of a soldier like me. In any case, whenever we attempt to say anything that you would classify as politics, you get very cross. And you consider as politics anything that does not agree with your opinion, so I would rather not express my opinion on anything."

By then I was already very much aware of the fact that you could dabble in politics as much as you liked, as long as you supported their views. Otherwise, as soon as you have an opinion of your own, they immediately remind you that you are a soldier. GANIĆ ignored my comment, but continued to try to engage me in the discussion. I stuck to my guns, saying that this was politics, that this should be discussed by the Presidency, the Government, political parties ... Alija also joined in and said to me: "We know you have a good understanding of it and that you have your own opinion. But remember: only a fool never changes his mind. It is very important to us what you think and you should tell us."

"All right," I complied, "First, this would mean an division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic lines and the destruction of a thousand-year-long Bosnian state, which I think is unacceptable, to say the least. Nor do I think that we have the right to do this. Second, this would mean creating some sort of miniature Muslim state, and it is very debatable how this would be accepted by the international community. Third, this would include mass or, as MOLJEVIĆ called them, humane resettlement of people. Stalin did this in the Soviet Union and it proved to be completely wrong. Four, this would also represent a violation of the R BH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Constitution and the rejection of the platform that we, as a Presidency, adopted with great difficulties. Five, in addition, this seems a little immature. Because, in the end, Eastern Herzegovina is for now firmly in KARADŽIĆ's hold, and Sandžak is under MILOŠEVIĆ.

As soon as I said this, they both stood up. I stood up too. Alija said to GANIĆ:

"Didn't I tell you that there was no point in talking to him about this subject? He insisted on the sovereign, integral, indivisible and he is sticking to it."

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There was only one more occasion when we spoke openly and directly about this matter: in the plane, on our way back from Geneva.

This was, in any case, a different journey. We set off from Sarajevo on 1 January 1993.

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The first plenary session was the following morning at 11 o'clock. My escort came soon after 10 and we went out into the corridor. I went into the President's suite and saw him in prayer. He was still in his dressing gown. I said to LUKAVAC: "Please could you knock on my door when you set off, so I don't stand around waiting in the corridor." Mido and I went back into my room and waited. I looked at my watch: 10 to 11. I was surprised that nobody had knocked. I came out of the room and saw Swiss policemen outside the door; a policeman gestured that they had already gone. I could not believe it, so I grab hold of the door handle, but it was locked. I asked Mido: "Do you speak any English?" He said: "Little /as printed/." I will remember this 'little' for the rest of my life. We left the hotel, got into a taxi and went to the United Nations Office. Of course, we both used our hands to speak English. We were looking for the Bosnian delegation. But ... KARADŽIĆ is also the Bosnian delegation, and BOBAN is also the Bosnian delegation. The Yugoslav delegation is also at the negotiations: ĆOSIĆ, MILOŠEVIĆ, BULATOVIĆ, with the rest of the team, in which only the security numbered around 200 people. Therefore, the UN Office was full of Chetniks and Ustashas. We only just managed to stumble on to the right Bosnia and Herzegovina delegation.

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Returning to Sarajevo, we were once more in the small plane, but now it was only our delegation and there was enough room. The President and I sat opposite one another, our legs were touching. It was narrow. All our things were there, and among them was something like a plank wrapped in ordinary cardboard and tied with some rope. I casually asked:

"What is this you have here, Mr President?" "Ah," he said, "let me show you." He took the plan, it was about 80 centimetres long and let's say 50 or so centimetres wide, and he started unwrapping it. "Please, do not go to any trouble," I said. "Never mind," he replied and unwrapped a extremely beautiful picture of a mosque in Palestine, made from mother-of-pearl. At the bottom of the painting there was something written in Arabic. I asked: "Can you read Arabic?" "No," he said, "but I

know this prayer off by heart." He was pointing at it and teaching me: "Bismillah irrahman ..." After he had studied it, he said: "Arafat gave me this picture. I was with him. We had a long talk. The fate of the Palestinian people is very similar to our fate." I did not agree: "The fate of our people is similar to that of the Jews, because when they expel the Palestinian, he takes his coat and goes off to Yemen, to Egypt, somewhere, while the Jew has nowhere to go." "We can discuss this some other time, but you will see that you are not right," the President replied and then went on: "But let me tell you what Arafat said to me. He said: 'Alija, are they offering you anything?' I replied: 'They are, they are and a good chunk.' And Arafat said: 'Take it, Alija. They made offers to me too and I did not want them, I wanted everything. In the end, I am left with nothing. Take it, Alija, while the offer still stands, because you too will be left without anything.'" When he finished telling me this, he looked straight at me and continued: "You are seriously mistaken. We should take a part of Bosnia. Let the people come back to that piece of Bosnia, let the situation be sorted out and a state made. This way, we will be left with nothing."

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A discussion ensued. I started explaining: "We do not want everything. We want to live in equality with all those who have always lived in Bosnia, without depriving of their rights anyone who respects the Bosnian state. We want to live in the entire territory of BH, since we lived on 94% of its territory. Nobody wants to deny the Serbs and Croats the right to be sovereign and equal, but if we take a piece of Bosnia, we would then be destroying the Bosnian state and the outcome would be uncertain. And finally, the Muslims cannot fit on to the piece of Bosnia that they are offering us, because in that case there will be a tendency for all the Muslims to flock to this little Bosnian state." The President said: "We need a piece that will accommodate around two million people. Some will come, some will leave and it will be just right." We both fell silent.

**78 OBZOR / Večernji list reminiscences**  
**Interview with American Ambassador Okun**

Interview by Jadranka Juresko-Kero in the Vecernji List, Zagreb April 15, 2006  
 Translated from Vecernji List by Hilda M. Foley

American Ambassador Herbert S. Okun speaks about Milosevic, Tujman, the war, the negotiations...

Tudman saved Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ambassador Herbert S. Okun has spent a full thirty six years in the service of the State Department and American diplomacy. Born in New York 76 years ago to a immigrant Russian Jewish family, he did not continue his father's successful tradition in the food supply branch, the manufacture and distribution of food, but instead received his education at the prestigious American universities Stanford and Harvard and from his 25th year on devoted his life completely to diplomacy. He spent his first time in Croatia in 1957 as a tourist. He was immediately impressed by the beauty of Hvar and Dubrovnik. He returned to our country in 1990, first as the executive director of a nonprofit financial group that offered help in the establishment of a free market in the post-communist countries of the eastern block. Soon after, he exchanged his voluntary role with one of official duty as the deputy of Cyrus Vance, the special emissary of the United Nations' Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali., actively spending time in the areas of former Yugoslavia from 1991-1993. Today he lectures international relations at Yale and John Hopkins.

**Interviewer:** Once you commented that you already realized during the first meeting with Milosevic that one is dealing with a man of bad character, capable of anything!

- Yes, I met Milosevic in Belgrade on Dec. 12, 1990. I arrived with a group of business people and Cyrus Vance and I had a private meeting with Milosevic. Observing how he talked and acted I could not come to any other conclusion than Milosevic being a common gangster. You know, those types from Mafia movies with cigars in their mouths, who try to express themselves very theatrically but in reality are selling fog. The American ambassador at that time in Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman, spoke of Milosevic as a charming person. I was shocked. I said to him: "Don't you see that he is a gangster?" Unfortunately I was right, because it was soon apparent that the war and all the crimes were initiated by Milosevic, that he was a liar and a politician who did not honor agreements or his signature.

**Interviewer:** You were the vice-chairman of the International Conference for former Yugoslavia in the negotiations regarding the arrival of UNPROFOR in Croatia. Could the war have been prevented in Croatia if the West had intervened in time?

- When I was in Belgrade in 1990 I asked everyone - from Milosevic to ordinary people, taxi drivers, waiters - do they think it will come to war, they all answered, can you imagine, that this is not possible. My experience told me that this was not correct, that war was coming because I did not trust Milosevic. I asked him for instance on the eve of elections in Serbia if the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) has a considerable role in the country. He answered that it does not. "Mr. Okun", he said, "we are building democracy". The next day I saw his picture with the JNA generals in the Politika (newspaper).

I warned that one cannot trust him. But Milosevic knew how to manipulate the foreign media and politicians. He constantly kept repeating that "Croats are making necklaces from fingers of Serb children". Just imagine such statements! The West tried to stop the war more than is known or deduced in public, but Milosevic did not want it. Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance offered a plan for the so-called peaceful separation of all sides in Yugoslavia, but while Croats accepted discourse plans, were signing everything and showing that they want peace, in Belgrade everything was the opposite.

**Interviewer:** What were your impressions of President Tudjman?

- I can say openly that I liked Tudjman because he was a serious politician who kept his word. True, he had a rigid style of behavior which many falsely interpreted, especially western journalists, but all my experiences with Tudjman are positive. After all, Tudjman, who led his country in war, with an imposed arms embargo, could not act like Gandhi. He was cooperative, wanted peace and actively participated in negotiations in the Haag, Geneva and Zagreb. They resented that he changed street names from the communist times and while he was doing that, Milosevic was killing Croats in eastern Slavonia.

I was with Tudjman when the exodus of Croats from Ilok began. He said to me: "Mr. Ambassador, do something, it is terrible what my people are experiencing". Then Vance called Milosevic but he answered that he does not know what he is talking about, that he has nothing to do with Ilok. That man never spoke the truth. Tudjman was intelligent; he knew history, and speaking openly, with his leadership Croats through Operation Storm and other military actions saved Bosnia Herzegovina. At a meeting in Sarajevo in 1991 Izetbegovic told me that he will demand of the JNA to leave BiH and I asked him: "Where is your army, who will defend you if the JNA does not comply?" I quickly realized that in Bosnia only the Croats offered organized defense and saved it from downfall, something often kept quiet by the media as well as politicians.

**Interviewer:** You created the Vance plan which stopped the war in Croatia. Did you have difficulties in the realization of the plan?

- After some fifteen armistices pronounced by the EC which no one honored, we turned to a different logic, and that was that the armistice is not declared by us but by the opposing sides. At that time the Serbs were already prepared for the Bosnia campaign and had therefore relatively quickly accepted the armistice. When I presented the contents of the plan to Tudjman, he immediately asked several questions, such as the status of the police which had warned about the vulnerability in the plan. Later on, these questions were shown to be correct, as the Serb side used it to evade their obligations.



**Večernji list- Tuesday 06. 03. 2007**

**Interview with Jacques Paul Klein, a former interim director of UNTAES:**

**IZETBEGOVIĆ OFFERED HERZEGOVINA TO TUĐMAN**

**Jadranka Jureško - Kero**

Retired U.S. General Jacques Paul Klein, who from 1995 to 1997 was interim director of UNTAES for the Croatian Danube region, and then Deputy High Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations Office often speaks to American public about the experiences from this period. After the lecture held at Columbia University in New York regarding the economic problems in the new countries of Southeast Europe, Jacques Klein for Večernji List commented current and former political events in Croatia and Bosnia.

VL: How do you comment on the verdict of the International Court of Justice which granted Serbia the amnesty from direct responsibility for genocide in Srebrenica?

KLEIN: Before making a final decision, I would like to study (review) the verdict, since I haven't had time to do it yet. I am confident that not all sides can be equally satisfied with the verdict, but the court decision should not disrupt the efforts to enhance political and economic relations in Southeast Europe. The term genocide is obviously interpreted differently. What happened in Rwanda (IZETBEGOVIĆ told me that Croats were a BIG PROBLEM so he wanted to get rid of them by offering them Herzegovina) is genocide over the genocides. Also in Srebrenica! Ratko Mladic is a criminal and I'm not sure that he needed the command from Serbia to kill because he wanted to kill anyway. No, it is not giving amnesty of responsibility to Serbia, I'm just telling the facts. It is a shame that he and Karadzic are not in The Hague!

VL: Well, why not? Many in Croatia and the former Yugoslavia claim the tribunal in The Hague has not fulfilled the role for which it was founded 14 years ago. Croatia met all the requirements, our generals are awaiting trial, and Serbian war criminals ...

KLEIN: Yes, I know. It is a political court! And while I was in Bosnia I reacted strongly to the fact that there is no political will to arrest Karadžić.

VL: At the lecture you emphasize that Tuđman, Izetbegovic and Milosevic were telling one thing when speaking with you alone, and another in front of their people or the public. What about the claim that Izetbegović offered Tuđman to affiliate Herzegovina!

KLEIN: In politics, there is the reality that many do not understand or do not want to see. There were many occasions when they used to say the same thing: I would have done as you suggest Mr. Klein, but if I tell this to my people, I will lose support. (I think that the BiH is an experiment, on paper everything looks good, but in reality implementation is SLOW) No, I will not single out anyone, I had a similar experience with all of them. And after I was told by President Tuđman, that Izetbegovic indeed offered a separation of Herzegovina, I openly raised this question to the President of Bosnia in Sarajevo. He replied that it Croats are big problem and he wanted to get rid of them and thought that this is the best way, but Tuđman declined the offer.

VL: And today, Tuđman and not Izetbegovic is accused of a dividing the Bosnia. Do you believe in the survival of this country!

KLEIN: I sincerely think that Bosnia and Herzegovina is still an experiment. Everything on paper, all the agreements and laws seem idyllic, but the implementation of it in reality is slow. Some say Dayton is dead. But I ask them: Do they really want an Islamic state in the heart of Europe? I think we need to accelerate the integration of Southeast Europe, including Bosnia, to the European Union. The Bosnian conflict in the nineties is not the only one in history. In America we had a civil war and afterward, we continued to live together!

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Interview conducted by: Jadranka Jureško Kero (Večernji list, 06. 03. 2007)

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Q: I'm sure you'll be able to confirm that in fact all the humanitarian aid, except for a negligible portion brought in on planes from Sarajevo, that all the humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina from the beginning of the Serb aggression right up to the Dayton Accords went through exclusively, exclusively went through the Republic of Croatia, that is to say the transport routes for humanitarian aid went by Croatia, at least from the port of Ploce to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, passing by many ports and airports. Is that true? Would that be correct?

A. That would be -- yes, that would be substantially correct. I think the air-lift into Sarajevo was not insignificant. I mean, it was very important, but overwhelming the humanitarian assistance that came to Bosnia came through Croatia. It was -- without Croatia, Bosnia would not have survived.

Q:...and please confirm that - that Croatia, the Republic of Croatia, on its own territory never, not at any single point in time, stopped any humanitarian aid convoys going to Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it?

A. I think that statement is correct.

Alija IZETBEGOVIC  
President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

**THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION**

A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples

Sarajevo, 1990

# THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION

## A PROGRAMME FOR THE ISLAMIZATION OF MUSLIMS AND THE MUSLIM PEOPLES

OUR GOAL: The Islamization of Muslims

OUR MOTTO: Believe and struggle

BISMILLAHIRAHMANIRRAHIM!

The Declaration which we today present to the public is not prescribed reading, intended to demonstrate to foreigners or doubters the superiority of Islam over any particular system or school of thought.

It is intended for Muslims who know where they belong and whose hearts clearly tell them which side they stand on. For such as these, this Declaration is a call to understand the inevitable consequences of that to which their love and allegiance bind them.

The entire Muslim world is in a state of ferment and change. Whatever whatever form it eventually takes when the initial effects of these changes is felt, one thing is certain: it will no longer be the world of the first half of this century. The age of passivity and stagnation has gone forever.

Everyone is trying to make take advantage of this time of movement and change, particularly foreign powers, both East and West. Instead of their armies, they now use ideas and capital, and by a new mode of influence are once more endeavouring to accomplish the same aim: to ensure their presence and keep the Muslim nations in a state of spiritual helplessness and material and political dependence.

China, Russia and the Western countries quarrel as to who among them will extend patronage and to which part of the Muslim

world. There is a pointless dispute. The Islamic world does not ~~arrange~~ them, but ~~the~~ the Muslim people

A world of 700 million people with enormous natural resources, occupying a first class geographical position, heir to colossal cultural and political traditions and the proponent of living Islamic thought, cannot long remain in a state of vassalage. There is no power which can check the new Muslim generation from putting an end to this abnormal state of affairs.

In this conviction, we announce to our friends and enemies alike that Muslims are determined to take the fate of the Islamic world into their own hands and arrange that world according to their own vision of it.

From this point of view, the ideas contained in the Declaration are not absolutely new. This is rather a synthesis of ideas heard with increasing frequency in various places and which are accorded about the same importance in all parts of the Muslim world. Its novelty lies in that it seeks to promote ideas and plans into organized action.

The struggle towards new goals did not begin today. On the contrary, it has already experienced *shihada*\* and its history contains pages of the suffering of its victims. Still, this is mainly the personal sacrifice of exceptional individuals or courageous minor groups in collision with the mighty forces of the *Jahiliya*\*. The magnitude of the problem and its difficulties, however, required the organized action of millions.

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 \**shihada*: martyrdom. *Jahiliya*: the godless. Period of darkness prior to Islam. (Translator's note).

Our message is dedicated to the memory of our comrades who have fallen in the name of Islam.

Sarajevo, 1970  
*Jumadi-l-awwal*, 1390

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The Islamic order is a society freed of this conflict, a framework of relations in which the Muslim finds himself in complete harmony with his surroundings.

To the question: what is a Muslim society? we would say it is a community composed of Muslims, and we think that this says it

all, or almost all.

The meaning of this definition is that there is no system of institutions, relationships and laws disparate from the people who are its object of which it could be said: this is an Islamic system. No system is Islamic or non-Islamic of itself. It is only so because of the people who compose it.

A European believes that society is ordered by the rule of laws. Since Plato's "Republic", and the various utopian idea which followed up to the most recent - Marxism - the European spirit has been searching for one scheme, one pattern, which, by simply altering the relationships between people or groups, would give birth to the ideal society.

In the QU'ran, on the other hand, there are relatively few real laws, and much more religion, and requirement for practical action in keeping with this religion.

A multiplicity of laws and a complex legislature is usually a sure sign that something is rotten in a society and that it should stop passing laws and start educating people. When the rottenness of the environment surpasses a certain point, the law becomes impotent. It then falls either into the hands of corrupt executors of justice, or becomes the subject of open or concealed trickery on the part of a corrupt environment.

Wine, gambling and sorcery - once widespread and deeply rooted vices throughout the entire Middle East - were eliminated for a lengthy period from an enormous region by a single Ayet of the Qu'ran, and by a single explanation: God had forbidden them. As soon as religion weakened, intoxication and superstition returned with unabated vigour, to which the incomparably higher level of culture by now obtaining offered no obstacle. America's Prohibition Law, proclaimed in the name of contemporary science and implemented with all the force of one of the most highly organized communities in the world, eventually had to be abandoned in the 'forties, after thirteen years of futile attempts, full of violence and crime. An attempt to introduce prohibition into Scandinavian countries ended in similar failure.

This and many similar examples clearly demonstrate that a society can be improved only in the name of God and by educating

man. We should take the one road which surely leads to this objective.

While in principle confirming the spiritual, interior approach in all of its manifestations, Islam, however, did not content itself with that. It endeavoured to tear the devil's weapon out of his hands. If, in what concerns man's relationship with the world, Islam did not start with man, it would not be a religion; if it were to remain at that, it would be simply a religion, merely repeating Jesus's teaching on the ideal and eternal aspect of man's being. Through Muhammad, (peace be upon him) and the Qu'ran, Islam addressed the real man, the outside world, nature, in order to evolve as a teaching on the complete man and on all aspects of life. Faith allied itself to the law, education and upbringing to power. Thus Islam became an order.

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...ritual and physical life, or more precisely, that he must willingly and in full awareness accept both these aspects of life as the human definition and meaning of his life on earth (Qu'ran 28/77). Translating this requirement into the language of everyday life, we could say: he who believes that life should be ordered not only by faith and prayer, but by work and knowledge, whose vision of the world not only allows but demands that temple and factory stand side by side, who considers that people should not only be fed and educated, but that their life on earth should be facilitated and promoted, and that there is no reason to sacrifice either of these objectives to the other - this man belongs to Islam.

This, together with faith in God, is the main message of the Qu'ran, and in it is all of Islam. All else is mere development and explanation. This aspect of Islam, besides containing the principle of the Islamic order, the conjunction of religion and politics, leads to other significant conclusions of enormous fundamental and practical importance.

First and foremost of these conclusions is certainly the incompatibility of Islam with non-Islamic systems. There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions. The failure of

these institutions to function and the instability of the regimes in Muslim countries, manifest in frequent change and *coups d'etat*, is most often the consequence of their *a priori* opposition to Islam, as the fundamental and foremost feeling of the peoples in these countries. By claiming the right to order its own world itself, Islam obviously excludes the right or possibility of action on the part of any foreign ideology on that terrain. There is, therefore, no lay principle, and the state should both reflect and support religious moral concepts.

*Every age and every generation has the task of implementing the message of Islam in new forms and by new means.*

*There are immutable Islamic principles which order relations between people, but there is no Islamic economic, social or political structure which cannot be changed.*

This is only the first and most important conclusion in approaching Islam as an integrated order. The remaining three, equally important but less preclusive, are:

First: by opting for this world, Islam has opted for the best possible ordering of that world. Nothing which can make the world a better place may be rejected out of hand as non-Islamic;

Second: to be open to nature means to be open to learning. In order to be Islamic, any solution must fulfil two conditions: it must be maximally efficient and maximally humane. It must therefore reflect the reconciliation of religion and science in its highest form;

Third: by pointing to one link between religion and learning, morals and policy, the individual and the collective, the spiritual and the material - questions which divide the contemporary world - Islam regains its role as the intermediary of ideas, and the Islamic world as intermediary among nations in a divided world. By promising "religion without mysticism and learning without atheism", Islam can interest all people, no matter who they are.

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### ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE

Stressing the priority of the religious and moral renewal does not mean - nor can it be interpreted to mean - that the Islamic order can be brought about without Islamic governance. This means only that our way does not start by taking power, but by winning people, and that Islamic rebirth is first a revolution in education, and only then in politics.

We must therefore be first preachers and then soldiers. Our weapons are personal example, the book, the word. When is force to be joined to these?

The choice of this moment is always a tangible one and depends on a series of factors. There is, however, a general rule: the Islamic movement should and can start to take over power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough to be able to overturn not only the existing non-Islamic government, but also to build up a new Islamic one. This differentiation is important, because overturning and building do not require an equal degree of psychological and material readiness.

To act prematurely in this regard is just as dangerous as to delay.

To take power due to a fortunate set of circumstances, without sufficient moral and psychological preparation or the essential minimum of staunch and well-trained personnel, means causing another *coup d'etat*, and not an Islamic revolution. (The *coup d'etat* is a continuation of the un-Islamic policy on the part of another group of people or in the name of other principles). To delay in taking power means to deprive the Islamic movement of a powerful means of attaining its aims while offering the un-Islamic authorities the possibility of dealing a blow to the movement and dispersing its personnel. Recent history provides sufficient tragic and instructive examples of the latter.



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potential forces, into active ones. Loyalty to the Qu'ran should grow into determination to apply it; the Islamic community of emotions should turn into an organized, aware community, and folk humanism into clear ideas, which will become the moral and social character of future laws and institutions.

Who will carry out this transformation, and how shall it be done?

Every action taken in relation to events is social action. Every successful struggle can only be a joint, organized struggle. The younger generation will be able to carry out its task of transformation only if its inclinations and idealism are poured into an organized movement, in which the enthusiasm and personal value of the individual will be correlated with methods of joint, coordinated action. The creation of this movement with a single basic aim and programme is an irrevocable condition and starting point for rebirth in every Muslim country.

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*\*merhamah: mercy (translator's note)*

This movement will gather together what is built, raise the unbuilt, elevate and call on people, define aims and find a way to attain them. It will introduce life, thought and action everywhere. It will become the conscience and will of a world awakening out of a long, deep sleep.

In sending this message to all Muslims throughout the world, we wish clearly to state that there is no promised land, no miracle-workers or *mahdis*. There is only the way of work, struggle and sacrifice.

In times of trial let us always have in mind two things: behind us stands God's blessing and the consent of our people.

**YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SAY THAT YOU  
DIDN'T KNOW!**

Magazine

Elections 1990

“Stranke, programi, ličnosti”  
/Parties, programs and personalities”

Edited by; Oslobođenje

Sarajevo, October 1990

Page 19

Alija Izetbegović, President of the Party of Democratic Action

“Civil republic or civil war”

Page 20, paragraph 3

Aleksandar Zinovjev, Soviet dissident, claims that, in several years, mujezin shall be learned from the Eiffel Tower. He says this shall be a defeat of European-centric Christianity as well as the conflict that shall, after the death of classes and bolshevism, characterize the century in front of us. What is your comment to Zinovjev?

Regarding Islam itself, I would love to hear mujezin from the Eiffel Tower. However, I am not convinced about the accuracy of this theory, even though bearing in mind that Islam is indeed the only religion, being expanded.

You wrote a book “Islam between East and West”. Why did, according to you, the horizon of Islamic world, from Kashmir, over Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Sandžak, all the way till Western Europe in time of bolshevism collapse, seek for the Koran? All these agitations, are they a part of one unique wave?

I think they could be envisaged as unique wave, among others, for the reason that Islam, as thought and philosophy, is indeed in the sign of renaissance. People that belong to Islam, belong to it entirely, for Islam is a thought that touches every field of life; you can't be Muslim, without being defined in every way. People in horizon of Islam were dominated by the foreign forces and when leading the battle for liberation, they do it regularly under the flag of Islam.

.....

Let me cite you a *sura* from Koran: “He who purifies himself, shall achieve what he desires for” Let's purify ourselves by question; would you find the creation of society, in this century, in the middle of Europe, based on religion, to be precise it is about Islam, a social progress? I am not talking about Bosnia only.

Yes, I do! Absolutely so, if this society is the Muslim society indeed. True, Islam is not an ideology but belief, that's why the system, in which people would accept Islam, as belief, as religion, precisely in that society, that system, the one of established Islamic norms and life standard, would mean a progress to me.

Could you copy it to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

No! Our party stands for creation of civil republic; in Kladuša, I have just invited my fellow citizens, Serbs and Croats to join us in the battle for creation of civil republic. Nothing can connect us better but the civil republic because we cannot make a national state out of Bosnia. Let Serbia and Croatia proceed with creation of such states, we however, have no conditions for it. We have got only the possibility to realize the ideal of civil republic or the civil war!

/ edited by Nermin Šahić, Bahrija Šehović) .- Sarajevo: Democratic Action Party, Center for Analysis, documentation and communication with the public, 2004. - 354 p.; 25 cm /

Bosnia will not be part of Great Serbia  
Pre-election rally SDA (Democratic Action Party)  
Velika Kladuša \*), 15. September 1990

Dear brothers and sisters, dear Krajina people, Dear friends, I begin my remarks with Bismillah and ask God to help us and to show us the right path.

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Our ideal is a civic republic. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a civil republic. Therefore, not an Islamic republic, not even a socialist republic. Free and civic republic. This is a definite commitment of the Muslim nation. But this is not enough.

That's why it needs the consent of both Serbs and Croats, and we invite them here to join us in the effort to build Bosnia and Herzegovina as a civic republic and democratic state.

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I believe that I have approval not only by Muslim people but also by Serbian and Croatian people. Why do I have such an approval? Because what is the alternative to civic republic, which we proclaim here, the alternative is only civil war, and no reasonable man in Bosnia can stand behind such a decision. Therefore, there are only two ways: either to build civic republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina together in peace, or that we have a civil war ...

### **During the first session of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 8th October 1992, I stepped forward in the name of the BH Army:**

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests,

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We started with a defensive war with Patriotic League, the MUP (Ministry of Interior) and the organized and unorganized groups and individuals and we won the greatest battle –we stopped the aggressor's strategic attacks, saved the Republic of BiH and in particular rescued the viability and existence of the Muslim people in this area and thereof moved to the strategic offensive, since we started to further liberate new territories and win the first great battle. We will lose an occasional battle, but it has become clear to the Nazis that we will win this war, so in their offensive their crimes became even more brutal and unscrupulous.

All of this was possible because our citizens, and our soldiers are the pillar of morality with political objectives which were clearly set at the beginning of the war imposed on us

1. Contemporary, integral and indivisible Republic of BiH.
2. Republic of BiH as a democratic state of all citizens' who live in it. Therefore, we soldiers, have very precise military objective which is:

- Liberation of the entire BiH territory and definite military defeat of the internal and external enemies.

Serbian-Muslim «Historical agreement»: Muhamed Filipović-Radovan Karadžić  
(2 August 1991)<sup>1</sup>

#### Text of the Serbian-Muslim agreement

Confronted with the development of events, carrying inside bigger and bigger confrontation danger of our two nations, whose interest do not confront in a historical manner and never had any conflict of such kind, aware of their responsibility of nations that we represent and all nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Yugoslavia, in light of future cooperation and peace, we decided to establish and sign the following political Agreement:

1. Aware of inherited difficulties and those the prevailed political life led to, we decided, in spirit of sincerity and mutual respect, to pledge for realization of political and historical interests of our two nations. Hereby, this is not an agreement against any person whatsoever, but for all people and as such, it shall be open to everyone that supports the principle of common life in freedom and full equality.
2. We find that the basis of such life is due to a mutual recognition of suzerainty of certain nations as well as the enabling of full territorial integrity and political subjectivity of our Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its identical constitutional-legal position with other Republics of common state of Yugoslavia.
3. According to our opinion, Yugoslavia has got its full historical justification as common state of fully equal Republics and nations, therefore, we shall pledge to maintain and develop such community.
4. We agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be legally-politically unique as well as organized federal unit in a democratic manner, with legal interference within each part of its territory, under condition that the federal constitution and legislation create the base of the legal state system and a guarantee of the citizens, nations and Republics equality.
5. We express our interest that the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina live with us in full equality; therefore we invite them to approach this agreement. Regardless to the position of the Republic of Croatia within or outside of Yugoslavia, the Croats in BH are fully equal nation in rights.
6. The mutual relationships among citizens, nations and Republics in Yugoslavia shall be established in a common constitution, involving the European standards.
7. We are aware that this agreement represents merely historical and political base for the permanent and peaceful common life of ours. However, such political agreement opens space for most constructive and most rational solutions on the platform of federal e.g. common organs functioning, including monetary system, unique market, unique armed forces as well as the foreign affairs.
8. In addition, we find that the optimal Yugoslavian community is the one that comprehends all six Republics and all nations that initiatively constitute such community. Each withdrawal from such community of those nations and Republics who are willing to do so, understands the achieving of agreement of this matter and provides guarantee for real interests of every member in relation to other members.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: «Oslobodenje» 2 August 1991; the agreement was published on 1 August 1991 in Belgrade as «agreed text», while, according to certain sources the text was agreed on 14 July 1991, while other sources claim that the text was agreed on 12 August 1991.

**FAKSIMIL ZAKLETVE SA POTPISIMA**

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ZAKLETVA

Objavljenom od Allaha Jelleshanuhu da su svijet, u svaku vrijeme i na svuda držati, braniti sve interese muslimanskog naroda, i sve dostojanstvo, i slobodu vjerskog života!

Objavljenom da su braniti slobodu i integritet države svoje i Hercegovine, jedine svoje domovine, čije su granice historijske, trajne i nepovredive!

U to im prihvatim sve obaveze koje proizlaze iz potreba organizacije za ostvarenje pomenutih ciljeva.

POTPIS:

Sarajevo, 17.04.1991.godine

Safet Hadžić

Kapidžija

7 signatura listed

*Ovo je jedno od svjedočanstava da su patriote ove zemlje pravilno ocijenili šta se sprema.*

### OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I swear by Allah Jelleshanuhu that I shall always, in any time and every place, defend all interests of the Muslim people and all (two words illegible) at costs of my life! I also swear that I shall defend freedom and integrity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, my only homeland, whose borders are historical, permanent and inviolable!  
As to it, I accept all commitments, emerging from the organizational needs in order to realize the above cited goals.

/signature/

Safet Hadzic  
Kapidzija  
7 signatures listed

Sarajevo, 17<sup>th</sup> of April 1991

## PATRIOTIC LEAGUE


Patriotic League had a historical role in organizing people in a nationwide resistance against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressors, the former Yugoslav Army and the Chetnic's hordes. With the vision, League was the first who, in the wake of the attacks on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and an unprecedented genocide against the Bosnian people was organized and stood in front of patriots to lead them in battle. PL's spirit can be felt today by most people and by large number of soldiers of the BiH Army. This spirit should not disappear, it must be guarded and carried over to future generations. Our soldiers who gave their lives against a brutal enemy, our martyrs will not forgive us, if we do not continue the fight for free, independent and integral Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We pledge to them. We guaranty that PLs spirit will be nurtured and guarded forever.

### FATHER OF PATRIOTIC LEAGUE




Mr. Izetbegovic, despite the troubles at the time, managed to gather the Bosnians, by forming the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and through other forms to mobilize the resistance against the aggressor. Patriotic League was the nucleus of the first military formations.

### MAN WITH HUGE MERIT



The future will show everything that was done by Hasan Čengić for the Patriotic League and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Patriotic League was formed, organized and armed by the Democratic Action Party. The League is the military division of the DAP, and emerged from a military-political organization formed on 31st March 1991, while its roots reach back to the DAP division of "Herceg-Bosna", formed in late 1990. Father of the Patriotic League is the founder and President of DAP, Chairman of Presidency of Republic B&H, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. The man who has a huge merit in the organization and its operations is Mr. Hasan Čengić. When talking about the establishment and work of the PL one must mention the late Safet Hadžić. The name "Patriotic League" was created under the auspices of the DAP, in agreement of Mr. Hasan Čengić, Dr. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, and others. The first officer who left the JNA and came to the center of the DAP was Sulejman Vranje - Sule.



## IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATION

Sulejman Vranje – Sule was the first officer who left the former JNA and put his service at the disposal of his people through the DAP

After the DAP victory in 1990 elections, the Bosnian people were allowed for the first time to get familiar with its past by studying its history, to assume what to expect, and to get organized as soon as possible. Before the attack on Slovenia, it was clear that Serbia and Montenegro have territorial aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalistic and chauvinistic settings of “Memorandum” SANU (Serbian Academy of Science and arts), displaying relics of Prince Lazar, recalling of the Kosovo battle, the events at Gazimestan, calling Serbian saints and heroes, excavation of common graves, public burials, public liturgy, singing of nationalist and chauvinistic songs, fiddle evenings and such, pointed to the great threat that hangs over Bosnia, and in particular against Bosnians.

PATRIOTIC LEAGUE IS A SECRET  
ORGANIZATION WHOSE EXISTENCE AND  
WORK WERE NOT EVEN KNOWN TO ALL  
MEMBERS OF THE DAP

Former Yugoslav Army (JNA) carried out serious preparations for the realization of the plan of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and creating conditions for a “Great Serbia”. Among other things, JNA significantly reduced the number of members in Territorial Defense, with a tendency to abolish it (the number of members has been reduced from 7 to 1.8 percent), while the weapons were placed under the control of the JNA in their warehouses. Also the command of the 7th Army Region, which was responsible for the units on the territory of BiH was abolished, while all command was concentrated in military centers located in Belgrade, under cover of form-

P.10

## Chapter 34

**Directive from Main headquarters of the Patriotic League of Bosnia and Herzegovina for defense of the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo 25. February 1991.)\***

“The enemies (forces of disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina) with their current military-political activities have for the most part managed to disrupt the system of government and create strongholds in certain areas. This have created conditions for the complete disintegration of the Bosnian government and splitting of the BiH territory.

The main strongholds of the forces for disintegration are located in the Banja Luka region, eastern and western Herzegovina and the Doboj region, and the main actors are SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) with the Yugoslav Army (JA) and the extremist wing of the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union).

In their present activities they have managed to: attain full political unity of the SDS and JA (Yugoslav Army), to create parallel authorities throughout BiH, form commands, military headquarters and units, to partly establish their own information system and the relocation of materials to make provisions for their needs. By reorganization of JA throughout BiH there is a high concentration of JA and with the arrival of the Blue Helmets that concentration will be even greater.

Total enemy forces are:

- JA, six corps KOV (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Bihac and Knin and parts of Titograd Corps), the likely strength of 2-3 corps KOV and one strengthened VAK.
- SDS manpower (from 80,000 to 120,000 people)
- HDZ extreme wing (one to two brigades)

The main objective of these forces is to divide the territory of BiH and to adjoin them with their nation states. They will try to realize this goal in two stages: in the first stage the creation of national confederation units within BiH, and in the second stage connecting them to Great Serbia and Great Croatia.

Expectations before the beginning of the general operations are: further intensification of psychological and propaganda activities in order to deteriorate the interethnic relations, conducting sabotage-terrorist operations, causing social unrest, sabotage, kidnapping and assassination of the most prominent people of the Muslim nation. Once the general operations start one should expect strong air and artillery-missile support to all regions.

2. Our forces are organized in the Patriotic League of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the formation of the squad, platoon and brigade, with a total strength of 120,000 people. With the start of combat operations the influx of more volunteers is expected as well as members of MOI (Ministry of Interior) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would increase the strength of our forces to about 150,000 people. The basic task for PL BiH forces is to protect the Muslim nation, preserve the

integrity and totality of BiH in order to ensure continued and future co-existence of all nations and nationalities within the BiH state territory. Once the combat operations start, to protect the population and simultaneously to close the main routes leading to the territory of BiH, with the mass deployment of destruction and obstruction, with rapid and vigorous operations to block and invade military facilities within the republic and with certain number of forces (weapons warehouses, warehouses of ammunition and mines and military barracks) and then as soon as possible arm our formed military units, continue with the action plan, in order to free larger territory and secure functioning of the legal authorities. Special attention is given to redraw and to secure the population from the threatened areas.

3. Once the action plan is in motion to invite the people of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia to show solidarity with our just struggle and start immediate action to combat binding enemy force and weaken its combat power on the BiH territory. At the same time to establish contact, cooperation and coordination in joint activities with the Croatian people in Bosnia against the common enemy. In the international arena call on the progressive world public to protect Bosnia's sovereignty.

4. I decided, with the involvement of all Patriotic League forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with the neighbors, to close the main routes leading to BiH with rapid and vigorous attacks, especially in the valley of the Drina and Sutjeska. At the same time obstruct and invade suitable locations within the internal routes, for defense of BiH people, with a focus on the routes that lead from a wider region of Banja Luka and Eastern Herzegovina. With certain number of forces with fast and energetic attacks occupy JA warehouses of ammunition, mines and weapons and army barracks, to prevent the penetration and spread of hostile action on the entire territory of BiH. Once the favorable conditions are created, to start the wider offensive attacks aimed at breaking up, destruction and expulsion of the enemy from the territory of BiH. Deploy the main forces in central Bosnia and minor in Cazin-Prijedor region and Tuzla region ... “

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\* Safer Halilović: Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo: Marshall, 1977., P. 164-169: “On 7th and 8th February 1992. , in the village Mehurići near Travnik, a military conference was held that will later take the title of a historical, on which regional commanders of regional military headquarters and part of the staff of General headquarters of Patriotic League of Bosnia and Herzegovina met. The goal of the conference was the harmonization of plans by regions and division of tasks for the next period. Preparation of this gathering began in late 1991, when I have sent the instructions to all the staff in the field: RVŠ (regional military headquarters) Tasks. It was a document which, among other things, laid the foundations of a dedicated domestic industry. When we met, I made an introductory



speech regarding the present military and political situation and the assessment and evaluation of future strategies. The basis of this presentation at the conference has been accepted and summarized in the first two paragraphs of the most important PL document: Directive to defend the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Presentation and report to the commanders, the immediate exchange of

opinions and information, completed this document, which was finished on 25th February, in Sarajevo. Rifat Bilajac and Zičro Suljević, as advisors, helped in the preparation and implementation of the document, as well as with running the conference in Mehurići, however, the Directive is my hand work, the manuscript was copied, and later retyped distributed to commanders of regional headquarters.

Assembly of the municipality Grude  
Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union Grude)

Grude, 19 February 1992.

HDZ BiH PRESIDENCY

S A R A J E V O

SUBJECT: Taking a position on the referendum

Aware of the importance of time in which we find ourselves, we feel the need for immediate, definitive and effective expression and taking a clear position regarding the scheduled referendum on the status of BiH.

Croatian Democratic Union, a political party through which the Croatian people of Herceg-Bosna explicitly expressed their will and true desire, at this time must, determined – through its highest authorities, clearly and timely express a final view on the referendum.

The overall activity of the parties regarding this issues, has given its clear expression on the proposed referendum question in Livno on 9th February this year. It is obvious that the content of this proposed issue is the result of a life and historical experience of the Croatian people of these regions of former Yugoslavia, as well as real and just a desire to such coexistence in BiH, which will protect national interests of all sovereign nations. Therefore, the proposed issue of the request provides a concrete and clearly defined sovereignty through the cantons. Given that this proposed issue is the result of continued political struggle of our people, and /illegible/ legitimate representative, the deviation from it would also be the abandonment of the minimum requirements for the protection of national interests below which, here and now we must not go. Also, for the purpose of principles and the dignity of the party, almost unanimously adopted stand point cannot be doubted once defined.

Time flows inexorably, so we must now – in order to preserve the Croatian National Corpus and the Croatian area as a whole, clearly commit to the scheduled referendum.

Only this way can we expect, that in this occasion an unique and clearly expressed will of our people will, once again get an official confirmation which will /illegible / generations' perspectives who will live after us.

/Stamped: Croatian Democratic Union, the municipality of Grude/  
Stamped: illegible /

President of the HDZ Grude  
Signed/

President of AOM Grude /  
/Signed/

/illegible/ Zorić

Jozo Marić

NOTE: This letter was sent to municipalities, Municipal Committee of HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) in BiH, the Central office of HDZ in Zagreb /illegible/ Croatian President, Election /illegible/. European observers. leadership of the SDA and /illegible/ governments.

**Alija Izetbegović: Speaking at a closed session of the SDA (Democratic Action Party) after returning from Lisbon negotiations, 25 February 1992.**

Their views on the Lisbon declaration and negotiation, **Alija Izetbegovic** explained in a closed extended session of the Central Committee of the SDA, which was held on **25. February 1992** in the House of police in Sarajevo


**Izetbegovic:** First of all, to inform you because they misinterpreted what we did in Lisbon, we have not reached any decisions, we have not reached any agreement, in fact, we have not signed anything, we have after two days of talks for which I will tell you the circumstances that have taken place, and maybe some unknown facts to you. Kutiljero who conducted a meeting had with him another two men, a Portuguese Goreš who is a consul in Paris, and Darwin, an Englishman. The three of them were representing the European Union. Kutiljero lead the meeting as deputy chairman, not as someone from Portugal or the Portuguese officials, but as European Community representative.

So, at that meeting which lasted two days, one afternoon of intense four–five hour talks and the next day for five to six hours, somewhere up to about three in the afternoon, 9:00 to 3:00. We have after the first day of talks in the evening, received a paper from the European Community, the first version we have, we get two papers out there, I am now talking about the first paper that we got the first night that, we were just, if nothing else to say consternated but well surprised. This paper has provided a confederation Bosnia and Herzegovina and it came, to our surprise from the European Union, not as a suggestion of some of these partners, some of these parties, rather vice versa by the European Community. It was sometime after dinner, actually during the dinner because it was announced that we will get that paper after dinner, the paper was distributed. We returned to the hotel and read this text and stayed there for three–four hours. As you know, when I say we, I mean me, professor Mahmutćehajić and Haris Silajdžić, the tree of us represented our delegation there.

The situation was quite uncomfortable, after reading the paper, we did not know what to do, we felt we were pressed against the wall, simply because we knew that this paper suited the Serbs and Croats in its entirety but definitely not us. In fact, for the most part, I do not know if I could say definitely not, but it does contain some very inconvenient provisions.

After a lengthy discussion and since we talked to the HDZ, somewhere around midnight, we went our separate ways ...

... What is most problematic is the clear confederation option of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such independent but confederate Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it stated Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of three "status" – "states". There were other provisions that Sarajevo is to be exterritorial....



## Cutileiro's plan

### 19. March 1992.

40. Cutileiro's plan: The text of the statement regarding the principles for the new constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo 18. March 1992.) \*

#### A. Independence

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a state consisting of three units, based on principles of nationality and taking into account the economic, geographic and other criteria.
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will retain its current boundaries and neither the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor its constituent units of government will not encourage nor support the aspirations of any part of its territory by neighboring countries.
3. Sovereignty rests with the citizens of the Muslim, Serbian and Croatian nationality and other nations and nationalities, exercising its sovereignty in civic participation within the constituent units and the central authorities of the republic.

#### B. General principles

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina and its constituent units will be managed in conjunction with the following constitutional principles, in the manner they are understood and generally implemented in the democratic countries of Western Europe, and in the way they are presented in convention draft discussed at the conference:
  - a. Respect for human rights as the highest standards required by the convention draft, respect for private property rights, market economy and free enterprise;
  - b. general and equal right to vote, free elections and secret voting;
  - c. Freedom for political and union activity;
  - d. The secular state system with full freedom of religion, separation of church and state, separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, with respect for the law and effective system of democratic control and protection of constitutionality and legality;
- c. International oversight and jurisdiction over the protection of the rights and freedoms.

... They tell us – We know what is your goal – an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina – you have it. Their goal is the reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you cannot dispute this. Keep in mind that the two nations are requesting this. I can tell you that this is the main argument for the two nations, because they didn't but we had in mind, the issue was a referendum.

I hereby present our motives and our way of reasoning, what we are motivated by, the later notification that was issued for us to accept it as something we have agreed to. Reluctantly, but we have agreed. I'll tell you later to what this notification relates, because it should not be confused with this paper. As the paper was not accepted. We only accepted the notification consisting of three points. The rest we did not accept, we said – these are the issues for future discussions.

In fact, I had in mind and please you should also have it in mind, also in future discussions we'll have. Keep this in mind. If the Croatian community does not come out to the

referendum, the referendum will fail. Keep this thing in mind. Do not gamble with this no matter what. We need a pass on referendum, if we do not pass we will get stuck in the well and there will be no way out for another thirty years. Who knows? There would probably be a phase, we would plumb very deep, like when you push that stone, you know the one what they call it, you push it to the top of the hill and then it slips away again back to the valley, so you push it up to the hill again. A referendum must not be lost ...

Such Bosnia as it is today in the case of a successful referendum, even with 55 percent, we already have a series of recognitions during the next week, and during the following another series and we can definitely have a strong position here.

Our reasoning was this – well, let me put rings around Bosnia, to preserve it, to throw back the primary threat and inside let the situation get stormy, what I can? Some transformations, and some regions, and some national ... So let the rings around the Bosnia be in place. That was our reasoning.

So, let's keep in mind in this debate what we will do now one thing. Don't, this morning I discussed with some people, very fine, prominent people and they only come to me with a wish list, we need this, we need that, a Muslim nation has a right to this and that and no one tells me how to realize this. So if you have any suggestions, tell me how to achieve them. Keep in mind one thing, that all of this must go before this Assembly. The Assembly must have the consent of the HDZ for any solution, otherwise we do not have a majority. Weight out this proposal, as they say twice, two or four times. The other day we barely pushed the referendum through. We had there this pure formula, are you for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The delay was not only due to the refusal of the Serbs, I can tell it was also because of the HDZ. It took us another three or four hours of discussion, they did not want to go to a referendum. Then they came with the reformulation, so they created this issue, and they went to Livno and they repeated their own opinion, they disagreed with themselves so they threw in, if you remember those cantons. I think that with the above conditional acceptance, I think we got the Croats for the referendum. Now they want to vote because they hope that in such Bosnia and Herzegovina they will get some sort of sovereignty, some kind of national recognition, some regions, etc., because it is a part of this agreement. And this agreement consists of three points. The first point, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains, guaranteeing the survival of intact historical and present borders. The second point – that Bosnia would be transformed Bosnia forming regions, the base of which would be the ethnic population, on the ethnic grounds, as they say. And the third point, that all this is implemented in the presence and with guarantees from the European Community. The first and third points are not in dispute, the second one is. The second one is the one that causes controversy and considerations should it be done this or that way, etc.

Headline: **Bosnia and Herzegovina - a Task for a Nobel Prize**

**Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ, yesterday you talked to Mr. BOBAN in Grude, yesterday and today to Dr. PRLIĆ in Mostar. Can you comment a little on these talks and on how cooperation between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be improved? (Marinko ČAVAR, HTV /Croatian Television/)**

I think I'll first have to make a little circle in order to be able to definitely answer this question. Namely, I'll travel through this part of Bosnia here, although it's not advisable, as my people tell me, to say what my intentions are; my intention is finally to make a tour of Bosnia to give an answer to myself, above all, to the question they asked me, although a part of it can already be answered. Namely, our strategic orientation is cooperation between Muslims and Croats in building the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbs, of course. I don't think we have anything more to say to the Chetniks, ever. We will cooperate with the Serbs and build the state insofar as there are no Chetniks involved. Of course, the Serbs themselves will have to answer the question of what percentage of them are Chetniks. We can't do anything with the Chetniks but fight, it's us or them. I don't think all Serbs are Chetniks, of course they're not, thank God they're not, but this time the aim of my visit is to implement, to find a way of implementing our strategic goal, and that is cooperation between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina in building one state on the principle of equality. The Muslims should accord to the Croats all the rights they themselves have, and vice versa. It's the principle on which Bosnia and Herzegovina should be built. I don't think this principle is in dispute. And if this principle is not disputable, then this issue is slowly becoming a legal issue of how, in what way, what kind of mechanisms and what kind of organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will satisfy this principle. I don't think cooperation between the Muslims and the Croats is in dispute at any level, certainly not at the level of, well, ordinary people. People demand such cooperation, they demand that a solution be found. Problems certainly exist; they should not be kept hidden, because there is no good in hiding them. In order to resolve something, one should have an accurate diagnosis.

What is the problem then? We think that there's a little ... The problems stem from something that was in fact completely legitimate, and that's the organisation of the defence of the Croatian people. However, a step further was made towards the creation of something that was becoming a state, which is beginning to be bothersome. Up to that limit, to that point there was no dispute. It's clear to us that in a situation when the country was attacked, the day it was actually born, because some people calculate that the war began on the fifth or sixth of April, in your parts here I think it began on the third of April, so it's a couple of days before or after. As you know, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised as an independent state on 6 April. Therefore, the war is as old as the state. Clearly, one should not ignore the fact that prior to that there were attacks on Brod, attacks in the Kupres area and so on. But all-out, large-scale aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina began approximately in the first days of April, in some places a couple of days earlier, in others a couple of days later. In a situation like that the state could not respond appropriately. We were practically occupied, except for small parts that were free. At one point it was said to be the biggest barracks in the world. Occupied by a hostile army that became a machine for destruction, devastation of towns, for killing people. It was normal in a situation like this that the Croatian people and everyone else would defend themselves as best they could, because the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not able to organise this in such a short period of time. Anything the HVO has done with regard to defence here or elsewhere should be regarded as legitimate. We were bothered by the fact that later a further step was taken towards creating a state. If it's not a state and if it remains within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all solutions are

possible and there will be no problems at all. We have such statements, and if you ask me about the talks I had with Mr BOBAN and today with Mr PRLIĆ and their associates, we have clear statements that everything that is being done in that regard does not compromise the sovereignty, independence and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If that is so, then there are no problems and there cannot be any. But if there are, then it's someone's fault and those who are obstructing the creation of a strategic alliance between the two peoples, particularly in these parts where Muslims and Croats live together, should be removed.

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These issues include military cooperation and the coordination of military activities, in order to pre-empt certain things, to avoid such things as happened in Brod. It was only when I arrived in Zagreb that I heard about the alarming situation in Brod. I travelled to Brod in an open attempt to have something done to stop such developments. I arranged a meeting with Mr TUDMAN and travelled to Zagreb all night. We met the next morning, agreed certain things, but it was already too late. Nothing could be done any more. So we tried to do something, and it was the first time we tried to do something together, but unfortunately we failed, because the news came late. I hope similar things won't happen again. Gradačac is again in a critical situation, and this time we'll try to do certain things with greater success to save Gradačac, to save Jajce and, of course, Orašje and Brčko.

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The internal organisation of BiH will have to be completed one day. Many of us think the ethnic principle should not play the decisive role, but it should be included as one of the criteria. Our position will be that great importance should be attached to and emphasis placed on the future and on economic relations, possibilities of communication, to ensure an unimpeded flow of people and goods, and to avoid a situation in one of these future regions in which someone might say that injustice is being done to Muslims, so let's pay them back in areas where we are in the majority, and so on. I think this should be accomplished for the future. How to do it is a matter for wise people. It's proceeding with some difficulty.

And these European commissions, specifically the Cutileiro Commission, it has failed the test, because things obviously didn't work out. And now in Geneva, judging by the slowness, it's clear that there are a lot of difficulties to find a viable solution, which is not surprising because Bosnia is one complicated whole. Anyone who finds a solution for Bosnia should be given a Nobel Prize. But people will find some solution which is probably beyond the grasp of our reason, knowledge and experience.

Monday, 28 December 1992 Sarajevo

569

Pursuant to Amendment LI, Item 5, paragraph 3 to the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at a session held on 24 December 1992, adopted the following

## DECISION

### TO ELECT A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

#### I

Dr Tatjana LJUJIĆ-MIJATOVIĆ is hereby elected member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### II

This Decision shall be published in the *Official Gazette of the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/*.

Number 02-111-921/92

24 December 1992

Sarajevo

President of the Presidency of the RBH, **Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ**

Monday, 28 December 1992 Sarajevo

568

Pursuant to Amendment LI, Item 5, paragraph 3 to the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at a session held on 24 December 1992, adopted the following

## DECISION

### TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

#### I

Miro LASIĆ, a deputy of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is hereby elected President of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### II

This Decision shall be published in the *Official Gazette of the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/*.

Number 02-111-920/92

24 December 1992

Sarajevo

President of the Presidency of the RBH, **Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ**



## All our misunderstandings

Our first meeting in Hrasnica, on 2<sup>nd</sup> of December 1991 was actually our first misunderstanding.

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The president encouraged me with his speech on that day, otherwise I was rather concerned: as Radovan Karadzic in late October publicly threatened that the Muslim people would disappear if the Parliament does not vote for the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president himself took the Parliament stand and said: "I still wish to give the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina a message that there will be no war. My prognoses are based on tested facts. One should not be afraid, because there are two needed for a fight;" he promoted his position of neutrality even earlier, after destruction of Dubrovnik and aggression of the former JNA against Slovenia and Croatia and it reflected in a line of statements. In September 1991 he said: "This is not our war". Those days are over and now, apparently, everything is clear. Or, it at least seemed so to me. There will be no war if the bearers of the greatserbian policy estimate the possibility of loosing it. In the contrary, it can only become bloodier. "If we do not prepare ourselves, Karadzic's prognosis will come true" – I said to the president a day after.

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I explained everything we did in the Sarajevo region and persisted on the claim that it is necessary to bring the organization procedure to the same level in all the regions, and then continue with the work even more intensely. The President looked at me and asked: "And what if the whole work is done in vain? In this way you will mobilize over 50,000 people. " "Not 50,000, Mr. President, but at least 250,000. And if you want a sovereign state, the job is not in vain: you will gain the backbone of the Bosnian Army," I replied. Then he stated the historical: "Yes. Continue

the work throughout the republic, the same way you did in Sarajevo "\*". Shortly afterwards, while using a towel after ablution, he confessed: "Now, that I have heard and seen all of this, I feel safer. Until now, whenever I spoke with Karadzic and his people and when they were pushing me with threats, I had the feeling that even though I was sitting, the chair and carpet were slipping beneath me, as though the ground was sinking". He was not in this mood very long. He was persistent in his belief that there wouldn't be any war.

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"Oslobodjenje" released his statement for the New Year's Day 1992:

"I think that the Army will not attack the BH, because it estimated that force "cannot do a thing"". The same newspaper, on 10<sup>th</sup> of March 1992, transmits Alija Izetbegovic's impressions from Brussels, given to the local "Soir": "Tormented by the tragic experience of the filthy war that ravaged throughout Croatia, the Yugoslav people are waking up from a nightmare." He also then claimed there would be no war in BH. He repeated it even on 17<sup>th</sup> of March 1992 in the interview for "Danas" newspapers: "Above all, what are you talking about? Do we discuss the same matter – the army is no longer what it used to be several months ago. It is neither better, nor worse; it is different, regarding its quality, quantity, psychology, as well as intentions and goals. The army will not occupy Bosnia; it will not execute a coup d'etat."

I read such Izetbegovic's statement in "Oslobodjenje", given on 5<sup>th</sup> of March 1992: "Take a walk, socialize, and go out on the streets. I would like to invite the citizens to accept this in a cold-hearted way and prevent them from falling to rumours and stories. There are powers that wish to provoke chaos and panic-do not fall for it. The situation is under control, you can walk through town calmly."

Izetbegović later admitted this profound conviction and misconception. No argument could convince him that the preparations for the attacks were being carried and in front of everybody. He strongly believed that there will be no war. It's true he finally agreed to prepare for Defense and approved the project of organization, tactics and strategies of defense, but after that he was gone. As if this did not concern him.

Our second disagreement erupted about the acceptance of the Directive for the defense of the BiH sovereignty. When we finished it, and after the data regarding numbers of Chetnic - Ustasha forces was checked several and conversations about Tudman and Milošević intentions, evaluation of Karadžević, we looked for ways to inform the state leadership. Karišik stated all red in the

face”Behmen will not even hear of it”. I used the given opportunity and after a few days I asked Behmen for an opinion on the Directive. All the red in the face he slammed his fist on the table and snapped: “Get the hell out of my office. You too want a war here.” I stayed calm, politely apologized and told him that there will certainly be a war, and it is my obligation, and the people at the headquarters of the Patriotic League to warn and to suggest ways of defense. Those who do accept or do not accept will assume the responsibility. He fell silent, and then I went away.

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The third and a rather serious misunderstanding concerned a role of the former JNA in BH and its relation towards BH. The last man in BH could tell that it was in function of Belgrade's imperialistic and aggressor's policy, as its most forwarded and most dangerous part, everybody could say it, but not Izetbegovic. As the war started in Croatia and as BH practically became a base, apart from Vojvodina, for execution of operations against Croatia, Izetbegovic simply wanted to believe that JNA is not a possible occupant of BH, respectively, that its presence in BH is even necessary.

As the Bosnian Croats in Listica stopped the tank convoy, Izetbegovic said:” You must trust me and Tudjman.” Apparently, it was still his opinion, as well as after the revelation of the RAM plan, in which all tasks of SANU memorandum realization are emphasized, that is, creation of Great Serbia, or, as the former generals used to justify it then: Yugoslavia for nations and republics who want it. The former JNA, Chetnik units of SDS and paramilitary formations from Serbia and Monte Negro were the instrument of realization of this plan which should destroy the Bosniak state and Bosniaks, respectively the Muslims as the political factor. Munir Alibabic – Munja and Dr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic testified on several occasions that the former Bosniak leadership talked about it in details, analyzed the condition and made an unambiguous conclusion: a severe war is in the store for Bosnia and Bosnian people. Nevertheless and besides, Izetbegovic decided to make an agreement with the Army, further believing its alleged neutrality and possible transformation into the Bosnian Army. Till one established on 26<sup>th</sup> of April that already more than 1000 people have been killed so far: hence, 20 days before the beginning of the bloodiest war. Yet then, in Skopje, along with the president of the inexistent presidency of the inexistent SFRY, Branko Kostic, in the presence of General Blagoje Adzic, chief of the main staff of already fascistic armada, the agreement on JNA's leaving from BH has been signed.

According to Oslobodjenje's release, he stated: “A process was initiated which will eventually lead to either the JNA's leaving from Bosnia and Herzegovina or to its radical transformation, therewith it should transform into the Bosnian army at the end of the process, respectively, the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

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In the background of such attacks there were anti-Yugoslav and nationalistic-separatist forces, being right-wing oriented, with a basic aim to break the federal state, respectively, to separate themselves and to create independent states with their own armies, whereby the structures of Territorial defence (TO) would be under their command. In realization of such aims, JNA was the main obstacle and therefore first object to be attacked by the retrograde forces, who established their destructivity for the national moment in order to break the army from within.

Growth of internal process of disintegration among Yugoslav republics, which manifested through overcoming of nationalistic-separatist orientations over joint and general-Yugoslav interests, significantly endangered the unity and integrity of the SFRY. Split of the armed forces (OS) of SFRY to TO as republic-provincial armies in the jurisdiction of competences of republics and provinces and JNA as joint army in the jurisdiction of federal management, represented a danger to survival of SFRY. Existence of two parallel components of the OS SFRY (TO and JNA) with double organization and commanding, organized within 9 armies (6 republic armies, 2 provincial and one federal army) in the joint territory, made the national defence, as the key factor of SFRY survival, highly complex and problematic.

Crisis situation in the country and military-strategic position of SFRY imposed a need to complete the defence system, organization and functionality of OS at state level as well as within institutions of OS alone. In order to build up the defence ability of the country, in mid 80's, the military leadership approached the reorganization of JNA, by making the plan under title "Unity". The essence of organization was brought down to perfection of organization-formational structure of JNA unity in order to strengthen the unity of OS, securing of unique organization and commanding the OS of SFRY, as well as reduction of number of soldiers in peace to 185 000.

By the plan "Unity", one executed the building-up of JNA units, by establishing the military districts (VO) and corps (K) from the existent JNA units. Out of existent armies, whose zones of responsibility, most of them and with their biggest parts overlapping with the territory of certain republic, military districts were formed as strategic groupings, according to which the battlefield of Yugoslavia was divided into 4 battlefields (central, north-western, south-eastern and military-maritime district).

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The military leadership had a task to execute decision on defence of "remnants of Yugoslavia" on the line of western territory borders, where the Serbs were majority. Having intended to execute the aforementioned decision, the supreme command staff started from the situation overview in Dalmatia and Herzegovina, especially from anticipating contingent events in the forthcoming period. Certain re-grouping of existent forces in Dalmatia and Herzegovina were planned, as well as bringing other forces from other territories.

One started with preparations for execution of decision on "defence of remnants of Yugoslavia". Dalmatia and Herzegovina were key areas. In late June, I was invited by General Blagoje Adzic, who briefly introduced me to the situation on Herzegovinian-Dalmatian part of Yugoslav battlefield. He presented me with the decision of military leadership on establishment of operations group (OG) of JNA for execution of tasks in Dalmatia and Herzegovina: I was also appointed for its establishment and commanding. Afterwards, he presented me with the composition and tasks of the OG, the essence of which is control over Dalmatian area as well as prevention of international conflicts outbreak. Beginning of activities shall be determined subsequently.

My task was to plan the operation urgently, train the command of the operations group and to establish operations group which should carry out operation in Dalmatia and Herzegovina. I had an obligation to conduct the coordination organization with JNA and territorial defence compositions in this area which shall not enter the composition of operations group and yet it shall have influence to its activities.

I should established the command of operations group with headquarters support units, consisting of seniors from armed forces inspectorate and units of the first military district, which were located in the broader area of Sarajevo as well as certain number of seniors from the general staff of JNA.

I established the combat compositions of the operations group in the manner that all units for operations within JNA and Territorial defence in Dalmatian-herzegovinian part of the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina went into the composition of the operations group, whereby they were made of Knin corps of JNA (9<sup>th</sup> corps) and parts of Sarajevo corps (4<sup>th</sup> corps), than 37<sup>th</sup> corps (Uzice corps) from the first military district, which was free, second corps (Titograd corps) from the composition of 3<sup>rd</sup> military

district, military-maritime sector "Boka" from the military-maritime district as well as certain part of territorial defence units of Monte Negro and eastern Herzegovina.

I was thinking about the way and order to approach preparations and execution of the given task. I was burdened by a complex and chaotic situation in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I couldn't influence that neither change anything. Perfectly logical, the making of operation plan was the priority task.

After receiving and understanding the task, as well as after general estimation of the situation, I came up with the basic idea for operation- by offensive activities of land forces from the area of Herzegovina and Knin borderland and maritime forces from sea, Croatian paramilitary compositions are to be broken in the area of Herzegovina and Dalmatia and one should join the forces of JNA in the territory of Knin borderland and western Bosnia. This would enable unblocking of garrison and JNA units in these areas, prevent the outbreak of international conflict and disable terror against the Serbian population.

Due to secrecy of operation preparations, there was an order that only commanders of subordinated corps are to participate in the operation plan making. Along with Colonel Ninoslav Krstic from the composition of IOS, I included commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps (Titograd corps), Major general Eremija Radomir, commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> corps (Knin corps), Colonel Ratko Mladic, commander of the 37<sup>th</sup> corps (Uzice corps) Major General Milan Torbica and commander of the military ship Krsto Curovica, commander of the military-maritime sector "Boka". After I introduced the present ones to the given task and basic idea, together we evaluated the situation in details and made the decision proposition, which we submitted to the chief of general staff to approval. As decision proposition was accepted, the operation plan was made, which anticipated that the given task should be carried out in two stages.

Plan for the first stage was the following: forces which serve for execution of operations (and they are in contact with Croatian paramilitary units) in Knin borderland should continue with offensive activities and take Ravni Kotari, than Zadar and Sibenik, as well as to imperil Split from the west. Parts of the operations group from Kupres highland should control broader area of Livno, prevent outbreak and spread of international conflicts as well as excesses of Croatian paramilitary towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After arrival of fresh forces, one should move to attack with the majority of forces from Igalo and Trebinje towards broader area of Dubrovnik and areas of Popovo Polje towards Adriatic coast, break the Ustasha forces and put the southern Dalmatia under control, whereas partially take eastern Herzegovina and Neretva valley in order to prevent blocking of JNA garrisons and outbreak of international conflicts.

At the same time, imperil the Jadranska magistrala /road/ and disable traffic in Adriatic Sea and along the coast. Disable manoeuvre of Croatian army and transmission of their activities from one area to another.

One anticipated that first stage is to be executed within 7 to 10 days.

In the second stage, one anticipated that main forces of operations group move to attack from Neretva River line in direction Mostar-Split, whereas part of forces, in direction Drnis-Split. The task of both forces was to take Split and control Dalmatia, supported by air and sea forces. Duration of this stage was 12 to 15 days

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I was familiar that parts of the 37<sup>th</sup> corps are already in the areas of accumulation (corps command with staff support units, 33<sup>rd</sup> partisan brigade, engineering battalion, rear units). I was introduced that on 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> of September other units of the 37<sup>th</sup> corps shall move to Herzegovina. I was told that arrival of 18<sup>th</sup> partisan division and 19<sup>th</sup> mountain brigade shall be delayed due to difficulties in mobilization.

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While accumulation of units in Herzegovina was going on, mobilization of units, which should have come to composition of the operations group, took place in Serbia and Monte Negro simultaneously.

Units of 37<sup>th</sup> corps are located in the area of Nevesinje, Kruzanje and Mostar, units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps in the area of Stolac, Ljubinje, Trebinje and Igalo, parts of 4<sup>th</sup> corps in the area of Mostar, 9<sup>th</sup> military-maritime sector had its compositions in the clutch of coastal area sea and on the coastal edge. Parts for aircraft support in Neretva valley, in the areas of permanent location.


The composition of operations group was coming from several corps and units and from the territory of three republics. To make a homogeneous operations group as well as to motivate it for execution of combat tasks wasn't easy at all.

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Jevrem Cokić:  
The beginning of the end  
Publisher: Serbian book,  
Ruma 2008.

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Blockade started on 7<sup>th</sup> May 1991. Alija Izetbegović came on the 3<sup>rd</sup> day of the blockade on 9<sup>th</sup> of May  
 2. The 10 motorized brigade. of JNA was blocked, which had intended:

GRANTS  
 KOMANDANT  
 Colonel  
 Milojko Pantelic  
 /Signed/  
 /Stamp: command of the 10th Motorized brigade/

MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
 /Handwritten/: code 01-206

#### DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The possible variants for use in the area of responsibility

- JUNE 1991-

#### Variant no. 1: March-routes:

- 1.1 s.D.Malovan - Kupres - Bugojno, length of 39 km
- 1.2 s.D. Malovan - Kupres - Bugojno - D. Vakuf length 51
- 1.3 s.D. Malovan - Kupres - Bugojno - Donji Vakuf - Jajce length 75
- 1.4 s.D.Malovan - Kupres - Bugojno - Donji Vakuf - Travnik length of 93 km.

#### Variant no. 2:

The march routes are:

- 1.1 s.D. Malovan - v.Šujica - Duvno - v.Kolo - v. Jošenica - v.Stipanić - saddle Prčvala (tt.991) - v. Glrahovica - Kazaginac - v. V. Malovan - Aržano - v. Cista Provo - v .Trilj in length of 105 km.
- 1.2 v.D. Malovan - v.Šujica - Zagoričani - Livno - v. Guber - v. Bila - v.Vržerala - v. Bishovača - v.Rašeljka - v. Kamensko - saddle Vukić (tt.731) - s . Jabuka, in length of 91 km.
- 1.3 Upon arrival from Malovan to v.Cista Provo it is possible to extend towards v.Ljut - v. Šestanovac in length of 90km.
- 1.4 Upon arrival to military region s.Trilj - Jabuka it is possible to extend the march towards Sinj or Klis.
- 1.4 a) For direction Silj - v.Trilj - v.Brnaze - Sinj in the length of 119 km  
 - v.Jabuka - v.Udovčić - v.Orok - v.Obrovac - sin.
- 1.4 b) Direction of Klis: v.Trilj - v. Brnaze - v. Kraj - v. Osoje  
 v. Osoje - v. Klis, in length of 144 km.

#### Variant no. 3.

The march routes are:

- 1.1 v.D. Malovan - v.Šujica - v.Zagoričani - Livno - v. Priluka - saddle Koručina (tt.1113) - Glamoč, in length of 71 km
- 1.2 v. D. Malovan - Šujica v. - v.Zagoričani - Livno - v.Priluka - v. Bojmunte - v. Sajković - v. Crni Lug - v. Peulje - Bosansko Grahovo, in length of 111 km.

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#### Variant no. 4.

There is only one march-route for this task and it is as follows:

v. D. Malovan - v. Šujica - Duvno - v. Duvno - v. Kolo - v. Omerovići - v. Mesihovina - Posušje - saddle Vranić (tt.901) - v. Kočerina - Lištica - Mostar in length 122km.

From this march-route it can be expected to send a portion of power from Posušje to Imotski, in direction: Posušje - Imotski.

\*\*\*

#### Variant no. 5

For this task to Prozor there are two march-route, as follows:

a) v.D. Malovan - Bugojno - Gornji Vakuf - Prozor - Jablanica, in length of 110 km.  
 From there be ready for b / d to: Konjic in length of 21 km and Mostar 48 km.


b) v. D. Malovan - v.Rilići - Zahumsko saddle - v.Rumbci - v. Jakulići - v. Međugorje - Prozor at which point becomes part of the brigade behind the MB, in length of 60 km.

To carry out the task form two columns as follows:

GK: CO, 2okb, ing. from K-da sub-headquarter's Unit, MB and pozč.

PK: CO, 1.tč, K-da, 1 okb, 2tč, poz. jed.


**SERBS ATTACKED  
THE VILLAGE OF RAVNO  
15.09.1991. - 06.10.1991.**




**ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ'S STATEMENT:  
"THIS IS NOT OUR WAR"**







Expulsed population (Muslim and Croat) from the left bank of Neretva river



HK /Herzegovina Corps/ COMMAND  
 /handwritten:/ **20 May 1992**  
 IKM /Forward Command Post/ MOSTAR

MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL /handwritten/  
 illegible/  
 /handwritten: **Attachment No. \_\_\_\_\_**  
**Copy No. 2/**

To the /handwritten:/ **Mostar Brigade** Command

Herzegovina Corps Commander's Order  
 for further operations

Section 1:50,000 Nevesinje 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Mostar 2 and 4

1. The enemy continues bringing in forces from Western Herzegovina to the Neretva valley to reinforce the forces in the general area of Mostar.

They are continuing offensive operations against our positions and features. The attacks are of varying intensity and cover most of the Corps' zone of defence with all the combat elements.

They have focused their attacks on the western and north-western approaches to Mostar, especially on the Lištica-Mostar, Čitluk-Krivodol-Jasenica and Čitluk-Dobro Selo-Bačevići village axes.

In the attacks, they are using artillery, mortars and infantry forces. They are firing artillery and mortars at the VP /firing positions/ of our artillery and mortars in order to neutralise them. The fiercest shooting is from the /illegible/, Kruševo, Ljuti Dolac, Žrnica, Borovčevina and Sovići village sectors.

They are using their infantry forces primarily for attacks to capture key features on Jasenička Kosa and the Orlovac, Hum and Košaruša features.

In the operations so far, the enemy has suffered substantial losses in manpower, which has had a significant influence on the dropping of morale in its units.

The enemy's probable further intentions are to continue offensive operations, capture key features on Jasenička Kosa, disrupt our system of defence and create conditions that are favourable for further action.

In order to achieve the set goal, in addition to engaging the existing forces in contact, the bringing in of new forces from deep behind the lines the equivalent of 1-2 brigades can be expected.

In carrying out offensive operations, they will avoid a frontal attack, but will primarily use the gaps and features which are not so well defended.

Before the attack on individual key features, a stronger concentration of artillery and mortar fire can be expected in order to neutralise them.

The insertion of DIG /sabotage and reconnaissance groups/ into our disposition can be expected in the zone with the aim of introducing unrest, disorganising command and inflicting losses in ž/s /manpower/. In the next operations, they will intensify psychological-propaganda activity.

2. I have decided in the course of 19/ and on completion of an additional mobilisation of defence forces of Eastern Herzegovina and their bringing in to the general area of the Mostar airport, with the aim of organising the b/p /combat formation/, carry out a regrouping of a part of the forces of the H /Herzegovina/ Corps, taking measures to raise barriers in front of the entire p/k /forward defence line/ and prepare the bridges on the Neretva River for destruction, stabilise the defence on the line reached and prevent the enemy from breaking through on the Lištica-Mostar, Čitluk-Mostar and Čapljina-Stolac axes

Readiness for rotation and regrouping of forces will depend on the extent of the additional mobilisation and the arrival of troops.

3. Tasks for units:

3.1. The Mostar Brigade, with the Bjelušine and Potoci odTO /Territorial Defence

Detachments/ and the forces for defending the airport, the light artillery battalions/ of the 171st VB /Air Base/ and combat groups of the 63rd pad. /Parachute/ Brigade and other forces in the zone where the defence is being organised and in the Salakovac - mouth of the Buna River - Čobanovo Polje - Zijemlje village zone, with the task:

On completion of the additional mobilisation and rotation of the 1/1.bTO /1st Company of the 1st Territorial Defence Battalion/ from the general area of Pijesci, form a brigade as per establishment and take over some of the positions of the Nevesinje Brigade on the Orlovac, Kobilovača and Lice features. With a part of the forces, prevent enemy forces from breaking through from the direction of Podvelež, Mali Grad and /?prepare for the possible reception/ of forces from a new position.

Resubordinate the mixed armoured-mechanised group from the Tasovčići sector to the Nevesinje Brigade.

Boundaries right: Salakovac - Zijemlje

Boundaries left: mouth of the Buna River, source of the Bunica River

Excluding - Orlijev Kuk

Supported by the KAG /Corps Artillery Group/ Čobanovo Polje - Podvelež

KM /Command Post/ Severni Logor /Northern Camp/, IKM /Forward Command Post/ Jasenica

3.2. The Nevesinje Brigade, with the Tasovčići OdTO and the Berkovići OdTO, the Hodbina čTO /Territorial Defence Company/ and the armoured-mechanised 10th Brigade from Tasovčići, will organise the defence in the zone: up to but not including the village of Buna - Klepci village, Stolac, Orlov Kuk, with the task: in coordinated action with the Mostar and Trebinje Brigades, on completion of the additional mobilisation and rotation of units from the Orlovac, Kobilovača and Lice features, take over some of the positions of the Mostar Brigade from the Gubavica - Tasovčići village sector, stabilise the defence on the line reached, prevent the enemy from breaking through and infiltrating from behind the lines and the arming of paramilitary formations in the zone of responsibility.

Boundaries right: mouth of the Buna River, source of the Bunica River, Uzduša, Orlov Kuk

Left: Gradina - Bregava River, up to and including Stolac.

Supported by the KAG.

KM Rasadnik, IKM Gubavac

3.3. The KAG will continue to provide support for the defence operations from the general area of Podvelež.

VP:

122 mm D-30 /towed howitzer/ had /Howitzer Artillery Battalion/ Velika Stražnica, tt. /trig point/ 665 700 metres s/i /north east/, Golubinka pit.

ZnI /?reconnaissance zone/: Velika Stražnica - tt. 675 - Krstina (tt. 632 and tt. 655 - Hum (tt. 467) - tt. 263 (Blizanci),

RNP /area of special interest/ - general area of Mostar, Hum, Orlovac and Krivodol village, Čula.

Build into the formation of the had an M-1 2/155 mm /?double-barrelled 155 mm air defence system/ - 3 "Plamen" 128 mm a/?automatic/VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ artillery pieces.

VP: Kričanj village (400 m south), Velika K. (tt. 652), tt. 675 1,000 m s/z /north west/,

ZnI: Gornje Opine - Platidol village and Velika Kosa (tt. 652) tt 520 - Slipčići (tt. 302).

RNP: general area of Mostar, Gornja Jasenica village - Milićevići village.

"Oganj" 128 mm VBR battery: OČR /zone of expected operation/ in the Čobanovo Polje sector.

The 130 mm artillery piece and VP in the Čobanovo Polje sector.

For all artillery pieces, prepare a minimum of 3 AZOP /?base line azimuths/ for the sectors VP, Mostar, Goranci village, VP, Dobro Selo, Blatnica village and VP, Salaševina village, Pijesci village.

#### 4. Engineering Support:

1. The focus of engineering support will be on fortification, construction of obstacles and supporting movements and manoeuvres in the depth.

Fortification will be carried out to the 2nd degree of protection by building up the existing system of protection. Construct shelters for protection of the half-dug-in and earth-covered type to ensure efficient protection of troops and combat equipment and efficient fire. Camouflage the facilities well.

For all the troops, construct shelters with a sub-parapet cover. Construct the shelters

with own forces. Predict areas for reserve positions and begin organising these in succession.

The focus of the construction of obstacles will be on laying mine fields and groups of mines in front of the p/k /forward line/ of defence at a safe distance. Make tripwire m/p /mine fields/ separately. In case there is not enough time, in exceptional cases, also lay m/p and groups of mines by sowing. These tasks will be carried out by the troops that have occupied positions.

Set up a good barrier system for the eastern bank of the Neretva River by laying mixed m/p, and prepare all bridges on the Neretva River for demolition, and demolish them on the basis of a separate order, by forming an GZ /?obstacle construction group/. Prepare for demolition the bridges on the Buna River in the village of Buna. Set up a good barrier system for the defence sector and in the depth, which is organised by the Nevesinje Brigade, by laying m/p and groups of mines. Pay special attention to setting up barriers on the following axes: Buna village - Kapića Avlija village, Žitomislić - Pijesci village, Strmac village - Stolac, Tasovčići village - Klepci village.

Set up a strong barrier system for roads in the depth and predict possible sections of roads for destruction.

Leave passages in the mine fields, organise a KZS /?control and protection service/ and plan the means for closing these. Determine the exact location of m/p, compile records of mine fields.

Fortify mine fields with TČM /expansion unknown/ by laying mines in tiers. For these tasks, primarily engage the engineer units of the brigade. The location of the mine fields will be specified by the brigade command.

KZS is organised by every unit for itself.

Form GOB /?intelligence support groups/ in the brigades and ensure unhindered communication along the front and in the depth.

Take the MES /mines and explosives/ from own reserves and by bringing in the necessary amounts from the depot, and immediately replenish from reserves the MES that has been used up. Carry out replenishment by request.

#### 5. Support for Combat Operations:

a) Moral-psychological: take urgent measures in time, and at the latest by 25 May 1992, to prepare the troops from the SAO /Serbian Autonomous Region of Herzegovina/ who will remain on the front after the departure of the v/o /military conscripts/ and soldiers and officers of the regular forces from the FR /Federal Republic/ of Yugoslavia for a decisive resistance against the fascist forces and in that way prevent the breakthrough of Croatian-Muslim forces in the territory of Eastern Bosnia.

b) Intelligence: focus on taking measures and activities in order for the established system of observation and reconnaissance not to be disrupted, thereby preventing any possibility of being taken by surprise.

c) Security: take measures in the units and commands to discover the organisers of desertion from positions and units and take stringent disciplinary measures against them immediately.

d) Logistics: focus on taking care of the p/o /wounded and sick/, repairing TMS /materiel and technical equipment/, recovering fuel, evacuating faulty and nonessential equipment from the battlefield, replenishing units with MS /materiel/ and providing assistance in establishing a system of logistics support for the army and the population.

COMMANDER  
Major General  
Momčilo PERIŠIĆ  
/signed/

/handwritten: 5/

/handwritten: s p /strictly confidential/ 73/340  
26 May 1992HERZEGOVINA CORPS /HK/  
COMMAND  
Strictly confidential no. 229-90  
25 May 1992

Order for further operations

To: \_\_\_\_\_ COMMAND

## I

Due to the influence of international factors, the situation in BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ is becoming increasingly complex. Even a military option is being proposed, including the engagement of part of armed forces, particularly the Air Force and the Navy.

## II

1. Combined armed forces, including the Croatian army and paramilitary formations from BH are carrying out b/d /combat operations/ in the River Neretva valley, eastern Herzegovina and around Dubrovnik.

The operations are focusing on Mostar and the following axes: Crnoglav – Stolac – Trebinlja – Ravno villages and Slano – Zavala villages. They have assembled forces in depth in the Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuški, Grude, Posušje, Đanta Doli village, the Pelješac p/o /peninsula/ and Šipan o /island/ sectors.

They have been providing artillery fire support with various artillery weapons grouped in firing groups of 2-3 guns, launching fire attacks with 5-10 projectiles and quickly relocating VP /firing positions/. So far, the effects of their fire were mainly accidental hits rather than the consequences of adjusted target ranges i.e. the accuracy or density of fire.

They used the air force for reconnaissance with piston-driven aircraft and helicopters.

It is expected that they will focus offensive operations along the following axes: Mostar – Nevesinje, Crnoglav – Stolac, Trebinlja village – Ravno village – Popovo Polje, Slano village – Zavala village – Popovo Polje, with the following probable intentions: reach the general Stolac area with the help of the Muslim population, cut the Herzegovina Corps zone of defence, and by reaching Popovo Polje create favourable conditions for further operations in depth of the eastern Herzegovina territory.

2. As of 26 May 1992 all forces on the territory of eastern Herzegovina shall be joined under the single Herzegovina Corps command, including: 23<sup>rd</sup> TO /Territorial Defence/ br /brigade/ - Bileća; 472<sup>nd</sup> mtbr /motorised brigade/ - Trebinje; 10<sup>th</sup> mtbr – Mostar; 13<sup>th</sup> mtbr – Nevesinje; 13<sup>th</sup> map /mixed artillery regiment/; 13<sup>th</sup> mpoap /mixed anti-tank artillery regiment/; 13<sup>th</sup> PVO /anti-aircraft defence/ lap /light artillery regiment/; 13<sup>th</sup> bVP /bomber regiment/, 13<sup>th</sup> bv /communications battalion/, 13<sup>th</sup> snb /medical battalion/, 13<sup>th</sup> atb /transport battalion/; HK command PJ /headquarters support unit/ and PoB /anti-armour battalion/; Borci TO od /detachment/, Berkovići – Stolac TO od and Ljubinj TO od that shall be resubordinated to 23<sup>rd</sup> TO br /brigade/; and the Trebinje TO od /472<sup>nd</sup> mtb /motorised battalion/.

3. I have decided to: continue with decisive defence on the Salakovac – Klepci villages part of the front and the current 13<sup>th</sup> Corps line of defence; stabilise the defence in the 23<sup>rd</sup> TO br zone and with 472<sup>nd</sup> mtbr organise defence on the Velja Međa village – Terbinlja village – Orahov Do village – Velika Pečina – Grebci village – Kaldurdevići village – Visočnik line.

The objective is to prevent enemy penetration through the zone of defence and further through eastern Herzegovina.

4. Focus PVO on organising VOJ /air surveillance and warning/ and PVZ /anti-aircraft defence/.

5. Focus engineering work on setting up obstacles and fortifying the lines of defence.

6. Focus PNHBOb /anti-nuclear, chemical and biological defence/ on organising efficient NHB /nuclear, chemical and biological/ control of the territory and have individual protection equipment in constant readiness for use.

7. Focus intelligence security on gathering information on the disposition, strength, activities and intentions of the enemy.
8. Focus anti-electronic defence on the anti-electronic protection of communications.
9. Focus security on the counter-intelligence protection, timely detection and prevention of any intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and other subversive activities. Provide constant and total control of the territory through the disposition of units and engagement of VP /Military Police/ units in coordination with MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ forces.
10. Focus the work on moral and psychological security on informing the troops about the unit tasks, explaining the current situation and stressing the need for disciplined and responsible implementation of tasks.

Prevent negative incidents that could damage the combat morale.

11. Organise logistical support with own forces and resources. Focus on 472<sup>nd</sup> mtbr and security of units defending the Mostar sector along the Mostar - Nevesinje axis.

The PoB /Logistics Base/ shall provide combat supplies to units on the Mostar – Nevesinje axis, 472<sup>nd</sup> mtbr and the Trebinje TO od, using their own and combined transport facilities.

The units shall carry out basic maintenance with own forces and resources, relying on PoB supplies.

Troops shall be fed hot meals exceptionally, on order, and all units are to be supplied above the norm with a Sd/o /dry daily rations/ /?per soldier/.

Units shall be supplied with drinking water from reliable water supply facilities.

Increased hygiene, prophylactic and epidemiological protection measures are to be applied in all units on the territory.

For further treatment of the p/o /injured, wounded and sick/ rely on medical institutions on the territory: Nevesinje, Trebinje and Ljubinje.

12. Command and communications:

KM /Command Post/ in Bileća; IKM /Forward Command Post/ - 1 in Mostar or Nevesinje, depending on the combat situation.

IKM-2 in Mrkonjići village.

Subordinate units KM in current sectors.

Command communications according to current organisation. Focus communications on wire and radio – relay communications.

Regular combat reports with situation as at 1500 hours shall be submitted by 1700 hours every day; interim reports shall be forwarded as necessary and in the course of combat according to developments.

To:  
 - IKM -1, Mostar; IKM-2, Mrkonjići village  
 - Mostar, Nevesinje, Bileća and Trebinje brigades  
 - map, mpoap, PVO lap, Borci TO od

COMMANDER  
 Major General  
 Momčilo PERIŠIĆ  
 /signed and stamped/

MILITARY POST

No. 2469

(Hand written) Pa, no. 1189-1

28.10.1991.

ČAPLJINA

MILITARY SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL


Based on the orders from higher command, and based on an assessment of the vulnerability of facilities in the army compound and the barracks, plan for defense of facilities, as well as approval of garrison commandant,

I H E R E B Y O R D E R:

1. Make the necessary protection of the barracks, "Miro Popara" and isolated facilities, "Tasovčići" and "Čuka" by placing a group of mines in the zone of 50 meters from the wire fence, the entire length of the barracks fence and isolated facilities. Implement protection by setting the anti-personnel mines and directed impact mines, and strengthening the existing wire fence.
2. All the gates of the barracks and isolated facilities close temporarily and prohibit their usage, except the gate no. 1 of the compound and one gate on each facility which are to be protected by the movable obstacles. The gate must be blocked with different objects and materials suitable for preventing the violent passage through the gates.
3. The person in charge of the protection will be cap. Mijailović Radomir with the necessary number of soldiers. Upon completion of works produce prescribed documentation and submit the same to me for review.
4. During the prevention works strictly follow the prescribed measures when handling the mines and hazardous materials, in order to prevent injuries and protect the health and lives of personnel.
5. At the end of all prevention works, at the line of the last group of mines set signs labeled "Mines" or "Do not go beyond this point." Person in charge is Captain Mijailovic Radimir, who will report to me in person.
6. Daily visual inspection of mines of directed impact between 10:00 and 13:00 hours will be carried out by Corporal Sokolov Ljubisa with Private Garić Radom. Control the position of mine, cables and cable connections, and extensions thereof.
7. Hand inductor machines must be packed in foil bags and placed with platoon and department commander. It is strictly prohibited connecting them with the cables, except in cases of imminent danger upon my command.
8. At the appropriate meeting warn the entire personnel of the compound regarding the protection of the facilities, during which directly specify the allowable movement paths.
9. For all clarifications and questions address to me personally by phone. Local number 613

DEPUTY  
COMANDANT  
Captain of First Class  
Hadzic Džemal

/ Stamped: MILITARY POST 2469 -  
ČAPLJINA /



Reg. Number  
Serial  
**(MEO)**

**RECORD OF MINE - EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES**

Map /hand written/ MOSTAR R1: /hand written/ 25000 page number \_\_\_\_\_ coordinates: X=  
4773570 Y=4775570

Edition /hand written 1975

**A - INSTALMENT DATA**

Orientation points  
Facility no. 18, south of the  
concrete playground, south  
border, south corner.

Lay out of MEO by rows and groups

1. Type of MEO - number of installed MED: group anti-personnel mines  
Total number installed 24 mines PMA-1
2. Type of the installment of MEO: by hand, machine layout
3. Number of lines (groups) in MEO quantity of installed MOD by lines-groups: two rows in total  
In the first row 12 mines, in the second 12  
mines
4. MOE passage data: -

Printed in 4 copies and delivered:  
1. org. Corpus command  
2. copy command of the 10. mtbr  
3. copy command of the 1. mtb  
4. copy commandant of the 3. Mtu  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_

UNIT: 3/1. mtb 10.  
Person in charge: cap. Mijailović Radomir  
Amendments done by: \_\_\_\_\_

And reported \_\_\_\_\_ data \_\_\_\_\_  
/stamp: ARMY POST NUMBER 2469 ČAPLJINA/

**B - DEMINING DATA**

1. Way of demining:
2. Demining ordered by:
3. Quantity and type of MED (extracted - destroyed)
4. MED submitted to:
5. Demining unit:

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

In charge of demining:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Rank, first and last name)



Reg. Number  
Serial  
(MEO)

## RECORD OF MINE – EXPLOSIVE OBSTICLES

Map /hand written/ MOSTAR. R1: /hand written/ 25000 page number \_\_\_\_\_ coordinates: X= 4773790 Y=4775120

Edition /hand written 1975

### A – INSTALMENT DATA

Orientation points  
Metal pole of the exterior light,  
between two trees south of the  
pathway to gate no.4

Lay out of MEO by rows and groups

- 
1. Type of MEO – number of installed MED: **group anti-personnel mines**  
Total number installed 40 mines PMA-1
2. Type of the installment of MEO: **by hand, machine layout**
3. Number of lines (groups) in MEO quantity of installed MOD by lines-groups: **two rows in total**  
**In the first row 20 mines, in the second 20**  
**mines**
4. MOE passage data: **-**

Printed in 4 copies and delivered:  
1. org. Corpus command  
2. copy command of the 10. mtbr  
3. copy command of the 1. mtb  
4. copy commandant of the 3. mtu  
Date:

UNIT: 3/1. mtb 10.

Person in charge: cap. Mijailović Radomir

Amendments done by: \_\_\_\_\_

And reported \_\_\_\_\_ data \_\_\_\_\_  
/stamp: ARMY POST NUMBER 2469 ČAPLJINA/

### B – DEMINING DATA

1. Way of demining:
2. Demining ordered by:
3. Quantity and type of MED (extracted – destroyed)
4. MED submitted to:
5. Demining unit:


Date: \_\_\_\_\_

In charge of demining:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Rank, first and last name)

Military secret  
 TOP SECRET  
 Attachment no.  
 Copy number  
 "TISA"



Battery  
commandant



**Wed. September 18th, 1991**

**Bombing of TV transmitter**

This afternoon JNA planes bombed the TV transmitter on Biokovo so that the whole Herzegovina and Dalmatia remained without a Zagreb radio and TV programs. I somehow manage to receive Radio Zagreb, but the transmission was very poor. They say that the reason we are receiving anything is due to the Radio Posušje. I can hear Belgrade and Sarajevo well but how can one trust them since they are still in communist hands. Will the Serbian information blockade be successful?

\*\*\*

**Fr. September 20th, 1991**

**Herzegovina on its feet**

In the morning hours, Serbian and Montenegrin reservists entered Herzegovina from two directions: Trebinje, Stolac, Čapljina and Višegrad, Nevesinje Mostar. Čapljina residents set up barricades in Potkoš and stopped the reservists from entering into their municipality. They say the reservists went through Stolac and Dubrava without any problems. Those from direction of Nevesinje entered Mostar without any resistance. They justify their arrival as reinforcement for protection of the Ortiješ airport. As far as I know, so far, no one has attacked the airport, so I do not know why it should be further protected by the reservists from another republic?

Some of the residents from Gnojnice are fleeing to Mostar, and many from Mostar to Western Herzegovina. Many companies and all the schools in Mostar are closed, vehicle after vehicle are moving along Žovnica and Kobilovač, there is rarely someone going in the opposite direction. The people are left to themselves, none from the authorities gives any information on what to do and how to behave.

There is a great uncertainty and war psychosis hanging over Mostar and Herzegovina.

In western Herzegovina civil authorities are preparing for defense and some kind of mobilization. They say weapons are scares, there is an occasional rifle, and they mentioned some kind of Russian Kalashnikovs, which are of similar value as an average cow and the occasional hand grenade.

Tonight, the army stopped the transmission of TV Sarajevo, apparently because of the TV frequency interference.

\*\*\*

**Tue. September 24th, 1991**

**People from Dubrava are fleeing**

Tonight TVZG started working again from Biokovo. Over the phone we find out that people from Dubrava (only Croats) are fleeing to safer places like Čapljina, Neum, Mostar and Metković. So, unfortunately, the Autumn of 1942 repeats. The people of entire Herzegovina are anxious and the fear is great.

The army does not respect the decision of the BiH government to retreat. It is obvious that the army doesn't respect anyone

from above, but do as they wish. True, the army does not attack civilians, but they constantly intimidate them with gunfire into the air. Today such shootings occurred in Mostar at 4,00 pm.

The Crisis Headquarters, Red Cross and Caritas were activated for the reception of refugees from Dubrava. All this functions badly, so the people are dealing with the situation themselves as usually.

\*\*\*

**Tue. October 1st, 1991**

**Attack on Dubrovnik**

Montenegrin reservists attacked Croatia from several directions. From Herceg Novi on Konavle, from Trebinje via Ivanjice, from Trebinje via Čepikuće. The planes strike from the air, and the ships with from the sea. The attack, although fierce is stopped for the time being. There are casualties among the attackers. HTV (Croatian television) said 70, Serbian sources said 21. There are casualties also among the defense. Montenegrin TV said 400, Croatian sources are silent. HTV is showing houses and facilities that were damaged by the shells and mines. Montenegrins attacked under the pretext to liberate Dubrovnik from Ustasha. This is a clear sign of aggression, because at least in Konavle there are no Serbs, and they cannot be threatened, in order that so called JNA (Yugoslav national army) should defended them and in such a manner, destroying the entire city, the pearl of culture in all categories.

**Sun. October 6th, 1991**

**This is not our war, says Alija**

Tonight Alija Izetbegovic declared neutrality of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this war. "This is not our war, this is a war between Serbs and Croats." SDS (Serbian democratic party) declared Alija's statement regarding neutrality of BiH illegal.

All of this shows a complete impotence of civilian authorities in BiH. The real power is in the hands of military leadership in alliance with the SDS and they do whatever they like. When it suits them they call upon the Constitution of the SFRY, and when it doesn't suit them they call upon constitutions of various Serbian Krajinas and the will of the Serbian people.

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**Sat. October 26th, 1991**

**Army requests surrender of Dubrovnik**

The Army requires the surrender of Dubrovnik, in order to stop destroying it. Even some of the gentlemen from Dubrovnik agree with this alternative because they don't want to fight and have no sense of national identity. Even Herzegovinians, who came to defend them, were accused for Chetnik attacks.

In Krivodol there was a shooting between reservists and national guard. Later, five of our men came to negotiations, but the reservists captured and transported them by helicopter to the Heliport, and later in Nevesinje. The same night they were

returned and released home. That night, the dead guard was placed in Kruševo.

**Sun. October 27th, 1991**  
**Help for Dubrovnik**

Today, in several of our parishes we were gathering help for Dubrovnik. Parishes of Potoci, Katedrala and Plog were involved. We gathered around 15 tons of food. We didn't even dare to hope that people would respond so well to our call, since it was announced only this morning. We could not announce it earlier because we were just informed this morning that assistance can be transported to Dubrovnik.

**Fr. October 28th, 1991**  
**Help for Dubrovnik left**

Our help for Dubrovnik joined the Red Cross composition. The army allowed the March route: Mostar, Split and then by boat to Dubrovnik. This military nerve exceeds all limits of rational thinking, doesn't it? But one must be grateful that they allow any help at all.

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**Sun. November 3rd, 1991**  
**Chetnik provocations around Mostar**

JA reservists roam around the hills surrounding Mostar and are causing conflicts with the local population. Especially in Krivodol and Miljkovići where six civilians were arrested, but were later released without consequences. Apparently the JA soldiers were threatened; if they are not released the whole of western Herzegovina will be mobilized.

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**Sat. November 9th, 1991**  
**Situation in Herzegovina is deteriorating**

Due to the presence of reservists and their provocation, situation in Herzegovina is getting worse every day. JA does such crazy moves as though their aim is to provoke a war and not to prevent incidents. Everything is possible in this situation, and the wildest of all seems the most realistic, the war.

**Sun. November 10th, 1991**  
**Blood and soccer matches**

In Croatia, the war rages on all fronts, cities are under fire, people are dying, and TV BG (Belgrade) and SA (Sarajevo) are, unbelievably broadcasting soccer matches. These are the crazy times, and the sense for humanity seems to be lost. One would prefer to die without being involved in these wild times, or should I say wild people.

**Mon. November 11th, 1991**  
**A fake Europe**

Europe and the world, same as in Turkish (Ottoman) era, praise us promising help, but in practice do nothing. What is seen in Croatia seems like something from the movies about the Wild West, not reality. Is the world so helpless or so

corrupt, that they will do nothing to protect the innocently attacked?

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**Sat. November 16th, 1991**  
**First dead soldier from cathedral**

In the Cathedral parish, today we had a funeral for the first dead soldiers. His name was Zoran Pehar 23 years old, he died near Dubrovnik. He was buried in Masline in the presence of great number of people.

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**Tue. November 19th, 1991**  
**Tension around Hutovo**

The situation in Hutovo is tense. Montenegrin reservists want to go on with plunders, but the Neum or better to say Metković defense, occurring at Hutovo, does not give away. Skirmishes are frequent, but the defense lines are not moved. Feeble and old population moved out of Hutovo. The pastor is in the parish during the day, but goes somewhere safer during the night.

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**Th. December 12th, 1991**  
**Croatia's first recognition**

Ukraine recognized Croatia, but what is it worth since Ukraine itself is not recognized?

Our priest Mijo Bosankić came back from Dubrovnik, and he said there was no great famine in Dubrovnik, but the town is largely destroyed.

On Mostar TV AS interview with a mayor Gagra was broadcasted, after a colonel and representatives of intellectuals from Bodiroga. They were saying that JA is peaceful. Only if it weren't for the frightening reality of Croatia and Ravno in ruins. Serbian outlaws would not have succeeded if JA did not arm them and constantly supported them. Even the blind can see that JA stands behind everything.

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**Sat. December 14th, 1991**  
**Bombs again**

The café bar owned by Jadranko Topić, the leader of the HDZ and vehicle from brother of Defense Minister Doke, were blown away last night. Also the auto paint shop at Buna owned by S. Gagra and photocopy shop "Canon" at Center II, owned by Pero Ivankovic were blown away. Nobody was injured. No one knows for sure who is doing it, but it can be assumed that JA or SDS is behind it. They have recently started to arrest and attack some prominent members of the HDZ (Croatian democratic union). Is this the beginning of Serbian-army attacks on Croats in Mostar, or just a provocation, God only knows!

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Friday, 10 January 1992

### ATTACK ON TRAIN IN MOSTAR

Last night the Borba newsagent's kiosk and a café were blown up in Mostar. Near the airport, reservists opened fire at a freight train and wounded two railway workers, one Muslim, one Serb.

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**Tue. January 14th, 1992**

Reserve Army provocations

Tonight an explosive was set at Radio Mostar. The damage was great but there were no casualties. Who could be behind this, it is hard to say?

San Marino recognized Croatia.

Reserve army has placed unauthorized mines at Miljković. One cow and several goats wandered in this mine field which was unmarked, and were killed. A claim for damages was sent to JA.

Chetnik reserve soldiers have good salaries between 30.000 and 50.000 YUD (Yugoslav dinar) so they were able to buy everything in Mostar, especially foreign currencies on the black market behind the HIT. People are already used to new Serbian dinar, and privately Croatian currency is also available, and is considered to have greater value than Serbian dinar.  
1 DEM = 60 HRD = 70 YUD.

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Saturday, 25 January 1992

### HUNGER KNOCKING AT THE DOOR

The Yugoslav dinar was depreciated again by 400%, to 1 DEM = 65 YUD, although the official exchange rate is artificially maintained. The shops are empty because it is not profitable for shopkeepers to sell anything for these melting dinars. Jobless citizens are facing hunger. The situation in the countryside is slightly better because they grow their own produce. Reservists have bought up all the stocks. Their pay ranges from YUD 30,000 to 50,000, while our workers get 5,000 when they manage to get money at all; otherwise, they are given some internal coupons that are accepted in a limited number of shops. The average salary of republic MPs in the Federal Assembly for January 1992 was between 60,000 and 80,000, 10 times the pay of an ordinary worker. Many of our young men joined the Croatian Army or the police for patriotic reasons, but also for the money, because life here is hard.

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Tuesday, 28 January 1992

### CARITAS IN ACTION

The diocesan Caritas in Mostar is working at full steam. There are a lot of paupers and people on the brink of poverty. There may be among them some who are feigning or maybe smuggling, but it's difficult to sort it out all the time. The distribution of food, medicines and goods is not all it should be, because the organization leaves a lot to be desired. There are frequent complaints against the distribution of Caritas aid across Herzegovina. Some priests are running their own separate charities - they don't want to join the central diocesan one, because it just wouldn't be right if everything was all right. Medugorje has its own separate organisation for collecting aid, as does Father Jozo ZOVKO, and no-one from the official Church has any insight into their work or any way to check how they distribute and to whom.

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Friday, 31 January 1992

### WHO IS GUARDING WHAT?

For the past few days there have been no major events for the TV News. Who is holding and guarding what in Mostar? Reservists hold both barracks, both airports and their own hospital. They took control of the Austrian bunkers and fortresses on Velež and its slopes (Hum, Orlovac), and roam the hill around Miljkovići and Krivodol. Every day they go to do their stint in military 4x4's, in full combat gear, and food is transported to them all the time. Every day they pass by the cathedral on their way to Hum, but so far, they have not made trouble for us. Helicopters fly over frequently, especially by night – they are said to be carrying weapons to the hills, and for the Serbs in surrounding villages: Medine, Raška Gora and Bogodol. The police hold the police station and try to maintain order in town.

Saturday, 1 February 1992

### A NEW PROVOCATION BY RESERVISTS

There was again a skirmish with reservists in Krivodol. They tried to broaden the area they control in Krivodol, but the locals did not allow it. There was an exchange of fire and several reservists are said to have been wounded. Two of the villagers' haystacks were torched. European monitors and representatives of both the army and the civilian authorities came to perform an on-site investigation. People from Široki Brijeg arrived tonight to help Kruševo.

Sunday, 2 February 1992

### CANDLEMAS

The traditional Candlemas. The people turn out in good numbers to mass, not just today, but regularly. Although many have found their way back to God, got baptized, married /in church/ and confessed, there are still some who are afraid to do it. They don't seem to understand that Communism is finished for good and are putting off their return to the path of the faith, just to be on the safe side.

Monday, 3 February 1992

### CANNONS AT HUM

The reservists have rolled out tanks onto Hum and the surrounding hills. One only needs to remember what happened to Ravno to know their intentions. But who can stop them and how?

Tuesday, 4 February 1992

### BLOCKADE AT BALINOVAC

In response to the army and its guns, the people and the police have blocked the exit from Mostar towards Čitluk and the surrounding hills held by reservists. The Army cannot pass. They can get replacements and food only by air, by helicopter. Will the Army show some sense and withdraw the guns from Hum, Miljkovići and the other hills or will they continue their show of force? The tensions are running high. We are waiting to see which it will be – war or peace. People have grown so sick and tired of this tension with the reservists, they almost don't care any more if a war starts, they just want this tension and uncertainty to come to an end.

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Thursday, 6 February 1992

### REMOVAL OF BARRICADES

It has been agreed with the Army that all the barricades put up yesterday and the day before be removed, if only the Army isn't lying when they say they will put the heavy weaponry back into the barracks.

Slovenia has established diplomatic relations with Croatia. Turkey has recognised Slovenia, Croatia and BH.

Friday, 7 February 1992

### A PILOT'S DEFECTION

One pilot has defected from the Yugoslav Army /VJ/ to the Croatian side. Defections of young Croats from the VJ to the Croatian side have been frequent. Young Croats are defecting from barracks in BH to go running home or to Croatia, because they can see that the former JNA has collapsed and its role has been taken over by the Serbian Army and command.

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Monday, 10 February 1992

### THE UNCERTAINTY OF WAR

There is still no real peace in Croatia, while the situation in BH is not improving at all. One gets the impression that the Serbs have failed to achieve what they wanted in Croatia and they are now getting ready to go for it in BH.

Tuesday, 11 February 1992

### ATTACK ON THE CATHEDRAL

Around 1220 hours a Chetnik bullet from a tower in Hum hit the cathedral. The bullet pierced the plexiglass above the southern entrance, went through the windowpane and hit the rug at the altar, ricocheting from the foot of the altar. Father Ivo ŠUTALO was playing the organ in the cathedral when it happened and did not hear the shot, but was frightened by the bullet that whizzed over him. The police have carried out an on-site investigation.

VJ planes have been circling above Mostar all day, and ordinary people have been unable to get a drop of petrol for a week now. What sort of impudent trick is the VJ up to now?

Wednesday, 12 February 1992

### DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN

The Vatican has established diplomatic relations with Croatia. Croatia and Russia have recognized Macedonia.

Yesterday Vicar Gen. Luka PAVLOVIĆ and Father Ivo PAVLOVIĆ visited Trebinja and Ravno and confessed the old folks there. They were taken there by a VJ captain of whom they have only good things to say. Of the religious property, only the church in Trebinja is still standing, all the rest has been destroyed. The people who remained under Chetnik occupation are very fearful. Some Chetniks are arrogant, while others seemed normal. This visit to Ravno and Trebinja had been arranged by the Minister for Religion in the BH government, Mr. BRKIĆ.

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Saturday, 22 February 1992

### **CUTILEIRO'S LISBON AGREEMENT**

The negotiations in Lisbon are over. IZETBEGOVIĆ has stated that everyone has declared their support for a sovereign BH with national autonomies sharing the same currency and army. BH will consist of three components: the Croat, the Muslim and the Serb peoples. And municipalities will be formed according to the 1981 census. All three sides are happy, even the SDS. When even they are happy, it must be either special mercy from God or a successful Serbian ruse that the SDA and the HDZ have not seen through yet.

Will this CUTILEIRO'S Plan for BH succeed?

Sunday, 23 February 1992

### **SOMETHING IS COOKING**

A gathering of the Croat troops has been observed on the Hrasno-Neum line. It seems a liberation of these parts from the Chetniks is being prepared.

The cathedral has been hit again.

Monday, 24 February 1992

### **THE NUNS ARE MOVING**

The nuns who had come from Trebinja have moved tonight to a rented flat at 23, Kavazbašina Street. I can't see why they didn't go to the house in Ilići, closer to the hospital where they work.

An explosive device was planted outside the Napredak Hall in Odžak and the explosion injured 12 persons.

In Glamoč, physician Alojzije KELAVA was killed. He was killed in a café, at 1540 hours, from behind, for no reason at all. It was a Serbian reservist who killed him.

Tuesday, 25 February 1992

### **SERBS ACTING STRANGELY**

The SDS is acting like they never signed anything in Lisbon. They are setting up their Serbian assemblies and republics. President IZETBEGOVIĆ has complained to the EC about this misconduct by the Serbs.

Wednesday, 26 February 1992

### **EXPLOSIONS IN STOLAC**

Everything is abuzz with the referendum called by the SDA and the HDZ. The bishops in BH have also sent out their own appeal.

General mobilization has been carried out in Ljubinje. In Banjaluka, the Ferhat Mosque was bombed.

Late last night in Stolac and at Drenovac, the monuments to the partisan heroes of the national liberation struggle in WWII were blown up.

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Tuesday, 24 March 1992

### HRASNO UNDER ATTACK

The VJ is shelling Hrasno with a vengeance. Shells are falling on Svitava. Drijen is targeted as well.

Last night in Mostar there was a serious exchange of fire between the VJ and the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, fortunately without any consequences.

Wednesday, 25 March 1992

### TALKS AT VILLA NERETVA

It's quiet around Neum. The barricades facing Kruševo were put up by the VJ, which allows no passage. Talks are going on at Villa Neretva to solve the problem of Kruševo. There are representatives of the Army, the representatives of Kruševo local commune and vicar Ljubo Planinić.

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Sat. 28th March 1992

What are Serbs waiting for?

Chetniks are holding all of the hills around Mostar, except Žovnica, Galco and Planinica. On all these hills they have all kinds of weapons and they are constantly provoking passengers. In both camps and around the airport they have dug in tanks and heavy artillery with pipes facing westward. It is a miracle that chetniks are waiting when they have everything ready to level both Mostar and Herzegovina.

Sat. 29. March 1992

People are frightened?

One can notice that there are considerably fewer people attending the Sunday mass. All of those who are from the western part of Herzegovina leave on Friday to be with their families, not wanting to spend the weekend in Mostar. Fear of war is creeping in.

Tue. 31st March 1992

Bus from Lištica under attack

Reservists from Orlovac fired on the bus from Lištica and have wounded one person.

I watched Biljana Pavšić on TV how she was wondering who ostracized JNA? Does she not see that she herself is ostracized by the evildoings both in Croatia and eastern Herzegovina?

The 6th conference regarding BiH ended in Brussels. It was concluded that the peace agreement is to be signed and a group of experts established to divide BiH.

Barricades were placed around Stolac to protect Stolac from the Serbian occupiers; Muslims also participated in this defense action.

Wednesday, 1 April 1992

### AIRSPACE OPENED ABOVE CROATIA

The night between 31 March and 1 April was real war. Shots were often heard from the direction of Jasenica, Đikovina and Miljkovići.

The airspace above Croatia has been opened to traffic and the airports are working again.

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Friday, 3 April 1992

### WATERTANK EXPLOSION

The Chetniks attacked our men near Šujica earlier today. There are dead on both sides.

The VJ is attacking Drijen with the aim of breaking out towards Neum, but our resistance is managing to repel the attacks.

Rumour has it in Mostar that the town will be attacked today. It seems this panic is being sown in order to cast a shadow over the Muslims' holiday tomorrow, Bairam.

A session is underway at Villa Neretva in Mostar. A delegation of the government in Sarajevo is there with the military leaders to solve the problems in Mostar. During the meeting, at 1715 hours, a strong explosion was heard from the direction of the railway station. It's been a while since I last heard a blast that strong. I went out onto the terrace and watched the column of smoke rising from somewhere behind the North Camp. Who blew up what this time? I don't know yet.

The BH Crisis Staff has declared a general mobilization in BH. People who have cars are streaming out of Mostar. All manner of rumours are going around. Is this it? Has the attack on Mostar begun?

Very few people were there tonight for the Stations of the Cross. In peacetime, the cathedral would be packed. It's obvious that most people have moved away to safer areas in Western Herzegovina.

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Sunday, 5 April 1992

### ATTACK ON THE CATHEDRAL

The night was completely still. The news is spreading like wildfire that Mate RAJIĆ, father of four and member of our Cathedral's church choir, was killed near the North Camp together with his colleague, Mile MARIĆ from Grabovica.

It was a high-temperature explosion – some kind of liquid explosive in a watertank – that simply melted down Mate's car so that nothing remained of Mate, just a small piece of Mile.

Our troops shot down two planes at Kupres. There is great commotion in Sarajevo. The police force split into Muslim-Croatian and Serbian and the two are engaged in a verbal duel.

Toward the end of evening Mass, while announcements were being read, a bullet from Hum flew into the Cathedral again. Luckily, it flew over people's heads and lodged in a plank. There is talk, especially on the police walkie-talkie channel which the Chetniks and Ujas (the Chetniks' short for Ustashas) use to snipe at each other, that the Chetniks will blow up the cathedral.

In Sarajevo, a throng broke into the Parliament of the Republic demanding replacement of the government and the establishment of a temporary, transitional government. It seems to me that these protesters are under the influence of communists because they are carrying Tito's pictures and communist signs and they are shouting party slogans. TVSA is broadcasting all that, while reporter PAUNOVIĆ keeps criticising the government and the political party but has nothing to say against the VJ or the SDA. You can see which way the wind is blowing.

R. KARADŽIĆ, M. LASIĆ, A. IZETBEGOVIĆ and KUKANJAC, under the aegis of the UN observers, have jointly decided on a cease-fire. If past experience is anything to go by, this decision will not be respected much.

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Tuesday, 7 April 1992

### BH RECOGNISED

The night of 6 April was a real night of war in Mostar. From the North and South Camps, the VJ kept Orlic and Jasenica under a barrage of fire, especially around midnight. It was very dangerous, so we went down to the basement (the small chapel) and spent the night there. Last night the first shell fell on Kruševo village.

Croatia has recognised BH and granted double citizenship to the Croats in BH.

Early this morning, at 0620 hours, two VJ MIGs attacked Lištice. Six persons were killed. Čitluk was also attacked from the air, but I don't know if there were casualties.

The SDS has proclaimed an Independent Serb State of BH based in Banja Luka and PLAHSIĆ and KOLJEVIĆ have withdrawn from the BH Presidency.

The President of the BH Assembly Marijofil LJUBIĆ announced that the municipal TOs /Territorial Defence/ of Western Herzegovina shall defend their own territories, including Mostar. He is demanding from the VJ that they retreat honourably from those parts.

At 1550 hours the HTV /Croatian Television/ announced that the US had recognised Slovenia, Croatia and BH. Austria and Norway have also recognised BH. IZETBEGOVIĆ has addressed a protest to the VJ over the shelling of towns in Western Herzegovina.

Tonight at Villa Neretva, a truce was signed between the TO of Western Herzegovina and the VJ. But who can believe in this truce?

The first Croat soldier has been killed while defending a village – Vjeko BOŽIĆ.

Wednesday, 8 April 1992

### **THE HVO, A NEW COAT-OF-ARMS FOR BH, THE WORD SOCIALIST DELETED**

The past night was very peaceful. On the terrace we found fragments of cartridges from yesterday's shooting. The VJ is again targeting Slipčiči, Rodoč, Tepčiči, Kruševo... Cannon fire was especially loud around 12 o'clock.

VJ planes have attacked Grude, Lipno and Trn. Still no news of the consequences. The HTV denies the news carried by TANJUG /Yugoslav news agency/ on the fall of Kupres. Rumour has it on the police radio channel that the Chetniks are intending to destroy the Aluminium Plant, the *Razvitak* company, both churches and even the bridges on the Neretva. The management of the plant is thinking about closing down.

The BH Presidency has deleted the word "socialist" from the name of the republic and renamed it Republic of BH. A state of general and immediate threat has been declared. A new BH coat-of-arms has also been made. Five golden lilies against a blue background divided by a line. They say it is the old coat-of-arms of the Kotromanić, an old Bosnian royal family from pre-Ottoman times.

Switzerland and Canada have recognised BH. We reckon that those who have recognised us, especially the US, will help us defend ourselves from the VJ.

There is no petrol, shops are sometimes open, sometimes not, and schools are not working, along with some businesses. The town looks half-dead.

Herzegovina's Croats have established their own defence against the aggression and named it HVO /Croatian Defence Council/.

1 DEM = 100 HRD /Croatian dinar/ = 400 YUD on the black market.

Thursday, 9 April 1992

### **WAR ALSO IN MOSTAR**

Last night in Mostar was filled with gunfire. From the airport, the VJ fired at Ljuti Dolac, Slipčiči and Kruševo with a MRL /multiple rocket launcher/.

At 0730 hours the VJ opened strong artillery fire from the North Camp against Orlac and Cim. Our commander, Perko, ordered a retreat of our troops via Goranci. The troops saw that as treason, refused to obey the order and stayed in town, putting up resistance to the VJ. Artillery fire lasted until 1030 hours. Orlac, upper Cim and the bend towards Goranci – where it is said our side has a cannon firing at the North Camp – took the brunt of the attack.

No-one is out and about, no-one even came to the Caritas today. I don't know if there are any dead and wounded. We still have water and electricity and telephones are working, although you can't get reach anyone outside Mostar. A curfew has been

imposed from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m.

Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia /as printed/ and Poland have recognised BH.

Friday, 10 April 1992

### ŠABANOVIC THREATENS TO CLOSE DAM

We spent last night in the basement although it was pretty quiet. The refugees have been evacuated from Soko. Many residents of Rodoč, Jasenica and other villages on the eastern side of the Neretva had found refuge in Soko. Although the evacuation had been negotiated with the reservists, they still opened fire at the column and there are casualties. The Army opened fire at a procession of civilians, killing a 13-year old girl and wounding a number of other people.

The BH government has imposed the work obligation. The VJ is firing from Pijesci at Bivolje Brdo and Slipčići.

In the municipalities down the Drina the situation is critical: the Serbs are attacking and the Muslim defence is very weak. A Muhamed ŠABANOVIĆ took control of the dam near Višegrad and is threatening to cause a deluge all the way up to Belgrade if the attacking Serbs do not withdraw. CUTILHEIRO of Portugal arrived in Sarajevo to preside over talks to resolve the crisis in BH.

One armoured unit of the VJ has come to Poplat near Stolac and another one was stopped near Berkovići. Talks are underway to let them pass through Stolac without a fight. Radio SA says that three units are on their way to Stjepan Krst from the direction of Nevesinje. The people from Dubrave are fleeing.

The US has threatened Serbia and Croatia over the unrest in Bosnia. What ignorance!

Twenty people attended the Stations of the Cross at the small chapel of the cathedral. A big turnout for these times.

Saturday, 11 April 1992

### DUBRAVE EMPTYING OUT, KUPRES FALLEN

The night was quiet in Mostar. Kupres has fallen although our news bulletins are keeping mum about it. There are people dead, wounded and taken prisoner. Three of our defenders were killed yesterday at Bivolje Brdo.

The reservists are not letting the civilians who had come to Mostar from Jasenica return home. The priests who had come to Mostar from Blagaj on some errands were not allowed by Chetniks to go back. The Chetniks want the people to flee before them, so they can loot and conduct ethnic cleansing more easily, but the people won't flee.

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We are trying to reach Stolac by telephone, unsuccessfully. We have learned that the Army has routed our defence at Drenovac, and Stolac seems to have fallen without a fight. The Army is shelling Dračevo and they have also reached Stjepan Krst. The people from Dubrave are fleeing towards the Neretva. The Chetniks from Tasovčići won't let them go to Čapljina across the bridge in Tasovčići; instead, the people in Počitelj cross by boat, so all the cars, rotary hoes and the tractors they had brought them to the Neretva river stay there for the Chetniks to keep. The Muslims who had fled together with our people from Dubrave to Počitelj are going back home. The Bishopric is asking the Red Cross, the government, acquaintances and all sorts of institutions to help the refugees from Eastern Herzegovina. The Red Cross, the Crisis Staff and the military command are showing their readiness to help, but nobody is doing anything to stop the attackers, which would be the most valuable help. The Serbs obviously know what they are doing and helping Croats does not fit into their plans.

Some sort of meetings chaired by CUTILHEIRO are under way in Sarajevo, but they will probably amount to nothing because the Chetniks are advancing on all sides beyond all expectations.

The bridge across the Neretva at Aleksin Han has been blown up. There were rumours later that it was done by some of our men who were held at gunpoint by some Muslims from Jablanica.

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Monday, 13 April 1992

### ČAPLJINA AND LIVNO UNDER ATTACK

The VJ is attacking Slipčiči, Čitluk and, in Bosnia, Višegrad. Two of our defenders were killed near Kupres. They say we have captured two tanks and shot down two planes. Rumour has it that the Chetniks are torching houses in Bačnik, Drenovac and Bjelojevići and advancing towards Hrasno. The refinery in Bosanski Brod has been hit.

Starting at 1525 hours, the VJ attacked Capljina with a barrage of fierce artillery fire. The town is ablaze. Mogorjelo Hotel, the church, the mosque and many other buildings have been damaged.

Buses from Mostar are frequently taking refugees to Dalmatia. According to the radio, Dalmatia is full of refugees from BH.

Eyewitnesses say that Jasenica is on fire; the Army is either arresting or killing our people around town and the surrounding villages. Pavo GAGRO was found at Buna with his throat slit.

Livno was attacked earlier tonight. At the southern entrance to Mostar there was street-to-street fighting from 7 to 9 p.m. between looting reservists and the Mostar TO. The reservists have been repelled. We will hardly be able, with our equipment and training, to stop the VJ, but we have no other choice except defence.

The news has reached us that two high-ranking Muslim officers have left the VJ to join the TO and are now publicly revealing VJ's treachery. M. ŠABANOVIĆ has partially released the water at the dam in Višegrad, so there will be no consequences down the Drina river.

People are pinning their hopes on the US, but all it is doing is sending some sort of notes to Serbia. To send letters to the illiterate – only crazy Americans can do a thing like that!

Tuesday, 14 April 1992

### HVO ESTABLISHED, CATHEDRAL HIT

The news is spreading that the Croats of Herzegovina have recently (8 April) organised a defence force and a council called the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). A municipal HVO Staff has been organised in Mostar as well.

At 1720 hours while I was on the terrace, a sniper hit our terrace with two bullets from Hum, breaking two large windows. Around 9 p.m. strong artillery fire was opened from the eastern side of Bjelušin, Fortica or Podveležje, shells falling on the town. We are on the ground floor. Everything is shaking and the blasts are echoing through the town. We heard on the radio that the cathedral had been hit. As soon as there was a lull, we ran over to see what happened with the cathedral. In the dark, frightened as we were, we only saw a hole in the roof and weather-boarding strewn over it. We had thought the shells were much more destructive, the way they explode.

Around 2130 hours the shooting calmed down and it was quiet until the morning.

Wednesday, 15 April 1992

### PROTECTING THE WINDOWS

We got a better look at the cathedral this morning. It is lucky the shell from the southern side hit the supporting beam and exploded there. The panelling inside has crumbled completely, several windows are broken, stained glass windows are damaged. Last night a second shell fell outside our garage from the south. It damaged the garage door, all the windows on the garage, three cars – rather badly and another two – less so. All those cars were inside the garage.

At 8 o'clock I spoke on the phone to the nephew of Father Ivan Zovko at Rotimlja. There are some of our men up there guarding the village against looting. There are some VJ soldiers, too. One house has been torched, most of the people have fled, but a small number remain.

Today, the Wednesday of the Holy Week, we spent the whole day carting boards out of the basement to board up the windows and doors.

Many citizens of Mostar have come to take stock of the Chetnik crime against the cathedral. The people walked through the garage and the cathedral like a procession on a wartime pilgrimage. Curiously enough, the Chetniks did not shoot although they could have killed hundreds of us with one shell. Some UN commissions have come and gone, as well as some others, to be seen to be doing something. TVSA showed the real picture of the situation in BH tonight. For the first time they said who was attacking and who was defending themselves. They also showed footage of the damaged cathedral. Finally something good from TVSA!

Tonight again, around 9 p.m., many shells were fired at Cim and Ilići, followed by a quiet night. The VJ seized the automobile of the Franciscan nuns from Potok saying the Army needed it. Tepčići was targeted and the parish house was damaged.

C. VANCE has brought American threats to Belgrade. He is going to Sarajevo tomorrow. Will this visit amount to anything?

Thursday, 16 April 1992

### MAUNDY THURSDAY

I doubt that any priests will attend the mass of the consecration of the Holy Oil because the Chetniks are firing machine guns from Hum whenever they feel like it.

It drizzled this morning. Eleven concelebrates, including me, gathered for the oil consecration mass at 1000 hours, and another six stayed among the people. The following persons came from outside Mostar: parish priests P. MARIĆ of Sutina and M. LEKO of Posušje, A. PERKO and K. RAVLIĆ from Drinovci and L. MARIĆ from Čapljina. The mass was held in the small chapel, with fifty or so believers. At

the end of the mass you could hear bursts fired from Hum. I do not know what they were shooting at.

The CSCE /Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe/ today unanimously condemned Serbia, the JA /Yugoslav Army/ and the Serbian terrorists as the only culprits that caused disorder in Yugoslavia. The SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/ in BH is taking police stations by force wherever they can – for instance, in Derventa and a part of Mostar. The Serbs are imposing disorder in BH, and the Government is imposing work obligation. The SDS wants to destabilise BH by stopping all work. To achieve that, they shell enterprises and fire sniper rifles at people who are on their way to work. Despite this situation, some enterprises in Mostar are still working.

In Sarajevo, the leaders of three parties met with UN special envoy Cyrus VANCE. His position is that the negotiations should continue under the auspices of the EC and its Chairman Jose CUTILEIRO. Will this warning be as useless as the ones that came from Boutros GHALI and L. CARRINGTON?

The Bishop's Ordinariat in Banja Luka said this evening that the JA had attacked the monastery and the parish office in Bosanski Aleksandrovac. A nun was wounded.

This evening we celebrated a holy mass in a small chapel full of people. The TVSA /Sarajevo Television/ warned children to beware of the pen-grenades that the JA planted on the city streets.

At 2100 hours, a general alert was sounded again, on time for the first time, as up to now it had been sounded only after ten or so shells. You could hear shell explosions and bursts of fire, and then it was quiet again, with an occasional burst.

Some information from people outside /Mostar/: the church and the parish house in Hutovo and Čeljevo have been partially damaged. The shrine in Hrasno and the church in Dračevo were shelled but they were not hit or damaged. The parish priests from these parishes are in their villages although many people have left as refugees.

Good Friday, 17 April 1992

### CHETNIKS ATTACK ČAPLJINA

We spent the whole afternoon cleaning the cathedral. I protected my room a little as well because I had not slept a wink last night in the common basement. I woke up at every sound. I have decided to sleep in my room from now on, come what may.

At about 1400 hours, the Chetniks launched a powerful attack on Čapljina from Modriča, Tasovčić and Domanović. Currently, at 1600 hours, you can hear strong detonations from the direction of Kruševo. It was quiet all day in Mostar. We went to a small chapel to perform the ceremony of bowing to the Cross. About 150 persons gathered. During the ceremony, a general alert was sounded. We remained where we were because this small chapel was one of the safest places in town. The army shelled Žovnica and the road to Goranci. I heard later that a civilian passer-by had been wounded and another one killed in Žovnica. We heard that today's shelling in Čapljina damaged the church and the church-towers.

The SDS took over the police stations in Bratunac and Vlasenica. Fighting is underway over B. /Bosanski/ Brod and Derventa and the Chetniks mutilated 14 Muslims in G. /Gornje/ Kolibe.

R. /Radovan/ KARADŽIĆ withdrew all his deputies from the BH Government. The USA is threatening to impose economic sanctions on Serbia, block the JAT /Yugoslav Airlines/ and prevent Serbia from succeeding the former Yugoslavia. Although there was talk about withdrawing from the barracks in Čapljina, JA soldiers are still in it and are shooting at Čapljina. The Turks would send a plane with aid for BH, but Belgrade requests that it goes to Belgrade for customs duties first. Today I spoke to a woman who had been at the VMA /Military Medical Academy/ in Belgrade where she had had an appointment for a surgery. However, she was told that she was from another country and so they would not perform the surgery. This means that the Serbs recognise the whole of Yugoslavia when it suits them, but when it does not suit them, they say that it has fallen apart.

There is overall lawlessness in Mostar. Armed people are taking away everything they want on the pretext that it is for the needs of the TO /Territorial Defence/, but God knows in whose basements and yards it will end up. had been wounded and another one killed in Žovnica. We heard that today's shelling in Čapljina damaged the church and the church-towers.

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Heavy shooting could be heard from the south of Mostar at 2000 hours. Chetniks took control of the rug factory, looted it and set it on fire. They are also looting pharmacies.

Dalmatia gave a warm welcome to about ten thousand of our refugees from BH. Most of them are accommodated in Gradac, Korčula, Hvar, Makarska and other places. The state leased them hotels and some of them are in private houses.

Saturday, 18 April 1992

### PEACE FOR A SHORT WHILE

The night was peaceful. It became colder and snow covered surrounding hills. Yesterday evening, a civilian from Gnojnice was shot dead in his car in Žovnica by a Chetnik sniper. Yesterday evening, a Chetnik VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ damaged several houses in Ilići and Cim.

The HTV /Croatian Television/ visited the cathedral, escorted and protected by my relative Viktor ZOVKO in a good-quality bullet-proof jacket. I showed Viktor my shelter in the room and asked him if I was safe here. He said, "It's better than the one I have in Kozica, but...", and he shook his head. He did not want to disappoint or scare me. Indeed, I knew all too well that a more powerful shell could destroy all that.

We drove a Renault full of food to an old people's home. We provide as much food as we can to the expelled persons in Mostar, and there are many of them. We give out mostly cooking oil, macaroni, margarine and milk.

The Easter wake began at 1700 hours. St Joseph's chapel was full of people. Throughout Herzegovina, this was one of the quieter days. Fighting went on around B. /Bosanski/ Šamac and Derventa – the SDS wants to take control of these towns but those defending them will not let that happen.

Easter, 19 April 1992

### PERIŠIĆ IS DESTROYING MOSTAR

The morning was peaceful and cold. The north-eastern wind was blowing. The turn-out at the morning masses was better than expected. The chapel and the entrance hall were full during each mass. There were many people at the confessions.

There was a power outage at 1100 hours. At 1445 hours an alert was sounded and detonations could be heard. At 1500 hours, a Chetnik fired an infantry weapon from Hum and hit the cathedral. General M. /Momčilo/ PERIŠIĆ threatened to destroy Mostar, starting from Cim. He said that the reason was that our men had abducted two of his pilots, but the Mostar Crisis Staff said that they did not know anything about them. Up to now, 45 soldiers have left the JA and joined our side, and so Momčilo PERIŠIĆ can keep on giving ultimatums to the town for ever. The Crisis Staff accepts no ultimatums, only negotiations. But PERIŠIĆ personally said that he did not want to negotiate with "GAGRO, the Ustasha". If he considers GAGRO to be an Ustasha, then who is not an Ustasha? At 1700 hours, one of the abducted pilots announced from Sarajevo that he had abandoned the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/, but PERIŠIĆ continues with fierce artillery fire against Mostar because this is not about the abducted pilots – his aim is to take control of Mostar. From Južni Logor, the army fired at the H. Brkića bridge and there were dead and wounded passers-by. PERIŠIĆ completed his crime against Mostar at 2020 hours. Many prominent people from Mostar spoke on the Radio, asking for a ceasefire and an end to the shelling of

the town, but it was in vain.

We did not celebrate the holy evening mass on Easter because nobody had come on account of the shooting.

Fighting took place today in many towns in Bosnia, too, especially in Sanski Most. In Ilidža, the SDS blocked the way out of Sarajevo, as its aim is to paralyse Sarajevo's economy and block the city.

Monday, 20 April 1992

### HUNGER AT THE DOOR

You can no longer leave Mostar without putting your life in great danger, because the Chetniks constantly have the road via Žovnica and Goranci in their sights. There are more and more people at the door asking for help, but how can help be brought to Mostar? If things go on like this, hunger will become Mostar's worse enemy.

The day was rather peaceful, with occasional fire from infantry weapons.

Tuesday, 21 April 1992

### EIGHT HOURS OF FIGHTING, HUM WAS HIT

In Mostar, they are mopping up snipers, and rumour has it that they include Muslims and Croats who are committing these crimes for money. It is rumoured that they get 500 DEM /German marks/ for each person they kill. If they shoot someone above the waist, they are not likely to survive because of the destructive power of the bullet.

Negotiations were held between the SO /Municipal Assembly/ and representatives of the barracks in Čapljina yesterday. Only a man whose last name is BOŽINOVIĆ would not surrender, and the others would. Ten or so tanks and several lorries full of reservists passed through Stolac yesterday and went in the direction of Čapljina. Was this reinforcement for the forces that are to break through towards Metković?

An average of ten or so people are killed in BH every day.

At about 1200 hours, a plane bombed Kočerin, Ljubuški and Metković. One person was killed and a number of people were wounded in Ljubuški.

At 1540 hours, Cim, Ilići, Orlac, Žovnica and the town were subjected to fierce fire from all weapons, coming from Bjelušin. Our forces fired mortars in return. They say they have two mortars and so they move them from one street to another and around Biskupova Glavica so that the Chetniks should think that we have many. In the evening, our forces hit the Chetnik depot at Hum and you could see a big fire. We thought that the Chetniks would leave Hum and we were as happy as if all the hills around Mostar were liberated. The fighting lasted until 2300 hours without breaks - eight hours of shooting in total. Chetnik planes flew high above the town and I do not know if they carried out air strikes somewhere.

The cathedral has been hit at least ten or so times. The roof is riddled with bullet holes, several window panes are broken and DULČIĆ's stained-glass window and a closet are damaged.

Wednesday, 22 April 1992

### PLANES ABOVE MOSTAR

This morning at 0930 hours there was a general alert. Planes flew over the town but the defence was excellent and they reported that they had shot one down. At 1400 hours, an alert was sounded again, and then there was shooting. They said that the new hospital was fired upon with guns. S. IVANKOVIĆ, the director of the hospital, was on the radio, asking that they stop firing at the hospital. At about 1830 hours, there was fierce mortar- and gunfire again, and our forces fired back. The fighting went on all night, with breaks. In the morning we heard that the Ruža Hotel, the Đački Dom /pupil's dormitory/ and many houses in Cim, Ilići and Orlac were damaged. Glinica stopped working.

At about noon, I heard that my aunt Filipa had died in Polog and that the funeral would take place the next day in G. Draga. How can I go out? If I leave Mostar, how will I come back?

Thursday, 23 April 1992

### I GOT OUT OF MOSTAR

It was a rather peaceful morning, although a general alert was sounded at 0900 hours. At about 1000 hours, I set off for the funeral in G. Draga. I drove along the Goranac road. I was on the top of Cim and nobody was shooting. I said a prayer several times. I drove around rocks, holes and broken power lines on the road. I drove at the full speed of the second gear, thinking how I was more likely to die than to survive. There was no one to be seen. Everything around me was deserted. I passed the Goranac band and drove by many cars on the road that had been hit. I could not believe that no one was shooting at me. I stepped on the accelerator, changed to the third gear, and in a few minutes the hill was behind me and I could not believe that I had passed it. I paid a short visit to the Goranac parish priest, Father Kornelije KORDIĆ. We exchanged the stories of our wartime experience and news from the field and then I went across Bili to G. Draga.

The funeral went off without any problems although we were afraid of the planes that flew over those parts several times, high above us.

I went to the house in Polog, and they seemed not to be taking the war seriously. They would peer out at every shell or plane, and they did not have any protection. We protected the windows and doors immediately.

In Polog in the past few days, Chetnik shells set fire to Damjan ANDAČIĆ's house in Vlasnići and A. SALČIN's stable, destroying these buildings and killing several heads of cattle in the stable. M. /Mostarsko/ Blato is flooded. They are keeping the water in place artificially so that the Chetniks should not carry out an assault. There has been no electric power for two days now because the power transmission lines in Grude have been severed.

In western Herzegovina they do not celebrate mass in churches because they are frequently targeted by Serbian aircraft. They celebrate mass in private houses and shelters.

A truce has been signed in Sarajevo in the presence of CARRINGTON, but nobody observes it. This evening, the Chetniks fired guns at Kruševo, Miljkovići and Lj. /Ljuti/ Dolac. They said on the radio that mosques had been targeted in Mostar.

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Monday, 27 April 1992

### A NEW SO-CALLED YUGOSLAVIA

At 1130 hours, 3 x 3 shells fell above Vlasnići, and they say that they were fired from Južni Logor. We have several decoy bunkers at Vlasnići and it is good that the Chetniks are firing at them. At 1300 hours, the town of Mostar, Ilići and Cim came under heavy gun fire. At 1400 hours, a VBR fired at Kruševo, Biograci and Jare. Shells fell not only on military targets but on houses, too.

Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves Yugoslavia and adopted their Constitution. The Constitution itself is not bad, but they are just empty words. The SPO /Serbian Renewal Movement/ is against the new Constitution because, they say, it is a Communist constitution. Some Serbs protest because, they say, their flag is not Serbian but Yugoslav, and they call the authorities "the red gang" and they seem to be right. The Šiptars /Albanians/ do not accept the newly-created state. The USA agreed to talk to new Yugoslavia but will recognise it only when Yugoslavia meets the European state requirements, that is, when it refrains from interfering with the affairs of neighbouring countries and grants rights to ethnic minorities.

The BH Presidency adopted a decision on the withdrawal of the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ from BH. Alija decided not to go to Lisbon until tomorrow.

Talks were held in Mostar between UNPROFOR and the JA, but it seems that nothing will be achieved, because the JA is only throwing dust in the world's eyes. The Chetniks are on the rampage in eastern Bosnia, fiercely killing Muslims. The JA is helping them, openly in some places and secretly in others.

Macedonia has introduced a new currency – the denar, which can be exchanged for the Serbian dinar at the 1:1 rate. My neighbour Milenko was issued HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ uniform today and will probably go to the positions in G. Polog. There is a lot of disorder with regard to mobilisation. Some people have participated in the war since the beginning, some fled to Germany or Croatia, and some are running their own private business and nobody is forcing them to be mobilised, and they will not volunteer to be mobilised. It seems that the HVO military authorities are still very weak.

Čitluk and its surroundings have been without electricity for 14 days because SDS formations have not let them eliminate the breakdown in Tasovčići.

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Tuesday, 5 May 1992

### ATTACK ON ŠUJICA

Eight persons and one child were killed east of Vinkovci yesterday evening, bringing the death toll in Croatia yesterday to 12. I have only just heard about the massacre against Muslims near Zvornik, which was committed on 30 April, when forty or so people were killed. In Belgrade yesterday, parents protested against the JNA asking it to return their children who were doing compulsory military service in BH and waging war.

The Philippines recognised Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and BH.

At about 1300 hours, an aeroplane fired rockets at a gorge on the outskirts of Lištica.

Belgrade denies that it discontinued payment transactions with BH. It still carries out payment transaction with banks under its control.

Marrack GOULDING arrived in Sarajevo.

Šujica has been under artillery attack for two days now and the parish church has been hit. The sound of guns could be heard coming from Mostar in the evening. At 1830 hours there was also a powerful earthquake. At 1900 hours shells fell on Kruševo again. A little later, two houses caught fire and a grove on the side towards Polog was on fire. A mild north-eastern wind helped the fire. Fighting took place in Mostar, especially in D. Mahala, and Konak – the SDS Headquarters – was on fire.

Truce was signed in Sarajevo at 2000 hours, which was supposed to enter into force immediately but, judging by the shooting, we can forget about the truce.

Wednesday, 6 May 1992

### BISHOP'S PALACE SET ON FIRE

Everything was on fire and smoke was all around from the shelling yesterday evening, and it seemed that everything would be destroyed by morning. But this morning, everything seemed to be untouched, and you almost could not tell whether last night's developments were real or just a dream.

At 0900 hours, the Chetniks opened artillery fire on Kruševo, Žovnica, Galac and G. Polog. They fired incessantly until 1230 hours. Maybe they were shooting so that Satish NAMBIAR and Marrack GOULDING could not travel from Sarajevo to Mostar, as they said yesterday that they would. By 1500 hours, the Serbs violated last night's truce a hundred times. Obviously the Serbs shoot better when they sign a truce!

At 1500 hours, the grove beyond Medine was on fire again. At 1930 hours, the Chetniks fired at Kruševo and hit the church. The cathedral and the parish house were hit in Mostar. The bishop's palace and the HIT /?department store/ were on fire. Before the war broke out, we succeeded in moving away the church records and valuable paintings from the bishop's palace but we simply could not find a place for about 50,000 books, and we did not think that the Chetniks would fire at the bishop's palace, because they had no reason to do that and it would damage their reputation more than it would hurt us. But the Chetniks have nothing to do with a good reputation. Unfortunately, it took us a long time to realise that!

A session of the conference on Yugoslavia is being held in Brussels today. The meeting is being held to make sure that nothing happens, and not to make sure that something happens.

In Svrake village near Vogošća, a thousand or so people laid down their weapons following a Chetnik ultimatum. The JA withdrew from Travnik in a peaceful way. General PERIŠIĆ requested that the Mostar HVO and TO withdraw to the right bank of the Neretva River or else he would send aircraft to attack Mostar.

In the Gruž harbour, ships collided and ten people were killed. Telephone lines have been down in Polog for a month now.

At yesterday's CSCE conference in Helsinki, the chairman of the Conference from Czechoslovakia first gave the floor to the representative from Yugoslavia – none other than Nikola KOLJEVIĆ from BH. What insolence! Croatia, Albania, Austria, the USA and others – 11 countries in all – protested immediately, and their representatives left the room. The chairman of the Conference requested at the beginning of the session that Yugoslavia's membership of the CSCE be terminated. Many supported him and the decision was put off for today.

I heard a report on Radio Belgrade about the Serbian houses on the right bank of the Neretva being torched and looted and the Serbs being persecuted. Nobody has touched anyone yet here in Medine and Dobrič, but who is going to deny the lies that come from Belgrade?

Thursday, 7 May 1992

### ANNIVERSARY OF STOPPING TANKS IN POLOG

A year ago today, tanks were stopped in Polog. The unarmed Croatian people of Herzegovina stood in the way of JNA tanks. The tanks had set out from Mostar at about 0900 hours on Tuesday, 7 May 1991. The Croats of western Herzegovina parked their vehicles in front of them, blocking their passage in Polog, on the border between Mostar and Lištica municipalities. The people did not know where the tanks were headed, but we had a feeling that they were bad for us. On Tuesday, in Mostar on the crossroads where a road leads to Ljubuški, Tihomir MIŠIĆ organised a blockade so that no help could be driven to the tanks blocked in Plog. I was at that /?checkpoint/ for several hours and I saw that JNA officers, although armed, were afraid of unarmed people. On Wednesday, President IZETBEGOVIĆ and some other leading BH figures came to Polog and requested that agreement be reached between the people and the JNA in order to avoid bloodshed. In the evening that day, after an agreement was reached, the tanks were allowed to go in the direction of Kupres without a shot having been fired.

Yesterday evening, JA aircraft above Blato fired /?flares/ which lit up the sky and slowly fell down towards the ground and went out. No one knows what they wanted to achieve with them.

Osijek was attacked, and two persons were killed and a large number was wounded. In Graz, Austria, KARADŽIĆ and BOBAN reached agreement on lasting peace under European auspices. Some agreements were also reached in Sarajevo between the JA and the BH Government. The JA has said that it would withdraw from BH by 19 May.

At 1545 hours, the Chetniks fired at Galac and Kruševo. Aircraft fired rockets at Duvno and Livno. In /?Gradac/ near Neum, they fired rockets at a church, which then burned to the ground. The Church of St Peter and Paul in Mostar was hit. The convent in Čardak was hit. Krmače were thrown on Odžak and two people were killed.

They keep postponing an assembly session in Helsinki because they cannot agree on the final declaration.

The audibility of Radio Mostar and Sarajevo programmes has been very poor for several days now. It seems that the Serbs wish to impose a total blockade on the transmitters in BH.

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Saturday, 9 May 1992

### ST. PETER AND PAUL CHURCH SET ON FIRE

Yesterday the Serbian army relieved some of its generals (B. ADŽIĆ, KUKANJAC, and others – a total of 39 generals). In our view it is just a tactical trick. Western politicians believe that in this way the criminals are having their bloody hands washed. Others say that the Yugoslav generals are being replaced by the Serbian ones.

Six soldiers were killed and a large number was wounded in Mostar yesterday. Krivodol, Kruševo and Lj. Dolac came under fire at 0900 hours. The old railway bridge in Čapljina was destroyed.

The HVO called for a gun to be positioned at Podić in Polog, but the people were not in favour of this as they feared that Chetnik shells might fall on their houses. The HVO, however, did not budge and built a bunker. They did not position a gun but a platform for a portable VBR.

Power supply was restored at 1600 hours, after one day.

The Conference in Helsinki has reached a dead-end. The western countries are on one side and Russia and Romania are on the other, in favour of Serbia.

The USA directed another protest at Serbia, requesting the faster withdrawal of the JA from BH. The JA handed over the barracks in Sarajevo to the SDS and not to the TO. The Chetniks occupied Doboj. Odžak municipality was liberated. The parish church in Potoci was hit. The cathedral in Mostar was hit and the Church of St Peter and Paul was set on fire and burned to the ground.

Ten buses full of women and children left Mostar today as refugees.

A total of 28 people were killed and more than a hundred were wounded in BH today. Eight people were killed and 50 or so wounded in B. Brod alone.

Sunday, 10 May 1992

### ROCKETS FIRED AT POLOG AGAIN

The new bridge on the Neretva was blown up in Čapljina last night and yesterday evening the Chetniks tore down the Red Cross building in Sarajevo, for the first time in the history of this institution.

At 0720 hours, an aeroplane flew over and fired a rocket and they say it targeted Čule. I celebrated two masses at Polog, at 0800 and 1000 hours. All that time, you could hear the detonations of the shells coming from Žovnica, Galac and our gun at Trtar. At 1210 hours, suddenly an aeroplane came flying so low that we did not hear the sound of its engines, we just heard the horrible blasts of the rockets, and a blast pushed me back into the house from the front door. It fired again at something on Blato, around the willow trees. Maybe the Chetniks really believe that there is a gun or something else there.

In B. Brod, our forces inflicted losses on weekend Chetniks. They destroyed about ten of their tanks and liberated some of the territory. An agreement was signed in Sarajevo on the handover of barracks in Sarajevo, Zenica and Konjic to the BH TO. The question is, when? The military hospital in Sarajevo was handed over to the Red Cross.

Radio Sarajevo was renamed Radio BH today, and the same probably applies to the Television.

Osijek was attacked again. UNPROFOR announced that it would soon take over control in Eastern Slavonia. Hotels in Neum were damaged by bombs dropped by aeroplanes. Two cluster bombs destroyed two houses in Metković, and there were dead and wounded in the attack.

A total of 1,320 people have been killed in BH since the beginning of the war.

Monday, 11 May 1992

### DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH VATICAN

This morning you could hear infantry weapons being fired from Kozica. People were talking about a Chetnik assault on Mostar. Zagreb reports that it is just Belgrade spreading panic.

Several women left Polog for Split as refugees, with their children. Those who have stayed behind are anxious about what will happen to us and our children. If the air strikes continue like this, no one will survive. You can feel a degree of panic among women with children.

Radio Zagreb reported about large-scale Chetnik massacres in Vidovice, Kopanice and Ularice, and around Dobož. The church in Dobož was torn down, and rockets were fired at the monastery in Čardak.

At 0705 hours, an aeroplane fired rockets at G. Polog and Grabova Draga again. In G. Polog, rockets were fired at a bare hill in Kruševac, where there were no positions at all. Fifteen or so Muslim sheep were killed and it is a miracle that the shepherd girl among them remained untouched. In G. Draga, two houses were destroyed and a woman was wounded.

At 1830 hours there was an exchange of artillery fire between the HVO and the Chetniks, but it was not all that deadly – just to let the people know that they were there. The artillery fire stopped at about 2200 hours.

In Brussels, nine ministers decided to withdraw their ambassadors from Belgrade for a consultation. The JA was declared the occupying force and its full withdrawal by 18 May 1992 was requested.

The Pope's envoy presented the Vatican credentials to Franjo TUĐMAN in Zagreb. Diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Croatian state were thus established.

The CSCE again postponed its final decision because Russia is stalling. The Russian delegate requested that the declaration state that there were 52 votes for and one vote against, which the others did not accept. The Russian was given 24 hours to state his final decision.

YUTEL stopped working.

For 20 days now there has been no rain and the drought is considerable, and on top of everything, strong north-eastern wind started blowing, to make the already dry land even drier.

1 DEM /German marks/ = 100 HRD /Croatian dinars/ = 700 YUD /Yugoslav dinars/ are the exchange rates on the black market.

Tuesday, 12 May 1992

### DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE HVO AND THE TO

Aircraft are humming again, but they are high up and not attacking. The north-eastern wind is blowing and the power-transmission lines are buzzing. This chaos of sounds is filled with the fear of aerial bombs.

Last night, fighting in Mostar lasted until 0200 hours. Fifteen or so projectiles hit the cathedral.

It is rumoured that there are misunderstandings between the HVO and the TO, that is, the army under the command of the Croats and the army under the command of the Muslims in Busovača and Zenica.

Croatia was admitted to the International Civil Aviation Organisation - ICAO. It was announced that Croatia Air would resume flights between Zagreb and Split tomorrow, after almost eight months.

After several days of arguing, the CSCE conference finally excluded FR Yugoslavia from the overall decision-making process regarding the states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia until the end of June.

Two planes were downed today near Gabela and one near Neum, according to radio reports.

B. Brod was finally liberated from the Chetniks. Kalesija fell. The Church of St Vinko in Sarajevo was damaged. Two civilians were killed in Mostar.

Our forces took control of the JA base on Čvrstica after the JA had withdrawn on its own initiative.

Wednesday, 13 May 1992

### FIVE-DAY UNILATERAL TRUCE

Radio reported that the church and the monastery in Konjic were damaged. Serbian BH announced a five-day unilateral truce from 0600 hours this morning. It seems that the SDS announced the truce in order to arrange for JA members to join SDS units. The Chetniks have already violated the announced truce four times, firing around Blato at our positions.

Srebrenica was liberated. In BH, eighty or so mosques were destroyed or damaged.

The USA and the EC countries withdrew their ambassadors from Belgrade for consultations.

The SPO /Serbian Renewal Movement/ put up a monument to D. /Draž/ MIHAJLOVIĆ on Ravna Gora. The Alliance of War Veterans of Belgrade protested against this.

China and Croatia established diplomatic relations.

Radio Zagreb has reported that ten defenders were killed in Mostar yesterday evening, and 1,200 or so women and children left Mostar through the mediation of UNPROFOR.

Thursday, 14 May 1992

### NO CHANCE OF PEACE

It was quiet until 1130 hours and then our positions around Blato were fired upon briefly with guns. Fighting took place in Podrinje and Sarajevo. The church at Stup was set on fire. Radio BH said that KARADŽIĆ and MILOŠEVIĆ were trying to reach an agreement not to recognise the agreement on the withdrawal of the JA from BH. The current authorities in the BH are to be discredited, but fortunately the UN is against Serbia's scheme. This Radio said that a conversation between KARADŽIĆ and MILOŠEVIĆ had been intercepted, in which KARADŽIĆ requested aircraft to bomb Sarajevo because the Serbs were losing their positions.

Steps are being taken in Strassbourg to freeze the Yugoslav property around the world. By now, the damage caused by the war in Croatia amounts to about 18 billion USD. At a meeting of the non-aligned countries in Indonesia, Croatia and

Slovenia requested to be admitted as guests. There was disagreement between those who were in favour of Yugoslavia's continuity and those who recognised current reality.

The Close Up programme broadcast from Split by HTV /Croatian Television/ this evening featured guests from Mostar – L. PAVLOVIĆ, M. TOPIĆ, J. TOPIĆ and two Muslims. The hosts were A. IVANKOVIĆ and M. CAVAR.

Friday, 15 May 1992

### UN RESOLUTION ON BH

The Chetniks are firing at Kruševo and Sretnice again and the blasts of shells are coming from the direction of Čitluk.

Radio BH reports on the massacre of 80 or so Muslims in /?Gracko/ near Dobo.

It is peaceful in Mostar, they are hunting for snipers and they have already killed three of them.

UNPROFOR has taken over control of eastern Croatia, but shells are falling on Osijek again. Two pilots defected and came to Croatia in their planes.

The HTV is celebrating the Radio's 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary (1926) and the TV's 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary (1956).

In the evening, attacks were carried out again on our positions in Kruševo and Galac and on Mostar.

The UN adopted a resolution on BH: a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the JA and disarmament of all military formations. Another useless paper! Why does not West understand that it cannot help BH at all with papers? You, blind West, should know that only force is recognised in the Balkans!

Saturday, 16 May 1992

### TIHOMIR MIŠIĆ KILLED

There is occasional shooting in Herzegovina and fierce fighting is underway in Sarajevo and around Tuzla. The JA has blown up what they say is the most modern airport in Europe.

The church in Biletić Polje was hit. The telephone lines with the world have been down in Mostar since 7 May. Strong north-eastern wind is blowing again and the draught is serious.

War damage in BH is estimated at 25 billion USD. It seems that this figure was given as an approximation.

Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion Tihomir MIŠIĆ was killed. Tiho was the initiator of all Croatian activities in Mostar, from stopping the tanks last year and establishing the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/, to the fighting for the liberation of Mostar this year. (Rumours circulated later that he had been /?shot/ in the back, which means that he was not killed by the Chetniks).

Sunday, 17 May 1992

### BRAVE PEOPLE OF BIJELO POLJE

The Chetniks carried out a fierce attack on Bijelo Polje yesterday evening. They lost 163 soldiers and two tanks, and the Radio has said nothing about our losses. The fighting is still going on there today, and they say that the Serbs have called in aeroplanes to help them. Aircraft attacked Kočerin and Grljevići and near Posušje today.

Kruševo and Galac were fired upon occasionally. I celebrated two masses in shelters. A total of 63 persons attended at 0800 hours and 114 at 1000 hours.

There was another attack on Osijek even though UNPROFOR took over control of Sector East. These Westerners are useless, whether they are at home or in the field!

A dreadful scene of a Chetnik massacre against Croats was discovered near Brčko. The Chetniks from Pelagićevo and Serbia had brutally killed 50 or so people.

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**Tue. May 19th, 1992**

**Dangerous Goranačka road**

This morning on Goranačka road, Chetniks killed 3 persons. Poison was thrown on B. Polje and airplane through bombs. There is an occasional shooting in Mostar. Our troops have liberated access to Pelješac and are advancing to Slano. JA left Sarajevo, and during withdrawal from Tuzla destroyed the airport.

**Wed. May 20th, 1992**

**Liberation of Trebinje, Bijelo Polje fell into enemies hands.**

Our troops liberate villages around Slano. Liberation of Trebinje.

In Kuti Chetniks massacred over 12 of our people. B. Polje fell because they could not resist Chetnik superiority in

aircraft, tanks, artillery and special tanks that are resistant to Zolja.

Belgrade reports that JA withdrew from BiH, although in practice nothing has changed.

The war still rages in Sarajevo. The Russian minister who arrived in Belgrade yesterday, flew to Sarajevo today but didn't land, apparently due to fog. There was no fog. It must have been some kind of political fog.

A convoy of 2000-5000 children, which left Sarajevo for Split, is being held up by Chetniks in Ilidža. Italy has declared a state of emergency due to the large influx of refugees from BiH.

School year has ended today in Bosnia. Pupils who failed the exams will transmit the subjects to the next grade.

The Belgrade press has accused the former Yugoslavia generals for betrayal of the Constitution and SFRY.

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Saturday, 23 May 1992

**CHETNIKS ARE SHOOTING FIERCELY**

Early this morning, the Chetniks fired fiercely on our forces from Krivodol to Jare. It looked like the end of the world. The whole lower part of Blato was in smoke. Our forces fired back. At about 0815 they became a little quieter. A. PEHAR reported that the Chetniks were transporting ammunition to Fortica and so they covered themselves with fierce fire.

An indictment was issued in Sarajevo against R. KARADŽIĆ, N. KOLJEVIĆ, B. PLAVŠIĆ, V. OSTOJIĆ and SIMIĆ for providing the Serbs with weapons and waging war against BH.

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Saturday, 6 June 1992

**CHURCH HIT IN DOBRO SELO**

There was an exchange of gunfire again between the Chetniks and our forces. In D. /Dobro/ Selo, the Chetniks hit a filial church. Fierce fighting is underway in Sarajevo. A total of 17 defenders were killed and 120 were wounded in Bosnia. In Mostar, eleven soldiers were killed and 50 were wounded.

There is a good chance that the Sarajevo airport could be re-opened again, under international control.

Whit Sunday, 7 June 1992

**TARGETING CHURCH IN LJUTI DOLAC**

From 0700 to 0810 hours, the Chetniks fired at the church in Ljuti Dolac once every five minutes, probably from Varda. One could see the shell explosions and the smoke as they fell about 100 metres from the church. Our *Slavuji* fired back. Will St. Anne protect her church? They hit it at 0810 hours. The entire church was covered in smoke. I watched closely with binoculars: the smoke was clearing up and the roof and the church-tower seemed to me to be undamaged, but I could not see the other parts of the church because of the forest. Artillery fire around Blato, at intervals, lasted until

1900 hours.

Good news came from the Neretva valley. Klepci was liberated and the Chetniks ran away from Prebilovci.

About 5,000 shells were thrown on Sarajevo today and everything is on fire. About 30 people were killed and more than 100 were wounded. In a village near Zenica, the Chetniks cut the throats of 28 Muslims.

Serbian Radio Mostar keeps broadcasting marching songs, and Radio Trebinje is giving warnings as to what to do when a general alert is sounded. Commanders are threatening that those who run away from the front line will be executed. It seems that the Serbs, too, are in big trouble!

Monday, 8 June 1992

### **TASOVČIĆI LIBERATED**

Occasional shots were fired on both sides. From 1215 to 1245 hours, the church in Ljuti Dolac was targeted again. They were more accurate now, after a few shells, and the smoke was coming from the church itself. Again, I could not see any damage through my binoculars.

The media said that the 6<sup>th</sup> fleet had issued an ultimatum to MLADIĆ to withdraw the soldiers to the distance of 10 km from the Sarajevo airport. Fighting took place in Sarajevo all day and the Radio was reporting on the initiative of the TO. The UN adopted declaration no. 758 on lifting the blockade of the Sarajevo airport and placing it under UNPROFOR's command.

The HVO liberated Tasovčići and Hotanj, and is advancing towards Domanovići. The Chetniks are fleeing and torching everything behind them.

Today the Chetniks targeted Dubrovnik and Slavonski Brod, where they killed one person. In BH, 31 people were killed and 350 were wounded.

This evening the HTV showed footage of the exhibition in Zagreb of the paintings from our bishop's residence. The paintings had been transferred to Zagreb several days before the fire in the bishop's residence.

Soft rain fell and thunder could be heard, but it was quiet as compared to gunfire.

Tuesday, 9 June 1992

### **CHEJNIKS ARE FLEEING AND TORCHING**

The morning was so clear and peaceful that it was hard to believe that there was war going on. One person was killed in Dubrovnik the day before and a lot of damage was caused to cultural monuments. During the liberation of villages near Čapljina the day before, ten soldiers on our side and about 100 Chetnik soldiers were killed, and two inhabitants of Šurmanci were killed in this village by a Chetnik shell.

From noon, guns fired again at the area around Blato. Fierce fighting was conducted around Modriča, with a death toll of 20 defenders and 150 Chetniks (black shirts).

A total of 32 soldiers were killed in Sarajevo today.

The Chetniks are fleeing through Dubrave, beating people up and torching houses and churches on their way.

Wednesday, 10 June 1992

### **CHURCHES ON FIRE IN DOMANOVIĆI AND ALADINIĆI**

In the morning, gun shells were fired at the usual positions around Blato. The Serbs were advancing from Kupres towards Rama and requested that weapons be handed over in Jajce, which our forces refused and put up defence.

The parish house and the house of the nuns in Domanovići were burnt to the ground and the church was partially burnt. The church in Aladinići was still on fire. This had probably all been set on fire the day before. More than 100 houses, mostly Croatian, were torched in Dubrave. The Muslims, too, started fleeing Dubrave now, but I do not know from whom and where to. (The church in Aladinići was set on fire with phosphorus and various other stuff. Rumour has it that it was set on fire by Šefik KOVAČEVIĆ, aka Sudo, and Kemo BALAVAC).

The French are preparing the re-opening of the airport in Sarajevo. The foreign media – SKY, French Channel 5, the RAI and the CNN – constantly follow the developments in BH and Croatia. They are rather objective.

Some Chetnik dentist in Doboј punished Croatian and Muslim detainees by taking their blood and giving it to wounded Serbs. A tribute in blood to the Chetniks! The Chetniks slaughtered 22 Muslims near Višegrad, and killed a *hodja* and his entire family.

Thursday, 11 June 1992

### ORLOVAC AND HUM LIBERATED, RATKO PERIĆ NAMED BISHOP

At 0430 hours, Chetnik positions at Orlovac and Hum came under fierce fire from all our weapons, except aircraft because we have none. They fired back. Judging by the smoke and detonations, the church in Ljuti Dolac was hit again. The ground was shaking with explosions. This was one of the toughest mornings in this war. At 0800 hours, it was reported on the news that the Convicts' Battalion from Široki Brijeg was assaulting Orlovac. Fierce shooting lasted until 1200 hours and then there was good news – the Croatian flag was flying on Orlovac, Hum and Varda. Celebratory shooting from infantry weapons around Blato lasted about an hour. In the afternoon, Jasenica and Rodoč were liberated. At Varda, our forces captured three Chetnik tanks. The Chetniks blew up a railway bridge in Raštani. Two or three of our soldiers were killed and we do not know how many Chetniks, but it is said that ten or so were killed.

Belgrade Television reported that the Orthodox church in Mostar had been hit. Fighting was taking place in Sarajevo. Finally, an aid convoy led by UNPROFOR arrived in Sarajevo. They had problems with the SDS on the way. There is no water or electricity supply in Sarajevo.

A total of 19 people were killed and more than 100 were wounded in BH today.

It is Bairam today. It seems that occupation started on Bairam and, on Bairam again, Mostar is liberated.

Ratko PERIĆ was named bishop coadjutor of our diocese.

Friday, 12 June 1992

### LIFE IS GETTING BACK TO NORMAL

A peaceful morning. After more than a month, shops started working in Polog. There is enough of basic foodstuffs (flour, cooking oil, salt, sugar, and so on). In the very beginning, you could pay with Serbian and Croatian dinars, but now they only accept Croatian dinars and German marks. Everything is expensive. The last salary that ordinary workers received for March amounted to 10,000 YUD, and not now this money will only buy you ten beers. There are no major problems with food in the countryside yet, because some of the food comes from the land, some from the cattle, some from the foreign currency stashed away, and Caritas also gives something away. The situation is much more difficult in towns, because people there live only on humanitarian aid and old reserves of food. The electricity is on, although there are outages. Telephones lines in Polog have been down since 6 April 1992. Since a few days ago, there has been enough fuel and its price is a little over 1 DEM /per litre/. Traffic between Mostar and Lištica has been /?blocked/ since the beginning of the war. There is a bus line from Lištica to Split and Zagreb. Bosnia can be reached via the Posušje – Rakitno – Risovac – Jablanica – Prozor - G. Vakuf route. This road has been named *Put spasa* /Salvation Road/.

Since this morning, Serbian Radio Mostar has been silent. A seminar entitled The Spiritual Renewal of Croatia was held yesterday and today in Zagreb.

Fighting is underway in Sarajevo and nine people have been killed. KARADŽIĆ has announced truce that is to begin at 0600 hours on Monday. Shells can be heard exploding from the direction of Pjesci.

Saturday, 13 June 1992

### DUBRAVE AND STOLAC LIBERATED

An occasional Chetnik shell still falls on Galac. *Slavuji* have been firing all day. Domanovići, Aladinići, Crnići, Pjesci and Stolac have been liberated. The Chetniks are now fleeing in larger numbers than our forces were hoping, but they are torching everything on their way.

A total of 26 people were killed in Sarajevo today. A new regiment, *Bruno Bušić*, took an oath in Grac near Posušje.

Sunday, 14 June 1992

### BUNA IS LIBERATED

Detonations could be heard all day from the direction of the Mostar valley. *Slavuji* have been fired constantly. Buna was liberated by noon.

Fierce fighting is underway at Kupres but the lines have not been moved.

There are 1,400,000 refugees in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including 535,000 in Croatia and 62,000 in Slovenia.

A French humanitarian aid convoy arrived in Sarajevo. Greece is still contesting Macedonia's name. In Belgrade, Serbian Patriarch Pavle was at the helm of a peace march. I watched it on television. A lot of people took part in it. Too late, Pavle! It seemed more like an attempt to save Serbia than concern for peace. Serbia's policy of conquest is now going downhill and should be saved by all means available.

Yugoslavia was kicked out of the European football championship and Denmark got in. The Philippine Government banned the Yugoslav chess delegation from appearing in Manila at the world chess championship.

Monday, 15 June 1992

### HODOVO LIBERATED

Five persons were killed and 60 were wounded in the Chetnik shelling of Mostar yesterday. A new BH Government was established in Sarajevo yesterday.

Serbian unilateral truce was to begin today, but nothing came of it, as always. The Chetniks mutilated 40 or so Muslims in Ilijaš.

Students in Belgrade demonstrated against the MILOŠEVIĆ regime. Dobrica ĆOSIĆ was elected President of Yugoslavia.

At about 1600 hours, shots could be heard around the airport. Our forces crossed to the left bank of the Neretva river and pushed the Chetniks back. They liberated Hodovo.

A declaration between Croatia and BH was signed on the telephone. It seems that it is nothing special.

Serbian Radio Mostar can be heard again and is broadcasting marching songs.

Tuesday, 16 June 1992

### MOSTAR LIBERATED

A peaceful morning. At about 1045 hours, Serbian aircraft flew over Blato but did not attack. At 1100 hours, Serbian Radio Mostar broadcast the order of Krsto SAVIĆ, probably from Nevesinje, that all conscripts aged between 18 and 60, report to Nevesinje. Those who fail to do so will be prosecuted or executed because of the betrayal of SAO /Serbian Autonomous District/ Herzegovina. In the past ten or so days, Radio Trebinje has been broadcasting the writings of Serbian authors from World War I or the Balkan Wars. This is intended to lift the Chetniks' shaky morale – if they have one at all.

In Ovojci today I attended the funeral of Josip BOŠNJAK, who had been killed on the Stari Most /bridge/ on Sunday. There were many people although a general alert was in place all day.

The Orthodox church in Mostar was burning and the HVO was fighting the fire, and the HTV, among others, showed footage of it.

Mostar, Vrapčići and Trijebanj were liberated today and late last night notorious Fortica was also liberated. They said that the Chetniks were fleeing in panic towards Nevesinje.

A Chetnik shell hit the prison in Konjic, killing 13 Chetnik detainees. In Slavonski Brod, five persons were killed by the Serbian long-range artillery from Motajica, Bosnia.

Serbian soldiers were kneeling in front of the Assembly building in Belgrade and Patriarch Pavle was demonstrating in the streets. The HTV said in a comment that those who should march were praying and those who should pray were marching. A comment on MILOŠEVIĆ stepping down from the post of President and ĆOSIĆ filling it said that ĆOSIĆ had overthrown MILOŠEVIĆ in order to save him.

Wednesday, 17 June 1992

### BH DINAR

Serbian Radio Mostar was silent this morning – the staff had probably fled to Nevesinje. The Mostar airport was liberated. Fighting was being conducted around Stolac. Ošanići was liberated. The Chetniks are fleeing B. Polje. Rumour has it that the Chetniks have long-range rockets of great destructive power somewhere in Velež. Do they really have them or are they only trying to frighten us? They are the only ones who know.

Islamic countries had a meeting in Istanbul about aid to BH. Some of them have already sent humanitarian aid.

The 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1242 battle against the Tatars is being celebrated in Grobljansko Polje /field/. How many nations have we had to fight in order to survive?

The BH government announced the introduction of the BH dinar, of the same value as the Serbian dinar. In the free territory in Herzegovina, they are using only the Croatian dinar or the German mark.

Thursday, 18 June 1992

### I AM IN MOSTAR AGAIN

I went down to Mostar via Žovnica. The road was full of holes from the shells. From Žovnica, everything in Mostar looked quite healthy, but once I reached the houses, I could see the substantial damage caused by the shells. The burnt-down bishop's palace was the most ghostly sight. The restored, beautiful façade was still on the walls, but everything else was black and empty. The cathedral was almost all riddled with bullets and shell fragments, and a quarter of the roof was destroyed by shells. There are many holes around it from the Chetnik shells that missed it. The stones it was covered with were almost all broken.

Gradačac was attacked for the first time today.

The Chetniks fired guns at Slipčičići and Krivodol this evening and the shooting could be heard well into the night.

Friday, 19 June 1992

### BIJELO POLJE LIBERATED, HOS AND TO IN CONFLICT

Serbian Radio can be heard again, but its name has been changed to Serbian Radio Studio Herzegovina. At 1100 hours, it lied brazenly that the Serbian flag was waving in Buna and Sjeverni Logor.

In Travnik and Vitez, a conflict broke out between the TO and the HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/, and there were arguments between the HVO and the TO in Mostar. There were some misunderstandings in Stolac too. They say that in Mostar there are about 6,000 defenders in the HVO and about 1,000 in the TO. Many of the HVO members are Muslims, while there are few Croats in the TO.

The HOS in Herzegovina consists mostly of Muslims although the Croats are the main commanders. They say that the Muslims are settling their own accounts under the Croatian name – torching Orthodox churches and looting and torching Serbian houses. This information about the HOS should be checked - /it should be checked/ whether this is the truth or just rumours circulated among people.

Dubrovnik came under fierce attack. Fighting is underway around Derventa. They say that the Chetniks re-captured Stolac, but were chased away once again. Our forces are mopping up Bijelo Polje. The Chetniks slaughtered 40 or so Muslims near the Sarajevo airport.

Zdenko ŠKRABALO is Croatia's new Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is not a member of any political party. He introduced himself to journalists.

The publication of the Zagreb-based daily *Vjesnik* was discontinued today for financial reasons, and the weekly *Danas* suffered the same fate several days ago.

Since the beginning of the war in BH, a total of 7,200 or so people have been killed and 25,000 or so wounded, about 30,000 have gone missing and there are 1,303,000 refugees, of whom 603,000 are in BH and the rest are outside the republic.

**Sut. 20th June 1992**

**Traveling through Herzegovina**

Because of the church in Kamen I traveled through the whole Central Bosnia to record the situation in devastated parishes. I write about this extensively in CnaKu no. 6-7/92. I'm only briefly listing the parishes in which churches are damaged: Lj. Dolac, Kruševo, Tepčići, Čitluk, Gradina, Čapljina, Čeljovo, Grljevići, Gabela, Hrasno, Hutovo, Gradac, Domanovići, Aladinići, Prenj, Stolac, Rotimlja, Trebinje, Ravno, B. Polje, Konjic, Šujica (I later learned that churches in Nevesinje and Šćepan Krst were destroyed). Many Serbian houses on the left bank of Neretva in Tasovčići and Žitomislčići have fallen, and Serbian monastery is burning. I think there are much better alternatives for the Serbian property, then burning it.

BiH government declared martial law, mobilization and work obligations. Chetniks were shelling Stolac from Hrgud.

**Sut. 21st June 1992**

**Refugees are returning**

There are fights in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Posavina, Jajce, and on edges of Stolac (Baran) and Mostar municipalities. The commander of the French forces at Sarajevo airport requested 48 hours of peace, or otherwise they will withdraw from their positions. Serbs do not wish peace and continue to shoot. Today I held the mass in Položac shelters, the number of people has increased rapidly, indicating that many refugees returned from Dalmatia.

Chetniks have damaged HE plant in Mostar.

Patron mother of Church and mass for all fallen soldiers was held today in Mostar cathedral. Many people were present although it is still unsafe to move around the city and chetniks can always start shelling again.

**Mon. 22nd June 1992**

**Terminating relations YU.**

Last night in Dobrići several Serbian houses whose owners (Stevo Slavic) have joined Chetniks exploded.

There are fights around Šibenik, in Sarajevo civilians were killed again by sudden shelling. There is nothing on radio on Herzegovina as though war in Herzegovina has ended. In Travnik there are some disputes between the HVO and TO (territorial defense) are some disputes. The dispute was resolved peacefully. Today is one year from the Chetnik attacks on Slavonia. Croatia is celebrating struggle against fascists.

BiH has terminated all relations with Serbia and Montenegro.

26<sup>th</sup> of November 1991:

There is an order coming from Belgrade, probably at Vukosavljević's proposition, that my assistant, lieutenant-Colonel Jovo Vukobrat becomes commander of the TO brigade in the 5<sup>th</sup> corps, respectively in Bosanska Krajina. That brigade shall personally be subordinated to executioner Uzelac, it will cross the Sava river and fight against Croatian patriots in Pakrac-Gradiška battlefield. Vukobrat receives order with disapproval in front of me, however, in front of Vukosavljević, it wasn't like that. I inform the chief of staff, Fikret Jakić about this, while he merely says: "It must be done, execute the order". To my comment; "Which means, tie the horse where the master tells you to", he only smiled.

The R BH TO armament is massively plundered

4<sup>th</sup> of December 1991:

All warehouses of the TO staffs from Mostar region were burglarized one night by unidentified JNA members and all means were taken "in unknown direction". The man who informed me about this by phone told me that he was my friend as well as the friend of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I find out, through mine and other friends that Stipe Tatalović, former Colonel of JNA and former friend of mine, appeared during the night, carrying the authorization of the Herzegovinian corps commander, General Strugar. He showed this paper to Colonel Mitov, commander of the OkŠTO Mostar and this one allowed him whatever Tatalović requested. In this way, the former JNA completely disarmed the territorial defence of Herzegovina. The Bulgarian guy Boris Mitov informed only General Vukosavljević about this. The second day, I initiate the procedure, while as the reason, I cite the fact that Mitov gave everything away without any single document on handover, therefore I ask him to be responsible for it. I couldn't find any other reason to initiate the procedure.

18<sup>th</sup> of December 1991:

I receive a report that Uzelac's Chetniks burglarized the warehouse of OpŠTO in Bosanska Krupa and stole everything what was in it. Vukosavljević gave a simple comment to that; "What can we do about it?" As to my proposition to inform Belgrade and the BH presidency about this, he responded; "There is no need, they know that all what has been taken is in safe hands".

23<sup>rd</sup> of December 1991:

We receive an order from SSNO to deploy TO armament and ammunition to new locations, according to the plan of the 2<sup>nd</sup> VO command, to locations nobody from RŠTO will be familiar with. I insist that Jakić and Vukosavljević inform the presidency of the R BH about this, whereby I openly for the first time, use the term "deception and theft". Jakić warns me in front of Vukosavljević; "Watch your language, those are big words". I think that the presidency has never been introduced to this matter. However, this decision meant that material resources, which our people were buying for their money and for their defence, are allocated to the army which is more Serbian every day, instead of national, more and more Chetnik and aggressor army.

6<sup>th</sup> of January 1992:

Colonel Ostojić insists on retreat of counter aircraft TO armament from enterprises such as "Famos", "Unis", Iron factory Zenica, "Krivaja" Zavidovići and others, with explanation that they don't need it. He says that this decision comes "from Belgrade", the weapon should be retreated into the JNA warehouse in order to prevent the parties "from killing each other". Hence, it was a totally thinly-veiled explanation. (Didn't the presidency of R BH, as well as the ministry of defence really get that?). On the same day, Colonel Pavlović, at collegium of commanders, informs that in Lopare, Ugljevik and Šipovo new commanders of OpŠTO are appointed. People from SDS were appointed, while the previous commanders were dismissed without explanation. Everything was done without our knowledge, in personnel council. We were presented with an accomplished fact.

The panic starts

1<sup>st</sup> of April 1992 /handwritten/:

Everything smells like war. The atmosphere is highly charged in the entire republic, especially in Sarajevo. The previous day, HOS guys took the educational centre of TO in Vareš, but they retreated this morning. However, the forces of HOS took the OkŠTO Livno. They alienated motor vehicles, war prey, mobilized the manpower and the fights in the triangle Šuica-Kupres-Tomislavgrad have already started.

## Attack to BH towns

11<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

The situation is rather dramatic in Višegrad; the level of Drina River and storage reservoir is increased, while Murat Šabanović, with his men, occupied the dam, threatening to blow it up. The forces in JNA occupied the public security station, SO, as well as the radio station. One can hear artillery detonations in Bosanski Brod. Foča has been intensively bombed from the air, as well as from the ground. Muslim villages exclusively were hit. In Čapljina, Bivolje Brdo is razed to the ground, while the town itself was sprayed with grenades. JNA came out from the garrison in Tuzla and occupied the road towards Gračanica. In Goražde, Azotar Vitkovići, unidentified persons showed up, threatening with releasing ammoniac into Drina River. JNA controls Zvornik while the people are leaving it in masses.

Hydro plants Mostar and Salakovac were occupied by the Serbian "territorials", respectively Chethiks in Mostar. Čitluk is sprayed with grenades. Derventa is occupied. On Kupres, JNA and reserve soldiers burn down Croatian villages.

## Destruction and plunder of Sarajevo

12<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

In the morning hours, Sarajevo is being destroyed violently and viciously, burned down and demolished, as well as plundered. Nevertheless, that day, the massive plunders and breakings into stores started, as well as into warehouses and apartments. Although our police, headed by Jusuf Pušina and the specialists of MUP, led by Dragan Vikić, endeavoured to prevent the plunder of town, I think the priority should have been carrying out the presidency order to defence Sarajevo, and it would be more important to give out all the forces to save the capital from occupation and prevent the aggressor from entering the town. Therefore majority of the police, along with TO forces, was engaged at over 60 kilometres long defence town lines.

In Aleksin Han near Jablanica, on the road Sarajevo-Mostar, a bridge was destroyed by the explosion of cistern with fuel. In Mostar, JNA occupied "Soko" enterprise, burglarized magazines of construction material of "Velmos" and drove away the entire material. The aircrafts of Yugo-army bomb the marginal parts of the town in Neum, whereby, on several occasions, the town itself was hit from the artillery weapon. In Stolac, the bridge on Radimlja was brought down and the communication Stolac-Domanovići interrupted.

On relay Mejavica, near Tuzla, Serbian TV program started transmitting. In Zvornik, Chetniks and members of the TO are fighting in the Kula-grad which is held by our troops.

Chetniks are shelling Kula grad with mortars. In Foča, in local community Aladža, houses are in flames, and Muslims are fleeing to Ustikolina and Goražde.

The JNA aviation bombed Široki Brijeg but the defendants managed to bring down one aircraft.

On the same day, I get the impression that entire Sarajevo is on fire. One can see it especially clearly at night. The sky is almost completely illuminated by arson and fire. Sakib Mahmuljin gives me information that Imra Agotić, former negotiator on behalf of Croatian liberators, with the aggressor JNA in Zagreb, phoned the Operational centre, offering a great help. I inform the minister of defence about this, as well as the President. Edin Halilagić from Bihać reports about ending the mobilization of the TO forces. It has also been done in Cazin and Velika Kladuša. There is training and education of signalmen. Vahid Karavelić and Fehim report from Tuzla. They tell me that one is planning to capture several JNA tanks. However, very early in the morning, Fahim calls again and ask me whether we are behind Karavelić's action. Nevertheless, the two of them got into the conflict, all due to bad estimation of desires and abilities. Fehim finds Karavelić's desires and intentions rather too optimistic and that we have neither forces nor means for their realization. I report on all this to commander Efendić. Jure Karlušić answers, PVO second lieutenant of the former JNA who we employ in our operational centre. Safet Isović comes to me, popular singer of folk music and delivers us information from Rajlovac that officers Albanians wish to join us but they do not know how.

13<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

While general Kukanjac states, in the morning news, that the only army in BH is his JNA, I receive information that, a day after the agreed cease-fire, Široki Brijeg has been



shelled and sprayed with missiles again, especially the Gradac settlement. Power-transmission line was brought down in Mostar, Medine, while, in the southern part of the town, the Serbian reservists continue with plunder. There was a surprise attack to military establishment by the HVO and TO BH in Čapljina, while the JNA is threatening with bombing the town. In the early morning hours, the JNA aviation was carrying out activities in Neum and Klek. Bosanski Brod is sprayed with grenades and one fell into the refinery circle which burns. The Old town has been intensively attacked in Sarajevo, being in flame. There is a non-stop fire towards Muslim villages in Višegrad from direction of Sjemeć. Numerous refugees keep coming from Foča to Goražde.

Commander of JNA from Zenica threatens with a rocket attack to Busovača, if the guard shift in the warehouse is not allowed, which is on the way towards Kačuni and Kiseljak, being surrounded by the forces of HVO and TO.

On the same day, we organize and carry out barrage throughout the town; setting of barricades and spikes, organization of team management from a centre of the city TO staff. The convoy of JNA trucks with approximately 50 vehicles entered Faletići; they are pulling out material resources to the mountains and to Pale. We organize an armed attack to Butmir airport, under the management of the BH MUP. We had a poor success here, due to ammunition shortage. After setting barricades and obstacles throughout Sarajevo, we determined corridors through which the Yugo-army can move, because it is still located in the barracks in the town.

Commander of OpŠTO, lieutenant Osmić is reporting from Gradačac and I arrange with him that Ivo Mijačević, lieutenant-colonel of JNA becomes commander and he, his deputy, which he accepts without thinking. We receive propositions from Bihać, by Edin to appoint a commander, as well as other propositions. (Edin Halilagić proposes Osmangić to be commander). Faletići get emptied, as well as mined. The Yugo-army evacuates technique from KMT, but we set the spikes and disable them in realization of those intentions. So we blockaded the KMT in three areas.

The reserve captain Zec from Rudo reports to me that major number of trucks head off to Rudo from Užice and Višegrad.

I also receive information by Jukić from Žepče, who notifies me on the situation in this town. There is crowd in Živinice; Osman Fočaković, president of SO asks, on behalf of the people, to move Vaha (Vahid Karavelić) from Živinice, because the forces of TO confiscated one tank from JNA and Vaha does not allow it to be returned to the aggressor army which, otherwise, threatens to raze Živinice to the ground. Eventually Vaha takes my advice, disables the tank and the problem becomes solved, rather favourably for us.

Brčko is surrounded, so is Gradačac, while Bjeljina is occupied. Command of the 17<sup>th</sup> corps moved out from the town and placed itself on the command post in Ljepunice.

In night analysis we conclude that HVO and HOS are still working and conduct a fight against the aggressor separately from each other, as well as separately from the TO. There is no coordination whatsoever.

Although today's day was exhausting and rather dynamic, the arrival of Sefer Halilović and his associates into our lines brought more self-esteem and optimism. I get the impression that this man knows what he wants, whereby he often leaves an impression to know it all, although it is not so.

The Belgrade scenario becomes real

14<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

Brčko is completely surrounded by the JNA and paramilitary formations of SDS. All resident and business establishments, property of Muslims in Bjeljina are destroyed and brought down, while the Arkan's Chetniks were joined by approximately 250 volunteers from Bjeljina, armed to the teeth, in order to attack Zvornik. In Sarajevo, after pulling out the technique, Faletići and Vasin Han were sprayed with rockets. There is fire in the area of Mejtaš, Mojmil, Alipaša Polje and Vrac. In Višegrad, after releasing water from the dam, the village of Dušča was flooded by wave impacts. The situation in Foča is hopeless. There are fights in Mostar between the TO forces and JNA units which plunder enterprises, while the JNA army sets houses in the area of Gnojnice on fire. Artillery fire is opened to Čapljina, cassette bombs are thrown from the aircrafts. The church and the mosque were hit and Mogorjelo hotel set on fire.

I organize distribution of labels marked TOBiH (Territorial Defense of BiH). Ramiz Šuvalić contacted me from Zenica and he is asking for labels and money. Edin from Bihać insists that Osmangić is appointed commander as soon as possible, Mirsad Ćeman from Tešnje informs us that TO Headquarters is formed, and the adjacent municipalities have done nothing in this respect.

15<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

Several grenades fell at GRAS in Sarajevo and damaged the major number of vehicles. The streetcar traffic was interrupted. There is opening of fire in the area of Nedžarići and the movement of citizens is forbidden.

The Chetniks captured two UNPROFOR liaison officers. I find out that Miljevića squad of "volunteers" moves towards Foča from direction of Kalinovik. Units of Užice corps entered Višegrad and took the hydro plant. Serbian and JNA army arrest and take people in Mostar in an unknown direction. There is a cannon fire throughout the town, while many houses are destroyed, as well as the power-transmission line. The "Soko" enterprise is completely plundered. Stolac is completely surrounded by the JNA forces and the police members are being arrested. There are severe fights in Bosanski Brod, followed by the usage of artillery weapon. Osman Zeljković reports to me, commander of the TO staff, who didn't want to mobilize the TO staff and says that the situation in Modriča is calm although JNA surrounded the town.

Osmić reports to me from Gradačac, Mirsad from Odžak, Marko Božanović from Brčko, Mušović from Tešanj, Nijaz from Travnik and Fehim from Tuzla informs me that Vaha took over the function and there will be no misunderstanding. They report from Goražde that parties slowly take over the units' management and detour the district TO staff. They took the people into the municipal TO staff without having consulted the OkŠTO. The worst situation is happening in Višegrad.

Abidin Deljanin reports to me, with dozen loyal people, among which are Ogorelac, Maltarić, Sarić and others who are in the "Jusuf Džonlić" barrack which is still in JNA hands. I issue him substantial tasks. Žepče, Zavidovići and Maglaj inform us about sending us propositions for the new system of TO management body in those municipalities.

I contact Mrs. Huber from the International Red Cross and agree on the aid for Sarajevo. Vladimir Srebrov brings me data that Serbs from Pale threaten Serbs in Sarajevo. Master Ramadanović comes and says that he alone can blow up "Viktor Bubanj" barrack; he merely asks from me an approval and an order. He has already executed preparations in the gas boiler-room, in which he operates. I decisively forbid him to do so and prove this would be a disaster for the population around the barrack, perhaps for the entire town as well. Sefer Halilović at the meeting of commanders' collegium proposes maximal offensive and aggressive psychological-propaganda war against the aggressor.

16<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

The building of Elektroprivreda of BH was attacked in Sarajevo; the JNA army reached Dobrinja and Mojmiilo. One reports from Višegrad that "Beli orlovi" arrived from Serbia, while the grenades keep falling on the town all day long, especially on the left Drina bank. There are approximately 15 000 of refugees in Goražde. The town is on fire.

There are severe fights ongoing in Mostar, followed by the mutual artillery fire. One is firing towards Čitluk from all artillery weapons. The rain of grenades fell on Široki Brijeg. Brčko has been shelled from the military establishment, from the warehouse in Krepišić. The post office building in Dobož has been completely destroyed. Derventa and vicinal villages are attacked by approximately 900 Serbian "territorials".

At the collegium of the TO staff, we discuss the personal and joint safety, secrecy of documents, the uniqueness of the staff and other issues. We make a decision to form the 122 mm artillery division in Visoko. Kadir Jusić from Visoko reports to me, while Šuvalić reports from Zenica and transmits the message that HVO of the so called Herceg Bosnia will not go in front of the TO command, while HOS accepts it.

Čilić reports from Prozor and says there is fear and panic and that displacement of Muslims and Croats towards western Herzegovina has begun, which is supported by the former commander Borić. Sulejman Herceć reports from Maglaj, Huso Avdagić from Visoko, Mirsad Durmić from Dobož who says that he had a stronger platoon of 150 people, which is well armed and placed around the village Kladari, at the exit of Dobož towards Derventa.

Halim Avdagić, commander of the TO staff, reports from Visoko. Avdo Hebib informs me that the Republic of Croatia invited the population of Čapljina to mobilization.

17<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

A severe mortar and infantry fire has been opened to Sarajevo from directions of Vrac, Trebevići and Lapišnice. There is shooting in Hrasnica, Ilidža and Hadžići, where the members of "Serbian militia" took the forestry establishments.

There is a real anarchy in Mostar. Plunders of communal and personal property are unbelievable. Almost all enterprises in the southern part of the town are ravaged.

I am giving a speech at the funeral of General Mujo Mujkić, followed by the constant

firing from direction of Betanija. I think that Mujo Mujkić was the last man who was buried at Bare cemetery in the course of war. At the meeting of commanders' collegium, we agree on establishment of special unit under the command of Kerim Lučarević-Doctor. We order the forcing of sabotage activities with a basic aim of confiscation as much of the war prey as possible. Franjo Plečko and Himzo Pečenković are given substantial logistics tasks. In the evening, I contact Safet Hadžić and find out that 15 trucks are taking the old road from Ilijaš towards Pretis, while Ismet Dahić from Stari Grad gives propositions how to help Vogošće. A person who doesn't wish to introduce himself phones me at 23:15 hrs and reports that trucks from Ilijaš are fooling us because, special vehicles are going away through Skakavac, by a newly dug through road, and by those trucks, one wishes to collect means from Pretis. The same person says that, through Vučja Luka and Betanija, the Chetniks are digging through the road towards TAS in Vogošća. At midnight sharp, I receive information that 100 tanks are on their way from Glamoč towards Livno.

18<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

In the morning hours, on the occasion of attack of our forces to "Pretis" factory, 5 of our combatants lost their lives, while 23 of them were wounded. The building of the Assembly of the Republic, as well as the UNIS building, where the premises of Children's embassy are located, came under attack of the aggressor's artillery from the hill this morning. Houses in Foča are set on fire; people are terrorized and taken in unknown direction. Nobody buries the dead. The Serbian terrorists, with the assistance of JNA have taken away several vehicles of various enterprises and organizations in Mostar. Grenades are falling to Ilići and Cim from the Hum hill. There are plenty of killed people. Weapons were distributed from the military truck in the centar-2 settlement. There is a severe artillery and infantry fire in Čapljina. There are wounded and killed ones. 10 tanks with outposted Serbian flags arrived from Serbia to Tuzla Dubrave airport. There are disarmed members of active and reserve police composition in Orašje. One is firing in Derventa all night long. There are plenty of the dead and the houses are on fire. The Croatian village Prud in Bosanski Šamac has been shelled from the right bank of Bosna River. Zvornik has been completely ravaged. Late in the night I find out that our morning actions to Pretis factory were successful but among dead combatants, there was a good man and great patriot, Safet Hadžić. I receive a dispatch that the command of Knin corps arrives to "Maršal Tito" barrack.

Mustafa Polutak reports to me from Visoko that HOS entered the barrack at 10:15 hrs. Bahtanović from Pretis being deputy of the general manager reports to me and gives data about the means which remained in the factory. He suggests Tintor and Risto Bajala to be arrested as soon as possible. He emphasizes that Zurovac is a dangerous man and that Seid Morjaković is the most suitable for the cooperation.

We adjust the "Igman" factory in Konjic is to be secured by TO and we order it to the manager. He disagrees but then, we send him an order by which we regulate he must hand over the entire factory to TO Konjic. We hand over 5 tank drivers to the commander Italian.

19<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

The inhabitants of Dobrinja are to be found in crossfire, because one is shooting from Mojmil, Vrac and Vojničko Polje. 3 fire engines with full equipment were stolen in Vogošće. Grenades are falling into the centre itself in Neum. Approximately 500 grenades were fired to the village of Miletici near Čitluk. The bridge in Žitomisljci was completely destroyed. The railway line between Konjic and Jablanica was mined again. Srebrenica is completely blockaded. There are ongoing fights between the TO units and Serbian "volunteers". We engage Mušir Brkić, former lieutenant-Colonel, with Ph.D. in law at the exchange of detainees. We decide to give priority to defence of directions by which one could cut Sarajevo through. We specially emphasize nutrition and shift of units at positions. We engage ourselves in supplying of bombs from Bugojno, PT mines from Breza, as well as zoljas and wasps. We decide not to attack the barracks but we will demand a decent and human surrender.

Physicians Bašić, Čovrk and Sarić, having abandoned the military hospital, report to be at our disposal. President of SO from Konjic reports about hiding all goods from "Igman" and having it placed safely, as well as arresting the security officer of this factory. The Chetniks ultimately ask for his release, otherwise they will shell Konjic.

Lieutenant Rusmir Kurić, engineer, having managed to escape from Mostar for being born a true Sarajlija /native Sarajevo inhabitant/, reports to me.

At midnight, we discuss the ongoing situation on Zlatište which is the IKM (forward command post) of Sarajevo corps, in which there are certainly Ante Karanušić, probably

Asim Džambasović as well, maybe Enver Hadžihasanović, former commander of the 43<sup>rd</sup> motorized brigade. Is there also Rasim Delić, lieutenant-colonel and one of the most educated and best officers of the former JNA that I have known?

20<sup>th</sup> of April 1992:

There is an ongoing artillery cannonade in Mostar from the hill throughout the town. Strong forces of JNA are concentrated by the "Sokol" motel. Jarčedoli and Širokača are suffering a heavy mortar fire in Sarajevo. Means from "Pretis" are taken away in organized manner, followed by the protection of "Serbian" militia. There is a complete blockade of "Serbian" militia on Ilidža which doesn't allow going to work.

The situation in Foča is dramatic. The bearded Chetniks in the town burn the private houses of Muslims while some villages are completely burned down. Bosanski Brod is under artillery cannonade from direction of "Serbian" municipality of Bosanski Brod. The building of SO, in which there were police members of Muslim and Croatian nationality was set on fire in Sanski Most. At the meeting with the district TO staff commander, Mustafa Hajrulahiović, we find out that armoured vehicle of JNA cruises around Novo Sarajevo. Hajrudin Šuman asks for one zolja or a wasp to organize its destruction. We organize a reinforced securing of the presidency building establishment. "We have plenty of people, but merely 4 automatic guns and one scorpio" so reports Fikret Muslimović.

I find out that two TO battalions are formed in Čapljina, but one of them is Muslim, commanded by Džemo Najetović, while the other one is Croatian. At the meeting of the commanders collegium, we issue an order on ban of taking motor vehicles from the citizens and enterprises by the TO members in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We send people to Stari grad and Novo Sarajevo to help with establishments of units. We emphasize the problem of communications wiretapping and counter-electronic protection.

Minister Doko called me in the evening, and ordered that as of today at the Republican Headquarters building and Presidency building the following people can no longer enter or work at Republican Headquarters of Territorial Defense (RŠTO): Mladen, Valentina and Kemo Bećirević, Huso Paravlić, Dževad Jusić, Marija Pavlović, Himzo Pečenković, Vehbija Kari, Ivan

Slaviček and others, who were with us from the first day of the war. When I asked him what does this mean, he replied that they cooperate with the Chetniks, and have mixed marriages. I replied: "Minister, while I'm here they will be here, and when I'm dead, you can throw them out."

21<sup>st</sup> of April 1992:

Population from Konjic starts to move out, mostly Croats, as well as Muslims. There is a severe shooting near the barrack. The aircrafts launch missiles towards Grude. Plunders in Mostar are still going on. There is a huge bombing damage in Široki Brijeg. The municipal building was bombed in Čitluk. There are strong detonations in Derventa and street fights in the town. Industrial zone has been torn down permanently. Population from Brčko is massively moving out because the tanks are entering the town. Defenders of the town of Zvornik keep resisting the aggressor.

The Serbian units execute massive shooting in Bratunac and Srebrenica, while they take away the property by trucks across Drina. One starts the artillery attack to Odžak from the village of Miloševac, from the right bank of Bosna River.

There is a conflict between Chetniks and TO BH members in Travnik. In Sarajevo, Šešelji followers, members of SDS and "Serbian" MUP attempt the artillery attack on the town. Vital establishments in the municipalities Centar, Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad are being shelled by grenades. The RTV hall has been hit while the business establishment "Unioninvesta" has burned till the ground. One is shooting at the ambulance teams. There are street fights going on. There are plenty of the dead and wounded. Traffic and entire life in Sarajevo are paralyzed.

On that day, we make a decision that the team of seniors leaves Sarajevo towards the area of Kiseljak, Konjic and Visoko in order to prepare an organization of attacks to the aggressors from the back. They report to me from Čelebići that approximately 150 men (led by Narcis Hasičić), who have much less ammunition and weapons, consider how to bring it to us to the town.

"Wounding" of Alija Delimustafić

22<sup>nd</sup> of April 1992:

Rather severe attacks from all directions are carried out towards Sarajevo. Among others, the hall of police, the MUP building and the cathedral have been hit. The former minister of Interior of BH, Alija Delimustafić has been allegedly wounded. As of that day, he was

moving across Sarajevo with a helmet on his head and bandaged arm. The eyewitnesses claim that he wasn't wounded, because he wasn't in his cabinet during the shelling, which was hit indeed.

On the same day the Olympic museum was hit, and the sport hall on Mojnilo was set on fire.

The situation in Trnovo is dramatic, because three reserve militiamen were killed. Mistreatment and arrest of Muslims continue in Foča. Another cannon attack was carried out to Bosanski brod. The area of Cim and Ilići in Mostar was again shelled and machine-gunned from the aircraft, while 56 "Serbian" sniper shooters are active throughout the town from Konak. They are all from Aleksin Han from Serbia.

In Bosanska Krupa the aggressor is attacking the militia station and establishments of vital significance which are defended by TO BH units. Our units in Zvornik moved to the counterattack. There is a total war with the aggressor going on in Odžak, with all weapons and instruments.

I receive information that one of our platoons is surrounded on Butmir and there are some 20 wounded combatants. We urgently organize unblocking and sending of aid. Late in the night, one from the TO staff informs me that they didn't manage to find an agreement with Serbs, because they were working on agreements in the last ten days. Nevertheless, as of today, they are in total war with them.

23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1992:

Mostar has been destroyed systematically. The UNIS aluminium plant department has been hit from Velež. The damage is huge. A power-transmission line towards Goranci has been knocked down, while the sniper shooters kill passers-by in the town. Plunders on Buna, Jasenica and in the town itself are going on. Čapljina is on fire.


250 "Beli orlovi" came to Doboj; Johovac, where the Croats are majority, is being attacked. Bosanski Brod doesn't have water and electricity. The Chetniks threaten Odžak to become a second Vukovar and, if defenders do not surrender, they shall shell the town with "lunas".

Stjepan Šiber: : Deceptions, delusions, the truth - 1992 war diary (Rabic, Sarajevo 2000)

## SFRJ (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) armed forces in 1985


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





\* MD (Military Districts)

\* MMR (Military Marine District)










# AGGRESSION Of Serbia, Montenegro and BiH against Croatia



\* MMD (Military marine district)

TOTAL JNA AND VRS STRENGTH (2. MD, 4. MD, 1.MMD) January - April 1992.	
83 000	Personnel
460 - 500	Tanks
400 - 420	Armored vehicles
950 - 1000	Cannons

TOTAL JNA AND VRS STRENGTH 1992 - 1993	
135 000	Personnel
550	Tanks
430	Armored vehicles
1300	Cannons

Structure of 10. and 4. VRS (Army of Srpska Republic) Corps

10. Corps – Western Bosnia	
General major Špiro Ninković	
Soldiers	25 086
Volunteers	2 300
UNITS STRUCTURE	
622 mtbr	Motorized brigade
9 mtbr	Motorized brigade
592 mtbr	Motorized brigade
2 lib	Light Infantry Brigade
4 lib	Light Infantry Brigade
145 lib	Light Infantry Brigade
6 maaar	Mixed anti-armor artillery regiment
6 mar	Mixed artillery regiment
306 lar AAD	Light artillery regiment AAD (anti air defense)

4. Corps – Sarajevo	
General major Vojislav Đurđević	
Soldiers	5 826
Volunteers	33 220
UNITS STRUCTURE	
49 mbr	Motorized brigade
14 mtbr	Motorized brigade
120 lib	Light Infantry Brigade
4 mar	Mixed artillery regiment
4 maaar	Mixed anti-armor artillery regiment
240 ssrp	Light Infantry Brigade
346 lar AAD	Light artillery regiment AAD
340 engr	Engineering regiment


**IX. Structure of 5. and 9. VRS (Army of Srpska Republic) Corps**

<b>5. Corps – Western Bosnia</b>	
<b>General major Vladimir Vuković</b>	
Soldiers	19 316
Volunteers	16 750
UNITS STRUCTURE	
329 abr	Armed brigade
16 mtbr	Motorized brigade
343 mtbr	Motorized brigade
122 lib	Light Infantry Brigade
6 partb	Partisan Brigade
11 partbr	Partisan Brigade
5 maaar	Mixed anti-armor artillery regiment
5 mar	Mixed artillery regiment
30 aaad	Anti-armor artillery division


<b>4. Corps – Sarajevo</b>	
<b>General major Vojislav Đurđević</b>	
Soldiers	14 531
Volunteers	2 200
UNITS STRUCTURE	
11 mtbr	Motorized brigade
180 mtbr	Motorized brigade
221 mtbr	Motorized brigade
9 mar	Mixed artillery regiment
557 maaar	Mixed anti-armor artillery regiment
271 lamr AAD	Light artillery missile regiment AAD
594 engr	Engineering regiment


**X. Structure of 17. VRS (Army of Srpska Republic) Corps**

<b>17. Corps – Tuzla</b>	
<b>General major Sava Janković</b>	
Soldiers	19 316
Volunteers	16 750
UNITS STRUCTURE	
336 mtbr	Motorized brigades
92 mtbr	Motorized brigades
327 mtbr	Motorized brigades
395 mtbr	Motorized brigades
6 partbr	Partisan Brigades
216 mbr	Mountain Brigade
22 partbr	Partisan Brigades
454 maaar	Mixed anti-armor artillery regiment
17 maaar	Mixed anti-armor artillery regiment
17 mar	Mixed artillery regiment
38 aaad	Anti-armor artillery division




XII. Plan of the attack of JNA on BiH and Croatia according to the book of admiral Cokić







## 6. Initial general idea for the aggression against Croatia and Slovenia





**Plan of attack on Croatia after retreat of JNA forces from Slovenia (VII 1991)**





## LEGALLY UNAUTHORISED USE OF ARMED FORCE

### Aggression

#### The attempt to convict and define aggression until the Second World War

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One of the attempts, which have had been done mostly outside the League of Nations, to condemn the aggression and to reach a single definition of aggression is also a known Litvin - Politis Draft of definition of aggression, made within the frame of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Arms in 1933. Namely, an attempt was made to put together, in one document, the acts of state committing the aggression. On February 6th, led by Litvinov, the Soviet delegation has filed the Declaration draft on the definition of the attacker to the General commission, that is the Security committee headed by Politis who has submitted it in a slightly amended form to the General Committee (hence Litvinov – Politis draft). Article 1 of the draft stated that the country which first executed one of the following is to be declared an aggressor:

1. Declaration of war towards another country;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, on the territory of another country;
3. Attack by its land, sea or air military force, even without a declaration of war on the territory, vessels or aircrafts of another State;
4. Naval blockade of coasts or ports of another State;
5. Assistance rendered to the armed gangs which, after formed in its territory, would intrude on the territory of another State, or refusal, despite the demands of the attacked state, to take up on its own territory, all measures that depend on it, to deprive the said gang every assistance and protection . “

The proposal noted that the internal situation in one country, whether of economic, political, military or other nature, cannot justify the country in case of attack.

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The definition of aggression in the order of the United Nations

\*\*\*

The general definition of aggression is determined in Art. 1 of the definition in a way that aggression is considered to be “ the use of a countries armed forces against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another country”, or in any other manner contrary to the UN Charter. In a note to that article the term “Country” refers to the country regardless of its recognition by or membership within the UN , and includes the concept of group of states.

According to Art.2 of the Definition, act of an aggression is considered, prima facie, the first attack against the UN Charter, which is sufficient proof of the act of aggression. However, in addition, it was pointed out that the Security Council “could conclude, pursuant to the Charter, that it would not be justified to mark that as an act of aggression without taking into account the other circumstances, because acts concerned or their consequences, have greater significance.” This means that for minor violations of peace the qualification of aggression can be avoided if the Security Alliance deems that to be justified and in connection with these other measures by that authority will follow.

Art 3. Of the aggression definition, regardless of whether the war is declared or not, lists the various acts (with reservation of art. 2) which constitute the act of aggression:

a)

The invasion or attack on the territory of a country by the armed forces of another country, occupation, even temporary, resulting from such an attack or invasion, annexation of part or a whole of a country as a consequence of the use of force.

It may be noted that the editors of this Article have had taken into account the distinction between military attack and invasion, because the attack can be carried out without an invasion (e.g. an artillery attack across the border or from the air), while the invasion has to be a penetration of aggressor’s troops on the territory of the victim of aggression. Also, occupation as the actual situation is the result of the invasion, which is a prerequisite for the occupation.

b)

The bombing of the territory of a country by the armed forces of another country, or use of any weapons by a country against the territory of another country. According to the interpretation of the Special Committee for the definition of aggression, the phrase “any weapon” refers to both the conventional and the weapons of mass destruction.

c)

The blockade of ports or coasts of a country by the armed forces of another country.

d)

The attack of the armed forces of one country on land, sea or air forces of another country. It is, in fact, an attack that could be done outside the territory of the attacked country. For example, in the free (open) sea, the air space, beyond the national jurisdiction of the attacked state.

e)

Use of armed force by one country on the territory of another country with the consent of the receiving State, contrary to the conditions stipulated in the agreement or any extension of their presence in this territory after the end of the agreement.

f)

The fact that a country allows that its territory, which it made available, the other country uses to carry out acts of aggression against a third country.

Points “e” and “f” art.3. form a legal option, as follows: e) that the act of an aggression is committed by the country which owns the military base or armed forces stationed in another sense from the foreign country territory on which military bases and forces are stationed, and such in two ways. First, if they're used contrary to the agreement concluded by the host country and base owner country, or country to which armed forces belong; this use, contrary to the agreement, may be different, as against the base host country as well as against a third country. And second, an act of aggression is also their presence in the territory beyond the contract period specified in the same agreement. In the case regarding the “e” it is about an aggressive act of the country which owns military bases or armed forces against the host country. According to pt. “F” of that article, in the event that the territory of the host country or the armed forces are used to carry out acts of aggression, the host state itself, besides the state whose armed forces or bases were used, would be in a position to qualify as an aggressor.

g) Deployment by the country or on its behalf of the armed gang or a group of irregular forces or mercenaries against another country for acts of armed force so serious to be equated with these acts, or serious engagement in such action.

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## CONCEPT, SPACE AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE FRONT

### Front

It is a long ago adopted rule in the law of war that military operations are conducted on the territories and open spaces that are under the sovereignty of the warring parties, or under their factual authority, and from which military operations are prepared or performed. Except that, the spaces that are not under the sovereignty of a country (the open sea and air space above it) fall under the front if their status is not regulated by special norms of international law to the exclusion of military operations on them.

\*\*\*

The front is the territory of countries in conflict, as well as other territories that are not under the sovereignty of countries, and can become the frontline in international law, where the preparation take place and military operations are conducted. That territory includes land, sea and air over which it enjoys sovereignty as same as the territories ruled by conflicted parties even though there is no sovereignty of either side over them, neither party to the conflict. So, it is about the conflicted sides' territories, land, air and sea, be it

home territories or non-self-governed territories (colonies), trusted territory, if they are used in military purposes, sometimes warring parties' condominiums and the occupied territories. From the moment of the conflicts outset the designated territories are encompassed by the concept of the front. Beside these a territory of the neutral state where neutral countries in peace time allow the bases of a warring party to be installed can become a front. The territory is usually limited around the base, on a certain area which is under military administration of the country's base.

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### Area of war

Area of war is different from the front. This is an area where war operations are conducted, and is usually referred to as a war zone.

Although legally the front was very wide, in many wars military premises, in fact, included only a few territories. In the Russo-Japanese War, in the year 1905, only Manchuria and Korea were military premises. In the first Balkan War military premise was south of Nis - Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as the sector of Skadar. In the Second World War 53 countries of the world were against the Axis and the front encompassed all of their territory. However, the military premises considered the Eastern Front, part of North Africa, southern and Western Europe and the Balkans and parts of the Far East, while on the territories of many countries that were at war there was no war operations (Americas).

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Gavro Perazić:


International law of war – 2nd updated edition - Belgrade: Military Publishing and News Center, 1986

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Commanders of TO (territorial defense) units in respect to the May 27th, 1992 decision signed by Chairman of the BiH Presidency Alija Izetbegović

Nationality	Number	%
Muslims	43	97,73%
Serbs	1	2,27%
Croats	0	0,00%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>

## Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991



### REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Pursuant to Article 9, related to Article 41 of the legal power Regulation on Armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the meeting held on 27th of May 1992 issues the following

#### DECISION

on the formation of territorial defence units

The following territorial defence units are going to be formed:

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina brigade «Kralj Tomislav». For the commander of the brigade, General Mate Šarlija is appointed.
1. Brigade of the Zenica Territorial Defence (further in text TO),. For the commander of the brigade, Duvak (son of Rasim) Enes is appointed.
11. P.Brigade “Zmaj od Bosne”. For the commander of the brigade, Zejnilagić Enver is appointed.
12. P: Brigade “Hadži Lojo”. For the commander of the brigade, Džaferagić Safet is appointed.
13. Novosarajevska Brigade of the TO. For the commander of the brigade, Šehović Enver is appointed.
14. Brigade Novi Grad Sarajevo. For the commander of the brigade, Zyrapi Bislim is appointed.
- Military police Battalion of Sarajevo region. For the commander of the battalion, Topić Dževad is appointed.
- Escort platoon for the security of the BH Presidency. For the commander of the platoon, Lukovac Haris is appointed.
- TO squad “Husić Eniz”. For the commander of the squad, Bukva Sejdalija is appointed.
- TO squad “Sretno” – Breza. For the commander of the squad, Hodžić Džemal is appointed.
- TO squad “Misoča” – Ilijaš. For the commander of the squad, Rožajac Avdija is appointed.
1. Brigade of the Bihać Krajina. For the commander of the brigade, Butković Sakib is appointed.
- OdTO (territorial Defence squad, further in text OdTO) Velika Kladuša. For the commander of the OdTO, Behrić Sulejman is appointed.

14. OdTO Kladuša – City. For the commander of the OdTO, Bajro Pajazetović is appointed.
15. OdTO Vrnograč. For the commander of the OdTO, Dukić Hasan is appointed.
16. OdTO Mala Kladuša. For the commander of the OdTO, Memić Hasan is appointed.
17. OdTO Bužin. For the commander of the OdTO, Kulauzović Fuad is appointed.
18. OdTO B. Otoka – Jezerski. For the commander of the OdTO, Kahrić Mustafa is appointed.
19. OdTO Bos. Krupa. For the commander of the OdTO, Palić Derviš is appointed.
20. OdTO Pećigrad. For the commander of the OdTO, Osmančević Murat is appointed.
21. OdTO Tržac. For the commander of the OdTO, Bećirević Hazim is appointed.
22. OdTO Ostrožac. For the commander of the OdTO, Pandžić Kasim is appointed.
23. OdTO Cazin – city. For the commander of the OdTO, Dizdarević Munir is appointed.
24. OdTO Čoralići. For the commander of the OdTO, Mizić Muhamed is appointed.
25. OdTO Bihać – centre. For the commander of the OdTO, Salkić Ahmet is appointed.
26. OdTO Bakšić. For the commander of the OdTO, Vuković Fuad is appointed.
27. OdTO Prekounje. For the commander of the OdTO, Toromanović Sead is appointed.
28. OdTO Brekavica. For the commander of the OdTO, Skalić Mesud is appointed.
29. OdTO Vrata. For the commander of the OdTO, Adil Bešić is appointed.
30. 3. Brigade of TO Tuzla. For the commander of the brigade,..... is appointed.
31. 108. Brčko TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Mujkanović Ferid is appointed.
32. 2. TO Tuzla Brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Ljali Džemail is appointed.
33. 1.OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Džambić Muharem is appointed.
  2. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Aziri Ali is appointed.
  3. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Kurspahić Ševal is appointed.
  4. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Mujović Mirsad is appointed.
  5. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Đjordje Marko is appointed.
 Engineer battalion – for the commander of the battalion, Prcić Faruk is appointed.
34. 1. Lukavica TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Salihbašić Dževad is appointed.
35. OdTO Kalesija. For the commander of the squad, the existing commander is appointed.
  5. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Đjordje Marko is appointed.
 Engineer battalion – for the commander of the battalion, Prcić Faruk is appointed.
34. 1. Lukavica TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Salihbašić Dževad is appointed.
35. OdTO Kalesija. For the commander of the squad, the existing commander is appointed.
36. 1. Spreča squad Živinice. For the commander of the squad, 1<sup>st</sup> class Captain Malkić Salih is appointed.
37. OdTO Olovo. For the commander of the squad, Vrbanac Nijaz is appointed.
38. OdTO. Solun. For the commander of the squad, Hasanspahić Akif is appointed.
39. OdTO – Careva Čuprija. For the commander of the squad, Rotić Enver is appointed.

## II

Minister of Defence shall organize the Seniors into the commands, Main Staffs of the above mentioned units and issue close Orders on number of men in compositions as well as the armament of the formed units.

PR number 1170  
27<sup>th</sup> May 1992  
Sarajevo, 27<sup>th</sup> of May 1992

President of the Presidency of the  
Republic of Bosnia and  
Herzegovina  
Alija Izetbegović  
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten/

To Dajdza and Zejnil (reply to 9<sup>th</sup> of June 199 /missing number/ telex)

You have to go together. Zejnil remains commander of his unit, or as long this operation is under way, he should obey Dajdza's orders, therefore Dajdza covers the whole operation. The rest will be regulated when we meet in Sarajevo.

Sarajevo, 10<sup>th</sup> of June, 1992

Alija

Translation of the transcript dated 13<sup>th</sup> October 2009 – witness Dragan Ćurčić in case IT-04-74

D-28a

- 22 Q. [Interpretation] General Curcic, good morning to you once again.  
 23 A. Good morning, General Praljak.  
 24 Q. Now, Kralj Tomislav is a regiment which was established where?  
 25 A. Kralj Tomislav is a regiment founded in Croatia, in Dubrovnik and  
 Page 45949  
 1 then in Vrgorac.  
 2 Q. And you were the Croatian Army?  
 3 A. Correct.  
 4 Q. That particular unit, how many Croats were there in it and how  
 5 many Muslims?  
 6 A. The unit had 60 per cent Croats and about 40 per cent Muslims.  
 7 Q. What percentage of people in that unit was born on the territory  
 8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was citizens of the republic or, rather, the  
 9 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina just like you are?  
 10 A. Over 90 per cent of the members were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 11 Q. Were you a military conscript of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  
 12 A. I was an active military person in Belgrade.  
 13 Q. Very well, we know that. But afterwards, you were a military  
 14 conscript of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  
 15 A. Had I stayed on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would have been.  
 16 Q. Correct. Now, the Prosecutor said the Croatian Army -- you were  
 17 on loan. He used the term "on loan." You said that was a strange term  
 18 to use. But isn't it correct to say that you were on loan from  
 19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, both the Croats and Bosniaks, voluntarily to the  
 20 Croatian Army to defend the south of Croatia? Would that be a more  
 21 correct interpretation?  
 22 A. Yes. We first went to defend Croatia.  
 23 Q. General, Cepikuce, did you take part in the fighting for  
 24 Cepikuce?

25 A. Not me, General, but members of our unit, yes, led by the late

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1 Bozan Simovic.

2 Q. Against whom were you fighting in Cepikuce?

3 A. They fought there against the Serb army, the JNA.

4 Q. General, it doesn't matter whether you were there, personally.  
5 I'm talking about the unit. Now, had Cepikuce been lost at the time,  
6 where would the Serb -- what area would the Serb army have reached and  
7 what axis would it have taken?

8 A. Had Cepikuce fallen, automatically Dubrovnik would have fallen,  
9 and they would have advanced to Split.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, your commander, you say that your commander was  
11 General Daidza; right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What was his full name, his real name?

14 A. We all knew him under the name of Mate Sarlija, nicknamed Daidza,  
15 but his real name was Nijaz Batlak.

16 Q. Was he a Muslim?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, please, after the truce that was signed, as far as Croatia  
19 is concerned, where did you have your training centres?

20 A. We had our training centres in Basko Polje and Vrgorac.

21 Q. That's in Croatia?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Who came from Bosnia-Herzegovina to be trained in your training  
24 centres, to be trained and go back? Were they Croats, Bosniaks? Were  
25 there more Croats than Bosniaks or more Muslims than Croats?

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1 A. The prevailing number was among the Bosniaks. There were more  
2 Bosniaks.

3 Q. What was the name of the logistics man in your unit?

4 A. Kralj Tomislav logistics man was Nikica Raguz -- Nikica Raguz  
5 and Marko Potrebica.

6 Q. As far as you know, how many weapons were sent to Bosnia and  
7 Herzegovina via Kralj Tomislav unit? That's the first question. And how  
8 much of those -- how many of those weapons were sent to the Muslims and  
9 how many to the Croats?

10 A. I wouldn't know that, General. There were large quantities, we  
11 are talking about truckloads here, but most of those weapons went to the  
12 Bosniaks.



13 Q. General, can we agree that Mr. Nijaz Batlak or Mate Sarlija was a  
14 Croatian general, a general of the Croatian Army, and that he provided  
15 weapons in truckloads that were sent to the army -- or, rather, to the  
16 Muslims of the BH Army?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Did Zuka also come for training to you?

19 A. Zuka was in Basko Polje with us for a while.

20 Q. We all know here who Zuka was, so we won't dwell on that any  
21 longer.

22 Now, my next question. Following this, what happened was an  
23 aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina; in other words, the JNA and  
24 the Serbian Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Before we go on to that, could we please have document 3D00420.

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1 3D00420.

2 As you can see, this is a document from the Republic of  
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it relates to a decision on the formation of  
4 Territorial Defence units. And you can see, under 1, that the person who  
5 signed this document, and as we will see, this will -- we will see in a  
6 moment that this was Alija Izetbegovic, well, where we see that he  
7 proclaims Kralj Tomislav unit and General Mate Sarlija as a  
8 Bosnian-Herzegovinian brigade.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, I have a  
10 question from the Chamber. The document is interesting, but was this  
11 mentioned in the cross-examination?

12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the foundation  
13 for the questioning was the status of the brigade Kralj Tomislav or,  
14 rather, the regiment, where we see an order that Mate Sarlija, Daidza, is  
15 the commander, and the basis of that was to show that the  
16 Croatian Army -- that actually it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the  
17 orders of the Croatian Army.

18 But from this document, Your Honours, we can see that  
19 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic considers that brigade to be a brigade of the  
20 Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that he  
21 considers Mate Sarlija, Daidza, a commander of his Army of  
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that he actually appoints him to that  
23 position. In other words, he appoints him as commander.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Laws.

25 MR. LAWS: I may well stand to be corrected, but I don't think I

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1 asked any questions about the Kralj Tomislav Brigade at all at any stage,  
2 and I hope I've been quite patience, watching the transcript going by,  
3 but we haven't been dealing with topics that arose in cross-examination  
4 now for some few minutes.

5 MR. KOVACIC: I don't think that really a response is needed.  
6 The transcript could easily show whether this brigade was discussed or  
7 not.

8 And if I may add, since I'm on my feet, this is a classical  
9 example how documents and which kind of documents should be used on  
10 direct. Mr. Praljak precisely said what was inserted in the cross and  
11 precisely said why this document has to be shown in redirect. This is  
12 more than a clear example.

13 Thank you, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What's sure is that  
15 General Daidza was a topic mentioned by the Prosecutor. It seems that  
16 the real name of Daidza was Mate Sarlija and that we have a document  
17 mentioning him within the army -- the BH Army.

18 Let's move on. Please put your question, General Praljak.

19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

20 Q. My question is very simple. Sir, are you aware -- do you know  
21 that at this time you were, in fact, under the command both of  
22 Alija Izetbegovic and the Croatian Army, as this document shows?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Thank you. At this point, there was a clash in the army, the  
25 conflict broke out; and this brigade, this regiment, Kralj Tomislav, in

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1 view of its composition, crossed over to the territory of  
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to fight for the survival of  
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Is it true that it was split into two: A, Ludvig Pavlovic,  
6 numbering 92 members; and another number of Muslims who went to Konjic to  
7 create what?

8 A. To establish the regiment Nihad Kulenovic.

9 Q. Nihad Kulenovic was part of what?

10 A. Part of the BH Army.

11 Q. Of the original 92 members of the Ludvig Pavlovic Regiment, how  
12 many were Croats and how many Bosniaks?

13 A. I don't know exactly, but the ratio is about 70 to 30 per cent.

14 Q. Thank you. Is it true that these members, too, who had gone to  
15 join the Konjic Regiment, which was part of the BH Army, were they, too,  
16 retained -- or did they, too, retain the status as Croatian soldiers when  
17 their benefits are concerned and their pay?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is it true that the 92 of you also retained that status?

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Stop, General.

21 The Prosecutor showed you a good number of documents earlier. We  
22 spent a lot of time on this. But now I'm discovering that the soldiers  
23 who had left the Republic of Croatia to go to Bosnia-Herzegovina were  
24 split up in two. Some joined your Ludvig Pavlovic unit, and the others  
25 go to Konjic to join a BH Army regiment, the Nihad Kulenovic Brigade.

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1 Now, I'd like to know the following: The soldiers that go to the  
2 BH Army, as far as you know, were they still paid by the Croatian Army?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, even General Daidza,  
4 in his case, he spent more time in Konjic than in Croatia or Herzegovina.  
5 In other words, they retained their rights, just like the 92 of us did.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand you correctly,  
7 General Daidza came to see you and then would go and visit the Muslim  
8 soldiers in the BH Army. He would go from one unit to the other; is that  
9 it?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes. It was only on  
11 the 6th of June that the Ludvig Pavlovic unit was established. Up until  
12 then, we were part of Kralj Tomislav, and I'm talking about 1992.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1993, could you tell us  
14 whether the Muslim soldiers in the BH Army who were stationed in Konjic  
15 were still -- were they still paid by the Croatian Army?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know because  
17 at that time we had lost contact, we were not in contact.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General Curcic, do you recall that you addressed me as well  
21 within the Ministry of the Republic of Croatia relating -- regarding the  
22 status and service-related matters?

23 A. Well, for the most part, we addressed you.

24 Q. Could you tell us -- so --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters request, could the question please

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1 be repeated.

2 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment.

3 General, would you please slow down a bit. A portion of your  
4 question, which is important, did not make it into the transcript. On  
5 page 72, lines 7 to 9, the General said that both sides addressed him,  
6 requesting assistance to resolve the status-related and service-related  
7 issues, and I would really appreciate it if the general could repeat his  
8 question because the transcript is unclear as it stands.

9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I will repeat my question.

10 Q. General, did you address me in the Ministry of the  
11 Republic of Croatia to resolve the status and service-related issues of  
12 the 92 of you?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And also the issues that related to the men who had joined the  
15 regiment in Konjic?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Tell me, would I, perhaps, be the best source to provide an  
18 answer about the date up until when all the members of Kralj Tomislav who  
19 were members of the Croatian Army, regardless of whether later on they  
20 joined the HVO or the BH Army, up until what date they actually enjoyed  
21 the benefits of the Croatian Army?

22 A. I think so. I think that would be you.

23 Q. We saw that Mr. Nijaz Batlak was appointed, and this was his real  
24 name of Mato Sarlija, that he was appointed by Alija Izetbegovic?

25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Do you know that he received his pension, once he retired, from  
2 the Croatian Army and that he was buried at Mirogoj as a member of -- as  
3 a Croatian general?

4 A. Yes, I was at Mirogoj.

5 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we now see 3D00560.  
6 3D00560.

7 Q. Please read this document. I don't know if you have ever seen  
8 the signature of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, but I think you had occasion to  
9 see it in Sarajevo.

10 My question is this: Do you know that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic  
11 trusted, to a large extent, and had intimate cooperation with  
12 General Daidza?

13 A. I never saw them personally together, but Mr. Izetbegovic's  
14 envoys often came to see General Daidza in Vrgorac.

15 Q. Do you know, General, that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic wanted to

16 entrust the operation for the liberation of Sarajevo to General Daidza?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was this operation carried out? And we won't discuss how  
19 successfully.

20 A. Well, it was more an attempt at doing that.

21 Q. Did members of Kralj Tomislav participate in this attempt?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And the last question regarding this: when you were -- when you  
24 crossed over to the HVO, was it voluntary or did you ever receive an  
25 order to that effect?

Page 45958

1 A. Well, the easiest -- that's very easy to answer. We went back  
2 home. It was voluntary.

3 Q. Mr. Curcic, other than Bozan Simovic, your commander, who was  
4 killed in an operation, was there another commander of your battalion who  
5 was killed?

6 A. Yes, Ante Primorac was killed Kupres during an operation to  
7 liberate it.

8 Q. Well, let's clarify that issue. Did you -- let's talk about  
9 Urina Ravan and those events, we were together at that hut. Were we  
10 exposed? Could we have been killed because there was shooting going on  
11 some 30 metres away from us?

12 A. Yes, I remember it.

13 Q. Could you have been killed?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Tell us, is it true that the most important thing then was not  
16 death, itself, but what would happen to the families; in other words, to  
17 your mother, to your father, to your two sisters, what would happen to  
18 them after you get killed?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. So Croatia was already a state. Was it important, very  
21 important, to gain in any way possible a status so that the Croatian Army  
22 would take care of your family and your loved ones if anything should  
23 happen to you?

24 A. That was the most important question.

\*\*\*

Sheikh Abdel Aziz “Barbarossa”, the second participant in the Zagreb meeting of humanitarian workers from the /?BH/ and the TWRA /Third World Relief Agency/, mujahidin from Bosnia and bin Laden’s envoy from The Sudan, remained in Bosnia at least to the end of June 1993. On 21 August 1992, in Travnik, he was in charge of the lining up of the Muslim Forces unit in front of the Madrasah building in Travnik. A video recording of this ceremony shows that the review was attended by the key political and religious leaders of the Bosnian Muslims in the area of Travnik.<sup>51</sup> The internal organising of the BH Army had not yet been completed at the time. The *Muslim Forces* which Sheikh Abdel Aziz had lined up in Travnik were the forerunner of the subsequently formed 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim Brigade. It was only later that these units of the BH Army were split into the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim Brigade, which comprised exclusively local Islamic volunteers and the *El Mudžahedin*, a unit which comprised both foreign and local Islamic volunteers. The 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim Brigade was formed in the autumn of 1992 and the *El Mudžahedin* on 13 August 1993. According to testimonies, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Barbarossa left Bosnia, pretending to be wounded, in the ambulance of a humanitarian organisation.


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Hećimović Esad,  
GARIBES-MUJAHEDINS  
IN BiH 1992-1999,  
Zenica: Fondacija Sina,  
2006.

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<sup>51</sup> Video footage of the ceremony has been used by BH State prosecutor as prosecution evidence in case vs. Abduladhim Maktouf, BH citizen with Iraqi origin who was indicted for a war crime against civilian population on 10th September 2004 – kidnapping of five civilians in Travnik on 18th October 1993



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA      DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES      MILITARY SECRET  
 SARAJEVO      STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential no: 14/75-86  
 Sarajevo, 13 August 1993

Subject: formation of *ELMUDŽAHIDIN* unit  
 in 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps zone of responsibility, order.-      To: 3<sup>rd</sup> CORPS COMMAND

Pursuant to the Decision by the Presidency of the Republic of BH on the organisation of the armed forces of the Republic of BH number 02-011-461/92 of 4 July 1992, and to 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Request Strictly Confidential no. 05/900-90 of 12 August 1993,

## **I HEREBY ORDER**

### I ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES

#### 1 FORMATION

In the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps zone of responsibility FORM the *ELMUDŽAHIDIN* detachment in accordance with a proposed establishment which you are required to submit to this Staff for approval. The newly formed detachment shall be assigned the number T-30030, the military unit (VJ) number shall be 5689, duration of mobilisation shall be 12 hours, and the mobilisation plan shall be conducted by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Command.

### II MOBILISATION PREPARATIONS

Recruit the *ELMUHADŽIDIN* detachment from the personnel, i.e. the foreign nationals – volunteers, who are in the territory of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps z/o / zone of responsibility/. These personnel shall bring with them the weapons and other MS /material supplies/ they have currently been issued.

/handwritten: OS <sup>1</sup>ŠVK<sup>2</sup> CV<sup>3</sup> - KZP<sup>4</sup>  
 sent to 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps  
 14 August 1993 at 1639 hours  
 /a signature//

### III LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

<sup>1</sup> OS - Armed Forces  
<sup>2</sup> ŠVK - Supreme Command Staff  
<sup>3</sup> CV - Communications Centre  
<sup>4</sup> KZP - cryptographic data protection

1. Logistical support of the RJ /wartime unit/ in item I/1 of this Order with all combat and non-combat requirements shall be conducted by drawing upon the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Logistics base.
2. Financial support for the RJ in item I/1 shall be conducted by a letter of credit with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps financial organ.

### IV FINAL PROVISIONS

1. Commence execution of the tasks in this order IMMEDIATELY, and complete them by no later than 31 August 1993.
2. Enter the newly formed unit into the Army of the Republic of BH Schedule of the Basic Mobilisation Plan, 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Section.
3. Appoint officers to establishment posts in accordance with the regulations in force.
4. Enter the order in the list of mobilisation documents.
5. Submit a written report on the implementation of this order to this Staff no later than 5 September 1993.

NF/MA

COMMANDER  
 OS SUPREME COMMAND STAFF  
 Rasim DELIĆ  
 /signed and stamped/

To:

- 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Command  
 - files

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 3<sup>rd</sup> corps command  
 No: 01/2474-1  
 Date: 28<sup>th</sup> of August 1993

/01/  
 29<sup>th</sup> of /illegible/ 1993  
 /signed/

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/POORLY LEGIBLE STAMP/  
 01/780-1  
 29<sup>th</sup> of August 1993

Order to resubordinate units, to be submitted

Attn: command of the OG "Bos. Posavina"  
 Command of the 306<sup>th</sup> brigade  
 Independent squad "El Mudžahid"


Pursuant to indicated need and in order to maximize the RTK /abbreviation unknown/ to units for carrying out combat activities, herewith I

#### ORDER

1. The unit, independent squad "El Mudžahid" with entire manpower and MTS /material technical resources/ is to be resubordinated to 306<sup>th</sup> brigade for carrying out combat activities.
2. The commander of the 306<sup>th</sup> brigade and the commander of "El Mudžahid" unit are responsible for the joint preparation and for planning further combat activities.
3. The deadline for execution of this Order is; immediately.

Commander  
 Enver Hadžihasanović  
 /signed and stamped/





\*\*\*

He has always repeated the following words, showing satisfaction about his involvement in the mentioned attack: «Thank you, Allah Jalla Shanuhu, for enabling me to kill your enemies by your own hand. It is a great honour and pleasure for me»



## Esad Hećimović: Garibes – Mujahedin in BiH 1992 – 1999

D-29/6

### Esad Hećimović GARIBES Mujahedin in BiH 1992 – 1999




Military commander of 7th Muslim brigade General Halil Brzina and leaders of "El Mudžahida" Abu Maali and Sheikh Enver Šaban, together with Halid Čengiđ and other SDA (Democratic action Party) politicians listening to Alija Izetbegović in September 1995 in Vozuća by Zavidovići.



Sheikh Enver Šaban, religious leader of the Unit; Alija Izetbegović Chairman of the BiH Republic Presidency; Abu Maali, military commander of the Unit and Sakib Muhmuljin, Commander of the 3rd Corps of BiH Army; photos taken in September 1995 in Vozuća by Zavidovići.



Abu Hamza Al Misri, leader of the Ensarija Sheriat from London and veteran of wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina



Murder of Petrica Bilić on June 12ve 1998. Kalibunar close to Travnik

Trace of steel balls: photo shows entry holes on the outer side of the passenger vehicle's floor in which police officer Perica Bilić was killed



Murder of Luka and Pero Jezerić in their family home in village Nule close to Travnik, August 30th, 1997



Bismilla-hirah-ma-nirrahim  
/In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most Merciful/

Muslim brethren, the time has come to finally liberate our homeland. Like 500 years ago, the Muslim Corps will rule over its historic areas. We have had enough of injustice, both from the *krst* /cross – Orthodox use/ and from the *križ* /cross – Catholic use/. Our holy mission is to liberate Mostar and Stolac. Sarajevo, Zvornik, Goražde, Banja Luka, Doboj, Foča, Nevesinje, Trebinje and other towns throughout our proud Bosnia will once again embark upon the path of Islam. Let everyone be aware that Muslims die with the name of Allah on their lips and for the glory of their faith.

WE WERE NEVER STRONGER. MUSLIMS OF THE WORLD ARE WITH US.

We will take our part of the Adriatic coast. Ploče will be the first Bosnian port and Neum will be the new Constantinople.

THIS WILL BE OUR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
/a map/



/Fax marks/ July 00 1000 14:04 headquarters SDA Sarajevo      fax: 071 510007  
page 1

Party of democratic action  
Sarajevo  
Maršala Tita street no. 7-a/IV

/stamp/  
SDA  
Party of democratic action Sarajevo  
NO: 1258/91  
Date: 8<sup>th</sup> of July 1991

List of candidates for training of specialists in MUP of the Republic of Croatia

Dr. Brajko Brnčić

/round stamp of SDA/

Secretary of the SDA  
/signed/

Sarajevo, 8<sup>th</sup> of July 1991

Party of democratic action  
Sarajevo  
Maršala Tita street no. 7-a/IV

List of candidates for training of specialists in MUP of the Republic of Croatia

/list of people with their names, surnames, father's name, date of birth and addresses/  
starting from number one and concluded with number 463/

SOFIĆ (SAFETA) NAIM	born 19.12.1962., St. Partizanska Fojnica 139
1. Mukoča (Ibrahima) Samir	21.05.1969., Pločari Polje Fojnica
2. Mukoča (Alije) Halid	21.05.1962., Pločari Polje Fojnica
3. Omerčević (Refika) Amir	18.09.1964., Ragole 25, Fojnica
4. Bukvić (Adema) Samir	07.02.1969., Pločari Polje nn, Fojnica
5. Tulumović (Ibre) Maid	08.01.1969., Sčitovo Polje nn, Fojnica
6. Mešić (Fadila) Mustafa	20.03.1963., Rike Vrička 35, Fojnica
7. Huzbašić (Mustafe) Ibrahim	23.05.1969., Pridola nn, Fojnica
8. Fejzić (Avde) Munib	16.09.1968., Dusina nn, Fojnica
9. Kurta (Alije) Muradif	01.01.1969., Ostružnica 34, Fojnica
10. Nuhanović (Alije) Haris	20.12.1969., Sčitovo Polje nn, Fojnica
11. Bigdanić (Ibre) Rusmir	09.09.1963., Alanporka 38, Fojnica
12. Pašić (Behazije) Refik	16.06.1969., Pridola nn, Fojnica
13. Ramić (ibrahima) Zihinja	28.04.1969., Cemernica, Fojnica
14. Durić (Avde) Latif	20.11.1971., Rijeka 24, Fojnica
15. Mujin Nijaz	03.08.1970., Kozica nn, Fojnica
16. Čehajić (Esada) Suad	1970., Orodjac, Visoko
17. Genjac (Sulejmana) Zihinja	1963., Podrinje, Visoko
18. Spahić (Ibrahima) Fuad	1964., Podvinjci, Visoko
19. Imamović (Čamila) Ibrahim	1967., H. Muzaferija 8, Visoko
20. Javorovac (Hilme) Sele	1966., Selo Čitluk, Visoko
21. Sehić (Avde) Selver	1963., Selo Kološići, Visoko
22. Bašić (Nusreta) Dženan	1970., Selo Srhinje, Visoko
23. Džafić (Muhameda) Sead	1968., Selo Ginje, Visoko
24. Mahmut Spahić (Huseina) Hasan	1967., Selo D. Seoča, Visoko
25. Bučuk (Ismeta) Izet	1965., Selo M. Trnovci, Visoko
26. Huseljić (Halida) Adem	1971., Selo Tušnjici, Visoko
27. Šaljić (Derviša) Dževad	01.01.1971., St. Sulje Jahića 59, Sar
28. Bašović (Islama) Behudin	25.09.1963., St. Izeta Čamore 100, Ilidža
29. Bašović (Islama) Fahrudin	28.10.1974., St. Izeta Čamore 100, Ilidža
30. Bašović (Islama) Džemko	14.01.1967., St. Izeta Čamore 100, Ilidža

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456. Hukić Safet	1971., Bijelašnička 124, Ilidža
457. Hukić Sulejman	1968., Bijelašnička 124, Ilidža
458. Kasapović Mevsudin	1969., Barska 30L, Ilidža
459. Mrakoviović Šahim	1959., Sl. Suha, Živinice
460. Huseinović Ibrahim	1965., Sl. Zelenika, Živinice
461. Zukić Fuad	1963., Sl. Bašigovci, Živinice
462. Dedić Fahudin	1968., G. Dubrane, Živinice
463. Bešić Ševal	1969., Gračanica-Živinice

Concluded with ordinal number 463; you shall receive the resumption to this list in 7 days

Rasim Muharemović

SDA Sarajevo /round stamp/

/coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE  
 DEPARTMENT FOR COOPERATION  
 WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS  
 Zagreb, Mesnička 23  
 Phone; (01) 63 03 044  
 Fax; (01) 63 03 862

Class: 018-04/06-909  
 Number: 514-09-01-06-892  
 Zagreb, 9<sup>th</sup> of June, 2006

Subject: Mr. Slobodan Praljak, Accused before the ICTY  
 - information delivery

Dear Mr. Kovačić,

Related to General Praljak's Defence letter, dated 20th of May 2006, regarding the participation of persons in compositions of ZNG (National Guard), HV (Croatian Army) and MUP RH (Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia), born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we inform you as follows:

1. In the MUP RH, till 15th of January 1992, there were 2246 members, born in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. 320 members of MUP RH, born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, participated in defence of Dubrovnik; nine of them got killed at Dubrovnik battle field.

We also inform you that we are still in expectation of further notifications, as requested by the above said Defence letter.

Sincerely yours  
 MT

Assistant of Minister  
 mr.sc. Jakša Muljačić  
 /signed/

**LIST OF SPECIAL UNIT POLICEMEN COMPOSED FROM  
EX-ATTENDANTS OF THE VI. CLASS COURSE WHO FILED A  
REQUEST FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT**

1. MUHAREMOVIĆ SENAD
2. POCRNJA JOSIP
3. PURIVATRA MUJO
4. KOŠAK ZORAN
5. ZIRDUM ZDRAVKO
6. ĐAKOVIĆ STJEPAN
7. GAVRAN DAMIR
8. VIDOVIĆ PEŠO
9. ALIBEGIĆ IBRO
10. ĐAKOVIĆ IVICA
11. VIDOVIĆ BRANKO
12. JAJČEVIĆ ANTO
13. JAKOVLJEVIĆ MARKO
14. ĐAKOVIĆ BLAŽAN
15. DUJMIĆ IVAN
16. KAREŠIK NUSRED
17. KASALO IVICA
18. HNJKAŠ GORAN
19. TRUMIĆ MIRALEM
20. KOLČAKOVIĆ RAMIZ
21. RASPUDIĆ VLADO
22. RAJIĆ MILENKO
23. BABIĆ ANĐELKO
24. SULJIĆ MIRZO
25. TALETOVIĆ ZIJAD
26. SALKIĆ RUSMIR
27. BEDROVIĆ HASAN
28. ZEKO HRVOJE
29. ŠUVAKIĆ HUSEIN
30. HAJDAREVIĆ KIRAM
31. MIJATOVIĆ MATO
32. MAHMUTOVIĆ ADEM
33. VUK PILE
34. JANIĆ MUJO
35. ŠEKLJA IVAN
36. OKIĆ SAKIB
37. HALILOVIĆ NEVZES
38. NUKIĆ MEHMED
39. MEŠAH AHMET
40. KOŠIĆ RIFET
41. IŠERIĆ NIJAZ
42. DELIĆ EKREM

/illegible/ Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
 /illegible/, Trg Djure Pucara bb  
 /illegible/ 212-983 TEL. 213-508  
 20th, 1992

Sarajevo, April

Confidential!

REPUBLIC CROATIA  
 Ministry of National Defense  
 Mr. Gojko Šušak, Minister  
 ZAGREB  
 Croatia

Dear Mr. Šušak,

As you are aware, Presidency and the Government of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have reached the decision<sup>1</sup> that all individual and other armed groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina are to be placed under unitary command of competent republic authority. Most of the armed individuals and groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina municipalities have accepted this decision. However, the decision was not accepted by so called JNA (Yugoslav National Army) and armed formations under control of Serbian Democratic Party. Ministry of nation defense and Headquarter of Territorial defense of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also faced with rejection of the above mentioned decision reached by the Presidency and the Government by certain number of armed formations of bosnia-herzegovinian Croats. These formations are by international military agents together with institutions from the rest of Yugoslavia, Serbia and so called JNA defined as „aggression of Republic of Croatia against Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina“. This statement is usually justified with refusal of armed formations on the territory of western Herzegovina to submit under the system of Territorial defense of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina and to adopt Republican emblems . Your personal connection and that of other responsible people from Croatian armed forces with individuals within stated formations is also motioned. This carries incalculable harm to our efforts to consolidate Republican defense forces, and is very useful for propaganda purposes of aggressors against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In accordance with this, I urge you to expediently request that all armed activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are put within the system of Territorial defense of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that you and all other officials in Republic Croatian dissociate yourself from all military-political operations which are not in line with national status and best interest of Bosnia and Herzegovina; to order all Croatian military officials to urgently disassociate themselves from all decisions regarding connection and cooperation with armed formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are not in accordance with the decisions of the Presidency, Government and Ministry of national defense of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Your commitment to an effective response to this call will be an important contribution to our struggle for freedom and a stable democratic Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Please notify me immediately in writing about measures requested in this letter.  
 With best wishes,

Minister of National Defense  
 /illegible/ of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 /illegible/ Doko  
 /signed and stamped/

CC:

- Mr. Franjo Tuđman  
 President of the Republic Croatia
- Mr. Franjo Gregurić  
 Prime minister of the Republic Croatia
- Mr. Anton Tus, Chief of  
 Military Headquarters

<sup>1</sup> Decision for consolidate all armed forces on territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated 9.4.1992. (no. 01-011-306/92)

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
ZAGREB  
Zagreb, April 20th 1992.

HERZEGOVINA

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND

Ministry of national defense  
Trg Dj. Pucara bb - SARAJEVO

Dear Mr. Minister,

Today I received your faxed letter dated April 20th, 1992. Since it was not sent through official channels, common among sovereign states, I presume it is of personal character, and therefore my response will be of such nature.

I must admit that the tone and the content of your letter is very surprising and suggests that some parts are not the result of your deliberation, but are indeed pressure of those who want to subdue and destroy freedom and spirit of Croatian people in BiH

As you are aware, Croatian Parliament has with the conclusion dated March, 27th 1992 expressed its support for territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and democratically expressed will of its citizens on referendum from February, 29th and March, 1st 1992 that Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be constituted as independent sovereign state, and as such to be internationally recognized. It also supports the efforts that internal relations in BiH are resolved in a peaceful manner through negotiations of three sovereign national communities, within the Peace Conference in Brussels.

With the same conclusion Parliament has requested from Government and President of Croatia, to recognize BiH as independent sovereign state as soon as possible.

In accordance with stated conclusions, and on government proposal, President of the Republic has in the name of Croatian Republic recognized BiH on April 7th, 1992.

From the above acts of Parliament and President of the Republic of Croatia, Republic Croatia's attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina is visible, and it is clear that there are no units of armed forces on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In case of aggression against BiH, certain number of people, originating from this republic, has requested demobilization, in order to participate in defense of their native soil. Croatian Republic has accepted these requests, because we have no moral right to prevent these people from defending their homes.



Also Republic of Croatia supported and will continue to support humanitarian aid for BiH which includes accepting all refugees from this Republic, regardless of nationality.

It is evident therefore that there is no question of "Croatian aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina" so we don't understand your acceptance of insinuations from factors which you mentioned (the rest of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and so called JNA) who do everything to destroy the independence and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Unfortunately, it must be noted that during the war in Croatia, from the territory of BiH there were active participation and attacks on the Republic of Croatia, while from Croatian territory Bosnia has never been attached and therefore claims from your letter are even more suppressing.

In your letter you however suggest that I am personally against the BiH sovereignty, which I reject with indignation. At the contrary, I fully accept decision from the Republic of Croatia regarding recognition of BiH, as sovereign independent state and I am not doing nor will I do anything in the future which would jeopardize its independence.

In accordance with my commitment, it is not for me to intervene in internal matters of one to me personally close and dear state, and I also can not influence the decisions of local Croats and how they will organize themselves, which you almost ultimately request of me.

Indeed it seems natural that you, a member of the Croatian people, politically by birth, the offspring of those people who out of necessity started to organize themselves, and given the high duty you perform in BiH, are the first called to synchronize the organization of defense in accordance with your needs, aptitude and means.

I wish you a lot of success, and I send you my best regards, and friendly BiH I wish a lot of luck in these grave times.

Yours,

MINSTER OF DEFENSE

Gojko Šušak

The Presidency and Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the "Decision on unification of all armed forces in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (April 9th, 1992) with the aim of all armed groups in the country brought under a unified command of the relevant government authority or TO (Territorial defense) Headquarters of BiH.

HVO, in principle, agrees with this decision, but insists on the respect for international and internal circumstances regarding its implementation.

Internally HVO is a form of self-organization of the Croatian and Muslim population in the territory of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities, as a form of defense against aggression and genocide that is carried out by the so-called Chetnik formations supported by JNA against Croats and Muslims.

HVO is organized as the only possible response to terrorism, massacres, expulsion (over 130,000 people), burned and destroyed villages (Ravno, Zlo sela, Kupres); HVO defends Croats, Muslims and other citizens on the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities.

HVO is committed to peaceful coexistence of all residents in the area and did not attack or take any conquest actions. HVO protect the entire population of HZOH B (Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities) regardless of their nationality and religion, the evidence of which is the fact that no one has fled from this area under duress.

With all of its activity HVO proves that it supports an independent and sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of three sovereign nations.

The European Community and many other countries have recognized the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state of three sovereign nations. What's more, at a conference in Brussels it was agreed that the sovereign people of BiH have their own governments and defense forces.

Bearing in mind the causes which led to the formation of the HVO, and respecting the international agreements on the structure of BiH, it is completely unacceptable to abolish HVO and to completely merge it within TO; This is contrary to the interests of the Croatian people and the agreement on Bosnia as a state of three sovereign nations.

From all this it follows that the formation of the HVO is legitimate form of territorial defense of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities, and only as such formation under the command of General Headquarters of the HVO, can they enter into the composition of the defense forces of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. On these principles, we suggest further agreements on consolidation and organization of defense of our common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
 MAIN STAFF OF HV (Croatian Army)

URGENT  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Class: 8/92-01/23  
 No: 5120-03-92-8  
 Zagreb, 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1992

OZ SPLIT (Operative zone)

Re: your act, class 81/92-02/56, no: 1080-01-92-1 dated 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1992

The formation systems of the Croatian Army are not valid outside of the territory of the Republic of Croatia. The departure of volunteers, organized in adequate units, is granted. The men cannot carry the HV insignias or any other documents. Providing all kind of material help is allowed, as well as the expert help in defence organization and other kinds of resistance. The arrival of men from other Croatian Army compositions, therefore the said ones should be collected in the rayon of Imotski and engaged according to the plan of the operative group.

Deputy of the Head of  
 The Main Staff of HV for the  
 Combat sector  
 General-major  
 Petar Stipetić  
 /signed and stamped/

CODED

/stamp of receipt/  
 Received on 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1992 at 16:10 hours /signed/  
 523(number of telegram) 200(number of group)pp (urgency) 31(processing)  
 Submitted on 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1992 at 16:40 hours /signed/

Republic of Croatia  
Ministry of defence  
General Headquarters HV

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
ENCRYPTED

Class: 8/92-01/23  
Office registry no: 5120-03-92-9  
Zagreb, 9 April 1992

OZ Rijeka  
Attn: commander

The request of the Chief inspector of the defence, General Martin Špegelj, for sending a part of the soldiers and officers of OZ Rijeka, mainly Croats and Muslims ready to voluntarily go to BiH to help the struggle of the people of BiH, has been accepted by the top ranking military authorities.

The General Headquarters of Croatian Army concurs and supports this idea, with a suggestion that this group, for a start, numbers 300 – 400 soldiers and officers.

They are to be sent under the command of major Porobić Mustafa and other officers, with different military equipment, weaponry and ammunition.

All who go retain all the rights of HV soldiers, including monthly salaries. They cannot wear HV insignia on their uniforms, nor can they hold other documents used by members of HV.

The task is an urgent one, and the execution of it is to be commenced immediately. Should the situation develop favourably, sending of other groups, ie reinforcement of this one, is not to be excluded.

Enclosure:

The request of the Chief inspector of the defence

Deputy Chief of Staff of  
General HQ of HV for combat sector  
Major General Petar Stipetić

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
/handwritten:/ 32  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
HV MAIN HEADQUARTERS

Class: 8/92-01/23  
Ref. no: 5120-03-92-19/1  
Zagreb, May 18th, 1992

Command  
153.no. „R“ HV  
OZ(Operation zone)

Zagreb

Based on the letter from Command of 153. Brigade „R“ HV (Croatian Army), ref. no: 84-01/92-047; V. Buna dated 17. May 1992, OZ Zagreb we agree that officers from 153. Brigade „R“ HV:

1. Damir Goršeta
2. Miroslav Drljača
3. Slavko Lencur
4. Anderja Kraljević-Mišić
5. Tvrtko Mišić

as volunteers go for unspecified time to Livno.

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF  
HV MAIN HEADQUARTERS  
General-major  
Petar Stipetić  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
SARAJEVO

Number:  
Sarajevo, 02.06.1992.  
041/451-226

Fax:

Mister General Stipetić,

Citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina residing in the Republic of Croatia informed us that the organization for the formation of units which will join the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is under way.

In this regard, we ask for help about accepting them in the military barracks "Borongaj" in Zagreb (about 300 people from Rijeka, 300 people from Ljubljana and about 5500 people from Germany). These people should at the barracks "Borongaj" until Saturday (06/06/1992) gather, dress-up and get ready to leave for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

People who already gathered in Zagreb are expressing the requirement for staffing of the unit. Unable to shift people from Sarajevo to Zagreb, we politely ask you, if you are able, to staff the unit with 10 officers, preferably with those who were born in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (because of the knowledge of the territory).

Thank you for your cooperation

MINISTER  
Jerko Doko, dipl. Eoc  
/signed and stamped/

/LOGO/

CROATIAN HERZEGOVINIAN COMMUNITY „HERCEG STJEPAN“

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ZAGREB, BOGOVIĆEVA 2  
ACCOUNT NO: 30105-678-82752  
TEL: 425-485  
TEL/FAX: 432-280

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
Attn: Mrs. Zloić Dunja  
/handwritten/ FAX: 432-415

Subject: Request for acceptance of certain number of people to HVO

We hereby inform you that during yesterday around 150 people from abroad arrived to Zagreb. They originate from Kotor Varoš (Bosnia). They wish the organization of training, procurement of necessary equipment, and to be included in the units of the HVO.

Please, meet their requirements as much as possible. We also inform you that the arrival of 100 more people is expected.

We suggest that “Herceg Stjepan” provides the transportation, and with your warrant HVO provides the training. We also suggest that the equipment is procured from the Ministry of Defense, because they have none.

We would also like to request names of persons who would help in the implementation of this complex assignment, as well as the requested information.

Best regards,

Zagreb, 17.06.1992

HHZ “Herceg Stjepan”  
President, Kamilo Čuvalo  
/signed and stamped/

Fax header: 24 June 1992      0125 hours      041 451 511      Republic of →  
Croatia      GS001/001

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

S A R A J E V O

Number: 01-389/92  
Sarajevo, 23 June 1992

To: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
ZAGREB

We hereby inform you that today, 110 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were sent from Kumanovo to Zagreb, departing at 1900 hours on 23 June 1992, under the organisation of the Macedonian Red Cross. Considering that a state of war has been declared in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we hereby ask you to equip these citizens of ours in an appropriate way and help them join the Territorial Defence units of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MINISTER  
Jerko DOKO

---

/coat of arms/  
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
41 000 ZAGREB

/handwritten enclosure no 1/

7 July 1992

INSTRUCTION OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TO  
ALL COMMANDS OF THE CROATIAN ARMY

Directing or usage of the Croatian Army is not allowed to any commander outside the Croatian borders. All those who do so, without the explicit order from the Supreme Commander, shall bear the consequences for their actions. If the volunteers from the Croatian troops, originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina, wish to go to the battlefield and defend their homes, the commanders are not allowed to stop them within these intentions.

Minister of Defense

Gojko Šušak  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL  
MUNICIPAL STAFF MOSTAR

Ref. No. 01-286/1099/92  
Mostar, 21 August 1992

MILITARY SECRET  
strictly confidential

**ORDER**

Officers and soldiers of the Croatian army (currently engaged in the HVO Mostar) are to report to the Municipal HVO Staff Mostar in order to return equipment, weapons, radio communication and other Material and technical Equipment they were issued by the HVO Mostar and in order to be sent to their original units in the HV.

NOTE:

Issuance of all external documents for /Illegible/ from the HV is prohibited.

The order is to be carried out by 23 August 1992.

COMMANDER  
Brigadier:  
/Signature/  
(Miljenko Lasić)

cc:

- commanders of all units
- archive

/Seal/

/Seal/



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
IPD MANAGEMENT

/handwritten annex 2/

CLASS: 804-04/92-02  
NUMBER: 5120-25-92-593/B  
ZAGREB, 31 AUGUST 1992

Command of the operative zone /OZ/ OSIJEK  
Command of the operative zone BJELOVAR

Subject: Instructions for operations of the commands of the Croatian Army /HV/ troops and the military-judicial bodies

Regarding your query on implementation of the criminal responsibility of the HV combatants on disobedience of the order execution, class: 035-01/92-01/01, number: 1076-01-92.37, dated 22 August 1992, we submit you our opinion (instructions) on operation of the military-judicial bodies and the commands of the HV troops. We are in accordance with your estimation that the Republic of Croatia has got every interests in Bosnian Posavina, as temporally, so in the future.

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia is aware of the fact that you have got many problems regarding the departures of HV troops to the Bosnian Posavina. Other operative zones encounter the similar problems.

Understanding the fact that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a foreign state as a starting point, being confirmed by the Minister of Defence through the public statement related to HV, we recommend you to avoid the repressive measures.

At the same time, it is necessary to continuously emphasize that the Republic of Croatia and its suzerainty is also being defended in Bosnia and Herzegovina zones, populated by the Croats that should be protected from the Chetnick genocide in the same manner they defended the Republic of Croatia.

Try to solve the above cited problems in ways that wouldn't lead to a misunderstanding. Having in consideration the soldiers resistance to leave to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as the Bosnian Posavina is concerned, we advise you to send the volunteers or to discuss the issue within the troops by conducting a survey among soldiers and research who is willing to go to Bosnian Posavina under the conditions of a contract. The contract could solve all status issues of a soldier. The contract could be signed by the soldiers at 3 or 6 months period, within which they would have a status of a professional soldier. Regarding this matter, it is most urgent to regulate it by decision of the personnel department.

Assistant of Minister of Defence  
General Major  
Slobodan Praljak

Submitted to:  
- Minister of Defence  
Mr. Gojko Šušak

/stamp of receipt mostly illegible  
recorded  
handed over/

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

**MOSTAR MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS**

3rd HVO BRIGADE  
Conf. number: 02-01-11/92  
Mostar, 9 December 1992

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL

In regards to the strictly confidential order concerning south-eastern Herzegovina Operative Zone no. 01-286/1514 of 27 November 1992 regarding various insignia and symbols on HVO unit uniforms worn as opposed to the symbols stipulated by the Decree on Herceg-Bosna Armed Forces which, as such, compromise the reputation of HVO and HV members by implying ideas which the world media may interpret as fascistic, I hereby

**O R D E R**

1. Commanders of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna HVO to ensure that unit members wear only HVO insignia and remove all other emblems.
2. commanders to point out to the individuals that wearing such emblems compromises the reputation of the HVO in the world.
3. Wearing HVO insignia is linked to accusations against the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna regarding a direct deployment of HV units in the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. Ask HV members (with explanation) to wear HVO insignia during their deployment in our area.
4. that the Brigade Command make a special effort to ensure HVO emblems in sufficient quantity. However, should there be a shortage of emblems, members may wear uniforms without any insignia.
5. /missing/
6. that only unit commanders make contact with UNPROFOR and EC members and provide information following the approval by the HVO Main Headquarters of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

Battalion and independent company commanders shall be responsible to me for implementation of this order.

**COPIES TO:**

- 6th Široki Brijeg Battalion
- Tihomir MIŠIĆ 4th Battalion
- 9th Battalion
- 8th Battalion
- 7th Battalion
- Buna Independent Company
- MTD /Motorised Division/
- Engineering Company
- Logistics Company
- Security Service
- Files

**COMMANDER OF THE  
3RD HVO BRIGADE**

Mr. Ivan PRIMORAC  
/signed/

/stamp: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,  
Mostar, 3rd Brigade, Defence Office/



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ZAGREB

/handwritten:/ Meeting OK 94

2 December 1992 →

→ Vera BABIĆ

→ from the MUP: Chief of Legal  
Department – Anđel MILOŠ

Chief of Personnel – Boris PINTA

Meeting chaired by: Josip LUCIĆ

Zagreb, 21 November 1992

To the  
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER  
Chief of Staff  
Prof. Dunja ZLOIĆ

Dear Miss ZLOIĆ,

As regards your letter PRO-334, which you sent to me for a decision, and which is a letter from the Ministry of Labour, Social Welfare and Family proposing bringing the status of HVO soldiers employed in the RH /Republic of Croatia/ into line with that of members of the Croatian Army, I consider all rights and obligations between two internationally recognised countries to be settled at the level of the two Ministries. With this in mind, I request the Office of the Minister to organise a meeting of the two Ministries, i.e. to set a date and the subject of the meeting.

Following the issue of instructions or passing of enactments, the Personnel Department shall act with full responsibility.

Sincerely,

ASSISTANT MINISTER  
Major General  
Josip LUCIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten:/

OK

/a signature/



**REPUBLIC OF CROATIA**  
**Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare**

Class: 110-03/92/01.798  
Number: 524-02-92-2  
Zagreb, 28 October 1992

**✓REPUBLIC OF CROATIA**  
**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**  
Minister, Mr Gojko ŠUŠAK, personally

**SUBJECT:** Request by the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna regarding the status under employment law of employees from Bosnia and Herzegovina employed in the Republic of Croatia

Dear Minister,

In connection with the request in the marked case regarding the status under employment law of employees employed in the Republic of Croatia, who are fighting in HVO units of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, and as agreed with Major-General Josip LUCIĆ, please be informed of the following:

We believe that in order to protect the status of the named employees under employment law, it is necessary to ensure that the status of these people is identical to that of Croatian citizens mobilised into the units of the Croatian Army, which is something that falls under the ambit of the Law on Defence, rather than employment law.

An identical status to the status of members of the Croatian Army implies maintaining the status under employment law, the right to be paid a salary, obligatory insurance, etc. Furthermore, it implies the right of economic and other entities to request retroactive reimbursements in accordance with the Law on Defence.

As regards the status of HVO members employed in the Republic of Croatia, this Ministry has advised all involved to authorise unpaid leave to such employees, which results in a deferral of the rights derived from labour and based on labour, including a guaranteed return to work on condition that a relevant certificate of HVO membership is provided. We are of the opinion that, according to employment law, it was not possible to impose a reimbursement duty on employers without ensuring their right to recourse, and hoped that this matter would, among others, be settled by way of an agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For the marked case we see the following solution:

- Equalise the status of employees employed in the Republic of Croatia and members of HVO units with the status of Croatian Army members either by changing the Law on Defence or by means of an instruction, or a compulsory non-instruction in this sense, from the Ministry of Defence and thus extend the scope of the Law on Defence, at least to a degree, to include those employees. This would automatically extend the scope of the provisions of employment law regulations to these employees, especially those regulations relating to the rights deriving from labour and based on labour, in particular reimbursements and related to that the continuity of retirement and disability insurance.

We look forward, honourable Minister, to hear your views on the matter and remain at your disposal.

Yours sincerely,

ASSISTANT MINISTER  
Vera BABIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

This is a true transcript/copy  
of the original document.

Zagreb, 12 May, 2005

Certified by:  
/initialled and stamped/



CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

**MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF**

Number: 01-482/92

Mostar, 17 June 1992

TACTICAL GROUP

/handwritten: VI/044

17 June 1992/

Pursuant to the order of the OZ /operations zone/ Zagreb command, number 1075-07/92-1309 dated 8 April 1992

**CERTIFICATE**

Free passage through the territory of the Republic of BH and Croatia on the route Drežnica-Mostar-Zagreb is approved for the following persons reporting to the reconnaissance company command in Zagreb. They are departing on 17 June 1992 and returning on 25 June 1992.

List of persons

- Žarko VALENTIĆ, group commander
- Amir LJUTIĆ
- Franjo GRČIĆ
- Zoran VRABEC

Vehicle: Citroen C-25 D, number plates ZG 542-010, with Amir LJUTIĆ as the driver.

These persons have been supplied with personal weapons, and the equipment specification can be found in the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Command of the Mostar Municipal Staff.

Mr. Žarko VALENTIĆ is responsible for both personnel and equipment. Under his command, all persons on the above list must carry out his orders.

Due to the well-known aggression on the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and BH, all HV /Croatian Army/ units, civilians and MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ organs are required to ensure that the above have free passage on the Drežnica-Mostar-Split-Rijeka-Zagreb route.

All personnel, equipment and vehicles under the command of Žarko VALENTIĆ have priority in traffic and movement and when boarding ferries.

Typed to:

- Mr. Željko VALENTIĆ
- a/a /archives/

/handwritten: for/ COMMANDER  
Major  
/a signature/

/stamped/ Jasmin JAGANJAC

/coat of arms/ Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna  
Croatian Defence Council

Mostar Municipal Staff  
Number 01-606/92  
Mostar, 23 June 1992

/handwritten: 06-054  
23 June 1992/

Request RH /Republic of Croatia/ MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
To Major General Slobodan PRALJAK

Having learned from our success in the wartime enveloping attack on the Ravni-Otole` village- Seli{te village- Zelenika village-Humi village-Li{ani axis and the cutting off of the Potoci village-Zijemlje road which was used by the Chetniks to withdraw, as well as the completely successful liberation of the Bijelo Polje-Salakovac area, and in order to plan further actions against the enemy on the north-eastern axis, we would like to ask you to:

1. Obtain from the Commander of the *Marijan Celjak* 161<sup>st</sup> Brigade from Sisak, Colonel Vjekoslav ZORAK, an extension to the residence permit for Herzegovina for Tvrtko MILOŠ, Assistant Commander for IPD /Information and Propaganda/;
2. Ensure that the Commander of the 161<sup>st</sup> Brigade sends the following reconnaissance and sabotage specialists:

Zdravko RADIĆ  
Željko CIVIĆ

Iskra and two to three other soldiers of the same speciality to be chosen by Zdravko RADIĆ and to put them under the Command of Tvrtko MILOŠ, coordinator at the Mostar Municipal Staff.

ZA/TM

Yours faithfully,  
/stamp/

/For/  
TG /Tactical Group/ Commander  
Major  
Jasmin JAGANJAC  
/signature stamp: Petar ZELENIKA/  
HVO Commander



PRESIDENCY  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
Number: 02-011-790/92  
Sarajevo, 16 October 1992

To: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Personally to the MINISTER

In accordance with the Agreement on friendship and cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, the following persons are appointed to the commission for coordinating military activities on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

1. Rifat BILAJAC,
2. Fabijan BENO,
3. Hasan ČENGIĆ (replacement Salem ŠABIĆ).

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ  
President of the Presidency  
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
/signed and stamped/

CRISIS STAFF FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /BH/  
Strictly confidential  
 Split, Tolstojeva street 28

Number: 02-290/92  
 Split, 18 October 1992

R E P O R T  
 On the work of the Crisis Staff for BH – Split  
 Between 6 April until 18 October 1992

The Crisis Staff for BH – Split was established as part of the Split branch of the Party of Democratic Action /SDA/ of Croatia, on 6 April 1992, on the day enemy aggression against BH began. From 29 September 1992 onwards, following a decision of the Main Committee of the Crisis Staff for BH – Split, the Crisis Staff was working independently of the SDA, i.e. the Split branch of the SDA, as a result of a non-statutory assembly session which was attended by only 6% of Split SDA branch members.

Very brisk activity in the following sectors ensued immediately after the BH – Split Crisis Staff was established, mobilizing volunteers, Muslims and Croats born in BH and starting a record of their details, equipping and sending them to battlefields throughout the Republic of BH, collecting humanitarian aid, technical equipment and materiel and other kinds of aid for BH, organising a reserve communications system oriented toward BH and laying the basis for logistics support for several municipalities in BH and coordinating this support from within the zone of Split. Activities also included coordinating medical and humanitarian aid, encouraging the international public to help BH, dismantling the information blockade of BH and launching the war information service “Republic of BH”, establishing the *Merhamet* MDD /Muslim Charitable Society/ and cooperation with all domestic and international humanitarian organizations, cooperation with the IVZ /Islamic Religious Community/ on religious and educational matters; cooperation with social and political organizations and parties of the Republic of Croatia through the Split branch of the SDA; cooperation with military and civil authorities in Split and in the Republic of Croatia; reception and housing of refugees in cooperation with the Regional Social Welfare Office and reception of refugees and displaced persons; cooperation with foreign and Croatian news services.

1.

#### Military issues – Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The organisation of calling and receiving volunteers, Muslims and Croats who were born in BH, with the help of all mass media (Radio Split, TV Marijan, *Slobodna Dalmacija* and others) started immediately once the Crisis Staff for BH was established. The help of the 6<sup>th</sup> Split Operations Zone was significant during these activities. Precise records, lists and documents of volunteers were kept. The plan and programme of the Crisis Staff were drafted and approved by the military and civil authorities of the town of Split and the Republic of Croatia. Close communication was established which is still in place to date.

By 18 April 1992, the 1<sup>st</sup> Split independent company had been established as the first military formation to help the BH Armed Forces. It was despatched to the areas of Livno and Tomislavgrad on the same day, consisting of 81 volunteer and eight officers. They were transferred in three phases. The 6<sup>th</sup> Split Operations Zone lent its direct support in establishing the company, supplying it with arms, ammunition, military outfits and daily rations.

Logistics, lead by Mr. Muhamed MUHAREMOVI], and a medical board first lead by Dr. Demal [?K/OZO and later by Dr. Omer STUPAC were established as part of the work of the KV [?Military Crisis Staff/.

Following the departure of the 1<sup>st</sup> Split Company all volunteers and later on the conscripts who had signed up were recorded and registered in proper lists and sent to the following units according to their own wishes: OS /Armed Forces/ BH and OS of the Republic of Croatia:

- OS BH, Visoko volunteers' admission camp – 142 volunteers;
- OS BH, Livno – Tomislavgrad – 89 volunteers;
- HV /Croatian Army/ @rnovnica rocket base - 12 volunteers;
- OS BH, Northern Bosnia, Zagreb – Borongaj barracks – 34 volunteers;
- (all from the *Ivan Lu~i} – Lav~evi} GP /construction company/ Split;*
- OS BH, 1<sup>st</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina *Kralj Tomislav* Corps– Ba{ko Polje – 157 volunteers;

- OS BH, 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Independent Battalion – 118 volunteers;
- HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Grude – 22 volunteers;
- HV – 126<sup>th</sup> Sinj Brigade – 12 volunteers;
- OS BH, Te{anj, ^apljina and Stolac – 56 volunteers;
- OS BH, Tuzla – 31 volunteers;
- Other towns and places in BH – Bugojno, Jajce, Zenica, Dobo{, Zavidovi}i and Biha} – over 70 volunteers and conscripts;
- HRM /Croatian Navy/ - Northern Bosnia – Biha} and Cazin – 120 volunteers (with the help of officer Adem HAMZI);

Eight-hundred and sixty-two volunteers altogether were recorded and despatched to battlefields and into units in BH. /handwritten/ (Over 2000 volunteers were recorded and despatched in the OS BH and the /HVO/ by the end of 1992)

Through the K[ /Crisis Staff/ volunteers registered and mobilised in Pula, Rijeka, Vara`din and Zadar were transferred. This was a significant number of fighters.

Among the volunteers despatched through the KV[ Split were also women and foreign citizens from Algiers, France and Turkey who were sent to the volunteers' admission camp of the OS BH.

The main task of the KV[ was to realise the plan and programme which it still holds at present. The basis of this programme was the reception and transport of humanitarian and other aid to places which the aggressor had not occupied. A special aspect of the KV[ welfare service was helping the families of fighters and the injured by visiting them and giving them aid with the support of the Split *Merhamet*.

A successful blood donation drive to meet the needs of the forces of the OS BH and the OS RH was successfully organised in May with the help of the Split Red Cross. The response was excellent, with refugees from BH taking part.

Successful cooperation was established with companies in Split whose workers joined the OS BH and the OS RH as volunteers. They are the following companies: GP *Ivan Lu~i} Lav~evi}*, the shipyard, *Konstruktor*, *Vijadukt Zagreb* and the *Djale* hydroelectric power plant. All their workers who joined as volunteers have been kept on their payroll and their salaries are being paid out to their families on producing certificates issued by us. They have received and housed some of the families at their own expense and provided them with healthcare and social benefits.

Cooperation with the military and civil organs of Split and the Republic of Croatia is maintained daily and is beneficial to both sides. Several actions of calling-up and transporting conscripts who had left BH or were stranded in the RH were realised jointly.

President of BiH Crisis Headquarters

Split

Alija Džafo

Delivered

- R BiH Government
- Hasan Efendić, military attache
- Office of R BiH in RH
- Archive



TOP SECRET

**LIST**

of volunteers who registered at the KVŠ (High Headquarters for Crisis) in Split for OS (defense forces) BiH and through it sent to the battlefields across BiH and the Croatian Republic in 1992.

1. Zijad Mehmedović, propaganda photographer at CCH Split
2. Širaz Muftić, propaganda photographer in a War newspaper BiH in Split
3. Džemaludin Alić, journalist -II-
4. Ahmet Muminović, -II-
5. Safer Muminović -II-
6. Memed Buhic -II-
7. Amila Cerić -II-
8. Mirsad Oergović, distributor -II-
9. Atif Dzafo, attorney -II-
10. Ahme Bosnić, journalist UNA magazine – Sarajevo in Split
11. Stanko Fišer, journalist -II-
12. Željko Rodić -II-
13. Seid Alić -II-
14. Josip Svoboda -II-
15. Zvonimir di Dallo, sales specialist -II-
16. Jajrudin Hodžić, journalist -II-
17. Šerbedžija Dr. Dušan, advisor -II-
18. Danije Dodić, journalist -II-
19. Daniel Šober, member of KVŠ
20. Asim Neretljaković, logistics – Ribomaterijal Split
21. Haris Mahmutović, specialist - weapons procurement
22. Zajko Hurem, volunteer at missile base Žrnovnica 22.04.1992
23. Dr. Omer Stupac, president of medical commission for volunteers 25.06.92.
24. Muni Čahajić, assistant at KŠ at Alija Džafo 25.06.1992
25. Osman Dželal, Pula logistics – initiated 10 volunteers to OS BiH Visoko
26. Zuhdija Kubat, Varaždin 70 pairs of boots for OS BiH Livno
27. Ana Mažar, RO Jugoplastika 120 pairs of slippers for wounded Tomislavgrad
28. Mersada Balavac, assistant at KŠ
29. Salih Muharemović, volunteer OS BiH Konjic 27.04.1992
30. Jerko Rudan, volunteer OS BiH HVO Livno 30.04.1992
31. Safet Kršlak, volunteer OS BiH Visoko 30.04.1992
32. Sadik Turfkfedžija, volunteer OS BiH Konjic 30.04.1992
33. Ademir Karišik, KVŠ Split 30.04.1992, left the KVŠ on 15.07.1992
34. Alma Šehović, KVŠ messenger 03/05/1992, left the KVŠ on 03/05/1992
35. Nijaz Kurtović KVŠ driver in July transferred to Merhamet
36. Enes Maslo, member of KVŠ for weapons procurement, transferred to Merhamet since 05/05/1992
37. Mirza Žeman, organiz. connection 05/05/1992
38. Dr. Zaim Bilalbegović KVŠ Plit transferred to OS BiH Zenica on 07/05/1992
39. Skelić Meho KVŠ Split 05/05/1992 (left the headquarters)
40. Salih Gafić volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 07/05/1992
41. Sead Šupčić, volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 04/05/1992
42. Hajrudin Salihović, Captain of first class -II- Visoko 07/05/1992
43. Vladimir Mihaljević, KVŠ connection HDZ BiH 05/05/1992 (left the Headquarters)
44. Eufik Dženanović, KVŠ Split refugee driver 06/04/1992
45. Mevludin Durgutović, KVŠ Split logistics for refugee reception and care
46. Filip Jurić volunteer with 12 volunteers in 126 Brigade Sinj 10/05/1992
47. Adem Delić, KVŠ from HRM for cooperation and aid 10/05/1992
48. Miro Radić volunteer OS BiH Žepče-Zenica 16/05/1992
49. Marinko Jurišić -II-
50. Esad Zeljković -II-

51. Ćazim Đug volunteer OS BiH Livno 13/05/1992
52. Danijela Prusac helper 14/05/1992
53. Meho Kelić, volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 14/05/1992
54. Alija Tica helper and connection for refugees from Donji Vakuf 18/05/1992
55. Mirelem Zekić volunteer OS BiH HOS (Croatian armed forces) Čapljina – Stolac 19/05/1992
56. Omer Smajić volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 23/05/1992
57. Samir Šutković, volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 23/05/1992
58. Husein Đulić volunteer OS BiH HOS Grude-Čapljina 25/05/1992
59. Džemal Mahmutović volunteer OS BiH Mostar 25/05/1992
60. Muhamed Šošić volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 27/05/1992
61. Salih Kasumović volunteer -II-
62. Ramiz Mervan volunteer OS BiH HVO Tešanj 27/05/1992
63. Hakija Lutviković volunteer OS BiH Maglaj 28/05/1992
64. Ahmet Huskić volunteer OS BiH Jajce 28/05/1992
65. Ismet Hamamović -II-
66. Mesud Dedić volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 28/05/1992
67. Sabahudin Ćusto -II-
68. Muhamed Đukić -II-
69. Vladi Šurlin volunteer OS BiH HVO Grude 28/05/1992 (deceased)
70. Amina Zvrko KŠ attorney and secretary of SDA (Democratic action Party) assistant
71. Ibro Glavaš volunteer OS BiH Jajce 28/05/1992
72. Kemal Makić -II-
73. Isak Karajčić -II-
74. Akif Hozan -II-
75. Zuhdija Makić -II-
76. Vehbija Devišević volunteer OS BiH Visoko 01/06/1992
77. Josip Masatović volunteer OS BiH Tesalić 01/06/1992
88. Sabrina Dadiković helper at KVŠ from 25/05/1992 to 01/06/1992 missing
89. Kemal Nakičević volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 01/06/1992
90. Ante Balić -II-
91. Sead Velagić -II-
92. Senahid Duraković volunteer OS BiH Visoko 03/06/1992
93. Enver Dadrić volunteer OS BiH Visoko 03/06/1992
94. Suljo Fuško volunteer OS BiH Travnik 03/06/1992
95. Emin Bašić -II-
96. Haris Bebić -II-
97. Ragib Bajrić -II-
98. Dževad Bašić -II-
99. Idriz Sarić volunteer OS BiH Visoko 11/06/1992 (from Australia) 15 v
100. Fahrudin karahasanović, assistant at KVŠ office supplies associate
101. Duško Jurić gave his apartment for wounded 11/06/1992 at Trolovke near Split
102. Zlatan Imamović volunteer special forces OS BiH Visoko 15/06/1992 (from Fr
103. Esad Praljević volunteer OS BiH Visoko 15/06/1992 (HRM Polic.)
104. Muhamed Rekić volunteer OS BiH Tuzla with 10 volun. from HRM 15/06/1992
105. Hasan Hadžić volunteer OS BiH Visoko 16/06/1992
106. Mehira Pita 16/06/1992 aid for solders cigarette package for Hrasnica
107. Behadem Imširević volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 16/06/1992 with 5 sold
108. Ismet Bošnjaković volunteer OS BiH Visoko 17/06/1992
109. Mirsad Mahović volunteer OS BiH Visoko 17/06/1992 with 9 volunteers
110. Zijad Ćosić volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 17/06/1992 with 12 volunteers
111. Salih Mujčinović volunteer OS BiH Visoko 17/06/1992
112. Nermin Delić -II-
113. Samir Omerović -II-
114. Aziz Ćeliković -II-
115. Mijo Bešlija volunteer OS BiH Jajce HVO 17/06/1992

116. Admir Bešić volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 19/06/1992 with 7 volunteers
117. Sead Bešić -II-
118. Šefik Piragić volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 19/06/1992 with 11 volunteers
119. Hamdija Džafić volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 19/06/1992 with 4 volunteers
120. Velid Malkić volunteer OS BiH Bugojno HVO 23/06/1992 with 15 volunteers
121. Ibro Omervić OS BiH Tešanj HVO and HOS 23/06/1992 with 5 volunteers
122. Alija Bilalović volunteer OS BiH Tešanj HOS 23/06/1992
123. Ilija Kovačević -II-
124. Nasrudin Šečić volunteer OS BiH Visoko 23/06/1992
125. Mihad Žutić -II-
126. Muhamed Bašić -II-
127. Ivo Radeljak volunteer OS BiH HOS 23/06/1992 with 4 volunteers
128. Senad Sedić volunteer OS BiH Visoko 24/06/1992
129. Galib Šeho volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 24/06/1992
130. Omer Vinčević -II-
131. Sabit Balihodžić -II-
132. Dževad Bašić -II-
133. Jusuf Nukić -II-
134. Omer Nuhanović volunteer OS BiH Bugojno 24/06/1992
135. Ševal Hrnjić volunteer OS BiH Maglaj 24/06/1992 with 6 volunteers
136. Husein Kapić volunteer OS BiH Teslić HOS 24/06/1992 with 5 volunteers
137. Harjrudin Berbo volunteer driver at BiH government office and OS Zagreb – Split
138. Halid Zejnilović volunteer OS BiH Visoko with 2 volunteers 24/06/1992
139. Zekerijah Mujčinović volunteer OS BiH Visoko 24/06/1992
140. Gabrijel Tolić volunteer OS BiH Visoko 24/06/1992 from Rijeka with 10 volunteers
141. Ekrem Srebrić volunteer OS BiH Visoko 24/06/1992
142. Dževad Verem volunteer OS BiH Travnik with 7 volunteers 25/06/1992
143. Muharem Krak volunteer OS BiH Jajce 25/06/1992
144. Meho Zekan volunteer OS BiH Jajce with 8 volunteers 23/05/1992
145. Džemal Sobo volunteer OS BiH Jajce 01/07/1992
146. Salih Bešliagić volunteer OS BiH Maglaj 07/07/1992 with 7 volunteers
147. Hazim Šuvalić volunteer OS BiH 01/07/1992 for Tuzla with 3 volunteers
148. Ibro Selimović volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 01/07/1992 with 12 volunteers
149. Atif Ahmetović volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 03/07/1992 with 3 volunteers
150. Refik Selimović volunteer OS BiH HVO Grude 03/07/1992
151. Falk Omerović -II- later transferred to Tuzla
152. Šamso Tursanović -II- -II-
153. Fehim Hodžić volunteer OS BiH Sarajevo 03/07/1992 with 4 volunteers
154. Hazim Kalbić volunt. at Daidža in Baško Polje 03/07/1992 OS BiH HVO
155. Munir Macavica volunt. OS BiH Jajce 13/07/1992
156. Halic Mecavica volunt. OS BiH Jajce driver 14/07/1992
157. Adem Spahić volunteer OS BiH Jajce 14/07/1992
158. Adem Hamzić volunteer HRM (Croatian military navy) Split higher officer, for OS BiH First Kraj. Brig. gathered and prepared 650 people, comm. Osmanović Osman directed to Travnik as well as I. Grop and II. Grop with over 312 volunteers gathered from Zadar, Šibenik, Zagreb and Rijeka 23/07/1992 formations of anti-armed brigade directed to Bihać – Cazin through Karlovac.
159. Ale Šabić from SDA Pula 120 volunteers directed to OS BiH HVO Baško Polje at Daidža 25/06/1992
160. Jasmin Hujdur volunteer driver OS BiH Mostar 16/07/1992
161. Tale jolo -II-
162. Hasan Žužić volunteer OS BiH Jajce 16/06/1992
163. Hasan Macić volunteer OS BiH Konjic 16/07/1992 with 7 volunteers
164. Bećir Fišić volunteer OS BiH Konjic 16/07/1992
165. Osman Marić volunteer OS BiH Sarajevo with 2 sons 20/07/1992
166. Stjepan Majurić volunteer OS BiH Grude HVO 20/07/1992
167. Ćamil Kreso -II-

168. Džabir Delalić -II-  
 169. Frane Jajalo volunteer OS BiH Jajce HVO 20/07/1992  
 170. Ante Topal -II-  
 171. Hasan Didin Mjčić from Kozarac 20/07/1992 for OS BiH Visoko took 180 volunteers from area of Pula Istra Rijeka directed through Split  
 172. Stjepan Jezerčić volunteer OS BiH Jajce HVO 20/07/1992 training for milit.  
 173. RO HIDRROGRADNJ Zagreb 119 volunteers 24/08/1992 for First Mostar independent battalion lead by Zlatko Bečević – directed through Split  
 174. Zlatan Kilim, volunteer OS BiH Jajce 26/08/1992  
 175. Haris Zlatan -II-  
 176. Šaćir Tojaka, volunteer OS BiH Mostar 26/08/1992  
 177. Safet Rašinović volunteer OS BiH HVO Baško Polje at Daidža 26/08/1992  
 178. Safet Osmanagić -II-  
 179. Medin Jašarović, artill. Lut. From JNA Rogatica OS BiH Visoko 29/08/1992  
 180. Amir Dedić volunteer OS BiH Jajce 30/08/1992  
 181. Fiktet Ružić -II-  
 182. Vlatko Lovrić -II-  
 183. Dževad Ališić -II-  
 184. Kasim Ježević, volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 08/09/1992  
 185. Nusret Suljagić, wounded from rehabilitation OS BiH Sarajevo 10/09/1992  
 186. Ferid Ahmetović, -II-  
 187. Savad Šuškić, volunteer OS BiH Jajce 10/09/1992  
 188. Haris Mrzić, volunteer OS BiH Sarajevo 15/09/1992  
 189. Bakić Asović, volunteer OS BiH Mostar 15/09/1992  
 190. Nezir Kukić, volunteer OS BiH Travnik 18/09/1992  
 191. Marko Sardelić, RO „Radež“ Blato Korčula 18/09/1992 for OS BiH Visoko directed through KVŠ Split 12 volunteers lead by Mirza Kuraljić  
 192. Čazim Bahitić, volunteer OS BiH Jajce 18/09/1992  
 193. Enes Kaharević -II-  
 194. Zijad Žuna -II-  
 195. Nikola Kamenc, volunteer OS BiH HVO Sarajevo 21/09/1992  
 196. Stipe Marušić, volunteer OS BiH Jajce HVO 22/09/1992  
 197. Hajdin Hrnić, volunteer OS BiH Tuzla 22/09/1992  
 198. Nazir Smajić, volunteer OS BiH HOS instructor 23/09/1992 Čapljina  
 199. Ismet Hehičević -II-  
 200. Ante Jerković -II-

=====  
 Note: According to above list total registered number of volunteers is 1.796. Everybody is transferred according to their wish and the proper receipt from KVŠ Split was issued. /handwritten/ (1869)

In first 3-4 months KVŠ was working the whole day and the service was organized in form of duty hours where list of registered volunteers were kept, from which this list was made. The RO List should also be added to this List, which was organized and directed later, and which will be added to this List. This is the final List of volunteers from Republic Croatia for OS BiH for year 1992.

In Split 08. January 1993

Commander of KVŠ Split for  
 Aid to OS BiH  
 Mehmed Malkoč

/stamped:/ CRISIS HEADQUARTERS /signed/  
 FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 SPLIT - 1

October 27th, 1992  
1292/92.

CENTRAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS  
OFFICE OF REPUBLIC BiH IN R.  
CROATIA  
SECRETARY FOR MILITARY ISSUES AT  
OFFICE OF R BiH IN R CROATIA

Based on the Decision of the Government of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina on the implementation of mobilization, and the freely expressed will

I HEREBY COMMAND

1. That army recruit: KAPNIĆ JOSIP from Crikvenica is REFERRED TO COMPOSITION OF 77. Brigade of BiH army forces, which is stationed at S. Andrijeva near Našice. /handwritten: that is at Dom... /illegible/ at Oraši.../ illegible//

2. The above motioned must report to the unit within 3 /three/ days.

3. For transportation he will use public transport.

4. This decision will enter into force immediately.

CROATIA

BiH MILITARY ATTACHE AT R

Colonel EFENDIĆ Hasan

\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
THE OFFICE OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
Zagreb, Savska Cesta 41/XI  
Tel. 041/537-161, 537-160. Fax 536-702



ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS  
ZAGREB

TO ALL UNITS  
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Zagreb, 28 October 1992  
Our No.: 1334/92  
Your No.: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Pass.

Please /issue passes/ for the following gentlemen:

1. Nehroad MATIN – passport no. 092908
2. Mohamed KAZEMROHANI NEJAD – passport no. 092909
3. Davud NAGHASH CHIMEH – passport no. 092910
4. Tofigh MOKHTARI – passport no. 052733
5. Mohmood TALEBLOO – passport no. 075832

who are accredited official journalists of the Iranian State Radio and Television and who are travelling in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You must provide all the necessary assistance and cooperation for them.

COMMANDER  
Brigadier Mehmed KAVAZBAŠIĆ  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/

27. October, 1992  
1292/92.

CENTRAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OF BIH  
REPUBLIC  
OFFICE OF BIH REPUBLIC IN CROATIA  
SECRETARY FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS AT THE  
OFFICE OF BIH REPUBLIC IN CROATIA

Based on the decision of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
on the implementation of mobilization, and the freely expressed will

I HEREBY COMMAND

1. That conscript Osman Krešo, is transferred to the district headquarters of Mostar defense, for further disposition.
2. The above named must report to the unit within 3 /three/ days.
3. For means of transportation he is to use public transport
4. This decision is effective immediately

MILITARY ATTACHE IN CROATIA  
Colonel EFENDIĆ Hasan

\_\_\_\_\_  
/Signed/

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
  
GOVERNMENT OF  
REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
Sarajevo, October 24th, 1992

On the basis of need,

I HEREBY AUTHORISE

Mister Davor Vulin and Mister /illegible/ Bećirović, for the purpose of Army of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina to deliver weapons and military equipment to logistic centers, and to areas which will be determined by Main Headquarters of Armed Forces of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

DEPUTY  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
/illegible/ Disić  
/signed and stamped/

Number: /handwritten/ 01-03/92-111

Mostar, November 06th, 1992

APPROVAL

to Mister SULEJMAN ČUČAK for unhindered movement and work on territory of Croatian community Herceg-Bosnia as a member of joint command of HVO and BiH Army.

Head of department of defense  
HZ H-B (Croatian community Herceg-Bosnia)  
Bruno Stojić  
/signed and stamped/

Number: /handwritten/ 01-03/92-112

Mostar, November 06th, 1992

APPROVAL

to Mister Omer Vatrić for unhindered movement and work on territory of Croatian community Herceg-Bosna as a member of joint command of HVO and BiH Army.

Head of department of defense  
HZ H-B (Croatian community Herceg-Bosna)  
Bruno Stojić  
/signed and stamped/

Number: /handwritten/ 01-03/92-113

Mostar, November 06th, 1992

APPROVAL

to Mister ZIKRIJA DJONKO for unhindered movement and work on territory of Croatian community Herceg-Bosna as a member of joint command of HVO and BiH Army.

Head of department of defense  
HZ H-B (Croatian community Herceg-Bosna)  
Bruno Stojić  
/signed and stamped/

---

Number: /handwritten/ 01-03/92-110

Mostar, November 06th, 1992

APPROVAL

to Mr. JASMIN JAGANJAC for unhindered movement and work on territory of Croatian community Herceg-Bosna as a member of joint command of HVO and BiH Army.

Head of department of defense  
HZ H-B (Croatian community Herceg-Bosna)  
Bruno Stojić  
/signed and stamped/

---

Number: /handwritten/ 01-03/92-110

Mostar, November 06th, 1992

APPROVAL

to Mr. ARIF PAŠALIĆ for unhindered movement and work on territory of Croatian community Herceg-Bosna as a member of joint command of HVO and BiH Army.

Head of department of defense  
HZ H-B (Croatian community Herceg-Bosna)  
Bruno Stojić  
/signed and stamped/



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
OFFICE  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
Zagreb, Savska cesta 41/XI  
Phone; 041/537-161, 537-160, Fax 536-702  
/coat of arms/  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ZAGREB, RADNIČKA CESTA 228  
Phone; 041/232-482

Number: 05-674/92  
On 12<sup>th</sup> of November 1992

Pursuant to decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia number 512-0316/92-1139, Class 314 and authorization, number 4/92, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 1992 of the Office of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia, on the transmission of jurisdiction, I issue the following

#### O R D E R

The group (armed and equipped) of 25 men and 3 guides shall be directed from the area of Sljeme near Zagreb to the region of Bihać at direction Zagreb-Karlovac-Ogulin, in order to be inserted in the region of Bihać.

The time of departure and stay on the march-route till their insertion in the region lasts from 13<sup>th</sup> till 16<sup>th</sup> of November 1992. /handwritten Asim Bašagić/

The list of group:

1. Kovačević (son of Rizah) Šemsudin
- 2.....
- 3....

/some of names are crossed or circled or both/ there are also handwritten marks on the right side

Guides;

1. Balčinović Esad
2. Rabić Zulfid
3. Rošić kasim

/all 3 names are crossed/  
/handwritten/

1. Velagić Nijaz AP 194144
2. Ružinić Mirsad APR TA 1639 + 2 guides from the HV
3. Grošić Zijad AP 164 854

This order bears the internal character for the composition of OSRBH; it serves to be shown as proof of direction in the Republic of BH to the bodies of civil and military power of the Republic of Croatia on relation of movement through the Republic of Croatia; the above cited order must be destroyed in case of movement through the temporary occupied territory by the Chetnicks or in case of capturing and any contacts with Chetnicks; the order must not be found in hands of Chetnicks in any case.

Concerning all other issues, act upon the oral order of the military attaché.

Military attaché of the RBH in the Republic of Croatia  
Colonel Hasan Efendić  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
OFFICE  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE  
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA /coat of arms/  
Zagreb, Savska cesta 41/XI  
Phone; 041/537-161,537-160 fax; 041/537-702

---

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Zagreb, 4 January 1993  
our number 05-6/93  
Your number:-----

ZAGREB

The military delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia expresses its deep respect to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and is free to ask to allow the engagement of the following officers of the Croatian Army in order to improve the expert work and organization and to supports the higher efficiency in the conflict against the Serbian-Chetnick aggressor and for the needs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- AVDIĆ ISMET, Colonel that operates in the area of Rijeka-Gospić
- AHMET PUŠKAR, Major of the west brigade in Dubrovnik and
- DR. RAKANović SADIK, Colonel that is engaged in the Military hospital Split

We are asking you to resolve the status of these officers, as that has been the case so far, by putting their status on hold (in order to have the entire jurisdiction as Croatian Army /HV/ officers) and to enable them a further engagement in the HV, after fulfilling the tasks.

We express our gratitude in advance.  
Sincerely yours

SECRETARY FOR THE MILITARY ISSUES  
IN THE OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN  
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Colonel  
Hasan Efendić  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

Number: 02/1/2-417 / 93

Mostar, 5 June 199 3

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, REPUBLIC  
OF CROATIA  
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION  
To the Chief in person

We would hereby like to ask you to resolve the status of the following persons  
in the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade and enable them to remain with us for some additional time  
(because they are extremely indispensable to us):

Zlatko JARKIĆ

Stojan MUSA

Ivan SABLJIĆ

Respectfully yours!

CHIEF

Bruno STOJIĆ

/a signature/

/stamp of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna

Defence Department, Mostar/

/stamp: illegible/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
/coat of arms/ CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

TOMISLAVGRAD DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION

POSUŠJE DEFENCE OFFICE

No.: 02-9/3-01-317/93

Posušje, 1 July 1993

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/To:/ MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

On the basis of the need for setting up and organising the Posušje Brigade in the best possible way, and on the basis of our talks with certain members of the HV /Croatian Army/ who are also documented in the Posušje Municipality HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Defence Office, as well as with several of their colleagues from our neighbouring municipalities, we send the following

REQUEST

for a re-subordination of the following members of the HV and their assignment to the

Posušje Brigade

1. Brigadier Slavko GRUBIŠIĆ
2. Vinko JAKOVLJEVIĆ
3. Ivica BEŠLIĆ
4. Tomo SABLJO
5. Ante SESAR
6. Vidak MARIĆ
7. Gojko JAKOVLJEVIĆ
8. Jerko PENAVA
9. Kristjan /as written/ MILOŠ
10. Ivica LANDEKA

Head of the Defence Department

Bruno STOJIĆ

/a signature, stamped/

We hope that you will meet our request and that the experience and knowledge of the above-named persons will only prove helpful to us.

To:

1. Ministry of Defence of the republic of Croatia
2. Files

HEAD:

Ivan MILIČEVIĆ

/a signature, stamped/

/hand-written text/  
Slobodan PRALJAK  
Trg Francuske republike 4  
41 000 ZAGREB

Zagreb, 01.06.93

/typed text/  
TO: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
ZAGREB

APPLICATION

I am kindly requesting the respected title to enable me, as Croatian citizen and conscript born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina as Croatian patriot and defender to help Croat people to defend their human rights and lives endangered by the aggressor in that area by my professionalism and knowledge.

At the same time, I am kindly asking you to eliminate all obstacles that could cause possible problems concerning the obligations related to the defence of sovereignty of Republic of Croatia.

Sobodan PRALJAK /signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT  
MAIN STAFF  
No.: 02-2/1-01-1538/93  
Mostar, 24 July 1993

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Notification for all HVO units

OZ /Operative Zone/ Central Bosnia  
OZ N/W Herzegovina  
OZ S/E Herzegovina  
OZ B. Posavina

1. Hereby we are informing all HVO HZ H-B units that pursuant to the Decree by the President of the HZ H-B, Mr. Mate Boban, Major General Slobodan Praljak is appointed to the position of COMMANDER OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF.
2. This notification is to be communicated to the lower levels of command.

CHIEF OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF  
Major General  
Milivoj Petković

/Hand-written text:  
Date: 24 July 1993  
Time: 20:20  
Duty officer/  
/Signature/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

**D E F E N S E   D E P A R T M E N T**

Ref. Num: 02-2/1-01-1522-/ 93  
 Mostar, July 24, 1993

*Record Stamp:*

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNIA  
 CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE  
 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT  
 MOSTAR  
 Received on: July 24, 1993  
 Receipt Record Num: 02-1/2-622/93

General FRANCIS BRIQUEMONT  
 UNPROFOR Commander  
 for Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 K I S E L J A K

Dear General,

I feel free to bring to your attention some important facts regarding the assessment of the spokesman of Your Command, Mr. Barry Frower, about alleged presence of the Army of Republic of Croatia (HV) in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the units of Croatian Council of Defense (HVO) are trying to stop the offensive of Muslim forces.

Yesterday, on July 23, at regular press conference in Zagreb, Miss Shannon Boyd, the spokeswoman of the Command of UNPROFOR for ex-Yugoslavia, made a comment regarding the above-said statement of Mr. Frower, and I quote:

'We surely would not confirm something like that before we get absolutely specific reports made out of many different reports and from many different UNPROFOR sources, and not from just a few of them. Chief Commander is very cautious before saying something as significant as that. We keep following up on that with lot of interest, but it is not always easy to make a judgment. I am sure you understand the UNPROFOR's need for caution with that kind of events...' [End of quote]

Two days ago Republic of Croatia Department of Defense issued a special statement in which it completely denied allegations of Reuter agency, based on statement made by the spokesman of Your Command, on the alleged engagement of the armed forces of Croatia in the territory of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH).

British radio (BBC) broadcasted two days ago an extensive interview with well known military expert, Mr. Jan Visnar, regarding this issue. According to Mr. Visnar our armed forces (HVO) posses sufficient potential for conducting defensive war, and there is absolutely no need for additional engagement of HV. With no reflect as to the accuracy of numbers presented by Mr. Visnar, as a commander of HVO forces, I agree with his general assessment on adequacy of our forces when it comes to effective combat against any aggressor on areas with autochthonous Croatian people in BiH.

I would take this opportunity to warn You about one possible confusion, which is however very often (depending on the conditions in the battle field, political or propaganda conditions of Muslim side in the first place) deliberately not recognized or is intentionally stated in the form of accusations on part of the Republic of Croatia.

Namely, during the Homeland war of Republic Croatia against Serbian aggressor, a large number of Croatians from BiH participated as volunteers, especially those from West Herzegovina. These numbers are estimated to count several thousands of people. After the same aggressor commenced aggression here, and with the lower intensity of combat activities in

Republic of Croatia, these men gradually returned to their native homes and joined HVO units. This process especially intensified since the beginning of Muslim aggression against Croatian areas. So, yes these men were soldiers of armed forces of Croatia, but they are now joining units of Croatian Council of Defense, as an organizer and bearer of the defense of Croatian settlements, their homes and overall survival of Croats in BiH. Please have this in Your mind, because incorrect presentation of this fact does not only inflict harm to Croatian Council of Defense and Republic of Croatia, but also to those ones who state or interpret these facts in a non-detailed context.

Mr. General,

I hope that you understand our need to jointly correct the effects imposed by statements of Your spokesman, Mr. Frower, regarding the accusations against Republic of Croatia for the alleged participation in the territory of another, sovereign state, in this case RBiH. Multiplication of this incorrect assessments (or mistakes, whichever it is) in media definitely aggravates already complex enough context of further peace negotiations in Geneva.

That is why I kindly ask you to, in accordance to your authorizations, judge these our remarks and check those facts, and then take appropriate measures.

I will use this opportunity to wish you a successful mandate in a very responsible military position of a Commander of UN Peace Forces for BiH. I would personally be very happy if I could share along with you, and for the benefit of all people in BiH who have already suffered enough, the joy of peace that is to be achieved in these areas.

Respectfully yours,

*Signee:*  
**CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF HVO**  
**Major General, MILIVOJ PETKOVIC**

*Stamp:* **REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**  
**CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA**  
**- COAT OF ARMS -**  
**2**  
**MOSTAR**  
**GENERAL STAFF**  
**DEFENSE DEPARTMENT**

CO:  
"SPABAT" Medjugorje



/fax header in English: CONNECTION TO ( 38 41 432415)

TOTAL PAGE = 1 RESULT – (SUCCESS)/

/handwritten: 4 August 1993 1850 hours/ /a signature/

DEFENCE

No: 02-2/1-01-1689/93

MILITARY SECRET

Mostar, 4 August 1993

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

RE: Posting of HV /Croatian Army/ – MORH /Ministry of Defence of the Republic  
officers to the HVO /Croatian of Croatia  
Defence Council/ GS /Main Staff/ to Mr. Gojko ŠUŠAK, personally

### R E Q U E S T

We ask you to place HV officers

1. Brigadier Žarko TOLE
2. Brigadier Ivan KAPULAR (commander of the 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade)

at the disposal of the HVO GS so that they can be appointed to it as follows:

1. Brigadier Žarko TOLE: Chief of HVO GS
2. Brigadier Ivan KAPULAR: Assistant to the N /Chief/ of the HVO GS for combat readiness.

Regards,

For COMMANDER OF THE HVO GS

Major General

Slobodan PRALJAK

/a signature; stamped/

R BiH HZ HB HVO (Republic BiH Croatian community Herceg-Bosna Croatian Defense Committee)

IZM (DIVISIONAL COMMAND POST) OZ N/W H

Number: 01-2959

Prozor, August 18th, 1993

SECRET

DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
TOP

GS (Main Headquarters) HVO HZ-HB IZM CITLUK

Inform 2. Guard brigade of HV (Croatian Army) that Mate Kunicc from G. Vakuf is located with me and will stay in command until necessary.

COMMANDER GS  
General - major  
Slobodan Praljak s.r.

R BiH HZ HB HVO (Republic BiH Croatian Community Herceg-Bosnia Croatian Army Forces)

IZM OZ N/W H

Officially

Prozor, August 18th, 1993

SECRET

DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
TOP

GS HVO HZ-HB IZM CITLUK

Make a correction in zip no: 01-2959 9 (ninth word) instead as written (KUNICC) it should say KUNKICC.

COMMANDER GS  
General - major  
Slobodan Praljak s.r.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
/coat of arms/ CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF /GS/ DEFENCE  
Number: 02-2/1-01-1679/93 MILITARY SECRET  
Mostar, 4 August 1993 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

RE: Accommodation of volunteers from the RH /Republic of Croatia/

Personally to: Colonel Ivica PRIMORAC  
3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade – for information

I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Colonel PRIMORAC shall organise the reception and accommodation of volunteers' formations from the RH, as well as the logistical support.
2. All the newly-arrived volunteers' formations shall be accommodated in the barracks at Heliodrom. The formations that have arrived so far are: Brigadier J. MILIČEVIĆ's (90 /men/) and Major I. MANDIĆ's (114), while the arrival of a formation from Brod (between 200 and 250 /men/) is still expected.
3. The HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ GS /General Staff/ shall determine the combat use of these volunteers' units.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE HVO GS

/signed/

Major General

Stanko MATIĆ

/stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNA

MAIN STAFF OF THE HR H-B DEFENCE FORCES

Ref. No.: 02-2/1-01-3120/93

Forward Command Post Čitluk, 22 October 1993

Subject: Request

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
to Minister Gojko Šušak, personally

In order to realise planned tasks and to strengthen and facilitate our capacities for anti-armour combat especially in the night time, we are requesting you to provide us with the following equipment that the HV has at its disposal:

- 1 night vision camera with *POVRS* /Anti Armour Multiply Rocket System/ *Fagot* /Anti tank missile launcher or anti tank missiles/
- 1 training simulator CRO TREND for *POVRS Malyutka*
- 1 training simulator for *POVRS Fagot*
- 10 *Fagots*

I would like to emphasise that during the last year we already sent a number of similar requests to the HV Main Staff through HVO's tactical carrier /as in original/ for *POB* /Anti-armour combat/ *POVRS*, major Miro Čolić.

/Seal/

COMMANDER OF THE MAIN STAFF  
OF THE HR HB DEFENCE FORCES

/Signed/

Major General  
Slobodan Praljak

R BH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ HZ HB /Croatian Community of  
Herceg-Bosna/

IZM /Forward Command Post/ of the OZ /Operations Zone/ S/Z H /North-Western  
Herzegovina/

Number: 01-2916/93

DEFENCE

Prozor: 16 August 1993

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE GS /Main Staff/ of the Mostar HVO /Croatian  
Defence Council/  
OZ S/Z H, Tomislavgrad

LIST OF FORCES

ON THE FRONT

L I S T  
OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL IN THE FIELD  
PROZOR - GORNJI VAKUF /AREA/

No.	UNIT	NUMERICAL STRENGTH ON THE DAY OF LIST SUBMISSION
1.	<i>Bruno Bušić</i> Regiment	60
2.	<i>Zrinski</i> Battalion	38
3.	5th Guards /Brigade/	230
4.	<i>Stjepan Radić</i> Brigade, Ljubuški	470
5.	Grude Brigade	64
6.	Lašva Company	120
7.	Komušina	22
8.	<i>Ante Starčević</i> Brigade	905
9.	Rama Brigade	1,558
10.	<i>H. V. Hrvatinić</i> Brigade	230
11.	<i>Kralj Tomislav</i> Brigade	150
12.	<i>Eugen Kvaternik</i> Brigade	295
13.	Turalija VP /Military Post/	35
14.	Rama VP	67
15.	Grđani	32
16.	OZ /Operations Zone/ Reconnaissance Company	12
17.	IDG /Reconnaissance and Sabotage Group/ TNA /expansion unknown/	37
18.	Koprivnica	
19.	ATG /Anti-Terrorist Group/ - Brđarića	9
20.	<i>Alfa Forca</i> ATG	25
21.	Garavi ATG	15
	Artillery	50

4,424

From the total number deduct 10 percent for various reasons (wounding, illness, death, etc), the entire logistics and other accompanying services and take into account the absolute exhaustion of the men from Jajce. 40 percent of the men from Sebešići (Zenica KPD /Penal and Correctional Facility/ and others) suffer from mental illness, part of the men from Grude and Bugojno have fled, only 130 soldiers of the 5th Guards /Brigade/ are foot soldiers, etc.

The only good-quality unit capable of carrying out an attack is near Filipovići, but they too are supposed to leave the Rama area in keeping with a verbal order (most of them have already left). In fact there are no /Klica's men/.

FUCK IT ! /as printed/

Commander of the HVO Main Staff  
Major General  
Slobodan PRALJAK, personally

/handwritten: HVO GS

5808

16 August 1993, 0955 hours/

/signed/

/hand-written document/

/stamp illegible/

GS /Main Staff/ HVO /Croatian Defence Council/

Reference No: 02-2/1-01-2689/93

Attn: Commander of the "KB" Brigade

Attn: Chief of UVP /Military  
Police Administration/

Because of negative actions of some individuals and units

I ORDER that

1. Conscripts, Jozo SULIĆ, son of Žarko and /Martin BEVANDA/ assigned as assistance to the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of "KB" Brigade Čitluk is to be immediately dismissed from the composition of battalions and "KB" Brigade Čitluk. The Defence Department will make a schedule according to the valid regulations.
2. The unit from the RH /Republic of Croatia/ "Jelen" that infiltrated into the territory which is in the zone responsibility of the "KB" Brigade Čitluk, is to be sent away from the territory of the HR HB /Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia/ to the territory of the RH.
3. The item 2 is to be carried out by the Command of the "KB" Brigade /word Illegible/, brigade of VP /Military Police/ and the Item 2 (two) of this order by the UVP /Military Police Administration/ of the HVO.

Upon the carrying out of this order of this order you are to inform me in writing.

Commander of the  
GS HR HB  
Major General  
Slobodan PRALJAK  
/signed/

/Stamp: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Croatian Community Herceg-Bosnia  
Defence Department  
Main Staff  
Mostar 2/

/logo/  
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
OSIJEK MILITARY DISTRICT  
The 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade Command

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
ENCRYPTED

Class: strictly confidential /SP/ 81/93-02/01  
Ref. No.: 3132-03-93-70  
Vinkovci, 8 October

TO: CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/  
MAIN STAFF  
NORTH WESTERN HERZEGOVINA  
MILITARY DISTRICT  
PROZOR FORWARD COMMAND POST  
ATT.: Major General S. PRALJAK

SUBJECT: Submission of the Information on the  
need to pull out the 5<sup>th</sup> Vinkovci Brigade  
volunteer units

Based on the need for the major restructuring in the 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade formation, it is necessary to assemble units at the Vinkovci ZM /assembly point or garrison/. Therefore,

PLEASE BE INFORMED ON THE FOLLOWING:

1. We have submitted a written request to the Republic of Croatia /RH/ Ministry of Defence for pulling out of the 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade volunteer units from your battlefields, because we are not able to carry out the assigned tasks.
2. The deadline for the *izvršenja* /execution, probably pulling out/ of the units should be as of 15 October 1993.

REMARK: We submit the information to you in order to enable you to plan the engagement of your units temporarily without our support, since we are aware of the situation you are in.

DB/ŽH

Cc:  
- Addressee  
- Files

5<sup>th</sup> GUARDS BRIGADE  
COMMANDER  
Brigadier  
Ivan KAPULAR  
/stamped and signed/

RECEIVED	08 October		1440 hrs	/illegible signature/	
	(date)		(time)	(signature)	
IZM /Forward Command Post/	473		“O”	BITKOM /expansion unknown/	1
(secret code)	(Cable No)	(Group No)	(priority)	(procedure)	(Communication No)
PROCESSED	08 October		1450 hrs	/illegible signature/	
	(date)		(time)	(signature)	
DELIVERED	08 October		1510	/illegible signature/	
	(date)		(time)	(signature)	



We meet so many children who trust nobody, and help from their fathers or mothers gives them no comfort. And for development of personalities that trust is priceless. Brod is a city where children on average are very often the victims: while swinging on swings, walking the dog, playing, running to the shelter, or hidden in a corner of the basement. The cry of a child calling for her mother who was killed in her home which was hit by the „brave“ Serbian army missiles, will not only resonate throughout Croatia, but throughout the entire world (no matter how much indifferent). 27 children were killed and 65 seriously injured in Brod. We particularly congratulate on this „successes“ “the bravest army in the whole world,” the Serbian Army.

In order to protect our children as much as possible, the Executive Council has asked the Croatian government to help shelter our children in safer Croatian regions. Headquarters of Civil Protection placed around 3,000 children in southern part of Croatia. Some European countries (Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Republics), also accepted children from Brod, and we are very grateful to the organizers in these countries.

Citizens of Brod believe that Croatia is also in the region which suffers the most. Brod is currently such a place. Brod is Croatia and this part of Croatia that suffers must be helped by all Croats, to ease their sufferings. Organization of schools for pupils from Brod in safer areas of Croatia, is a task and an obligation of the entire Croatian nation and the Croatian state.

People from Brod founded a foundation “Pupils from Brod” whose primary purpose is education of students whose parents were killed or died in the war, and helping the poor, highly gifted students.

#### CHILDREN KILLED

Age	Number of children
0-6	5
7-10	7
11-14	9
15-17	6
TOTAL	27

#### CHILDREN INJURED

Age	Number of children
0-6	9
7-10	11
11-14	22
15-17	23
TOTAL	65

#### KILLED FROM BROD MUNICIPALITY

Soldiers and policemen	242
Civilians	150
TOTAL	392

#### WOUNDED FROM BROD MUNICIPALITY

Soldiers and policemen	993
Civilians	633
TOTAL	1626

From these few pointers, it is clear that the citizens of Slavonski Brod are stripped of all the rights of human life. Citizens of Brod are like wild animals left to the evildoers' will. While going to work in a factory or field, they listen to determine the direction of exploding shells. Inside themselves everybody is thinking whether these shells directed by some unknown assassins will kill them today, or, what is even worse, their children. For their death no one will know, ask, or much less answer. The Conferences are in vain, the Resolutions are in vain! If someone somewhere killed 3-5 dogs a day, which is the number of people killed with impunity daily around the town and the villages, animal protectors would stand up and prevent this crime, so that it wouldn't be recorded that the generation of the late 20th century was indifferent to the sufferings of these beloved animals. But you see, there is no such powerful protector of people in this world! Something is rotten, but not only in the “state of Denmark”, and not only in Shakespeare's time! Such thoughts occupy citizens of Brod, also, let no one be offended and surprised, these creatures are also made in the image and likeness of God, even though their lives are much like that of a dog, and is worth less than a dog.

People from Brod live with their children in the basements. In basements, miracles happen. Our physicians save lives in the basements. Two greatest secrets of human lives are happening in the basements: children are born and people die. In basements children go to school, projects are designed and built, exhibitions are prepared. People pronounce this word in awe: the basement. We should write an ode to this basement.

Those who claim that they were “threatened”, that they are “unarmed” and “armless”, kill our people and our children, destroy our homes, hospitals, churches and tombs with tanks, planes, cannons, missiles. Or is this just in the imagination of people from Brod? Maybe these “vulnerable” and “unarmed” are so beloved by God, they just raise their hands to heaven, and the “Serbian God” (so they say), in rage sends his lightning on our basements. This must be the truth, because world's just diplomats would not allow for such crimes to happen even to the dogs (e.g., to keep the dogs in concentration camps, or God forbid, starved, or destroy one third of dog houses like what happened in Brod), without them noticing and without punishing the evildoers.

Here's a little man from Brod red with shame, because he thought that his little mind and heart can grasp and feel something. He thought that there are moments when conscience of all people in the world must become unitary conscience of mankind. He misinterpreted that this is such a moment which people from Brod are experiencing and that Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are experiencing. He made a mistake. He admits his sin. And he is ashamed because of it.

## ATTACKED - KILLED AS A RESULT OF SHELLING FROM THE TERRITORY OF BiH



In the period from November 1991 until September 1992, 24 children from 2 to 17 years of age were killed in shelling and bombing of the town and the surrounding area

### ATTACKS FROM BH TERRITORY

Children killed		Children injured		Killed in Sl. Brod municipality		Injured in Sl. Brod municipality	
Age	Number	Age	Number				
0 - 6	5	0 - 6	9	Soldiers and policemen	242	Soldiers and policemen	993
7 - 10	7	7 - 10	11				
11 - 14	9	11 - 14	22				
15 - 17	6	15 - 17	23	Civilians	150	Civilians	633
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>392</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1626</b>

CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY  
„BOSANSKA POSAVINA“

Military secret  
DEFENSE  
TOP SECRET

Class: 8/92-01  
Ref. Number: /handwritten/ 06-01/82-819  
Sl. Brod, October 6th, 1992  
14,00 hours

BY MESSINGER

TO COMMANDER OF THE 157. BRIGADE HV

From the newly developed situation, pulling the HVO and HV units from the wider area of Bosanski Brod and from the town Bosanski Brod, with the goal to protect the bridge over the river Sava between Bosanski Brod and Slavonski Brod and to protect the left bank of the River Sava in Slavonski Brod, I

C O M M A N D

1. Immediately engage all forces of HV 157. Brigade who are not used in Bosnian part of Posavina to protect the bridge between Bosanski and Slavonski Brod.
2. Organize the defense on the bridge, downstream and upstream from the bridge with focus on anti-armed, anti- personnel and air defense of the bridge.

By all cost prevent entry of enemy forces over the bridge and river Sava in wider area of town Slavonski Brod

3. Closer area of Bosanski Brod is defended by HV 108. Brigade and parts of the ZNG 3. Brigade.
4. Readiness for defense at 18,00 hours on October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1992.

VV/AM  
commander

Brigade

DELIVER TO  
-108.br. HV /stamped/  
/handwritten/ 3. Br. ZNG

Vinko Vrbanac  
/signed/

REPUBLIC CROATIA  
 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
 SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
 ZAGREB

Number: 512-o4/o1-7687/92  
 Zagreb, October 15th, 1992

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE RH  
 General-Major SLOBODAN PRALJAK

We deliver for you usage a report regarding the events in the area of operation group Eastern Posavina.

ASSISTANT MINISTER  
 BRIGADIER  
 Josip Perković  
 /signed and stamped/

Delivered to:           – Minister of defense, Mr. Gojko Šušak  
                           – Assistant Minister, major general S. Praljak

REPUBLIC CROATIA  
 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
 SECURITY – INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
 ZAGREB

Zagreb, October 15th, 1992

Once the Security-Intelligence Service (SIS) of the Ministry was organized and structured, the Center SIS in Osijek is established, which coordinates all activities of the Intelligence Service in OZ (Operation Zone) Osijek. Since the formation of Security-Intelligence Service, on the territory of operation group East Posavina 10 employees were hired to perform tasks within the scope of services, of which two employees were assigned to the Command of Operational Group East Posavina, and the rest to combat brigades that are operating in this area.

In accordance with the orders of the Minister of Defense from June 1992 Security-Intelligence Service has provided assistance in the organization and structure of the SIS within HVO units namely 102., 104., 106. and 108. HVO Brigades. Employees of the Intelligence Service in specified units of HVO contacted directly with employees of SIS Operation Group East Posavina, where further actions were coordinated.

On April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1992 Command of the Operation group East Posavina, and DZ Osijek received the first information on the conflicts in the area of Brčko and the poor state of defense in Eastern Posavina. This resulted in the first reaction, and this information was marked as incorrect by the current commander of the Operational Group East Posavina, but the subsequent sequence of events denied it.

From there on, the employees of SIS provided daily information on the status of the units and the Command. Most of the information was about the troops low state of moral, poor combat readiness, poor organization and bad relationship between the commands, failing to take measures to strengthen the discipline in relation to rejection of going to the battlefield and arbitrarily abandoning the battlefield, the false reporting on the number of soldiers in the units and the condition of the front lines, absence and irrational spending of ammunition and artillery projectiles and collision in reaching of certain decisions between Slavonian battlefield command, the headquarters of OZ Osijek, Command of Operation Group East Posavina, IZM and others.

In connection with these events, SIS submitted written reports and here are some of the statistics:

- Since the beginning of April 1992 regarding the situation on the territory of Operation Grope East Posavina, employees within SIS, OGEP and units submitted 176 reports to Center Osijek.

Center of SIS on the basis of such reports submitted:

- 132 information to SIS Headquarters of MOD
- 29 information to Command of OZ Osijek
- 11 information to Intelligence Department of OZ Osijek
- 5 information to Slavonian Field Command
- 5 information to Command of the Operative Group of East Posavina

SIS Headquarters of Ministry of Defense based on these reports submitted the information regarding the security situation on territory of Operative Group Eastern Posavina as follows:

- 3 information to the President of Croatia, dr. Franjo Tuđman
- 10 information to Head of Office for protection of constitutional order, Mr. Josip Manolić
- 56 information to Minister of Defense, Mr. Gojko Šušak
- 9 information to Chief of GSHV (Central Headquarters of Croatian Army) general assembly, Anton Tus
- 17 information to Intelligence headquarters of MOD

Based on the orders of the Ministry of Defense dated August 11<sup>th</sup>, 1992 the inspection of SIS staff was carried out for territory of Operation Grope East Posavina. At this occasion no weaknesses were found in the operation and organization of SIS. Information was delivered on time to commanders and based on these report they were able to react and improve the condition of the units and commands.

In accordance with the command from Chief of GSHV , on September 24<sup>th</sup>, 1992 an

analysis were performed regarding the state of the Operating group of East Posavina because of the arbitrary abandonment of the positions, and because disciplinary measures and criminal liability was not processed by superiors from the command headquarters. On this occasion, office staff expressed a perception which were previously reported in relation to weaknesses in the units and commands, which was confirmed by those present and through their discussions.

#### FORMATION OF OPERATION GROUP EAST POSAVINA (OGIP)

Commander of Military units of the Croatian army in the Operative Zone Osijek is Brigadier VINKO VRBANAC, and chief of staff Brigadier ČERNI JOSIP. Depending on the situation on the battlefield Command of Operational Zone Osijek in certain areas formed their own divisional command posts (IZM). For the area of Bosanska Posavina, Main Army Headquarters formed the Operation group for East Posavina (OGIP), which was responsible for coordination and management of combat operations across the Sava river. For its work OGIP was directly responsible to the Main Army Headquarters. At that time current commander of OGIP was Brigadier VINKO ŠTEFANEK. He was former commander of the 108. Brigade of HV.

Command of OZ Osijek has no competence over the OGIP, its duty is only to provide logistic support.

With the arrival of General STIPETIĆ on the position of the commander of the Slavonia battlefield (headquarters in Đakovo), IZM Operational Zone Osijek in Đakovo is abolished. By orders of the President, Operational zone Osijek and smaller part of Operational zone Bjelovar is placed under command of General STIPETIĆ. During establishment of Command for Slavonian battlefield, it was agreed that the commander of OZ Osijek (VRBANAC) or his deputy (ČERN) are alternately present at General STIPETIĆ for so the coordination between the Slavonian battlefield and Operational Zone Osijek would be improved. But Brigadier General STIPETIĆ appointed ČERN as his chief of staff, so the position of chief of staff in the operating zone of Osijek was vacant. There are 14 HV officers in Headquarters of Slavonian battlefield in charge of specific areas.

For activities in the area of Bosanska Posavina OGIP formed three (3) IZMs. First IZM was formed in the village Koraće under command of brigadier Kolak. After the fall of this part of Bosanska Posavina, this IZM was abolished. Second IZM which coordinates and manages combat operations in the eastern part of Bosanska Posavina is located in Tolisa under command of Colonel ČEBIĆ. IZM "Center" was also formed (no one was formally designated as the commander) to command 101. Bosansko-Brodsko brigade of HVO. Commanders of HVO and HV gathered here every night in order to coordinate combat activities. The Commander of OGIP was in charge of these meetings.

Since the formation of OGIP there have been constant changes of personnel, as well as the increase in personnel so before the fall of Bosanski Brod OGIP numbered around 100 people of which 37 were officers, which led to conflict and recrimination for the resulting situation.

The 3. Guard brigade was also engaged on the battlefield in Bosanska Posavina under the command of Brigadier BASARAC. It is known that there were often conflicts between BASARAC and ŠTEFANEK. In fact, according to ŠTEFANEK, Brigadier BASARAC refused (ŠTEFANEK was colonel at the time) to receive commands from him, so sometimes BASARAC voluntarily went to Zagreb for consultations.

HV Senior officers visited the area of Bosanska Posavina, like General BOŽO BUDIMIR, general PRALJAK and general ČERMAK who stayed in the area for six weeks. General ČERMAK came to improve the supply of units of HVO and HV in Bosanska Posavina with material-technical supplies (MTS) and mines – explosive devices (MES). After his arrival, HV units were much better equipped with these supplies.

We are not aware that there were conflicts in the relationship between General STIPETIĆ, Brigadier VRBANAC and Brigadier ŠTEFANEK, but the collision occurred about issuing orders to some units by IZM, OZ and OGIP. We are familiar with the case when Brigadier ŠTEFANEK told General STIPETIĆ that if he doesn't receive required assistance in manpower he will pull the troops out of Bosanska Posavina.

Local policy (METER, PIPLOVIĆ, SOČKOVIĆ) had a major impact on OGIP which was reflected on the HV units from the area of Slavonski Brod. Disagreement with such methods of work and influence led to conflicts and demands for the dismissal of their commander as was the case with the Commander of 157. and 139. Brigade.

In connection with events in Bosanska Posavina it can be expected that local politics, as main culprits for military failure in Bosanska Posavina, will blame Croatian army and its commanders, brigadiers VRBANAC and ŠTEFANEK and General STIPETIĆ.

## EVALUATION OF ENEMY FORCES

Intelligence Department of OZ Osijek continuously delivered intelligence data about the enemy: IZM Đakovo – commander of Slavonian battlefield, OZ Osijek and OGIP, for which two wiretapping center were formed focusing on the Bosnian Posavina and promptly reported on enemy forces, movements, directions of action, etc.

According to intelligence data the enemy had from May 1992 in direction Dubočac – Struga deployed one brigade composed of the tactical groups. Brigade was reinforced by one mechanized battalion. These enemy forces were grouped in directions Lješće, Zborište, Dubočac. In the past activities, after the artillery preparation, enemy usually carried out reconnaissance and violent penetrations with one to three tanks, one or two "Pragas" and 30–50 infantry soldiers.

During the attack on Bosanski Brod, in the area of oil refinery Bosanski Brod (village Sjekovac) enemy attacked with five tanks and about 30 soldiers, and from the direction of Kričanovo with 4 tanks, two "Pragas" and about 150 infantry soldiers.

It was noted that the enemy entered Bosanski Brod with four tanks, seven transportation vehicles and around 100 infantry soldiers.

HV 108. BRIGADE (SLAVONSKI BROD) OPERATIONS – SITUATION ON THE BATLLFIELD  
28.09 – 5.10.1992

- Brigade commander:  
     Colonel STANISLAV SORIĆ
- Chief of Staff  
     Colonel STJEPAN OREŠKOVIĆ
- Commander of 1. Battalion Captain MATO LACKOVIĆ
- Commander of 2. Battalion Major ZLATKO PREBEG
- Commander of 3. Battalion Lieutenant ZDRAVKO TOLIĆ
- Commander of 4. Battalion Major ZDRAVKO ŠIMUNOVIĆ

Occupation of positions

According to received command from OGIP on 28.09.1992 the following positions were occupied:

1. Battalion – 316 solders – until 7,30 hours occupied defense line: left river Sava (Struga) – right up to the poplar tree on Kolibar path before junkyard.

3. Battalion – 458 solders – until 7,00 hours occupied defense line: left junkyard – right KT-90

Stated battalions replaced HVs 106. brigade from Osijek.

Brigade's Divisional command post with total of 40 people is located at village Gornja Močila.

During the day enemy attacked with some artillery fire on the lines of 1. and 2. battalions. All units added to the battalions and health care have entered the defense lines on time without losses.

4. Battalion – 35 soldiers from 7,00 to 13,00 hours occupied the defense line: left KT-90, right channel perimeter in line with village Unka. Command post is located at village Novo Selo.

These forces replaced HV 105. Brigade from Bjelovar.

One company of HV 105. Brigade from channel perimeter was replaced by: one section of Brigade's scout platoon, one section of group "Cer" from 3. Battalion, and scout platoon with 45 solders.

On 30.09.1992 2. Battalion – 230 solders until 7,00 hours occupied the line of defense: left – channel perimeter in line with cemetery of village Unka, right KT-94.

It was noted that the 2. Battalion needed 50 soldiers to properly shut down the line.



Fighting morale of members of the 108th Brigade was not satisfactory due to long-term effects on the battlefield. Solders were on the verge of psycho-physical capabilities, as they spent in period from 16.07 to 05.10.1992 a total of 45 days on the battlefield. Due to such a long period on the battlefield solders were showing signs of fatigue, and there was no possibility of adequate replacement of units with new people.

The morale of the army was also affected by factors such as: not taking appropriate measures against commanders and troops, who refused to go to the battlefield, disregard for the established time for a replacement of units (failure or delay of unites from other brigades designated for replacement), and the knowledge that conscripts from Bosnia avoid involvement in the defense of Bosnia and that a greater number is located in Croatia.

#### COURSE OF ACTION IN THE ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HV 108. BRIGADE

On 30.09.1992 because of enemy troops attacked on the area of economy units of the 4. Battalion except the company under the command Mr. BOŽIĆ voluntarily left their positions in a disarray. Despite insistence of brigade commander, battalion commander did not carry out his orders to put the troops back to the positions. Members of the 3. Battalion and 101. Brigade of HVO took over the abandoned positions.

The enemy managed to get behind the line of defense of 2. Battalion and attacked it from behind. The enemy was able to get behind the line of defense of 2. Battalions because the troops of 101. Brigade of the HVO from Bosanski Brod, which were located on the right wing of the 2. Battalion left the positions without orders and without informing the 108. Brigade.

2. battalion pulls out from the surrounding, and establishes a new line of defense 800 m back. During this action 19 member of the battalion are captured by the enemy, which led to a negative impact on the combat morale. Newly established defense line is strengthened with 200 members of the 2. "A" brigade.

On 02.10.1992 at the junction line between 101. Brigade of HVO and 2. "A" Brigade of HV the enemy deploys a strong combined tank-infantry attack and manages to penetrate the defensive line.

After consolidation of forces of 101. Brigade, HVO organizes a counter attack and pushes the enemy back to the school in Zborište, where the new line of defense is established.

During 03.10.1992 the enemy occasionally fires from artillery and small arms, but doesn't take significant offensive actions.

From 28.10.1992 to 03.10.1992 brigade had following casualties: 9 killed, 19 missing and 21 wounded soldiers, 5 of which seriously .

On 04.10.1992 around 11.00 hrs 101. Brigade of HVO and parts of 2. "A" brigade start the offensive in direction of village Novo Selo towards Zborište in order to take under control village Zborište and to establish the previous line of defense. Enemy was able to stop the attack and turned into a counterattack, and managed to penetrate the line of defense of 2. "A" Brigade, whose members are drawn from the position.

Enemy threatens the right-side of the 2. battalion as it is left unprotected once the 2. "A" brigade withdrew. The 2. Battalion leaves the position in fear of being encircled again and draw back in direction of village G. Kolibe. Brigade and battalion commanders try to keep the army on a new line of defense, but without success. At that point battalion commander asked for permission from brigade commander to leave the battlefield which was granted.

Together with the 2. Battalion, the 4. Battalion also left the battlefield without the approval led by commander Major ZDRAVKO ŠIMUNOVIĆ.

After 2. and 4. Battalion redrew, members of the 3. Battalion form a temporary line of defense.

Due to the mental and physical exhaustion of the 3. Battalion, Command of the 108. Brigade of HV asked the OGIP to replace the members of the 3. Battalion. Furthermore, the brigade commander asked the commander of OGIP, brigadier VINKO ŠTEFANEK and general STIPETIĆ commander of Slavonian battlefield to determine absent line of defense. They replied that there is no absent line of defense and that in the morning hours of the next day 3. "A" Brigade and parts of 101. Brigade of HVO will arrive.

On 05.10.1992 at 6.35 a small group of solders from 101. Brigade of HVO arrives as supplement to the 3. Battalion of the 108. Brigade, which was not ready to take over the lines. Upon exiting the truck, the solders scattered in small groups, which had a negative effect on the combat morale of the 3. battalion.

Commander of the 3. Battalion at 7.00 hrs reported to Brigade Headquarters that he was not able to control the unit and at 9.00 hrs the complete 3. Battalion left the line of defense.

From the units of 108. Brigade of HV only 1. Battalion remained on the battlefield.

Due to the absence of 3. "A" Brigade of HV, 1. Battalion performed a maneuver to structure semicircular defense.

At 15.30 hrs the Battalion commander voluntarily withdrew the troops in the direction of the road to Bosanski Brod.

Due to intense artillery fire, the commander of the 4. Company of the 1. Battalion asked for the permission to withdraw and the anti-armor group of 36 soldiers from the TG-123 that was in their composition left the positions.

After that, until 17.00 hrs 1. Battalion on their own initiative redraws to Slavonski Brod .

#### OPERATIONS OF THE HV 3. "A" BRIGADE FROM OCTOBER 5<sup>TH</sup> TO 7<sup>TH</sup> 1992

In accordance with the orders dated October 3<sup>rd</sup> 1992 of Brigadier Commander of OZ Osijek VINKO VRBANAC , 3. "A" Brigade, has been put on October 3<sup>rd</sup> 1992 in the highest degree of battle readiness, and 3. battalion is prepared to engage in the zone of responsibility of the Operational Group for the "Eastern Posavina".

The introduction of the battalion in the fight should have been, according to the command of the commander of OZ Osijek dated October 4<sup>th</sup> 1992 executed in the morning hours of October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1992 by decision of the commander of Operational Group for the "Eastern Posavina".

Brigade Commander Brigadier IVAN BASARAC ordered the following forces to be engaged at the battlefield

- 3. Battalion, commander DRAGAN DIKANOVIĆ
- 3. Company of 4. Battalion from N. Gradiška, commander BORO JELINIĆ
- MAD (mixed artillery division), commander MIRKO ŠTARK
- PZO (antiaircraft defense), commander DRAŽEN BATRNEK
- OMB (Armored mechanized battalion) – tank crew, commander ZDENKO ČULJAK
- Military Police – independent company, commander MIJO HARŠANJI

It is anticipated that total of 400 members of the 3. "A" brigade are added to the battlefield. Although it was anticipated that these forces arrive at the battlefield on October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1992 at 9.00 hrs, they started arriving only around 14.00 hrs ending at 16.00 hrs.

These units should have taken the positions in the region of village Kričanovo, however they did not do so since, according to their statement, the enemy troops were located on this position. Because of this they took the position in village Donja Močila.

For this reason the merge of units from 3. "A" Brigade and 1. Battalion of 108. Brigade of HV was not possible and at 15.30 hrs they voluntarily withdrew to KT-86 (the road to Bosanski Brod).

Enemy attacked the units of the 3. "A" Brigade with canons, armed vehicles and infantry.

Tank crews of the 3. "A" Brigade did not receive the armed vehicles, and on the morning of October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1992 they found abandoned armed vehicles (5 armadillos – 3 T-55 and 2 T-84) and used them as support.

On the night between October 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup>, 1992 brigade commander Brigadier IVAN BASARAC arrived at the positions to organize the redraw of units towards village Struga (the gravel along the river Sava), which was completed on October 06<sup>th</sup>, 1992 at 11.00 hrs.

Since enemy was attacking with artillery and armed vehicles, and was constantly attacking the unit flanks they begun to voluntarily redraw towards B. Brod.

While doing so, they destroyed three armed vehicles in B. Brod, cannon B-1 and part of the ammunition that our forces left in the retreat, so it wouldn't fall into enemy's hands.

According to data presented by members of the 3. "A" brigade retreat of the units to Croatia started in the evening hours of October 6<sup>th</sup> and ended in the early morning hours of October 7<sup>th</sup> at which time at 5,00 hrs the last 18 soldiers were pulled out from the battlefield.

ĐURO IVIĆ, company commander of the 3. Battalion and ŽELJKO DIKANOVIĆ, platoon commander of the 3. Battalion were killed during the combat operation, and dozen soldiers were wounded.

The enemy knew exactly that the 3. "A" Brigade was in front of them, and through a megaphone urged them to surrender promising them procedure in accordance with international law.

With this retret the defense of Bosanski Brod fails, and the aggressor completely controls the area around 17.00 hrs on October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1992.

#### OPERATIONS OF 157. BRIGADE HV (SL. BROD) AND 111 BRIGADE HV (RIJEKA)

On October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1992 200 soldiers from 157. Brigade occupied the position from Sava River to village Potočani, and are followed by TG-11 company from Rijeka, and members of Sijekovački response team which are followed by units of the 2. "A" brigade. Members of 101. Brigade HVO were in reserve in village Korače.

After beating the enemy on October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1992 on the left wing, outside the main line of enemy troop attacks, 200 soldiers from 157. HV Brigade remained as well as about 200-300 soldiers from TG-111 from Rijeka. Considering that they were cut-

off from our forces, they gradually organize semicircular defense and begin to prepare for extraction across the Sava river, for as late as possible

....

and in the afternoon hours of October 6<sup>th</sup> they receive also verbal approval from OGIP, since the communication between Derventa and Bosanski Brod was cut off.

While withdrawing with boats and ferries, 157. HV Brigade had 4 wounded and TG-111 5 missing soldiers. They redrew completely from the battlefields of Bosnian Posavina.

It should be noted that the TG-111 arrived on the battlefield with about 1,100 soldiers, and although the situation on the battlefield required rapid deployment, only 200 soldiers were gradually engaged at the battlefield.

#### OPERATIONS OF HV 135. BRIGADE ON OCTOBER 4<sup>TH</sup> AND 5<sup>TH</sup>, 1992

On the basis of written orders from brigadier VUKIČEVIĆ MILE a fighting group of 135. Brigade was formed, which numbered about 146 soldiers, mostly volunteers, and the Major ŠIMIĆ DRAGAN was appointed commander and Captain ZETOVIĆ SINIŠA deputy commander. In line with the order from brigadier VINKO ŠTEFANEK, on October 4<sup>th</sup> battle group was sent at the line of battle near the village Kolibe with a zone of responsibility from the village Kolibe to Ribnjak. During the deployment of troops to the area of the village Kolibe one soldier was killed and six were wounded. Because of these losses and heavy artillery attack the deployment of the fighting groups started on October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1992 when Major BRANKO KOVAČ voluntarily assumed command and issued the order to the battle group to leave the position after which the battle group left their positions using ferry crossing near the village Zbjeg where at that time ruled a total state of chaos.

#### OPERATIONS OF HV 109. BRIGADE

On 24 - 25 October 109. Brigade sends to the battlefield the reinforced battalion, tank platoon, 120 mm mortar platoon, scout and anti-terrorist squad, which occupies the positions on the road from village Čardak towards Gaj. During the occupation of the positions behind the troops on their own initiative two armadillos from 108. Brigade and one "Praga" opened fire towards the enemy. The enemy returned fire and two soldiers were killed and seven were wounded, which demoralized the unit.

On October 30<sup>th</sup>, 1992 HVO 101. Brigade left its position and 2 km gap remained empty on the left wing. Enemy forces entered here with 2 tanks and 2 transporters and tried to surround the unit.

During the night from September 30<sup>th</sup> to October 1<sup>st</sup> due to the danger of being surrounded, reinforced battalion of 109. Brigade pulls out without the approval from the headquarters, and battalion commander GRČIĆ reported to operating duty officer that he is not able to keep soldiers on the battlefield.

HVO 101. Brigade soldiers filled the gap, who on request from commander of the battalion of the 109. Brigade GRČIĆ refuse to fill the gap, although they promised to send help.

During the redraw of reinforced battalion and two platoons of 109. Brigade, two platoon tanks were left on the battlefield. Commander of armored mechanized units of HVO 101. Brigade took over the tanks and refused the request of 109. Brigade to give them back, and accused them of desertion.

From October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1992 units of 109. Brigade were not engaged on the battlefield in the Bosnian Posavina.

#### HVO OPERATIONS FROM OCTOBER 4<sup>TH</sup> TO OCTOBER 6<sup>TH</sup> 1992

In the last few days it was practically impossible to command the HVO troops. HVO 101. Brigade had about 300 soldiers and as early as October 6<sup>th</sup> 50 soldiers fled to Slavosnki Brod. Others were leaving Bosanski Brod along with civilians claiming that they will take care of their families and then return to combat.

It has to be noted that the engineering regulated absent defense line of Bosanski Brod existed, which was formed at the beginning of the war. During the defense of Bos. Brod this line was not used, and no units were introduced to this line.

The intensity of enemy attack operations is evident from the fact that during September 64 soldiers from HV were killed and 33 members of HVO, 650 soldiers were wounded, of which 370 seriously. 27 civilians were killed in Slavosnki Brod and a large number wounded.

HVO MAIN STAFF  
Ref. number 02-2/1-01-1537/93  
Mostar, 24 July 1993

DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Assistance to HVO units  
REQUEST

To:  
President of the Republic of Croatia, dr. Franjo Tuđman  
Minister of defense of the republic of Croatia, Gojko Šušak  
Head of the HV /Croatian Army/ Main Staff Janko Bobetko

Dear gentlemen,

Due to exceptionally difficult situation for the Croatian people, the Croatian area of the HZ HB and the HVO, as a result of total aggression of Muslim forces (superior in manpower and technically well equipped), we are referring to you with the following request:

1. That the HVO zone of responsibility, right - Popovo Polje - left Drenovac (zone of responsibility of the TG-2 /tactical group/) which the HVO is defending with 750 soldiers in one shift be overtaken by HV units.

This is an extremely significant defense sector as it provides the shortest link for the Serbs to Čapljina (Metković) and Neum. A better equipped HV unit is a guarantee that a possible Muslim breakthrough towards Neum will be prevented (it is not excluded that the aggressor might be composed of joint Serbian-Muslim forces).

With this replacement, the HVO would be able to redeploy its forces on other battlefields.

2. For the activities between G. Vakuf – Bugojno, we URGENTLY need a well equipped battalion with a part of its support (tanks, artillery) in order to assist the Bugojno forces.


3. In order to cut off Muslim forces in Jablanica and Mostar in the area of Salakovac-Ravni-Podgorani, we also need a professional battalion. They would attack Jablanica, together with HVO forces and a part of requested forces.

4. If possible, we would like them to be forces from the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> HV Guards brigade.

Sincerely,

COMMANDER OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF  
/seal/ \_\_\_\_\_ /signed/  
Major-General  
Slobodan Praljak

DEPLOYMENT OF HVO MILITARY FORCES ON TG-2 FOR  
DEFENCE





...of the Bosniak republic come forward, and there are fools who accept this, Catholics, Croats, those who, from the national point of view, were so, so. These are my suggestions, a permanent analysis of the situation solution /as printed/.

SLOBODAN PRALJAK:

The idea of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna required a stronger centralisation of all structures of civilian authorities, which was not achieved. The idea itself has not been operationalised, it was held waveringly, it was let go. The quality of our equipment is bad, the losses of competent personnel even worse. The cities - a combination of incompetence, thievery and smuggling. For example - we did not attack the Muslims in Konjic, but on our brigade, which was divided into three battalions - Konjic, Klis and Jablanica, we first had one of their brigades, then another, then a third one, while we were fighting against the Chetniks. After that, they attacked two more brigades from Igman; there was no chance for defence, slaughter and all of the international public, which, with all those political games, did not accept the fact that the Muslims, too, could be criminals. The expulsion of Muslims by the Serbs, we experienced an ethnic occupation, the number of inhabitants shifted from 1:3 to 1:10 to their advantage. Especially Bugojno, Travnik and these enclaves up here, Mostar. With a view to that, they were building an army in the rear, 30,000 - 35,000 thousand strong of which only 10 to 15 people were holding the lines towards the Chetniks. I think that this was the beginning of their idea of creating their own Muslim, fundamentalist state, and it is easy to prove sociologically that a young nation would aim towards that goal, for it is its basic cohesive force.

The military situation in January was relatively decent. We were discussing at the time whether the Croats, who used to constitute 17% of the population - and had fallen down to 12% at the time - whose deployment was the worst, could keep all these enclaves. A suggestion was put forward to try and define precisely the political thought, to define our borders and then start calling both the army and the people to come to those borders, and at the time it was to be the Croatian *Banovina* /territorial district/.

After the Vance-Owen plan that was considered to be the final stage in solving this problem, almost half of the army was demobilised, the war was almost over and the Muslims took advantage of it all to gain strength, so that we almost got burned more than we did.

All levels of military competence of the Croatian Defence Council, in that respect, are now very low. On the one hand, the military situation today is decent

because the Muslim offensive which went from Vakuf to Mostar has been crushed - with all their proclamations that they would reach Ploče and then expand a little to the left and a little to the right. In Vakuf, this offensive lasted a good month - ...the South of Mostar, Vakuf, to cut off Prozor etc. It was stopped and crushed in those areas, but there is still the area of the enclaves we had lost earlier. And Mr President, we have lost Fojnica, even though everyone had been saying for months that the co-existence there was peaceful and good, that a good example was being set by UNPROFOR and all the others. Naturally, there was no strength there, for peaceful co-existence can be achieved with strength, and thus, attacked by the Muslims, it fell silently.

The same thing happened in Bugojno. Me and Colonel AMRIĆ (?) spent a long time in Bugojno, fortifying the line towards the Chetniks. After that, endless appeasement towards the Muslims in the sense of - they won't do it to us, they won't do it to us, reselling oil, etc. All the documents were on the table, people who were doing it were named, but the combination of the civilian authorities and their influence on the military structures in these princedoms that had newly sprung into being was so huge that the operational abilities of military command were greatly limited. There were so many strings and connections that you cannot grasp in the little time you have for each city.

And thus Bugojno fell, in spite of being the best armed brigade of the Croatian Defence Council, with 3,700 men, of which there were 2,400 - 2,300 people and soldiers, plus 1,300 members of the Home Guard, a tank, howitzers, a thousand mortars etc. It all fell because it had disintegrated on the inside, and there were no clear political ideas about what to defend, as can be seen in the opposite example, say Žepča. We had the same situation in Travnik where, similarly, the civilian structures are the most frequent, simply the same as in Vareš. It is a group of thieves who traded, they were not trying to find their place but traded upwards, reselling, getting rich. It is my deepest belief that PEČIROVIĆ, who was imprisoned, should have been shot, together with the whole gang, for such a position leads nowhere, had they not been, this is an excuse for Stupni Do, but I will come back to that later, but the issue here is that they would have been imprisoned anyway, and that will happen to the others, too, except in places where the Croats are exceptionally weak, such as Tuzla, where they don't stand a chance and are, in fact, servants, and Usora which has not made a deal with the Muslims out of love, but because they have no way of getting out - either left or right. The military situation today. There is a possibility that an offensive on Vakuf will start in seven days, and that the possibility of it succeeding is relatively high. The same stands for the offensive towards the south of Mostar with Blagaj, somewhere in the direction of Bugojno, to Granačica. I believe that, with the forces that we have, it is impossible to go any further, although up there we have taken one to the left and

one to the right, taking certain better tactical positions, and managed to do something similar to Mostar. The problem of Drežnica still remains and it is not that simple.

The problem of the Kiseljak enclave and Vareš is now relatively decent because the units up there are simply of high quality and good. Kiseljak and Kreševo - the units are good, the military organisation is good, the strength of unit leaders is good. The problem remains that our entire supplies up there, the entire logistics of war are being done through Serbian territories, by trade - oil for weapons - and by jointly planning certain actions where the Serbs, naturally, will not provide men.

The military situation of Žepča is good for the simple reason that from the start, the views of this brigade, as well those of its political leadership, have been crystal clear. They behaved accordingly, inflicted serious losses and relieved the attack on Vitez, Busovača and Novi Travnik. The winter, however, is coming, the territory is quite large, the Serbian army is growing weaker so that up there, on several occasions, men had to reclaim territories that the Serbs have lost to the Muslims. The logistics depends a great deal on the Serbs and for the winter, they are asking for -

THE PRESIDENT:

Who are you talking about?

SLOBODAN PRALJAK:

Žepče.

THE PRESIDENT:

Please, about the problem of Novi Travnik, Vitez...

SLOBODAN PRALJAK:

Novi Travnik is our worst enclave, extremely narrow in certain areas, the Muslims are very eager to break it because these parts would then be too far away. They are especially interested in the *SPS* explosives factory, which would enable them to integrate the entire production of ammunition. The factory has been mined, and in case of a fall, it will all be blown up. We have no communication with this

enclave other than by helicopters. There have been terrible problems, which sometimes culminated in fighting and cursing. The pilots fly two or three times, and then - after being shot at - they often give up. If a corridor is not established very soon from Kiseljak towards Busovača, taking into consideration the current logistics support provided by helicopters that can deliver 100,000 bullets which is far from enough, there are no realistic chances of maintaining the enclave. That, for us, would spell disaster. We in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr President, cannot have two enemies. That is Vitez.

THE PRESIDENT:

I know that, I told you that this line - Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovača, that it had to be defended and ensure this...

SLOBODAN PRALJAK:

Mister President, when we discussed this up there on one occasion, I went twice - if you remember - waiting for Croatia to help with two...  
... discussed this on one occasion, I went twice - if you remember - waiting for Croatia to help with two battalions to establish that corridor towards Fojnica.

Bugojno fell soon after that and you know what problems arose in course of that, in order to do that.

So, it is my belief that we cannot go up there with two enemies. The number of people we have is relatively high taking into consideration what is left. There are over 12,000 deserters in Croatia, the lines towards the Chetniks can still be held, people are terribly exhausted.

UNPROFOR is helping the Muslims to take the territories that should not be taken from the Serbs. That seems to me to be their overall political game here, plus the newspapers.

It is my deepest conviction that Croatia should help by quickly infiltrating certain units for a seven-day action and then evacuate them by night.

In other words, if Vakuf were to be taken, if Bugojno was being taken, the units in Imotski, reconnaissance of their - commanders and the rest, infiltration of units at night, attack and after that, immediate pull-out.

As for this other functioning, Mr President, I believe there are three men in the Main Staff, except that General MATIĆ is not present, all three of whom should soon be replaced.

Why? I think that, after prison and those battles, General Tole is exhausted physically too, throwing up, etc., he often shows that a replacement should be found within some 15 to 20 days.

The same pertains to me. I have been in the game for 27 consecutive

months. I think I am not the same person as I was six, seven months ago. There is more, I am tired, I have neither the strength nor the aggression required for this present situation.

Moreover, because of the way that the units here are, it is more the case of ordinary people who donned uniforms rather than a regular army. I know a third of my units and now that we have built something, it seems to me that another team should come who would, because they would know them in a different way, enforce a somewhat different form of discipline than I now can, for I am on friendly terms with a third of my army.

The same, I think, pertains to General PETKOVIĆ, because both on that level, and, it seems to me, also on a wider scale, the following things have started surfacing. Men are tired, so that even the usual, minor, animosities are developing into conflicts and intolerance which, it seems to me, is slowly beginning to ruin the military as well as the overall civilian structure of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

In that respect, I believe that severe cuts should be made both in the military and the civilian department, changes in the personnel, changes in the government, replacements, reshuffling of positions within, for it seems to me that, the way things are standing now, regardless of all the great analyses, we will get to a place where we can only lose. This means to precisely define the policy towards the Muslims, and I claim that it is fundamentalist and that they will try to take as much territory as possible.

PRESIDENT:

From Kiseljak towards Busovača, and from Gornji Vakuf in that direction.

Slobodan PRALJAK:

All right, but it's more narrow there, you know, Mr. President, and we should see about this here.

There's another matter I just want to mention briefly. If you look at the Serbs /? whose/ state is a semblance, they have their three television stations, they have their foreign ministers and assemblies, they simply look like something irrespective of the fact that everything inside is hollow.

The same applies to the Muslims. You should see them parading their government, the tuxedos, the ties, and so forth.

In this respect, Mr. President, we have all started to look like an agricultural collective. This cannot be tolerated and we should change the entire semblance of this state which is called the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Thank you.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, before we move on to  
13 Posavina, what you're telling us is very interesting. You are one of the  
14 few witnesses we've had who volunteered and who actually is telling a  
15 story now.

16 So you went to Mostar with these nine other lads that you  
17 selected. I note that there is five Croats, three Serbs, and two  
18 Muslims. But you're going to Mostar, but could you tell us what you're  
19 going to defend over there? Mostar is in the Republic of Bosnia and  
20 Herzegovina. It is not located in the Republic of Croatia. So why are  
21 you going there, yourself? Could you tell us what motivated you to go  
22 there? Is it General Praljak who said, I need you, and if -- you would  
23 have jumped over a bridge for him, or did you go there, you know, to  
24 really defend something? But if it's the latter case that prevails,  
25 could you tell us exactly what you were going to defend?

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1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not have any reason to go and  
2 defend anybody or anything. Nobody told me to go and wage a war there.  
3 I was told to try and establish units there, to train their commanders,  
4 and that was all. We were not engaged in any war operations down there  
5 at all.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fair enough. I agree with what  
7 you just said. However, this was -- was this a foreign state or was this  
8 a notion that you just did not take into account -- that was not taken  
9 into account at the time?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what you mean. In the  
11 Croatian Army, there were also lads from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at  
12 the time we all thought that we were fighting the same enemy, the JNA.  
13 And to put it simply, it was only after the conflicts between Croats and  
14 Muslims when questions started being asked. At the time in question,  
15 nobody thought in those terms. We simply went to help the people down  
16 there to prevent the things from happening as they did to us, to help  
17 them prepare themselves. We just wanted to pass on our experience, our  
18 knowledge, to apply our experiences to prevent some things from happening  
19 to them, because they had already happened to us and we didn't want to  
20 see that repeating.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You are telling us  
22 that according to you, the enemy was the JNA, and you didn't really think  
23 about anything else, and that's why -- that's the reason why you went to

24 Mostar?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. That's how the two

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1 Muslim lads went with me, to help their friends defend themselves from  
2 the JNA, and that was the only motive they had.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When General Praljak asked you  
4 to come, did he say, The JNA is around Mostar, it's in jeopardy, we have  
5 to go there, or did he say, We have to go to Mostar because there are  
6 Croats in Mostar, Croats who might be in jeopardy? What exactly did he  
7 say?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak sent a message asking  
9 us to come and help people organise themselves. He didn't mention either  
10 Croats or Muslims. It was well known who was attacking everybody. He  
11 didn't have to tell me that the JNA was down there and that they were  
12 getting ready to prepare to attack Mostar. We knew it, even without him  
13 telling us.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I thought I understand -- I  
15 thought I understood, and please correct me if I'm wrong. It would be a  
16 favour. But I thought I understood that when you arrived there, you  
17 executed your mission, but that you found that the Muslims were hardly  
18 cooperative, whereas they should have worked hand in hand in order to  
19 achieve a common goal. So you found that -- you perceived the Muslims as  
20 being a bit reluctant, as far as this common defence was concerned; is  
21 that it?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a soldier. I'm not a  
23 politician. I don't want to go into the reason why they refused to  
24 cooperate. I came down there and tried to explain to them how to  
25 establish lines. They refused to listen. I returned, I reported back to

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1 the general, and he said, Okay, you don't have to go there anymore.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You had selected two Muslims,  
3 so I would like to know whether you discussed with them in order to try  
4 and find out why the Muslims didn't want to cooperate? Did you ask them?  
5 Did you ask these two Muslim lads that you had selected, what their  
6 opinion was on this?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't ask them anything.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At the time, did you try and  
9 understand what their motivations were or was this really way beyond the

10 scope of what you were supposed to do?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not feel that I could  
12 influence them in any way, and I just did not give it a second thought.

17 Q. We know that you went to Posavina. When was that, under what  
18 circumstances? And I'm also interested in the time-frame of your  
19 departure there.

20 A. We left on the 3rd of July, 1992. At that moment, that's how it  
21 functioned in the army. Lads, get on the buses. We are taking you on a  
22 field mission. It was never announced two days ahead. And then in the  
23 second village, we were told that we would be heading for Slavonia or, to  
24 be more precise, Slavonski Brod. We arrived there, Mr. Praljak was  
25 waiting for us there, and he told me to get onto one of -- onto the bus,

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1 and informed the lads that it was their own choice whether they wanted to  
2 cross or not. I did that. 50 per cent of the soldiers crossed, and the  
3 other 50 per cent didn't.

4 Q. And do you know whether the 50 per cent that did not cross --  
5 were they subject to any disciplinary procedure, were they punished  
6 because of that?

7 A. No, nobody was punished. The men continued to work. Some of  
8 them work to this very day, some have been pensioned off, some were  
9 killed. In any case, nobody was punished on account of that. Nobody had  
10 any problems. They were given a choice, to cross or not.

11 Q. Why did you cross? Tell us, please.

12 A. The then company commander told us, and we obviously saw that  
13 Slavonski Brod had been destroyed. Shells were falling on us as we  
14 approached it, and he told us that under the military law, we could go 30  
15 kilometres deep into the enemy territory if somebody shelled our cities  
16 and towns from that territory, that was the most compelling reason, the  
17 fact that the Croatian territories were shelled from that area. And  
18 another reason was the general was there, of course.

19 Q. You've just said that the general was there; yes?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. When you arrived in Posavina, did you meet with the general? Can  
22 you describe the situation for us? Did you go to the front-line on your  
23 own? Were you shown where to go? Did you know already where the  
24 front-line was? How did that happen?

25 A. Of course we didn't know where the front-line was. We went there



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1 during the night, we arrived during the night, and the general, himself,  
2 took us around the front-line and showed us what we could see in the  
3 dark.

4 Q. So what did that look like, when you were looking for the line?  
5 Do you remember, as you sit there? If you don't remember, never mind,  
6 it's not a big problem.

7 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry, Madam Pinter, to interrupt you, but I  
8 would like to clarify one issue here.

9 It was not very clear, when you asked about going to  
10 Slavonski Brod and when the witness answered to you. I believe that the  
11 issue was, indeed, that they may have crossed to Serbian territory, not  
12 to Slavonski Brod, itself, but to Serbian territory, because he spoke  
13 about -- now let me quote:

14 "Shells were falling on us as we approached it, and he told us  
15 that under the military law, we could go 30 kilometres deep into the  
16 enemy territory if somebody shelled our cities and towns from that  
17 territory, and that was the most compelling reason, the fact that the  
18 Croatian territories were shelled from that area ."

19 My question is that: What was that area? And as I understood  
20 it, it was that that action was taken against the Serbs, or JNA, from  
21 Serbian territory, but I stand to be corrected if I am wrong.

22 Thank you.

23 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Maybe the witness should answer  
24 instead of me testifying. I believe that there has been a  
25 misunderstanding.

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1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. To the point where we  
2 crossed, that was Croatian Posavina, those were Croatian villages,  
3 Croatian population.

4 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

5 Q. In what state is Posavina?

6 A. In Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you. But again, of course, then I'm  
8 saying that Sunja was, of course, and is Croatian territory, and then you  
9 crossed through Posavina, that is Bosnia and Serbian -- sorry, the  
10 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is what I would like to clarify.  
11 Thank you.

- 12 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]
- 13 Q. Was that part of the Serbian territory or was this the territory
- 14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
- 15 A. It was not the Serbian territory. It was the Bosnian and
- 16 Herzegovinian territory.
- 17 Q. And who resided in that territory of Posavina?
- 18 A. The majority Croatian population, Muslim population.

### Summary of testimony of Miroslav Crnković in the case IT-04-74

The witness came to greet him. Praljak dragged him aside and said: "Crni, enter the bus and tell the guys who wants to leave, leave and who doesn't go back in the bus, and is returning back." The witness entered, and said these words: "Guys we need to go across. "When you defend a city, three, four, you can even go 30 kilometers in depth ... So if there is shelling, such as the one in Slavonski Brod, day and night, children are dying, people, innocent civilians - you should go over to Bosanski Brod. Some 50% returned. They were volunteers. They were all volunteers. Our troops were already there. They crossed Sava. The command was stationed in a school. In Bosanski Brod.

Praljak went with the witness to show him the line. They went down the highway on foot, all night they were on the road.

It was not a line, there were too many holes in between. This was a real war, death and gunfire. You see them on 20 meters. Sunja - we later laughed when we said that we were in war in Sunja.

Situation in regards to the troops was the same as in Mostar: locals - week. There were some Muslim units down, one Muslim, local. I think there were from Koliba. I think it's a totally Muslim. You know, scorched land. There is nothing there. We were at a village called Žeravica. There were 30-40 houses. No house was spared, none, absolutely none. Everything was burnt. We did not have a place to sleep. We slept in a pigsty. Each house had a basement.

The witness was present when two or three houses away from him grenade hit the window of the basement where guys from Vukovar were stationed. There were six of them inside. The fights went on day and night. Late Sven Lasta, the actor, was wounded here. The witness was with Praljak at the meeting and when he returned to the yard where he usually was, he saw that everybody is lying down - not knowing that they were shelled with VBR (multiple rocket launcher) few seconds before he entered the yard. He saw the wounded and dead. That was an hour before my injury...

## Testimony of the witness Filip Filipović in case IT-04-74

4 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General Filipovic. I'm going to  
5 do my best to make my questions clear, as precise as a Swiss watch. So  
6 just say, Yes, No, or you don't know; affirmative, negative, or you don't  
7 know about what I'm going to ask you.

8 Here's the first matter: You said that in May 1992, in Travnik,  
9 50 buses arrived with roughly one and a half thousand Muslim soldiers.  
10 Now, my question is this: From which country had they come to Travnik?

11 A. They came from Croatia. They couldn't have come from any other  
12 country.

13 Q. Do you know, the buses that they came in, did they mostly have  
14 Croatian license plates or BH license plates?

15 A. Exclusively Croatian license plates.

16 Q. Do you know which the last town they rallied in before they went  
17 to BH was?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Do you know which route they took towards Travnik? Where did  
20 they pass by?

21 A. I do know that. They could have come in from Prozor, Makljen,  
22 Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, Travnik.

23 Q. Across Mount Vran, following the salvation road; right?

24 A. Yes, Tomislavgrad road of salvation.

3 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

4 Q. The people up there, were they wearing military uniforms when  
5 they arrived and did they have weapons?

6 A. They had both uniforms and weapons, and were already a unit.

7 Q. Can we, therefore, conclude that they received weapons in  
8 Croatia, and uniforms, too, and became a unit when there was an embargo  
9 enforced by the United Nations?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Now my question: Do you know whether anybody from Sarajevo, the  
12 government, the ministers, or whatever, gave any money to procure the  
13 weapons, uniforms, buses, the dredges along the road of salvation, or did  
14 you, yourself, ever, as a soldier of the HVO or anybody else, any  
15 remuneration or any material resources, weapons and so on, from what we  
16 call the government in Sarajevo?

17 A. The government in Sarajevo had nothing to do with this subject,  
18 the arrival of the units in Travnik.

19 Q. Did you, as the HVO of Central Bosnia, at any time receive any  
20 salaries from the central government, or weapons, shoes, uniforms;  
21 anything?

22 A. Never, nothing.

23 Q. Yesterday, we saw a document on the type of weapons in possession  
24 of the Army of BiH. My question would be this: In Bosnia-Herzegovina,  
25 was there, under the control of the BH Army or the HVO, any factory which

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1 manufactured rifles, automatic rifles, light machine-guns, anti-aircraft  
2 guns, cannons with one, two, or three barrels, or four barrels, Bofors  
3 weapons, ZIS multi-barrelled rocket-launchers, cannon or howitzers, 105,  
4 122, 150-millimetre howitzers, Zolja missiles, malutka missiles, Osa  
5 missiles, RPGs or shoulder-propelled rocket-launchers, anything like  
6 that? Could any of this be produced in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

7 A. Nothing except in the Bratstvo factory which I referred to  
8 yesterday. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, none of those could have been produced  
9 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, except for the large-calibre artillery pieces at  
10 the Bratstvo factory in Novi Travnik.

11 Q. But if it's -- was it possible to find some --

12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ms. Pinter has kindly invited you to wait until  
13 a question is interpreted, including allowing some time for translation  
14 also. You have been overlapping totally.

15 Please continue.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So when I said Bratstvo and  
17 large-calibre artillery, I meant those that had been manufactured  
18 previously. But in 1992 or 1993, it wasn't possible. I don't know about  
19 1994, however.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Filipovic, the stock of finished products at Bratstvo, how  
22 was this divvied up between the HVO and the BiH Army?

23 A. I think I explained this already. Well, the basic thing was  
24 this: we had to agree on a single opinion, in view of the distribution  
25 of those numerous pieces there and in terms of political and military

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1 actors on both sides, such as Genjac, Tamburic, and some other  
2 individuals. So one-third went to the southern front-line, as per  
3 agreement, because down there Muslims and Croats fought together, hand by  
4 hand. One-third went to the Army of BiH, to Visoko, to their central  
5 depot. And one-third was left to me in the area where I was accepted as  
6 commander, to be shared with the Muslims, and this is what happened.

7 Q. So the last third you divvied up between the Army of BiH and the  
8 HVO in the area where you were responsible; is that correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. My question is as follows: If we were to -- if that -- weapons  
11 that you saw in the possession of BH Army could have been taken from the  
12 Chetniks, could have been there from previous times, or could have  
13 arrived from Croatia? Out of those three possibilities, what would be  
14 the correct answer, A, B, or C?

15 A. Well, each of them, in part, but 90 per cent is the answer C or  
16 the latter.

17 Q. So 90 per cent of the weapons came from Croatia; is that your  
18 answer?

19 A. Yes, that's my answer.

20 Q. Did the Army of BiH have communications such as packet radio  
21 service or satellite telephones?

22 A. Yes, they did have.

23 Q. Did those complicated, sophisticated electronic equipment -- was  
24 it manufactured in Bosnia or was it procured through Croatia?

25 A. It wasn't manufactured in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It came from the  
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1 territory of Croatia.

2 Q. Fine. General Filipovic, sir, 1993, Jajce fell -- or 1992, Jajce  
3 fell. Did you immediately -- after the fall of Jajce, did you see me in  
4 Travnik?

5 A. In Travnik.

6 Q. Tell me the following, please: The Travnik HVO, where did it end  
7 up? Did it stay in the area of Travnik and Bugojno? And the Jajce HVO,  
8 the HVO forces from Jajce, after being defeated, did they stay in Travnik  
9 or did they go towards Croatia?

10 A. Since up to that point Jajce saw fierce battles and manned 100  
11 kilometres of front, and there were 4.000 fighters, half of them HVO,  
12 half of them BiH Army or the Territorial Defence, those 4.000 fighters  
13 came to the area of Travnik. And with respect to the HVO, although we  
14 tried to stop them there, make them stay there, they went and took the  
15 salvation road to Croatia, and those Muslim fighters from Jajce stayed in  
16 the area of Travnik, and some of them in the area of Zenica.

17 Q. Did the same thing happen with the Croatian and Muslim civilians,  
18 the population? So is it true that civilians, Croats from Jajce, went to  
19 Croatia, and Muslim civilians left in the area of Travnik, Bugojno,  
20 Zenica, et cetera?

21 A. The fighters would not have left had the civilians stayed.  
22 Fighters left because of the civilians leaving, and the Muslim civilians  
23 stayed in the area.

24 Q. You just discussed this. It disrupted the ethnic balance and  
25 gave rise to a host of problems, that fact. So is it true that the

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1 refugees who were driven out of Central Bosnia by the Serbs, additionally  
2 complicated and brought this problem to a head?

3 A. The problem of refugees arriving from other areas was already  
4 present there. But when the Jajce Muslims came to the area, and we're  
5 talking about more than 20.000 people from the whole municipality of  
6 Jajce, was the final blow to the relations among the peoples in the  
7 Lasva River valley.

8 Q. So we are faced with a thesis of the Prosecution to the effect  
9 that Praljak came up there so that we could occupy that area, drive out  
10 the Muslims, and annex the whole area to Croatia. My question to you is  
11 this: Logically speaking, how could it be possible for us to leave a

12 whole armed brigade to enter the area, leave our people and fighters and  
13 civilians, to leave and let the alleged opponent to stay, all in order  
14 for us to attack the Muslims and drive them away? Isn't it logical, in  
15 your opinion?

16 A. The fall of Jajce did not mean just the fall of the Jajce  
17 municipality, but also part of the Travnik municipality, and another  
18 10.000 people, and in an area which was exclusively defended by the TO or  
19 the Army of BiH. And the front-lines of the HVO were held firm, and they  
20 repelled further advances from the Serbs. And when you came to that  
21 area, you helped the Muslims more than the Croats, because the Croats had  
22 held firm, although you did help us as well, because personally you  
23 visited two prominent elevations with me where you could see that the HVO  
24 was holding firm in the defence of the area of Central Bosnia.

25 Q. Now, Mr. Filipovic, could you please tell Their Honours whether I  
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1 managed to assist more the Army of BiH and create co-operation up  
2 there - that's under A; under B, was Travnik shelled by the Serbs, and to  
3 what extent? Please relate that situation to Their Honours, what we did  
4 and what I did in that area, briefly. Did we manage to save Travnik, for  
5 instance?

6 A. Well, the Territorial Defence or the Army of BiH in Travnik was  
7 on the brink of complete disarray because exactly happened what I just  
8 explained. One-third of the territory of Travnik municipality was  
9 cleansed of its population, and particularly the inability of  
10 Hamandjici [phoen], Softici and other units who were holding the  
11 front-line there. There was panic in that area. The HVO was not  
12 cool-headed about that, because the situation was very grave.

13 Two days after the fall of Jajce, Alija Izetbegovic stated that  
14 the HVO was to blame for the fall of Jajce, which was blasphemous, as  
15 some other of his statements.

16 I personally took it the hardest throughout the war, the fact  
17 that Jajce fell, because I've invested quite a lot of time and my life  
18 force, and I was wounded, and my investment was in the defence of the  
19 Jajce area. And the fall of Jajce brought into question the defence of  
20 Travnik, which until that point had not been jeopardised.

21 Q. Mr. Filipovic, I was a volunteer, a high officer in the Croatian  
22 Army, assistant minister of defence. Which high officer of the BiH Army  
23 walked with me on the hilltops, forced people to dig trenches, organised  
24 the defence? Who, among the ranks of the BiH Army, was there with me?

25 A. Nobody, nobody, not a single person.

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1 Q. And where were Valenta's [as interpreted] three battalions, and  
2 why didn't they attack Komer [phoen] and extend the corridor towards  
3 Jajce? Who was Lendo? Did he have three reserve battalions, and why  
4 didn't he attack Komer earlier on, thereby expanding the corridor towards

5 Jajce.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] A correction to the transcript.  
7 Line nine, it says "Valenta's three battalions." It's "Lendo's three  
8 battalions," just to avoid any misunderstanding later on. So could that  
9 be corrected. "Lendo" is the name.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that there was  
11 disorganisation in Travnik and Novi Travnik, so Novi Travnik wasn't  
12 supposed to have any consequences from the fall of Jajce. And the  
13 battalions that you're referring to, they should have been active. Now,  
14 why they weren't active, I can't say at this point in time. But they had  
15 such a favourable position because we held Mravinjac, which is three to  
16 four kilometres as the crow flies, and Komer is a strategic bend from the  
17 Lasva River Valley to Vrabac.

18 Q. Do you happen to know where Lendo's family was when this fighting  
19 was going on?

20 A. I don't know. I know that the Lendos are a large family in  
21 Opara. Now, where his family was, I really can't say.

22 Q. Now, while we were organising all this, how many shells did the  
23 Serb Army use against Travnik on a daily basis? How many shells were  
24 falling on Travnik from the Serb side?

25 A. The Army of Republika Srpska had positions around Travnik, and  
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1 long-range artillery and medium-range artillery was deployed, and there  
2 were about a hundred heavy artillery shells falling on the town every  
3 day.

4 Q. Very well. That's what I wanted to learn from you about Travnik.  
5 Did we pull out the wounded, all the wounded, did we take care of them,  
6 and afterwards did I remain in the area? And to the best of your  
7 knowledge, how energetic was I in working towards a rapprochement between  
8 the HVO and BH Army?

9 A. I couldn't follow all your activities, there were so many of  
10 them, but I do know that you had an overall influence, or your arrival  
11 did, with respect to the defence of Central Bosnia.

12 Q. Was it negative or positive?

13 A. I don't think there can be any dilemmas on that score. It was  
14 all positive, your positive involvement in matters of defence.

15 Q. Now look at document 4D01611, please.

16 Yesterday, there was a question as to where Izetbegovic's  
17 signature was.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

21 Q. On the 14th of June, Mr. Filipovic, had Travnik already fallen?  
22 June 1993.

23 A. From Kiseliak. on the 10th. I crossed over. and on the 11th. I

24 was engaged in heavy fighting to stabilise the line and to prevent the  
25 opposite side from breaking through deeper.

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1 Q. Tell me, at the end of March and beginning of April 1993, did you  
2 see me again in the town of Travnik?

3 A. Yes. I was surprised to see you moving around quite normally in  
4 Travnik, without any escorts or anything like that. I came across you,  
5 and you were sitting in front of a cafe where nobody usually sat, and you  
6 were sitting there alone. That's not the kind of thing we did over  
7 there, any of our commanders over there or anybody else.

8 Q. That's correct. I remember that, too, Mr. Filipovic. But in  
9 Travnik, what was the ratio of HVO soldiers compared to the BH Army of  
10 the 17th, 7th, or whatever unit? What was the ratio, the proportion of  
11 the two sides' soldiers in Travnik in 1993, April?

12 A. It was a ratio of 5:1, roughly, to the advantage of the BH Army.

## D-32 Sefer Halilović: Cunning Strategy

It was 7 June 1993. That night I had planned on going to bed early, as I had to leave for Kiseljak already at two in the morning. It had been agreed that an UNPROFOR vehicle would take me across the airport, and by morning I would have to be over /mount/ Igman. A meeting with Milivoj PETKOVIĆ, the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ commander was scheduled at ten o'clock, at the UNPROFOR base in Kiseljak. But somehow I was not really up for it ...

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Almost four hours passed quickly and around 2300 hours the sound of the phone startled me. It was a call from President IZETBEGOVIĆ. He always introduced himself, saying: "This is Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ on the telephone", although that really was unnecessary. We had already spoken so many times over the telephone.

"What's up Halil?" asked the President. I told him in short that I was just about to take some rest, as I had to get up early. "Don't hurry", he said, "that meeting is not that important anyway, and we have some more important business in the morning to deal with here in Sarajevo."

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That morning, after I had first listened to the debriefing in the Operations Center at eight o'clock, and given the necessary orders, I had a rather unpleasant conversation with General MORILLON and GANIĆ. Strangely enough, on that occasion GANIĆ was very clear and decisive. He supported me when I snapped at MORILLON: "Lift the embargo which is only in force against Bosnia, that is, against the Army of BH, pick up your ramshackle operation called UNPROFOR and go back to where you came from. Leave us alone, we will very quickly agree with both Ustasha and Chetniks on whom Bosnia belongs to. And there will be peace in Bosnia very quickly".

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## Delimustafić, MUP and successors

One can even say that the bearers of the special war were hiding within MUP, provokers of the conflict within our defence system and producers of “enemies” by Bosnian patriots. Could it be a coincidence that Juka Prazina, as a famous Sarajevo criminal, becomes commander of the reserve force of special police unit? There were so many capable active policemen which were involved into preparations for the state defence. Why not them, but Juka? As one finally decided that Juka wasn't suitable for police, Juka was promoted. The state presidency appointed him commander of the special army units.

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I was telling the president about all this on daily basis; however I initiated these issues in all presidency meetings, asking for help. It was in vain. The things took some of their own courses. Was Sarajevo not plundered, without a single Chetnik entering the town? Or; who should be asked, if not MUP directly, where did the goods (coffee, cigarettes, alcohol) from Serbia and Monte Negro at Sarajevo markets in the middle of the blocked city coming from?

Delimustafić was a rather skilful merchant and let him work in this ministry; he can be rather useful here. And these days, on several occasions, he showed me loyalty – so ended the president this conversation of ours. Heading to the office, I confusedly thought whether that was possible; well, he knows that Alija Delimustafić verified the agreed decision with Aleksandar Vasiljević at the government /as written/ that JNA protects all TV relays and occupies them all in this way!? He also knows about the decision of the R BH Government on separating of 30 millions marks to the account of the Ministry of Interior to equip the reserve composition and that, from that money, almost nothing of armament and equipment was purchased. And somewhere in late February 1991, as it was the most needed, the reserve composition was dismissed in the biggest part of the Republic under excuse there was no money for salaries. He also knows that Delimustafić, in the second half of 1991, agreed with Petar Gračanin, federal minister for Interior and Aleksandar Vasiljević, chief of military security administration of JNA (read KOS) the arrival of approximately 100 inspectors from the federal SUP (again KOS) who completely paralyzed the work in defence preparations. That he also agreed with them the joint patrols of R BH MUP and JNA, so that our MUP was worse for us in PL than KOS, because here, you never know who you about to run into. Well, he knows that exactly Delimustafić, in cooperation with ministers from SDS and HDZ kept Hajro Balorda on the position of National BH bank general manager, along with the simultaneous decision of the government on extension of deadline for replacement of old bills.

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It is significant how at that time Fikret Muslimović behaves, being at that time chief of KOS in the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of JNA and the best expert for the Muslim nationalism in JNA. Colonels Vehbija Karić and Muharem Nadžak attend the meeting of corps commanders collegiums in summer 1991, among other associates and assistants, followed by, of course, lieutenant-Colonel Fikret Muslimović. At the end of the meeting, Karić and Nadžak remembering this, Fikret Muslimović stands up and at everybody's surprise, turns to the corps commander, Vojislav Đurđević, asking him to understand his personal addressing. Muslimović then condemns “the fundamentalist politics, headed by Izetbegović” as well as he marks the “fundamentalists” as breakers of Yugoslavia. He expresses his readiness to fight against such politics and asks, if necessary, not to go to the war-general school, for which he has just prepared himself, solemnly taking an oath “never to be Alija's soldier”. The present ones weren't clear why is Muslimović talking if nobody asked him a thing. They say that even Đurđević, confused a bit, concluded a meeting.

Such course of events and conduct of JNA has its pre-history. Even earlier, in the federal leadership, there were important personal shifting going on. Nikola Ljubičić, who, after Tito's death was retired by the force of the law, becomes president of the presidency of Serbia and than member of the SRFY presidency. In order to understand the meaning of this act. one needs couple of sentences to nav attention to Ljubičić. He was in the

leadership of JNA for full 20 years and although he did not start his carrier of an officer as member of the counterintelligence service, he ended his political carrier in its spirit. KOS, which will in the meantime become the most powerful organization in SFRY, was rendering accounts directly to Tito through Nikola Ljubičić. Ivan Stambolić testifies: "The more supreme commander was exhausted, the more his military minister became sovereign. He gained the complete control over KOS and almost independently led the staff policy in the army, promoting and deploying commanders". Ljubičić took over all power tools"-so concluded Stambolić after the outcome of the 8<sup>th</sup> meeting of CK SK of Serbia and claims; "Not only he is still holding strings (in JNA) of KOS, but he placed feet to the state security in Serbia in the meantime," (Path to the wilderness", I. Stambolić, pages 185 and 187).

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The behaviour of SDS and HDZ in BH leaderships, especially the Chetnik and Ustashes units in war from 1992 till 1995 are the best evidence of persistence in agreement on division of BH. They simply have never been belligerent parties but they certainly cooperated well. The story about Stolac, as well as the one about Mostar is very interesting. After a first agreement between Chetniks and Ustashes, Stolac went to Chetniks. The Ustashes retreated from the town and the Chetniks entered without a single shot fired. Afterwards, they made another agreement; and than Chetniks retreated from Stolac and Ustashes marched right into it. They are still there. It would have been the same story in Mostar if the Bosnian patriots hadn't incited to rebellion. However, in any case, the Chetniks, after an agreement with Ustashes, retreated towards the border of Splitska banovina, to Podveležje. Ustashes hang around at points of reference in Stolac, Kiseljak, Konjic, Vareš and Žepče the Chetniks, do business, exchange information and make war together against the BH army. If the problem is focused and only the SDA is sorted out, one can ask a line of questions that clearly point at a constantly present desire for one's own beylic; can it be by chance that from the moment of SDA establishment till nowadays, the official policy of the state is led by a unofficial éminence grise, known as the Zagreb group? Did Doctor Mustafa effendi Cerić, the former imam of Zagreb mosque became reis in BH in an illegal way? Was Fikret Muslimović, the former key staff of KOS, by chance most significantly supported exactly by the circles of IVZ? The national weekly magazine Ljiljan promoted Muslimović into the measure unit of the Bosnian patriotism. And so on. All the way till the moment when one must admit that Bosnia and Herzegovina today looks exactly the way KOS wanted it to be; compartmentalized by ethnic lines, the Bosnian issue reduced to a humanitarian one whereby the Bosniak problem is reduced to a Islamic problem in Europe. Later on, let's say, Muslimović, along with Zijad Ljevaković played a key role in reforming the army to exclusive party role, respectively, one should give him credit for ideologization of the army and its reinforcement with Mujahedins. By his activities, the entire line of institutions was discredited; among others, the Council of Bosnian intellectuals' congress, the initiative board for establishment of this body, believe it or not, were consisting of; Fikret Muslimović the way he is, Atif Purivatra, retired Colonel of the former JNA, Mujo Kafedžić and naïve Avdo Hebib.

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Thanks to military organization, created in the entire territory of the R BH, we managed, in only couple of months, from April till September 1992, to create the army, consisting of 5 corps with a major number of units and liberate 58% of the country. The free territory under control of the army and HVO is calculated within this calculation. The free territory before there was no conflict with the HVO. As one saw in the main staffs of HVO and the Croatian army there would be no agreement between Tuđman and Milošević, they headed towards conflicts with the army and on 25<sup>th</sup> of October 1992, the Ustasha units entered Prozor.

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Bosnian patriots at the same time had an Army with five corps and about 250,000 soldiers, which successfully fought the villains on two fronts. In the history of mankind there are no such examples.

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Throughout entire 1993, the manpower of the army are 261 500 combatants; in late 1993

and especially in 1994, this number starts to decrease by various bases; uncontrolled, elementary and easy giving out of working obligations, absences and departures abroad, releases from service in the army on the basis of incompetence, even unpermitted number of desertions and unexcused absences from the BH army units. This period in its time frame corresponds to the pressure in the army which will later on be given its proper name – ideologization, or even more precise; the beginning of creation of the party (SDA) army.

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Sefer Halilović, Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo

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## M. Filipović: I was Alija's diplomat

If we were not the authors of our fate, if everything that happened to us and around us happened according to the intentions of decisions taken by others, if therefore we were only an abiding element of our history, then we did not have the right to do even what we did, or to take decisions that significantly altered the position and situation of all the inhabitants of our country. By doing so, to a great extent we decided what would happen to our country and ourselves and for this we bear the greatest responsibility.

Tito was no longer around, MILOŠEVIĆ's attack on the Alliance of Communists, carried out with the help of some incautious pro-Yugoslav politicians from other republics, and the growing tendency to resurrect an old proposal for the so-called amputation of Slovenia and northern Croatia from the former Yugoslavia, initially launched by the former Yugoslav King Aleksandar KARADORĐEVIĆ in 1929, creating a Greater Serbia, clearly indicated that there was but one solution for all the states that found themselves in Yugoslavia, which was to flee from this hell, exercising what was at the time the constitutionally guaranteed right of the republics to disband and declare independence.

Unfortunately, it must be said that the Muslims, particularly the intellectuals, were not aware of the actual position of Bosnia and Herzegovina or themselves. They failed to react to the massive political persecution of the Muslims in the so-called Agrokomerc affair. They did not show even the slightest interest in the work of the Forum, in fact, some very well known Muslim intellectuals easily fell under the influence of forces and ideas that had their foundation in anti-Islamism. In order to awaken interest in this topic, I initiated a meeting of some eminent Muslim intellectuals, planned for the end of 1989 and finally held at the mosque in Zagreb in 1990. The meeting took place on 12 February 1990 while I was a guest at the Novinarski Dom /Journalists' Club/, at a round-table discussion of the Alliance of Croatian Journalists, where I was invited to talk about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the problem of the national identity of the Muslims. I had arranged this guest appearance myself as a cover for the meeting that was the real reason for my trip to Zagreb.

I had no desire to become its member, and was silent in response to IZETBEGOVIĆ's and ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ's offer to join the party. Once, when IZETBEGOVIĆ told me he was having a problem with some people in the party over including me in the executive committee, which he had supposedly recommended, as was confirmed by Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ, I told him that he should not do it because I had no desire to be in the same party as people like Omer BEHMEN, Hasan ČENGIĆ, Salim ŠABIĆ etc. since I was a very different type of man, and to me there was no connection between religion and politics. Of course this did not mean that I considered these men unsuitable for any other reason save our difference of opinion. My opinion was completely different from theirs, because, from what I could see, they derived all their political positions from their religion, which to me were wrongly understood. I believed politics and religion were different things.

The meeting with TUĐMAN took place in his residence, the presidential palace on Grič hill, on 8 April 1991.

During the meeting TUĐMAN was very pleasant and benevolent, and showed a great interest in the idea of Bosnia following the example of Croatia and Slovenia, which, he then told us, had taken an irrevocable decision to leave Yugoslavia, even telling us the precise date when the decision is to be made public. They took the decision for state reasons and because all possibilities to reach some kind of logical, rational and political agreement with MILOŠEVIĆ had been exhausted. Even if it had been difficult in the past in Yugoslavia, always dominated by the Serbs, then a Yugoslavia dominated by MILOŠEVIĆ could not survive and a decision had to be made to leave it. This was a legally justified and politically logical move, which he recommended to us wholeheartedly at the time. He emphasised that if Bosnia and Herzegovina were to leave Yugoslavia with Slovenia and Croatia, it would be much easier for everyone to take the step and strike back against any action taken by MILOŠEVIĆ. Finally, TUĐMAN believed, the world would have to support three republics leaving a state so obviously dominated by MILOŠEVIĆ, who, as far as we knew, was considered by politicians abroad to be a brute, Serbian nationalist and semi-fascist. He also told us that the Croats and Slovenes already had significant support from Germany and Austria for the step they intended to take, which was far from little to begin with. We gave him our assessment that for Bosnia and Herzegovina it would also be best to leave Yugoslavia together with Croatia and Slovenia, since once two states departed Bosnia and Herzegovina would be left alone in a Serbian sea, which will be additionally frustrated after the departure of Slovenia and Croatia, so democracy would not stand a chance in such conditions. TUĐMAN reacted to this by openly saying that he did not believe that Bosnia would leave Yugoslavia, saying he believes that IZETBEGOVIĆ was impressed and somehow prepared by the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/. Assessing that he was surrounded by agents of the KOS /Counterintelligence Service/ and DBJ /Yugoslav State Security/, he said he knew that IZETBEGOVIĆ had been at the JNA General Staff for preparations, where all the power and might of the army was shown to him and that he would not have the strength to break free from it and risk a conflict with such a force. Of course, I reacted to his statement, saying that IZETBEGOVIĆ was not the topic of discussion here and that all of this could be conjecture, but rather /we were there to discuss/ the political conditions in the country and the best decisions that could be recommended. However, TUĐMAN stuck by his position, repeating that he did not believe IZETBEGOVIĆ would take the decision to leave Yugoslavia together with the other two republics. At the end, concluding our conversation, he offered to have us join them in leaving Yugoslavia and said he would wholeheartedly welcome such a decision from us and that he would make the effort with his Slovenian partners to accept such a position from us. He even said that he believed they would be prepared to wait a month if we could prepare for such a decision. We agreed that such a decision required some minimal but necessary preparations. Above all it was necessary to prepare the appropriate decision on our leaving Yugoslavia in the utmost secrecy, and those pertaining to the functioning of the future independent state, and it would be necessary to develop the methods for implementing such decisions. It was necessary to immediately activate military forces that would be loyal to the Bosnian government after the decision to break away was taken. We believed that the conditions and proposals offered to us were fair and that it was possible to examine the issue of us breaking away from Yugoslavia based on them and to take a set of decisions to legally and technically prepare us for it. It was really a very urgent matter and events would not wait for us to catch up. Complete political, military and legal measures were needed very urgently to allow the implementation of this delicate, risky and complex state, legal, political and military operation and to ensure its success.

Following the talks, we departed for Ljubljana on 9 April 1991. I mentioned earlier that Adil had long been acquainted with the leading Slovenian politicians of the time, some of whom were then very influential, had taken part in the former Democratic Alternative abroad, thereby making contacts and discourse much easier.

Actually, our discourse with BAVČAR, BUČAR, JANŠA and other Slovenian politicians was very direct, meaningful and smooth. Like TUDMAN, all our collocutors believed that we would inevitably leave Yugoslavia, that it was better done as soon as possible and that the most favourable moment was when the two western Yugoslav republics were leaving Yugoslavia. They too were of the opinion that such a decision needed to be prepared, taking into account that some preparations, already completed while Slovenia and Croatia were preparing to leave Yugoslavia, would now take less time, but there was a need to hurry up with the preparations in all fields: military, political, economic, constitutional and legal. Above all this was a thorough international probe of how influential western countries would accept such a document. Considering this, it would be easier for us to take a decision knowing that it would be supported by some very important states. They believed that leaving the existing federal state or the separation of three republics would be a more plausible act and that it would offer much greater chances for tactical manoeuvring in these circumstances. First, it was not disintegration as much as halving Yugoslavia. Second, the West, whose political calculations include economic interests as an important criteria would more readily accept the separation of three than two republics, because it would thereby keep a larger market for its goods and technology and we would be better partners. In that case we represent the more developed part of Yugoslavia. Militarily it would be easier for three to defend themselves from an attack than to do so individually. Finally, now is the right time, because MILOŠEVIĆ has not properly prepared Serbia for war or homogenised the Serbs to the measure where they would be prepared to chance direct war operations.

According to Adil, IZETBEGOVIĆ said that he had neither guarantees, nor was he working on any plan for militarily or politically opposing the anticipated operations and he believed that the only way out of the situation lay in negotiations with the Serbs. When Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ asked him to negotiate, IZETBEGOVIĆ supposedly told him that he could not, that he was not the best person for it, because the Serbs did not trust him, and therefore he was not a suitable negotiator. He requested that we, Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ and I, negotiate with the Serbs on behalf of the Muslims. I felt something was not right and that a trap lay somewhere in IZETBEGOVIĆ's illogical proposal.

We believed that the negotiations had take place, primarily between the Serbs and Muslims. Namely, the greatest problems and severest possible consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina would be the result of severely disturbed relations between the Bosniaks and Serbs. It had to be clear to everyone that the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be determined above all others by relations between its largest ethnic communities.

Thus began the negotiations, often referred to later, between the Serbs and Muslims on how to solve the problem of the fate of our country began under auspices of the President of the SDA Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, with the mandate he gave us. These were negotiations for finding a solution to the problem of relations between the Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the same time on the future relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Actually, the negotiations dealt with whether and under what conditions Bosnia and Herzegovina could possibly remain in Yugoslavia or whether she must leave, even if under the most unfavourable conditions

The negotiations began on 8 July 1991 and were held in the building of the state Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, actually in the office of its member Nikola KOLJEVIĆ. The preliminary, introductory negotiations were lead only by Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ, Radovan KARADŽIĆ, Muhamed FILIPOVIĆ and Nikola KOLJEVIĆ.

The negotiations began intensely every day at meetings of the two delegations. Adil and I were in one, Karadžić and Koljević in the other.

Occasionally, Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK and Biljana PLAVŠIĆ would join the negotiations on the Serbian, while on our side only Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ sometimes took part in the negotiations.

He took part in one of the very important sessions of the negotiations, when it seemed we had already come close to an agreement. This was on 23 July 1991, after IZETBEGOVIĆ's return from a visit to the USA, when he gave a positive assessment of the negotiations, welcoming them and saying that he was aware they were being held with his knowledge and approval. The negotiations were interrupted briefly because the Serbian representatives had to consult with Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, which the late Nikola KOLJEVIĆ said openly, because these were issues of the highest national interest for all Serbs. We did not need that much time, our communication with IZETBEGOVIĆ was easier, interrupted only by his brief visit to the United States of America. Upon his return from that visit, at Sarajevo airport, IZETBEGOVIĆ gave a statement for TV BH that he knew the so-called Serbian-Muslim talks were in progress, he approved of them and that he hoped they would succeed. During that visit, IZETBEGOVIĆ was received by BAKER's assistant at the time, Lawrence EAGLEBURGER, and by General SCOWCROFT, the President's National Security Advisor.

Furthermore, JNA operations, which had two basic objectives, began. The first of these was to include the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in intense military operations, which the JNA was waging against the state of Croatia at that time. The second objective, in conditions of the assumed absence of a proper and energetic reaction by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to this obvious seizure of its territory, was to force a worsening of relations between the Croats and Muslims, as logical allies in this situation, so that a variety of activities aimed at destabilising these rations were carried out from our territory. The city of Dubrovnik was attacked from the territory of the municipality of Trebinje, an attack was carried out against Ravne village in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, populated by Croats committing an overt military provocation and aggression on its territory. Finally, and the final measure to test the ability of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to protect its territory, was the shameful act of the Bosnian authorities turning over the captured defenders of the Croatian town of Kostajnica, who crossed to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to avoid falling into Serbian separatists' hands in Croatia, to be turned over by our authorities to the Serbian army in the guise of the JNA, and all of them kept in the ominous Manjača camp and probably killed.

To all these over provocations, our government and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ himself remained mute. The expected silence was the condition for the continuation of a possible Serbian military operation in our country. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina silently allowed the Serbs to continue such operations, and their conduct as occupier received additional impetus from the stepped up campaign of the Serbian autonomous districts throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian Krajina SAO, Old Herzegovina SAO, Ozren SAO and Semberija SAO. Preparations were under way for creating other similar entities, all with the aim of breaking up the country. This was how Bosnia and Herzegovina became a kind of leopard skin, spotted with zones where the legitimate authorities had no influence.

## A letter of the President Izetbegović to the President Tuđman

Dear President,

I am convinced (within that context I have got certain information) that he will offer you some partial solutions in the bilateral negotiations, that would partially be realized opposite of Muslims' and Bosnia and Herzegovina's benefit.

I ask you to turn such offers down. You know that this would lead into chaos, rather desirable by some forces. The friendship between the Muslim and Croat people can give more than any unprincipled conditions like now like in the future. I want to assure you in the friendly feelings of the Muslim people.

Sarajevo, 24 March 1991

Sincerely yours  
Alija

#### 4. Secret Meeting at Karađorđevo

In order to transform Karađorđevo into a mythical place where "Bosnia was divided" between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević, the creators of this myth first had to declare that the meeting was secret. It is not quite convincing to make a secret agreement at a public meeting. It is easier to believe in a theory of conspiracy, if "the secret agreement" had been made at "the secret meeting" between two parties at the expense of the third party, i.e. Bosniacs (still calling themselves Muslims at the time).

The Hague Prosecutor also accepted the assumption that the meeting at Karađorđevo was a secret one. Here is the explanation that Prosecutor Kehoe gave to the Tribunal President as he questioned academician Dušan Bilandžić, who testified as Tribunal expert witness in the Blaškić case:

*Mr. Kehoe: Mr President, there are, with all due respect, there are numerous questions - not numerous, but several very important issues concerning this very important secret meeting in Karađorđevo that need to be asked of this witness.*

*Source: Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by academician Dušan Bilandžić, 9 September 1998, p. 11389-11390*

Not only that Prosecutor Kehoe accepted the theory about the secret meeting at Karađorđevo, but he also did not know the exact date of this "very important secret meeting". Presumably, he tried to confirm, by way of his "ignorance", how secret that meeting was indeed, since nobody knew its date.

*Mr. Kehoe: Now, Doctor, what you were discussing during that (expert meeting - remark by M.T.) is the secret meetings in Karađorđevo on the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> of March, 1991, between President of Serbia Milošević and President of Croatia Tuđman;*

*Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A, testimony by academician Dušan Bilandžić, 9 September 1998, p. 11364.*

For laymen in legal matters, a courtroom is a place where facts should be established. It is surprising therefore, that neither the Prosecutor, in his Indictments and when addressing witnesses, nor the Tribunal in its

Judgement, did not bother to establish such basic facts as the exact date of the meeting at Karađorđevo and that the meeting was not "a secret meeting", since many news agencies reported on it.

*ZAGREB, 25 March (Hina) - It has been announced that, prior to the forthcoming meeting of the Presidents of the six republics to be held this week, President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman and President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, met today in the border area between the two republics.*

*During lengthy long talks about key issues relating to a political and economic crisis and the future relations in Yugoslavia, the Presidents considered the main issues to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the republics' Presidents. Despite well known differences in opinions about the basic issues concerning the interests of Croatia and Serbia, i.e. of the Croatian and Serbian peoples, both Presidents took into account that the relations between Croatia and Serbia are crucial for the overall relations between Yugoslav republics and, as such, for the solution to the political crisis in the SFRY. Therefore, their efforts were aimed at eliminating the options that might endanger the interests of the Croatian and Serbian people alike and, at seeking permanent solutions that would guard the historic interests of peoples. The following was concluded:*

*- to determine the period of solving the existing Yugoslav problems of two months at longest, that will be submitted as a joint proposal at the forthcoming meeting of the republics' Presidents,*

*- to consider, under the conditions of the aggravated economic crisis, solutions and proposals, inspired by the proposal by the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia, concerning changes in the functioning and composition of the Federal Executive Council in the transition period, in order to protect the country from the economic collapse, as is set forth at the end of the statement about the meeting between President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman and President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević.*



Source: HINA, Baza EVA, 25 March 1991

LJUBLJANA, 26 March (Hina) - One of the motives for a meeting between Tuđman and Milošević is probably because they both realised that their policies, excluding each other, have started to weaken Milošević's position and to undermine Tuđman's authority, as is stated in the today's comment of Radio Slovenia on the yesterday's meeting between Croatian and Serbian presidents.. It is stated further that this went especially for Milošević "whose position has started to shake after the developments in Belgrade. After having announced its secession from Croatia, the Krajina of Knin disturbed many of Tuđman's plans for a sovereign and independent Croatia".

Among factors which influenced the summit we can include ever more frequent negotiations between republics, a partial or only simulated withdrawal of the Army from the political life and, above all, a diminishing activity and influence of the SFRY Presidency, goes the comment on the presidential meeting by Radio Slovenia.. Milošević and Tuđman will jointly propose a two-month deadline for solving the Yugoslav agony. They also partly agreed on proposals to modify the functioning and composition of the Federal Executive Council in order to protect the country from the economic collapse" as reported by Slovenian Radio. The comment also wonders as to whether Ante Marković's days in office are numbered and whether one of Slovenian representatives might leave the Government adding that "the meeting raised many questions, the answers to which we will have to wait..

Source: HINA, Baza EVA, 26 March 1991

PARIS, 27 March (Hina) - The meeting between the Presidents of the two Yugoslavia's biggest republics, Tuđman and Milošević, is perceived in France as a good sign that an agreement on restructuring Yugoslavia is possible. The Catholic daily paper, La Croix, says that Yugoslavia is "on its way to a con-federative model" like the European Union, as Croatia and Slovenia are proposing.

Serbia's President Milošević has "opposed this strongly"

so far, the paper emphasised. However, he is now "saving his reputation" because he agreed to a con-federative project of "the northern republics" according to which the relations between the republics will be reduced to economy, diplomacy and the Army. La Croix also published an analysis by a well-known historian for Central Europe, Francois Feuilletau: the meeting between Tuđman and Milošević is assessed as "great progress towards restructuring of Yugoslavia". According to Feuilletau, "Milošević perhaps realised that he has to renounce his plan for a great Serbia and accept a con-federal model of Yugoslavia in order to stay in power". All leading French newspapers - Le Monde, Le Figaro and Liberation - published reports about "the meeting on the border" between the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia stressing that the two biggest republics agreed to solve "the difficult Yugoslav crisis" within next two months.

Source: HINA, Baza EVA, 27 March 1991

DÜSSELDORF, 27 March (Hina) - Handelsblatt, a German paper on economy published in Duesseldorf, dedicated much of its space to a meeting between Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević. In a framed report on the cover page next to Tuđman's photograph, its Belgrade correspondent Georg von Hubbenet reported on a surprising meeting between the two political enemies and emphasised that - according to the reached agreement - formal constitutional preparations for concrete negotiations on the future structure of Yugoslavia might be finalised within two months at the latest. The Duesseldorf paper reported that Tuđman and Milošević had also agreed that the future Yugoslav economic policy would be carried out pursuant to ideas of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia and not pursuant to the reform plan of Government President Ante Marković. "According to the Economic Chamber, the restrictive monetary policy of the Belgrade Federal Government should become more flexible, which would increase the liquidity of the Yugoslav economy, Handelsblatt says and stresses that further devaluation of the dinar is not to be excluded.

Source: HINA, Baza EVA, 27 March 1991

It is a fact that all Croatian agencies as well as

agencies from abroad reported on "the secret meeting" at Karadžorđevo. Accompanied by different comments, they all emphasised what we gather from the French press: "All leading French newspapers - *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and *Liberation* - published reports about "the meeting on the border" between the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia stressing that the two largest republics agreed to solve "the difficult Yugoslav crisis" within next two months."

It is also a fact that, at the first meeting of the Presidents of all republics of 28 March 1991, the conclusion was adopted that the Presidents of the republics find a solution to "the difficult Yugoslav crisis" within two months. This was the first result of the Karadžorđevo meeting, although the Presidents could not agree on the solution to the Yugoslav political crisis even after six meetings that were held during the next two months.

It is a fact that that was not a secret meeting and, that the Croatian and foreign press reported about it. It is also a fact that neither the Prosecutor nor the Hague Tribunal were willing to accept the exact date of the meeting, its contents, as they were announced, or a number of comments on the meeting published by the European press. Instead, they preferred interpretations and behind-the-scenes manoeuvring that preceded the meeting itself. Over the years - as the first pieces of information about the meeting fell into oblivion - they helped creating a myth about "the partitioning of Bosnia" at Karadžorđevo.

Rumours that "the partitioning of Bosnia" would be discussed at Karadžorđevo were spread **before** the meeting at Karadžorđevo and not after it. Who was the first to spread them is hard to establish now. The following fact, which is probably a new piece of information for the readers, will confirm this. A day before the meeting between Tuđman and Milošević at Karadžorđevo, Alija Izetbegović wrote to President Tuđman that he knew that Milošević would offer him "to divide Bosnia":

*"I am convinced (and I have certain pieces of information in this respect) that He will offer you, during bilateral talks certain partial solutions, that would partly be applied at the expense of the Muslims in*

*Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

*I am asking you to refuse such offers. You know that this would lead to chaos which some are hoping for. The friendship between the Croatian and Muslim peoples can now as in future offer much more than any unprincipled arrangement.*

*Let me assure you of the friendship of the Muslim people.*

*Yours sincerely,*

*Alija*

*Sarajevo, 24 March 1991<sup>27</sup>"*

The contents of the meeting between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević were called into doubt before that meeting. As far as I know, Alija Izetbegović never said in public who gave him, before the meeting "certain pieces of information" that "He" would offer "certain partial solutions".

Izetbegović did not reveal what convinced him thereof, but he said in public that President Kiro Gligorov gave him first information about "the partitioning of Bosnia" one day after Karađorđevo.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> I got this letter in December 1994 from an adviser to President Tuđman. After having compared its handwriting with some other handwriting of Alija Izetbegović, I believe that the letter is authentic. The letters *BiH* in the right upper corner of the letter are President Tuđman's handwriting. That was his way of marking documents so that they could be classified easily. I believe that the original of this letter, that was obviously faxed, must be in the archives of the Office of the President.

<sup>28</sup> See: A. Izetbegović: "Two Sides of the Rubicon" (*Dviije strane Rubikona*), in M. Tuđman (editor). *Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990-2025*. Zagreb:UHIP, 2005, p. 53. Izetbegović's letter, sent to President Tuđman on 24 March 1991, refutes Izetbegović in saying that he had found about the alleged contents of the talks one day after Karađorđevo, i.e. on 26 March 1991. Besides, on 26 March 1991, Izetbegović was in Vienna, where he participated in a round-table discussion called "Europe" and gave a presentation on the topic "The Rights of National Minorities and National Minority Policy within the New European Order". Gligorov was not at that gathering. However, the first meeting of the six Presidents was held in Split on 28 March 1991. It is probably there that Gligorov could have told Izetbegović what Izetbegović claimed to have heard from Gligorov.

Izetbegović never used the letter that he sent to President Tuđman, one day before the meeting at Karadžorđevo, as an argument to be used when discussing the story about "the partitioning of Bosnia". On the other hand, "the partitioning of Bosnia" at Karadžorđevo was never an item on the agenda during negotiations or used as an argument for disputing at the meetings of the Presidents of the six republics, that were held during the next two months. Had any agreement to divide Bosnia been reached, the meetings of the Presidents of all republics, which resulted from the joint proposal agreed on at Karadžorđevo, would have never taken place, or would have had quite a different course.

The origins of the myth about "the partitioning of Bosnia" are to be found somewhere else. The logic behind them is of a different kind and it will be discussed after we have examined statements made by those who, either directly, or indirectly, participated in the meeting at Karadžorđevo.

##### **5. "The agreement to divide Bosnia is Mesić's fabrication"**

Karadžorđevo is the central point, a source of all indictments against Croatian generals and officials, that are based on the existence of the international conflict and "Croatia's aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina". The argument used by The Hague is that there was "a plan to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina" and that "that plan was agreed on at Karadžorđevo".

That is why the Prosecutor asked Stjepan Mesić to give evidence as witness for the Prosecution in the General Blaškić case - to testify about "the agreement between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević to divide Bosnia":

*Prosecutor Harmon: He will testify in that regard about a meeting that took place 1991 between Slobodan Milošević and President Tuđman at Karadžorđevo, after which President Tuđman's clandestine policy to divide Bosnia was implemented.*

*Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A., testimony by S. Mesić, 16 to 19 March 1998*

Stjepan Mesić met the Prosecutor's expectations.

However, he also played his role of the key witness in a way that would satisfy the yellow press, the Prosecutor aspiring after quick success and the Tribunal, that was poorly informed about the causes and events relating to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. By providing partial information and disinformation about Karađorđevo, Mesić created an illusion of a truthful testimony. Nevertheless, each time he had to answer to a direct question by Blaškić's Counsels for the Defence, he either distanced himself from his previous statements or relativised them. That is why he can now claim that he did not say what he said, because he said nothing about the merits of the thing.

*S. Mesić: Tuđman came from Karađorđevo that same day and told us ...that it would be difficult for Bosnia to survive, that we could get borders of the Banovina.*

*Tuđman also said that Milošević, sort of in a gesture of largesse - that Croatia could take Cazin, Kladuša and Bihać, because this was the so called Turkish Croatia and the Serbs did not need it.*

*Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A., testimony by S. Mesić, 16 to 19 March 1998*

**Question: So, after President Tuđman returned from the Meeting at Karađorđevo with President Milošević, he informed you that Bosnia would be partitioned - partitioned between Croatia and partitioned between Serbia; is that correct?**

*S. Mesić: Roughly, from what he said one could deduce that Bosnia could not survive, that we would be given the borders of the former Banovina plus Kladuša and Bihać -Cazin and Bihać. That was the conclusion that could be drawn from what he said. Of course, nothing was said to the effect that there was a written document about it, or a written contract. That was not mentioned.*

*Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A., testimony by S. Mesić, 16 to 19 March 1998*

*S. Mesić: Work on the maps started after the agreement in Karađorđevo. Smilja Avramov, a university professor*

and an adviser to Slobodan Milošević came to Zagreb and Hrvoje Šarinić and some others - after all, this was in secret - they went to Belgrade. They certainly discussed maps. Experts were engaged, university professors, specialising in that science, and they were invited - I would meet them, but I did not participate in those talks, because, after all, this had a dose of confidentiality, but I knew that they were working on them. I knew that Professor Lerotić was working on the maps, I knew he stopped working on them, he abandoned the job. I knew this because Professor Bilandžić also told me that. Now, whether they could speak in public about those maps, I do not know, but he told me, and later on, he made the statement for the media, he said, "While I was drawing the maps, Tuđman liked me," so you can read this in the media.

Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A., testimony by S. Mesić, 16 to 19 March 1998

During the cross-examination Stjepan Mesić was no longer sure, he did not know what was the purpose of the meeting at Karađorđevo. He did not know what had been agreed at Karađorđevo. He knew only "what he had been told" about the agreement, but it was no more President Tuđman who had told him about it. "I do not know what agreements were reached there", Mesić claimed. Nevertheless, he was only "aware of the consequences". How did he come to realise that those consequences resulted from the agreement of Karađorđevo, he did not explain. Just as he did not explain to the Tribunal the full context of the events relating to the meeting at Karađorđevo, or of all other events he testified about.

**Question: Is it correct that the aim of President Tuđman's going to Karađorđevo was to avoid war-- was that the intention behind the scheduling of that meeting ?**

**S. Mesić:** I do not know what his intention was. I do not know what my intention was when I arranged that meeting.

Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A., testimony by S. Mesić, 16 to 19 March 1998

*Question: You said that the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was formed similarly to the formation of Republika Srpska as a consequence of the agreement between Tudman and Milošević at Karadževićo?*

*S. Mesić: I do not know exactly what was agreed in Karadževićo. All I know is what I was told about Karadževićo. What the arrangements reached there were, I do not know. I am only aware of the consequences.*

*Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A., testimony by S. Mesić, 16 to 19 March 1998*

The testimony of Stjepan Mesić was good enough for the Hague Tribunal which accepted it as credible. In its Trial Chamber Judgement, the Tribunal refers to his testimony:

*105. These aspirations for a partition were furthermore displayed during the confidential talks between Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic in Karadjordjevo on 30 March 1991<sup>204</sup> on the division of Bosnia -Herzegovina. No Muslim representative participated in these talks which were held bilaterally between the Serbs and Croats<sup>205</sup>. Following Karadjordjevo, Franjo Tudjman opined that it would be very difficult for Bosnia to survive and that the Croats were going to take over the Banovina plus Cazin, Kladusa and Bihac<sup>206</sup>. Preliminary secret negotiations were held using maps to come to an agreement with the Serbs on how to partition Bosnia<sup>207</sup>. An interview of the Defence witness Bilandzic published on 25 October 1996 by the Croatian weekly Nacional confirms that, following negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic, "it was agreed that two commissions should meet and discuss the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina"<sup>208</sup>.*

*Source: Blaškić Case No IT-95-14-A., Judgement, 3 March 2000*

Whether it is a task of the prosecutor and the tribunal to establish facts and the truth or not, is a theoretical question. However, in the case of the Hague Tribunal the problem becomes more complex and, the responsibility of both, the Prosecutor and the Tribunal, even greater. Why is that so? It is because in different cases before the Tribunal we find witnesses, which are



relevant to some other case as well. Besides, the Prosecutor also indicts dead persons incapable of defending themselves. In doing so, he uses some of their statements as evidence, while disregarding others.

We will, therefore, set forth some statements made by President Tuđman and President Milošević alike and, by some Hague witnesses - the statements which refute the indictments and Mesić's efforts to confirm them.

The President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr Franjo Tuđman, presented the views of the Republic of Croatia on Bosnia and Herzegovina in his letter<sup>29</sup> 16 July 1993 to UN General Secretary Boutros Gali:

*2) The Council (VONS - remark by M.T.) -believes that the pressure on Croatia and threats against her, because of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are unfounded out of following reasons:*

- a) Croatia was the first to recognise the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia still stands firm on her position of recognising Bosnia and Herzegovina as independent state*
- b) There were, and there are, no agreements between Croatia and Serbia to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina.*
- c) So far, Croatia has proved its willingness to co-operate with the Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to find solutions. Croatia will support each and every solution that will be accepted by all of the three constituent nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.*
- d) Croatia supports the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are of the opinion that an agreement on the system of government of that state could end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pursuant to such agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a tripartite federal state of its three constituent nations.*

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<sup>29</sup> The latter was also sent to: The Chairman of the UN Security Council, Sir David Hannay, the Chairman of the EC Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Willy Claes, and to the Co-chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. See: M. Tuđman, *The Truth on Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Documents 10991 - 1995, Zagreb, Slovo M, 2005, p.407-409

President Tuđman also repeated in a number of his interviews that "there were, and there are, no agreements between Croatia and Serbia to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina":

*Franjo Tuđman: "As for the rest, I repeat once for all: there was no alleged agreement between Milošević and me to divide Bosnia whatsoever".<sup>31</sup>*

Slobodan Milošević said the same even before the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended and, before he signed his recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina together with Alija Izetbegović in 1996. Moreover, Milošević's answer about the meeting at Karađorđevo was quite blunt: "I am telling you know, had we decided to do so there, we could have done it right away."

*Slobodan Milošević: "Tuđman told me he wanted an independent Croatia. But we simply could not agree - he wanted to destroy federal institutions and I could not agree to it. As before, I proposed a change of the Constitution that will allow self-determination. There was speculation that we agreed to divide Yugoslavia. I am telling you know, had we decided to do so there, we could have done it right away."<sup>32</sup>*

On 17 July 1993, Presidents Tuđman and Milošević also signed in Geneva a joint declaration confirming that "the speculation about the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia was not founded".

- e) There are no regular troops of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina except in the border area pursuant to Art.8, Agreement on Friendship and Co-operation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, that was signed on 21 July 1992. The individuals who joined the Croatian Defence Council ( the HVO) are those members of the Croatian Army from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who voluntarily joined the Croatian Army during the Serbian aggression against Croatia to defend the Republic of Croatia, and who have now returned to defend their centuries-old ancestral homes.
- f) The best confirmation of our views is to be found in the already submitted Croatian proposal that UNPROFOR should efficiently control the borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and, that this should include the entire border, not only the border next the the UNPA zone.

<sup>31</sup> Dr F. Tuđman, A Word from Croatia to the World (*Hrvatska riječ svijetu*), Croatian University Press, Zagreb, 1999, p. 451

<sup>32</sup> Laura Silber and Allan Little, 1996, p.124

**Statement by Presidents Tuđman and Milošević, Geneva 17 July 1993**

*GENEVA. President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman and President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević made the following statement after the meeting that was organised by the Co-chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord David Owen:*

*1. The speculation about the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are totally unfounded.*

*2. The only way to achieve permanent peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in promoting the interests of all of the three constituent nations and in reaching agreement on setting up three republics within the con-federation.<sup>33</sup>*

All these statements have been ignored as if they were never made. When one attaches importance to some of their statements, and to some other not, and explanation would be desirable. The Prosecutor should not have ignored them. The Defence, especially, should not have disregarded them. It is well known that President Tuđman was not a person prone to lie or to deny his own views. On the contrary, everybody knew how persistent he was in presenting his own views, even at his own expense. He could have been wrong, but he was not insincere. When it comes to the myth about Karađorđevo, it is much easier to prove that it is a product of a propaganda war, than that President Tuđman concealed the real intentions of his "dual policy" towards Bosnia and Herzegovina by his statements about the meeting at Karađorđevo.

It is a paradox that those who opposed Tuđman's policy and the idea of an independent Croatia alike talk more precisely about the meeting at Karađorđevo. The President of the SFRY Presidency was most certainly not a man well-disposed to President Tuđman. He had a negative opinion about him. Yet, he expressed quite an opposite opinion about the meeting at Karađorđevo from the one Mesić did:

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<sup>33</sup> Vjesnik, 18 July 1993; M. Tuđman, *ibid*, 2005, p. 413

*Borisav Jović:* "The information that I have are quite different from what has been rumoured all the time. Milošević did not tell me whether they really talked about the partitioning of Bosnia or not, but I personally do not believe in it. He was always telling me then everything he was talking about with others, just as I did to him. I simply cannot believe that such talks were conducted. He told me that they talked about whether we should replace the President of the Federal Government or not. Since Croatia, too, did not agree with Marković, they had some objections, and so did Slovenia and Serbia, they discussed whether to replace the President of the Federal Government and agreed to postpone this matter for a while..." "it would be a great surprise to me, because a consent by Milošević (to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina - author's remark) would at that moment represent a considerable departure from our entire policy. I cannot believe in it therefore ...".<sup>34</sup>

The Prosecutor mentioned Mesić's testimony about Karadžorđevo as a turning point "after which the clandestine policy" started to be applied. If the Prosecutor's thesis were correct, it would have been, according to statements made by witnesses, a double "clandestine policy", since even the closest associates of Milošević and Tuđman alike knew nothing about it. (A pragmatic question might be raised: Who was implementing such policy if even the closest associates knew nothing about it?)

The Prosecutor and the Tribunal also have pragmatic legal problems. Borisav Jović signed, as a witness in The Hague, a statement under oath which is quite contrary to Mesić's statement also given under oath. Moreover, Jović said: "I believed that such agreement to divide Bosnia was Mesić's fabrication intended to discredit Tuđman with whom he was in conflict".

*72. With regard to the meeting at Karadžorđevo, that allegedly took place by the end of the March 1991 and, where the partition of Bosnia was allegedly discussed, Milošević never told me anything about it. I believed*

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<sup>34</sup> RFE-RL, Borisav Jović, Interview, 2004, <http://www.danas.org/svjedoci/html/BorisavJovic.html>

that such agreement to divide Bosnia was Mesić's fabrication intended to discredit Tuđman with whom he was in conflict. If it turned out that Mesić had indeed talked with Tuđman about the partition of Bosnia, it would only mean that Milošević was hiding that from me. In that case, my opinion about Milošević would be worse. I did not believe in the possibility of talks about the partition of Bosnia, because it was not in accordance with the aims of the policy pursued by the Serbian leadership. It was contrary to our idea of how to solve the Serbian issue in Croatia and to our belief that Yugoslavia should be preserved. (Interview no 1, part 2, p.6; interview no 3, p.3-5)

Source: Borisav Jović: "Statement pursuant to Rule 89 (F), the Hague, testimony date: 18 November 2003."

Smilja Avramov, Prof. Ph.D., was also a witness in the Milošević case. She did not testify about Karadžorđevo, i.e. about her participation as member of an expert team, but she wrote about it in detail in a book which was published as early as 1997. Once again we have the same question for the Prosecutor and the Tribunal: Why is it that they accept the account of the work of expert teams, that was published in the *Nacional* magazine (the one that academician Bilandžić disputed as witness before the Tribunal), as relevant, while they disregard as irrelevant the account given by a Serbian member of the expert team?

*Smilja Avramov: The Presidents of the two republics, Tuđman and Milošević, took another step, unofficial this time. They formed two teams with the aim to consider political, economic, constitutional and international consequences and legal aspects of the possible disintegration of Yugoslavia and to find a solution from that perspective. The decision thereon was probably taken at the meeting of the two leaders at Karadžorđevo in March 1991. The negotiating team was not informed about the course and results of these talks.<sup>35</sup>*

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<sup>35</sup> Croatia's negotiating team consisted of President Tuđman's advisers: Josip Šentija nad Dušan Bilandžić, and Zvonko Lerotić, a professor in Zagreb University, and Smiljko Sokol. Serbia's team consisted of President Milošević's advisers: academician Kosta Mihajlović and Vladan Kutlešić, and professors in Belgrade University, Ratko Marković and Smilja Avramov. The first meeting was held in a hunting mansion near Osijek on 10 April, the second one at Dedinje on 13 April and the third in Zagreb one week later. (a note in the original document - remark by M.I.)

Unfortunately, this attempt failed too. The only point on which the two parties agreed on was that the main determinant for the talks should be 70 years of living together; views on all other issues were far apart. The Croats categorically presented the view that any Yugoslav option had no chance of success and that the only solution for Croatia was to withdraw from Yugoslavia and create an independent state within the existing republic borders, based on the AVNOJ decisions. They emphasised that a sovereign Croatia had already been created during the National Liberation War and Revolution and that it should remain so. In their opinion, all other solutions would lead to a civil war. In doing so, they contradicted themselves and this contradiction is still present when addressing the resulting problems. Mr. Josip Šentija substantiated a thesis that breaking the existing structures in Yugoslavia would be a major blow to Bolshevism, but in spite of that, the Croats cling to the one achievement of Bolshevism, the revolution. The Serbs insisted on the continuity of the state (not of a regime) and treated in that light the problem of borders as an open issue, which was to be solved should the country disintegrate. In other words, the issue of disintegration was placed in the international context with an emphasis that the developments in the territory of Yugoslavia were utterly opposed to global integration trends. For the Croats, legality and legitimacy were of little relevance. According to Professor Lerotić, neither the First nor the Second World War solved the Serbian or the Croatian issue so that we were, even now at the end of the Cold War, "in the same boat". Nobody disputed that, but the problem was that the Croats treated the Croat-Serbian relations on a non-historic and non-legal level. The only fact of political relevance for them was the revolution. They insisted on a thesis that the collapse of the Eastern Block led to a collapse of the entire European structure. Two crucial issues came up in the course of the second general discussion: the issue of borders and of the legal continuity of the state. When we finally agreed to hold a concrete discussion on these issues based on documents and ethnic maps, the Croats broke off the negotiations by the end of April 1991.

*There were fiery conflicts whenever the genocide against the Serbian people and the discrimination and persecution of the Serbs in Croatia in the last months were mentioned, especially on the mention of the resistance of the Serbs in the Krajina region to the secession. However, the atmosphere became less tense as we went on to discuss the plan. Some digressed from the topic, for example Mr. Šentija as he said that Croatia was willing "to sacrifice" Ante Marković provided that Serbia renounced the Krajina region, which academician Mihajlović interrupted resolutely by refusing to discuss that or any similar issue. The fact remains that the discussion was held behind the closed door, far away from the public, but there were no secret arrangements, or anything that should be kept hidden from the public. It was only an episode in attempting to find a solution, which would not be worth mentioning, had there been no rumours in the press which had nothing to do with what had really happened".<sup>36</sup>*

According to the testimony of Smilja Avramov as well, "there were no secret arrangements, or anything that should be kept hidden from the public". Two crucial problems manifested themselves during the three meetings that were held (in Osijek on 10 April, at Dedinje on 13 April and in Zagreb on 20 April): the issue of the state continuity and the issue of borders. The negotiations stopped there because the Croats broke them off:" Two crucial issues came up in the course of the second general discussion: the issue of borders and of the legal continuity of the state. When we finally agreed to hold a concrete discussion on these issues based on documents and ethnic maps, the Croats broke off the negotiations by the end of April 1991."

During his testimony in the Blaškić case academician Bilandžić, too, kept on repeating the contents of the talks conducted by the expert teams. His testimony differs from the account rendered by S. Avramov with regard to arguments used by the Croats, but leaves no doubt about the topic of those meetings and talks. Although he was, as historian, an

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<sup>36</sup> Smilja Avramov, *Post-heroic War of the West against Yugoslavia (Postherojski rat Zapada protiv Jugoslavije, Veternik, LDI, 1997, p. 140-141*

expert witness who was supposed to explain the establishment and significance of the Banovina in Yugoslavia, the Prosecutor and the Tribunal were more interested in his role in the Croat Serbian negotiations after Karađorđevo:

*D. Bilandžić: These talks between the so-called delegations, they were called expert-groups, transformed themselves into a sharp dialogue or confrontation so that the only topic was whether Croatia or Serbia or both or either of them would agree to the inviolability of the results of the Second World War. That was the crux of those talks. The Serb side did not clearly and emphatically ever say that it would respect the borders of the existing republics, because if they had, the war would never have occurred.*

*Question: Well, Doctor, you attended the meeting, and pardon me if I mispronounce the name of this town, excuse me, Tikves, T-I-K-V-E-S, which is near Osijek, on about the 10<sup>th</sup> April 1991, as part of a Croatian delegation that met with a Serb delegation to examine maps and to determine which part was going to go to Croatia and which part was going to go to Serbia; isn't that right?*

*D. Bilandžić: No, it is not right. What is right is that meetings were held. I repeat that 95 percent of the talks centred around the recognition of the 1974 Constitution, and the borders formed as a result of the Second World War, as regards maps or any concrete divisions they did not exist. There were only ethnic maps, which is quite natural that this should be discussed too, but I repeat, there are no other documents, as far as I know. We did not at all discuss a division in the sense of delineating borders between Serbia and Croatia in Bosnia -Herzegovina because I and my colleagues did not at all believe, and this was before the war, we did not believe in the realism of such a policy, and we thought that we shouldn't enter into it at all.*

*Source: Blaškić Case IT-95-14-A, testimony by academician D. Bilandžić, 8 September, p. 11234-11235*

Another witness, Milan Babić, who was a repentant and



prisoner in the Hague, gave his version of the meeting at Karadorđevo, that was first published in the NIN magazine as early 1992 and then again in 1996. He gave his version of a conversation he had with Milošević immediately after the meeting at Karadorđevo:

*"The most convincing proof that there would be a departure from the idea "one state for all Serbs" provided the agreement between the President of Serbia and Tuđman at Karadorđevo in March 1991 already. As he was showing me on the map the parts of Krajina to be surrendered to Croatia, Milošević told me that, in return, Tuđman would help him eliminate Ante Marković. Shortly afterwards, I found out that Milošević also promised to him not to obstruct the Zagreb-Knin-Split traffic route. Members of the so called expert team were supposed to provide a scientific basis for these political arrangements."<sup>37</sup>*

Even his version of the meeting at Karadorđevo says nothing about maps dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina, but about political arrangements concerning the role and position of the President of the Federal Government instead.

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Miroslav Tuđman, Time of perjury, Zagreb, June 2006

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<sup>37</sup> Srđan Radulović,, 1996, p.31, according to the interview of 18 December 1992 to the Belgrade NIN weekly;  
Milorad Tomanić, 2001, p.93

President, George Bush  
White House  
Washington, DC 2 0500

24<sup>th</sup> of January 1991

Dear Mr. President,

We completely understand and we are aware of your concern regarding the bay crisis. However, as you already know, the situation in republics, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is unfortunately developing in a similar way as the events in Kosovo used to develop. At the moment, we find ourselves in a serious state of readiness.

It is the ultimate time for Yugoslav Army to stop its well known scenario of “threats, retreats, threats” by movements of tanks, aircraft and military units. We would also like to pay attention to redeployment of Croatian soldiers – reservists outside of Croatia. All this seriously destabilizes democratic governments of the aforementioned republics and prevents us from focusing to vital difficulties which would help us to fortify a free and democratic society, as well as the open market economy.

Mr. President, a path to stability has only one direction, which is a success of a democratic society. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have elected democratic governments. An election of Marxian communist, Slobodan Milošević, cannot compare to elected democratic governments in North.

The catastrophe in Yugoslavia can be prevented by an explicit message of the United States of America, supporting the majority and referring to newly established democratic republics; inviting to a peaceful solution in order to ensure a future stability, as well as the respect of internal borders and cooperation among aforementioned national states.

Yugoslavia is not the USSR; Serbia is not Russia and the Yugoslav Army is not the Soviet Army.

It would be an unforgivable mistake, if we encountered the imposition of the communistic terror over the majority in Yugoslavia which established its democratic power in free elections. That would neither be the interest of the Yugoslav nations, nor the United States of America. It can be avoided by a decisive position of the United States of America.

If one doesn't stop the aforementioned intimidation immediately, we will feel long-lasting and fatal consequences. Therefore we expect support of the United States of America.

Respectfully,

Dr. Franjo Tudman  
President

Co; Senator Dole

Zagreb, 11 December – Today in Predsjednički Dvori /Presidential Premises/ Head of the office of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Jure Radić and President's adviser for foreign affairs, Dr. Željko Matić handed in a letter by the president of the republic, Dr. Franjo Tuđman to a group of ambassadors and charges d'affaires accredited in Croatia and presided by a doyen of the diplomatic Assembly Giulio Einaudi, which the president addressed to Chinmay Rajaninath Gharekhan, president of the UN Security Council regarding the engagement of UN peace corps in Croatia. We broadcast the message of president Tuđman in whole:

“Dear Mr. President,

The situation in Croatia forces me to address you with this letter, wishing to bring to your attention a line of flagrant problems which represent a true burden not only to Croatia but also to the international community which obliged itself with a task to actively participate in establishing and maintaining a peace in the territory of ex Yugoslavia. Already at the beginning, I must regretfully establish that the joint efforts of the United Nations and European Community haven't provided expected results so far. On the contrary, after few positive initial steps, a further progress was forestalled by the extreme elements of Serbian ethnicity in UNPA which had an encouragement and decisive political and material assistance of the Serbian (Yugoslav) powers in Belgrade.

Contrary to all expectations and hopes that we had, aggression against Croatia continues even after the international recognition of its independence and sovereignty and despite UNPROFOR's engagement, whose task was to secure the cease of armed fights, monitor the retreat of the Yugoslav Army, implement the disarmament of Serbian quasi-military irregular groups in UNPA, enable return of displaced persons and refugees in order to gradually bring legal order and power of the Republic of Croatia into those areas and in the so called “pink zones”. The extreme Serbian elements, by receiving stimuli and continuous political and material support of powers in Belgrade and of Yugoslav Army and through their actions, almost completely disabled the Vance-Owen plan to be implemented. The Yugoslav Army keeps helping the rebellious individuals in manpower, war technique and equipment, including combat helicopters. A brutal terrorism still rules in 3 UNPA sectors (East, North and South) and murders, torching, destruction of houses, demolition of churches, killing of livestock and domestic animals occur daily and continuously. Helpless elderly who were being left in those areas especially suffer in those armed robberies. More than 600 Croatian citizens have been murdered before UNPROFOR came to those areas. Even some members of the so called “local police” are horrified at savagery of Serbian “special militias” which is also directed against “moderate” Serbs in those areas. Lately, one is trying to deteriorate modest results achieved so far in sector West by visits of Serbian extremists from Knin and Bosnia and Herzegovina who publicly speak they would establish a condition of cruel anarchy which is equal to those in other UNPA sectors.

It is very clear that the responsibility for non-implementing the peace plan undoubtedly lies with the “powers in Knin” which misused the trust, given to the “local powers” to implement the plan and which, in the contrary to it, created or maintained circumstances that enable anarchy and disorder, whereby they perfidiously used the presence of UNPROFOR and cease of armed conflicts in this area in order to realize their pretensions to “sovereignty and statehood”, refusing to retreat and disarm their irregular troops according to 762 Resolution decision from 1992, with intentions to consolidate the usurped conditions.

All the aforementioned is confirmed by the report of the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghalli, sent to the Security Council on 24 November 1992 (paragraph 24848). Reports of Special correspondent and other representatives of the United Nations

testify about disobeying the human rights and crimes that occur daily, on the basis of which the Third Committee of UN General Assembly made a 3 December 1992 resolution (A/C.4/47/L.79/Rev.1). That is the reason the European Community and the global public opinion are being more and more concerned, which is also and among others, supported by the joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign affairs of Balkan region states from last month's conference in Istanbul as well as the resolution of the 6<sup>th</sup> extraordinary session of Islamic conference dated early this month.

Taking into consideration that only initial part of the Vance-Owen plan was implemented, hence that the forces of the Yugoslav Army retreated from the area of the Republic of Croatia while everything else remained still, I find it is my obligation, Mr. President, to express my conviction, which is also a conviction of a certain number of world officials that more vigorous steps of the European Community are necessary to solve the existent crisis than the previous ones, especially those by the Security Council and United Nations.

Please allow me therefore, that I make a suggestion to the Security Council to do one thing that could stop this mad aggression which aims to conquer foreign ethnically "cleansed" territories. Those are efficient steps similar to those which were taken in case of an attack against Kuwait as well as in case of the present situation in Somalia. Therefore I suggest that the United Nations take the following measures in order to stop the war and create preconditions for a permanent peace in this area:

1. UNPROFOR should be given an authorization to realize its tasks within the frame of Vance-Owen plan when necessary and by use of force.
2. UNPROFOR, according to the Security Council Resolution 769 from 1992 should urgently introduce a strict regime of control over international borders of the Republic of Croatia towards Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to be able to prevent an uncontrolled movement of goods and population, especially the pass of armed units or delivery of armament and war equipment.
3. UNPROFOR should implement the disarmament of all Serbian para-military troops in UNPA and in the so called "pink zones" until 31 December 1992.
4. Return of displaced persons to the so called "pink zones" should be enabled until 31 December 1992.
5. Highway and railway traffic on direction Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Lipovac should be enabled, being an integral part of communication from Europe towards the South-East Europe (Belgrade-Skopje-Athens-Istanbul) so that the existent blockade of the entire economic life of that area could be lifted until 31 December 1992.
6. Until 31 December 1992 the Croatian powers should be enabled to establish a temporary pontoon bridge across the gorge of Masleničko Ždrilo as well as to start with the construction of a new bridge and be able to finish it before the commencement of the tourist season of 1994.
7. Until 31 December 1992 the Croatian powers should be enabled to use the international airport of Zemunik (near Zadar) and Klis (near Osijek).
8. As soon as possible the Croatian powers should be enabled, with the assistance of UNPROFOR, to de-mine the dam of Peruča which would enable a normal work of the hydro plant and remove fear and uncertainty from a possible catastrophe with the population, located down from the dam.
9. A repair of the power-transmission line in UNPA North and South should be enabled which would secure the establishment of the entire power transmission system of Croatian Elektroprivreda which is very important for a general power supply in Croatia, especially concerning southern Dalmatia and UNPA sectors of North and South.

10. Opening of the railway and road communication Split-Knin-Karlovac-Zagreb and further towards Europe should be enabled until February 1993.
11. Under the supervision of UN observers and European Community, elections for the County Assembly of the Republic of Croatia should be enabled in UNPA as well as for the bodies of the local self-government in municipalities and districts, which was also requested by the Serbian National Party and the majority of the Serbian population in UNPA which opposes to the extreme policy of “imposed” leaders which removed the legally elected representative bodies;
12. in order to normalize the life in UNPA, one should urgently prevent a resumption of the Serbian extreme resistance towards Vance-Owen plan implementation, which is politically and materially supported by the Serbian powers in Belgrade and in Bosnia and Herzegovina; it is a precondition for establishment of administrative, social and health services functioning (post offices, banks and others) of the Republic of Croatia in those areas, supply of provisions, arrival of doctors and medical teams, as well as arrival of spiritual leaders of all religions in order to assist the population, being exposed to a terror of Serbian extremists and para-military troops.

The Republic of Croatia on its behalf obliges to provide an unconditional support and assistance to the implementation of Vance-Owen plan and the aforementioned requests. It will unconditionally protect the human rights as well as the rights of ethnical communities in UNPA based on its Constitution, Constitutional Law on Human rights and rights of ethnical minorities and all other Laws in its legal system, including the Law on Abolition.

The Republic of Croatia supports the efforts of the United Nations which establish the ad hoc international Tribunal for convicting the war crimes and investigating cases of committing the criminal acts against the international humanitarian law through the UN Commission for war crimes and on the basis of the 771 Security Council Resolution from 1992.

Eventually I want to convince you, Mr. President, that all efforts of the Croatian powers are directed towards creation of preconditions in order to terminate the crisis and cease of bloodshed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia as well as to establish a permanent peace in this part of Europe.

Mr. President, please accept my deepest respect” it says in the letter of the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman to the president of the UN Security Council.

## 3.7

People of Herzegovina who got in the way of JNA tanks– Polog, May 1991

In May 1991, the majority of the armoured-mechanized units of the 10<sup>th</sup> motorized JNA brigade started to make movements from the peaceful location in Mostar – Northern Camp, through Balinovac and Široki Brijeg in order to deploy in the broader area of Kupres plateau. This activity developed according to the strategic mobilization and regrouping plans of the assault JNA units for the armed aggression to the Republic of Croatia, later to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The movement of this brigade functioned as protection of Chetniks para military army in the territory of the R Croatia, especially in the region of Knin-Zadar-Split as well as in the south of Bosnian borderland, from Bugojno, Jajce, Ključ and Bosnian Petrovac. By camping and performing training on the Kupres plateau, this brigade could easily carry out the combat activities in each of directions where necessary, as a support to Chetniks para military units, who ravaged in the R Croatia at the time.

While the people were standing on the way in front of tanks, the leadership of HDZ from Zagreb, Sarajevo and Mostar insisted that people move away and that the convoy passes through. The whole situation resulted in a maximal inner homogenization of Croats and Serbs. The only ones, who split in opinion, were Bosniaks, some of them having supported the Croatian people and some of them the JNA.

### 1.3 Chetnik rampage in Banja Luka

The decision from JNA headquarters followed that on 21st September 1991, all thirty students from the Military school are to be assigned to units, which conducted combat operations in Vukovar and other battlefields on Croatian territory. With about a dozen students of the Military School, I was assigned to the Command Operations Group with command post in Šamarice (Petrova Gora) in Croatia, near Sisak, Petrinja and Glina.

No one except Sefer had any influence on Mido Aljić, who during the take-over of personnel from the Military Police Battalion exercised very poor triage. He separated all non-Bosnians, even Bosnians from mixed marriages. To make it more absurd, during the war Sefer formed a political party and started to organize propaganda campaign against Izetbegović, Delić and myself, accusing us that we are to blame that Army of R BiH was mostly composed of Bosnians and that we allegedly expelled the Serbs and Croats from our ranks.

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## 4.8

Sefer protected criminal groups in Sarajevo

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Operative situation: “From the beginning of the war in BH, the criminal activity of individuals, as well as groups, escalated in Sarajevo.

A conclusion that there is no establishment in Sarajevo which was not looted more or less and that there is no citizen who suffered some damage in such criminal activities, is completely realistic.

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I used this opportunity to point out to President Izetbegovic that the relations between him and Sefer is one of the largest and most sensitive issues that should be given attention. I expressed the need that President questions Sefer’s loyalty towards him, because I had reasons to suspect that there were problems in that respect. President asked me, what I meant by that. I continued, saying that I had in the past two to three months, several times been present when Sefer, during appearance on TV, commented his words: “That fool. I do not know what to do with this old man. I tell him one thing and he does another “etc.

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## 8.2. Salutory arrival of Delić on the head of the BH Army

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Konjicija has briefly, in several sentences, introduced the present ones about the decision of the presidency, that is, the appointment of Delić as commander of the supreme command staff and, related to this decision, presidency also appointed commission for takeover of duty between Delić and Sefer.

Afterwards Sefer was speaking extensively. He seemed nervous and exasperated. He said that the decision of the presidency on the appointment of Delić as commander of the supreme command staff is a huge deceit and treason. He emphasized that the decision of the presidency is scandalous and made by the measures of the Chetnik's politics from Belgrade and Pale, that he personally is not endangered by this decision; however, the decision endangers the BH. He pointed out that the decision of the presidency is a reflection of his conflict with the president Izetbegović in view of BH defence concept and that president Izetbegović is destroying his, the only justified concept of the BH defence. By explaining that the appointment of Delić to duty of the supreme command staff commander understands the victory of the Chetnik line in the R BH presidency, he pointed out that the key role in it have I, whereby he rudely insulted me and made me the most responsible for a defeat of the so called "his concept" of the BH defence.

As far as Delić is concerned, he said that he neither has credits nor necessary abilities for the function of a commander and that, appointing Delić, presidency ignored the shown results and abilities of individuals in the former fight against the aggressor. He said that I, by striking down his concept of defence, prepared the scandalous decision of the presidency and that the presidency hit the road of treason because it did not respect the supreme command staff. He emphasized that the presidency cannot make important decision with accordance of the supreme command staff which came as suggestion to the present members of the supreme command staff to declare themselves against the presidency decision.

All in all, Sefer's discussion showed his exasperation and hatred towards Izetbegović, Delić and me. The time will show that we gained a great life-long enemy.

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## 8.4.

Sefer's manipulations with Sanžaklians

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Sefer manipulated the citizens of BH, originating from Sandžak. His positions on "Sandžaklians" opposed to the general mood of the Bosniak people. The Bosniaks from all around BH are not inclined to see something special in "Sandžaklians", opposite to their identity. They feel them as a part of Bosniak nation and nobody even dares to make a difference between Bosniaks, originating from Sandžak and Bosniaks from any region of BH. I personally think that "Sandžaklians" in BH are not endangered by anything. Their position isn't either better or worse in relation to Bosniaks from any part of BH. The Bosniaks from "Sandžak" adapted in many places in BH, especially in Sarajevo, where they are very present but nobody of local Bosniaks counts them. Sefer wanted to establish special relations with "Sandžaklians". He did not count on them as a special element of personal protection, if once his function of an official is endangered. He wanted to make a special strength of "Sandžaklians" which he would be using as pressure to those who jeopardize his position of an official. Those are, in terms of security, dangerous divisions.

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## 8.5.

In the surrounded Sarajevo, Sefer did not like to leave his office. He rarely visited the unit commands that defended Sarajevo. He used to sit in the office and all day long, he would receive various persons of which many did not have any significance for the performed work. In many conversations of his, topics outside of the war situation context were dominant or they used to be far below his role as chief of the supreme command staff.

Sefer's estimations on war, military and political situation were rather shallow, very detrimental even. He estimated that the international community by its military presence in UNPROFOR forces form is detrimental and that the international military forces should leave the BH, because, as he used to point out, Bosniaks without them would soon achieve an agreement with Serbs and Croats and that UNPROFOR's leaving would be necessary for peace in BH. Milošević, Karadžić and Mladić wanted the same thing.

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police in work with detainees. Letter of the district prison Sarajevo, no. strictly confidential 01-8/92 dated 20<sup>th</sup> of May 1992, signed by the warden Esad Osmanbegović.

His evaluations that the military presence of the international community is the only obstacle for peace which would be accomplished through the agreement among Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats were rather odd.

Sefer's evaluations on the abilities of the BH army and its superiority over the aggressor's forces in BH were pretty arbitrary. As such, they could present an expression of a poor introduction to the situation on the battlefield, like in the conditions among combatants of the defence forces, like on the aggressor's side. He wanted to present himself as he established the BH army in a split-second and as he, already in 1992, was mighty enough to carry out major offensive operations, whereby the international military forces, that is, UNPROFOR are a threat. In those terms he was deluding the political leadership which behaved responsibly and did not fall for Sefer's false reports.

Sefer did not, as he should have, execute the military tasks but he rather detrimentally meddled into the responsibility of politicians. Decision about war and peace is the jurisdiction of politicians while the soldiers are the instruments of politics. Sefer emphasized the thesis that one should "liberate" BH, which understood that the war must go on at every price so that the BH army units would repulse the aggressor's forces from East and West, outside of the territory of the R BH

Sefer wrote and often said that in time of performing the highest military duty, as Izetbegović was his superior, he was in "misunderstandings" with him. Exactly the story about "misunderstandings" with Izetbegović, shows Sefer's unnatural behaviour, as if he trusted Izetbegović with political issues, instead of vice-versa. He did have any basics for "misunderstandings" with Izetbegović on the political level. If he saw that Izetbegović was a traitor of BH and Bosniak people, as he used to claim, he should have resigned, explain that resignation and than fight against Izetbegović outside the military ambience. He did not do it. For Izetbegović, he used to say and write about him as the "grave-digger" of BH. He could bear Izetbegović as the "grave-digger" of BH, while he was performing duty; however he got the appetite to burden the public yet after he lost the lead function in the BH army.

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Everywhere and on each step, Sefer was criticizing Izetbegović. All politicians, even the president Izetbegović he used to call them "cellar-men"; he used to say that they don't understand the conditions of fight and that they inhibit him in achieving major results in fight. Several times in the course of 1992 and in the first half of 1993, while Sefer was performing duty of the Chief of ŠVK /supreme command staff/, I was in his cabinet as we watched the TV together. TV often broadcasted the statements of president Izetbegović. Having listened to what the president was saying, Sefer gave comments roughly and with obvious hatred: "There he is, the old man, the fool... I have just been with him and I was telling him differently and he again is saying nonsense."

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### 8.9. Sefer encouraged conflicts in Sarajevo and doing that he was destroying Caco, Čelo...

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In the course of 1993, Sefer systematically acted to intensify the crisis of confidence between the commander of the aforementioned brigades and MUP. He was telling Delalić-Čelo, Topalović-Caco and Aljić on daily basis that "soon", "in the course of the day" or "in the course of the night" the attacks of the MUP police to commands of their brigades will follow and that the officials of MUP are planning their arrest. On the occasion of such warnings, Sefer told them to prepare, to oppose, to accept the conflict and to "shoot right at the meat" which was otherwise a style of his primitive but very dangerous way of communicating with people who already fell for his tricks. Sefer had a practice to wake up the aforementioned commanders in the middle of a night in order to inform them to alert their manpower because the attack of MUP will follow. Pursuant to such dispatches from Sefer, commanders Delalić, Topalović and Aljić ordered their units to blockade accesses to all locations. In one of the situations, after he woke them up and after they blockaded accesses to locations of their deployment, Sefer informed the aforementioned commanders that the MUP police and military police are in the joint action in order to wipe out Delalić, Topalović and Aljić, that is, to remove them from their commanders' functions. Sefer demanded that the 9<sup>th</sup> brigade, 10<sup>th</sup> brigade and "Delta" brigade prepare for the fight with MUP and military police as soon as possible, that they become active in the fight and, if they give a joint resistance, MUP and military police cannot harm them at all.\*



### 8.10. Response to Sefer's propaganda that we were chasing away Serbs and Croats from the BH Army

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In their propaganda, the Chetniks emphasized that Bosniaks persecute them from Sarajevo. Sefer included himself in such propaganda. Regarding that he showed ambitions to be the main political and military leader of Bosniaks, the question whether he was aware of it or not, loses its sense. As he established his political party, wishing to discredit the personnel in the BH army, through media he quite often used to say that Delić and I are the guilty ones for not having Serbs and Croats in the BH army, because we allegedly implemented Islamic ideology of an army, by which we practically chased Serbs and Croats away from the BH army lines.

### 8.11. My letter to commander Caco and arrest of members of 10th brigade

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President Izetbegović positively evaluated my persistence that I showed by addressing Caco with a letter that I specifically asked him with to change his behaviour<sup>146</sup>. Although he insisted in talks with Caco to stop the practice of abusing people, mistreatment and taking people to dig trenches, president Izetbegović also sent a letter to Caco on 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1993<sup>147</sup>.

In late June we were receiving data on way Caco is solving the problem of lack of gas and oil. He and his men used to phone citizens in Sarajevo and ordered them to manage as they can and to bring a can of gas or oil at the specific time and to the specific place. They did it with threats; if they do not bring it, they will take them to dig trenches. They accomplished many threats. I felt responsible to suppress such practice. I prepared men from the crime service of the military police which was well built already. They contacted citizens who already received one such threat. They gave them security guaranties. They suggested them not to fulfil Caco's request, that is, not to ask and not to bring gas and oil, as one was requesting from them by threats. I informed commander Delić and president Izetbegović on the matter. Within informing I emphasized that we must take measures in order to cut such Caco's practice. They agreed. Actually, it was my legal obligation and I could accomplish it, if I was able to, as a current task, according to my authority and without special approval by anyone.

Estimating that Caco's men, due to unfulfilled requests, come and take them to dig trenches, ambushes were organized in front of their houses. As Caco's men came to arrest innocent citizens, we arrested them. We took them to Sarajevo barrack "Maršal Tito". It was not a prison at all. Those were plain offices, in which the members of the crime squad of the military police were performing pre-investigating tasks. Among the arrestees there was Pecar Senad, deputy of the 10<sup>th</sup> brigade commander, Mušan Topalović – Caco. We touched the most raw and most dangerous nerve. On 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 1993 in the late afternoon and evening hours, Caco raised a huge alarm. In the night of 2<sup>nd</sup>/3<sup>rd</sup> of July Čelo's and Caco's men arrested some 20 members of the civil police, military police and BH army officers. Some of them were brought in to Čelo's base "Sloga" in Lugavina Street and more of them to Caco's staff on Bistrik, at "Sedam braće". Caco and his men abused them severely whereby Deljkić Almir was the least lucky one; he was knocked flat to the ground by Caco and his loyal Senad Hasić and than beaten by feet and they eventually ordered him to be brought to dig trenches. It was the most difficult for those who got arrested by Caco and Senad Hasić, knowing that one supports the work of 1<sup>st</sup> corps commander, Mustaf Hajrulahović, his deputy Vahid Karavelić and me, as the chief of the security administration of the supreme command staff. Amir Deljkić was officer in the security department of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps command, which was more than enough for him to be beaten in such measure that he almost dies.

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in regard to our agreement, I inform you on the following:

1. In the future, you can have the necessary workers (diggers) through the district secretariat of Sarajevo defence (the building of the former DPO near Skenderija). It is necessary that you send the number of necessary workers till 15:00 the next day, on the phone numbers 664-151, 664-152 or 664-153. Responsible person is Esad Medošević. Let's proceed to organization of engineering

<sup>147</sup> The content of the letter that president Izetbegović wrote and sent to Caco on 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1993 is the following: «Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, presidency, president to Caco, commander of the 10<sup>th</sup> mountain brigade, here

In the evening on 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 1993 I was in the command of the 102<sup>nd</sup> brigade which was in the wire factory on Alipaša Polje. While I was talking to the commander of that brigade, Paldum Esad, his phone rang. The secretary of president Izetbegović forwarded a message that I should come right a way. I went, but I did not find the president in his cabinet. They told me that he went to the staff. It was night already. As I came to the staff, in front of the Vranica building and the court building, I found a major crowd. As Caco's men saw me, some of them moved towards me. One of Caco's assistants pointed a gun against me and insulted me vulgarly. I was protected by the escort. In the mean time, I received a notice that the president is in the Vranica building. Before I arrived, president agreed with some of Caco's men to move away from the staff and that Caco comes to his cabinet to talk. I followed the president to his cabinet. We talked about the occurred situation there. President had to decide whether we should let go Pecar Senad and other arrestees, which was an ultimate Caco's request, or should we keep them in prison, risking shelling of the presidency building, according to Caco's threats. The president did not make a final decision at that time, while talking to me. As I left, he received Caco in his cabinet, along with several persons from his command. Those were hard talks for the president Izetbegović. Caco extended his requests; to return the arrestees and that president immediately dismisses me from the function of chief of the security administration, Mustaf Hajrulahović – The Italian from the function of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps commander and Vahid Karavelić from the function of deputy commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps. The president finally decided to keep Pecar and others in prison and to investigate and process cases of citizens' abuse in the court. Caco was discontent.

We entered a long, hard and uncertain night. Caco was threatening and president Izetbegović followed the logic of justice and need to finally stop the capriciousness, implemented by Caco and his men. That night, Caco practically established the battle lines throughout the streets of Sarajevo, from the post office to Vječna vatra.

In the course of night and when the morning came, Caco was in action of taking hostages. He set his men among bridges over Miljacka, from the city hall till Drvenija. Citizens, who during the night and in the morning of 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 1993 had a need to cross from the left bank of Miljacka to the right side and vice-versa, were stopped by Caco's men and taken to a building on Bistrik. 200 hostages were taken in that way. Among them there was also Delić Admir, arrested the night before, son of General Delić. Caco reinforced his arguments. The president was forced to decide to release from prison Pecara and other arrestees. The situation calmed down soon.

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2. New commander of the main staff, Rasim Delić is a good man and soldier. Cooperate with him. Nobody can do something on his own. We have to be a state if we want to deal with Chetniks, which means that we must be together and fight together and coordinated. Otherwise the Chetniks will break us, one by one. If our state is still not working, we must improve it; change what is bad instead of closing it as it is.
  3. For MTS /material technical resources/ - send your logistics man to the corps and you will get it. If the things are not working, let me know. Send my Selams and best wishes to combatants. May God be with you.

Sarajevo, 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1993, president of the presidency of the R BH, Alija Izetbegović

Interview was conducted by Nedžad Latić, Zenica 1997

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... but that was the first time I came to Travnik in my life. I remember well, it was January 13<sup>th</sup> 1993. I reported to a personnel guy in the barrack; "Fellow-countryman, I report to you voluntarily and I can be anything – from the soldier till the commander!" He asked for papers on military degree. I had a rank of a Lieutenant-colonel. My entire personal documentation was in my bag. I went to Visoko where I met Fikret Ćuskić, Sakib Mahmuljin and Enver Hadžihasanović. The barrack was not recruited. My first task was to recruit three battalions. As I was lining up the third battalion, one man from the formation made a comment: "What do you communists want? You want the posts!" I responded harshly to that combatant to come to my place, while I went to his place; "You can't be in my place but I can be on yours" – I responded. I consider this moment as the first military step of the BiH Army.

Ćuskić is about to return from vacations from Rijeka at the time. It has been agreed that an *operative group Bosanska Krajina* is to be established, in the composition of which the units of 7<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup> and 37<sup>th</sup>, which is an indicator of BH army structure line in this area. Order for establishment of the OG Bosanska Krajina was issued on 27<sup>th</sup> of February. Rasim Imamović came from Zagreb with some order to establish the motorized Banja Luka brigade with a command headquarters in Zagreb.

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... I claimed it was important to have men in formation. Officers of HVO, who still cooperated with us at the time, severely blamed me for going on with mobilization in such harsh manner. I concentrated units in Travnik pursuant to idea of turning towards North. So I brought the 305<sup>th</sup> Jajce /presumably brigade/. Ambassador Thebault visited me then, Vance-Owen plan being current. "The plan will go down here, Mr. Thebault" – I told him. "Herceg-Bosnia will fall here". We were still sharing the barrack in Travnik with the HVO. "Two armies cannot be in one barrack, neither can two flags" – I said to Gašo, commander of HVO, "You will leave the barrack".

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I find the creation of the operative group Bosanska Krajina an embryo of our army recruitment. It had only two brigades within, the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim and the 17<sup>th</sup> Krajiška, however, in a very short period of time, this formation managed to be active in Travnik, Zenica and Kačuni. This mobile military formation prevented the intention of the enemy to control the Lašva valley, to be precise, the line Travnik-Vitez-Lašva loop and Kiseljak-Fojnica-Busovača. Battle on Sebešić is a book example of the philosophy of this group war campaign. Our tactic composed of entering of a part of forces into the rear and making conditions to attack from the circular base.

In expectation of HVO attack to Travnik, the units of OG Bosanska Krajina were secretly deployed according to the plan

Before I go on about these conflicts, I will remind you, I will even remind myself on this occasion; decision that I should take over the OG Bosanska Krajina was made at the meeting in Plava Voda in Travnik. Exactly then, some units of ours returned from the Visoko battlefield. Hadžihasanović ordered me over the phone to take over the command over the group and said that a part of units from the existent OG West will enter its composition, which were 306<sup>th</sup>, 325<sup>th</sup>, 312<sup>th</sup> and 308<sup>th</sup> brigade, while the 305<sup>th</sup> brigade was already subordinated to OG Bosanska Krajina, as well as the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim and 17<sup>th</sup> Krajiška. Later on, 27<sup>th</sup> brigade, being in formation and 705<sup>th</sup> Jajce brigade would join us. Hence, expecting the attack of the HVO to Travnik, we have already deployed our forces in secret, not only in the town, but in the entire area. For instance, we had forces behind

the HVO back on Vilenica, without them being aware of it. Also, we were ready to take positions towards Chetniks in case HVO abandons them. The weakest moment in fight was linking of 312<sup>th</sup> and 306<sup>th</sup> brigade which were at the task. Therefore, as the town was cleared, around 13:00 hrs, I fought my way through to Maline, by the rocks of Saint John's church, along with a white horse.

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What was your role in operations near Vareš?

After a meeting in Visoko, I wrote an order for operations for Vareš by my own hand. Sakib Mahmuljin has been given a task to approach the liberation of Vareš from this side with the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim (brigade) and other smaller units. Thereby we obtained a rather safe communication with the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps. The liberation of Vareš was very undisputable battle. However, we feared the Chetniks' breakthrough on Greda. We used the sabotage battalion there, commanded by Asim Šuvalić. We also had problems with stabilization of lines after liberating the town itself.

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
On the occasion of the first meeting with Izetbegović, I said: "Mr. President, we must move into offensive war"

**The time passes in the meantime; you are waging battle after battle. When did you enter Sarajevo for the first time?**

Late summer 1993. I met the president Alija Izetbegović at the time.

**How did you see the leadership of the BH army, the officers?**

I did not know who the people in leadership are, I was not familiar with internal relations, and I did not know anything about what was going on among officers in Sarajevo. I wasn't receiving any orders from them at the time, instructions, guidelines, aid, nothing. I talked to president Izetbegović. It was a conversation as between two human beings. I told him I had contacts with Bosniaks in Zagreb, I have just sent him Selam/ greeting/ from Hasan Čengić. I explained to him that Krajišnici /borderland combatants/ traditionally have good combatants and that we must move into offensive war.



**FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM EASTERN HERZEGOVINA ACROSS THE NERETVA RIVER NEAR ČAPLJINA AT THE END OF APRIL 1992.**



## IV CIVIL PROTECTION

Civil protection is formed on April, 1992 at Ševač Polje. Commander of Civil protection is Halil Šabanović, and his deputy is Ahmet Šabanović, Alije. The following older people from the village join this squad of civil protection:

1. Rahić Omar, Mumina
2. Rahić Ahmet, Salke
3. Rahić Ibro, Salke
4. Rahić Velija, Salke
5. Rojčić Ibraga, Halke – messenger
6. Šabanović Bećir, Mehmada
7. Šabanović Mujo, Salke
8. Šabanović Ibro, Omera
9. Šabanović Hasan, Omera
10. Šabanović Huso, Salke
11. Šabanović Alija, Salke
12. Šabanović Ahmet, Salke
13. Šabanović Mustafa, Husnije
14. Šabanović Salko, Husnije
15. Šabanović Murat, Alije
16. Šabanović Ćamil, Halila
17. Šabanović Enver, Šabana
18. Šabanović Muhamed, Bajre
19. Šabanović Rijad, Halila
20. Šabanović Dženo, Ahmeta
21. Šabanović Adis, Zulfe
22. Đelno Mugdin, Muharema – messenger
23. Đelno Muharem,
24. Bojčić Ale, Salke

## Note:

More about the formation of two companies in Medugorje and company Počitelj-Ševač Polje, their work and activities, crossing the Neretva River during the night 06<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> June, 1992 and the cleaning, that is liberating this territory will be the subject to additions of this document.

## THIS DOCUMENT IS PREPARED BY

1. Šabanović Zulfo – member of Crisis Headquarters in Počitelj,  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/ member of Crisis Head. for Dubrave, member  
of First Company of IV Battalion, later member  
of First Battalion, IV Company
2. Šabanović Mustafa – member of Crisis headquarters in Počitelj, later  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/ member of I Company IV Battalion, later  
I Battalion, IV Company
3. Bojčić Enver – member of Crisis Headquarters in Počitelj, later  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/ member of III. Company, IV Battalion, later  
officer for legal and general affairs at the Command  
of IV Battalion, later member of III Company, I Battalion
4. Šabanović Musair – driver – messenger at Crisis Headquarters in Počitelj,  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/ Later member of III Company of IV Battalion, and later  
member of CP
5. Šabanović Halil – CP Commander for ševač Njive, later member of  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/ I Company of IV Battalion, later  
Commissioner for CP for village Ševač Njive
6. Šabanović Džufer – Squad commander at Hinze Lete troop, later  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/ member of III Company of IV Battalion, later  
member of III Company of I Battalion
7. Šabanović Sulejman – Squad commander at company Počitelj-Ševač  
\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed/ Polje, which was later part of III Company of  
IV Battalion, and later III Company of I Battalion

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On 10 April 1992, a heavy front line was open on Bivolje Brdo. The tank unit moves from Pijesci towards the Bivolje Brdo and hits Bivolje Brdo by artillery. On that day, around 10 am, artillery fire has been opened towards the Bivolje Brdo from tanks and mortars and lasted till 19:30 in the evening, non-stop and without any single interruption. This was a day in hell at Bivolje Brdo but also on Ševač Njive and Ševač Polje for the reason of vicinity. That day, 10 April 1992, around 4 pm, Jozo Popović and Andrun Drago arrive to Ševač Njive and seek for help to dig trenches for the first line of fire on Bivolje Brdo. Šabanović Zulfo and Musair, as well as Zijo Veledar arrive to Vinko Andrun's house and negotiate where to dig, whom to report to and etc. It has been agreed that Dadić Luka and Toni Andrun come to the Harem on Ševač Njive, take over men and lead them to the spot, where they would dig. Šabanović Musair takes the men by his truck, the following men being from Počitelj: Merdan Alija with a nickname The Hero, Dizdar Zijo and Alagić Alaga, whereas from Ševač Njive the following persons: Šabanović Musair, Džemil, Kemo, Enver, Rijad, Bojčić Ibraga and Rahić Ibro son of Salko. On 10 April 1992 at Bivolje Brdo, Beno Frano and Beno Martin from Hodanj got killed, as well as Raguž Dragan from Bivolje Brdo.

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All the members of the Crisis Staff in Počitelj are way too occupied. A large number of people should be provided with medical help being in great panic, fuel for boat engines on Neretva should be secured, a large number of people should be accommodated on that night on 11/12 April 1992, as well as the following nights. The Crisis Staff organizes shelter for children – babies in Počitelj, it organizes young women to milk the village cows in hamlets of Gradina, Ševač Polje, Hodanj and Veledar. It also organizes help in kitchens of the "Staklenik" restaurant in Počitelj to boil milk and provide it to mothers with small children. In this night, on 11/12 April 1992, the people keep coming in continuously and in masses. The day after, on 12 April 1992, Dr Esad Boškailo from the Crisis Staff in Počitelj negotiates with the local government in Čapljina and chiefs of Serbs in Tasovčići in order to establish the convoy of vehicles in Počitelj and Ševač Polje to be passed through Tasovčići, heading south. The agreement has been reached and a large vehicle convoy full of refugees is formed in Počitelj and Ševač Polje and moves towards Tasovčići. The convoy front arrives to the new intersection and bumps into a barricade that the Serbs do not want to remove. The convoy stops here. The negotiations were going on for a while. After that, Serbian extremists threatened to open fire on the convoy, therefore the entire convoy returns to Počitelj and Ševač Polje, leaving the vehicles behind and moving across Neretva. The Crisis Staff estimates that back then approximately 10 000 people were in Počitelj and Ševač Polje.

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On 13 April 1992, the Chetnicks are attacking Čapljina. This is the first attack to Čapljina. From Modrič and Muminovača, they hit bunkers on Gradina by tanks, as well as the entire Čapljina. In Ševač Polje there has been an agreement to move all elderly inhabitants of the Ševač Njive along with the rest of refugees from Dubrave, whereas all younger men, able to fight, remain in the village. On 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 April 1992, almost everybody leaves the village, almost all elderly persons. Till the 17 April 1992, all refugees were transported across Neretva. Large number of vehicles remained in Ševač Polje. According to our evaluation, approximately 3000 vehicles were placed along the tunnel in Hauz, till the tunnel that was struck down, closer to the "Sunce" restaurant, also from both sides of the road. Apart from this, many vehicles were in front of private houses in the field, everywhere where a vehicle could be left, along the entire road from the street at the village passage, over the road (*magistralni put*)?, till the boat on Bare, whereas many vehicles were placed on the meadows of Bare.

As the watch by Atrij stopped, following the agreement that the young men do not leave the village, new watches are organized in the village. Nevertheless, on 17 April 1992, all the refugees, those who arrived, as well as majority of elderly from Ševač Njiva, hills and fields, were transported. That day, on 17 April 1992, a second major attack on Čapljina took place. The passage over Neretva is closed for several days; however, new refugees begin to arrive from Dubrave, which opens the passage in order to transport the refugees.

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In the meantime, the rest of the refugees from the entire Dubrave arrive in waves, depending on occasions in Dubrave and possibility on crossing roads from Dubrave to Počitelj, being transported over Neretva, along with their vehicles. The refugees' transportation, along with their vehicles lasts till the 22 May 1992.



Željko Ostojić

A: PERSONAL DATA

1. My name is Željko Ostojić, I was born on 25<sup>th</sup> of August 1960 in Mostar
2. I attended the elementary school in Međugorje. I graduated from the high school of electrical engineering in Zagreb, as well as from college of electrical engineering, VII degree.
3. I am currently employed in HT Mostar.

B: THE INDICTMENT AGAINST JADRANKO PRLIĆ ET AL

By the Counsel who works on the preparation of Slobodan Praljak's defence in view of the indictment against Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Valentin Ćorić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković and Berislav Pušić before the Tribunal in The Hague, I was asked to provide a statement referring to acceptance and accommodation of major number of expelled persons, Bosniaks-Muslims, in the area of Bijakovići and Međugorje during 1992, in occasion of which I give the following

S T A T E M E N T

1. In the period from September 1991 till late August 1992 I performed duty of the Commander of Bijakovići company which was in the composition of the "Brotinjo" battalion which again was and acted as part of HVO HZ HB. The company I commanded had a zone of responsibility in the south-eastern part of Čitluk municipality, that is, in the area of Bijakovići, Krućevići and Šurmanaci settlements, to be precise, immediately by the Neretva river, whereby the zone of responsibility was extended to the marginal settlement of Šurmanci which, in terms of the territory, belonged to the vicinal municipality of Čapljina. The company had 180 soldiers and throughout the time of war in its composition, it had at least 3 or more Bosniaks-Muslims.
2. In the second half of April 1992, I was invited to a meeting of the HVO Main staff in Čitluk. The meeting was called and presided by the commander of the Main staff, Slobodan Praljak; the meeting was also attended by my immediate commander of the "Brotinjo" battalion, Pero Pehar. Apart from me, other captains from the "Brotinjo" battalion were present at the meeting, however I am not sure whether captains of all companies were present as well. After we, the captains presented short reports by companies, commanders Slobodan Praljak and Pero Pehar introduced us to the course of preparation of a major JNA and Republika Srpska Army's offensive on the eastern side of Neretva river, to be precise, in the area of Stolac, Ravno and Čapljina municipalities and that that offensive is taking place in order to expel and ethnically cleanse Bosniaks-Muslims from the area of those municipalities, that is, from the entire space eastern from the Neretva river. Since the JNA and the army of Republika Srpska already in 1991 exiled all Croats that lived in this area, commanders Slobodan Praljak and Pero Pehar warned us that we can expect a huge wave of expelled persons, Bosniaks-Muslims already tomorrow, after which they issued an order to organize acceptance and accommodation of all expelled Bosniaks and to use all disposable accommodation capacities in Bijakovići, Međugorje and Čitluk. Our attention was especially concentrated to disposal of accommodation capacities of highest quality, food provision and other necessary care for the expelled persons, as well as the respect of will of each individual in terms of intention to stay in the area of Čitluk municipality or to be accommodated in some other locality.
3. Since I was the commander of the company in whose zone of responsibility, that is, in the settlement Šurmanci, was an improvised "ferry" on the river Neretva, which could transport people, cars and cattle over the river, I was

issued with an order to organize acceptance, along with the military police from Čapljina of all expelled persons who at this point cross the Neretva river, while the commander of civil protection was issued with an order to organize shelter, provide food and other care for the expelled persons. In the following 10-15 days, to be precise, from 15<sup>th</sup> of May 1992, my company accepted several thousands of expelled Bosniaks and after the acceptance, the accommodation, nutrition and expelled persons care was taken over by civil protection who accommodated expelled persons in mobilized tourist settlement "Kompas-Međugorje" and several private pensions in Međugorje. I know that more than 200 expelled persons were accommodated in mobilized tourist settlement "Kompas-Međugorje", some 40 of them in the pension "Europa", certain number in private houses of Ivan Ivanković, Nada Čilić and Žarko Ostojić, while about the rest of them I am not sure in which houses they were placed in. The procedure of acceptance and accommodation of expelled Bosniaks in the area of Čitluk municipality was monitored by the commanders of the staff, Slobodan Praljak, commander of the "Brotnjo" battalion, Pero Pehar, deputy commander of the battalion, Zoran Buntić and commander of the civil protection, who did not have any objections to the task that was executed by my company. I most surely know that the certain number of expelled persons, that is, one military unit, whose commanders were Bajro Pizović and Mr. Mahumtćehajić expressed wish to join Daidža's military unit because I personally and by their specific wish took this group to Vrgorac where they joined Daidža's unit. I also know that certain number of expelled persons, mostly women, elderly and children, expressed their wish to leave for Croatia or third countries, which was enabled to them, while mostly military capable men remained in the area of Međugorje and Čitluk all the way till the end of military action "Čagalj", known as "Lipanjske zore" /The Aurora's of June/ in which HVO liberated the taken areas of Stolac, Ravno and Čapljina municipalities. Out of expelled Bosniaks which I accepted then, I can remember names of Bajro Pizović, later commander of the "Bregava" brigade, Mahmutćehajić and Šabanović who was accommodated by Ivan Ivanković and who I contacted to at the occasion, while other names I cannot remember.

4. Already the day, after HVO liberated the area of Stolac and Čapljina municipalities, the expelled Bosniaks-Muslims established the headquarters of "Bregava" brigade in the liberated area, to be precise, in Počitelj in Fika's house. After the HVO, in the marked military action, liberated the taken areas of Stolac and Čapljina municipalities, the expelled Bosniaks-Muslims returned to their home, along with expelled Croats.
5. I state that this statement is given in good faith, that it is true and given according to my best recollection.

Čitluk \_\_\_\_\_

Željko Ostojić  
/signed/

/stamp/

It is confirmed that Željko Ostojić /handwritten/ /illegible/

4.00 KM

7955/05

9<sup>th</sup> of November 2005

/round stamp and signature/

Ilija FILIPOVIĆ  
Mostar HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Command Coordinator  
for EC /European Community/ and UNPROFOR /United Nations Protection Force/  
Observers

REPORT

ON THE ACTIVITIES OF EC AND UNPROFOR OBSERVERS  
DURING THE WAR IN MOSTAR UNTIL THEIR DEPARTURE  
FROM MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY

Mostar, May 1992

I

I personally think that it is necessary to create this report in order to make a lasting record of the presence of EC peace missions and unarmed United Nations observers – UNPROFOR – during this unprecedented aggressive and imposed imperialist war of the Serbo-Montenegrin army against Mostar.

All war events are also covered in Mostar HVO Communications Centre daily reports, which also partly mention the effectiveness of EC and UNPROFOR observers and which mostly focus on enemy activities and other facts.

Minutes of all important meetings between observers and representatives of the Mostar HVO Municipal Staff were sent promptly to the participants of those meetings, so this report does not cover the contents of the meetings, except in cases when minutes were not made because of the conditions in which the meetings were held or because there was not enough time, so these cases are also covered in the report.

This report covers only the most important daily events during the attack on Mostar with regard to the presence and role of UNPROFOR observers, our requests to them and mostly their inability to have influence on anything important in this war for the simple reason that the enemy did not respect them and because fear from the aggressor for their own lives affected their activities. This is why they often delayed their daily plans and our requests, waiting for an enemy attack to end, without being able to effect a ceasefire. I am at liberty to judge UNPROFOR's services as insignificant, because they could not achieve one important thing that we expected from them, and that was to stop the criminal shelling of the city. In any event, only when they left the city was Mostar soon liberated.

Moreover, Mr Jozo KRALJEVIĆ and I spent hours every day explaining to EC and UNPROFOR observers who the enemy was, why we were attacked, what the aggressor's goals were, that the Serbs wanted hegemony, that Serbia was conducting an imperialist war and so on.

It was possible to conclude that EC and UNPROFOR observers had come to Mostar without any historical knowledge about our region, relations, and cultural, ethnic and other traits, and about how the former Yugoslavia had been created and why it had to collapse. Or their knowledge about us was either modest or untrue. Maybe this can explain their indecisiveness, understatement, frequent suspiciousness, vagueness and general inability to do what we expected from them.

During the EC and UNPROFOR mission, it was mostly the following persons who provided oral orders and positions for discussion with UNPROFOR: Mr P. ZELENKA, Mr J. TOPIĆ, General S. PRALJAK, Mr R. BOŠNJAK, Mr D. SLEZAK and Mr PRIMORAC. One of them was always present during discussions on all important issues in meetings with UNPROFOR.

The present member of the Municipal Staff or Communications Centre was always promptly informed of specific messages /sent/ through UNPROFOR and he conveyed them to the Command.

The following persons were wholeheartedly engaged and secured all the necessary contacts with all the relevant people in the city, even when telephone communications were destroyed: Mr ČULJAK, Mr MABIĆ, Mr LOVRIC, Mr VENDO and others. In general, the communications system and the Communications Centre itself functioned very well and without them the work described in the report could not have been carried out successfully, nor could we have cooperated with international organisations at the required level.

UNPROFOR in particular was warned that throughout the war the enemy systematically violated the rules of the International Law of War and the Geneva Conventions, because, among other things, they obstructed or did not allow the

evacuation of civilians and the wounded from imperilled city districts and because of the criminal destruction of the city and civilian targets.

However, they demonstrated total ineffectiveness in preventing this and the more the aggressor expressed his bestiality, the more UNPROFOR was awed by him, and when they finally received orders to withdraw to the west their happiness was understandable.

The following is a chronological overview of events on each day from the arrival of UNPROFOR to the day of their departure from our area.

## II

21 April 1992

- The Head of the EC Monitoring Mission, Xavier de CHAMBORD, (France) announces that UN observers would arrive in Mostar in four to five days.
- It is agreed that between 1130 and 1500 hours, repairs would be done on the power transmission line at the Čule TS /transformer station/ with EC escort. An agreement on unhindered work is also reached with the Yugo Army. We expected that some municipalities in Western Herzegovina would finally get electricity. However, after 1200 hours, the Chetniks killed an EC monitor in Čule (a Belgian) and this activity, like many others, was postponed indefinitely, and soon afterwards EC monitors left Mostar.
- On the same day, I passed on to the HVO Municipal Staff – the Communications Centre – a threat by General PERIŠIĆ that he would “attack the city with all means available if we did not return his child”. In fact, the Chetniks had sent to the city from the Konak location a Serbian sniper accompanied by a twelve-year old girl, Slavica PETROVIĆ, whose mother Gordana was a civilian serving in the Konak barracks. The sniper was arrested, while the child was provided shelter in a basement in Titova Street because of enemy artillery attacks on almost the entire city. /To show/ that the mad general’s threat had no justification, I gave them, with prior approval, a telephone number at which they could reach the child, but this was just another excuse for destroying the city, which the aggressor did throughout the war.

22 April 1992

- With an explanation of the dirtiness of the enemy’s actions and the abuse of children for achieving murderous goals /against/ the innocent civilian population of Mostar, I handed over the child to EC observers in Mostar, or rather, to the Head of the Monitoring Mission in Mostar in person, so that they could hand her over to her mother Gordana, because I did not agree that I personally or anybody else from the Staff should do this or that the handover should take place on the old bridge due to security concerns for all of us and our lives.
- Contact was established with the International Red Cross and they asked to visit prisoners. This was conveyed to the Staff and action was then taken in accordance with the orders until another person took over this duty.

23 April 1992

- Negotiations continued with EC monitors on the necessity of evacuating about 200 workers from the aluminium smelter, since the destruction of the southern city zone was worsening by the hour.
- An appeal to the EC to prevent looting at the smelter and to save millions of dollars worth of finished products remained unsuccessful.
- It was pointed out in the most alarming way possible that the possible destruction of the aluminium smelter would cause an ecological catastrophe in the city and its surroundings. However, the Yugo Army and Colonel LJUBOTINA did not heed messages delivered by the EC when it came to our requests.
- The arrival of UNPROFOR observers to the areas of Mostar, Čapljina, Stolac and Trebinje was announced through EC monitors. They are supposed to arrive by 30 April 1992.

24 April 1992

- I was informed through EC monitors that eight UNPROFOR observers with a chief for the Mostar sector would arrive at around 1300 hours along the road from Nevesinje to Mostar (across the Hasana Brkića Bridge to the Pensioners' Home), of which I informed the Staff, and the signalmen notified our units of UNPROFOR's arrival route. Their arrival was postponed later and all the relevant persons were informed of this.
- At the same time, EC monitors were asked to request an end to enemy fire from the Hum, Fortica, Konak and Šehovina locations, and a sharp protest was lodged because of their insufficient influence on the aggressor, which the gentlemen accepted.
- Mediation was requested to deliver diesel for the power generator at the Velež relay, because there was no other power source – and this was promised.
- EC escort for buses carrying our citizens to the west was accepted and the monitors did this several times.

25 April 1992

- The EC Monitoring Mission announced the arrival of an UNPROFOR observer group from the north at around 1000 hours and proposed a meeting between UNPROFOR and the HVO Command and the Mayor at 1600 hours on the same day. This meeting was postponed because of the all-day artillery attack on the city and everybody was informed of this, but another appointment was not made.

26 April 1992

- Just like on the previous day, EC monitors received on time our reports on the aggressor's fire from all positions: the North Camp /Sjeverni Logor/, Fortica, Hum and Orlovac, and especially from the North Camp and from Fortica on civilian targets in the Cim and Ilići districts, as well as on the southern zone of the city. After the aggressor broke the short-lived ceasefire on the previous day, a mutual and simultaneous ceasefire at 1800 hours was agreed through the EC, with the approval of the Staff. As a rule, all agreed truces and ceasefires were violated by the aggressor, and when the EC and I personally tried to get in touch with the Yugo Army during their artillery attacks, as a rule, the contact telephone was blocked or nobody answered. They acted like this until their artillery destroyed many commercial and cultural buildings, as well as the post office, but before that ceasefires were agreed by phone.
- The EC lodged a protest demanding that HVO units (individuals, as they said) that were opening fire around the UNPROFOR headquarters building, thereby putting them in danger, be put under control.  
  
They were told that the city was full of Serbian snipers who posed a threat to the civilian population as well as EC observers and that our people had to clear the city from inserted Chetniks, who had also infiltrated the building of the Pensioners' Hotel according to our information. The gentlemen from the EC were asked to bear this in mind, and also that it was our duty to protect all buildings in the city, and especially the Carinski Bridge, which is close to the EC headquarters, and that they had to have understanding for this.
- The Yugo Army announced through the EC that they had wounded members and for this reason they threatened to attack Bijelo polje and demanded that some obstacles be removed. I told them that this was a fabrication, that there were no obstacles, and that their intention, in fact, was to destroy that district, and I asked the EC monitors: "Why is there shooting from the direction of Vrapčići on Bijelo polje and the Convent? Is that a military target?" The EC monitors did not reply, but they did pass this on to the Yugo Army as our question to which we received no reply.
- UNPROFOR's official interpreter, Mr LERO, announced for 27 April 1992 a meeting between the HVO Command and the Mayor and UNPROFOR. The meeting time and place were agreed together with the meeting participants.

27 April 1992

- The first meeting with UNPROFOR observers was held in the building of the Head of the University. The HVO was represented by: Mr TOPIĆ, Mr SLEZAK, Mr ZELENKA, Mayor GAGRO, Mr Ismet HADŽIOSMANOVIĆ, Mr FILIPOVIĆ and also, with the Staff's approval, our interpreter Mr KRALJEVIĆ (because UNPROFOR's interpreter was a Serb). The Municipal Staff promptly received the minutes of this meeting with UNPROFOR, and this was also done after subsequent meetings.
- On this day again, after a meeting between UNPROFOR and the Yugo Army, the enemy opened fire on the entire city, justifying this to UNPROFOR observers by claiming that Croatian forces were grouping in Ilići in order to attack Orlovac.
- On the first day of UNPROFOR's presence in the city, after their return from the meeting at the airport, I asked them to mediate a ceasefire, but they passed this to EC monitors, and so it was done.

28 April 1992

- UNPROFOR mediated the transfer of the sick from Blagaj to Mostar.
- Mr LUNDGREN, the UNPROFOR Commander for the Mostar Sector, informed that he had arranged a ceasefire with Mr PERIŠIĆ at 1030 hours and requested the opinion of the HVO Command, which replied positively. In spite of this, artillery fire was opened on the city, sniper fire was opened from the direction of Bjelušine, and there was movement of enemy tanks in the South Camp /Južni Logor/ – of which UNPROFOR was immediately informed.
- UNPROFOR was asked to mediate urgent work to repair the water and power supply systems and to deliver food to the hungry population in some districts.

29 April 1992

- Our units were informed of the arrival of EC monitors from the north and of the departure of another group of EC monitors towards Sarajevo, along a defined route.
- A meeting was held between the HVO Command and UNPROFOR at 1000 hours and the minutes were sent to the Municipal Staff immediately after the meeting.
- EC monitors provided escort for 25 *Soko* workers who escaped from the factory to the city in privately-owned vehicles.
- Information on the atrocious Chetnik attack on Bijelo polje was promptly conveyed to EC and UN observers in order put pressure on the enemy. Our information that five enemy trucks with artillery weapons were moving from the North Camp towards Fortica was also conveyed.
- The evacuation of children and nuns from Bijelo Polje, together with two bedridden and sick priests, was successfully agreed and carried out together with UNPROFOR observers.

30 April 1992

- At UNPROFOR's request, a meeting was held with the HVO Command, and minutes of the meeting were compiled and submitted to the Staff.
- The enemy suffered great losses in the southern zone of the city and requested a ceasefire through UNPROFOR in order to collect the dead and wounded Chetniks. The HVO Command accepted this with pleasure.
- The enemy is digging in at Fortica – UNPROFOR was informed – and there was Chetnik fire from Hum and Bjelušine. A number of key features in the city were hit, of which the observers were informed.
- The EC and UN are complaining about insecurity in the

Pensioners' Hotel. An alternative was offered to them, but they did not accept it, and they were told that we must protect all parts of the city, including the vicinity of the Pensioners' Hotel.

1 May 1992

- It was announced through UNPROFOR that General S. NAMBIAR, the UNPROFOR Commander, Mr G. SANTOS, the Head of EC Monitors, Mr Mijenko BRKIĆ and other high officials would arrive in Mostar. General S. NAMBIAR did not arrive, and the enemy threatened the city through the EC and opened machine gun and artillery fire on Balinovac and the entire city. In the south-west, the enemy launched a *krmača* /type of aerial bomb/, while the road to Žovnica was shelled from Fortica – the observers also knew about all of this immediately.
- At around 18 hours, a simultaneous ceasefire was agreed at the enemy's request.

2 May 1992

- I sent off three EC observers and our technical team to repair the Čule TS.
- At 1230 hours, the EC and UN announced that General PERIŠIĆ was ready to talk with the HVO Command and General PRALJAK and that they wanted direct contact with our General – the Staff was informed of this.
- At around 1300 hours, the enemy mortally wounded an EC monitor in Čule while an EC monitoring team was escorting our electricians to a damaged pylon in Čule.
- The EC suspended all of their activities for the day, and the enemy continued to destroy the city, of which UNPROFOR was informed, but they did not react that day to our requests towards the aggressor.

3 May 1992

- I informed UNPROFOR of General PRALJAK's conditions for talks with General PERIŠIĆ.
  1. There can be no trilateral meeting, only separate meeting rooms (this way we do not grant legitimacy to the enemy).
  2. That the following areas be demilitarised: Hum, Orlovac, Fortica and Brkanovo brdo, and that this be done within 24 hours.
  3. That the following roads be freed: to Lištca, Čitluk and Liubuški.
  4. That enterprises in the southern zone of the city be allowed to work normally.
  5. That the Mostar HVO Municipal Staff have a lead role in the talks.
- Fierce enemy fire almost the whole day from the direction of the airport towards Kruševo and Krivodol, and towards Slipčiči and Tepčiči. From Hum, Bjelušine and Brankovac, artillery fire was opened on Luka, Donja Mahala, Cim and Ilići.
- Mr SANTOS, the Commander of EC Monitors in BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/, announced that he had received explicit orders regarding the withdrawal of the EC Mission from BH, and that they would come /back/ when the situation calmed down – this was passed on to the Staff.

4 May 1992

- At UNPROFOR's request, a meeting was held at 1100 hours with the HVO Command and minutes of the meeting were made. It was announced that Mr GOULDING, Mr S. NAMBIAR, General McKENZIE and Mr SOLBERI /as printed/ would arrive in Mostar on 6 May 1992. The details of the visit will be announced later. The means of transport, route and time of arrival were provided.
- At our insistence, Mr. LUNDGREN accepted to visit the aluminium smelter with his team, but the Yugo Army did not allow UNPROFOR to do this until they receive approval from Belgrade.

5 May 1992

- A list of people from the aluminium smelter, selected for a visit to the smelter by the smelter's management team (Marko PETKOVIĆ and Marijan JAMBREŠIĆ), was given to UNPROFOR. The Yugo Army is avoiding entry into the aluminium smelter with the excuse that they must receive approval from Belgrade.
- UNPROFOR announced that the visit of the high UN high delegation was postponed and that instead of Mostar they would visit Osijek and Sisak.
- Enemy artillery fire on random targets in the city and the northern and southern parts of the battlefield has been going on from the morning.
- The EC and the UN entered and left the city from the west.

6 May 1992

- At 0900 hours, UNPROFOR reported that PERIŠIĆ had threatened to attack the city at 1000 hours. The reason: "The JNA is being harassed" and the HVO is preparing to attack their targets.
- The UN requested our urgent mediation through the communications centre to halt a UN and EC convoy in Grabovica until the Yugo Army's threat ended. (A message was sent via our communications that Mr Joko and Mr Pero stop the observers until further orders).
- UNPROFOR is hurriedly working on a ceasefire, primarily because of their people on the road.
- The Yugo Army is threatening with aircraft and simultaneously grouping infantrymen and moving tanks in the southern zone of the city. At our request, the UN requested the Yugo Army to stop all movement and to cease fire. Two thirds of the city do not have water supply. A terrifying attack on the city from all enemy positions. A ceasefire agreed by both sides at 1600 hours. I passed on to UNPROFOR General PRALJAK's message that the enemy was not respecting the ceasefire and that we had to return fire because our units positions were under threat. Mr LUNDGREN passed on a message of appreciation from General PRALJAK for his cooperation /as printed/.
- After 1700 hours, the UN agreed to evacuate 50 people from the *Razvitak RK* /expansion unknown/.
- At around 1800 hours, a UN observer was wounded at the Pensioners' Hotel. This was reported to Commander ZELENKA. General PRALJAK is requesting that everything necessary be offered to UNPROFOR, including transfer to Split. This was conveyed immediately to Mr LUNDGREN – he expressed his gratitude for this.
- At around 1945 hours – while the UN was escorting people from the *Razvitak RK*, fire was opened from Mali Kuk at UN personnel.
- At 2200 hours, I informed UNPROFOR in detail of all the destruction that Mostar suffered since its foundation. This was the hardest day of war for the city so far.

7 May 1992

- UNPROFOR accepted with disapproval our requests to go to the left bank and, in general, to move around the city.
- Chetnik snipers are constantly firing at civilians in the direction of Titov Bridge. Early on, a woman was hit on the bridge, and it is impossible to come close to her.
- Mr. ZELENKA requests that UNPROFOR be informed of the concentration of new weapons at Fortica and other enemy movement.
- UNPROFOR reports that they cannot establish contact with the Yugo Army, because they blocked the line, and later "that this was a personnel rotation".



- I asked UNPROFOR to escort our teams repairing power transmission lines, evacuating civilians and securing water supply for the city. They insist that electricity be supplied to their hotel as a matter of priority. I protested because of the arbitrariness in choosing priorities.
- Father Luka PAVLOVIĆ was informed of the arrival of food and medicines for *Caritas* /Catholic Humanitarian Association/.
- The UN requests that Mr ANDRIĆ be freed. I conveyed Mr J. TOPIĆ's protest to them. Under pressure of the enemy, they continued to insist on this several times later. Our protests were always submitted to them, but they did not reply.
- When Mr LUNDGREN was asked "whether he had personally accused the so-called JA /Yugoslav Army/ of wounding this man", he replied: "I accused them of firing shells near the Pensioners' Home".
- At around 1900 hours, a total communications blockade occurred, because not a single telephone in the city worked.  
At 1948 hours, I came to the Pensioners' Home together with the interpreter, Mr KRALJEVIĆ, under a hail of shells to try to agree a ceasefire.  
UNPROFOR refuses to evacuate the wounded under fire. They set a condition: a mutual ceasefire lasting at least three hours. The UN has no contact with the so-called JA and cannot effect a ceasefire.

8 May 1992

- UNPROFOR holds a meeting with Mr PRALJAK, Mr ZELENKA and Mr TOPIĆ (minutes of the meeting were made).  
After this meeting, UNPROFOR went to a meeting with the so-called Yugo Army.
- UNPROFOR reports that a ceasefire was agreed at 1300 hours and that it would last at least three hours so that earlier agreed activities could be done during this period (repairs, escort, exchanges, etc.).  
(From 1300 hours to 1338 hours, the enemy breeched the ceasefire precisely six times – this was also obvious to UNPROFOR, because they opened artillery and VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ fire on Cim, Ilići and the entire city. The enemy always behaved like this when a ceasefire was agreed).
- UNPROFOR enquired where Sejdo BAJRAMOVIĆ's son had been killed and requested that his body be handed over. We promised to give them an answer if we found out anything.  
When they were asked where they got that information from, they replied that Colonel LJUBOTINA had asked them to do this.

9 May 1992

- General PRALJAK's message that armed persons would not enter the Pensioners' Home was conveyed to UNPROFOR.
- The UN confirmed that they had agreed with the Chetniks that they would not open fire between 0800 and 1600 hours on that day. The UN escorted 40 women, children and elderly from the left to the right bank.
- There was an attempt to send our people to Opine to repair the TS – UNPROFOR failed to arrange this with the enemy. A message from Mr ZELENKA was conveyed to UNPROFOR that we had footage of enemy action at the time of Mr LUNDGREN's departure for the airport.
- Until 1200 hours, UNPROFOR had several individual escorts from the city, but then the enemy violated the ceasefire and all other planned activities were postponed.
- The enemy is requesting a ceasefire through UNPROFOR to collect their wounded and dead Chetniks. The Command accepts this.
- On the same day, just like on several previous days, aircraft appeared above Mostar and all of Herzegovina. Most of the time, they came from the south, but also from the north.

10 May 1992

- At around 0230 hours, the enemy hit the Pensioners' Hotel – UNPROFOR's headquarters, with artillery fire.
- UN observers were fast asleep at the time, so I informed them personally of this at 0830 hours, which surprised them.
- A ceasefire was agreed on this day from 0900 to 1600 hours, but the enemy attacked the city already in the morning. We lodged a protest with UNPROFOR because of the positioning of a howitzer at Fortica, because of an attack from the direction of Rodoč, because of enemy infantry movement from Bjelušine and because of constant enemy attacks from all positions on civilian targets in Mostar.
- When we insisted with UNPROFOR to lodge a protest and demand that the enemy stop destroying the city, they conveyed to us Colonel LJUBOTINA's reply that they could not stop until they reached "their line", but they did not say which line this was. I passed this on to the HVO Command.
- Only at 1730 hours was a ceasefire agreed at the enemy's request on our condition: no movement of units or equipment. The aggressor did not even respect this. They moved their infantry towards Donja Mahala and trucks towards Fortica, with constant fire on the city.

11 May 1992

- The enemy started their actions a little after 0900 hours by firing incendiary bullets and teargas from the Bjelušine area and from all enemy positions during the entire day. They fired on the city until after 2400 hours. Artillery attacks intensified in particular after 2000 hours in the southern zone, and they also moved vehicles and equipment towards Bijeli Brijeg. They also opened VBR fire from Fortica and the North Camp. UNPROFOR was promptly informed of all enemy actions, but without any effect on scaling down the Chetnik attack.
- On the same day, at 1555 hours, UNPROFOR requested permission from the HVO Command for the enemy to collect their dead from the Šarića harem location. The reason for requesting the ceasefire was particularly pleasing to us, so the Command accepted this.

12 May 1992

- Some significant activities, which had also been accepted by UNPROFOR observers the day before, were planned.
  - a) Evacuate about 800 children and women to the west via Goranci;
  - b) Visit the Luka, Donja mahala, Mazoljice and Brankovac positions because of our fighters and civilians;
  - c) Start repairs of power transmission lines;
  - d) Together with the International Red Cross, send two of our people to Podveležje (Dobrč and Kružanja) to deliver essential medicines and carry out other tasks.
- A Chetnik attack on the city in the morning – they delayed point a) and intentionally targeted the road to Goranci, as well as the Cultural Centre at the Rondo, where we had provided shelter for women and children.
- UNPROFOR could not effect a ceasefire, and when the enemy accepted this and the UN went to implement item b), the Chetniks shelled UNPROFOR's vehicle on Titov Bridge and wounded one UN observer. UN observers immediately postponed all activities planned for the day.
- At 1410 hours, Major TURIEN /as printed/ gave me Colonel LJUBOTINA's message that the best thing to do would be to withdraw Croatian forces from the left bank in order to achieve a ceasefire, at least on that bank. I asked: "Are you suggesting through Colonel LJUBOTINA that we should surrender the left bank of Mostar? And what do you think that that request would resolve?" Mr LUNDGREN and TURIEN shrugged. I then asked whether Mr LUNDGREN wanted personally to announce this to the HVO Command, because I personally had no

authority to reply to such a request.

He gave a positive reply.

Because of calculating and malicious rumours at the expense of the Mostar HVO Staff regarding this event, I will present in this report the transcript of the conversation between the Mostar HVO Command and UNPROFOR on the aggressor's request for the withdrawal of Croatian units from the left bank of the Neretva.

- Mr J. TOPIĆ: "We've known that message for a long time now. We can't accept those conditions, because the JNA doesn't represent a people or a state. Our message is that they should stick to 15 May 1992 as the date by which Serbia called them to return to their state. They are the aggressor here. That kind of ultimatum is unacceptable and unimaginable to us. I don't know what they are looking for on the left side. Have they explained that to you, Sir?"
- Mr LUNDGREN: "They warned a number of times that you were harassing them at their positions and that Croatian and Muslim forces often violate the ceasefire."
- Mr J. TOPIĆ: "We've even withdrawn partly in order to avoid bloodshed. They advanced two kilometres today, and we withdrew because we didn't want to return fire.  
Mostar is an indivisible entity and there is a limit to which we can tolerate this. Ask the people whether they want to be divided: the Neretva is not the Drina, and Mostar is not Berlin. We don't want a wall."
- Mr J. JAGANJAC: "I would like to tell you something: I'm the only professional here – an officer, while Mr TOPIĆ is a well-known football player and Mr Petar is a well-known worker. The people are defending themselves here and the price is not important to us."
- Mr LUNDGREN: "I'll convey the following: the request that you withdraw is unacceptable!"
- Mr J. JAGANJAC: "Let him (LJUBOTINA) withdraw, because terrorists do what he is doing.  
LJUBOTINA and his army do not put us under any obligation, least of all to give up what is ours."
- Mr LUNDGREN: "I'll also convey that his request is unacceptable and that the JA does not represent the state, and remind him of 15 May 1992 – Serbia's request that they return to Serbia."
- Mr J. TOPIĆ: "Ask him: In the name of whom, in the name of what he is requesting that? I'd also ask you about the wounded and the dead."
- Mr LUNDGREN: "I've been doing that lately. To evacuate civilians and the wounded, and to evacuate Serbian families to the right side. I also have a separate question: I have a damaged vehicle on the east side of Titov Bridge. Do you have any units nearby that could extract it? I'll also ask LJUBOTINA."
- Mr J. TOPIĆ: "How is the injured gentleman?"
- Mr LUNDGREN: "Good. Just the leg and shrapnel in the back and flak jacket."
- Mr J. TOPIĆ: "What can we do about the vehicle and when?"
- Mr LUNDGREN: "Between 1600 and 1800 hours. If you have a towing service to raise the front end and bring it in front of the Pensioners' Hotel.  
Alright, now we'll go and convey the messages to LJUBOTINA.  
(The following persons were present during the conversation: Mr J. TOPIĆ, Mr J. JAGANJAC and Mr P. ZELENKA; recorded by Ilija FILIPOVIĆ and interpreted by Jozo KRALJEVIĆ)

- On the same day, the aggressor unilaterally declared a five-day ceasefire via the BH SDS /Serbian Democratic Action/, starting on 13 May 1992.

13 May 1992

- UNPROFOR informed Mr JAGANJAC and Mr ZELENKA at the Municipal Staff of its work plans for the duration of the "ceasefire".  
Mr JAGANJAC informed Mr LUNDGREN that that was an illusion of the enemy's entry onto the east side /as printed/. At the same time, the aggressor was requested not to move at all if they wanted a ceasefire. Mr LUNDGREN promised to pass that on to LJUBOTINA.
- We extracted the UN vehicle from *Titov Bridge*.
- In the course of the day, the aggressor did not let International Red Cross vehicles pass through to Rodoč.
- Frequent shooting around *Titov* bridge, occasional artillery fire on

the southern zone of the city, while Luka and Mahala are engulfed in dense smoke.

14 May 1992

- At 0800 hours, UNPROFOR announced its relocation to the west within the next 12 hours on orders from New York.  
Mr LUNDGREN: "We're withdrawing because the enemy is not sparing our people either, but we'll continue to try to perform our mediation and humanitarian roles in the city.  
In addition, there is no chance for any of the actions in the city that we planned, because LJUBOTINA did not approve our safe passage to the left bank."  
Petar ZELENKA was immediately informed of this.  
Mr LUNDGREN personally informed Mr R. BOŠNJAK of this at the Municipal Staff, saying that they would first go to Medugorje and then look for other possibilities.  
Mr R. BOŠNJAK thanked him on behalf of the HVO Staff for their effort and desire to help and expressed his hope that they would stay in touch with Mostar. He made Mr FILIPOVIĆ and Mr KRALJEVIĆ responsible for their accommodation in the west."
- At 1330 hours, UNPROFOR left Mostar via Goranci.

15 May 1992

Široki Brijeg

- UNPROFOR received Mr PRIMORAC from the Široki Brijeg HVO Municipal Staff. He informed them very thoroughly of the situation in the municipality, relations among the population, the enemy's intentions, mercenaries in his ranks, the diversity of his military formations and confusion in the ranks of the aggressor.  
He put at their disposal everything they needed in the municipality. (I warned Mr PRIMORAC that they were also considering Grude for their headquarters. This is why we proposed the Šaškur location so that they would stay in Široki Brijeg, as they did eventually.)  
Mr KOŽUL and Mr V. LASIĆ were assigned to take care of all services provided by Široki Brijeg municipality with regard to their accommodation.

16 May 1992

- UNPROFOR is asking to get in touch with Mr ČAVAR and wants to meet the commander of the Grude Zone.  
The Staff in Široki Brijeg has been informed of this.

17 May 1992

- Mr LUNDGREN is protesting: the Pensioners' Home is full of Croatian soldiers and this hinders the work of the International Red Cross, because it violates their rules of procedure.

I explained: the Pensioners' Hotel is on the bank of the Neretva and close to the Carinski Bridge, and our positions and the defence of the city are more important to us.

We can move the International Red Cross to Bijeli Brijeg or elsewhere. We believe that it more important to defend the city.

I also informed Mr LUNDGREN of the following: the enemy had launched poison gas on Luka, Donja mahala and Slipčiči, and the following areas had been shelled:

Municipalities:

- 1) Mostar
  - Bijelo Polje: artillery and infantry attack; cluster bombs dropped,
- 2) Široki Brijeg
  - Kočerina (four times)
  - Mamići
  - Mokro
- 3) Posušje
  - Vranić
  - Broćanac
- 4) Ljubuški
  - Grljevići
  - Lipno
- 5) Metković

UNPROFOR could not establish contact with the Yugo Army, so they informed the UN Mission in Stolac of their protest to LJUBOTINA so that they could pass it on to the Yugo Army.

LUNDGREN refused to let the UN go to Mostar.

18 May 1992

- With the help of the Široki Brijeg Municipal Staff, I handed over to UNPROFOR samples of gas masks and poison gases used in Bijelo Polje, but they did not analyse them because of their hurried departure.

19 May 1992

- Mr LUNDGREN announced that he had received orders from the highest place that his sector and other UN observers (Stolac, Trebinje, Medugorje) would leave BH on the following day already.
- The Mostar and Široki Brijeg Municipal Staffs were immediately informed of this.

20 May 1992

- UNPROFOR observers – the Mostar sector – departed for Split, and then on to Zagreb.

REPORT MADE BY:  
Mostar HVO Command Coordinator  
for EC and UNPROFOR Observers  
(signed)  
Ilija FILIPOVIĆ

The following are attachments to the report (10)

III

- ATTACHMENTS (10):

1. Minutes of meeting with EC monitors held on 24 April 1992 at the Pensioners' Hotel, starting at 1700 hours
2. Minutes of meeting with UNPROFOR observers held on 27 April 1992 at the University Head's office, starting at 1000 hours
3. Minutes of meeting with UNPROFOR observers held on 28 April 1992 at the University Head's office, starting at 1000 hours
4. Minutes of meeting with the UNPROFOR Commander for the Mostar Sector held on 29 April 1992 at the University Head's office, starting at 1000 hours
5. Minutes of meeting with UNPROFOR observers held on 30 April 1992 at the University Head's office, starting at 1000 hours
6. Minutes of meeting with UNPROFOR observers held on 4 May 1992 at the University Head's office, starting at 1000 hours
7. Authorised text of the statement of Mr Ismet HADŽIOSMANOVIĆ on the occasion of the signing of the Decision to put all armed forces in Mostar under the command of the Mostar HVO Municipal Staff
8. List of fax numbers of international organisations and prominent international figures to whom numerous appeals with regard to the aggressor's attack on Mostar were sent (the texts of the appeals are in the files of Mr Franjo ŠIMUNOVIĆ, Mostar Municipality Secretary)
9. Text of plan proposed by Commander LUNDGREN for the possible arrival of M. GOULDING and S. NAMBIAR with associated in Mostar
10. Text of interview with the HVO Command Coordinator for UNPROFOR (*Slobodna Dalmacija*, 8 June 1992)

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As already mentioned, the first interparty meeting was held in Brussels and next three meetings were held in Lisbon. The fifth meeting was held at Konak in Sarajevo on 16th, 17th and 18th March 1992. At that meeting the principles of the constitutional arrangement of BiH were agreed, and for offered map, which was the based on absolute and relative national majority for each municipality, needed to be further discussed. The sixth meeting was held on 30th and 31st March, 1992, again in Lisbon. And at this meeting the map of the three constituent units remains controversial and needed to be discussed further until May 15th the same year. However, after returning from Lisbon, under pressure from his party, Alija Izetbegovic renounced his agreement with Cutilleir's plan. After that,

the other two participants also withdrew their consent. Soon after that the general conflict began across the country between the Serbian army on one side and Croatians and Muslims on the other side. In regards with Izetbegović rejection of the Cutilleir's plan in his later interview with the Belgrade Blic Cutilleiro confirmed that leader of the Bosnian Muslims Alija Izetbegovic initially accepted the plan "just to satisfy Europe, then he withdrew his consent to satisfy the Americans who encouraged him to do so. "He (Izetbegovic) believed that Washington supports his idea of a unitary Bosnia. Dayton has proved him wrong, "said a Portuguese diplomat, noting that European Union was also against unitary Bosnia. "63

Pursuant to conclusion from meeting of parties in Lisabon, on 31<sup>st</sup> of March, the talks on Cutillero's plan continued on 23<sup>rd</sup> of April among three party delegations on one side and European community delegation on the other side. The talks took place in the airport building Butmir Sarajevo, being surrounded by Serbian military forces. The European community delegation, consisting of three members was headed by the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affaires Pineiro, along with the members Cutillero and Lord Carrington. The Serbian delegation was headed by Radovan Karadzic, the Muslim by Alija Izetbegovic and the Croatian by Franjo Boras. I was in charge, because Mate Boban couldn't come to the surrounded Sarajevo, whereby Miljenko Brkic, being at the time temporary President of HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), had some family affaires in Sarajevo. Mile Akmadzic was also with me in the delegation, being at the time the general Secretary of the War Presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As the talks with Croatian delegation were reaching its end, Lord Carrington addressed me with following words: "Mister Boras, if you do not reach an agreement, we shall allow to kill each other mutually and than we shall impose our solutions". I responded him: " Lord Carrington, how and who with should we reach an agreement, the Serbian aggressor has everything at its disposal, it took all military equipment of JNA (Yugoslav National Army), you yourself can hear the repercussions of cannons and mortars from the surrounding hills. When we talk to them, that conversation is rather deaf. The representatives of the Muslim people are passive; they don't do anything for defense of BIH and still hope to get some help from JNA." After the talks were over, I came back through the rain of grenades, safe and sound to the Presidency building. At the end of talks, Cutillero clearly pointed out that all three delegations should mutually agree upon the territorial fixing boundaries of three constitutive units within BIH without presence of the international communion representatives.

#### Talks in Graz

Related to Sarajevo conclusion, the meeting in Graz between the Croatian and Serbian delegation was held on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1992. Mate Boban was heading the Croatian delegation, along with Vlatko Santic and I, as members. Radovan Karadzic was heading the Serbian delegation, escorted by Momcilo Krajisnik and Branko Simic. The talks took place in the airport building of Graz. The subjects of talks were three key issues: Kupres, Bosanska Posavina and the left part of Neretva, from Jablanica to Metkovic. The Serbian delegation proposed to take Kupres, (in order that Croats have some kind of bypass

\*Daily newspaper, Mostar July 7th, 1992 p.5

towards Bugojno), the left bank of river Neretva from Jablanica to Metkovic, including Mostar, along with the corridor through Bosanska Posavina, 20 kilometers wide. The Croatian delegation proposed the opposite: the Croatian constitutive unit in BIH is entitled to Kupres, the South-East Herzegovina, along with Mostar, including the municipality of Stolac, in order to be able to discuss the narrow part of corridor through Bosanska Posavina. The held talks haven't been supported by any protocol. We agreed that both delegations shall meet the Muslim side. The talks began around 11 o'clock and ended around 16 o'clock. The Croatian delegation returned to Zagreb by car, while the Serbian took off by plane, as far as I know, in an unknown direction. Later on, some kind of public announcement on talks in Graz appeared which wasn't mentioned in the meeting at all. I found this announcement in Zdravko Tomac's book that I bring in whole.

“Determined that all issues, including the delineation of two constituent units - Croatian and Serbian in Bosnia and Herzegovina resolve through peaceful means and negotiations, representatives of Croatian and Serbian national community determined that in relations to the drafted map of delineations there are a discrepancies in the following cases:

1. In the city of Mostar Serbian side believes that the border is a river Neretva, and Croatian side considers the entire city of Mostar as Croatian national unit.

2. Croatian side considers that south of Mostar is part of Croatian national unit determined in 1939, ie the border of Croatian Banovina. Serbian side believes that the border between Croatian and Serbian units is river Neretva.

3. Both sides agree that the delineation of the two constituent units in Kupres, as well as in Bosnian Posavina (Doboj, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Odžak, Orašje, Modrica and Brčko) takes into account the compactness of space and communications.

4. Both sides are determined to persevere in the principles adopted at the conference of the European Community regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on which basis they agree that they will in the process of determination of disputed and other areas respect the established criteria for defining the national territory with the arbitration of the European Union.

5. With this agreement there isn't any reason for the termination of the Conference of the European Community regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina and both sides seek an

urgent continuation of the conference.

It is insisted that the delineation through arbitration is performed in the an agreed period until May 15th, 1992.

6. According to the above agreements there are no more reasons for armed conflicts between Croats and Serbs throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Total and permanent ceasefire is announced under the control of the European Community, which shall enter into force on May 6th, 1992. at midnight.

Representative of the Serbian national community

Radovan Karadzic

Representative of the Croatian National Community

Mate Boban» 64

No notes were taken during the discussions in Graz, nor was any protocol made. We have also agreed not to issue any press release. Nevertheless, after two or three days in the domestic and foreign public a statement appeared, to which I came across in the book written by Zdravko Tomac. This was followed by negative reaction from the world, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political rivals and opponents presented this meeting as a secret meeting of Croatian and Serbian delegations to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is it possible from the statement, which was maliciously published by the Serbian side to read any kind of division of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

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In the second half of April 1992 refugees and displaced persons from Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia around Sarajevo were arriving. Local refugees from the suburbs: Gnojnica, Blagaj, Bune, Rodoča, Jasenica, Vojna and Bijelo Polje had already arrived at the liberated territory. Mostar is becoming overcrowded. The Crisis Committee is organizing a mass settling of refugees to hotels and private accommodations in Croatia. These refugees and displaced persons are joined by a large number of people from Mostar. Unfortunately, among them there were many able to fight who sabotaged the defense and left Mostar. They used all possible methods to escape to Croatian coast. And while town defenders were bleeding, they were spending their days carefree and enjoying the sea, thinking that the war would soon be over.

Local Serbs in great numbers joined the military aggressor, and the remaining Serbian civilians were leaving Mostar, through route communications from Mostar to Nevesinje and Stolac. Only a small number of Serbs remained in the city.

#### IX.4. Decision of Mostar Crisis Staff on new structure of defense of Mostar

Document 011: Decision of Crisis Staff no: 427/92, 29th April 1992

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**  
**Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar**  
**Municipal Crisis Headquarters**  
**No: 427/92**  
**Date: 29 Apr 92**

### DECISION

Pursuant to the Order of the Republic Headquarters of Civil Defense and the Resolution of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed on 4 Apr 92 and 10 Apr 92 and the Decision on Proclaiming the Immediate Threat of War in the Territory of the Municipality of Mostar No: 1/92 of 9 Apr 92, and the Decision on the Withdrawal of the JNA Units from the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed by the Presidency of the Republic of BiH on 27 Apr 92, the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar, proceeding from the fact that the Municipality of Mostar is under partial occupation by units of the so-called Yugoslav People's Army and the paramilitary formations which are cooperating with it in armed action against the civilian facilities and are, at the same time, looting commercial establishments and family homes and taking prisoner the inhabitants of this Municipality, as well as the fact that the so-called JNA and other paramilitary formations cooperating in action with it do not recognize the legitimate and legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of the Municipality of Mostar, passes the following

### DECISION

#### I

The so-called Yugoslav People's Army and other paramilitary formations which are cooperating with it in action are proclaimed to be the enemy and occupation formations in the territory of the Municipality of Mostar.

#### II

The Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar and members of the Ministry of Interior - Mostar Center shall be entrusted with the protection and defense of the city of Mostar against the formations described in Article 1.

#### III

The Croat Defense Council shall consist of the members of Moslem and Croat peoples and the members of other peoples and minorities who recognize the legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and profess allegiance to them.

The Moslems may form their own armed formations which shall be placed under the unitary command of the HVO Municipal Headquarters Mostar.

#### IV

The ethnic structure of the command personnel of the Croat Defense Council shall match the ethnic structure of soldiers on active duty.

When forming new defense forces, the command personnel shall be represented on the parity principle. This provision shall apply to forces formed after 1 May 92.



## V

The task of the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall be the liberation of the entire territory of the municipality. In order to carry out the foregoing task, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall coordinate with other defense forces from neighboring municipalities.

The Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall form and organize its armed forces which shall guarantee peace, freedom and security to the citizens.

The military police shall perform this function.

## VI

In order to perform the judicial function in the domain of the Laws of War, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall establish and form, and organize the work of the Military Prosecutor's Office and the Military Court for the territory of the Municipality of Mostar.

The ethnic structure in these institutions shall reflect the ethnic structure of soldiers on active duty.

## VII

When the circumstances so warrant, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall coordinate with the Municipal Crisis Headquarters, the Ministry of Interior and other legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to defend the Municipality of Mostar.

The questions of common interest shall be resolved at joint sessions of the Crisis Headquarters of the Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar and the Croat Defense Council, Municipal Headquarters Mostar.

All documents for movement of people and goods shall be issued by the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar.

## VIII

The Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar shall establish as soon as possible the temporary Executive Council which will ensure the functioning of the government bodies of the Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar.

## IX

All other questions and political decisions regarding the competency of the decisions passed by legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be regulated after cessation of hostilities i.e. liberation of the Municipality of Mostar and creation of conditions for normal functioning of legal authorities.

## MEMBERS OF THE CRISIS HEADQUARTERS:

- |                         |             |
|-------------------------|-------------|
| 1. Milivoj Gagro        | (signature) |
| 2. Ismet Hadziosmanovic | (signature) |
| 3. Zijad Demirovic      | (signature) |
| 4. Borislav Puljic      | (signature) |
| 5. Josip Skutor [?]     | (signature) |
| 6. Mehmed Bahmen [?]    | (signature) |
| 7. Ilija Filipovic      | (signature) |
| 8. Fikret Bajric        | (signature) |
| 9. Jole Musa            | (signature) |

On the April 29th, 1992 the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar made a decision regarding new structure of Mostar defense no. 427/92. Here is the full content of the above mentioned decision:

This decision was preceded by a number of meetings of the Crisis Headquarters and proponents of the decision HVO main Headquarters and its president Jadran Topić. These discussions lasted for several days, and the foundation of discussions was the first letter which defines the starting point for decision arrangement.

### **DEFENCE OF MOSTAR AND REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Political option and situation solution regarding the town should be looked for in terms of discussions and solutions within the Conference regarding BiH under the auspices of the EC.

Military engagement for the defense of Mostar is carried out by Croats and Muslims.

Military commander for defense of Mostar is Croat – all commands go through him.

Jadran Topić

/signed and stamped/

Document 012: The initial conditions for the alignment of the final draft decision of the Crisis Headquarter

The above mentioned decision establishes the fundamental principles of preservation of the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- Compliance with the applicable decisions of legal authorities,
- JNA is declared the aggressor,
- Protection and defense of the citizens is taken over by the HVO Mostar,
- HVO is composed of the Croatian and Muslim people, and command staff will be appointed on the basis of parity,
- judicial authorities for trial in the war are introduced, appointed on the basis of parity,
- HVO is required to coordinate all operations with legitimate authorities in BiH and
- Once the war operations stop and Mostar is liberated, decisions brought by legal authorities will be accepted.

The next day, Ejup Ganić member of the BiH presidency phoned the president of the Crisis Headquarters Milivoj Gagro and requested an explanation regarding the decision taken the previous day. He was satisfied with the explanation and did not ask for any consequences or possible elimination of the decision. On April 29th 1992, as a member of the Crisis Headquarters I issued a statement which was read in its entirety on Radio Mostar, as well as the complete text of the decision on the show at 6:00 p.m.

Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina never formally responded to this decision.

It is interesting to note that in the regions of BiH which were free at that time, especially in central Bosnia, Crisis Headquarters were formed not by legal authorities, but mostly by ex-communist authorities. Such decisions did not bother the authorities in Sarajevo.

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Document 017: Decision  
on appointment of Croatian  
Defense Council (HVO)  
no: 01-227, 21st May 1992

**CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
CENTRAL BOSNIA REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS  
MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS FOR MOSTAR**

Number 01-227/92  
Mostar, 21 May 1992

Pursuant to the Statutory Decision on the Establishment of Temporary Executive Power and Administration in the territory of the HZ H-B /Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna/, the president of the municipal HVO of Mostar hereby proposes the following

**DECISION**

**On Appointments to the Municipal Croatian Defence Council for Mostar**

**Article 1**

The following shall be appointed to the Croatian Defence Council of the municipality of Mostar:

1. Jadran TOPIĆ - president
2. Stojan VRLJIĆ - vice-president
3. Mumin ISIĆ - head of the General Administration Department
4. Milenko MUSA - head of the Finance Department
5. Senad KAZAZIĆ - head of the Department of Economy
6. Sejo MASLO - head of the Department for Social Affairs
7. Miro PANDŽA - head of the Procurement Department
8. Hamdija JAHIĆ - head of the Department for Public Utilities, Housing and Reconstruction
9. Franjo GOLEMAC - head of the Department for Transportation, Telecommunication and Information
10. Drago ZOVKO - head of the Department for Social and Health Care and Refugees
11. Roko MARKOVINA - head of the Civil Defence Department
12. Jasmin JAGANJAC - head of the Defence Department
13. Viktor STOJKIĆ - head of the Department of the Interior

**Article 2**

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of issue.

Mostar, May 1992

**PRESIDENT**

**Mr Jadran TOPIĆ**

**IX.7. Arkan criminals are coming to Mostar**

With the overall aspects of military and political events in Mostar, we are disclosing an important and very interesting message.

/handwritten:  
Urgently!  
Omer Behmen called!  
Arkan we are moving for Mostar

Document 018: The content of telephone messages dated April 17th, 1992 received from Omer Behmen.

This message was received by phone on April 17th, 1992. from SDA BiH Central in Sarajevo. The message was sent by telephone by Omer Behmen, a member of the Executive Board of the SDA BiH, who according to the party program was responsible for Herzegovina.

The message reads:

“Chetniks - the army is moving for Mostar, block Mostar block, message Hadžija.”

Much was said by this dispatch. We remember well photos from TV about the crimes that these troops have committed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The crimes, above all, had a psychological message that we should be aware of what awaits us. In Mostar at the time, the lines of defense were being hastily reinforced. It is interesting to note that the credibility of the message sent by Omer Behmen was later fully confirmed. However, it remains unclear how the Omer Behmen learned of this movement?

## Chapter IX.8

### Talks between Slobodan Praljak and Momčilo Perišić

Josip Jule Musa was the member of the Mostar municipality Crisis staff and he was the only staff member that officers of the aggressor army wanted to talk to. On 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 1992 Momčilo Perišić, commander of UŽice corps reported to the crisis staff, wishing to talk to the commander of HVO. We contacted Slobodan Praljak, commander of the HVO operational zone Mostar and forwarded him a message. The day after, around 14: 00 hrs a phone call was established and M. Perišić suggested, without hesitation, that his army and Croatian army come to the banks of Neretva and that each of armies guards its new positions, calmly waiting for the solution of the political crisis in Yugoslavia. To such proposition, S. Praljak responded: "We will execute the balance in Nevesinje". After that conversation, Mostar suffered the biggest shelling and destruction up to that moment.

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The presented historical documents clearly indicate a very serious military and political situation in Mostar, and negotiations in Graz between Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić who held a joint meeting of May 7th and 8th 1992, contributed this situation in particular. Discussions at the meeting were regarding the future arrangements. These discussions were conducted at the request of Lord Carrington.

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Events in Graz, Austria could not pass without severe reaction. Regional Committee of SDA for Herzegovina at this occasion issued a statement and sent it to interested parties, and warned of the deleterious effects of all these negotiations held without the presence of Muslim representatives from RBiH.

\*\*\*

"Considering the very serious military and political situation in Mostar and Herzegovina, SDA as a major legitimate representative of the Muslim nation, as well as Muslims from other opposition parties accepted and gave its political approval for the establishment of a unified defense in Mostar which was entrusted to the Croatian Defense Council, composed by Croats, Muslims and other citizens. We accepted this decision under one condition, namely not to accept any political solution for the duration of the joint war against the common aggressor. On this fact, we had to warn Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić, who had negotiated in Graz »<sup>15</sup>.

### The occupation of Mostar left bank

... On May 11th, 1992 in the early morning hours the aggressor moved to a violent attack in order to break the resistance and repression the defenders on the right bank of the Neretva. The attacks included all the available power that according to our information, amounted to about five thousand soldiers, backed by artillery and tanks. The attack was carried out from the direction of North Camp, through the bypass on the east side of town from direction of the South Camp, Ortiješ airport, Rodoč heliport. The artillery was firing mercilessly on the right and left side of Mostar, and especially from Hum, Stolac and airport Ortiješ. Such a violent attack defenders of Mostar have resisted for more than twelve hours.

After that command was issued that all civilians and soldiers have to withdrawn to the right bank in order to avoid a general massacre.

This is followed by the general destruction of the left bank of Mostar. Houses and facilities were systematically robbed, mosques were destroyed, and everything that presents Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian culture was burned without mercy. Mostar Serbs stand out in these robberies. They were organized in a Serbian paramilitary group.

During that period the scale of casualties in Mostar was: committed genocide against Muslims and Croats who were caught in their houses and apartments, two mass graves at Uborak - city landfill in the village Vrapčići were found. In the first grave about 80, and in the second about 40 Muslims and Croats were found.

During the period of occupation of the left bank from May 11th, 1992nd until June 13th, 1992, all of the mosques on

<sup>15</sup> Page 2 of the mentioned statement

the left bank were either destroyed or damaged. Earlier, the crypt and the Franciscan monastery in Podhum, Episcopal Ordinariate, Cathedral in Balinovac were burned out and so on.

The factories Soko, aluminum conglomerate, Hepok, Vrapčići, Compressor and other smaller companies were looted or damaged. Vast fortune from the family houses and flats were taken. The value stolen and destroyed property from Mostar will never be determined.

After the military operation, the aggressor took military position from HE Salakovci the north of Mostar, to Doljani and Stolac. Areas south of Mostar experienced a similar fate.

The entire Muslim and Croatian population was exiled to the right bank of the Neretva, app. 40 000 inhabitants. Many to this day have not returned to their homes.

On May 13th, 1992 The Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar made the first preliminary report and informed the world public about the suffering of Mostar and Herzegovina. All these desperate moves were left without any response or help.

After the liberation of Mostar in the summer of 1992, a group of experts from Mostar prepared a comprehensive report about the aggression and sufferings of Mostar and combined them in a book entitled "Mostar urbicid 1992."

This book was sent to many addresses in the world. The city of Mostar is organized the whole series of public presentations around the world so the wider world public could get familiarized with the sufferings of Mostar.

Mostar has not yet come to turn to try the individuals for crimes committed in Mostar. Victims of Mostar are patient, knowing that the perpetrators will get just punishments.

During the period of occupation of the left bank of Mostar, the aggressor demolished with mines: Carinski Bridge, Titov Bridge, Lučki Bridge, Hasan Brkić bridge, bridge for Vojna, bridge in Žitomislíci, bridge in Čapljina, railway bridges in Raštani and Bačevići. The aggressor's army destroyed the aviation bridge in Rodoč during the retreat from the Jasenica heliport.

All bridges over the Neretva river are mined on the basis of technical documentation prepared by the communist government in Yugoslavia. These projects have been stored in the archives of the Regional Territorial Defense for Herzegovina.<sup>16</sup>

## **IX. 12 Arming of the Patriotic League**

In the previous section we explained how the reserve police was armed. One part of the weapons from the contingent of the reserve police was assigned to the Patriotic League in Mostar.

The largest part of the weapons came from Croatian army, which was personally distributed by Mate Šarlija Daidža and Croatian Crisis Headquarters assigned to help the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After aggressor was stopped at Čepikuće in October 1991 and aggressors' first defeat, Daidža transferred the command post to Vrgorac, a little town in Croatia close to the border, where he continued to work defending the Republic Croatia and organizing the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Upon approval from Gojko Šušak, Daidža conducted an interview with Mustafa Hadžiosmanović so he would guarantee that the weapons delivered to the Muslims will be properly distributed. Mustafa and Daidža knew each other from the days when they were imprisoned in communist jail. After completion of the secret meeting, the first contingent of arms from Vrgorac was taken by Arif Hadžiosmanović, Suad Ćupina, Nail Nožić Pinca. Transportation safety was provided by Zikrija Džonko, Sejo Čelebić and Omica Đukić.

Transportation of arms was carried out in utmost secrecy and at great personal risk to their lives. Trucks owned by brothers Husić from Podveležje were used most of the times. Weapons were distributed successively from Stolac, Dubrava, Gubavice, Buna, Blagaj, Podveležje, Gnojnica, Mostar, Bijelo Polje, Jablanica, Konjic all the way to village Bijelimići towards Boračko lake.

Weapons were dispatched continuously in small quantities. Daidža delivered approx. 4500 rifles and considerable quantities of ammunition. Each delivery had their own security, because Daidža wouldn't allow transportation until he got a safety guarantee. For each delivered quantity all proper documentation was kept by Daidža himself.

<sup>16</sup> Jovan Divjak was in October 1992. held in detention under the accusation that he provoked the conflicts between Croats and Muslims in Prozor. The whole investigation was led by the authorities of IV Corps of the BiH, headed by Arif Pašalić. This investigation confirmed that he was informed about the mining of the bridges, but he didn't submit any information to the defense authorities of Mostar, although communications with Sarajevo still existed. Central Post office in Mostar was bombarded in May, so he was able to give the directions on how to save the bridges from destruction.

This process lasted about three months. In similar manner, Croats in Mostar also received weapons from Daidža.

From the same contingent that is from the Croatian Army, Sarajevo and Foča also received the weapons. To retrieve the weapons for Sarajevo and Foča guarantee was previously given by Omer Behmen, who personally visited Daidža in Vrgorac.

Page 2.

Three thousand pipes that I stole from my country, Republic Croatia, let them be halal to you, but I ask of you, please do this for me: order your commanders, or captains, whatever you call them not to turn them against me, because patience also has its limits. I especially ask the President of the Presidency, if he still has any influence and authority, to stop the rampage, and to allow us to pass into the damn Sarajevo, and I give my word of God and the people, and I swear by everything sacred that I will never personally go to Sarajevo!

Document 027: Part of Daidža's letter to Alija Izetbegović dated July 6th 1992, which confirms that three thousand pipes (rifles) were sent to Sarajevo. Because of the historical facts, the full content of this letter will be shown later, which reflects Daidža's great contribution for liberation of BiH.

The attached document 028 is a report of weapons and equipment delivered by SDA to Independent Battalion (later the First Mostar Brigade) in period from April 1st to September 1st, 1992.

- R E P O R T -

Procurement and transportation of weapons and equipment  
in period from April 1st to September 1st, 1992.

- 1) Automatic rifles 10 pieces (delivered to xxxx) Daidža
- 2) Hand grenades 100 pieces (delivered to xxxx, Carina)
- 3) Automat "Zagi" 10 pieces (I. Brigade) Daidža
- 4) Ammunition 7,9 5000 pieces (I. Brigade) Daidža
- 5) Ammunition 7,62 x 34 10000 pieces (I. Brigade) Daidža
- 6) RPG 20 pieces (Luka + Carina) Daidža
- 7) Explosives 200kg (I. Brigade) Pag.

\*\*\*

-2-

- 32) Computer communication system (I. Brigade) SDA
- 33) Portable radio stations 50 pieces (I. Brigade) SDA
- 34) Portable radio stations 30 pieces (I. Brigade) SDA
- 35) Uniform sets 100 pieces (I. Brigade) SDA
- 36) Rocket Launcher (I. Brigade) Herceg Stjepan
- 37) Rockets for launchers 80 pieces (I. Brigade) Herceg Stjepan
- 38) Metal beads 150 pieces (I. Brigade) SDA
- 39) Blankets 200 pieces (I. Brigade) SDA

Report prepared by  
Hadžiosmanović /illegible/  
/signed/

NOTE: Dispatch documents stored at SDA Mostar archives.

Document 028: Report for procurement and shipment of equipment delivered for defense of Mostar and Herzegovina by SDA Mostar.

The document 029 shows weapons that were provided by Emir and Tarik Bijedić by their own initiative, and document 030 is also a list of weapons and equipment that were provided on their own initiative by Emir Bijedić and Hivzo Kazazić.

Document 030 is interesting because it shows part of the weapons delivered by the Crisis Headquarters of Muslims in Croatia for defense of Mostar, three days after Mostar was liberated. The weapons were transported by boats in Donja Mahala across the Neretva River and shipped to the first line of defense in Podvelež, where it was delivered to Podvelež troop command. Weapons were approved by Šefko Omerbašić and transported by Miralem Batlak, President of SDA Bileća.

At the beginning, weapons were handed over directly to company commanders, and later to Mujo Koto for First Mostar Brigade and Adil Krgo.

\*\*\*

The action continued to the next day, when the lines of conflict moved deep into the mountain Velež and communication towards Nevesinje. Buna, Blagaj, Podvelež, Vranjevići, Bijelo Polje, Dubravska plateau Čapljina, Stolac and the hinterland town of Neum were liberated. The offensive that started on June 12th lasted several days and the enemy was constantly suppressed in the depths of their positions.

Thereafter, the defense line was formed that went around the slopes of the mountains Prenj, Velež, Hrgud and Stolac. The common defense was formed on this line which was occasionally moved in favor of the defenders and it remained about the same way until the Muslim-Croatian war May 9th, 1993.

In this well-performed action defenders of Mostar nonetheless had victims. Among the Independent Battalion and HVO 15 people were killed and about 30 people were wounded more or less severely.

After the celebration of victory and decrease of euphoria regarding the liberation of Mostar, it was scary to visit and determine the magnitude of crime committed in Mostar. Indeed, it was a city of horror.

Mostar refugees from Jasenice, Rodoč, Carine, Zalika, Mazoljica, Brankovci, Luka, Šehovina and so on, slowly began to visit their burned and looted homes and condos. Those were untreatable wounds, fatal to the further recovery of Mostar, which even after 14 years fails to recover. God only knows whether all this would ever be recovered. One of the world's famous city was gone forever known for its poets, artists, coot, jumpers from the bridge, rowers and swimmers from Neretva, who indeed were the sole of the city. Traditional promenade and beauty and ambiance of the Old Town were gone. Sad and unspeakable pain will remain for future generations.

The numbers of the first part of the war were horrible, but we thought it was finished and that we will accept all of the problems as reality, and will find the strength to rebuild our city and country. Unfortunately, it was only the first part of the scenario Mostar went through. The second part of the scenario commenced on May 9th 1993 when war between Muslims-Croats begun.

For genocide and urbicid committed in Mostar, authorities have filed a complaint with the International Tribunal in Hague against Momčilo Perišić, the commander of the aggressor's army and its supporters.

After the liberation of Mostar and parts of Herzegovina, political games were starting over the future status of Mostar. Much more will be written about the course of these events later in this book.

## **X. 2 Preparations for the liberation of Sarajevo**

Major General Mate Šarlija Daidža (Nijaz Batlak) was directly involved in preparation and implementation of large-scale action for liberation of Mostar and wider area of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose contribution is immeasurable.

Immediately after and due to the liberation of Mostar, Alija Izetbegović, President of the Presidency of BiH and the Supreme Commander of the BiH Army, by the decree appoints him the Chief Commander of the Southern front, with the aim of further liberation of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this decree all active units of the HVO and the Mostar Battalion and the BiH Army in the area of Mostar, Jablanica and Konjic are placed under his command.

\*\*\*

Before the offensive for the liberation of Sarajevo, Daidža created all the prerequisites for Croats and Muslims to jointly head in a decisive battle for the liberation of Sarajevo. At the first call, six hundred Muslims and Croats volunteered, including me. Excellent atmosphere was created for this action.

Pursuant to the powers conferred, Daidža issued a number of commands which, in military terms, were strengthening the

combat readiness of Mostar and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I would like to name two: the command number. 11057/92. from May 16th, 1992 regarding the collection of food from the liberated villages to feed the army and refugees and the command number 11562/92. from May 16th, 1992 ordering the placement of people from Podveležje under a unified command.

SECTOR COMMANDER

MOSTAR-SARAJEVO

NUBER: 11562/92

DATE: May 16th, 1992.

SPECIAL ORDER TO PODVELEŽJE

In case you do not join or execute the order to join our formations, and you received the weapons, all and each will be disarmed. Your commander will bear the greatest consequences.

It is your duty to join the other units in action, or you will all be exiled from Podveležje.

We can jointly expel the enemy in 24 hours, but those like you who sit and wait and look for ways to slip under the table, interfere with our /illegible/ and we must expunge you.

SECTOR COMMANDER

MOSTAR – SARAJEVO

D A I Ć A

/signed/

Document 038: Special order to Podveležje, May 16th, 1992 no. 11562/92.

To Presidency of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dear Sirs,

After the agreement with you, that is after your wishes and pleads, and in agreement with the President of Republic Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tuđman, I was approved to go ahead with your requests. I am prevented by your people to help you brake the encirclement and to deliver to Sarajevo some brad, weapons, and what is most important to retract into town one thousand and five hundred people, who now deep in the background wait for my call /illegible/ and participate in the joint brake of the encirclement behind the enemies back on Pale. I'm not sure what kind of circus you are operating with me or with those poor Islamic people who cannot withstand much more of this. The brake of the encirclement was planned for June 28th of this year, as Mr. Alija Delimustafić suggested. This plan was stopped by Mr. Zejnil Delalić and his letter addressed to you, copy of which was sent to me. You can assess why on the basis of this letter you have put me under the command of some gentleman called Polutak Mustafa. Excuse me for talking like a solder, I will never agree that some reserve, ex-officer of JNA, which used to help with the coats and opening the doors, gives me lessons about strategy, and whose units didn't move even for 1 meter. You bear the consequences, because no one from the presidency came to be by my side to witness bandit operations of international smugglers and road bandits that were appointed by you as all kind of commanders. Or maybe they appointed themselves.

Document 039: First page, Daidža's letter to A. Izetbegović because Izetbegović didn't unblock Sarajevo on June 28th, 1992, second page has code number Document 027, content of which is about the weapons provided for Sarajevo defenders.



I will publicly announce to people of Bosnia and Herzegovina all future rampage of these people, and place them on Croatian radio and TV, because I can no longer hide this disgrace. I will tell you one example: there is a commander in Jablanica called Hindić Safet or so called "Božidar, who at this very night ordered his troops to raise their arms against me and shoot, because I was going to accept 300 freshly arrived Muhadzers, to our misery, from eastern Bosnia. I was going to refer the Muhadzers immediately to hotel "Alem" in Baško Polje, where they would have peace and quiet, food and good sanitary conditions, and children would be able to swim in the sea. I beag you, I warn you and I'm telling you this: If within three days "little A" doesn't come in front of me, I will stop all supply of food, medicine and any other aid, which was well organized.

Page 2

Three thousand pipes that I stole from my country, Republic Croatia, let them be halal to you, but I ask of you, please do this for me: order your commanders, or captains, whatever you call them not to turn them against me, because my patience also has its limits. I especially ask the President of the Presidency, if he still has any influence and authority, to stop the rampage, and to allow us to pass into the damn Sarajevo, and I give my word of God and the people, and I swear by everything sacred that I will never personally go to Sarajevo!

Document 027: Second page of the same letter in which Daidža confirms arming Sarajevo defenders.

In his letter Daidža writes to A. Izetbegović explaining the reasons for not breaking the encirclement around Sarajevo on June 28th 1992. Original part of the letter with explanations is part of the document 039.

The operation development regarding the brake of the encirclement around Sarajevo is clearly evident from this letter. Participants of these events still have to answer the raised questions.

Why didn't they allow the liberation of Sarajevo? We remember the Safer Halilović statement at the time "we will not be liberated by Ustasha".

---

Dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović: The Bosnian-Croatian political reckoning / Mostar, 2004.

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/handwritten/

To Dajdza and Zejnil (reply to 9<sup>th</sup> of June 199 /missing number/ telex)

You have to go together. Zejnil remains commander of his unit, or as long this operation is under way, he should obey Dajdza's orders, therefore Dajdza covers the whole operation. The rest will be regulated when we meet in Sarajevo.

Sarajevo, 10<sup>th</sup> of June, 1992

Alija

## D-48/1 Uborak and Sutina

Two days before the left bank of Neretva was liberated (east side of Mostar), member of JNA (Yugoslav national army) or VRS (Republic Srpska Army) or paramilitary units killed 114 people of Muslim and Croat nationality.

At village Vrapčići – north part of Mostar, at the mass grave Uborak 88 dead people were found, and at mass grave in Sutina 26 Croatian and Muslim men and women were found.

I'm writing Muslim with capital M, because this is the way it was written at the time. From total number of found bodies 107 were identified, and 7 were never identified. The funeral of the remains was held in front of the Mostar University.

Political and military representatives of Muslim and Croatian people, HDZ (Croatian democratic union), SDA (Democratic action party), HVO (Croatian defense committee) and Mostar battalion from BiH Army were present at the funeral.

Investigation nonexistent, offender unknown.

## D-48/2



## The forces of the HVO and the HV engaged in liberation of Dubravka plateau and Stolac

### Forces engaged in the first phase

A) BG-1 composition: 1. and 2. Company / 1 no. platoon HVO Čitluk, div. platoon Čitlu, commando group Našice, commando group Zadar, HOS

Forces move in an attack to lines: Bridge in Čapljina - Šurmanci. The goal at this stage - with the forces of BG-2 to break the enemy on the first line of defense (R. Neretva) and control the broader area of Domanovići.

Clean the free area.

B) BG-2 Composition: 1 company 156. brig. of HV, reinforced platoon 156. brig. of HV,

1 comp. / 1 brig. HVO, a group of HOS, Wolves,

POG/156. brig. HV, Sc. section/156. brig. HV, div. Pilot group

Forces move in an attack to lines: village Struga – v. Čeljevo - v. Gnjišta - Tasovčići.

Mission: to break the enemy in the area - v. Prebilovci, v. Tasovčići, Hotanj, and strike the communication Domanović - Bivolje hill.

Clean the free area.

### Forces engaged in the second phase 13.06. - 20.06.1992

A) HVO forces (part of the OZJIH forces) cleans the area of Dubravka plateau, focus was on direction Domanovići – v. Gubavica and v. Domanovići – v. Rotimlja.

B) HVO forces: “L. Pavlović” and group HOS are extending direction of action to v. Aladinić – v. Maslin – Stolac, pushing the enemy forces and with forces of “Stolac battalion” liberate Stolac and form safety defense of Stolac .

C) TG-2 forces of HV and “Stolac battalion” operate south of river Bregava, liberating town Stolac and south parts of Stolac municipality.

They establish cooperation with forces of “L. Pavlović” and HOS forces.

They organize firm defense of town Stolac.

XV. HVO and HV forces involved in liberation of Dubravka plateau and Stolac



13.04.1992

## REPORT

on the disposition and structure of enemy units in the general Mostar area from Orlovac – Slipčiči – Tasovići to Prebilovići and on the barracks in Čapljina town

Through operative processing of the general area of the line of defence and visual observation, the following has been established:

1. There was some movement on Hum Hill tt /elevation/ 436 and they were interpreted as leaving the trig point, but it was troop rotation on Hum. So far they had been carrying out troop rotation with helicopters, but now, due to the vicinity of combat operations, they are doing it on foot. Fifty men strong Chetnik forces continue to be deployed on Hum. There are three ZIS /pack howitzers/, three Bst /recoilless guns/ and two 120 mm MB /mortars/. The terrain around tt 436 remains mined from before. In addition to two bunkers and old fortifications, another reinforced concrete bunker was built on Hum.
2. There are Chetnik forces about 60 men strong in the Brkanovo Brdo – Orlovac – Vokodol sector. Their objective is to control the Čitluk – Mostar and Široki Brijeg – Mostar roads. They have the following heavy weapons: a 130 mm gun and four 82 mm mortars. During the day and at night the Chetniks from these units come down into the abandoned houses in Miljkovići village and loot.
3. There are Chetnik forces about 50 men strong in the Varda, tt 331 – Humac sector, reinforced with three 82 mm Bst. There are a number of snipers in this unit who often keep our forces in positions in Čule under sniper fire.
4. There is a Chetnik company about 80 men strong in the Košaruša –tt 315 sector. They set up sniper nests at those peaks and have a fortified firing position for an 82 mm MB section. After our forces in Krivodol offered fierce resistance several times, they do not dare attack any more, so this line has been quiet for some time now if we exclude sporadic fire.
5. Two 20/3 PAT /anti-aircraft guns/ and about 60 Chetniks (the crew and security) are entrenched between Milićevići village and elevation 342.
6. There is a Chetnik company about 80 men strong in the Slipčiči sector on the Gradina, 274 – Škore – Vlaka line, and they secure and control the approaches to the Slipčiči, tt 281 – Škore – Vlaka – tt 313 – Milićevići – tt 342, Krivodol excluded line, at nine checkpoints, with forces about 300 Chetniks strong. They are helping the Serbian population from Škore hamlet, which has seven houses and 30 people.
7. The Ortiješ airport reserve command tower, reserve command post and communications centre are located at elevation 302, Gubavica. They provide security with a platoon 30 Chetniks strong. Near the mosque at Gubavica there is a fortified firing position and two 155 mm howitzers, which open fire daily on our positions in Slipčiči and often on Čitluk town proper as well.
8. They have forces about 120 Chetniks strong with six tanks and seven armoured personnel carriers in Pijesci village. In addition, they have a *Plamen* VBR /multiple rocket launcher/. On 10 April 1992 these forces attacked our units in the general Dubrava sector and early in the morning on 12 April 1992 they took control of the general Tasovčići sector.

There are six tanks and three armoured personnel carriers in Tasovčići, deployed as follows: below elevation 83 there is a tank and at about 50 m to the south there is another tank; the third tank is about 100 m to the east behind elevation 83, The fourth tank is next to the Catholic chapel and the remaining two tanks are deployed between elevations 142 and 241. A B1 gun is deployed at Hotanj, elevation 241, and the other B1 gun is in front of the TO /Territorial Defence/ depot in Tasovčići. They control the intersection with the RB /rocket launcher/ crew, and provide security with 10 machineguns and an unverified number of sniper rifles. In addition to the equipment the Chetniks forces in Tasovčići are about 200 men strong.

These forces fired on Čapljina and inflicted considerable material damage on commercial buildings. They also destroyed the old bridge in Dretelj.

9. Prebilovci: in addition to the targets observed so far, including two *Plamen* VBRM, two 155 mm howitzers, three machineguns and a RB, there are no changes except with regard to troops. Part of the troops – about 140 Chetniks, transferred to Tasovčići and there are now about 150 Chetniks in Prebilovci.
10. No major Chetnik forces have been observed in Klepci village except for individual patrols.

11. Gabela depot: on the night between 11 and 12 April 1992 we captured about 15 young soldiers who surrendered without fight.
12. Grabovina garrison: there are about 120 Chetniks well entrenched for circular defence. They have two T 55 tanks, seven 76 mm ZIS and a 12.7 mm PAM /anti-aircraft machinegun/.
13. Dretelj fuel depot: emptied long ago; guarded by about 20 soldiers who are waiting for surrender.
14. Our defence from Kozica to Dobro Selo is good and vigorous, with good shelters and brave soldiers, mainly locals. Defence of Slipčiči is a great problem because it is not fortified at all; there are no shelters for firing and protection and they should be built urgently using all resources, materiel and technical equipment. Even if we bring in fresh forces and experienced fighters, we will not be able to keep this line if the above shelters are not built.
15. The forces in Čaplina should be restructured and some of these units' members detained for wilful abandonment of units and spreading rumours.

There are a number of civilians and military servicemen in the field who have been spreading rumours on airborne assaults and powerlessness of our defence, and advocating escape. The police at these checkpoints who have been listening to these rumours have not been taking any action, and in that regard an instruction ought to be sent to these public security stations on how to act in these and similar cases.

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA HVO  
CHIEF OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS ZA S/W HERZEGOVINA

Č i t l u k

On April 22nd, 1992.

DEFENSE  
OFFICIAL SECRET  
TOP SECRET  
BY COURRIER

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Oper. No. 1-1/92

Dana from April 25th, 1992 from Mostar source  
North camp 680 Chetniks

4 tanks and 6 armed transporters. These means are in constant motion. They move from North camp to Orthodox church in Bjelušine where 200 Chetniks are stationed.

- South camp contains about 6 tanks and 3 armed transporters and 300 Chetniks. One operational tank was given to Montenegro reserve forces, other tanks are out of service because of incomplete crews.
- There are 150 white eagles on Buna. All Serbs on other side of Neretva (Buna, Ortijež, Bjelušine etc.) are armed.
- There are 100 parachutists in Jasenica with a mission to secure command posts and some special tasks. (Example retreat of Yugoslav soldiers from Dretelj warehouse)
- Aviation bridge: condition unchanged 2 tanks and 1 transporter
- Mostar is shelled mostly from bypass around the city south of Orthodox church for which they use tanks and cars with installed mortars and PAT 120/3 mm – all movable.
- Our units in Mostar are missing anti-armor supply  
BST cannon – not enough mines (just few)
- Towards Tasovčići moves reconnaissance troop with commander Mihaljević and special reconnaissance platoon formed on Pijesci by Major Batanić

CHIEF  
Frano Primorac

**CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA  
CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE**

MUNICIPALITY HEADQUARTERS MOSTAR

Number: 05/92.

Mostar, April 30th, 1992

Based on decision from president of HVO for municipality Mostar, no.1-1/92, from April 29th, 1992 I appoint commanders of HVO units for Mostar municipality headquarters:

I battalion – Bijelo Polje – Marko Radić

II battalion – Rudnik – Mario Mikulić

III battalion – Cim – Ilija Vrljić

IV battalion – Balinovac – Tihomir Mišić

V battalion – Ilići – Marinko Bošnjak

VI battalion – Kruševo – Mile Pušić

VII battalion – Gnojnice – Jadranko Lovrić

VIII battalion – Rodoč – Nino Vidović

IX battalion – Jasenice – Vjeko Čutura

Mostar battalion – Suad Čupina

Independent company “Zalik” – Vinko Grubišić

Independent company “Goranci” – Pero Raić

Independent company “Drežnica” – “Vrđi” – Karlo Marić

Independent company “Buna” – Mate Brljević

Independent company “Orlac” – Mladen Jurić

Military police HVO Mostar – Željko Džidić

Appointment shall take effect upon its issuance.

Commander

/signed and stamped/

---

Petar Zelenika

HVO  
 Independent Defense Battalion Command  
 Mostar

CONFIDENTIAL

NR. 165/1  
 Mostar May 16<sup>th</sup>.1992.

Daily report

To: County headquarters  
 Mostar

1. During the day's of May 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>. 1992 enemy demonstrated it's activities through sniper fire during the entire day, and in afternoon hour's enemy targeted areas of D. Mahala, Cim, and Ilici with artillery and canon fire as well as mortar fire on wider area of the town itself.
2. SBOM companies performed tasks and they were deployed on the following:

I company / training and rest

II company / visited D. Mahala area

II company / training and rest until 20:00 hrs, from 20:00hrs visited D. Mahala area

3. Battalions man count

a. Battalion command	79
b. I company	109
c. II company	139
d. II company	102
e. IV company	80
f. Anti/armor squad	40
g. Mortar squad	12
h. Machinegun squad	8

4. During May 15<sup>th</sup>.1992. there was no wounded or KIA soldiers.

"Round Seal"  
 Commander  
 Arif Pasalic



HVO /Croatian Defence Council/  
 Independent Battalion Command  
 of the town of Mostar defence  
 Confidential number: 27-3/92  
 Mostar: 31<sup>st</sup> of May 1992  
 1992/

/stamp/

/handwritten: 01-286/196

31<sup>st</sup> of May

Report on the situation regarding  
 weapons and MES /mines and explosives/

HVO MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF

Please find enclosed the list of weapons and MES we currently have at our disposal.  
 Please send us the equipment we asked from you in accordance with the letter  
 Confidential number 21/4/92 of 27<sup>th</sup> of May 1992.  
 We hope you will recognise our problems and resolve them favourably.

Yours faithfully,

ZM/ZM

/a signature/

Attachment:

- List of technical equipment in the unit, 1 x

COMMANDER  
 Arif PAŠALIĆ  
 /signed and stamped/

Confidential number: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mostar, 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 1992

By our enactment number 01-286/166 of 31<sup>st</sup> of May 1992 we banned the enlargement  
 of units without consent from the Organisation and Mobilisation Department. The  
 Municipal Staff is not able nor does it feel obliged to equip units established in this  
 manner.

COMMANDER  
 Major  
 Jasmin JAGANJAC  
 /signed and stamped/

/coat of arms/  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF  
 Number: 01-286/165/92  
 Mostar, 31<sup>st</sup> of May 1992

SUBJECT: Request for information                      Independent HVO /Croatian Defence  
    Council/ Battalion  
    of the Mostar town defence

The latest reports on the numerical strength of the Independent Mostar Battalion and the reports /on/ technical equipment reveal large discrepancies. The numerical strength has increased dramatically, which in the current situation cannot be followed in terms of establishment or logistics.

Please send us a report as to what caused this increase.

The report should be submitted by 1800 hours today, 31<sup>st</sup> of May 1992.

To:  
 - Addressee  
 - Files  
 - Operations Department                      /stamp/

C O M M A N D E R  
 Major  
 Jasmin JAGANJAC  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 /signature: Petar ZELENKA,  
 HVO Commander/

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 /a signature/



CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

**MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF**

Number 02-243 / 92

Mostar, 8 June 1992

**BEST WISHES FOR BAIRAM TO MUSLIM BELIEVERS OF THE  
HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ OF THE MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF**

We are at the end of the year 1412 according to *Hijra*, or the spring of 1992 according to the new calendar, in a frantic time, a time of madness, blood and hope.

In a time when the enemy is destroying everything that is holy and valuable to us, essential for a bare life and existence, a time when the crazed butcher's knife is being held to the throats of all of us who do not belong to his tribe, mob, thirsting for our innocent blood, a time which, in spite of everything, awakens hope in a better and happier tomorrow, and also brings us these Bairam holidays filled with hope.

The entire Islamic world is greeting these holidays with their eyes fixed on Mecca and Medina, where the observance of this year's Hajj is coming to an end, and we know very well that the basic purpose of the Hajj is a rebirth of the believers who perform it, but its social dimension of sacrificing an animal whose meat is mostly to be distributed to the poor is also not unimportant.

Muslim brethren! You have been prevented by this war drama in our parts from expressing all the virtues of these holidays as they are prescribed to you by Islam and to express before Allah and the world the goodness which adorns you as Muslim believers. Kurban Bairam, the celebration of rebirth, will, we are sure, reach all your homes with pain and the hope and firm conviction that we will greet and celebrate the next one in peace, freedom, with a new quality of life together, free forever from fear and the insane hatred of our common enemy. On that account, the HVO Municipal Staff of Mostar wishes a happy Kurban Bairam to all the Muslims of Mostar, our Herceg-Bosna and the entire world.

Bairam Mubarek Olsun!

/For:/ COMMANDER

Major

Jasmin JAGANJAC

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/stamp/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF

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 sent/

Strictly confidential number: 01-286/354  
 Mostar, 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1992 – 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1992

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 M A I N S T A F F  
 O P E R A T I O N S G R O U P  
 "SOUTH-EAST HERZEGOVINA"

ČITLUK

Subject: Report

1. Information on the enemy

1.1. During 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1992 enemy forces actively fired at the following targets:

- at 1700 hours on 7<sup>th</sup> of June 1992 the enemy fired at Kozica and Galac
- at 1910 hours, sporadic artillery fire was heard in the town
- at 1230 hours on 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1992, the enemy opened fire from Velika Fortica at DJubrani (Sveta Gora)
- at 1235 hours the enemy opened tank fire at the road below Kozica
- at 1535 hours Cim and Vrelo Radobolje came under an artillery attack
- at 1605 hours the aggressor fired a VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ around the bend towards Goranci and then performed adjustments on Hadrovići
- at 1645 hours they fired at Galac
- at 1655 hours, they called the *vojvoda* /military leader/ from the Orthodox church and told him that shells coming from an unknown direction were falling all around them
- at 1705 hours, an enemy VBR fired four shells at Žovnica

1.2. It is clear that the enemy is concentrating the majority of its forces on the northern part of the Mostar front – Rujiste, Zijemlje – thereby possibly securing easier withdrawal and dominant elevations. With frequent tank movement the enemy is trying to create the impression that there are more of them than there actually are, so the same tank is going to Fortica, then southwards on the main road and then northwards through the town.

A large concentration of enemy snipers was discovered in the features along the left bank of the Neretva.

1.3. By intercepting the enemy's messages it was revealed that there is chaos and confusion in its ranks and even panic when they spoke through their lines about a large number of dead and wounded.

2. OUR FORCES

2.1.

- On 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1992, at 1510 hours, we commenced firing on Hum from a VBR. A message was intercepted that the enemy has many wounded and killed.
- at 1545 hours, there was communication between the enemy about out Howitzer

being in Gornji Polog.

- At 1600 hours, the enemy became panicked again as it had many wounded and dead.
- At 1620 hours, our forces fired at the Šehovine sector from the Djubrani and Domaset sectors.

2.2. Our forces are still in a phase of regrouping and significantly covering the northern sector of the front. They are firmly holding their positions at the section of the front in town.

2.3. During 5<sup>th</sup> of June 1992, our TG /tactical group/ from Djubrani sent three snipers, two scouts and a guide to reconnoitre the Raštani sector, compose a sketch of the enemy forces, and if favourable, fire two or three shots at enemy targets and then withdraw to the redeployment sector of the independent battalion's TG. During the operation, our three (3) soldiers disappeared (two were probably killed and one was wounded). They were not pulled out due to heavy enemy fire coming from Raštani. Regarding this matter, the commander formed a team consisting of the military police and the operations department to investigate the incident and what occurred. At least three Chetniks were killed in this operation.

COMMANDER  
Major  
Jasmin JAGANJAC

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**CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
MUNICIPAL STAFF, MOSTAR  
Strictly Confidential No: 01-286/366  
Mostar, 9 June 1992**

D-50/9

**CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG - BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
MAIN STAFF  
OPERATIONS GROUP  
SOUTHEAST HERZEGOVINA  
ČITLUK**

**Subject: Report**

## 1. INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMY

- 1.1. - At 1940 hours on 8 June, enemy artillery fired at the positions of the 1st Battalion - Pometenik above Orlac, Čordina Kula;
- At 2200 hours, the road to Gorance was fired at, which was repeated at 2230 hours;
- At 0500 hours on 9 June, several shells fell on Vrelo Radobolje;
- At 1120 hours, the Chetniks discovered our mortars on Balinovac

(4th Battalion) and pounded Balinovac;

- At 1125 hours, the Chetniks pounded Orlac and Rudnik with PAM /anti-aircraft machine gun/ fire from their position under the Raštani *Željeznički Most* /Railway Bridge/;

- At 1130 hours, our artillery at Kozica (howitzer) was discovered and the Chetniks switched the fire from Balinovac to Kozica;

- At 1135 hours, the Chetniks brought out a mortar and a tank onto Hum next to the castle, which was reported to our units;

- At 1345 hours a gun was brought out onto Orlovac and the Chetniks pounded the pedestrian path through Drinova Draga with it.

1.2. The enemy's OMJ /armoured-mechanised units/ and artillery have been deployed in a manner so as to delude our forces and create the impression of great force and numbers of artillery pieces.

1.3. The aggressor's forces are not giving up the intention of holding on to PZT /temporarily occupied territory/ on the left bank of the Neretva River. We believe that the PZT can only be liberated by use of force.

## 2. OUR FORCES

2.1. - At 1710 hours on 8 June, from positions on Planinica, our forces opened fire from 82 and 120 mm MB /mortars/ at targets in the *Sjeverni Logor* /North Camp/. The CV /Communications Centre/, depots and personnel were hit. The attack was forceful and the hits precise. The Chetniks panicked.

- At 1820 hours, our VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ fired successfully from the position on Planinica at targets in Bjelušine. The courtyard of the Orthodox Church was hit by several rockets.

- At 1915 hours, our 105 mm howitzer on Planinica fired successfully at targets in Bjelušine.

- In addition to the above, our mortars and other artillery pieces from VP /firing positions/ in the town and snipers from the forward defence line were also active. It is a fact that the defenders of the town are becoming more active by the day and that the moment for offensive operations is approaching.

- The commander of the 2nd Battalion reports: fire from RPG /hand-held rocket launcher/ and PAM using explosive rounds was opened from positions on *Carinski Most* /Customs Bridge/. He reports that many enemy soldiers have been wounded and killed (which he concludes by the constant engagement of ambulances). One enemy Deutz truck, which caught fire, was destroyed.

2.2. - Our forces are in the phase of regrouping and preparations.

2.3. - The staff is resolving all issues through (command /*komandiranje*/) command /*zapovjedanje*/, as well as by agreement with other institutions in the town which are still functioning.

**COMMANDER**  
**Major**  
**Jasmin JAGANJAC**

/coat of arms/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF

Number: 01-447/92

Mostar, 9<sup>th</sup> of June 1992

MILITARY SECRET!  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten: 01-286/383

10<sup>th</sup> of June 1992/

/initialled/

Pursuant to the Grude Main Staff Order confidential number 01-476/92 of 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 1992 of the Grude Main Staff /as printed/, privates, non-commissioned officers and officers ("the Mostar men") from the units of other staffs will be discharged and dispatched to our staff, and in this connection I hereby

### O R D E R

the commanders of all units to admit to their units all the soldiers who arrive from the units of other staffs.

Report to me in writing about any private, non-commissioned officer or officer who arrives, mentioning all the personal details of the soldier and the type of weapons and equipment that he has.

To:

- All units
- Files

/stamp/

/handwritten: For/ COMMANDER

Major

N//illegible/ /expansion unknown/ /a signature/

Jasmin JAGANJAC

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/emblem/  
**CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA**  
**CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL**  
**MUNICIPAL STAFF MOSTAR**  
**Number 01 286/395/92**  
**Mostar, 11 June 1992**

MILITARY SECRET!  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!!!

R E P O R T

10 June 1992

- At 1920 hours the enemy fired MB /mortars/ at the town /?from/ above the small Orthodox church, the Independent Battalion reported.
- At 1950 hours the enemy fired PAM /anti-aircraft machine-guns/ at Cim, the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion reported.
- At 1952 hours the enemy attacked around the Avenue, *Projektant* and the School of Civil Engineering, the Independent Battalion reported.
- At 2040 hours they fired VBR /multiple rocket launchers/ at Cim and Ilici, the 5<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> battalions reported.
- At 2040 hours MB fired at Rudnik, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion reported.
- At 2045 hours they fired at Galac from Svetigora, our scouts reported from Planinica, then the enemy attacked from Dobroč with artillery bursts, from Pojaci with PAM.
- At 2155 hours the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ was hit, special forces members jumped out, the MUP reported.

11 June 1992

- At 0000 hours the enemy fired FLAKs at the town, *Lika* reported.
- At 0600 hours they fired above Ilić, and after that at Galac, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion reported.
- At 0345 hours the forces of Široki Brijeg HVO and Mostar HVO started a mopping-up operation of Orlovac. Fierce artillery preparation was conducted, and then the infantry of the Široki Brijeg and Mostar HVO liberated Orlovac – at 0630 hours Orlovac was in our hands.
- At 0930 hours a tank was observed above the railroad station, our teams advanced toward it with *Maljutkas* /Sagger anti-tank missiles/, and earlier at 0915 hours part of the units were in full combat readiness to advance through D. Mahala and mop up Stotine.
- At 0945 hours a state of alert was given for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> battalions to mop up Hum and Rodoč. Fierce artillery preparation was conducted before that.
- At 1005 hours the General ordered that our units and units from Široki Brijeg advance toward *Sokol*.
- At 1010 hours the 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion was ordered to advance on Hum with half of its forces, and to advance through Mahala with /the other/ half to free Rodoč.
- At 1020 hours Major JAGANJAC ordered a state of alert for the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Independent Company (Buna) from Bile was ordered to be near the University with all its troops in 1 (one) hour.
- At 1025 hours the enemy fired at Hum and Kobilovača from Fortica. At the same time, while withdrawing, criminals set houses on fire in Rodoč and Jasenica, and the enemy continued to fire at our forces on the slopes of Hum.
- At 1055 hours criminals blew up a bridge in Ulog on the Jablanica River.
- At 1057 hours the Chetnik criminals also blew up Carinski Most /Customs Bridge/.



- At 1110 hours the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion was ordered to advance on Rodoč through Kobilovača, and at 1105 hours Planinica was ordered to fire at the North Camp.
- At 1130 hours the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion received orders to advance toward the *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion with 50 (fifty) of its men - and on to Hum, and at 1140 hours *Umag* was ordered to advance toward Rodoč.
- At 1150 hours our forces reached *Aluminij* and the first hangars at Jasenica airfield.
- At 1203 hours our forces reported from Planinica that the Chetnik criminals destroyed the railroad viaduct across the Neretva near Raštani.
- At 1225 hours and constantly the enemy is trying to attack our forces with artillery fire, but our artillery fiercely responded.
- At 1400 hours the aggressors destroyed the *Hasan Brkić* Bridge.
- At 1445 hours *Stotine* were in our hands, as was the intersection where the road leads to Rodoč. A T – 55 tank was destroyed.
- At 1507 hours our forces captured Hum from the Balinovac side.
- At 1517 hours the Military Police was ordered to go to Rodoč for a mopping-up.
- At 1545 hours our forces were already mopping up Rodoč and Jasenica, and the enemy fled in panic /and/ fear, destroying their own equipment and public resources.
- At 1540 hours the Independent Battalion reported as follows: “Colonel PUŠARA, a hardened criminal, called Raštani and ordered that they loot whatever they still can, wheat from the silos and fuel, and to pour kerosene over whatever they can’t and set it on fire.”

Offensive operations of our forces are continuing.

TP/MM

Copies:

- Čitluk GS /Main Staff/
- to the Commander
- Chief of Staff
- files            /stamp/

Handwritten; For  
COMMANDER  
Major  
/a signature/  
(Jasmin JAGANJAC)

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCILMOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF  
Number: 286/39...  
Mostar, 12 June 1992MILITARY SECRET!  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

## REPORT

## 1. INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMY

1.1. Enemy Activity1 June 1992

- At 1615 hours, enemy fired mortars from Konaci and howitzers from Gontina Šuma. This was reported by the Independent Battalion,
- At 1655 hours, a tank fired from the North Camp. One of our soldiers was found dead in *Velmos* (Cernica). This was reported by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and the Independent Battalion,
- At 1710 hours, a tank was destroyed near the Rodoč helipad. The Sabotage platoon reported that they had the situation under control,
- At 1735 hours, enemy artillery fired at Orlovac from the North Camp,
- At 1750 hours, a VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ was observed in Mazoljice, below the cliffs, in a small forest at the far end of a meadow. This was reported by the Independent Battalion,
- At 1800 hours, our unit in Đubrani reported that Raštani was being /?evacuated/,
- At 1910 hours, an enemy group was observed hiding at Varda where their tent was. This was reported by the *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion.

12 June 1992

- At 0030 hours, truck and tank activity was observed in the North Camp and its surroundings. This was reported by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion.
- At 0432 hours, a loud detonation was heard from the southern part of the municipality; the aggressor destroyed a military bridge,
- At 0950 hours, /?aggressor personnel carriers were observed moving towards Nevesinje/. This was reported by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion.
- At 1245 hours, an enemy tank fired from the North Camp at *Žo/?v/nica* and Ilići. This was reported by the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion.
- At 1247 hours, the enemy fired at our forces in Orlac. This was reported by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion.

1.2. Deployment of forces (OMJ /armoured mechanised unit/ and artillery)

Following an offensive mounted by our forces on 11 June 1992, enemy forces lost a large number of important positions, which has significantly altered the deployment of their forces.

During yesterday's clashes between the aggressor and the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ forces from Mostar and Široki Brijeg, the enemy lost its firing positions at Num, Orlovac and the Miljkovići - Krivodol - Slipčičići axis, as well as its positions around Jasenica Airport, Jaseničko Polje and Rodoč. The entire aggressor force is now deployed on the left bank of the river Neretva.

There are a number of issues which are being dealt with in connection with further offensive activities on the left bank of the river Neretva.

These activities are ongoing.

Having won the battle, on 11 June 1992, our forces at Orlovac, Num, Jasenica Airport and other enemy positions, seized a large quantity of weapons and MTS /materiel and technical equipment/ the number, type and quality of which have not been established yet.

What is important is that our forces came out of this battle as winners, significantly better off, both morally and materially.

1.3. The enemy will probably attempt to inspect its ranks, regroup and fortify its positions for the "defence" of the left bank of the River Neretva.

Bearing in mind that the enemy has suffered a crushing blow to its morale, both within the units and in the eyes of the local and global public, it does not stand a chance of holding on in either Mostar municipality or anywhere else.

## 2. OUR FORCES

2.1. Our forces are firmly holding the new /?line of defence/ along the right bank of the River Neretva, from Bačevići to Raštani, and the old line of defence, from Planinica via Đubrani to Dražnica.

Following yesterday's (11 June 1992) successful day of combat, our soldiers' morale has reached the maximum required for it to mount successful resistance against the enemy and, if necessary, engage in offensive operations to liberate the PZT /temporarily occupied territory/.

Even a superficial analysis of yesterday's activities reveals the following:

- That virtually no mistakes were made in running the combat operation,
  - that the sabotage action on the hill of Orlovac was successful (the sabotage group was composed of two thirds of Mostar saboteurs) and that the action was successfully co-ordinated from all South-Eastern Herzegovina centres during the entire operation on the South-Western Mostar front: Orlovac - Num - Jasenica - Mahala - Rodoč - military airport.
  - that, with a view to their preservation, liberated territories and seized MTS were occupied and fortified very quickly and responsibly,
  - that the activities of the Military Police and the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ aimed at safeguarding citizens' peace and security and protecting the facilities, proceeded without virtually any mistakes.
- There were no instances of unnecessary shooting, no panic, and no civilians were reported killed or wounded.
- Only one sniper was reported. The area was located and searched but, unfortunately, the sniper was not caught,
- Only one mistake could be singled out as having affected the course of the operation:
- One of the units did not operate on the central radio frequency and the commanding was successfully done via couriers. One courier was slightly and another seriously wounded.

### 2.2. CURRENT DEPLOYMENT

At present, our forces are deployed on the right bank of the River Neretva, from the village of Bačevići to the village of Raštani and from the village of Raštani to the village of /?Drežnica/.

They have regrouped and prepared for further offensive action.

2.3. In solving future materiel problems, we can rely, among other things, on the technical equipment seized and captured from the enemy.

2.4. During the entire operation two of our soldiers were killed and four /?defenders of Mostar/ wounded.

We wish to note that one Široki Brijeg Croatian Defence Council defender was killed, of which the Široki Brijeg unit will be informed.

TYPED:

- Čitluk GS /Main Staff/
- Commander
- Chief of Staff
- a/a /files/

COMMANDER  
Major  
Jasmin JAGANJAC

HVO Herceg Bosnia  
OG South-east Herzegovina  
Čitluk, 13<sup>th</sup> of June 1992

HVO Mostar for general Praljak

Bivolje Brdo, Pijesci and Gubavica empty, Božan takes the aforementioned.  
Our forces partially entered Stolac, the majority of our forces moving towards Stolac.

Marin Karačić

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
MUNICIPAL STAFF MOSTAR  
Strictly confidential, number: 01-286/419  
Mostar, 14<sup>th</sup> of June 1992

*/handwritten 116/92 1500 hrs 14<sup>th</sup> of June 1992/*

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
MAIN STAFF  
OPERATIVE GROUP  
"SOUTH-EAST HERZEGOVINA"

ČITLUK

Subject: Regular report from 14<sup>th</sup> of June 1992 – chronology

- 0258 hours – a cannon fire could be heard in town. It was the moment of /illegible/ our attack activity in order to cleanse the eastern bank of Neretva.
- 0300-0415 hours – our heavy artillery covered passages of our forces over the Old Bridge and the river Neretva
- 0545 hours – a re-disposition of our forces began by the estuary of Buna into Neretva, whereby the activities of the enemy continued in the town. (at 0620 hrs according to Rondo)
- 0650 hrs – General ordered to the heavy artillery from Planinica to constantly fire towards Bjelušine
- 0720 hrs – a convoy of enemy vehicles was moving from the Northern camp to the South by magistrala road.
- 0740 hrs – the battles were current in Fejićeva Street by the cinema Zvijezde and around the Old Bridge.
- 0745 hrs – the enemy from the Southern camp hits our forces around the Old Bridge. General ordered to Široki Brijeg to perform activities near the Orthodox

Church, detour way, Southern and Northern camp.

- 0747 hrs – The Chetnicks requested help from Vrapčići
- 0752 hrs – Djubrani were ordered to hit Vrapčići
- 0805 hrs – panic occurred in Chetnicks' lines
- 0807 hrs – tank was moving on the magistrala road towards the Orthodox Church
- 0810 hrs – two tanks with infantry were moving from the Southern camp towards the town
- 0812 hrs – the heavy artillery of Široki Brijeg was hitting Bjelušine, Southern camp and Mazoljice
- 0814 hrs – The enemy announces fire towards the Old Bridge and the city
- 0830 hrs – among Chetnicks occurred general panic, they have no manpower and request for reinforcement
- 0835 hrs – the battle is Podvežje allegedly started, which hasn't been confirmed
- 0837 hrs – General ordered to our units on Čitluk to move from the southern side across bridges at the river Buna and to save them
- 0850 hrs – 0855 hrs – grenades were shelling Cim
- 0910 hrs – parts of the Southern parts were on fire (barracks) and the convoys of vehicles were leaving the city. Our military police is placed in three areas of the eastern bank, Fejić brothers' street, area around the Old Bridge and Port. General ordered to the individual battalion to move forwards eventually, leaving the bank.
- 0915 hrs- the heavy artillery of the enemy hit the town
- 0920 hrs – two tanks and a cannon entered the VTI in Vrapčići
- 0920 hrs – General ordered to the sniper shooters of the "Tihomir Misić" battalion to perform activities in the area around the Orthodox Church and Konak in order to silence the enemy sniper shooters and enable to our fresh forces to cross the Old Bridge
- 0936 hrs – the enemy receives help over Zalik, our heavy artillery towards them is necessary
- 0950 hrs – it is necessary to cover the Southern camp by our fire, which has been ordered to the Staff in Široki Brijeg
- 0958 hrs – General ordered the movement of the Independent battalion because the fresh forces are necessary
- 1000 hrs – information that we control the bridge over the river Buna on the main road
- 1010 hrs - the enemy shall hit the area around Old Bridge and Tito's Bridge, dispatched to the Staff in Široki Brijeg
- 1011 hrs – two PAMs hit Vrapčići towards the city. This activity was covered by our cannon fire from Planinica
- 1015 hrs – wire communication to the Jasenica airport came into operation
- 1017 hrs – the enemy moved PAM towards Fortica. This activity was covered by our cannon fire from Planinica
- 1045 hrs – Colonel Pusara went to Nevesinje to bring help, a help from Seselj's guys has been allegedly promised
- 1046 hrs – the enemy performed activities from big Fortica, this activity has been covered by our cannon fire from Široki Brijeg
- 1100 hrs – the "Tihomir Misić" battalion requested for mines for MB 82 mm
- 1110 hrs – 30 of our defenders should have been brought through Cernica to the left bank of Neretva river – realization, Petar Zelenika
- 1114 hrs – our heavy artillery from Planinica performed intensive combat

activities

- 1018 (as written) hrs – Lovric Jadranko has been given an order from the General to perform activity on Buna with his unit
- 1120 hrs – obtained information that out tanks are mowing from direction of Stolac
- 1121 hrs – our heavy artillery (cannons) had 6 direct hits in Konak
- 1123 hrs – Rudnik (the mine) has been hit by VBR from Dobrc
- 1126 hrs – Staff in Siroki Brijeg informed to cover VBR on Merdzan glava
- 1140 hrs – tank performed activity under the underpass in Zalik, and the other one performed activity from Opin and moved towards the city
- 1145 hrs – tank from Sehovina above harem performed activities in the city
- 1150 hrs – the enemy VBR on Fortica by the heavy artillery from Siroki Brijeg
- 1153 hrs – tank from Vrapcici hit towards Raska gora – Planinica
- 1154 hrs – tank is by the underpass in Zalik
- 1155 hrs – the enemy was pulling cannons from VTI towards Rujiste for three days
- 1207 hrs – Domanovici have been ordered to relocate one company towards Buna (company from Siroki Brijeg)
- 1209 hrs – the enemy from Fortica coordinated fire in the city. General ordered to Siroki Brijeg to cover coordinators
- 1223 hrs – on the road to Goranci, one man got killed from consequences of enemy combat activities. Probably civilian. Emergency care organized
- 1230 hrs – one tank has been destroyed and dozen of Chetnics killed on Cari (illegible)
- 1235 hrs – the police has been ordered to organize the pulling out the dead body on the road to Goranci
- 1248 hrs – the enemy from Bjelusina hit by flacks and mortars. General ordered to our cannon artillery on Planinica to cover them.

END OF THE FIRST PART AT 1300 hrs

Delivered to:

1. HVO Staff Citluk
2. Commander of HVO Mostar
3. Chief of Staff
4. Files

Commander  
Major, mr Jasmin Jaganjac

H V O

INDEPENDENT BATTALION FOR DEFENSE OF MOSTAR

Strictly confidential

Mostar, June 14th, 1992

REGULAR REPORT Op. No. 1

1. The task of crossing the river and establishing a bridgehead on the left bank of Neretva river is fully executed.

a) On the left bank of Neretva river beachhead was established in the area CARINSKI BRIDGE - TEKIJA depth of str. M. Titus.

b) Units on the left bank of Neretva river:

- Independent Battalion - 1 troop

- 1 / 4 Battalion "TIHOMIR MIŠIĆ"

- Mostar police forces

c) Total number of people: 580

2. Losses during the execution of the task:

- Independent Battalion: 5 killed

1 missing

12 wounded

- Other units

1 killed

2 injured

3. The operation flow of the task was planned with the lack of a plan for transportation for boat crossings (just one crossing was operational) because of the high water level, which was customized by the enemy through the dam.

4. Prior and next tasks are executed.

5. REQUIREMENTS:

a) provide the needed and other ammunition according to submitted requirements to HVO logistics dated June 14th 1992,

b) provision of team for battlefield recovery,

c) providing the logistics protection of life and work in war conditions without water or electricity supply.

6. Execution of the operation for next activities and reaching the line of the main road is planned for June 15th 1992.

COMMANDER

Arif Pašalić

/signed and stamped/



CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF

Number: 01-286/420/

Mostar, 15 June 1992

MILITARY SECRET!

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

SUBJECT: REGULAR REPORT OF 14/15 JUNE 1992  
PART TWO

- 1251 hours - *Široki Brijeg* was ordered to try and take out the tanks in Bjelušine.
- 1325 hours - People were observed in the area around Strelište above Zalik and *Planinica* was told to act.
- 1327 hours - The personnel carrier that was roaming around Zalik took shelter and parked by the wall of the c o m p r e s s o r .  
The 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and 4<sup>th</sup> *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion were told to act.
- 1337 hours - There is one tank at the pub in /?Rašovići/, another moving towards K o n a k.  
The POOd /anti-tank detachment/ and *Široki Brijeg* ordered to calm them down.
- 1342 hours - The personnel carrier moved from the Compressor to Vrapčići after it was fired at by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion.
- 1355 hours - The tank at Rašovići was destroyed by the T.M. /*Tihomir Mišić*/ 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion.  
- The other tank got stuck - *Široki Brijeg* was informed.  
- The third tank and infantry units fleeing towards the tobacco station.  
- There are many dead and wounded.
- 1359 hours - *Planinica* reported firing from VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ at Strelište.  
Half of manpower buried underneath, the other half will do it when they get up.
- 1400 hours - One tank at the pub in /?B/ulić, two moving towards the G/ornji/ Brkić bridge - POOd ordered to act.
- 1401 hours - One tank at the petrol station, on the right-hand side, in the Mostar-Čapljina direction.
- 1405 hours - A Chetnik observation post was spotted at Merdžan Glava.  
*Široki Brijeg* informed.
- 1415 hours - Two tanks returned to the tobacco station perimeter. The 4<sup>th</sup> *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion and the Independent Battalion ordered to act.
- 1426 hours - *Planinica* reported two armoured vehicles moving from Vrapčići towards the city.  
4<sup>th</sup> *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion ordered to act.
- 1427 hours - 4<sup>th</sup> *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion reported a large group of Chetniks around the tobacco factory. *Široki Brijeg* ordered to fire on them.
- 1435 hours - *Široki Brijeg* fired on the tobacco factory. The Chetniks dispersed and the General ordered that they be "s p e d a l o n g".
- 1517 hours - *Planinica* reported that the Chetniks were firing from Čobanovo Polje or from some other location closer to us.  
- The Chetniks were reported firing from the direction of Gnojnice.
- 1518 hours - Chetnik artillery firing again from Bjelušine, 4<sup>th</sup> *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion ordered to shoot at them.
- 1550 hours - *Široki Brijeg* informed of a Chetnik observation post at Kričani -



- Merdžan Glava, they are to act.
- 1645 hours - Observers from Đubrani reported that the crest of the Mostar HE /hydroelectric power plant/ dam was damaged and that vehicles cannot go across.
- 1833 hours - It was reported that MALJEVIĆ was asking that both bridges on Suna be blown up.
- 1845 hours - The General ordered that a way be found to provide troops on the front with anti-armour equipment.
- 1856 hours - By listening in on the Chetniks we found out that they intend to fire at Slipčići because they found out that our artillery will be firing from there.
- 1926 hours - The General wants to know what is going on with the Čapljina units, why they are not protecting the rear.

Other enemy activities focused on disrupting our forces and preventing them from crossing over to the left bank of the River Neretva and taking up firing positions more suitable for the attacks and mopping up of the city.

In the morning hours of 15 June 1992, our forces came out at the Lakševina - (exclusive of) Blagaj axis in the south sector of the frontline.

In the city: /reference point/ Luka, exclusive of FDS /Sarajevo Tobacco Factory/ - Titova Ulica Street - Customs - Bus Station.

In the northern sector of the front: Customs Bridge - inclusive of Orlac and Planinica - Drežnica.

The Mostar HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ forces in the northern part of the Mostar front regrouped and, at 0900 hours on 15 June, were ready to engage in offensive operations along the Drežnica - Ravni - Porim axis with the aim of mopping up enemy units from Bijelo Polje.

Our infantry units have strong support of Mostar, Široki Brijeg and Čitluk HVO artillery.

Our forces' offensive activities of 14 and 15 June 1992 have so far yielded good results.

Enemy forces, which are losing morale and requesting assistance from deep in the rear, are disintegrating, some of them are even in flight.

On 14 June 1992 we had two (2) killed and four (4) wounded soldiers.

RM/AZ

TYPED:

1. Čitluk Main Staff,
2. Commander,
3. Chief,
- ZELENIKA,
4. a/a /files/.

COMMANDER  
Major  
/signature stamp: Petar

HVO Commander/  
/stamped/

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Jasmin JAGANJAC

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
MOSTAR MUNICIPAL STAFF  
Strictly Confidential no. 01-286  
Mostar, 16 June 1992

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
M A I N S T A F F  
"SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA"  
OPERATIONS GROUP

ČITLUK

Subject: Report

- 1600 A tank is descending from Pasjak toward the town.
- 1605 The Independent Battalion destroyed a personnel carrier near Pasjak. The Široki Brijeg artillery was active on this occasion.
- 1745 The Independent Battalion reported that "Konak" was surrounded, but the Chetniks don't want to surrender. In response to this the General ordered: "Set it on fire with bottles of petrol because that is the only solution".
- 1815 Chetniks are gathering around the Orthodox church.
- 1900 The Orthodox church has been set on fire (the Chetniks probably set it on fire when retreating).
- 1915 The soldiers of the 4<sup>th</sup> *Tihomir Mišić* Battalion entered the North Camp barracks.
- 1930 The "Konak" surrendered, and at the same time a tank is retreating into the cutting for Nevesinje, /?because/ they assume that our men have tanks which would attack their forces.
- /handwritten in the margin: illegible/  
An order was issued to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion to send 50 men as reinforcement and backup for the 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion in capturing the North Camp.  
An order was issued to the Military Police to send 10 policemen as security for the North Camp.
- 2050 The Chetniks fired two shells at Guranci, at Djinkića Kuće.
- 2110 Below Velika Fortica a tank is active which had retreated from Mala Fortica.
- 2120 Our wiretapping service intercepted a number of Chetnik messages indicating that morale is low among their troops on the defence line. They mention /?Mili/ TURKOVIĆ who located his position and ordered that they retreat and fortify on the next defence line of Hum-Kula.
- 2300 The Chetniks are firing PAM /anti-aircraft machine-guns/ at the Muslim neighbourhood in Sutina from the sports ground in Vrapčići.  
The 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Commander informed Deputy Commander Petar ZELENKA that 64 of his soldiers had crossed over to the left bank and are now guarding the line from the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ Social Centre to the North Camp with 224 soldiers.
- 2330 It was reported that the Chetniks will attack with artillery from Čobanovo Polje.

16 June 1992

- 0100 Twenty five Chetniks vehicles came down Porim in half an hour.
- 0115-0310 Our units on the southern part of the front are working on logistics support.
- 0520-0530 A group of Chetniks was observed below Velika Fortica. Our artillery fired at Nevesinje, and the Chetniks asked for attacks on Podveležje. Fifty soldiers from the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion were sent to the South Camp.
- 0550 The Chetniks are retreating toward Liješće.  
Petar ZELENKA asked for Široki Brijeg to fire on Velika Fortica. Colonel GRUBOR ordered that they mine the intersection above Blagaj and is asking for help in manpower and equipment.
- 0700 P. ZELENKA received reports that two villages in Podveležje have allegedly been activated.
- 0730 A panic-filled conversation between HADŽOVIĆ and the Command at Čobanovo

Polje who is reporting that the Command retreated in his direction and that a village in Podveležje has been activated, that the women and children fled into the woods, to the hill, and that the men took up arms.

They ordered him to fire at them and he replied: "What the f... with?. You fire." I must cover the retreat for Fortica.

Two military vehicles are setting off from the INA petrol station toward Vrapčiči, one is turning off in front of HEKOM /compressor factory/.

- 0820 We learned from the talks between the Chetnik commands that there is chaos and misinformation among them, down there some of them are reporting the loyalty of the people of Podveležje, and on the other hand it was reported that a road block has been put up for the troops at k-680 /elevation 680/ where the police checkpoint was. This happened during the negotiating stage between the Chetniks and the people of Podveležje so that the troops would pass through without any resistance from the villagers.
- 0920 The 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion and the 4<sup>th</sup> *T. Mišić* Battalion are reporting that they have cleaned up the South Camp and Opine.
- 1000 The Independent Battalion is reporting that the Chetniks asked for air support from the direction of Čobanovo Polje.

#### OUR FORCES

Our forces in town took control of the North Camp, the left bank, the ring-road sector with the Orthodox church, up to and including Opine and the South Camp.

We have no accurate information regarding the actions of our forces in the north sector of B. Polje.

Our forces in the south sector of the front are active on the following lines: Lakiševina toward Ortiješ, Lakiševina toward Blagaj and Hodbina toward Malo Polje.

A large quantity of MTS /Materiel and Technical Equipment/ was destroyed and seized during the operation and numerous troops were destroyed.

C O M M A N D E R  
Major  
Jasmin JAGANJAC

**CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA**  
**CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE**

MUNICIPALITY HEADQUARTERS MOSTAR  
Number: /handwritten/ 02-298/92  
June 17<sup>th</sup>, 1992

MILITARY SECRET  
TOP SECRET!

**REPORT FROM INSTRUCTOR AND OPERATION LEADER FOR INDEPENDENT  
COMPANY - BUNA**

On June 14<sup>th</sup> 1992 at 04,00 hrs, units of the II Independent company - Buna entered the area of Buna.

During the entry to Buna this company occupied the bridges, and on location of petrol station 20 Chetnics were killed.

On the same day at 16-17 hrs at the Buna area entered the first group of IV Split battalion. After their connection there were heavy confrontations with Chetnics. In the evening of the same day and on June 15<sup>th</sup> 1992 in the morning hours, members of IV Split Battalion looted and stole objects from Croatian and Muslim houses in Buna.

Also, IV Split battalion stole confiscated MTS from killed Chetnics and personal weapons and ammunition.

Also members of the same battalion stole one personal vehicle model Mercedes 300D and vehicle model "FIAT CROMA" and one off-road vehicle model "ZASTAVA" 2 (two) tons.

On June 16<sup>th</sup> 1992 Commander of IV Split Battalion Mr. Krstičević appoints for commander of Buna and II Independent company Mr. Franjo Zlomislić!

June 17<sup>th</sup>, 1992  
RM/AZ  
attested by

Affirmed and

Mr. Ivan Kovačević

\_\_\_\_\_  
/signed and stamped/

**CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA  
CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE**

MUNICIPALITY HEADQUARTERS MOSTAR

Number: III - 1/92

Mostar, June 18<sup>th</sup>, 1992

MILITARY SECRET

INTERNAL SEC!

Units of II Battalion

Chief Commander

Mario Mikulić

In final operations during occupation and clearing of Chetnic bases in Mostar and surrounding area II battalion:

On June 12<sup>th</sup>, 1992 participated in cleaning the notorious Chetnic base in Hum, which was thoroughly cleaned and our flag was placed. This operation was implemented without any losses.

On June 12<sup>th</sup>, 1992 at 18,00 hrs participated in cleaning of Radoč and Jesenice among the first units. There were no losses in this operation.

June 14<sup>th</sup>, 1992 at 02,00 hrs cross over the Old bridge and occupy position Pozorište - Konak which was cleaned by our soldiers and kept in the zone of responsibility until 14,00 hrs the next day.

June 16<sup>th</sup>, 1992 cross over to new zone of responsibility by INA (Sutin) and right of square Ivan Krndelj in depth until bypass. 224 soldiers participated in this operation.

In the morning hours of the same day our scouts enter to zone Raštani, where they perform detail reconnaissance, and on the same day at 14,20 hrs our soldiers enter, liberate and clear the area of Chetnics. Captured Chetnics are imprisoned for further processing and interrogation.

On the same day at 14,20 hrs I received a new command and one company moves up the hill Fortica in entire length to Podveležje. Second battalion captured a group of Chetnics at village Svinjarina near Podveležje. Please note that the members of the II battalion were the first one to enter this notorious Chetnic base and place the flag with sign "II Battalion" on the top of Fortica. While Chetnics were running and abandoning their posts they meet the 72 years old woman and slaughtered her in the area of Gostina houses.

-2-

During the meeting with the locals from Podveležje we were impressed by ovations from local people and the expression of enthusiasm because of our arrival and they also introduced us with the current situation of the enemy positions. We captured several Pinzgauer trucks and other heavy trucks as well as considerable number of weapons with artillery projectiles. In this operation we captured and surrendered 24 Chetnics to the Police.

**CONCLUSION:**

II Battalion complied with all orders received for the previous period, and to which we are extremely proud of, as well as me and all members of the II Battalion, that none of the Chetnik strongholds in the area of Mostar, have not been conquered or cleared without the presence of our troops.

GOD AND CROATS!

OFFICER FOR I.P.D. OF II. BATTALION  
/signed/

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Krešimir Šunjić)

## CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE

MUNICIPALITY HEADQUARTERS MOSTAR

Number: 06-055/92

Mostar, June 23rd, 1992

TACTICAL GROUP

Report on liberation of  
area of Ravni and Bijelo  
Polje.

Based on TG orders, reference number 06/047 of 18.06.1992, the TG units operated by pre-elaborated plan.

1. Engineers group during the night at 24.00 on 18.06.1992 installed the scaffolding across the destroyed bridge over the river Bijela.
2. Third Battalion from the area of deployment at Vrđi drew their company forces from direction Drežnica-bridge on the R. Bijela and at 01.30 hrs on 19.06.1992, went over the scaffold in direction: Mandić draga – Ravni plateau, ensuring a combat security of reconnaissance consisting of group of 7 people on top of Mandića draga which have been inserted on 18.06.1992 at 21,00 hrs.
3. First Battalion infiltrated a commando group during the night to the area of convent Potoci and withdrew the forces to Vojno and made preparations for forcing the Neretva river in rubber boats.
4. Third Independent Company in the region of village G. Jasenjani was securing the left flank from the north-west.
5. PAZ (Anti airstrike Group) with PAM (Anti-aircraft machine gun) 14,5/4 has from the area of tunnel north of the bridge of r. Bijela ensured the crossing of the bridge for the troops.
6. Artillery group composed of VBR (multiple rocket launcher), unit RL 120 mm and RL unit 82 mm from region Pometnik prepared for artillery fire at 04:00 hrs on regions: Lojpur, Bresnica and k.511.
7. MUP (Police) units and 2-3/5. Battalion in the direction of movement of 3. Battalion separated to the left and operated in direction: Mandić draga – Zeleni D6-Nazdrajvić-Mahala-Lojpur-Kripote.
8. POG has occupied PO region in a tunnel north of Salakovci in readiness for the POB in direction Salekovac-r.Bijela.
9. 3/5. Battalion (without the 2nd Platoon) was in reserve in the region of v. Grabovica.
10. Sabotage platoon in the region Drežnica was in reserve and readiness to intervene in the threatened direction
11. The main line of attack was on the line of attack of the 3. Battalion which included Mandić draga – v. Bresnica – v. Taška and alternative TG line in the whole, forcing Neretva river in the direction of Vojno-Potoci.

### Description of courses of action

Troops began crossing the bridge on the r. Bijela at 01.30 hours with the approaching line of attack without artillery preparation. At 04.30 hours the fire preparation began with a delay of 30 minutes for somewhat legitimate reason (fog).

MUP units and 2-3/5. Battalion commanded by Sender Nikola was developed only at the insistence of the TG commander and at slow pace was moving in the planned direction and they were also not decisive in the battle against the Chetnics. They didn't implement the decision to block part of the village Lojpur and with part of the forces to penetrate the village, but the v.

Lujpuri was attacked frontally and so Chetnics were able to flee to the slopes of the mountain Prenj.

3. Battalion was secured by response team and a group of HOS exerted a strong penetration in direction: v. Bresnica-v. Hazel-v. Otolež on the main direction of attack and with 3 company (1, 2, 3) broke the enemy positions and occupied the position Tasovčina-Humac. During this time the 4. Company made additional penetration in the direction of attack and took positions on the line: Hanina-Koviljača above Salakovci and 5. Company was in reserve in the region of Kuci. Sabotage Platoon of the 1. Battalion attacked a group of Chetnics around the curve of the road to Potoci and the Battalion with 3 companies under the enemy executed the forcing, generated the bridgehead and focused on the narrowest part of Bijelopoljske plains, towards Vrapčići where a large grouping of Chetnics took place in order to intersect the valley.

Since the whole operation was finished, which was planned to last 2 days for 3. Battalion, and with experience of the achieved success, TG Command has decided to carry out the regrouping of forces, exploit success and pursue with coverage of direction: v. Podgorani – v. Dolac – v. Zelenika and to interrupt communications and prevent redraw of Chetnics in direction Potoci-Zijemlje-Nevesinje.

As the troops were tired and achieved until 12.00 hrs planned daily march in consultation with the Deputy Commander Adem Žulov ... /illegible/ a group of 12 men from security of Technical Command Group (TG commander Slavko Puljić, Staff coordinator Tvrtko Miloš, Pero Raič, Želimir Puljić, D. Jovanović, Ivan Dinčir, Senad Kendić, Marin Zovac, Drago Sertić, Miroslav Jelkovic and security personnel Ivan Škutor and Djenko Zikrija) departed at the head of the line from v. Otolež through Podgorana, Dolac, by Zelenike and at 16.30 hrs reached the road for Potoci – Nevesinje in Humima.

In the same composition without waiting for the troops they came to Humi–Lišane and stumbled upon an abandoned armored personnel carrier, from which they pulled out 3 PM 7.9 mm M–53 and immediately set up a two–side ambush and RPG–7 is placed at the front of the ambush for possible encounter with armored vehicles. 3 vehicles were caught in the ambush of which the second vehicle did not want to stop and was firing on the unit. The unit responded to the attack and killed two Chetnics. One Chetnic tried to run away from the first vehicle and after a brief fight was killed. The third vehicle was encountered with two Chetnics who were captured and disarmed. Three captured Chetnics were brought to the Hum–Lišane where they were detained. Occupied position went in depth up to the road Potoci–Nevesinje above Huma and during the night a group of Chetnics were captured, two men and one woman. Their documents were seized and they were handed over to the security unit. Since contact with the first Battlefield was not established, the situation was unclear and the troops have penetrated deep into the depth behind the Chetnics lines, therefore it was attempted to transport prisoner by prisoner. During the first attempt prisoner tried to escape and despite the warnings did not want to stop and the guards were forced to shoot and kill him. Having learned from this experience, the security stayed with other prisoners and late in the afternoon military police was sent, after the liberation of Potoci and Vrapčići, to take the prisoners.

One company with 12 people moved from v. Humi to Potoci and during the action one Chetnik was killed who tried to throw a grenade at the troops. About 2 km north–east from Potoci 3. and 1. Battalion connected. With this the occupation operation was finished and commander ordered 3. and 5. Company to search the terrain that was not in the direction of penetration. The emphasis was thereby given to the dam Salakovac and tunnels in order to be demined. Positions in direction to Zijemlje in line Zelenika–Jedina were taken by 1. Battalion and 3. Battalion was sent to rest because of the great stresses during the combat operation. In all operations, 5 soldiers were wounded two of which slightly.

COMMANDER TG  
Slavko Puljić

/signed and stamped/

H V O  
Independent battalion for  
Defense of Mostar  
Number: /handwritten/ 53-2/92  
Mostar: July 13th, 1992

MILITARY SE CRET  
CONFIDENTIAL

Request for  
ammunition

HVO MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS MOSTAR

Considering that we are completely without ammunition, we request a disbursement of ammunition in order to be able to go ahead with combat operations.

We need ammunition according to the type and number of weapons in following quantities:

1. Ammunition 9mm PARA	3.000 pcs,
2. Ammunition 7,62mm x 19 for Automats	17.000 pcs
3. Ammunition 7,62mm - 43 /for P, PAP, PM/	126.250 pcs
4. Ammunition 7,9mm	32.850 pcs
5. Ammunition 14,5mm x 114 Traser /BZT/	10.000 pcs
6. TTM for 7,62mm /rifle current mine/	400 pcs
7. TKM for 7,62mm / rifle cumulative mine/	300
8. Bomb „Drunk Ustasha“	300
9. Hand grenade M75 or M52 R	300
10. Mine cumulative for RB M57	200
11. Mine PG-7 for RPG-7	90
12. RBR 64mm „ZOLJA“	as many as possible
13. RBR 90mm M79 „WASP“/grenade for „WASP“	48
14. Mine 60mm for MB 60mm	600
15. Mine 82mm for MB 82mm	600
16. Mine 120mm for MB 120mm	600
17. DRNČ for cleaning the weapons	20 kg
18. ZUON for lubrication of weapons	40 kg
19. Cleaning Cloth for weapons /cloth remains/	50 kg
20. WEAPONS /Shooting: AP, PAP, RB/ AS MANY AS WE CAN GET.	

Best regards!

Delivered to:

- Command 1x
- Municipal Headquarter 1x
- Archive 1x

COMMANDER  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/



H V O  
INDEPENDENT BATTALION FOR MOSTAR DEFENSE  
Top Secret, number: /handwritten/ 1252-1

TOP SECRET

Mostar, /handwritten/ 19.07.1992

REGULAR REPORT

Delivered to

MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS HVO MOSTAR

a) Force account:

- |                       |                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| 1. according to list  | 1265_/handwritten/ |
| 2. on positions       | 87_/handwirtten/   |
| 3. on standby         | 456_/handwirtten/  |
| 4. on post            | ___                |
| 5. on R&R             | 47_/handwirtten/   |
| 6. killed             | ___                |
| 7. wounded            | 55_/handwirtten/   |
| 8. on leave           | 46_/handwirtten/   |
| 9. sick (on recovery) | 12_/handwirtten/   |
| 10. deserters         | ___                |
| 11. in prison         | ___                |
| 12. other             | ___                |

b) Information about killed - wounded:

1. First Name (name of the father)last name \_\_\_\_\_
2. Date and place of birth \_\_\_\_\_
3. Date of entry to the unit \_\_\_\_\_
4. Responsibilities with unit \_\_\_\_\_
5. Place of death - injury \_\_\_\_\_
6. Date and hour of death - injury \_\_\_\_\_
7. Sent to medical treatment \_\_\_\_\_
8. Brief description of injury \_\_\_\_\_
9. Information about next of kin who should be notified \_\_\_\_\_

c) Information about the enemy in the zone of responsibility:

Commander


Arif Pašalić

/signed and stamped/

THE MAPS WERE DRAWN FROM MEMORY AND THEREFORE CERTAIN IMPRECISIONS AND SLIGHT INACCURACIES ARE POSSIBLE.

I APOLOGIZE TO MY COMRADES - IT IS THEIR VICTORY, I DID NOT WANT AND DO NOT WANT TO EMPHASISE MY ROLE AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER, BUT IT IS NOT FAIR NOR CORRECT THAT THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ANY PART IN THOSE ACTIONS DISCUSS AND BRING JUDGEMENTS ON THEM

**APPROVED**  
**commander**  
**brigadier general**  
**Slobodan Praljak**





**DECISION**


**of commander of OZ NWH  
for offensive activities**

**DEFENSE**

**MILITARY SECRET  
TOP SECRET**








**INDEX**


- DIVISION COMMAND
- REGIMENT
- MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER
- ARTILLERY
- 105MM HOWITZER AND HIGHER
- 105MM HOWITZER AND LOWER
- 100 MM GUN AND LOWER
- 100 MM GUN AND HIGHER
- 57MM ANTI AIRCRAFT GUN
- 120 MM MORTAR
- 82MM MORTAR
- ARMOUR UNITS






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	120mm mortar
	82mm mortar
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	Main line of attack
	Additional line of attack
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	Part of the 4th Balinovac Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar
	Part of the 2nd Rudnički Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar
	Part of the PB /Poskok Battalion Široki brijeg
	Part of the 4th Battalion of 4th Guards Motorized Brigade
	ZM / Commanding Post of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade
	OK / Armoured / platoon of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade Armour Platoon (T-55) within 4th Battalion of 4th Guards Motorized Brigade.




































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TO: MAIN STAFF  
 OF THE HVO OF MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY  
 IPD ORGAN

SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION  
 IN THE ALLOCATION OF FLATS

Enclosed please find applications by families of dead soldiers for participation in the allocation of flats that are allotted for temporary use and have been abandoned by previous users without cause.

The details in the applications are correct and have been verified by the Command's organs and we ask you to accept incomplete applications.

ENCLOSURES:

- list of dead soldiers whose families  
are in need of accommodation
- applications for participation  
in the allocation of flats

COMMANDER :

Arif PAŠALIĆ

*/signed and stamped/*

List of dead soldiers of the First Mostar Brigade whose families have submitted applications for participation in the allocation of flats that are allotted for temporary use and have been abandoned by previous users without cause:

- |                           |             |
|---------------------------|-------------|
| 1. SPAHIĆ, OSMAN, MUHAMED | 12.05.1992. |
| 2. VOLJEVICA, IBRO, MUJO  | 23.06.1992. |
| 3. GOSTO, AVDO, HUSO      | 16.06.1992  |
| .....                     |             |
| 44. KARIĆ, FADIL, FADIL   | 06.05.1992. |
| 45. LETUKA, MEH..., FADIL | 25.05.1992. |

COMMANDER

Arif Pašalić

*/signed and stamped/*

/handwritten: 6 October ?1992/

TO: MAIN STAFF  
OF THE HVO OF MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY  
IPD ORGAN

SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION  
IN THE ALLOCATION OF FLATS

Enclosed please find applications by seriously wounded soldiers for participation in the allocation of flats that are allotted for temporary use and have been abandoned by previous users without cause.

The details in the applications are correct and have been verified by the Command's organs and we ask you to accept incomplete applications.

ENCLOSURES:

- list of seriously wounded soldiers  
whose families are in need of accommodation
- 
- applications for participation  
in the allocation of flats

COMMANDER

Arif PAŠALIĆ

/signed and stamped/

List of seriously wounded soldiers of the First Mostar Brigade whose families have submitted applications for participation in the allocation of flats that are allotted for temporary use and have been abandoned by previous users without cause:

- |              |         |       |
|--------------|---------|-------|
| 1. REBAC     | IBRAHIM | ADIS  |
| 2. ĐELILOVIĆ | IBRAHIM | TOFIK |
| 3. ČESIR     | HASAN   | HALIL |
| .....        |         |       |
| 7. MARIĆ     | IBRO    | HADŽE |
| 8. NIŠTOVIĆ  | MUHAREM | OSMAN |

COMMANDER

Arif Pašalić

/ signed and stamped /

6 October 1992/

TO: MAIN STAFF  
OF THE HVO OF MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY  
IPD ORGAN

SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION  
IN THE ALLOCATION OF FLATS

Enclosed please find applications by slightly wounded soldiers for participation in the allocation of flats that are allotted for temporary use and have been abandoned by previous users without cause.

The details in the applications are correct and have been verified by the Command's organs and we ask you to accept incomplete applications.

ENCLOSURES:

- list of slightly wounded soldiers  
whose families are in need of accommodation
- applications for participation  
in the allocation of flats

COMMANDER

Arif PAŠALIĆ

/signed and stamped/

List of slightly wounded soldiers of the First Mostar Brigade whose families have submitted applications for participation in the allocation of flats that are allotted for temporary use and have been abandoned by previous users without cause:

1. PAJEVIĆ	HASAN	HADŽE
2. GOSTO	RAMO	SENAD
3. VUK	ASIM	FADIL

.....

21. HAMZAI	AZEM	RAMADAN
22. ŠALJA	AVDIJA	FATIM

COMMANDER

Arif Pašalić

/signed and stamped/

/handwritten: 357-45

15 October 1992/

TO: MAIN STAFF OF THE HVO  
OF MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY

/handwritten: 354/

Submission of applications for participation  
in the allocation of flats

Addition to the list of wounded soldiers of the First Mostar Brigade who  
have submitted applications for the allocation of flats and whose families are  
in need of accommodation.

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	FATHER'S NAME
1. OMANOVIĆ	MUHAREM	AHMET
2. FIŠIĆ	DURAN	AHMET
3. LJELJAK	NAFIJA	OMER
4. ZUKIĆ	ADEM	MEHMED
5. MIKULIĆ	JADRANKO	MARKO

COMMANDER  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten: ?357-44

15 ?October 1992/

TO: MAIN STAFF

OF THE HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ OF MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY  
IPD /Information and Propaganda Activity/

/handwritten: 357-44

15 October 1992/

Submission of applications for participation  
in the allocation of flats

Enclosed please find applications by soldiers whose flats have been destroyed or damaged to such an extent that they are rendered uninhabitable for the allocation of flats that are allotted for temporary use and have been abandoned by previous users without cause.

## ENCLOSURES:

- list of soldiers whose families  
are in need of accommodation

- applications for participation

Number	Last name	First name	Father's name
1.	KOTLO	MUSTAFA	
2.	MUŠINOVIĆ	KEMAL	OMER
3.	KOLIČIĆ	KEMAL	MUSTAFA
4.	MARIĆ	KEMAL	ADEM
5.	HUSNIĆ	HUSO	OMER
....			
682.	POBRIĆ	SALKO	HASAN
683.	DVIZAC	HABIB	HAMDIJA
684.	ŠABIĆ	SEAD	MUSTAFA
685.	KEVELJ	JASMIN	HAMID

COMMANDER  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/



From the book:

Dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović, the Bosniak-Croatian political reckoning, Mostar, 2006.

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**  
**/Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/**

/Handwritten:/ Document 050

**WAR PRESIDENCY OF GACKO MUNICIPALITY**  
**with temporary headquarters in Mostar**

REGIONAL BOARD OF SDA HERZEGOVINA  
MOSTAR

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO DISPLACES PERSONS FROM GACKO      LOCATED IN MOSTAR

Please, within your capabilities help the displaced persons from Gacko who are temporarily located in Mostar.

Thanks you for your support and cooperation, and please find enclosed a list of displaced persons from Gacko in hope that you will continue to assist this noble humanitarian mission.

MAHSUZ SELLAM!

Mostar, October 27th, 1992.

War Presidency  
Memić Dževad  
/signed and stamped/

Registration stamp imprint

Internal delivery book no. \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: LIST OF DISPLACED MUSLIMS FROM GACKO LIVING IN MOSTAR

Logo SOUR "Veselin Masleša" Sarajevo  
IRO Forms and teaching resources  
Mark for order 15/20 edition 1/89

Form no. 14

**LIST OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM THE GACKO MUNICIPALITY AREA  
PLACED IN THE MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY AREA**

/stamped:/ The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina wartime presidency of Gacko municipality with temporary headquarters in Mostar)

No.	Name	Father's name	Id.no.	Adress
1.	ARIF SUKIĆ	HAMID		BRANILOVIĆI G.
2.	AMRA SUKIĆ	TAHIR		BRANILOVIĆI G.
3.	RAZA SUKIĆ	ZULFO		BRAN. – GACKO
4.	SEJDA SUKIĆ	BEĆIR		BRAN. – GACKO
5.	AMEL SUKIĆ	TAHIR		BRAN. - GACKO

\*\*\*

-33-

1702.	ČUSTOVIĆ AHMET	MUJO		KLJUČ – GACKO
1703.	ČUSTOVIĆ NEFA	BEĆIR		“
1704.	TELOVIĆ DŽEMO	HUSO		1. September bb-GAC
1705.	TALOVIĆ ZIBA	ALIJA		“
1706.	TALOVIĆ SABRIJA	DŽEMO		“
1707.	TALOVIĆ ZINETA	DRVO		“

**FILES OF APARTMENTS** – records of social residencies foundation of the Mostar municipality.

Digital data are to be found in the list 1, under the category “Total” in Microsoft office Excel document, titled “Files of apartments”.

Based on the first and last name of the tenant's right holder, in the city of Mostar, according to the September 1992 file, nationalities of the tenant's right holders, as well as the nationalities of the newly settled tenants have been determined. The data have been processed from the “Files of apartments” document, issued by “URBING, d.o.o.” from Mostar, at request of law office “MARINKO ŠKOBIĆ”, consisting of 5 registers, counting in total 518 pages in A3 format, presenting the data on holders of the tenant right of tenure in the city of Mostar from 1992. Documents were processed by Sanja Matković. 13 701 out of 13844 records, this is, apartments, have been processed within those 5 registers, 143 of records being illegible.

Every register consists of 16 columns as follows.

- name of the street and house number
- last name and first name of the tenant's right holder
- records number of the apartment
- apartment surface in square metres
- owner of the apartment
- apartment and floor
- art of the apartment
- first and last name of the newly settled tenant
- legal base of the apartment usage, with the date of moving in
- address of previous residence
- previous position
- unit member
- number of members
- empty apartment (conditional/unconditional)
- first and last name of the person who provided data with PIN or “OK”, along with legible signature
- remark

The following columns have been used during data processing: records number of the apartment, first and last name of the tenant's right holder, first and last name of the newly settled tenant. The data have been entered in Microsoft office table. as follows:


	Holder of the tenant's right before the war	Newly settled tenant	Who moved out
Records number of the apartment	S (Serbs) H (Croats) M (Muslims)	S H M unknown	S H M unknown
	unknown		

Whereby the abbreviations S H M represent Serbs, Croats and Muslims and the category "unknown" represents the inability to specify the nationality of the tenant.


For each record, the records number of the apartment has been notified, and after the nationality of the tenant had been specified, number 1 has been added to a column "holder of the tenant's right before the war" to his last and first name; if somebody moved in some apartment, number 1 has also been recorded into a column "newly settled tenant", corresponding to nationality of the newly settled tenant. 3<sup>rd</sup> column (who moved out) is the copy of the column (tenant's right holder before the war) for the apartments with the newly settled tenants. Fields with records numbers of the apartments are coloured in 5 colours, specifying data from certain registers; records number (green) – register no 1, records number (yellow) – register no 2, records number (pink) – register no 3, records number (blue) – register no 4, records number (red) – register no 5.

Eventually, the data have been processed, providing the following results:

- population structure according to nationalities before the war:
- In total: 13 701; 100%
- Serbs: 3751 – 27%
- Croats: 4747 – 35%
- Muslims: 5140 – 38%
- Unknown: 63 – 0%




- tenants that moved in during the war, according to nationalities:
- In total: 1880 – 100%
- Serbs: 79 – 4%
- Croats: 609 – 32%
- Muslims: 1176 – 63%
- Unknown: 16 – 1%



-tenants that moved out during the war, according to nationalities

In total: 1880 – 100%

- Serbs: 1237 – 65%
- Croats: 479 – 26%
- Muslims: 151 – 8%
- Unknown: 11 – 1%



Legend: numerical values are shown on the graph in the following format:  
Number of holders of the tenant's right; percentage of total amount (%)

FILES of APARTMENTS –list of illegally settled apartments in the city of Mostar

Digital data are shown on the list 2 under the title „Illegally“, in Microsoft Office Excel format under the name „Files of apartments“.


The list contains records of apartments, illegally settled by tenants.

The data are processed from the list, made in December 1992 in the city of Mostar. The Microsoft Excel table is the same as in previous case. 1930 data have been processed, having provided the following results:


- structure of population before the war, according to nationalities for the apartments that were illegally settled by tenants:

In total: 1930 – 100%


- Serbs: 1289 – 67%
- Croats: 455 – 24%
- Muslims: 178 – 9%
- Unknown: 8 – 0%



- tenants that moved in illegally during the war, according to nationalities
- In total: 1930 – 100%
- Serbs: 69 – 4%
  - Croats: 645 – 33%
  - Muslims: 1155 – 60%
  - Unknown: 61 – 3%



- evicted tenants (tenants that were illegally moved out) during the war according to nationalities
- In total: 1930 – 100%
- Serbs: 1291 – 68%
  - Croats: 453 – 23%
  - Muslims: 178 – 9%
  - Unknown: 8 – 0%



Legend:

Legend: numerical values are shown on the graph in the following format:  
Number of holders of the tenant's right; percentage of total amount (%)

FILES of APARTMENTS – records of social residencies of the former “JNA”

1772 apartments have been recorded in the list, however, the records number of the apartment is not registered, therefore these data are not referent and also not processed.

# HERCEGOVACKI VOJNIK



The Herzegovinian soldier  
/coat of arms/  
2 photographs

Paper of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army, Mostar, February 1993, number 1

\*\*\*

## From the war diary of 4th Corps of the BH Army

22<sup>nd</sup> of January 1993

After a longer break, the Chetniks are scattering all parts of Mostar with grenades. Within two attacks, there were 20 wounded civilians that happened to find themselves on the town streets, out of which 7 heavily and 1 unfortunately killed.

On the battlefield of Konjic there was another success of defenders. They destroyed the recoilless gun with crew on the Chetniks' stronghold on Dijeve. All defence lines are stabile.

23<sup>rd</sup> of January 1993

The Chetniks are showing even today that they did not forget Mostar. They cover the town with heavy projectiles from all artillery weapons. The artillery of HVO fires back. There are no casualties among combatants but there are casualties among civilians. In total, 16 wounded civilians.

On the battlefield of Stolac, the Chetniks use all kinds of arms but they are not that successful. One combatant of the "Bregava" brigade was lightly and one heavily wounded. The defence lines are stabile.

24<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

The Chetniks' offensive in the entire area of Herzegovina does not subside. The grenades are falling on Mostar, Stolac, Konjic and defence lines. There are five wounded civilians in Mostar, one of them, unfortunately, lost the battle for life. The defenders fire back and hold the positions firmly.

25<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

The shelling subsides; the Chetniks' offensive is broken.

26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

The offensive is broken, but, as a rule, after the break of Chetniks, there is revenge. The grenades of biggest calibre are directed to the towns. Casualties among civilians.

30<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

By responding to the violent enemy attack, the combatants of the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of HVO and the first battalion of the "Bregava" brigade destroyed one Chetniks' bunker and two shelters for the tank. The Chetniks' tank, unfortunately, managed to pull out.

1<sup>st</sup> of February 1993

The violence of the enemy attacks moves to the battlefield of Stolac. Over 500 grenades fall on defence lines, some 20 on the town of Stolac and the Chetniks' infantry tried to make a breakthrough. The epilogue is 3 wounded defenders, one Chetniks' tank and one Chetniks' self-propelled gun destroyed.

2<sup>nd</sup> of February 1993

The offensive of Chetniks on the battlefield of Stolac continues. One combatant of the "Bregava" brigade is heavily and four of them, lightly wounded. In cooperation with the HVO troops, all attacks are rejected and the defence lines are consolidated.

4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> of February 1993

The fights seem to subside, however, one has noticed bringing and fortification of fresh enemy forces. Our forces also consolidate their positions.

08th February

Again, the most severely was on the Konjic battlefield, where the Chetniks tried to break through with infantry after the artillery preparation.

They were rejected, but there were two killed and one wounded combatant on our side. The crew was disabled and the cannon was damaged.

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In extended pleasant conversation, Mirsad Zuhrić told us about elapsed events:

\*\*\*

For the same aim

About the position of this Muslim unit in the HVO, our collocutor speaks in the following way:

"Through our hard work, we acquired a huge reputation in the HVO, and we are also known in the BH Army, who we are and how valuable we are. I think that they hold us for one of better units, which consists of Muslims. Through it, we gained a rather solid logistic support, as well as help in armament, although 60% of "barrels" are private property.

All my soldiers have worn lilies from the very beginning and as far as that is concerned, we have no problems from the HVO. After all, we are all combatants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is interesting to emphasize that regularly before the actions, we used to be visited by the religious participants – Hodjas; from that side, we have a special treatment in the HVO."

Realizing the reputation that this unit has among Muslims and Croats of this area, we asked M. Zuhrić to

\*\*\*

During the first days of war, while we were still wondering what was going on, during those crucial and the most difficult days, the following were killed:

Šaćir Šaćirović, killed in Donja Mahala, 20.04.1992.

Nadija Pašić, killed in Donja Mahala, 19.04.1992.

Edin Kajić, killed at Carina, 26.04.1992.

Alija Kajan, killed at Mazoljice, 30.04.1992.

Perica Karaul, killed in B. Krpo street, 03.05.1992.

Ozren Vrtikapa, killed in B. Fejića street, 03.05.1992.

Fadil Karić, killed at Stari Most, 06.05.1992.

Muhamed Spahić, killed in Donja Mahala, 12.05.1992.

Erman Ćorda, killed in Donja Mahala, 04.06.1992.

Avdo Karabeg, killed in Donja Mahala, illegible.06.1992.

Alija Maksumić, killed at Merdžan Glava, 27.06.1992.

Zoran Galuza, killed at Stari Most, 14.06.1992.

Meho Husnić, killed at Podveležje, 16.06.1992.

For each issue of the journal we shall prepare several interviews with the families of the killed combatants. If we will be able to, we shall publish the authentic information on killings of some combatants.

\*\*\*



MIRSAĐ ZUHRIĆ

**HDZBH**

THE CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

/receipt stamp:/

/illegible/			
Date of receipt		3 August 1992	
Type of record	/illegible/	Copies	Enclosures
"U"	46/92	1	1

YOUR REF.

/handwritten:/ Communication /GRBIĆ/

The Constitutional Court  
of the Republic of Bosnia  
and Herzegovina  
BH-71000 S a r a j e v o

YOUR LETTER OF

OUR REF. 267-im/92

DATE: 26 July 1992

RE: Your letter no. U 46/92 of 22 July 1992

Dear Mr. DAUTBAŠIĆ,

On 23 July 1992 the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina received a letter from the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina no. U 46/92 of 22 July 1992 bearing your signature. However, the letter was written on the letterhead and verified with the stamp of a non-existent state – the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – with the five-pointed star in the centre.

Given that the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina has spared no efforts in the creation of a new state – the independent, sovereign, democratic and internationally recognised state of Bosnia and Herzegovina – we regard this letter as invalid on account of its invalid heading and we will not respond to it. Also, we consider your Decision no. U 46/92 concerning the initiation of proceedings for evaluating constitutionality and legality inappropriate to the times we live in and thereby likewise invalid and not binding for us, since this too is verified by the same stamp.

I hope that as the President of the Constitutional Court of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina our explanations are sufficient for you.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Ivan MARKEŠIĆ  
Secretary General of the HDZBH  
/signed and stamped/



from the staff of supreme command phone no 521500 August 15 1992 4.44PM p01

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES  
SARAJEVO

MILITARY SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential number; 02/340-585  
Sarajevo, 15<sup>th</sup> of August 1992

Pursuant to need that appeared, related to the coordination of combat actions and activities

I

#### O R D E R

1. The troops of HOS /Croatian Armed Forces/ Konjic, Jablanica 1 Prozor under the command of Major LUKIĆ ZVONKO are to be subordinated to the TG-1 Command Konjic.
2. The subordination is to be executed immediately.

To be submitted:

- Mr. Major Lukić Zvonko
- TG-1 Command Konjic
- Files

Head of the Supreme command for the  
BH Armed Forces staff  
Sefer Halilović  
/signed and stamped/

PRESIDENCY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
Office of the President

In accordance with the demonstrated need, and pursuant to the responsibilities and powers I have as the President of the National Defence Council and the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I issue the following

O R D E R

1. The armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the BH Army and the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/) shall immediately begin preparations for the operation to lift the blockade of Sarajevo city by military means (in all further documents: the Sarajevo operation, shortly: operation "S"). The operation shall be prepared and carried out as soon as possible.
2. Jasmin JAGANJAC is appointed commander of the operation with full powers, and Mirsad ĆATIĆ his deputy. Other members of the operation staff are: Zejnil DELALIĆ and Ferid BULJUBAŠIĆ.
3. The troops and materiel and technical equipment needed for carrying out the operation, as well as the zones of authority and responsibility, shall be established in a separate order. The operation commander shall prepare a draft order within seven days.
4. All activities aimed at carrying out this operation are considered urgent and priority, and all commands and staffs of the OS /armed forces/ of Bosnia and Herzegovina are ordered to assist in this operation as much as required.

Konjic, 16 October 1992

President  
of the Presidency of BiH  
Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ  
/signed/

ARMY OF THE R/epublic of/ BH  
STATE SECRET

Copy no. \_\_\_\_\_

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES  
SARAJEVO

DT number: 02/  
Sarajevo, 10 September 1992

DIRECTIVE  
OF THE SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

I

THE AGRESSOR'S FORCES

The aggressor – the combined forces of the armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro, the rump of the former JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ and extremist forces of the SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/, backed by the mountain massif and with emplacements organised earlier on Mts Trebević, Romanija, Zvijezda, Majevisa, Ozren, Vlašić, Motajica, Grmeč, Prosara, Kozara and Vitorog Planina, has attempted to dissect the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina along several axes and to overrun Sarajevo, the more important commercial centres, and the Drina river valley, and to cut the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina off from the Republic of Croatia. In five months of war the aggressor has failed to attain his war aims, and owing to powerful resistance by the R BH Army and other armed forces he has been compelled to remain at his achieved lines and commence bringing up and regrouping forces for future operations. He is in part defending the lines: Odžak-Modriča-Doboj-Teslić-Vlašić-Donji Vakuf-Kupres-Šuica and Borci village-Podveležje-Sniježica-Hrgud. The following cities and major populated areas are under blockade: Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Jajace, Gradačac, the whole of the Cazin Krajina. In operations to date unprecedented terror and genocide have been unleashed upon the Muslim people, especially in the Drina river valley and the Prijedor region, large losses inflicted on the population and commercial facilities destroyed, the information media blocked and paralysed.

Forces equivalent to five corps have been deployed in the territory of the R BH, including former JNA combat resources: 900 tanks and OT /Armoured Personnel Carriers/, 850 artillery pieces and 48 aircraft. Aviation is being used for 30 or 40 a/p /sorties/ a day, and for chemical warfare agents (principally choking). Powerful mechanised armour formations are being used in the Posavina /Sava river valley/, the Bosna, Vrbas, Drina, Una river valleys, and around Sarajevo, Doboj, Brčko, Tuzla and the Kupres plateau.

The United Nations Organisation, the Security Council and the international public know the truth about the aggressor's goal and intentions, but they have not yet energetically taken a position in protection of the victims and have not imposed extremely strong sanction on the aggressor. However, the Serbian and Montenegrin foreign service, aided by the Russian, Greek and Israeli lobbies, has succeeded in negating all our efforts and in preventing military intervention. Because of the growing opportunities for looting and division of the spoils, internecine conflict has appeared in the aggressor's ranks, especially among the leadership, and has spread to the units and significantly affected the aggressor's combat morale.

The aggressor has sustained significant losses in operations to date, about 20% in manpower and 15-20% in equipment.

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## SARAJEVO REGION

Sarajevo-Romanija Corps forces (the 49<sup>th</sup> mbr /Mechanised Brigade/, Sarajevo sector; the 120<sup>th</sup> lpbr /Light Infantry Brigade/, Vojkovići village; the 14<sup>th</sup> motbr /Motorised Brigade/, Koran; and the 216<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/, Ustiprača) are engaged within this region, as are numerous volunteer divisions from Serbia and Montenegro, as well as numerous local Chetnik formations, with a heavy concentration of artillery and rocket units and motorised armour forces. The main forces are engaged in the Sarajevo, Pale, Sokolac and Han Pijesak areas, and the auxiliary forces in the Foča, Goražde, Rogatica and Višegrad areas. These forces are probably tasked with keeping Sarajevo under blockade, cutting off the so-called Serbian municipalities from the centre, forcing a capitulation and imposing the division of the city and the acceptance of their other conditions, and establishing their own authority in the Drina river valley and defending the borders of the so-called Serbian Republic.

## MOSTAR REGION

Forces of the so-called Herzegovina Corps and parts of the Užice Corps continue to be engaged in this region, with the goal of overrunning the area to the Neretva river.

The 9<sup>th</sup> Corps main forces are operating in the Tomislavgrad-Livno area, tasked with the defending the borders of the so-called Serbian Republic and the Knin Krajina from the Western Herzegovina direction.

## II.

### OUR FORCES

In the initial period of the war the BH TO /Territorial Defence/, and in the succeeding period, the OS R BH, in very adverse conditions and with large losses of manpower, succeeding in preventing the enemy from penetrating further, and capturing the city of Sarajevo and the towns of Tuzla, Zenica and Bihać.

The most significant successes have been achieved in Sarajevo, Mostar, Goražde, Tuzla, Kalesija, Gradačac, Gračanica, Zenica, Žepa, Doboje and Tešanj. The towns of Mostar, Stolac, Trebinje, Trnovo and Srebrenica have been liberated. Extensive free territories have been established within the Tuzla region (Srebrenica, Kalesija, Bratunac, Zvornik, Ugljevik, Srebrenik, Brčko); the Sarajevo region (Višegrad, Goražde, Foča, Rogatica, Trnovo, Hadžići, Breza and Ilijaš) and the Mostar region (Čapljina, Mostar, Stolac, Trebinje and Ravno). However, despite the results achieved, significant forces are still engaged in the defence of general urban areas, thereby limiting the possibilities of developing general offensive operations.

Valuable experiences have been gained: units have been beefed up and their organisation and establishment extended; the material and technical base has been improved (by our own production and from war booty), suitable conditions for the successive destruction of the enemy have been established by inventing and applying various forms and procedures in combat operations; morale has improved in the ranks of the OS and the people of the R BH, and the will to battle the aggressor and drive him out of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has grown.

## III

### NEIGHBOURS

Armed forces of the Republic of Croatia, conducting offensive operations to liberate Croatian territory, are directly cooperating with our forces to liberate Eastern Herzegovina, especially the towns of Trebinje and Stolac, with the part of their forces engaged in the Dubrovnik sector.

Part of these forces are cooperating with our forces in operations in the Posavina, especially in the Derventa and Odžak areas, and Brčko and Orašje, to rout the aggressor and prevent him breaking through at the Brčko-Derventa-Banja Luka axis.

#### IV

I have decided: to hold the free territory, prevent the taking of cities and the division of the Republic of BH, and establish conditions for moving to wide-ranging offensive operations by a decisive defence of the city of Sarajevo, a determined defence of encircled towns and free territories, assault operations in the Drina river valley, in the Posavina, the River Bosna in Cazin Krajina and Eastern Herzegovina /as printed/, and extensive sabotage operations in the aggressor's rear.

The main forces will be for raising the blockade of Sarajevo, the defence of free territory and for offensive operations, and the auxiliary forces for sabotage operations in the aggressor's rear.

Operational goal: inflict the maximum losses on the aggressor in ž/s /manpower/ and TMS /materiel and technical equipment/, smash his power of attack, unblock the towns, extend the free territory, prevent the introduction of fresh forces and establish the conditions for offensive operations towards the Podrinje /Drina river valley/, the Posavina, and the valley of the river Una.

The operation will be carried out in two stages, and will last 30 days.

- Stage one will last 10 – 15 days,
- Stage two will last 15 – 20 days.

In stage one: defend the free territory, prevent a corridor being established in the Posavina, raise the blockade of the cities, assemble the free forces, make preparations for the conduct of offensive operations against the aggressor's flanks and rear.

In stage two: isolate the aggressor's forces and break them up by degrees by offensive operations by operational and strategic forces, and by blows to the flank and rear in depth, establish more extensive free territory, prevent the withdrawal of material and technical commodities to outside the country's borders, and create conditions for offensive operations and the final liberation of the country.

Operational deployment: forces for raising blockades of towns, forces for the defence of free territory, forces for sabotage operations, forces for offensive operations and support forces.

Operational readiness: IMMEDIATELY.

KM /Command Posts/ as current deployment.

#### V

### TASKS OF OPERATIONAL FORCES

#### 1<sup>ST</sup> CORPS

Engage the main forces to raise the blockade of Sarajevo, as follows: introduce the South forces, backed by Mt Igman, to the Jahorina and Trebević area, with the task of: cutting the Pale – Tvrdinići village and Pale – Brus village roads, cut Pale off from

Lukavica in the Pale – Lukavica area, and continue operations in coordination with the forces from the city to break up the enemy in the Brus-Osmice area and create conditions for forces to withdraw from Sarajevo to the general Trebević and Jahorina areas.

Engage the auxiliary forces in Sarajevo to tie up the aggressor and firmly hold the positions. Engage the forces in the Visoko and Hadžići part of the front to liquidate the Hadžići, Blažuj, Butila, Ilijaš and Vogošća strongholds.

In stage two, engage the main forces on the Trbević-Pale axis, and engage the auxiliary forces in operations on the Hreša-Brezovice-Mokro axis, with the task: break up the aggressor on the assault axes, overrun the general Pale area and break out at the Sjetlina-Podvitez-Mokro-Kadino Selo line.

Continue operations with the South-Eastern Bosnia group according to the previous plan.

KM in Sarajevo.

## 2<sup>ND</sup> CORPS

Continue to defence the free territory with determined and active defence, focusing on sabotage operations in the rear, prevent aggressor penetration in widening the corridor at the Brčko-Lončari-Modriča axis and defend the town of Gradačac. Develop powerful offensive operations in the Bosna river valley, backed by Tešanj and Crni Vrh, extend the free territory, focusing on liberating the town of Doboj and linking up with forces in the Gračanica area, thereby preventing a link up by aggressor forces on Ozren.

Render the Kalesija operations group combat-ready for more powerful active operations against Zvornik, with the task of cutting the Zvornik – Drinjača and Zvornik – Šekovići routes, and thereby prevent the introduction of fresh forces from Serbia to the Glasinac area.

Engage the remaining forces, especially those from the Banovići sector, in extending the free territory with a focus on conducting sabotage operations in the aggressor's rear.

## 3<sup>RD</sup> CORPS

Engage the main forces at the Travnik-Jajce-Bugojno part of the front. Raise the blockade of the town of Jajce. Break up the aggressor forces on the Vlačić plateau, at the Komar pass and in the Donji Vakuf area, and then direct offensive operations along the Vrbaš and Ugar river valleys. In stage two develop broader offensive operations and break out at the Maslovare-Skender Vakuf-Mrkonjić Grad line. Engage the auxiliary forces in the Zenica, Busovača, Kakanj, Zavidovići and Žepče areas in the defence of the free territory, and coordinate with the forces defending Maglaj.

In the general Banja Luka area, develop forceful sabotage operations, especially against communications routes.

## 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

In coordination with forces of the Republic of Croatia, move to offensive operations with the main forces on the Mostar-Nevesinje, Trebinje-Bileća, Tomislavgrad-Kupres-Šipovo axes.

Defend the Livno-Glamoč axis with the auxiliary forces.

In stage two, continue offensive operations on the Nevesinje-Kalinovik and Bileća-Gacko axes and overrun Kalinovik and the Čemerno pass in coordination with 1st Corps forces, and with the auxiliary forces move to offensive operations towards Bosnian Krajina (Glamoč-Drvar and Livno-Grahovo).

\*\*\*

Units and staffs are required to hand over money, valuables and securities, etc. captured or looted during the conduct of combat operations to the authorised financial institutions with the relevant records and receipts, and to inform superior command of this.

#### g) Firefighting support

Organise firefighting support at every unit level, focusing on the protection of personnel and MTS.

#### h) War booty

Collect resources seized from the aggressor in a predetermined place, report this to the competent staff and secure it against theft. War booty must be inspected without fail before use, by expert personnel from the units, as well as the expert organs from the territory. War booty of unknown origin is only to be used after inspection and obtaining approval from a competent organ.

#### i) Clearing up the field of battle

For clearing the field of battle, engage CZ /civilian protection/ units and the population through CZ staffs in municipalities. Bury R BH OS soldiers in individual graves with all possible honours, and erect appropriate markers. Records on buried soldiers (personal details, date of death and place of burial) will be kept by company and battalion commands. Bury enemy soldiers in mass graves and mark them in a suitable way.

### CAMOUFLAGE

Focus on taking advantage of the resources available and the favourable conditions of the terrain, night, and favourable natural conditions.

### COMBAT SECURITY

Focus on direct security for KM, CV /communications centres/, unit movements, the preparation and conduct of combat operations, commercial and public facilities, using territorially-based defence forces for this.

## VIII

### COMMAND AND CONTROL

Main and rear command post in the current deployment sector.  
Following KM in the Igman sector.

Organise all types of communications, focusing on using PTT /Post, Telegram and Telephone/ communications, courier communications and radio ham communications.

Draw up and apply general and special KZ /cryptographic protection/ documents at all levels of command and control.

Drafted: ZS, MV, JD  
Typed: SČ

CHIEF OF THE  
R BH OS SUPREME COMMAND STAFF

Sefer HALILOVIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

No. 1-22/92-R  
Mostar, September 12, 1992

Attn. President of the Government of Republic  
of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Please find enclosed the acts passed by the temporary executive and administrative body, Croatian Defense Council of Croatian Community Herceg Bosna in the period of imminent war threat and in wartime, with the aim to normalize life and activities of legal system in the liberated areas.

In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated May 2, 1992, certain legal regulations have been inherited from former SFRY, while other regulations are declared null and void. By declaring those regulations null and void a legal vacuum has been created, the consequence of which is the fact that whole fields, especially in economy, remained unregulated.

Since the daily life in the liberated areas required that these legal vacuums be filled, the Croatian Community Herceg Bosna was forced to pass regulations in these fields, with the remark that all these regulations were passed as temporary regulations, and they are limited to the period of war and imminent threat of war.

In the mentioned acts, as you can see, we tried to be in consistency with the republic's regulations. Faced with continuous, enormous destruction, traffic and telecommunications blockade, lack of any kind of support by republic bodies, we were forced to take certain activities and draft certain acts with the aim of overcoming the chaos and total anarchy.

In accordance with the abovementioned, our opinion is that the mentioned activities and acts do not endanger the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we are often criticized, but on the contrary, it was and still is the only way to defend not only free and liberated territories, but the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The specific conditions under which these acts were passed, as well as the urgency of procedure, i.e. shortness of terms, created the need for further upgrading of certain regulations.

Therefore, should you have any remarks and suggestions as regards certain acts, please send them to us, and as soon as everything that is already created or is in the process of creation is normalized, we will make certain corrections.

With best regards

PRESIDENT OF THE HVO HZ HB  
Dr. JADRANKO PRLIĆ  
(hand signed)



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 ARMED FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS  
 confidential!

MILITARY SECRET  
 Strictly

SARAJEVO

Strictly confidential, number: 02/340-1907 (handwritten)  
 Sarajevo, 06.10.1992.

On September 30<sup>th</sup> 1992, after six months of the war, the first war consultation entitled "Organizational formational changes of the armed forces to strengthen combat readiness" took place at the Armed forces Central Command Headquarters.

#### Participants

- Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a member of Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed forces Central Command, Mr. Ejup Ganić,
- Minister in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić
- Chief of Armed Forces Central Command, Mr. Sefer Halilović,
- Deputy Chief of Armed forces Central Command, Mr. Stjepan Šiber,
- Members of Armed Forces Central Command senior staff
- Commander, Deputy Commander and Chief of Sarajevo corps headquarters,
- Commander of Sarajevo district defense headquarters,
- Brigade Commanders
- Commanders of Sarajevo municipal defense headquarters',
- Commander of Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina Special Units
- Commander of the Military Police, and
- Chiefs of military branches and services

Consultation was opened by Chief of Armed Forces Central Command, Mr. Sefer Halilović who, welcomed all present, and then gave a short introductory. After the introductory, the 22 participants discussed and gave their view of the problems treated, on the basis of which they identified the following

#### CONCLUSIONS

1.

First The war against an independent, indivisible and free democratic state – the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – is led by Serbian and Montenegrin Nazi indoctrinated forces, vastly assisted by the former Yugoslav Army. The objective of war is the disappearance of Muslims as a nation from these regions, the destruction of everything that is not Serbian and finally adjoining of Bosnia and Herzegovina to "Great Serbia". Resistance to this unheard-of violence came from the only organized force – "Patriotic League" which has, to some extent, awakened the dull consciousness of the Muslim masses, in order to timely point out all of the dangers and to organize them for an armed struggle.

Thus, the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have rapidly grown from many groups of patriotic citizens, through the six-month war, into a respectable armed force of about 150,000 soldiers, armed mainly with light infantry weapons. Classic genocide against the Muslim people significantly influenced the composition of combatants and commanders of our army, so that the Muslims account for 80%.

The war has increasingly become a pogrom against innocent Muslim and Croatian population, which has had the consequence that our army was increasingly approached

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Command composition of the former district headquarters should form the backbone for forming the Corps Command. In that way the operational function of the district headquarters will cease, and commanding over all the brigades is passed to the Corps command.

4.

Formed Aviation groups rely entirely on corps rear safeguarding, with an exception of an aviation-technical branch. The use of aviation is in the jurisdiction of the

Central Command Headquarters.

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Only a disciplined army, inspired by patriotism and high combat morale, convinced of the righteousness of the objectives of our liberation war, their conduct, proper mutual military relations, cultured and equal treatment of all peoples, can be a guarantor of their security and trust in its final victory over the aggressor.

All commanders of our army have been introduced to these conclusions, and their implementation is the responsibility of the Corps Commands (district headquarters) and Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces Central Command Headquarters Administration.

MV / SČ

Official Seal: The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Ministry of Defense  
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
/text is also written in Cyrillic/

Chief of Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces Central Command Headquarters  
Sefer Halilović  
/signed/

REPORT ON ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE AID TO JAJCE BY THE «VITEZ BOSNE SREBRENE» BATTALION, EXPEDITED FROM GRUDE ON 28TH OF OCTOBER 1992

We moved from Grude around 2300 hours in direction; Imotski, Posušje, Tomislavgrad. Everything was as planned till we exit Tomislavgrad. First trouble, however not significant, emerges at the check point, 7 or 8 kilometres away from Tomislavgrad towards Prozor, where the military police of HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ does not accept the pass, actually the signed order, approved by Mr. Petković, HVO Staff Head, but demands for paint over and list of soldiers. In addition, one of the policemen asks me; "ARE THERE BALIAS? I WILL KILL THEM ALL!" Regarding the composition of this troop, the question was rather awkward. There was also a reason not to allow the soldiers listing, but I was merely insisting on calling Mostar, Grude or anybody, who is authorized to confirm the validity and force of the written order, what has been done, after 45 minutes of waiting. (Fortunately, the guide from Grude had a phone number of the duty officer from Mostar, called him on the phone and so we were allowed passing through).

We arrive to Prozor only around 0700 hours, due to extremely hard driving conditions. There, I make a contact with Mr. Glasnović, who reports to me that there were two more groups, ready to move to Jajce and that 30 men of anti-terrorist squad from Široki Brijeg, along with 20 men, trained in Split and originating from Central Bosnia are waiting for me. We wait for two hours, till the men get ready. Nevertheless, the waiting took some time due to a quest for a transport vehicle for these 20 men. Around 0900 hours, we move towards Vakuf, preceded by the police. We pass the checking points without troubles all the exit way of Bugojno, jointly controlled by the Military Police of HVO and the BH Army. HVO passes us through, but the BH Army demands the written permit to pass, whereby the respond in written as well. I respond how impossible this is and useless as well, therefore I ask them to allow pass through as soon as possible for urgency, however they refuse and demand from me that I return to the city with them, in order to make a conversation with their commander. Eventually I accept it.

The commander Senad Dautović makes nice reception but requests a list of soldiers and officers; I refuse to do so, by warning him that he, as a soldier, must know how incorrect would that be, to check upon the list of soldiers at this spot. Furthermore, he demands the names of officers that I didn't know. I accepted some men, along the way. I go back to the convoy to pick up these names in order to deliver them to Mr. Dautović, whereby he transmits them to Novi Travnik, to his superior. Mr. Lendi afterwards gives me a written pass of bizarre content. In addition, along with the police escort, we have been escorted

by the anti-terrorist group, whose task is to protect us and in case of suspicious evolution, to destroy us. I accepted those terms nearly without any complaints, wishing to reach Jajce as soon as possible, as well as to prevent nervousness by the men. However, the reactions of HVO police members to it were rather harsh, estimating it inadmissible for us to be escorted by the BH Army div/as written/, along with mutual will /as written/ police. I emphasize that the reaction of military police of HVO took place after I returned from Bugojno and then we were placed in part of Bugojno and Travnik, in the hollow depression between two hills. The temperature rises till the red-hot point; I am being approached by two commanders Šuvalić and Biloš, informing me that during my stay in the Bugojno command, the members of military police and div. /as written/ group of the BH Army were disassembling RPGs towards the convoy. I find that the div /as written/ of BH Army surrounded the convoy from all four sides, deployed at 10 metres distance. Along the above cited anti-terrorist group of 30 men from Široki Brijeg, another such group was in my troop, whose commander is approaching me and seeks for permit to attack the BH Army members that surrounded us. The similar thing is done by Predrag Mandić (Lija), the foreman of the group from Široki Brijeg, having told me that he was ready and when I feel it would be a moment that I just give him a sign. Both times, I responded to stay completely still but ready. At that moment, I ordered that the convoy made a turn on the road and returned to Bugojno till HVO and BH Army agree upon the attitudes on passing through and escort issues. On the way back, joint representatives of the BH Army Mr. Dautović and HVO Živko arrive to Bugojno with agreed attitudes and ready to let us go through. I emphasize that it took us 5 hours of waiting. By the great number of men, substantial nervousness is visible, they express suspicion about the possibility of passing through, and they would like to go back. The commander from Široki Brijeg Mandić is rather categorical when saying; "I AM FOR THE FIGHT AND I AM NOT AFRAID OF DYING, BUT THIS IS MERELY A KILLING ACTION WITHOUT REASON. TUTA (HIS COMMANDER TUTA NALETILIĆ) ordered to me to estimate carefully where I go, I estimate that it is useless and too dangerous therefore I go back and in Herzegovina I am needed as well."

Then I hold a short meeting with other commanders, I order that the men should be motivated in order to leave. They managed to do so rather quickly and at the exact moment when men ascend the buses, a notification from BH Army arrives that they forbid the pass by just approved communication, but propose the new one over Vakuf-Pavlovica (we have to return to Vakuf eventually), which results an additional confusion but we still move, because of the heavy artillery attack to Bugojno that has just occurred. Before we are about to leave, we lost some men because the commander of the local police ordered them to go to the shelter so we lost more than one hour by looking for them. When we found them, we lined up the convoy and moved around 2000 hours. We passed couple of first barricades without troubles. Then, we arrive to the check point Šebešić, where Ivica Čobanac is the commander, whose men express significant resistance towards the Muslims, which is an additional burden for the Muslims from my troop. I am leaving to official premises of Mr. Čobanac where he promises me that he would pass the convoy in spite of the fact that he hates "Turks" more than "Serbs" (because they killed more of his men than the Chetnicks), but he claims that won't do it on the next two Muslim half private barricades for these are, as he said, the Croat haters and criminals. Therefore he suggests that the road should be cleared by use /as written/ and RPGs. A part of this conversation was heard by some of my soldiers, as well as seen. As some guys from this station, as stated, lay down by side with weapon, that some of them merely drove crazy because now, they don't know who they are fighting for or against. This, what I am telling you about, is happening around midnight. I have many thoughts in my head; should I go to the Muslim barricade, escorted by two of Muslim soldiers to explain them what kind of a troop we are and what are our intentions, but for that I takes me minimally an hour or two, so, what happens, if they let me go and the other behind them don't let me go through. What if I experience more of such unfavourable combinations, and what can happen in convoy while I am negotiating, eventually all this together, related to the fact that in Bugojno, a free pass has been promised to me with a joint police escort and it is not there. I make decisions and I order the return. I emphasize that all this is happening deep in the woods at the poor forest path, in the atmosphere of a real autumn rain. I am trying to get accommodation in Bugojno or Vakuf for my men through the police, but they even wouldn't allow me the parking for the buses but they escort us to Prozor where we arrive significantly after midnight. Here we also do not find any accommodation for the men; therefore I leave my men to spend the night in the bus. In the morning on 29<sup>th</sup> of October 1992 I invite soldiers to one spot; I gain the last atoms of force to motivate them to try one more time, because now, one

squad of BH Army members from Mostar is joining us. Again we get firm guarantees that we shall be escorted to Travnik by the mixture police, to the big barrack in order to rest the men and to be provided with food after 60 hours. This time, with minor problems (a short waiting at several spots and in the village of Opara there was a truck as obstacle, intentionally set by the Muslims, but removed within 20 minutes), we managed to reach Travnik, which was fine, however now we are having new problems; I need accommodation for men and correct information on the real situation in Jajce. They take me to Vitez, to the commander of the OZ SB Mr. Tihomir Blaškić. I am looking for accommodation for men; we consider some premises where we can place 20-50 men, mutually away one from each other up to 30 kilometres. Then I suggest (since I have been earlier told that the barrack was, although big, tight, for it is full of refugees) to make space for 260 places in the barrack for one night only, whereby some refugees, if necessary, should be placed in some hall or a bus because the army, having spent 60 hours in the bus, needs some rest in order to be able to go to its positions in the morning.

They are all in concordance with it. Mr. Blaškić determines Mr. Filipović to go with me to Travnik to act like this. Mr. Filipović fails, instead of ordering in an energy way, he begs and proposes, which doesn't bring any results. Since there is a part of premises in the same barrack, controlled by the BH Army, the BH Army officers promise to help in accommodation of men without beds, but with almost no effect. They manage to release only one premise without beds and blankets in a way that most of men stay in the bus. This issue on the accommodation reached my ears only the day after tomorrow, for I headed towards Jajce with two guides and one of my diversant to check upon the situation personally, whereby I left my men to the host's care, although in the main staff of HVO I have been told, right upon my arrival that Jajce "has fallen".

Not long as we left Travnik towards the place Turbe, there was an easy infantry weapon attack to our vehicle, having provoked a significant nervousness by one of the guides who was also driving the vehicle. It resulted in losing control over the vehicle and landing on the side way, very close to the Chetnicks positions. I am convinced that shots weren't coming from bigger distance than 200 metres. I replaced the driver, we carefully got out of scrape but twice again we suffered the open fire during extrication. Along the road from the spot where we were attacked, till the place Karaula, we stumbled upon a larger number of transport and cargo cars, destroyed or damaged by the Chetnicks fire. We also came across a large number of civilian and soldiers, walking towards Travnik. By the place Karaula we stumbled upon the set obstacles that prevented the passage of cars towards Jajce. Behind the obstacle there was a line of cars for the first 5 kilometres, lined up, only on the right side at the beginning and later, on both sides, so we had to give up on attempt to reach Jajce, but we returned to Travnik and reported all that we saw to the command of BH Army (for we couldn't find any HVO members) and suggested them to clear the road. They promised to do so, however, having failed in our mission, we managed to do something else. Having seen a large number of soldiers, chaotically moving towards Travnik from the Jajce direction and from conversations with some of them, we found out that our (HVO and BH Army) leave the lateral lines entirely. I was clear than that the organized defence is no longer possible, being confirmed till morning the following day. During the following day I spent a while talking to the regional superiors of HVO, analyzing events and searching for the most efficient way to help. Mr. Blaškić, Mr. Kordić, me and some other estimated fighters were even planning to take 70 of my men and around 40 domestic fighters and move to Jajce by foot in order to stop our fighters along the way and try to return them on positions. Couple of good fighters from jajce proved it being an illusion, having told us we should leave this mambo-jumbo. Neither they nor anybody else in this moment will not and cannot return to Jajce, therefore we gave up from this attempt.

The superficial view at the chart where the frontlines and positions of our forces as well as the enemy's forces were drawn on, points at the fact that Jajce couldn't be preserved by any other defence save the aggressive one. To clear it up, by the harsh breach of the hostile lines in the rayon of the town of Jajce and hardly less significant at the Travnik exit towards Turbe, where it comes to a very narrow passage that could be cut by the Serbs in any moment. According to my estimation, they didn't do it intentionally, because they didn't want to bring us in the position of complete surrounding and force us to use all power that we had, which they probably have never experienced.

I think that Jajce should be our last lesson and warning. We, fighting like this, with such enemy, cannot win the war. To lead a defensive war does not mean to defend ourselves at the same time and to defend ourselves exclusively. We have to give up on the trench

battle, become mobile and more elastic, and use the advantages that we have with more skill, which are, first of all, a larger number of motivated men that need to strengthen by a military discipline and lead more wisely.

Report submitted by  
Ante Prkačin  
/signed/

## Stjepan Šiber: Deceptions, delusions, the truth - 1992 war diary

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7<sup>th</sup> of October:

We have a meeting with the representatives of HVO scheduled for today. In the morning I convince Safer halilović, because I was informed about Petković's coming as well, that he will come to the meeting as well. Sefer is refusing it; "I don't want to talk to Ustashas. They are all Ustashas save you." I correct him; "Sefer, be careful what you are saying. If you think that I am comfortable with this statement of yours, then you are terribly wrong." "Ok, I was just kidding", he responded, smiling cynically. I keep being persistent and say that Ganić and Kljuić will attend the meeting and there is no sense about his not coming. "Lie Stjepan", he says "lie, whatever you know, tell them that I am sick, with fever and pull me out of it".

I take Vehbija Karić and Beno Fabijan to this meeting. One can observe that was the first time in the course of war that the representatives of the herzegovinian HVO, I underline it, the herzegovinian HVO came to the building of the R BH presidency in Sarajevo, to have a talk with the representatives of the BH army and the supreme command of our state.

On behalf of HVO, the following were present at the meeting; Milivoj Petković Tihomir Blaškić, Koštroman, some Žarko and some Bandić, who are less important and less known and on our side there are; Ganić, Kljuić, Dahić, Hebib and my team. The talk was performed in three parts. At the beginning, we were alone, hence, the representatives of BH and HVO and then General Morillon with General Razek joined us, while afterwards, we talked without presence of UNPROFOR representatives.

MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
"BURA"

Class: 8/92-01/40  
Ref. no :3105-01-01-92-10  
Ploče, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1992

Sections 1:50000

- Mostar 2 and 4
- Nevesinje 1 and 3
- Ston 2
- Trebinje 1

### 1. ENEMY

Forces of Herzegovina Corps is located in eastern Herzegovina from Rupni Do - Trebinje to Borci - Konjic with total strength of: about 5 000 Chetniks, 30 tanks, 40 self-propelled equipment, 12 OT, 12 VBR , around 60 different canons and 40 different air defense assets.

#### 1.1. Forces layout

- 23. Brigade TO (territorial defense) Bileća deployed in rayon: Oštri Kuk tt. 494 - Ibrahim Do - Ljubinje.
- 13. Motorized brigade Nevesinje deployed in rayon: Ravnice - Ljubljana - v.Kameni Obor.
- 10. Herzegovina brigade deployed in a wider rayon: Nevesinje from v. Ljubljana - Rošci mountain - Nevesinje.
- TO unit Borci deployed in wider Borci rayon: v. Glavatičevo - Paklena tt. 907 - Sivadija tt 1967.
- 47. Motorized brigade Trebinje deployed on wider rayon of Trebinje: Rupni Do - Popovo Polje - v. Donji Mionići.

#### 1.2. Position and Intent

After losing position on the left bank of the Neretva river the enemy was forced to withdraw. New positions were taken on the battlefield Podvelež - Ošljak - Stone - Kotašnica - Drenovac - Dvrnsnik - Žegulja which is well fortified, obstructed, a front end secured with MMP.

Subsequently, the front end of the defense and depth of the battlefield is reinforced with technical equipment in line with withdraw from Prevlaka, and enemy characteristic is that has more technology than manpower.

With regrouping of forces and further strengthening with resources and personnel from the Dubrovnik battlefield enemy will gradually seek to create conditions for the offensive action with the intention of breaking out on the left bank of the Neretva river, across the plateau Dubravska.

...

### 15. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION

Continuously take measures for increasing the security of command and communications.

From start of combat operations to the greatest extent possible, use wired connection, and in the absence use PTT (Post and telecommunications).

Use radio connection only during combat with the mandatory use of TKT.

Regular reports deliver each day until 6:00 p.m. with the situation at 05:00 p.m. and until 06:00 am with the situation at 05:00 a.m.

Outstanding reports submit IMMEDIATELY.


During the performance combat activities gather information about the enemy (VP, composition, action, losses, etc.), and deliver them promptly and openly.

**IZM (division command post) Čapljina**

COMMANDER OF HVO HERCEG BOSNA  
Brigadier Milivoj Petković  
/signed:/

**PLAN FOR OPERATION  
OFFENSIVE "BURA"**






Legend:

 VRS Attack directions  
 HVO unit names

Blue names, e.g. 105th Brigade  
 HVO unit names





/coat of arms (Lilies)/

/coat or arms/  
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE

COMMAND

Mostar, 14<sup>th</sup> of November 1992

HVO municipal staff Mostar

Notification

Referring to the conversation of this morning between Marić Stanko and Zilić Mehmed, and related to the events in Konjic, we found out about the following elements:

- units of the BH army and HVO Herceg Stjepan brigade jointly elaborated the plan of activities in details
- they are waiting for Mr. Praljak's order
- they are manned-up
- the fill-up of ammunition is incomplete, whereas the situation with artillery grenades is especially bad
- they determined the directions of activities and KM /command post/
- they have already sent certain groups to reconnoitre certain directions in order to collect data about the aggressor.

We shall notify you in time when we have more information.

We haven't received any information through communication instruments, whereby we hope that they shall notify us.

ZM/MZ

Commander  
Mr. Arif Pašalić  
/signed/

/facsimile report/

OS /DEFENCE FORCES/ AND HVO  
/CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ COMMAND  
BUGOJNO, GORNJI VAKUF

Bugojno, 01 December 92

No: 04-11/92

for: General PRALJAK

## REPORT

Following the order issued to me on the task of taking over the co-ordination and command with the aim of joint command of OS and HVO Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, I hereby submit the following report for your review and as a potential guideline in decisions on a higher level, since they are above my competencies. You have also issued me with an order on the withdrawal of HVO Prozor forces and Gornji Vakuf OS to Mt Makljen. In light of the above, I report that the first degree of co-ordination and command has been established, but that the reached agreements are ignored in practice. It is somewhat difficult to reach an agreement because OS Bugojno receives instructions from Zenica which do not coincide with the agreement on joint command in the area of responsibility entrusted to me.

I assess the combat readiness of both units as satisfactory, but not at such level as I consider realistic for the situation this town is in. Curfew and military police joint patrols have been introduced and there is good will to abide by them. Co-ordination in defence has shown positive development, but it must be borne in mind that HVO Bugojno can reach the level of readiness for offensive operations in a shorter time period. OS Bugojno need to work more on defence and have a smaller number of soldiers for offensive operations.

An agreement has been reached on the manner and better movement of convoys and other vehicles to Bugojno, Travnik, Zenica and Tuzla. There are certain problems in Prozor, which you are already acquainted with.

As for your order on the separation of opposing parties HVO Prozor and OS Gornji Vakuf on Mt Makljen, I report that I have received a report in writing from Rama' Brigade on their order for the pull-out of troops from the area and the deadline for execution of the order (15 November 1992).

On 24 November 1992, I saw for myself the truth of /?word missing/ together with HVO Gornji Vakuf Commander, "Rama" Brigade Deputy Commander and OS Gornji Vakuf Commander, Fahrudin AGIĆ. After this, on 25 November 1992, I issued an order to OS Gornji Vakuf to withdraw the second battalion from the village of Pridvorci, the southern slope of Mt Crni Vrh, Cipovi slopes and elevation 1303. Following the order, Mr AGIĆ informed me he had withdrawn his units from the said area. At 2350 hrs on 28 November 1992, according to "Rama" Brigade Command, infantry fire, lasting 45 minutes, was opened from the direction of Kosara above the village of Jurići. One can continually hear sporadic fire from the direction, especially from Hera village.

Following my order on closing all catering facilities at 1500 hrs, HVO Gornji Vakuf has been adhering to it, while OS Gornji Vakuf does not want to abide by the issued order because Mr AGIĆ says his superior command is in Zenica and that he will execute the order when he receives it from them.

I conclude that Mr AGIĆ indirectly does not want to implement the agreement.

Due to all the above stated, pertaining to relations and the execution of orders in the AOR I was entrusted with, the problems which are encountered are above my competencies. OS Gornji Vakuf Commander Fahrudin AGIĆ, with his promises, signatures, behind which nothing lies, and bypassing the truth does not instil hope for a better solution to relations within Gornji Vakuf or between Gornji Vakuf and Prozor. I note this particularly because the second battalion of OS Gornji Vakuf has been utilised in the direction of Prozor, and if the relations were to be resolved, it could be utilised on the Bugojno defence line.

Cooperation with "Ante Starčević" Brigade is satisfactory and one can sense that they are taking the execution of tasks seriously. I have not had the opportunity to check the quality of defence because the lines were not jeopardised by the enemy infantry.

Colonel Miro ANDRIĆ

/stamped and signed/

/coat of arms/  
 REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 ZAGREB

OFFICE OF THE MAIN MILITARY ADVISER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
 REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Zagreb, 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

Subject: official note on the meeting with the French delegation on 13<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

Please find enclosed the official note on the meeting and talk with the delegation of the Republic of France, lead by the General Quesnot, Chief of the Main Staff of the Presidency of the Republic of France that was held in the Ministry of Defence on 13<sup>th</sup> of January 1993.

Sincerely yours

General of the Guard  
 Anton Tus  
 /signed/

To be submitted to:

- Vice President of the Government, Mr. Ivan Milas
- Minister of Defence of RH, Mr. Gojko Šušak
- Minister of the Foreign Affairs of RH, Mr. Zdenko Škrabalo
- Assistant of Minister of Defence, Major General Slobodan Praljak
- Adviser of the President of the Republic, Dr. Željko Matić

NOTE FROM THE MEETING; FOUR STARS GENERAL ANTON TUS AND  
 GENERAL MAJOR SLOBODAN PRALJAK WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION,  
 HEADED BY THE GENERAL QUESNOT

Zagreb, 13<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

The French delegation members: general Quesnot, Chief of Main Staff of the French Republic Presidency, rear-admiral De Lussy, colonel Bastier, Mister M. Parc and the representatives of the Ministry of Interior, Mister Rouyer, Deputy Head for Eastern Europe, Mister Menat, Deputy Head of the UN Administration, Mister Dana, Deputy Head of Strategic Affaires Administration, His Excellency Mister Georges Marie Chenu, Ambassador of the Republic of France in the Republic of Croatia, colonel George Ledeuil, military attaché at the embassy of the Republic of France in Zagreb, Mister Jean-Luc Faure, first adviser at the embassy of the Republic of France in the Republic of Croatia.

The Croatian delegation being represented by: the Four Stars General Anton Tus, Chief military adviser of the President of the Republic, Major General Slobodan Praljak, Assistant of Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, brigadier Krešimir Kašpar, Head of the President's military cabinet, brigadier Željko Dobranović, Assistant of the first military adviser of the President and colonel Josip Štimac, adviser in the cabinet of the Main Staff Head of the Croatian Army regarding the cooperation with the foreign Armed Forces.

Interpreter: Mrs Solange Barišić

After welcoming and introducing the delegations members, General Quesnot asked General Tus to share his impressions on Geneva conference results.

Before sharing his impressions regarding the Geneva conference results, General Tus expressed his gratitude to French delegation for humanitarian and other aid, provided by France to the Republic of Croatia, acting in frames of the Monitoring Mission of the European Community, later on, in frames of UNPROFOR as well, in the Homeland war period and later in the period of alleviating consequences of the great Serbian aggression. As to Geneva, it was rather dynamic, whereby the Serbian party was more or less forced to accept the principles to solve the conflict in these areas, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs want a state in the state, which leaves the possibility of annexation to the Great Serbia; therefore they want to keep such possibility open for more favourable times. Furthermore, tough synchronizing among Serbs and Muslims regarding the territorial fixing boundaries in some provinces are going to remain actual. As for the military plan, the document has been accepted because it is about the technology of hostility up to the demilitarization although the realization of the document itself is going to be difficult. Generally speaking, it could be said that the conference was successful and that we were closer to peace than earlier, although, when it comes to documentation needed to be accepted, we remain with a pile of problems especially in relation to areas, being ethnically cleansed, considered by the Muslims as their own. General Quesnot was interested in interpretation of the above cited; would that represent a possibility for difficulties among Muslims and Serbs only, while the Croats, could they be more or less satisfied with such solution, save minor modifications?

General Tus gave an explanation that, earlier, the Croats have been in an unequal position in relation to other two nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, therefore they generally come in for by achieving the equal position. The Croatian people managed to defend their life space in war, whereby, in the sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, they achieved equality of rights by fact that they become a constitutive nation with full rights to the central government like the other two nations. Further explanation of situation has been left over to General Praljak.

According to General Praljak's opinion, such situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is going to last for a long period of time. The Serbian leaders promised to their people the Serbian state within the Great Serbia, counting with 80% of the territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is the reason they got killed for. Now, they are supposed to be told that everything was in vain. As far the Muslims are concerned, a common, actually, a Muslim state has been promised. Little they have been fighting for was for the purposes of the civil, Unitarian state. They had many dead people within the ethnic cleansing and now they are trying to capitalize their victim. The Croatian position has been clear from the very beginning. The territory that belongs to the Croats matches the borders of Banovina Hrvatska from the 1939 division of Yugoslavia; synchronized with the 1981 census (the 1991 census is not valid). The Croats stand for Bosnia and Herzegovina as integrity, as state, as well as for the rights of Croats as constitutive nation. The problems among Croats and Muslims are results of variety of goals within the political fights. The Croats fight for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the autonomy for Croats while the Muslims fight for the civil state. Since the Serbs are the common enemy, close mutual relations become closer or keep aloof, depends on the activity of this common enemy. The Croats are better organized, they fought better, started earlier, and they protected their territory. The Muslims kept avoiding fight, becoming refugees, simulated troops which created huge psychological differences among the fighters.

General Quesnot understood political differences among the Croats and Muslims well, but he was rather interested in General Praljak's opinion on the possibility of joint action of Muslims and Croats.

General Praljak is convinced that 80% of Muslims would accept the joint action without troubles, just like all Croats. The problem is a significant number of former JNA Muslim officers that do not work for their people. Jovan Divjak, Serb, was Mladić's man in the BH Army staff.

General Quesnot's next question was referring to the Mr. Izetbegović's statement about substantial number of men but lack of arms. Would that be a technical matter only – the lack of arms?

General Praljak responded that the problem does have a partial technical character. There are areas where the Muslims fight but they are mostly weak. The Serbs have predominance in artillery, which is, however, not decisive. Artillery is used for destruction of towns without military goals – they never hit the first combat lines. The same is going on in Sarajevo, Mostar, Jajce, Bosanski Brod, Slavonski Brod and elsewhere. Their tactic is to destroy the defence by using dead children, women and elderly.

General Quesnot wanted to hear General Tus' opinion on "krajinas" in the Republic of Croatia.

General Tus' opinion is that "the problem of krajinas" gets to be solved by solving the BH problem. This question cannot remain open. It must be clarified immediately within this process of solving crisis in the former Yugoslavia thoroughly.

There shall be no peace if we give the state inside of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Serbs. Neither Croats nor Muslims shall agree to it, because the aggressor would be rewarded than, having achieved his goal. This is neither about the religious nor the civil war but the conquering war, Serbian descent to the West. Yugoslavia served as instrument within this expand, while today, that is Great Serbia. That's the reason why they went to the war. These are the goals the JNA has been used for. As desired goals weren't realized, along came the JNA and SFRJ disintegration. Therefore, now, we have to create new states on healthy feet and stop the war. The Serbs must be either defeated or completely isolated in order to be able to understand that they committed crime. The process of conscience maturity by Serbs still hasn't reached the level of peace realization exclusively through the political instruments. The Geneva Convention offers an equal solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The creation of Serbian state in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a mistake that wouldn't help the solution of Serbian issue in the Republic of Croatia.

The Vance-Owen plan has been suspended by the Serbs for they expect the possibility to express their attitude regarding the connection to such state in Bosnia and Herzegovina in referendum, whereby such referendum, after the ethnic cleansing, is no longer any problem for them. The Republic of Croatia offers to the Serbs in Croatia a just solution of national issue according to the European criteria. The time to move in normal way is happening now, which understands the opening of traffic ways as well as the integration of UNPA areas in the Republic of Croatia. Although being the victim of aggression, the Republic of Croatia offers normal relationships, also supported by gentlemen Vance and Owen.

The Serbs must understand that the idea of creation of Great Serbia and their raid to the West failed. They must accept the European initiatives on international integration and resign to their ideas on homogenization within the own nation. Without defeat, they won't be convinced. General Tus doesn't expect a complete military defeat, for that would understand the war with Serbia, however, they cannot be allowed to realize what they couldn't realize by war, by using the political instruments in the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic of Croatia stands for peaceful solution, with firm political, economic and military pressure to the Republic of Serbia in order that they accept such solution.

General Quesnot was interested in the attitude of the Republic of Croatia regarding the UNPROFOR mandate extension in the Republic of Croatia.

General Tus expressed his gratitude on this issue. Breaking the Serbian opposition within the Vance plan implementation shall help to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and raise the authority of UN and European community, being already jeopardized. UNPROFOR must implement the Vance plan; however it is blocked in the second phase already. The disarmament hasn't been executed, whereby the demilitarization hasn't even started yet. UNPROFOR doesn't have a mandate to force the Serbs to hand in the weapons. They don't want it, counting on the connection with the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key issue of UNPROFOR mandate is not time of duration, but the condition change – the implementation of the planned. There wouldn't be any problems if UNPROFOR had a mandate to run its task, if they didn't wait to the agreement between us and the Serbian side, for that is impossible. UNPROFOR must impose the solution. The execution of these tasks must be enabled to UNPROFOR by new decisions and resolutions.

General Praljak has also confirmed that the role of UNPROFOR needed to be changed. He must be the controller of the contract implementation. If this body cannot perform the contract, it should be changed. A difference among contingents of single states in UNPROFOR composition should be made. There are normal, professional troops, that perform their job very well, within the frames of their mandates, but there are those who cannot enter this category. The Republic of Croatia doesn't want a war, if specifically doesn't need to enter one, however the contract has to be fulfilled in a reasonable time frame. We cannot allow another Cyprus. We play with territories, nations. Democracy barely started to develop here, while in UNPA every day's murders repeat. Since the cease-fire in these areas, we've got 600 dead civilians and 500 soldiers. Somebody has to be responsible for this. We don't want war, but for how long? The UNPROFOR mandate needs to be changed. The Republic of Croatia on her side invites to the control of fulfilled commitments, as far as the boundaries are concerned, we don't want to talk about them.

General Quesnot eventually expressed his gratitude for sincere and substantial response.



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 3rd CORPS COMMAND  
 Strictly confidential number 02/33-181  
 Zenica, 20.01.1993.

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/hand written number 38 circled/

**Engagement of forces toward Gornji Vakuf- response -**

To the Command Headquarters of Bugojno defense and 307th Brigade

We appreciate your thoughts and suggestions, but we draw your attention to the performance of the assignments in the area of responsibility. Do not engage in activities that are not in your domain. Write reports so as to reflect the combat situation and not to be a political lesson.

For conflicts in all towns of Croatian Community Herceg Bosna is still premature, although this option is also foreseen. Try to do everything you can and help Vakuf.

COMMANDER

Enver Hadžihasanović

Verified by stamp

stamp with crest of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sign 3rd corps /signature illegible/

/circled by hand/

JASMIN JAGANJAC  
 ZAGREB  
 12 February 1993  
 18:45 hrs

Attn. Mr. President of the Presidency of RBiH  
 Alija Izetbegović

1. During today's contacts with General Praljak and General Čermak, I arranged shipment of certain MTS quantity for Pazarić (actually East of Bosnia) as follows:
  - a) bullet 7,62 x 31      300.000 pieces
  - b)RPG – 7                200 pieces
  - c) Maljutka                20 pieces

Total quantity can be placed in 2 cargo trucks. When the cited quantity arrives, the following shall be sent. /crossed/. The material is symbolic, however they do mention passage.

2. To Mr. Praljak and Mr. Šušak I gave the proposal of Statement that you suggested to Mr. Boban. They find it quite approximate; however they admit the insufficient investigation of the statement. At my query whether they gave up on HZ Herceg-Bosna, General Praljak responded that it no longer exists and that one provisory period is necessary. Since Boban arrives from Germany yet tomorrow, they promised to make pressure on Boban to reach the signature. I think the item 5 was problematic. And those were insignias. Praljak thinks this also won't be controversial, to place the province flag next to the Bosnian flag as state flag. If anything is controversial, I shall inform you tomorrow.
3. As General Praljak travels to Herzegovina tomorrow, afterwards to Central Bosnia, he asked me to tell you to determine one or two prominent politicians

(Muslim) that would, together with him, survey the Central Bosnia and influence the further situation appeasement. Determined men should report to Mostar. Communication should be Zijo or Safet.

4. For the job in Germany I did all the preparations. I expect that on Monday, Pohara receives the passport and on Tuesday he will contact you from Cologne.
5. From the certain sources I received information that, 3 days ago, Mr. Adil Zulfikarpašić was on reception by the President of the United States, Mr. Clinton. Also, I found out that Adil and Sefer or Adil and Šiber communicate on daily basis.

Mr. President, I am really not familiar with all the schemes, that is why I send you the information. They are most certainly reliable. The statements of the chief soldiers in the last couple of days are not by chance, on the contrary, they enjoy support from Adil. He allegedly promised to give a substantial amount of money for weapon and equipment that would head for Bosnia. I am not sure for the second issue, because, one weapon trader praised for the job in front of me. The business failed after all because Adil didn't give the money. 7 days ago, Zulfikarpašić gave an interview in Frankfurt to the Globus newspapers (the Zagreb edition), which is expected in the following edition. In this interview, he accuses you for the sufferings of our people and for the problems of Bosnia. I am not familiar with his final goal, but the analysis say that he cares about agreement and co-existence between our Muslim people and the Croats. In that sense, it would be good that you keep the military command Sefer-Šiber-Divjak in sight. For the behaviour that he has, Adil promised Šiber that he would help him to obtain the general's rank and high position after the war. Knowing his /illegible/ character for a short time, I think this is not so far from the truth. I kindly ask that you take my information and concern for you as support and honest intention to persist and succeed. You are on the path of God. You will succeed.  
Selam!

Jasmin

(Note: text was underlined by the author of the document)

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**  
*GOVERNMENT / VLADA*  
**PRIME MINISTER / PREDSEDNIK**

February 24, 1993

The Honorable Senator  
Mr. Joseph Biden  
Chairman, European Affairs Subcommittee  
of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee  
United States Congress  
205 Russell Office Building  
Washington, DC 20010

Dear Senator Biden:

This letter concerns the testimony of Mr. Haris Silajdzic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the European Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on February 18, 1993. As Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I wish to advise you that Mr. Silajdzic's testimony as a whole did not represent fully the position of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The position was established in its November program by consensus in the Government and the Presidency functioning as Parliament. As set forth in this program, the Government fully supports the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance and Lord David Owen, and their pursuit of a negotiated solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We seek to achieve a just peace through this process. In our view, a just peace includes: (1) the return of all refugees and displaced persons who wish to return to their homes, (2) the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to try those accused of war crimes, (3) non-recognition of changes achieved by aggression, including ethnic cleansing; and (4) payment of reparations to those who were damaged as a result of the war.

The Government has also determined that Bosnia and Herzegovina can be politically arranged as a decentralized state. The proposals concerning establishment of provinces are an acceptable solution if not based only on ethnic principles, but rather on a combination of ethnic, geographic, historic, economic and other principles developed through negotiations. Our program includes full equality for the three peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croats, Muslims and Serbs, as recognized by the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

*Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations*  
*PO Box 1896 / New York, NY 10163 / (212) 867-6743 phone / (212) 867-5412 fax*

Senator Joseph Biden  
February 24, 1993  
Page 2

The Government has also agreed upon a delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina which is empowered to negotiate with other countries on all matters that concern our foreign relations. The delegation which represents the Republic in discussions with other countries is a delegation made up of two Croats, two Muslims and two Serbs. The issues concerning internal matters, including internal political arrangement under auspices or with necessary arbitration of the international community through United Nations or the European Community, are to be negotiated among its three peoples. This is the case with Vance/Owen peace talks, where three parties negotiate and no one party is the Government.

I therefore ask you to keep in mind that the testimony of Mr. Silajdzic on the current stage of the Vance/Owen talks and on the national history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is representative of the view of some Muslim members of the Government, and not of the Government as a whole.


Furthermore, please be advised that the mandate of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic as President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina expired on December 20, 1992. He is presently without constitutional authority to act in that capacity. The Presidency, and not the President alone, is the representative body of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the Presidency can invoke constitutional emergency powers, not the President alone. The President is merely *primus inter pares*. Like Mr. Silajdzic, Mr. Izetbegovic does not speak for the Presidency as a whole with respect to the current stage of the Vance/Owen talks, but only as one Muslim member of the Presidency.

I regret having to be so blunt in light of the immense suffering of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims. I am nevertheless compelled as Prime Minister to bring the foregoing facts to your attention.

My Government welcomes the support of the United States and we are very grateful for such help. I will be available to discuss these matters and other issues of concern to you.

May I request your kind assistance in circulating this letter to your honorable colleagues in the United States Senate and entering this letter as a record of your esteemed Committee.

Sincerely,



Mile Akmadzic  
Prime Minister

cc: President of the United States  
President of the Security Council of the United Nations

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**  
**GOVERNMENT / VLADA**  
**PRIME MINISTER / PREDsjedNIK**

March 1, 1993

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali  
Secretary-General  
United Nations  
New York

Excellency:

I have the honor to present to you the attached letter, dated February 24, 1993, addressed to Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee of the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

The purpose of my letter was to inform the Committee about the position of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the Vance/Owen peace talks, which is often confused with the position of the Muslim part of the Government. The issues concerning internal matters of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including internal political arrangement under auspices or with necessary arbitration of the international community, are to be negotiated among its three peoples: Croats, Muslims and Serbs. While the Government as a whole supports the Vance/Owen peace process, there is no single position of the Government on the current stage of the Vance/Owen talks. Each of the three negotiating parties has its own position on the proposal as it currently stands.

I also advised the Committee that the mandate of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic as President of the Presidency had expired. This is to demonstrate the immediate need for the international community to assist, not only in protecting Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also in assuring that the country is governed in accordance with its democratic and constitutional principles.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 143, and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,



Mile Akmadzic  
Prime Minister

*Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations  
PO Box 1896 / New York, NY 10163 / (212) 867-6743 phone / (212) 867-5412 fax*

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

No. 13-42-14/93  
Sarajevo, February 25th 1993

## GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SARAJEVO

Case: putting the districts of Mostar and Livno into operation

Under the provisions of Article 19 of the Decree with legal power on Education and Work of Districts (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 12/92, 14/92, 18/92 and 21/92) the District Assembly educates the district presidency. At the same time, Article 60 of this provision regulates that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina appoints the Republic's district commission whose main task is to execute the preparations and organize the constitution of district assembly.

In accordance with stated provisions the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has brought a decision on educating of Republic's district commissions (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina no. 16/92 and 19/92) which, among other things, indicated that the Republic's district commission shall function as a district presidency until the constitution of the district presidency.

According to latest information from the districts, received before February 25th 1993, district authorities were formed in districts: Bihać, Goražde, Tuzla and Zenica, while in districts Banja Luka, Doboje, Sarajevo and Travnik Republic's commissions appointed for these districts perform the function of presidencies of these districts.

Mostar district for the areas of municipalities: Bileća, Čapljina, Čitluk, Gacko, Grude, Jablanica, Konjic, Mostar, Ljubinje, Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Nevesinje, Posušje, Stolac and Trebinje and Livno district for the area of the municipalities Glamoč, Kupres, Livno, Prozor, Tomislavgrad have not yet been put in function.

Due to known reasons, primarily political in nature relating to the establishment of the so-called "Herceg-Bosna" authorities, the constitution of Mostar and Livno districts in accordance with the applicable laws of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been immediately started.

However, with an aim of putting these districts into function the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a letter to Mr. Mate Boban on September 27th 1992. which regards the question of putting these districts into operation, and inter alia states: "... at the beginning of the war, in very complex conditions in the Mostar and Livno region the provisional authorities of Herceg-Bosna have been formed.

It was determined by the Agreement of July 27th 1992 between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the interim government of Herceg-Bosna shall comply with the legislation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore we suggest that in order to ensure uniform practice of organizing war authority throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina you initiate the proceedings of relabeling of Herceg-Bosna temporary authority for the regions of Mostar and Livno into district authorities of Mostar and Livno district, in accordance with that provision. At the same time, by this letter it is requested from Mr. Boban to propose candidates for the most responsible positions in the organs and bodies of those districts.

According to the findings of this Ministry there was no official response or position on this issue received from Mr. Mate Boban. For these reasons, the Ministry of Defense is re-launching the initiative for districts Mostar and Livno to be put into function, and proposes to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with Article 56 and 60. of the regulation, to forward to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina the proposal on the adoption of a

d e c i s i o n

1. Districts Mostar and Livno are being put into function with March 1st 1993.
2. With the aim of constituting the district Assembly of Mostar and Livno and other organs the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is appointing the Republic's commissions for stated districts, with three members from among members of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the areas of these districts.

DEPUTY MINISTER

Munib Bisić

/ signed and stamped /

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL**

Mostar, 27 February

STATEMENT FROM AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ OF THE HZ H-B /CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA/

At an emergency session held on 27 February 1993, the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna discussed the security and military situation following the latest incidents by the BH Army in Central Bosnia, which might lead to renewed fighting between the Croats and the Muslims and a deterioration in the overall situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Consistently pursuing the struggle against the Chetnik aggressor, the HVO of the HZ H-B has concluded that the Muslim forces are provoking incidents in areas where they are not engaging the aggressor's forces. Symptomatically, this is happening in areas where a lot of their troops and technical equipment are being concentrated. Thus, in Central Bosnia the Muslim forces number about 25,000 soldiers, while at the same time they lack manpower to defend Sarajevo and the whole of Eastern Bosnia, and the towns in the Bosna river valley are not secured and the Serb forces have already captured them or are persistently attacking them.

In assessing the overall situation, the HVO of the HZ H-B has arrived at the following conclusions:

1. Simultaneously with the incidents involving the BH Army, some ministers from the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting independently or in association with parts of the BH Army Military Command, are arbitrarily taking over the competences of the legitimate authorities and are making moves that objectively represent elements of a classic coup d'etat. For that purpose, lower levels of command in the BH Army are being used /several lines illegible/, attempts to establish a parallel government in areas where provisional government bodies are already functioning, as is the case in the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. People responsible for such activities are bypassing the leaders of the SDA /Democratic Action Party/ in the field, particularly in areas where those leaders have achieved the necessary level of cooperation with representatives of the Croatian people and with the already established forms of provisional executive authority, as is the case in Mostar and several other places in the HZ H-B. This is being done despite the evident fact that such cooperation has resulted in successful resistance to the aggressor.

2. The HVO of the HZ H-B is warning the general public, the Muslim people and their political leaders that such attempts by the coup forces within the legitimate leadership of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are made, as a rule, when the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and leader of the Muslim people, Mr Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, is out of the country participating in internationally supervised negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact tells a lot.

Considering the common goal of the Muslim and Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the freedom and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HVO of the HZ H-B believes that the legitimate authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all political stakeholders from among the Muslim people and Mr Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ personally, must declare their position on the following:

- Is there a coup going on, at which several attempts have been made by individuals from the BH Army leadership and their followers from various government bodies?

- Can incidents and the behaviour of individual units of the BH Army be stopped, because they are evidently undermining the common struggle of the Croats and the Muslims and are causing serious tension between the two peoples? (The latest such incident occurred on the 26th of this month near Bugojno when, despite the joint Croatian-Muslim escort of a convoy, BH Army troops seized a large amount of food, valuable equipment, weapons and 80 million HRD /Croatian dinars/ in cash, which was intended for the defenders of Central Bosnia).

- How long will the media in Sarajevo, primarily RTV BiH /Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, ignore the fruits of the common struggle of the Croats and the Muslims and every successful move towards rapprochement between the national parties and political leaderships of the two peoples?

3. The HVO of the HZ H-B finds it essential for the improvement of the effectiveness of the common struggle against the aggressor and for the further development of Croatian-Muslim relations that there should be changes in the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this end, it recommends that the Defence Minister in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina suspend the Chief of the Main Staff, Mr Sefer HALILOVIĆ.

4. The HVO of the H-B is of the view that the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been adopting illegitimate decisions for a while now, because the Prime Minister and ministers of Croatian ethnicity are not participating in their adoption. For this reason, the HVO and the Croatian people do not recognise the decisions by the incomplete Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the reasons for such a position of the HVO is a recent letter from the Minister for Energy, Mining and Industry in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Rusmir MAHMUTĆEHAJIĆ, with countersignatures from the Minister of the Interior, Mr Jusuf PUŠINA, and the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Sefer HALILOVIĆ, addressed to the Commander of the BH Army 4th Corps in Mostar. Elements of a classic coup d'etat are visible in this letter, under its innocent (economic-related) heading, because military units are being asked to form the new civilian authorities and appoint leading people in businesses.

5. The HVO of the HZ H-B views as very harmful and dangerous attempts by such forces to blame the Croats or to apportion the blame between the Serb aggressor and the Croats, although everyone is aware of the contribution the Croats and the HVO have made, not just in the joint liberation operations but also in providing assistance to Muslim units in different parts of the Republic. The Command of the BH Army Tuzla Corps, which has received considerable defence aid in recent days despite difficult access through Central Bosnia, might testify to this.

6. In the light of the latest developments, the HVO of the HZ H-B has decided to close the border crossings in its territory towards the Republic of Croatia for all cargo and people in the service of the BH Army. This decision has been made in consultation with the Regional Board of the Mostar SDA and will be rescinded in consultation with them.

7. Because of the ongoing blackout in the Sarajevo media on reports from the HZ H-B and the positive results of cooperation between the Croats and the Muslims in the Tuzla, Mostar and Usora areas, the HVO of the HZ H-B demands that the media in the Republic demonstrate a professional attitude towards such reports, and that this statement be published in its entirety.

8. These views and measures of the HVO of the HZ H-B are directed at encouraging those forces among the Muslim people that are in favour of cooperating with the Croats. At the same time, their aim is also to stop those sowing dissent and advocating intolerant political options, which we are certain the international community will never accept or support.

The HVO of the HZ-HB takes this opportunity to stress once again its full readiness to cooperate in all fields and to settle all disputed issues through negotiation. In this regard, humanitarian and other organisations of both peoples are called upon to promote peace and restore trust.

President, HVO HZ H-B  
Jadranko PRLIĆ  
/signed and stamped/



Crest of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Government

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Sarajevo, March 3rd 1993  
 Number:

ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HEZEGOVINA  
 4th CORPS COMMAND  
 Mr. Arif Pašalić, Commander  
 MOSTAR

Mr. Pašalić

We are sending you the conclusion of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the implementation of emergency measures for the purpose of putting the district of Mostar and Livno into operation. We are asking you to, in cooperation with the Security Services Center Sarajevo and other political actors in this field, make contacts and consultations on the election of three commissioners from among the members of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (list attached), so that these commissioners could carry out the necessary activities in order to activate the district of Mostar and Livno.

In addition to the above conclusion and list, we will send you an instruction on the application of regulations on organization and functioning of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war conditions.

Sincerely,

Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Dr. Zlatko Lagumdžija  
 signature /illegible/  
 (official seal with the inscription in Latin and Cyrillic - Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo, the Crest of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

copy delivered to:

CSB Mostar  
 (Mr. Ramo Masleša, Chief)  
 -Mr. Jadranko Prlić  
 (commissioner of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 ARBiH  
 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Command  
 Number: 01-1398/93  
 Mostar February 26<sup>th</sup>.1993.

Defence of the Republic  
 Military secret  
 Confidential  
 U R G E N T!

Delivers information  
 Response to the request.-

To the Headquarters of Military Command Operational Sector Republic of  
 BiH  
 To: Sefer Halilovic

Regarding your act nr. 14/75-14 from the February 25<sup>th</sup>.1993. we inform you on following:

1. Commander of the First Mostar Brigade did not introduce me to the information which he received from you. On my request for the mentioned information he replied that he received it from you and that it's for him only.
2. On the day of February 27<sup>th</sup>.1993. ARBiH 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Main Coordinator for the logistical security on the relation ARBiH 4<sup>th</sup> Corps and SDA Center at Zagreb (Hasan Cengic) delivered the documentation and he doesn't want to coordinate any longer because of the parallel distribution of the money by the VK headquarters.  
 Mr Orucevic Safet successfully performed major jobs for us until now regarding the entrance of the goods with HVO.
3. Please, you did not answer me in writing regarding my conversation to you about the behavior of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade Commander.
4. Regarding your act 02/16-104 from February 24<sup>th</sup>.1993. I inform you that the President of the regional committee for Herzegovina Mr. Zijo Demirovic publicly stated that the military leaders are engaged in politics and that applies to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade Commander who is publicly saying that he received a power from Sarajevo (ARBiH headquarters and Government) for the organization of the administration and the economy at the Mostar territory.

I am of the opinion that you should clear up the situation and inform us in writing what is behind the Mr. Hujdur Midhat's visit as a 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade Commander which he performed at the ARBiH headquarters and BiH. Government.

Commanders of the 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade "Suad Alic", Brigade "Neretvica" and Brigade "Neretva" are already expressing disapproval regarding the presentation of medal "Zlatni Ljiljan\*" and awarding the money to the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade.

Commander  
 Mr Arif Pasalic  
 "Signed"

"Round seal"

**Excerpt from the tape recorded session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the parliamentary parties that is presidents or party representatives of parties held on March 10th 1993. The discussion was led with regards to the preparation for the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was supposed to comment on the Vance Owen plan.**

IZETBEGOVIĆ: I would like to have a useful conversation. ... So, are you familiar with the contents of the military document that was signed in New York, or do you think it would be good to read the introduction? Well, then it will be brought and we will read it ....

HALILOVIĆ: Mr. President, gentlemen, I would just give certain opinions related to the military paper ....

It comes out from it that one of the basic problems of the entire, even the military part of the agreement, is the fact that the solution to the war would not follow as a consequence of basic military victory over the aggressor, which would cause that the party who actualized the massacres and other forms of genocide against the Muslim and Croatian people, to remain in the role also of the organizer of the part of government in the Republic of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Especially in three provinces. They as such would further pose a great threat to the security of citizens who support Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims and Croats in particular.

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2. Freeze the activities of political parties and form a patriotic front of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the defense of sovereign state.

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4. On the political agenda, finally resolve the most important issue with the Republic of Croatia, and that is the logistics for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that is the armed forces.

5. At the international level to animate all friendly countries to exert pressure on Croatia to drop support for "Herceg-Bosna" and work actively to its abolishing.

6. To ensure that the port Ploče and direction Ploče - Mostar-Sarajevo - Zenica is in constant function for the needs of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it is necessary, engage international forces for this cause and if needed secure that space with our own forces.

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**Charles R. Shrader: The Muslim-Croat civil war in Central Bosnia, a military history 1992-1994**

## Prologue

In October, 1992, Jajce, an important town northwest of Travnik on the main road to Banja Luka, had been under siege by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) for nearly five months. A mixed garrison of Croatian Defense Council and Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina soldiers defended the town and its two important power stations. They were supported from Travnik over a tenuous, narrow, twenty-five-mile-long corridor through Serb-held territory. Reinforcements, food, ammunition, and other vital supplies were brought forward by truck, usually at night. Constantly under fire, the nightly convoys that snaked from Travnik along the primitive road through rough mountain terrain barely sufficed to keep Jajce's beleaguered garrison and civilian population alive. On October 27, 1992, the BSA's I Krajina Corps acted to end the siege of Jajce with an all-out attack preceded by several air strikes. The following day, Jajce's HVO defenders evacuated their sick and wounded along with the Croat civilian residents before abandoning the town that evening. The Muslim soldiers and civilians soon followed when, on October 29, the BSA entered the town and began a program of "ethnic cleansing" that resulted in what has been called "the largest and most wretched single exodus" of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.'

For many of the thirty thousand refugees who fled over the mountains or down the by-then notorious “Vietnam Road” toward the relative safety of Travnik, it was not the first time they had been forced to flee before the BSA. Many had fled earlier to Jajce from Banja Luka, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kotor Varos, and other towns and villages in the Bosanska-Krajina region. For the most part, the HVO soldiers and Croat refugees who fled Jajce filtered down into the relative safety of Herzegovina or even into Croatia itself. The twenty thousand or so Muslim refugees, on the other hand, had no place else to go and therefore remained in Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, or villages near Bila and Zenica. Amidst mutual accusations of having abandoned the defense of the city, both the HVO and the ABiH were forced to repair the substantial military damage suffered while their respective civilian authorities were faced with the problems caused by a major influx of refugees into the central Bosnia area.

Therein lay the seeds of the coming conflict. The Muslim refugees from Jajce posed both a problem and an opportunity for Alija Izetbegovic’s government. The problem was where to relocate them. The opportunity was a military one: the large number of military age males, well motivated for revenge against the Serbs and equally ready to take on the Croats, provided a pool from which the ABiH could fill up existing units and form new mobile ones that would then be available to undertake offensive missions. Until the last months of 1992, the lack of mobile units trained and motivated for offensive operations had prevented the ABiH from mounting a sustained offensive action—against the BSA or anyone else.<sup>2</sup> However, the influx of refugees from Jajce, combined with large numbers of military-age refugees from eastern Bosnia and the arrival of fundamentalist Muslim fighters (mujahideen) from abroad, made it possible for the ABiH to form such mobile units and to contemplate offensive action on a large scale for the first time.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, contrary to the commonly accepted view, it was the fall of Jajce at the end of October, 1992, not the publication of the details of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in January, 1993, that precipitated the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia. It was the Muslims, who had both the means and motive to strike against their erstwhile ally. The United Nations-backed VOPP proposed the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces, each of which—except for the one surrounding Sarajevo—would be dominated by one of the three principal ethnic groups. The plan’s details were announced in December, 1992, and the supporting map was released the following month. The common but nevertheless erroneous argument is that the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia arose from the Bosnian Croats’ premature and ruthless efforts to implement the plan in the central Bosnian provinces assigned to them.<sup>4</sup> However, that argument rests on faulty *post hoc propter hoc* reasoning unsupported by convincing factual evidence as to means, motive, and opportunity. Nor does it take into account the time required to plan and execute an offensive campaign. Open conflict between the Muslims and Croats in Central Bosnia broke out on January 14, 1993, just two days after the VOPP cantonal map was finalized in Geneva but two and one-half months after Jajce fell.

On the other hand, the temporal and causative connections between the massive influx of Muslim refugees into central Bosnia following Jajce's fall and the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict are clear. Their disruptive presence in central Bosnia's towns and villages, their incorporation into the ABiH's new mobile offensive units, and the urgent need to find them living space are well-known and widely accepted facts. The role they played as the catalyst for the Muslim-Croat conflict was pointed out by Franjo Nakić, the former HVO Operative Zone Central Bosnia chief of staff, and many other witnesses appearing before the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-

And many other witnesses appearing before the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. As Nakić succinctly stated, „The Croats and Muslims, the local ones, would never have entered into a conflict were it not for the influx of these refugees who sought a space for themselves, having lost their own in Western and Eastern Bosnia.<sup>5</sup>


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
Charles R. Shrader,


The Muslim-Croat civil war in Central Bosnia, a military history 1992-1994,  
Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga Zagreb - 2004

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
1. Edward Vulliamy, *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War*, 179–80.
2. The ABiH as it existed in late 1992 was composed almost exclusively of forces raised on the old Yugoslavian National Army Territorial Defense pattern. Its units were generally tied to a given geographical area and were not "mobile" in the sense that an American or British infantry battalion is mobile (i.e., available for deployment outside the immediate vicinity of its home station).
3. The infamous 7th Muslim Motorized Brigade, composed in part of mujahideen and the principal assault unit of the ABiH's III Corps, was formed on November 17, 1992, and the mobile 17th and 27th Krajina Mountain Brigades were formed from Muslim refugees in Croatia in November, 1992, and June, 1993, respectively and subsequently moved into Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4. The unsubstantiated opinion that the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia was precipitated by Croat insistence on early implementation of the VOPP surfaced early in the conflict. For example, Lt. Col. Robert A. Stewart, commander of the British UNPROFOR battalion in the Lasva Valley, recorded in his diary that he had expressed to the Equerry to the Prince of Wales his belief that "the HVO were causing problems in order to force the Muslims to agree to the Geneva Peace Plan" (Stewart diary, Jan. 29, 1993, sec. 3, 12, KC D56/1 and KC D104/1). It has also been promoted by journalists (e.g., Peter Maas in *Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War*, n 286); by human rights organizations (e.g., Helsinki Watch [Human Rights Watch] in *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 2:379–81); and in other Western publications (e.g., Jane's Information Group, *Jane's Bosnia Handbook*, sec. 2, 3–4).
5. Franjo Nakić, Kordić-Cerkez trial testimony, Apr. 13, 2000. Nakić was chief of staff of the HVO's OZCB from December, 1992, to December, 1996.


















- V
- ODNOSI HVO i ABIH - SIJEČANJ 1993**
- 1- Sukobi u Uskoplju (Gornji Vakuf) od 11-23. siječ 1993
  - 2- Napad A BiH na HVO (Busovača, Kiseljak)- prost HVO-a rasječen na dva dijela od 25-29. siječnja
- HVO - ABIH RELATIONS - JANUARY 1993**
- 1- Conflict in Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf) - January 11 1993
  - 2 A BiH attack on HVO (Busovača, Kiseljak)- HVO cut in two pieces - January 25-29, 1993

HVO  
A-BiH  
VRS




SARAJEVO, 2004. Stanislav Praljak




VI  
**NAPAD ABiH NA HVO – TRAVANJ 1993**  
 1- Konjic; 13.4. 1993  
 2- Vitez; 15.4. 1993  
 3- U Zenica ABiH aroružava, zatvara i protjeruje HVO  
 4- Sovići-Doljani, 17.4. 1993  
 5- Pripremni napad na Mostar- Plan za napad


**ABiH ATTACK ON HVO, APRIL 1993**  
 1- Konjic; April 13, 1993  
 2- Vitez; April, 15, 1993  
 3- In Zenica ABiH disarming, detaining and expelling HVO  
 4- Sovići-Doljani, April 17, 1993  
 5- Preparatory attack on Mostar- Plan for attack


S.R.P.M., 2009. Suvodan Praljak




септембар 1999. Станово Рогољан














**Structure and arrangement of  
OZ SB /OPERATIONAL ZONE  
CENTRAL BOSNIA /  
April 1993**

**STRENGTH IN NUMBERS OF OZ CB:**

1. Travnik brigade approximately 800 soldiers
  2. Brigade Frankopan approximately 600 soldiers
  3. Stjepan Tomašević Brigade approximately 700 soldiers
  4. Viteška Brigade approximately 1100 soldiers
  5. N. Šubić Zrinski Brigade approximately 1400 soldiers
  6. B. Josip Jelačić Brigade approximately 1900 soldiers
  7. Jure Francetić Brigade approximately 850 soldiers
  8. II. Zenička Brigade approximately 400 soldiers (in formation)
  9. Kotromanić Brigade approximately 600 soldiers
  10. Bobovac Brigade approximately 700 soldiers
  11. 111. XP Brigade approximately 1400 soldiers
  12. 110. Brigade approximately 650 soldiers
- 4. /Light transport rocket division/Ltrd AAD approximately 170 soldiers, MTD / Mixed artillery division / approximately 170 soldiers
  - 4. bVP / battalion MP / approximately 300 soldiers, PPN / Unit for special purposes / Vitezovi 60 soldiers
  - LOB / logistic base / approximately 150 soldiers, West OZ CB approximately 50 soldiers

**TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 12,000 SOLDIERS  
THEREOF:**

- **In Lašvansko-Lepenička valley approximately 7,400 soldiers**
- **Outside Lašvansko-Lepenička valley approximately 4,600 soldiers**


**Ratio of forces  
ABiH and HVO  
March 1993.**

**NUMBER OF BRIGADES OF BH ARMY  
DIRECTED TOWARDS LAŠVANSKO-LEPENIČKA  
VALLEY**

- From 3. Corps 15 Brigades with approximately 45,000 soldiers
- From 6. Corps 2 Brigades with approximately 4,000 soldiers
- From 1. Corps 2 Brigades with approximately 4,000 soldiers
- From squad for special purposes approximately 1000 soldiers

**TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 54,000 SOLDIERS**

**Ratio of forces in Lašvansko-Lepenička valley 7 : 1**






Chief  
Zičro Suljević


LEGEND:

Forces A RBiH

Forces VRS

Forces HVO





Scale 1 : 100,000  
0km

3

6

10

9

Number	ABIA Unit
1	1HG 3 Corps
2	314 Brigade
3	305 Brigade
4	306 Brigade
5	17th Brigade
6	312 Brigade
7	304 Brigade
8	307 Brigade
9	317 Brigade
10	333 Brigade
11	302 Brigade
12	7th Muslim Brigade
13	309 Brigade
14	318 Brigade
15	319 Brigade
16	304 Brigade
17	301 Brigade
18	303 Brigade

Number	HVO Unit
1	1HG Central Bosnia
2	Viteški Brigade
3	Niški Sused
4	Zinski Brigade (BDB)
5	Špičkov
6	Tomislavci Bivši
7	Novi Grad / Franjevac
8	Bunjevac / Jeleč
9	Dr Anis Šarić (BVC)
10	Bok (Muslims)
11	Members of the Army (Muslims)
12	Bukovica Brigade
13	111 Brigade


Abbreviations of various locations with Capital letters  
 in blue  
 Abbreviations of various units in blue  
 in red  
 Abbreviations of various units in red


17. Defence of Vitez after April 20, 1993















MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
END: "E21F"

COMMANDER'S WORKING MAP  
BEGINNING: 14.00, 05.11.'93



LEGEND:

- Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Chetniks
- Ustashas
- Line to be taken

COMMANDER  
AMIR KUBURA

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
Supreme Command Staff of the RBH Armed Forces  
Sarajevo

Office of the Chief of Staff

No. 111-1  
Date: 28 January 1993

To the Fourth Corps Commander

We have information that a small part of the RBH Army, Police and other authorities in the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Pazarići and Tarčin and probably in other areas within the Fourth Corps zone of authority, have fully sided with the Great-Croatia policy and are implementing orders received from the leadership of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna thus directly undermining our /illegible/ struggle for a united and democratic RBH and, both directly and indirectly, bewildering and confusing some of our members. This refers in particular to Dr. R. HADŽIHUSEINOVIĆ, Chairman of the Konjic Municipality; Jasmin GUSKA, Chief of the Konjic Police; Tufo REFA, Chief of the Hadžići Police; Midhad CEROVAC, Commander of the 7th Konjic Brigade.

To get an overall picture of the situation as a whole and to plan the adequate measures, I hereby

O R D E R

1. To visit Igman as soon as possible and to talk to the IGMAN OG Commander Dževad RAĐA, to Zulfikar ALIŠPAGA and others.
2. To engage all the other available sources to find out the truth and the overall situation. The truth shall be the sole criterion in this matter.
3. To study the problem in all its aspects and do all that you are authorised to; to propose any necessary personnel changes to be made by the RBH Army Supreme Command, the Ministry of the Interior, the RBH Presidency or the party.
4. If necessary, to propose criminal proceedings or to plan special actions for which funds and manpower will be provided in due time.
5. Check whether similar phenomena have also occurred elsewhere.

CHIEF  
SUPREME COMMAND  
RBH ARMED FORCES

S. HALILOVIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
BH ARMY, 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS  
7<sup>TH</sup> BRIGADE "SUAD ALIĆ" KONJIC  
Number: 02-211/93  
Date: 23<sup>rd</sup> of March, 1993  
/stamp of receipt/

4<sup>th</sup> corps Mostar

Special operative report

We inform you that the condition in our zone of responsibility is the following:

- 150 HVO members are captured
- town is blocked
- life in the city is paralyzed
- we continue with arrestment

Commander  
Cerovac Mithad

4<sup>th</sup> corps – communication centre

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL  
 HERCEG BOSNA BRIGADE KONJIC

DEFENSE  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFID.

Date: 24 March 1993

HVO MOSTAR  
 COMMAND OF THE OZ S/E H  
 M O S T A R

Report for 24 March 1993

Following the departure of the joint commission from Mostar, we started with implementation of the issued order. However, the other side did not comply with any of the points mentioned in the order. The Bosnia army fiercely attacked our positions from the early morning. We returned as much as it was necessary to keep our defense line. In Konjic, our MP and the command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion have been blocked. In the city, our flags are being burned and our people arrested. We received an information that our people in the Ivan-sedlo barracks and the other arrested people have not yet been released.

During the night, following the issuance of the order, they regrouped and planned an attack (entire night they used coded radio-communication). Early this morning our people in the village of Strgovnica were disarmed and after that, their forces moved in direction of our positions in that area.

On the previous day, they did not return one of our wounded and two arrested persons though we had sent a medical team to take them over. Today, they continued that practice. This morning, they stopped our medical vehicle that was transferring a wounded woman. On our intervention, the vehicle was allowed to proceed, but on its way back to Klis it was stopped at every check-point and the personnel was maltreated. As of that time, they are not allowing passage to the medical vehicle so that we are not able to transfer our wounded people to medical institutions. Since early this morning, the entire area of responsibility of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion is under attack. Also attacked is Pokojište where two of our people have been wounded. For already the third day, Vratna Gora is surrounded and is being taken under fire from Krušćica. Villages of Požetva, Plavza, Buščak and Prijeslop which are located close to the border area with the Prozor municipality are under constant fire and attack.

In the village of Jasenik, they arrested all our soldiers and civilians of Croatian nationality (around 50 of them) and detained them in a house close to a mosque whereby they probably thought that we would shell the mosque and kill our own people, something we, of course, did not do.

In the village of ?števići, they captured around 50 women and children and detained



them in a house hoping to use them as a human shield. In the village of Trusina, they set up a check point wherefrom they are opening fire. In Seonica, we have surrounded their forces but in the night we cannot control the huge area and prevent arrival of fresh reinforcement. From the villages of Podhum, Parsović and Goran our forces are pushed away towards Goransko polje so we are retreating towards the junction in the direction of Butrović polje. Around 400-500 Bosnian army members have been sent in the direction of the village of Vrce. The village was taken under mortar fire from Čelebići. Kostajnica was taken under fire from an unknown location in Jablanica. Falanovo brdo and Kostajnica were taken under fire from Ostrožac throughout the day, whereby only civilian targets were shot at. Luckily, there were no wounded or killed people in those two villages. Artillery weapons (10 pieces of mortars of 82 and 102 mm) were brought to Ostrožac from the Suad Alić brigade in Konjic whereby they weakened their positions against Chetniks on the front line in Konjic. /The village of/ Obri was taken under fire from the village of Gorica, but that place was neutralized. Strong fresh forces are being deployed via the village of Repovac towards the villages of Gornje Višnjevice and Donje Višnjevice. We pulled out the civilian population from those villages as well as from Mrkosović and Budišnje ravni to the area of Kostajnica though several old women remained there.

We received an unverified information from Konjic that the brigade Suad Alić had been tasked to defeat us militarily on all positions around Konjic (that will say on the military lines towards Chetniks), but some of subordinated people do not want to carry out the order and they allegedly want an end to the conflict.

Muslim politicians are demanding from the army an end to the conflict but the army is not under their influence. According to the earlier information, the objective of the Bosnian army forces was to remove Muslim political and civilian leadership and now, at the end, they are carrying out only the military plan about military take over of the municipality and the set up of a new Muslim authority.

So far, we had 4 killed and 2 wounded persons in the Klis area. We are currently negotiating a cease fire but we are also following their report for the BiH radio that is giving the opposite information. They are informing public opinion in a worse possible way with many false information (reports are being sent by Haso Hakalović with whom we are negotiating the cease fire) so we have doubts about their honesty.

FIRST BATTALION KLIS

Željko Mlikota

12 7 2000/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH MILITARY SECRET  
 Strictly confidential

/handwritten: 43<sup>rd</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/  
 02/1/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH MILITARY SECRET  
 IGMAN OG /Operations Group/ COMMAND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
 Igman, 16 April 1993

/stamp:/

<p>4<sup>th</sup> Corps          COMMAND          No. 02/1-3173/93          Date: 17 April 1993</p>
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COMBAT REPORT

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS  
 M O S T A R

During the day in the Konjic area fighting has continued throughout the municipality. Since a piece of equipment was not in working order, I do not have much information from Klis. We received a piece of equipment from Mt. Igman and re-established communication. I have been informed that there are no major problems there and that the Neretvica Brigade is fighting the aggressor HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ successfully.

In the area of the 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade, the situation is as follows:

The Zlatar feature is encircled and operations continue. The HVO forces are forcefully requesting assistance and, with regard to this feature, their strength is ebbing. From this feature, however, they are relentlessly shelling the town and all the Muslim villages.

We have introduced fresh forces along the Podorašac – Ovčari village axis and succeeded in lifting the blockade on the village and helping the civilians. According to the report, the sector south-west of the viaduct towards Zlatar has been mopped up.  
 - Our forces have continued their operations along the Homolje village – Repovica axis and are currently mopping up Galjevo village. The HVO forces there are putting up fierce resistance and two of our soldiers were killed there. Operations will continue until the end because taking control of Repovica is a condition for the movement towards Babin Nos. The Zlatar feature dominates everything and the operations aimed at taking control of this feature are commanded by CEROVAC, who is very slow, which affects everything else.

The HVO forces have been pushed back from Ovčari and Borovac villages and withdrew to the DC /dispatch centre/ warehouse, towards the town. The HVO forces are blocked from the direction of the town by the VP /Military Police/ forces under the command of ŠAHIĆ, who commands the battalion with much success.

- The Babin Nos feature is blocked and the operation to capture it will be launched only after Zlatar and Repovica.

- It is interesting that, via communications, the Konjic HVO is pleading for help, which has been promised from Kreševo and Kiseljak. Ambushes have been laid on these routes. Incidentally, your address to the public has met with positive reception, and /word/s/ missing/ said quite openly what the Croats are doing.

UNTIL FINAL VICTORY!!!

PNŠ /Assistant Chief of Staff/ FOR ONP /Operations  
 and Training/  
 Esad RAMIĆ

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 4TH CORPS COMMAND  
 Reg. no. : 01-3191/93  
 Mostar, 17.04.1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 Strictly confidential  
 URGENT!

ORDER

ADDRESSEE: ALL UNITS OF THE 4TH CORPS

Based on the newly-arisen situation, and the development of events and combat activities in the 4th Corps Area of Responsibility, and with the purpose of overcoming the situation and establishing a situation as favourable for us as possible,

I ISSUE THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

1. Units in contact with the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/ forces are obliged to continue their b/d /combat operations/, and all measures should be taken with that end.  
 The centre of activity should be focused on facilities and axes that endanger you the most.  
Initial successes should be maximally exploited.  
 Occupy dominant facilities (unless you have already occupied them) from which you will be able to control larger territories and wider areas.  
 Carry out mutual linking and coordination. Do the task of continuous reconnaissance and monitoring of axes from which the b/d are carried out toward your units.  
 Make the units logistically independent as much as possible. The focus should be on the technical security (this means the materiel equipment which ensures independent execution of combat operations).
2. Units that keep positions towards the Chetniks must not let them break through in their zones of responsibility.
3. As for the rest, adhere to the previously received orders and directions.
4. Immediately submit all information about captured members of the HVO and HV, as well as members who were killed.
5. You are also obliged to keep an accurate register about your wounded members, or members who were killed, and submit it to us.
6. Regular reports should be submitted every 6 hours, and special when need arises.

COMMANDER  
 Mr. Arif PAŠALIĆ  
 /signed/  
 /stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 BH ARMY  
 Command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army  
 Bradina, 17 April 1993, 2000 hours

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Combat report

To the Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps Mostar

Today, we continued with combat actions towards HVO in zones of both brigades in Konjic. The situation in the zone of 7<sup>th</sup> brigade is the following:

Pursuant to information, reported by the commander of the brigade.

/illegible/ today, in the s. Bradina from 1800 till 2000 hours, the situation is as follows:

The position of HVO "Stari Grad"

The object is surrounded. The forces of 7<sup>th</sup> brigade managed to capture 5 HVO soldiers. In the city, there are 11 combatants remaining, along with the commander Mikulić Dragan. /illegible/ the commander of the "resistant point" is the so called "Berko", who is not from Konjic and does not allow the combatants to surrender. Related to the weapon, we have got 2 PAMs, one MB 82 mm and one MB 120 mm. There is a mine field around the object.

The position of HVO "Zlatar"

The object is fully surrounded. It is surrounded by 60 men of "Crni Labudovi", members of the special MUP unit Hadžići and 80 soldiers of the 7<sup>th</sup> brigade Konjic. The object is rather resistant, well set and fortified. Within prevailed oppression of the object, we captured 20 soldiers of HVO, two deathmakers /"sijač smrti, interpreter's remark/ and one 20/3 on the vehicle. We shall continue with surrounding and oppression of the object, and, as the communications of HVO are concerned, we hear requests to surrender.

The position of HVO "Spiljani"

Our units disarmed and detained 15 members of HVO and the entire line towards Chetnicks in this area is held by the BH Army.

The position of HVO "Polje Bijela"

Our forces disarmed 15 HVO soldiers. These combatants asked to join the /illegible/ BIH. 8 of them are approved to pass and now, they are in BH Army. At this line, the line towards the Chetnicks is held exclusively by the BH Army. Yesterday, the HVO soldiers intensively shelled the unit that holds the line towards Chetnicks on s. Prevlje. /illegible/ captured our crew and took the line. I ordered from Igman, by the communications, to attack them and re-conquer the line. First battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> brigade executed my order and took the line by the morning of the day after, whereby the HVO soldiers were kept detained, in order to prevent the shelling of this area by HVO. Within this activity, we had two slightly wounded BH Army combatants.

The position of HVO "Babin nos"

It is the extremely well fortified object, wherefrom the city of Konjic has been brutally destroyed and civilians killed. The object is surrounded by the forces of BVB of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps and the forces of Konjic. We hit it by "samohotka" from the distance. The infantry does not want to move to /illegible/ till we liberate Zlatar and Repovica, wherefrom the object has been protected by the back fire. All significant objects in the city are controlled by us. Now, we have got 4 killed combatants in the 7<sup>th</sup> brigade, one heavily wounded and 5 slightly wounded soldiers. By Zuka, one killed and two wounded. One platoon of the brigade was surrounded at the stadium, however, during the night, they managed to reach the city.

The object of the HVO "S. Radešine"

The village is well fortified and presents the spot, wherefrom the HVO hits by 3-barrells weapon and MB 120 mm.

The village is surrounded by our forces from direction of s. Ribići, s. Seljani and s. Idbar. The commander of the brigade has been issued by substantial tasks, therefore the brigade continues with its activities. The commander of the Neretvica brigade reported the following:

Within an efficient action, the village of Trešnjevica has been disarmed and the inhabitants were left alone. The brigade forces took the Bušak object. We captured 40 000 rounds, 1 PAM of 12,7 mm and two MBs of 82 mm. Our forces liberated the villages of Lukšije, Šagolje, Prijeslop, Goransko Polje and Mirosavci. There are battles going on for the liberation of Buturović Polje. The "Neretvica" brigade managed to liberate the travel corridor Seonica-Buturović polje and Parsovići. There have been 3 killed combatants in the brigades so far and one wounded soldier. We are in the middle of forcing the Jablanica lake on direction Ostrožac-Gorica with intention to impact the S. Obrić. The brigade set 300 combatants on the line towards Prozor behind the positions of Here, Šćipe and Kute and does not allow the break of forces, invading from Prozor. We shall try to end our affaires as soon as possible and than move, with all our brigades, to perform a counterattack in two directions.

1. Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar

2. Konjic-Prozor-Rama

In addition, I inform you that we made an excellent cooperation with all brigades of OG "Igman". They assist us in men and MTS. The legendary Zuka stands out. HVO evidently cooperates with the Chetnicks. Proofs for it are 30 trucks with men and MTS brought to Hadžići and selective artillery activity on the Muslim villages from Borak. There is no doubt on the open aggression of Serbs and Croats on the sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. We shall persist till end in its liberation, East and West. Do not stop us, we kindly ask, and do not send any negotiators. However, we remind you that we would obey to every order, issued by you. We are in touch with your negotiations in Medias and you enjoy the full support of this nation.

If you want to send me any despatches, send them to CV OG "igman", wherefrom I send you reports as well.

Till the final victory"!!!

PNSS FOR ONP of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
Esad Ramić

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND  
HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
Bradina, 18 April 1993, 10:00 p.m.

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
TOP SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp impression/  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
No. 02/1-3257/93  
Date: 19 Apr. 1993

COMBAT REPORT

TO THE COMMANDER  
OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

For the whole day liberation operations have been led by our forces in Konjic. The situation is as follows:

Zlatar:

The facility was under siege and at 5:00 p.m. our forces managed to take control over the same. At Zlatar we captured: 2 mortars 120 mm, 1 cannon B-1, 1 multiple rocket launcher, 1 anti-aircraft cannon 20/3, and 2 heavy machine guns. We found no dead bodies in the facility because they managed to take the bodies with them while escaping.

The town:

The facility was also concentrically under siege and two hours ago it was taken. In the facility we captured 2 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns and one mortar 82 mm.

Our forces were efficient on the route village Galjevo – village Homolje – Repovci. The entire route with the point Repovci was liberated completely.

The villages of Ovčari and Vrbíci as powerful strongholds of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) were also liberated today. This means the liberation of the corridor Bradina – Konjic.

At this moment the "Neretvica" brigade is liberating the strongholds of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Pokoriši and Ceríci. By this, the entire right bank of the Neretva will be free.

The remaining strongholds on the left bank of the Neretva to be liberated are: Turija, Zabrđe, Pomol and Ljubinja. The action has been prepared and will be carried out tomorrow. All operations of both our brigades have vigorously started and are moving forward. Our goal is to liberate them as soon as possible and to help Jablanica and further.

According to your order, Mr. Mustafa Handžo, Bachelor of Political Science, has been designated for negotiations with the Chetniks on 23 April 1993 at Butmir.

ASSISTANT TO HEAD OF  
ONP SERVICE:

Mr. Mustafa Handžo

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/

HVO MAIN HEADQUARTERS  
Ref. number: 02-2/1-01-648/93  
Mostar, 18 April 1993.

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO:  
- CENTRAL BOSNIA OZ  
/OPERATIVE ZONE/  
- BOSANSKA POSAVINA OZ  
- NORTH-WEST  
HERZEGOVINA OZ  
- SOUTH-EAST  
HERZEGOVINA OZ

Cessation of hostilities  
between the BH Army and  
the HVO  
- Order -

On the basis of the conclusions reached after the talks between Mr. Mate Boban and Mr. Alija Izetbegović, which took place on 18 April 1993 in Zagreb, and in accordance with point 3 of the agreement,

#### I HEREBY ORDER

1. All HVO units shall immediately cease hostilities with BH Army units.
2. The exchange of prisoners, both soldiers and civilians, shall start immediately.
3. The wounded shall be cared for, regardless of which forces they belong to.
4. Reliable information shall be gathered concerning the protagonists of the conflict, the expulsion of the civilian population, the killing of captured soldiers and civilians, the torching of the houses and other buildings.
5. Contact shall be established with the BH Army command, asking them to implement the same order.
6. All HVO units are to be familiarised with this order.

CHIEF OF THE HVO MAIN HEADQUARTERS  
Brigadier  
Milivoj Petković  
/stamped/

ARMY OF THE R BiH  
Konjic, 22 April 1993

MILITARY SECRET  
TOP SECRET

COMBAT REPORT

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

During the day intensive attack operations have been carried out in Konjic. We gave up from the liberating of the villages Turija, Zabrdje and Zaslivlje until we liberate the village Radesine. After that the conditions will be created for the strike on the HVO forces from the hills in the direction Ljubina – Turija village and for the takeover of the lines towards chetnicks.

During the day the operation for liberation of the village Radesina was carried out and so far it went well and we had no casualties. The same is in the village Vrce, while in the village Budisina Ravna the situation is more difficult. There we had three killed fighters and the action goes more difficult.

Today, during a day, we listened secretly to the conversations of the chetnics' commander from Bijela. From those conversations it could be seen that they accept and take care of the HVO wounded men while, in return, they transport Serbs from Konjic over Turije. Now this corridor is cut through.

PNS (Assistant of Chief of Staff) for ONP  
Esad Ramic



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 /coat of arms/ CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 ZONE OF OPERATIONS SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA MOSTAR

	DEFENCE
Reference No: 01-2478/93	CLASSIFIED
Mostar, 22 <sup>nd</sup> April 1993	Strictly confidential

Report on the situation in Jablanica and Konjic

To: Main Staff of HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Mostar

- 1) On 20.04.1993 Joint Commission consisted of three representatives of OZ /zone of operations/ JIH /south-eastern Herzegovina/, four representatives from A BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina Army/ and representatives of UNPROFOR were sent to Jablanica and area of Konjic. On 20.04.1993 we managed to visit eight (8) our civilians and members of the HVO that were captured by the A BiH and are kept in the prison – in the building of former /?Commemoration Hall/. They were not mistreated but they are intimidated. Population (Croats) still lives in Jablanica but their rights are limited. Their apartments are subject to searches, weapons is being confiscated from them as well as all other objects that indicate anything Croatian. According to the statement of four Croats, who were in power before, there were no cases of people being beaten up. The members of A BiH are interested only in the apartments that the Croats are living in. People in Jablanice live in fear and there are 640 people in the town who would like to leave Jablanica. A BiH does not allow that because they believe that in case this happens the HVO artillery would shell Jablanica afterwards.
- On 20.04.1993 we managed to reach Ostožac and visit four families. We have found all of them in one house that does not belong to anyone of them. There is a guard outside the house. A BiH claims that the guard is there to prevent reprisals against them because one of their men got killed by the shell there. I had an impression that this was a set-up in order to present it in this way to the representatives of UN. They were not beaten up or mistreated. They do not want to leave Ostožac. They only want to return to their houses. While we were in Ostožac combat operations were going on. On that day Colonel KRIS /as printed/ asked the both side to cease fire. He asked for the cease-fire and continuation of working on

determination of the causes, consequences and the situation in general in field.

During the second day, on 21.04.1993, we managed to get only to our checkpoint in Doljani. Mr. PUŠIĆ, representatives of UNPROFOR and A BiH went there. Our Commanders were not at the checkpoint so the representatives were sent away from there. They did not go to Sovići.

On that day we tried to get to Kostajnica, to the Command of Stjepan Radić HVO Brigade. We were sent away from the Muslim controlled checkpoint in Ostrožac. Representative of A BiH did not allow us to pass with an explanation that UNPROFOR was going to Klis in order to help Croats, who were allegedly in a very difficult situation over there. Yesterday, by the help of UN managed to get into Konjic, to the Comand of 7th Brigade of A BiH. They threatened us there by verbally emphasising their goals. Zuka arrived at the time and only then they calmed down. He stated that he is in command in all the places from Igman to Drežnica. He said that HVO in Kojic should hand over the heavy weapons and then the negotiations could be continued. It was agreed to have Zuka and Zdravko ŠAGOLJ meet in Ostrožac today and negotiate. They always mentioned that the precondition is the cease-fire.

Situation in Jablanica and especially in Konjic is very difficult. We have found out that in Čelebići there are 300 Croats that were captured. Since the Croats in Jablanica and in other places are disarmed UNPROFOR should be asked to disarm the A BiH in Jablanica. Representatives of the HVO should not go, for now on, to Jablanica and Konjic.

For Commander of OZ JIH

/signature/

Miljenko LASIĆ

CC:

- GS HZ HB Mostar  
General Slobodan PRALJAK
- ONO /operations and training organ or all people's defence/ of OZ JIH

/stamp: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna

Mostar

Zone of Operations South-eastern Herzegovina

Defence Department/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 v.Bradina April 21st 1993, 21:15h

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
 -URGENT-

Combat Report

to 4th CORPS COMMANDER  
 MOSTAR

During the day our units have taken the line: village Prevlje - below the village Turija - Old Town - Pomol - Babin nos - village Orahovica - Lisina and hence surrounded the remaining part of the HVO on the left side of the Neretva river. On this shore on the way to Jablanica there is still a HVO stronghold in the Radešine village. That stronghold is also surrounded. During the night a part of the forces from the city will be brought to rayon Radešina with a mission to crash HVO forces in the village Radešina rayon, conquer the place and in that way unblock the Konjic – Jablanica road. In parallel with this action the action to liberate the village Unca and Ljesovina facility in Klis will take place tomorrow. As for the “Zlatar” object the major part of it is preserved in technical sense while the building is considerably damaged due to the Chetnik shelling. In an underground part almost all of the equipment has been put into operation so for now we have these capabilities:

- Maintaining KT UKT connections
- Maintaining wire post and telecommunication and inductor connections
- Eavesdropping Chetnik's and HVO's radio relay connections
- Other which is not for the public because neither this way of me reporting to you is safe .

Today I eavesdropped on a conversation which the Chetnik Colonel Risto Lazarevic from village Bijela had with a certain Colonel Djeram. Risto reported to him that the Croats who were suppressed by our forces have asked him to receive them in Bijela and through Nevesinje to transfer them to Mostar. Djeric hasn't approved it and ordered to be shot at HVO and the ABiH. Djero has informed Risto of coming of the reinforcements in sight of the army and artillery led by Boro Antelj, commander of the local Chetnik brigade.

Otherwise I have already reported here we captured a number of very important HVO documents, which speak of cooperation with the Chetniks, bargains regarding Konjic, ultimate goals of the HVO, etc. For that reason I have moved the documentation to a safe location and the team with Sejo Branković should break their way to you so I can give this to him and this closes the circle and here are the answers to all questions related to the HVO.

Today, the Chetniks were intensely bombarded the city in order to support the HVO. Risto Lazarevic supports the HVO with the artillery because he knows what awaits them in Bijela and Borci when we finish this with the HVO. The ground part of the „Zlatar“ facility was shelled with no major damage.

I'm sending the forces to help Jablanica today.

PNS for ONP

Esad Remić

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Croatian Union Herzeg Bosnia  
Croatian Defence Council

HVO Main Headquarters  
V O S  
Strictly confidential nr. 03-370/93  
Mostar, April 23<sup>rd</sup>.1993.

Defence  
Military Secret  
Strictly confidential

Information  
Supplement about Konjic

We are submitting to you a list of villages that were burned down from where Croats were driven out and we have no information about them.

a.) Konjic district – Klis area /Neretvica valley/

1. Village Trusina, Croats exiled, some of them were shot and village was set afire.
2. Village Sultić, Croats exiled and village set afire.
3. Village Bušćak, Croats exiled, part of the village burned down, man were shot.
4. Village Orlište, Croats that were found there were all killed, village completely burned down.
5. Village Mrkosovica – Lukšije, Croat exiled, we have no information on Casualties, and also do not know whether the village was set afire.
6. Village Jasenik, Croats exiled.
7. Village Slavkovići, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
8. Village Dobričevići , Croats exiled and village ransacked.
9. Village Bare, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
10. Village Prijeslop, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
11. Village Solakova kula, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
12. Village Goransko polje, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
13. Village Gorani, Croats exiled and 10 houses were ransacked.
14. Village Ljesovina, Croats are resisting, they are exposed to ten day attack.
15. Village Budišnja ravan, Croats exiled and they are currently at Ljesovina.

a) Territory of the city of Konjic and surrounding villages.

1. City of Konjic itself is completely under the Muslim control; Croats were either exiled or detained at the village Celebici, according to our knowledge there is approximately 300 Croats at the detention camp over there.
2. Croats that were exiled from the city are concentrated at the villages: Turija, Zabrdje and Zaslavlje. We know nothing about their destiny.

3. Croatian village Dubravice, Croats exiled, were used as human shield during the occupation of Zlatar facility which was held by HVO. We know nothing about destiny of soldiers and civilians.
4. Village Galjevo, Croats exiled, village ransacked and then set afire.
5. Village Ovčari, Croats exiled, village ransacked, we dont know whether the village was burnd down.
6. Village Radešine, Croats surrounded for ten days now, they are on left bank of Jablaničko lake completely surrounded.:


#### NOTE

Village Vrci /across the way from Radešine/ is completely surrounded. Croats are holding up well.


Village Obri is completely souranded, they are isolated from Vrci and Butorovic polje. Croats are holding up well at this village.

Chief of VOS HVO Main Headquarters  
ŽARKO KEŽA  
“Signature”


KONJIC MUNICIPALITY - SITUATION IN THE PERIOD FROM APRIL 13, 1993 UNTIL APRIL 25, 1993





KONJIC MUNICIPALITY - SITUATION FROM MAY 1993 UNTIL JULY 10, 1993




KONJIC MUNICIPALITY - SITUATION FROM JULY 10, 1993







**ORLIŠTE****25.03.'93 – 4 victims**

- IVAN KOSTIĆ b. 1923.
- ANDA KOSTIĆ b. 1923.
- BRANKA KOSTIĆ b. 1937.
- JANJA KOSTIĆ b. 1913.

**VRICI****23.03.'93 – 9 victims**

- IVAN (Ante) ANDRIĆ b. 1966.
- MIRKO (Stjepan) ĐOPO b. 1966.
- IVAN (Mato) ANDRIĆ b. 1970.
- IVAN (Pero) STANIĆ b. 1935.
- STOJA STANIĆ b. 1935.
- ANUŠA KOŽUL b. 1929.
- KATA KALEB b. - "Malezuša" b. 1910.
- ĐOKO RISTIĆ b. 1918.
- PETRA RISTIĆ b. 1918.

**BUŠČAK****13. and 14.04.'93 – 3 victims**


- MIROSLAV (Josip) MAJIĆ
- BRANKO (Jakov) MAJIĆ b. 1963.
- SLAVKO (Ljuban) MAJIĆ b. 1959.


**POLJE BIJELA – SPILJANI****10.07.'92 – 4 victims (family)**


- ĐURO GOLUBOVIĆ b. 1951.
- VLASTA GOLUBOVIĆ b. 1958.
- PAVLE GOLUBOVIĆ b. 1987.
- PETAR GOLUBOVIĆ (child)

**GOSTOVIĆI 23.03.'93 – 4 victims**

- MATO (Stjepan) STJEPANOVIĆ b. 1966.
- ZVONKO (Pero) ĐOPO b. 1966.
- MATO (Tadija) DRLJO b. 1942.
- DRAGAN ( Bosiljko) VUJIČEVIĆ b. 1963.







SPRING-AUTUMN 1993

**Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Summer – Autumn 1992**

**Legend:**

-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defence Council)
-  Directions of operation
-  HVO defence (Croatian Defence Council)



**Situation:  
November 2nd 1992**

**Legend:**


-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defence Council)
-  HVO defence lines (Croatian Defence Council)



**Situation:  
November  
2nd 1992**

**Legend:**

-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Directions of Croatian exodus
-  Directions of Muslim exodus




**Review of the HVO operational zones  
December 1992**

**Legend:**

-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Lines of HVO operative zones






Organization and deployment 3rd Corps A BiH December, 1992

**Legend:**

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)



**Structure and arrangement OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA April 1993**



**Legend:**

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)

**OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA STRENGTH IN NUMBERS**


1. „Travnička“ Brigade app. 800 soldiers
  2. „Frankopan“ Brigade app. 600 soldiers
  3. „Stjepan Tomašević“ Brigade app. 700 soldiers
  4. „Viteška“ Brigade app 1100 soldiers
  5. „N.š.Zrinski“ Brigade app. 1400 soldiers
  6. „Ban Jelačić“ Brigade app. 1900 soldiers
  7. „Jure Francetić“ Brigade app. 850
  8. II. „Zenička“ Brigade app. 400 soldiers (in forming)
  9. „Korromanić“ Brigade app. 600 soldiers
  10. „Bobovac“ Brigade app. 700 soldiers
  11. 111. XP Brigade app. 1400 soldiers
  12. 110. Brigade app. 650 soldiers
- 4. Lrd Anti Aircraft Defense app. 170 soldiers, MTD app 170 soldiers  
 - 4. bVP app. 300 soldiers, PPN Vitezovi 60 soldiers

LOB app. 150 soldiers, Command of the OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA app 50 soldiers

TOTAL app. 12 000 soldiers

**OF WHICH:**


In Lašvansko-Leptanička valley app 7000 soldiers  
 Outside Lašvansko-Leptanička valley app. 4600 soldiers



**Ideas - Intentions  
A BiH (Army  
of Bosnia and  
Herzegovina)**

**Legend:**


-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Blockage by A BiH
-  Operational directions A BiH
-  Conflict location



**Situation:  
January  
1993**

**Legend:**


-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Operational directions A BiH
-  Conflict location



**Situation:**  
March/ April  
1993

**Legend:**


-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Operational directions A BiH
-  Place of conflict



**Situation:**  
June 1993

**Legend:**

-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Operational directions A BiH
-  Place of conflict



**Situation:**  
July 1993

**Legend:**

VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)

ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)


HVO (Croatian Defense Council)



Operational directions A BiH



Place of conflict



**Situation:**  
September 1993

**Legend:**

VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)

ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)


HVO (Croatian Defense Council)



Operational directions A BiH




Place of conflict



Situation:  
October  
1993

**Legend:**


-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Operational directions A BiH
-  Place of conflict




Situation:  
November  
1993

**Legend:**

-  VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
-  ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
-  HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
-  Operational directions A BiH
-  Place of conflict






Situation:  
November  
1993

VRS (Army  
of Spska  
Republic)

ABiH (Army  
of Bosnia and  
Herzegovina)

HVO  
(Croatian  
Defense  
Council)

21.



Muslim and Croat armed conflict in the period from April 1993 until February 1994  
Armed aggression of ABiH against HVO



Dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović: Bosniak-Croatian political reckoning – Mostar 2006.  
(political reckonings in Mostar)

\*\*\*

In the morning hours of April 16<sup>th</sup> 1993, the HVO troops committed a crime against the Muslim civilians in the village of Ahmići.

In the early morning hours of the same day, a crime was committed against the Croatian civilians in the village of Trusina in the zone of responsibility of the BH Army Konjic brigade. This act showed that belligerent military sides mutually committed the war crime.

Intensive consultations between the municipal board of SDA and municipal board of HDZ in Mostar are in process on the political scene. Within the announcement, jointly signed by S. Vrljić and me, we welcomed the agreement between A. Izetbegović and M. Boban and demanded its urgent implementation in Mostar. We were not familiar with the crime in Ahmići and Trusina from 16<sup>th</sup> of April 1993.

Document 131: joint announcement of SDA and HDZ of Mostar, 16<sup>th</sup> of April 1993

/document/

From the joint meeting of the municipal HDZ board leaders, as well as the leaders of the municipal board of SDA Mostar, Mr. Stojan Dr. Vrljić and Mr. Ismet Dr. Hadžiosmanović, analysing the current political situation in Mostar municipality, they give a

#### JOINT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

1. Croats and Muslims invested /as written-to commit-to invest/ too many victims for freedom, democracy and co-existence in these territories in order to allow any endangering of these attainments. Given lives of the most extraordinary sons oblige us to persist in joint fight. We are against introduction of any type of anarchy and mutual destruction in our areas which is the interest of our joint aggressor.
2. In the areas in which the BH Army is majority and vice-versa, armed attacks of the BH Army and HVO units members are especially painful and disturbing.
3. The municipal boards of HDZ and SDA Mostar welcome the achieved agreement of Croatian and Muslim people delegations within the talks in UN and Vance-Owen plan, demanding that one immediately carries out its realization. Non-implementation of regulations from this agreement is merely in aggressor's interest and opposite to international efforts to end the war and to find a political solution of the conflict.
4. Due to this fact, the officials of the municipal HDZ and SDA Mostar boards demand from all their members an active contribution in implementing the achieved agreements by tolerance, good will and wisdom in places where they live and work which is the integral part in fight against the aggressor. The municipal boards of HDZ and SDA Mostar oblige themselves to carry out the realization of the achieved agreements by a mutual dialogue.
5. Individuals and groups, who are against this, are responsible for prolongation of war and alienation of the R BiH, which is the ultimate aggressor's target.

President of the SDA Mostar  
Ismet Dr. Hadžiosmanović  
/signed and stamped/

President of the HDZ Mostar  
Professor Stojan Dr. Vrljić  
/signed and stamped/

Having understood this rather dramatic situation and ultimately dangerous for a possible conflict of major proportions between the BH Army and HVO, the Regional board of SDA for Herzegovina issues two announcements on 17<sup>th</sup> of April 1993. In the first announcement it points out that in the night of 16<sup>th</sup>/17<sup>th</sup> of April members of HVO and BH Army jointly went out to the streets, protesting against the possible conflicts. This spontaneous group of joint army wanted to express its dissatisfaction and to prevent a possible war in Mostar between the HVO and BH Army. Management of the SDA party warned the highest political and military organs of Muslim and Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina on that occasion, to work on prevention of conflict without delay. In the second announcement the leadership of SDA emphasizes that the cause of major number of casualties who have died in mutual conflicts so far, was the stalling in talks and realization of the Vance-Owen plan. The leadership of the SDA regional board asks, within this announcement that Mate Boban and Ejub Ganić come to Mostar in order to influence the calming down of tensions directly. Eventually, they pointed out they would intensify the negotiations on political solution, that being the only way to remove the misunderstanding.

The main actors of the joint gathering of HVO and R BiH Army soldiers on April 17th, 1993 were Safet Oručević and Zijad Demirović, while an organized war crime in Ahmići and Trusina near Konjic were committed. During that time, A. Pašalić writes a command about the attack on the HVO and HV in the area of responsibility of the Fourth Corps no. 01-3191/93 dated April 17th, 1993.

In areas of northern Herzegovina situation is dramatically deteriorating between the units of HVO and BH Army. There are real fights in a wide region of Konjic and Jablanica. ...

Political developments during the aggression confirmed and proved that individual claims about creation of Islamic state of Bosnia are being realized. Coming of Muslim-Mujahedeen as they called themselves, their clothing, their march songs and crimes performed by some mujahedeen troops, it was sufficient to find one drop in a sea of crime and say that war crimes are carried out under the motive of jihad and for Islam. It is clear that with this statement, the justifications are made for the committed crimes carried out by certain groups of Mujahedeens in Bosnia.

Partial Islamization of BH Army was made. Second Muslim Brigade was created in early 1995. Mufti of Tuzla Kavazović, Sakib Mahmuljin, Deputy Defense Minister of the BH Federation Army and Rasim Delić commander of the Joint Staff of the Federation Army were present at the ceremony. Claim about the Islamization of the army as a military force that wants to proclaim Islamic state, has put A. Izetbegovic at fait accompli, which he could not resist. Video recordings of these ceremonies have been published around the world, and this act is viewed with suspicion and disbelief in good intentions of Muslim army of this kind.

In the area of responsibility of the Fourth Corps, there was an armed unit called "Muslim Armed Forces", whose first commander was Senad Mičijević. Later he was dismissed and Ibrahim Mimić was appointed by the Mufti of Herzegovina Hajji Seid ef Smajkić. The appointment of the commander "of Muslim armed forces" in the Fourth Corps was held by Mufti S. Smajkić according to the approval of "emir" Mahmut Karalić, commander of Muslim forces in the BH Army, whose headquarters was in Zenica. This is irrefutable proof that there was an organization of Muslim armed forces within the BH Army and that religious officials were directly responsible for the organization, especially in the Fourth Corps of the BH Army.

A. Izetbegović cannot distance himself from these facts, because he knew of the existence of a parallel military organization within the structure of the BH Army.

\*\*\*

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Islamic community BiH  
 Mufti for Herzegovina  
 Document 169-1

/ in Arabic /  
 88000 Mostar, Đački dom, tel/fax 088/32-164

/ handwritten /  
 Mostar, 28.11.1992  
 /in Arabic /

/ handwritten text /

Based on authorization of chief emir of Armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 25th November 1992 issued in Zenica

Appoint  
 Mimić (illegible) Ibrahim as emir M.S. Mostar until further notice.

M.S.  
 / round seal /

Mufti  
 Smajkić Seid

/ORDER HANDWRITTEN/  
 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 BH Army  
 COMMAND OF 4<sup>th</sup> corps

Operational number: 02/3148-1/93  
 Mostar, 16<sup>th</sup> of April 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
 URGENT!  
 DCCA64UB  
 MBCA64UC

Pursuant to information by ŠVK OS RBIH, the condition of HVO forces in the rayon of Neretvica is the following:

1. They are in hard position due to a lack of manpower. They demand that their artillery on Risovac hits our positions northern from Neretvica.
2. The HVO informs that the BH Army units took the s. Vila /illegible/ and that they move towards the s. Kostajnica.
3. The HVO units expect help in manpower from Prozor from the northern side and the HVO troops in Kiseljak were ordered to help those units over Bradina.
4. The HVO from Neretvica shall try to take the s. of Grevice because over Grevice and Kaćuni infantry can provide help to them.

Related to the above cited I

**O R D E R**

1. Continue with b/d in your zones of responsibility; do not allow the arrival of new forces from direction Prozor over the s. Kaćuni and the s. of Grevići, as well as from direction of Bradina.
2. Synchronize and integrate the joint b/d for successful combat performances and breaking the HVO forces, as efficient as it can. /handwritten by side – do not allow to be surprised and that the HVO takes new positions/
3. This order is to be executed immediately.
4. Send reports every 4 hours in order to enable us current with b/d.

ZM/

To be delivered to:

- 43<sup>rd</sup> and 44<sup>th</sup> bbr
- bVP
- OpSO Konjic
- OpŠO Jablanica
- Bb Prozor
- ONO
- a/a

**Commander  
Arif Pašalić**

**MUSTAFA HADROVIĆ –EXCERPTS FROM THE  
TRANSCRIPT**

22/02/2007

**On Prosecutor's question about the Old Bridge, witness  
responded:**

THE WITNESS: I'll tell the Trial Chamber the truth, the real truth. I have a document and a photograph too. Mr. Praljak was with us in the old town at the time, and he said that -- Mr. Praljak, the general. General Praljak. And I took a photograph, because I wanted to be seen standing next to a general who had already started to --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't understand what.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I took a photograph of him and Mr. Culajsic [phoen], Ali Pasalic [phoen], Hasic, and Kemo, the small pilot. Your Honour, then I took another photograph and I stood next to --

\*\*\*

THE PROSECUTOR: You were watching the Odl Bridge?

ANTONETTI: But one other point... The gentleman did indicate that he had some photographs taken with General Praljak. We understand that he has them with him. If it would be possible for the gentleman to turn them over or at least maybe copies for us or for the registry to make copies of those photographs, I think that would be something that we would welcome.

\*\*\*

You said you had photographs on you, with you. So the Defence would like to see them. Could you hand them over to us so that we can make photocopies of them and then you can take the originals home. Do you have the photographs with you?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do, Your Honour, yes. 24 Your Honour, I'll give you the first photograph for you

to photocopy and 25 to see who Mr. Praljak was sitting with, and then later on I'll give you the second photograph to have a look at or, rather, to photocopy.

\*\*\*

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the second photograph the same people I was with, Mr. Praljak, Arif Pasalic, Mica Lasic, Hasic the pilot, and Kemo. Now, this young man, Kemo, is working, and Hasic is the proprietor of a chemist shop in Mostar, a pharmacy.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] On the first photograph there are six of you. So one person took the photograph. Who was the seventh?...

... Unless it was one of those automatic cameras that take photographs when positioned themselves?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The first time I took the photograph with Mr. Praljak, Pasalic, Mica Lasic, Kemo, and Hasic. And the second photograph is the one that I wanted to be in, too, with the gentlemen, and that photograph was taken by Mr. Sisirak, Hara took the photograph. It's a cafe in the old town right by the Old

Bridge.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, yes, you have the floor.

... PRALJAK: Just a small question. Was this it taken in April 1993? I'm sure you'll remember -- as far as I remember it, this was April 1993, mid-April somewhere.

THE WITNESS: Thereabouts, yes, because the conflicts hadn't started yet. We had crossed the Neretva and went back from Podvelezje and from Velez. We returned from there. Mr. Praljak, you know that we all came back from Podvelezje and that the Chetniks had left at the time and had gone to Nevesinje.

PRALJAK: But if you remember correctly, and I'm sure you remember correctly because I also remember this, this photograph, as far as I remember, was taken roughly in mid-April 1993.

THE WITNESS: Before the conflicts. Just prior to the conflicts.



General Slobodan Praljak,  
Arif Pašalić next to him and  
General Mića Lasić



## ZLATAN BULJKO

**Here we go, recording is on. Could you please introduce yourself before we start. So, your name...**

My name is Zlatan Buljko and I'm from Mostar. During April of 1993 I had an opportunity to meet Mr. Slobodan Praljak. That was the time when I came to the premises of the regional committee of the Party of Democratic Action accompanied by Arif Pašalić and Mirsad Hujka, and I saw Slobodan Praljak sitting there, while Mr. Demirović known as Šosi was sitting next to him. Slobodan Praljak talked to men accompanying me, Mr. Pašalić and Mirsad Hujka, and I can remember one sentence Mr. Praljak uttered, saying all that needed to end soon, so there wouldn't be any casualties in a conflict that might happen.

**So, you came to the premises. What was your role at that time? Who were you? What did you serve as?**

At that time, exactly at that point, I represented the Army in negotiations with the HVO (the Croatian Defence Council), as well as the representatives of the international community, because I spoke English, which was necessary. So, I was often called to come to the meetings between the HVO and the Army. It started in April, and of course it continued in May, and I was often present during meetings after the conflict had started. That was the reason I... Exactly in those days there were some negotiations, i.e. meetings between the Army and the HVO.

**Tell me, that day, that event we are talking about and we are interested in, was it an official meeting or just improvised?**

Well, according to my memory and my knowledge at that time, it wasn't an official meeting. At least, no one told me that. Mr. Pašalić and Hujdur didn't tell me why they went there. So, I could speculate and say someone invited them there, perhaps Mr. Demirović, but they never gave me such information. I wasn't involved in that. So, it is possible it was a random meeting. It is also possible Mr. Demirović called them.

**What was the atmosphere there at that time...?**

Well, very... the atmosphere wasn't hostile or anything. Everything was normal. Now, when I look back on it, I know they were all soldiers, professionals, \*\*\*\*\*in that sense being...it was very relaxed. There were no, so to say, no threats or anything else.

**Let me ask you something else: after that meeting, that meeting has some connection with the event on Rondo. Therefore, the event that either preceded that meeting; let's call it a meeting; or happened after it, but most importantly tensions between armed units happened on Rondo. On one side were men from the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other side men from the HVO. Do you know what happened next regarding the event?**

Well, those things happened, of course. However, I never witnessed it. I don't know anything about it.

**All right.**

So, I can't help you with that any further. But yes, there were, there were some...

**So, you don't know what happened in Rondo?**

No. I don't know.

**You were not there?**

No, I wasn't there.

**I think that's all. Thank you.**

The interview was conducted by Lada Puljizević  
The transcript was created by Zdenka Omrčen  
Zagreb, February 2008.

I, the undersigned, Zlatan Buljko, state that in December 2005, of my own free will, I gave a statement for the Defence of General Slobodan PRALJAK about events in which I participated and which are connected to the wartime events in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1994). I agree that my statement be used in proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

I state that before giving this statement to the Defence of General PRALJAK I was warned that I had to speak the truth and that an untruthful statement is a criminal offence under the Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the rules of the ICTY.

I state that I have understood these warnings and that everything I said in my statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

I have read the statement through carefully and it corresponds in its entirety to what I stated. I signed the written text of the statement in my own hand.

/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

COMMAND

MILITARY SECRET

.....  
(Name of the unit)

.....  
(Degree of confidentiality)

Number: 01-3359/93  
Mostar 23.04.1993.

UNPROFOR AND EU

Translation

### P R O T E S T

Regarding the increased tensions and sporadic direct clashes between BH Army units and HVO during the last few days in Mostar we feel the need to address this protest to you due to the presence of a high ranking officer of the Croatian Army General Slobodan Praljak in the HVO Main Staff since 21<sup>st</sup> April 1993. He conducts and commands the HVO units, which is against the international regulations.

In the region Čapljina –Stolac – Dubrava parts of 114<sup>th</sup> and 116<sup>th</sup> HV Brigades are stationed and they carry out combat activities directed at the BH Army positions.

We feel that you as an international institution have to inform your superiors for the purpose of preventing such events which we consider an open aggression on the territory of sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

COMMANDER  
Arif Pašalić

/stamp/ ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
Command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps  
MOSTAR

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 BH ARMY  
 4th CORPS HEADQUARTERS

Confidential number: 01-3230/93  
 Mostar, 18th of April 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 CONFIDENTIAL

ORDER

41st motorized brigade  
 the GLORIUS  
 MUP CSB Mostar

Till the final construction of the bridge, by the hotel Bristol – Neretva, free passage is allowed only to the m/v of the 4th BH Army corps commander, CSB Mostar Chief and 41st motorized brigade commander. As to the rest m/v, they are not allowed to pass.

/stamp of receipt/

Commander  
 Mr. Arif Pašalić  
 /signed and stamped/

OFFICIAL NOTE

made in the Police station facilities related to the findings on BH Army positions fortification.

According to the amicable connection that lives in the area of Zalike, we found that the soldiers of the BH Army set the sniping positions in early morning on 19 April 1993 at the following objects: the ship bank in A.Zuanića street, at the top of the "Revija" building immediately near the Bristol Hotel and at the top of the building in Oneškovićeveva street above the café bar, owned by Pašić Bisera.

By personal inspection, I also established that the BH Army soldiers fortified a "nest with usage of machine guns" in front of the administrative building APRO entrance, where a machine gun of old type (šarac) is placed, as on the passage between the buildings of the Sarajevo Bank and the entrance in the branch of ZOIL as well as on the southern bank entrance, where /illegible/ around 10 cubic meter of ballast was delivered.

Official note made by  
 Jurica Božidar



## OFFICIAL NOTE

made on 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 1993, in the premises of the Police station Mostar, related to the below cited

Concerning the current situation in the city of Mostar, and the events that lately took place, regarding the agreement between the commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps, Arif Pašalić (as written) of the BH Army and Petar Zelenika, Head of HVO for the South-East Herzegovina, concerning the previous findings and city tour before these events, I came to additional findings that the majority of extremists from the BH Army were located in the building of the Mostar Hotel (by the Government's decision, earlier determined to serve as elderly residence, however, in practice, it has never started to function as such). The BH Army members from Podveležje, Nevesinje and Gacka are in the Hotel Mostar; according to the agreement of the above cited commanders, considering the fact, the hotel is the nest of extremists and sniper shooters, it is necessary to evacuate it immediately and replace it by the elderly residence, according to the previous decision.

The pupil's home "Đula Mučibabić", located in the S. Radića street, actually, being surrounded by the S. Radića, V. Nazora and A. Zuanica streets is the nest of all possible extremists and sniper shooters, who keep shooting the passers-by from the roof, therefore I recommend the pupil's home should be evacuated immediately (refugees from Podveležje, Nevesinje and Gacka are situated there).

In the Ričina street, number 104 (A. Šantića street), where the management of hydropower on Neretva is situated, one unit of BH Army is located, allegedly securing the cited object.

Around the Police station building Mostar, there are apartments, military and civil, in which the BH Army members live, as well as the members of the so called MUP of R BiH, on the higher floors.

In the building of the Partizan cinema, located in the Ričina Street, number 5 (A. Šantića, number 5), there are premises of the so called MUP of RBiH, along with his idea leader Memić Safet.

In the same street, on the number 6, a second brigade of the BH Army in the composition of 4<sup>th</sup> corps is located (Board of the R.O. "Mercur")

In the buildings of RO "Soko", being situated on stairs, actually in the V. Nazora street, number 20 "Premises of trade union" (as written) there are couple of BH Army members, that were shooting the passers-by in the latest events, therefore I presume they are still there.

This note has been written in order to present the localities of the BH Army members (there are still localities in the Cernička street, etc), however I do not have accurate data on this information. When the time comes for the disunion of belligerent parties, one of them would go to the Tihomir Mišić barrack and the other to South camp and Konak barracks, according to the agreement between commanders of BH Army and HVO.

I propose the below cited bodies should be introduced to the situation:

1. Police department Mostar
2. Management of the Military police of HVO

Note made by:  
Jasmin Dilberović  
/signed/

BiH emblem

BH Army emblem

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE

Command 41. mtbr

REPUBLIC

DEFENCE

Name of the unit

MILITARY

SECRET

Number: /handwritten/ 469-2/93StrictlyconfidentialMostar, April 19<sup>th</sup>, 1993

confidentiality

level

Deliver

immediately

Based on orders from Commander of Fourth Corps of the BH Army and the deteriorating situation in the region of Mostar, crossing and retraction of HVO forces as reinforcement for the units in combat operation in Jablanica against the R BH Army

I hereby command

1. Block and close the main road Mostar – Jablanica in the region Bijela and on the bridge at the entry of village Drežnice
2. At any cost stop the crossing of vehicles to and from Jablanica, especially if transporting forces of HVO and HV. At each crossing attempt respond with appropriate measures.
3. Crossing from and to Jablanica is allowed for vehicles of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and Red Cross (international).
4. Execution of this order IMMEDIATELY upon receipt. Report to me through KT connection, encrypted.

Delivered:

- 4. Battalion
- ONO
- Archive

Commander  
Mr. Midhad Hujdur  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
BH ARMY  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
Operational number: 02/-1-3200-26/93  
Mostar, 23<sup>rd</sup> of April, 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
URGENT!

Order

44<sup>th</sup> bbr Jablanica

Pursuant to situation development in the territory and agreement, current among BH Army (4<sup>th</sup> Corps), HVO, EZ and UNPROFOR, please transmit the Order to the 4<sup>th</sup> battalion of the 41<sup>st</sup> mtbr (Drežnice) to de-mine the Bijela bridge.

Nobody is allowed to be at the Bridge, save the security that protects the bridge, however, it must not be placed above the bridge in order to defend it successfully. Enforce the security of the bridge by choosing adequate positions for defence and protection.

BS/ZM

To be delivered to:

- Attendant
- ONO 4<sup>th</sup> K.

Commander  
Mr. Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

HVO OZ JIH

Operational number: 01-2529/93

Mostar, 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1993

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Report on situation in the area of Jablanica and Konjic

MAIN STAFF HVO HZ HB  
MOSTAR

Representatives of HVO attended the meeting, held on 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1993 at 1000 hours in premises of "Projektant" as follows:

- Commander of the OZ JIH Mića Lasić
- Stanko Marić
- Božo Raguz
- Berislav Pušić

After a while, they were joined by the BH Army representatives, with any authorization however as follows:

- Sulejman Budaković
- Mustafa Isović
- Bijedić and some more

The UN representative was presiding the meeting and it has been arranged that the meeting continued at 1200 hours in Jablanica.

The meeting has been held in the camp of Spanish battalion, in presence of the Colonel Morales. For the reason of efficiency, Mr. Kristofer, presiding the meeting, requested from HVO, to define the commission members that would visit three imperilled areas; Konjic, Jablanica and Klis at the same time.

Visit to Mr. A.Pašalić in hospital has been agreed, who would give consent to BH Army representatives in the commission, as it had been done. As to negotiations, Pašalić defined to be deputized by Mr. Emir Bijedić. The meeting continued, since the commander of the 7<sup>th</sup> BH Army Brigade, Mr. Midhat Cerovac arrived to take part in negotiations, as well as the commander of the NS HVO "H. Stjepan" brigade, Zovko Dobroslav, arrested and detained by the BH Army. During the talks, a BH Army soldier barged in the premise, having introduced himself as Nihad Bojadžić (allegedly the closest Sulejman Ugljanin's cousin and, again allegedly, former HV soldier). He showed the paper Order of the Supreme staff, according to which the BH Army forces commander from Igman to Drežnica exclusively, would be some Salko Gušić and his deputy Zuka, and that the BH Army from Mostar doesn't have the authority to negotiate on any matter when it comes to the area of gentlemen Gušić and Zuka. (Document on appointment dated 18<sup>th</sup> of April 1993).

Mr. Kristofer shortly spoke to the cited soldier and to Mr. Lasić and then proposed to terminate the meeting and return the teams to Mostar. Afterwards, he emphasized that this could be handled only on level of higher commanders, Mr. Petković and Mr. Halilović, whereas the meetings of this level should be continued upon their agreement.

To all the above cited, Colonel of the Spanish battalion, Mr. Murales expressed his disagreement.

In order to create space for future talks and improve the general impression, presenting us as real negotiators and showing interest in talks, we continued unofficial talks, without presence of UN envoys.

We have noticed that Zuka's and BH Army members easily enter the camp of the Spanish battalion fully armed, whereas within talks, we found out that they have been guided by the UN envoys where they want to, unbeknown to us. In addition, we have noticed that the trucks of suspicious owners and BH Army are somehow inserted into UN convoys, transporting cargo.

While departing, the Spanish battalion insisted, actually Mr. Morales in person, that we get back to the first check point of HVO by transport vehicle because they can't guarantee us safety if we drove our vehicles. We have also been warned that the Spaniards noticed Zuka in Jablanica and several of their sniper shooters; they are familiar with one sniper nest with two sniper shooters on one building. To the check point in Grabovica we returned by a transport vehicle and in Mostar, we introduced Mr. Kristofer once again that we are not able to negotiate because the other side commanders and co-parlours are not defined. For a while already, especially as the talks with observers started, it is visible that Mr. Pašalić does not control the situation and that he seems to be lost.

His inability to control the situation has been shown two days ago in Konjic.

Delivered to:

-Ministry of Defence of HZ HB Mostar  
GS HVO HZ HB Mostar  
ONO OZ JIH Mostar

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BH MILITARY SECRET  
 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
 42<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Brigade  
 Number: 01- /handwritten: 1025/ /93  
 Date, 18 April 1993

Preparation for brigade  
 combat operations,  
 order

/handwritten: 1/1 /

Pursuant to 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Command Order Strictly Confidential no. 01-5191/93 of 17 April 1993, and in consequence of the situation that has developed, the course of events and combat operations in the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps and 42<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Brigade zone of responsibility, and in order to prevail over the situation and establish as favourable a situation as possible for units,

I HEREBY ORDER:

1. Place the Command and all units of the Brigade on full combat readiness.
2. Apart from the positions in direct contact with the aggressor already occupied in the Rotimlja sector, undertake the following:

- 1<sup>st</sup> pb /Infantry Battalion/, organise defence (facing the permanent positions) in the Rotimlja and Podgradina villages with one company at the position, one company at readiness in the Rotimlja village sector and one company resting. Organise complete combat security in the redeployment sector with a part of the personnel from the company at readiness. Organise contact with the company that is resting through their officers, so that they can be mobile and at readiness to execute combat tasks in line with the agreed plan of engagement, as soon as possible. Engage the other units of the battalion in line with the existing plan and as required;
- 2<sup>nd</sup> pb, with one pč /infantry company/, be in the redeployment sector at full b/g /combat readiness/ for use on my order. With one pč, establish control of the Buna-Gubavica axis using part of the personnel, and with part of the strength of this unit control the Stanojevići village area and be at readiness for b/d /combat operations/ at the Buna checkpoint. Engage the other units of the battalion as required;
- 3<sup>rd</sup> pb, with forces of one platoon strength control and close the Žitomisljići-Pijesci axis, and with part of the forces control the axis bordering the Bivolje Brdo-Pijesci road. With the forces deployed in the villages on the Žapljina-Domanovići axis, control the Tasovčići-Domanovići, Počitelj-Muminovača, Ševaš Polje-Bivolje Brdo axes. Maintain permanent contact through persons assigned in the villages in order to exchange information and have personnel in the battalion records at full readiness.
- Brigade units: Command platoon, communications platoon, reconnaissance platoon, VP /Military Police/ platoon, MAD /Mixed Artillery Battalion/, POV /anti-tank platoon/, engineering platoon and logistics platoon are to operate in line with the plans of platoon and service chiefs, and on the orders of the NŠ /Chief of Staff/, assistant commanders for security and logistics.

/handwritten: illegible//

#### Tasks of Brigade Command Organs

The Operations and Training Organ (ONO), coordinating with the PNiŠ /Assistant Chief of Staff/ for ObP /Intelligence and Security/, the security organ, the morale and /?IPD/ /Information and Propaganda/ organ and the logistics organ, will prepare a Plan for the use of brigade units for combat activities, a Brigade Command Work Plan, a Command security plan, a unit control plan and a plan for cooperation and communications with adjacent Army units. Prepare and propose a Plan to coordinate the operations and engagement of the forces in the villages in the territory. Draft a Communications and TKT /secret commanding of troops/ Plan, an engineering security plan, draw up a 1:50,000 scale operational map, and a unit and command training plan.

- The PNS for ObP will draft an Intelligence Security Plan, a Reconnaissance Platoon Engagement Plan and documentation to accompany the operational map.
  - The recruitment and personal affairs organ will update the personnel files/records, fill positions where personnel is below strength, especially specialist VES /military occupational speciality/. Carry out recruitment in the municipalities of Mostar, Čapljina and Stolac.
  - The organ for moral affairs, IPD and VP /information, propaganda and religious affairs will draft a Plan for informing the personnel, the members of the brigade, the inhabitants of Mostar, Čapljina and Stolac municipalities, and the Muslim soldiers in HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units in these municipalities. When drafting the plan, exchange views and proposals with SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ municipal boards, and if necessary in agreement with other institutions of Muslim in the territory. Organise regular monitoring of radio and Sarajevo Radio News in commands and units, and if necessary organise explanations of events for the soldiers. Prevent the spread of rumours and disinformation affecting the morale of soldiers and the public, discipline, etc, and ensure that incidents and events are correctly interpreted.  
Prepare the personnel morally and psychologically for the tasks before them on a daily basis in a planned and organised fashion, especially before engaging the personnel in the execution of combat tasks.
4. Undertake all necessary measures through the Command organs and the commanders to prevent alcohol being obtained and consumed, injuries and self-inflicted wounds, unauthorised activities and leaving the unit without the approval of a superior officer.
    - The Security Organ will compile an Engagement Plan for the VP platoon, and propose measures for security and command and unit protection. Initiate coordination with the relevant security organs in the territory.
    - The Logistics Organ will compile security plans by service, and draft an Engagement and Combat Security Plan for the logistics units. Survey the options for provisioning with food items from local sources in the event that their use is required.
  5. When drafting these documents and plans, establish mutual coordination, and address the deputy commander where clarification is required.
  6. The deadline for the execution of these tasks is 1200 hours on 19 April 1993, when all documents drafted are to be given to me for inspection and verification.

To:  
 NŠ, Assistant Commander for Morale, Snč  
 /Medical Company/, OB /Security Organ/,  
 Assistant Commander for Logistics, 1<sup>st</sup> pb,  
 2<sup>nd</sup> pb, 3<sup>rd</sup> pb.

Commander:  
 Bajro PIZOVIĆ  
 /signed and stamped/

/ambem lillies/ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND  
HERZEGOVINA/ambem of the army/

Command of the 41st motorized brigade  
(unit name)

Defence of the Republic  
Military secret  
Strlicly confidential  
(confidentiality degree)

Number:-----

Mostar, 19 April 1993

On signal «Sicily-126» prepare the defence positions. Act in case of direct jeopardy.  
Colour of the stripe: «GREEN»

Commander  
Mr. Midhad Hujdur

/emblem lilies/ ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
/emblem of the army/

Command of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade  
(Unit name)

Defence of the Republic  
Military secret  
Strictly confidential  
(confidentiality degree)

Operational number  
Mostar, 19<sup>th</sup> of April 1939

On signal "Cancer 625", start the general attack in all places and in given directions.  
Colour of the stripe : "BLUE"

Commander  
Mr. Midhat Hujdur

/emblem lilies/ ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
/emblem of the army/

Command of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade  
(Unit name)

Defence of the Republic  
Military secret  
Strictly confidential  
(confidentiality degree)

Operational number  
Mostar, 19<sup>th</sup> of April 1939

On signal "Equator - 304", start the active performances, come out and take the given  
line according to the defence order. Start the combat actions after receiving the signal  
"Cancer-625".  
Colour of the stripe "WHITE"

Commander  
Mr. Midhat Hujdur



/RBiH coat of arms/

/ABiH coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE  
 41<sup>st</sup> MOTORIZED BRIGADE

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41<sup>st</sup> MOTORIZED BRIGADE COMMAND

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

(name of unit)

MILITARY SECRET

No: 470

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

(degree of confidentiality)

Mostar, 19-Apr-93

ORDER FOR THE DEFENCE, Op. No: 1  
 Map: 1:25, 000 Mostar 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4

Pursuant to the Order of the Commander of the ABiH 4<sup>th</sup> Corps and due to the worsening of the general military and political situation in the territory of the Mostar Municipality, and because of the reliable information that the HVO units, supported by HV, are to attack the city of Mostar and its environs, I hereby

ORDER:

1. All units of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade, as well as elements of units from the composition of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps, take up positions for decisive defence with the task of defending allocated regions, as follows:
  - 1.1. 1<sup>st</sup> BAT has the task of taking up positions for the defence in the region of *Južni logor* /South Camp/, closing down the axis from the village of Rodoč towards Mostar by using anti-armoured weaponry. On creation of conditions, launch an attack at the Mostar-Buna, Mostar-Blagaj junction, take up the defence positions and close down the passage across the aviators' bridge. In future combat activities, aim to link with the Blagaj Independent COY in the region of the village of Buna. Transfer elements of troops on to the right bank of the river Neretva and place yourselves under the command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> BAT Commander.
  - 1.2. 2<sup>nd</sup> BAT has the task of taking up positions for the defence in their zone of responsibility, the closing down of the axis from the village of Rodoč towards Mostar in the Čekrk region. Aim to take up the Čekrk- *magistrala* /main road/-Šerovac-Bulevar-Dr.S.Mujića Street-Bank (the new one)-"Vaha" coffee shop-Garrison Outpatients Clinic-Old Hospital-Dairy Plant-Centar II axis. In the rear of the reached line, block the HVO troops and neutralise them. Dispatch elements of troops from the 4<sup>th</sup> COY to the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade Command in order to strengthen the defence. As a future activity, launch an attack from the wings along the Šerovac-Podhum-Balinovac and Centar II – Rudnik axes. Select elements of troops for the capturing of the Hum hill.
  - 1.3. 3<sup>rd</sup> BAT has the task of taking up the defence positions in their zone of responsibility, closing down the axis from Vrapčići towards Mostar, in the

region of Sutin and preventing the crossing over the HE /hydro-electric plant/ "Mostar" damn, as well as totally blocking and capturing the *Sjeverni logor* /Northern Camp/ Barracks. Transfer elements of troops (approximately 30 men), with weaponry, on to the right bank and place them under the command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> BAT Commander. Dispatch the complete RBR /?Air-Defence rocket system/ "OSA" crew to the Command, with the containers, as well as the RPG /rocket grenade launcher/ crew.

- 1.4. "Nevesinje" BAT is placed under the command of the 3<sup>rd</sup> BAT Commander who will issue it a task and elements of troops (30 armed troops) are to be transferred onto the right bank and deployed in the *Djački Dom* /Pupil's Club/ and *Ekonomska škola* / High School of Economy/ where they will take up positions for the defence. The Commanding Officer leading the people onto the right bank is obliged to report to the Command of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorised brigade to receive more precise details about the task.
- 1.5. "Šargan" BAT is placed under the command of the 1<sup>st</sup> BAT Commander, who will assign it with a task.
- 1.6. MTD /motorized tank division/ is tasked to, from its current VP /fire positions/, open fire at targets specified by the NA /Chief of Artillery/ of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade, as well as upon the needs and requests of the brigade. 82mm mortars open fire from their VP at targets specified in the Fire Plan of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade NA, as well as per the requests of the BAT Commander.
- 1.7. "Blagaj" Independent COY has the task of taking up the defence positions in its zone of responsibility and, on creation of conditions /for it/, launch an attack along the Blagaj-Kosor-Buna axis and capture the bridges over the Buna river along the Mostar-Čapljina and Mostar-Domanović roads and in the decisive defence, prevent the penetration of the HVO units from the direction of Čapljina and Domanović towards Mostar. Aim to link with the 1<sup>st</sup> BAT troops.
- 1.8. MUP R BiH has the task of taking up the positions and defending the *Stari Most* /Old Bridge/ and the newly built bridge on Musala. With elements of forces, launch an attack at the MUP HZ HB premises and the Mostar Police Station, capture them and defend them fiercely. Aim to keep the *Hirurgija* /Surgery/ building in our zone. Troops to be used in the attack on the MUP building and the Mostar Police Station are to be on standby in the "Mostar" Hotel.
- 1.9. Recce PI has the task of capturing the *Elektro-Herzegovina* premises. On capturing them, they must be defended decisively and the electricity is to be cut off as per the requests of the brigade.
- 1.10. Sabotage PI has the task of attacking the Žitopromet premises, capturing them and defending them decisively. Carry out a sabotage action at the crossing from the *Sjeverni logor* /North Camp/ across the Neretva river.
- 1.11. Military Police COY has the task to defend KM /Command Post/ of the brigade with a reinforced manpower. Elements of forces are to be utilised as per an agreement with the 2<sup>nd</sup> BAT Commander for the defence in the region of Šenovac as well as for the control and the check up of the area in the zone of responsibility of the 2<sup>nd</sup> BAT.
- 1.12. The weaponry of the POČ /anti-armoured COY/ is attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>

BAT for the closure of the axis (one BsT /recoilless gun/ with crew each).

1 POLO "Crvena Strijela" /?anti-tank wire-guided weapons system/

is attached to the 3<sup>rd</sup> BAT. Position the malyutka /sagger anti-tank missile/ in the most favourable region for sending fire into B. Brijeg settlement.

1.13. The weaponry of the PAM /?anti-aircraft machine gun/ Platoon is attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> BAT and receives tasks from the BAT Commander.

1.14. Other units take up positions for the defence in the region of deployment and are on standby to be used on the order of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade Commander.

2. Be on standby for the defence by 17:00 hrs on 19<sup>th</sup> April 1993 by when the transfer of men and ordnance from one bank of the Neretva river onto the other should have been completed.

3. Maintain regular b/g /combat readiness/ at the line of the defence against the Četniks.

4. Manpower attached to other units, on arrival to the same, will be given tasks and will remain in them until further notice. Troop rotation will be scheduled by the Commanders under whose command the men have been placed.

5. Use the radio communication during the taking up of the defence positions and the execution of combat activities only by using the communications documents. Send coded messages.

6. Movement of units should be covert during the taking up of the positions and on the taking up of the same, reduce it to the minimum.

7. In case the enemy approaches, stop him and open fire as the need arises from all weaponry on disposal simultaneously. Pay close attention to expenditure of ammunition and do not waste it.

8. Reports from the BATs and other units are to be send every two hours, with an emphasis on the changes in the enemy disposition.

COMMANDER

Mr. Midhad HUJDUR

/affixed by stamp/

/signature/

MD/FI

Submitted to:

- 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> BATs
- "Nevesinje" BAT
- "Šargan" BAT
- "Blagaj" Independent COY
- MTD
- MUP R BiH
- Recce PI
- Sabotage PI
- MP COY
- Anti-armoured COY
- PAM PI
- 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Command
- Archives

*/Coat of Arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/*

*/Coat of Arms of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/*

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 The First Mostar Brigade  
 The 41<sup>st</sup> Motorised Brigade

The 41<sup>st</sup> Motorised Brigade Command  
 Republic

(Name of the unit)

Number: 470-1/93

Defence of the

Military Secret

Strictly Confidential

(Level of secrecy)

Mostar, 20 April 1993

On the basis of development of the situation in town of Mostar,

#### I O R D E R

1. Units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion are to strengthen fortification of the achieved defence line.
2. Prepare the manpower for crucial defence of the captured region, and for conduction of the attacks towards hotel Mostar and the 41<sup>st</sup> Motorised Brigade command in order to merge forces into one entirety.
3. Form groups that will be infiltrated during the day behind the enemy lines with task of destruction of the firing equipment of the enemy.
4. The signal for conduction of the combat activity of merging of the forces of the 4<sup>th</sup> Company, and upon getting conditions for aforementioned merge with the command of the 41<sup>st</sup> Motorised Brigade is "Rak – 625".
5. The following units will be subordinated to you for conduction of this task: MUP /Ministry of Interior/ R BiH, Sabotage Platoon, part of the Battalion Nevesinje (30 men). Upon they receive this order, the manpower from these units are obliged to cross over to the right bank of the river of Neretva as fastest as possible and be at disposal to the 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion commander. Use the boat crossings and "Kamenica" crossing during aforementioned cross over.

To:  
 The 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion  
 Sabotage Platoon  
 Battalion "Nevesinje"  
 MUP R BiH  
 ONO  
 Archives

Commander  
 Mister Midhad HUJDUR  
 /signed and stamped/

/fax marks 20/04 93 16:53 phone 088700364 to Široki brijeg  
up side down copy vrisak s brijeg 93 04/20 16:34 p01

### JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE PUBLIC

Today, on 20<sup>th</sup> of April 1993, by mediation of UN representatives, the representatives of HVO and BH Army met and in order to decrease tensions among the HVO and BH Army troops, they agreed on the following:

1. A joint checkpoint of HVO and BH Army is going to be established, near the diner "Jagnje". The point shall be managed by the BH Army representative Esad Humo, representative of the HVO Military police Žarko Jurić and one representative of UNPROFOR. The supervision shall comprise the Bulevar Street up to the hotel "Ero".
2. All units of HVO and BH Army retreat to objects where they are usually located. Before the object, only one guard can stand, whereby the cited units are not allowed to take the combat positions on the demarcation line. Urgent movements of vehicles and men shall be approved jointly.
3. Citizens are asked to strictly obey the curfew; possible misunderstandings shall be solved by the Military police.
4. The transport of the UN Spanish battalion shall be placed on the intersection by the Catholic Church, by the health care centre and by the mall Mit. They shall control the demarcation line together with the joint command of the checkpoint.

Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the BH Army  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

Chief of Operative zone of the South East Herzegovina  
Petar Zelenika  
/signed and stamped/

## JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE PUBLIC

At the meeting held today, on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1993, where Mr. Petar Zelenika, Head of the Operative Zone of the South East Herzegovina (OZ JIH) and Mr. Afir Pašalić, Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the Army BH were present, the following conclusions have been made:

1. A joint order shall be given: for the relocation of the BH Army troops to Konak and South detention camp and for the relocation of the Croatian Defence Council troops to the barracks "Tihomir Mišić" and the barracks "Heliostrom" (3<sup>rd</sup> brigade remains within the existing facility and gets displaced only towards the enemy line). Performing deadline is 48 hours after the order is given. (23<sup>rd</sup> April at 1300 hours).
2. Military police of the Croatian Defence Council remains at its position within the building of the University of Engineering, and the military police of the BH Army remains on Šamovac, if no other order is given.
3. Carrying long-barrelled weapons is strictly forbidden to those who are out of duty.
4. Mixed groups of the military police shall be formed and will perform their duty after the conclusion, pointed in item 1, is realized.
5. After the relocation of the troops to the barracks, all the laws for combat actions in the town shall be annulated.
6. The commission for supervision and control of the order execution is made of Redžo Mehić and Adis Hondžo on behalf of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army and Mario Mikulić and Mato Knezović on behalf of the Operative Zone of the South East Herzegovina.
7. All information related to the BH Army actions and Croatian defence Council announcement instruments can be given only by commanders' assistants for IPD within the 4<sup>th</sup> corps and Operative Zone of the South East Herzegovina by their joint announcements.

Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army  
Afir Pašalić  
(signature and stamp)

Head of the Operative Zone of the South East Herzegovina  
Petar Zelenika  
(signature and stamp)

R BIH /REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AD HERZEGOVINA/

HZ HB /CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNA/

HVO / Croatian Defence Council/

OZ JIH / SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA OPERATIONS ZONE /

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

File no. 01-2489/93

Mostar, 22 April 1993

With a view to regulating relations in the city and the obligations of soldiers in the area of the city and its environs, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Place HVO soldiers into the Tihomir Mišić barracks, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade at *Heliodrom*.
2. Carrying long-barrelled weapons shall be forbidden to all those who are not involved in performing duties arising from the orders which are in effect hitherto.
3. All HVO members shall be forbidden to wear black uniforms.
4. A combined HVO and BH Army team shall be established, with Mr. Mate KNEZOVIĆ and Mr. Mario MIKULIĆ delegated to the team on behalf of the HVO OZ JIH. The team shall start operating IMMEDIATELY.
5. The HVO Military Police shall remain in the University building (the Military Police of the BH Army shall remain in the existing facility at Šemovac).
6. Remove all combat shelters in the city by 1400 hours on 22 April 1993.
7. Deputy commanders for IPD /information and propaganda/ in the OZ JIH and in the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps are the only persons who shall be allowed to communicate with the media about the HVO and BH Army actions by way of joint press releases.
8. Joint HVO Military Police and BH Army teams shall be established to carry out around-the-clock patrols of all parts of the city and to control the situation in the city. Patrol members will wear identical military uniforms, without any insignia,

and the patrols shall be in place until item 8 of this order is repealed.

9. All the persons arrested by the HVO Military Police and the BH Army shall be exchanged by 1400 hours on 22 April 1993, on an "all-for-all" basis.
10. There shall be an unconditional halt on all actions in the OZ JIH area. Actions against Chetniks shall be carried out according to the Order on the Active Defence of the OZ JIH.
11. The assistant commander of the OZ JIH for IPD shall organise meetings in units to brief /the troops/ about obligations arising from this order and the significance of these obligations for the life in this area in the future.
12. All the obligations arising from this order must be met by 1400 hours on 22 April 1993. I shall hold the commanders of the immediately subordinated units responsible for the implementation of this order.

To:

- 1<sup>st</sup> HVO Brigade Knez Domagoj
- 2<sup>nd</sup> HVO Brigade
- 3<sup>rd</sup> HVO Brigade
- 4<sup>th</sup> HVO Brigade Stjepan Radić
- HVO Brigade Herceg Stjepan
- RT /rocket artillery/ Regiment
- Tank Battalion
- 2<sup>nd</sup> PZO LARD PZO /Air Defence Light Artillery Rocket Battalion/
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Military Police Battalion – for information only
- 4<sup>th</sup> A BH Corps – for information only
- Mostar PU /Police Administration/ - for information only
- ONO /All People's Defence/

OZ JIH Commander

Brigadier Miljenko Lasić



/handwritten 4<sup>th</sup> corps/

Commission for residence of OZ JIH Herzegovina  
 Number  
 /title crossed out/  
 Mostar, 3 May 1993

/stamp of receipt/  
 Command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
 No 01-3609/93  
 Date; 4 May 1993

REPORT OF THE MIXED COMMISSION OF THE BH ARMY AND HVO  
 For 3 May 1993

The condition, concerning the move from residential objects corresponds to the previous one, as cited in the report. Individual issues, related to removal from the residence, still occur, however, founded on any legal decision.

The patrol of mixed police visited all objects that should be abandoned, however the condition corresponds to the one from last week, mostly referring to the left bank. In addition, during the bridge visit, the mixed patrol has been told, by the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar brigade, there was nothing to be examined there. We kindly ask you to solve this issue from the level of OZ JIH headquarters, as well as the corps command.

The commission has been lately burdened by reports of citizens, asking the protection of their rights and property.

The commission proposal:

1. To interrupt the work of commission and to keep vigil in the premises of Vodoprivreda, with continuous presence of the mixed police in the cited premises, whereby the commission would meet if necessary and act only there, where it would be directed by both headquarters. The reason for these duties lies in current obligations within our standard affaires.

For HVO Mario Mikulić  
 /signed/  
 Mate Knezović  
 For BH Army  
 Ređo Mehić  
 /signed/  
 /stamped once/

HEADQUARTERS

/handwritten: 970-1/

8<sup>th</sup> of November

Request for telephone hook-up

To: MUNICIPAL STAFF OF THE  
MOSTAR MUNICIPAL CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/

Please provide telephone lines that we need for the normal operation of our units as follows:

1. Deputy Commander - *Visoko* KTK premises
2. IPD /Information and Propaganda/ - *Vranica* GP premises
3. Chief of Staff - *Vranica* GP premises
4. Third Battalion - *Konak* Barracks
5. Second Battalion - A. Šantića Street 4 (former *Merkur* office)
6. Brigade Logistics - *Vranica* GP premises
7. Telephone no. 411-744 - for the Commander's Chief of Staff, Mr Šemsudin HASIĆ
8. Telephone no. 412-404 - for the Brigade Deputy Commander, Mr Sulejman  
BUDAKOVIĆ
9. Telephone no. 415-120 - for the Brigade Chief of Communications, Mr Nijaz  
JAKUPOVIĆ
10. Telephone no. 38-434 - for the Assistant Security Affairs, Mr Kemal JUSUFOVIĆ

Respectfully,

/handwritten: For the/ COMMANDER

Arif Pašalić

/signed and stamped/

/stamp of receipt/  
1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade  
Con. 201-1  
Date: 4<sup>th</sup> of October 1992

/handwritten Jakupović/

Request for phone connection installation  
To be submitted

To the communication centre of the  
First Mostar Brigade

For the needs of scout platoon, it is necessary to install the phone connection in the premises of former Aero-club Ljubo Brešan, where the scout unit is placed.

Also, for the needs of the same unit, it is necessary to enable three radio-devices radio-communication with the centre.

Delivered to:  
-communication centre  
- Scout platoon

Commander  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

COMMAND OF THE  
FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE  
Int. Number: 357-14  
Mostar, 18<sup>th</sup> of September 1992

#### DECISION

Pursuant to BH Army authorization, concerning the MZ "14 Februar" work revival, I decided to assign the premise of "RAZVITAK" in Splitska Street to a temporary usage to MZ "14 Februar".

#### EXPLANATION

MZ "14 Februar", on 17<sup>th</sup> of September 1992 addressed instance, number 418/92 to be permitted to continue its work in the premises of "RAZVITAK" in Splitska Street. While making this decision, I was bearing in mind the occasions of war and the fact that the Government of HVO hasn't yet decided on the MZ work revival, therefore I took into consideration the fact that, at the beginning of war activities, the premises of MZ "14 Februar" were handed to the Mostar battalion for the purposes of Logistics.

AH/AP

Commander  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE

Number: 22-1

Mostar, August 10th, 1992

Request delivered

Post office Mostar

We request 3 lines in the following directions:

1. Konak - A. Šantića
2. Konak – Cernica – Krpića
3. Konak – Gojka Vukovića (scouts)

These lines are necessary in order to smoothly carry out the task for defense of the city.

NJ/MH

Commander  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

MUNICIPAL BOARD OF SDA MOSTAR

NUMBER: 416/93

Mostar, 4 January 1993

4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army

For the purposes of SDA local sub-board Avenue – Zgoni, we kindly ask that you provide us with approval for temporary usage of premises in Splitska Street, number 17. The boutique of "RAZVOJ" was located there before the war.

Municipal board of SDA - MOSTAR  
Dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović  
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten/  
administrative service

Usage of premises approved by  
Assistant of Logistics Commander  
Of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
Mr. Mirsad Mahmutćehajić  
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten/  
To be approved!

Make written decision on usage of premises according to the request  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 BH ARMY  
 COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS  
 PROTOCOL NUMBER 04-578/93  
 Mostar, 25<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

Pursuant to the Article 16, paragraph 1, items 7 and 12 of the Articles 67 and 69 of the legal power Regulation on decree ("Official Gazette no. 4/92, 9/92, 19/92), a Regulation with legal power on movements and standard civilians as well as the material resources disposition within the armed forces and for other defence needs has been made. Accordingly, the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army issues the following

#### ORDER

1. To evacuate the office facilities, the property of DP "Vranica" Mostar, in the S.Radic Street, the business building VRANICA, where the traffic service of HVO (Croatian Defence Council) is currently located.
2. This Order is to be executed not later than 26<sup>th</sup> of January 1993 till 15 00 hours. After the cited time, the authorized persons of the BH Army shall enter the above cited facility, according to the earlier requisition.

AT/AK

Commander  
 Arif Pasalic  
 /stamp and signature/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS  
 Operational number: 04-40  
 Mostar, 27<sup>th</sup> of January 1993

#### CIVIL PROTECTION MOSTAR

For the needs of office premises arrangement, of the BH Army 4<sup>th</sup> corps in the Aleksa Šantić Street, number 8, former premises of TP Merkur Mostar, it is necessary to perform repairs and to set protection.

1. Protection of apertures from mechanic impact:
  2. Within the object in the premises, plaster repairs, paint repairs, slandering windows with nylon as well as the check of electric installation should be done. The quantity of work should be established with CZ.
- Mr. Elezović Smajo is responsible to the 4<sup>th</sup> crops of the BH Amy, concerning the completion of the above cited repairs.

Assistant for Logistics  
 Of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
 Mahmutćehajić Mirsad  
 /signed and stamped/

BH ARMY  
4<sup>th</sup> CORPS COMMAND  
number: 05-777/93  
1<sup>st</sup> of February 1993

Acquirement of GP Vranica

To the staff of the Supreme Command  
Of the Armed Forces

In relation to GP Vranica acquirement, department Mostar, for the needs of BH Army, command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps, we ask the following questions:

1. GP Vranica, with headquarters in Mostar has got over 500 employees; part of the employees is on the field in Russia and Germany. Related to current contracts' fulfilment, 150 employees are in the BH Army and HVO.  
Part of the material resources has been acquired by the HVO Mostar.  
GP Vranica has got certain incomes concerning the nourishment products.  
Question number one; should the entire GP Vranica be acquired into the composition of the BH Army?  
Second; in case of acquirement, what is the status of enterprise and employees?  
Third; should only the part of resources and staff be acquired, depending on needs of the BH Army?  
Fourth: in case of acquirement, shall the GP Vranica be considered as civil or military enterprise?

The question of enterprises acquirement and work obligation has been regulated through the Regulation of R BiH, which understands the functioning of civil Government.

Regarding the fact that the civil Government in Mostar does not function; we kindly ask answers to these questions as well as your instructions.

Please consider this as urgent.  
/handwritten/

Commander:  
Mr. Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten 04 Amina/  
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps

Nr. 04-1025/93  
Mostar February 11 1993

Relinquishment of premises for usage

SDA REGIONAL COMMITTEE  
MARKETING Counsellor

Pursuant to your request, in which you demand to be ceded with premises of the former PBS PJ Mostar for a temporary use, as well as the County building in Fejiceva Street, we inform you that 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of BH Army has already occupied those premises for their purposes.

With respect to your request, as well as our current needs, we are informing you that we can fulfil your request and that we can cede you the mentioned premises for temporary usage.

All issues that might occur concerning the usage of premises shall be regulated afterwards.

DELIVERED to:

- SDA Regional Committee
- Logistics
- a/a

COMMAND  
Mr. Arif Pašalić  
“Signed”

“Round seal”

/coat of arms/  
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>th</sup> CORPS

MILITARY SECRET  
Degree of secrecy

Command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps (name of unit and troop)  
Operational number: 04/192/93  
Mostar, 11<sup>th</sup> of February 1993

#### O R D E R

I most strictly forbid issuing and acquirement of /handwritten material/ and resources of work from the production power DP "VRANICA", Mostar.  
The acquirement can be done only with /handwritten/ oral permission of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps command.

Commander for Logistics  
Mr. Mirsad Mahmutćehajić  
/signed and stamped/



Hydropower on Neretva – Jablanica  
emblem  
660

Phones:  
Central department (Jablanica) 752 620  
Central department (Mostar) 32

32 661

Manager 32 346  
Telex (Jablanica) 46 190  
Telex (Mostar) 46 112  
Telefax (Jablanica) 752 638  
Telefax (Mostar) 420 625

Electro-economic enterprise in social ownership for  
the production of electric energy, with full responsibility

Our number: 20/93 MT/JT  
Your number.....  
Mostar, 2 March 1993  
Alekse Šantića 106 a

Confidential

Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
4<sup>th</sup> corps  
Headquarters – sector of safety  
Mostar

Subject:

Pursuant to act of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar brigade command, Confidential, number 135-1, dated 19<sup>th</sup> of August 1992 (signed by the commander, Mr. Arif Pašalić), a part of the business premises has been acquired for the needs of units of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar brigade, with total existing inventory in the administration building of this enterprise in Mostar, in the Aleksa Šantić street, number 106 a. After the members of the brigade had moved into the facilities, minor part of the object continued to be used for the official purposes of the enterprise for the work of management employees, having the work responsibility (cca 20 employees) at this locality; the condition hasn't changed so far.

Since the arrival to these premises, the brigade members organized and secretly implemented permanent security and watch of the cited business object.

Couple of days ago, we have been notified, by the brigade unit members, situated in the above cited object, that they are about to change the location and abandon all premises within this object.

In the newly coming situation, we are not able to organize the security of this object by ourselves, due to lack of material and technical resources and staff. This object is of great importance for this enterprise as well as to the system of hydro powers at the multiple estuary of the Neretva river, where the large phone centre is placed, with all accompanying devices, computer for data processing, as well as technical and business documentation, significantly important for the functioning of hydropower system.

These days, we managed to contact Mr. Masleša Ramo (orally though) from the MUP of the Republic BIH in Mostar, however, we were notified that, in these circumstances, MUP was not able to assist us, concerning the safety of the cited object.

Pursuant to the above presented, we kindly turn to you and ask you to assist us in safety of this object, which is important to all of us.

Respectfully,

Deputy Manager  
Muharem Tanovic B.S. Ec.  
/signed and stamped/

KAPIĆ REFIK  
Drežnica – building P-35  
12 March 1993  
Mostar

OBJECTION to approval on acquirement of the residential object

/handwritten, the apartment must be acquired for the needs of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion, signed/

I immediately object to approval on acquirement of the residential object for the needs of 4<sup>th</sup> battalion, issued by the command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar brigade, number 335-9/93, dated 9<sup>th</sup> of March 1993, for the following reasons:

1. The approval does not correspond with the Regulation on criteria and norms of disposition of citizens and MS in OS, as well as other needs of defence, and with the Regulation on abandoned apartments (Official Gazette of the RBiH, number 19/92).
2. According to other basic argument, the apartment is not considered abandoned, for the residential object is used for residence. Nevertheless, it is the following issue: my wife, Kapić Zerina, for the reason of business issues, needs an accommodation in Jablanica, a one-room apartment of 12 m<sup>2</sup>, according to decision number 01-219/90, dated 1<sup>st</sup> of August 1990. She uses this apartment only in period of organized classes, during the academic year. According to the above cited, my family does not have two apartments, therefore I kindly ask to solve this issue and achieve a win-win situation. I find that the BH Army is a product of people and that they would protect the people, as well as that it would act according to the Regulation with the legal power from the R BiH Presidency.

/stamp of receipt/  
1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade  
349-1/93  
12 March 1993

Kapić Refik  
/signed/

## COMMAND

250-52

April 6

Pursuant to Regulation with the legal power on BIH defence (Official Gazette, no 4/92), Regulation on standards and criteria on deployment of citizens and material resources into the Armed forces, as well as for other defence purposes (Official Gazette, no 19/92), Regulation on labour duty (Official Gazette, no 19/92), Authorization of Ministry of R BIH for commodity exchange and entrepreneurship, no 13-320-19/92, dated 30<sup>th</sup> of July 1992, dealing in subject of requisition of material resources and deployment of citizens for the purposes of BH Army, to the command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade, brings the following

## DECISION

1. For the needs of BH Army – 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade in Mostar, from the “INTERŠPED” enterprise Mostar, REQUESTS:
  - Warehouse for business purposes in Bisce polje b.b.  
Concluded with number 1

## REMARK

- Upon entry into the business-warehouse, a list of acquired (fixed and movable) property must be made and condition of the property established.

Fair financial compensation for requested fixed and movable property will be determined at the moment when conditions for its payment are achieved, or will be returned to the owner with compensation for possible damages on the mentioned fixed property.

COMMANDER  
Midhat Hujdur  
“Signed”

“Round seal”

Delivered to:

- The appointed person
- Legal service

COMMAND

250-48

April 7

Pursuant to decision on requisition, no 250-32, dated March 30<sup>th</sup> 1993 I issue the following:

ORDER

1. To establish commission in order to make a list of property of the "HERZEGOVINA ROADWAYS" Asphalt base enterprise Bišće Polje – Mostar.
2. HUMO EMIR, BAKIJA KEMAL and PANDUR TEOFİK are appointed members of commission.
3. To deliver a report on conducted control and list of property (fixed and movable) to the Logistics of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade of the BH Army.
4. Deadline for completion is April 12 1993.

COMMANDER  
Midhat Hujdur  
"Signed"

"Round seal"

Deliver to:

- The appointed parson
- Legal service
- Logistics of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar Brigade

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
Operational number: 01-3240/93  
Mostar, 17<sup>th</sup> of April 1993

To the command of 41<sup>st</sup> motorized Brigade

Pursuant to Regulation on criteria and norms of disposition of citizens and material resources into Armed Forces and other needs of defence ("Official Gazette" of the Republic of BH, number 19/92), for the reason of protection of production capacities and enabling cigarettes for the combatants,

I

#### ORDER

1. Put under control the production and distribution of products of FD Mostar.
2. Within the existing staff, choose the most necessary staff, needed for the undisturbed production.
3. Organize production and distribution under authority of 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade that shall perform appointment of staff in management and appointment of other employees, as well as they would control the operative work regularly.
4. The commander of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade shall, by his orders, regulate the way of operations of FD Mostar in details.
5. The commander of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade is responsible for the implementation of this order and must report to me.

/stamp of receipt/  
Command of the 1<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade  
304-172/93  
Date: 19<sup>th</sup> of April 1993

Commander  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS  
Operational number: 01-2910/93  
Mostar, 12 April 1993

For the reason of physical security of objects, excepted for the needs of the 4<sup>th</sup> BH Army corps, I

O R D E R

1. Use the manpower from the composition of the 49<sup>th</sup> Mountain brigade to physically secure the objects, shown in the enclosed scheme.
2. The commander of the 49<sup>th</sup> Mountain brigade shall, by his order, regulate the security (number of watch positions, number and position of checkpoints and similar issues).
3. The physical security is to be set immediately.
4. The commander of the 49<sup>th</sup> Mountain brigade is personally responsible to me, concerning the implementation of this order.


Delivered to:

- 49<sup>th</sup> Mountain brigade
- Logistics of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps
- a/a (Files)

Commander  
Mr. Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped

Certified by:  
Commander

Mr. Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/  
Industrial / Platform



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
Number: 05-3047/93  
Mostar, 14<sup>th</sup> of April 1993

Work suppression of the café bar "INDEKS"

To the command of the first Mostar Brigade

For the reason of safety of the First Mostar Brigade command and the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army, as well as gathering of the unknown persons in the sphere of the Command, I

O R D E R

- 1) Immediately issue the order for the permanent closure of the café bar INDEK.
- 2) Execute the requisition of the café bar "INDEK" and use the object for your needs.
- 3) Turn the object inventory to the user of the object in written.  
Notify me on the order execution till 16<sup>th</sup> of April 1993.

AH/SH

Delivered to:  
-k-di of the First Mostar Brigade  
-Legal service  
-Files

Commander  
Mr. Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

/stamp of receipt/  
Command of the First Mostar Brigade  
Number 304-155/93  
Date 15<sup>th</sup> of April 1993



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
Operational number: 08/2-513/93  
Mostar, 21<sup>st</sup> of April 1993

MILITARY SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL

DP VRANICA

In order to enable and arrange the premises of the restaurant "JAGNJE" and "PETICA"

I

#### ORDER

- to make contact with the feminine organization "SUMEJA" and agree the way of activation of "PUBLIC KITCHEN" in the cited premises,
- to enable and make all necessary repairs in the cited premises and to notify us on your abilities as well as to propose how we can assist you.

Deadline to execute this task is 27<sup>th</sup> of April 1993, therefore we ask you to notify us on the outcome.

Delivered to:

- DP "VRANICA"
- Feminine organization "SUMEJA"
- Files

Assistant Commander for  
Logistics  
Mr. Mirsad Mahmutćehajić  
/signed and stamped/

/coat of arms/

/header/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE

Your emblem

Our emblem

Mostar

CONFIDENTIAL

Installation of the phone connection,  
to be submitted

TO THE BRIGADE PLATOON

I order immediate installation of the phone connection in the premises of the Construction and Engineering Faculty that are in requisition for the needs of BH Army.

The phone shall be used by the AOP service of the First Mostar Brigade.

OM/MH

Delivered to:

- Assistant Commander for Logistics
- Communication platoon
- Chief of AOP service
- Files

Commander  
Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY (further in text BH Army)  
 Command of 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
 Strictly confidential, number /handwritten/ 05-3573-93  
 Mostar, 02.05.1993.

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 Strictly confidential

ŠVK OS of the REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA  
 AND HERZEGOVINA  
 Management for operative and strategic planning  
 and instruction of the OS (Armed forces)

Report on situation and events within the 42. b.br., to be submitted

Pursuant to your act number strictly confidential number 02/369-1 dated 29 April 1993, we submit the 42 b.br. (Mountain brigade) situation analysis before and after the HV (Croatian Army) and HVO (Croatian Defence Council) intruding in sector Gubavica.

1. The 42 b.br. units were located in sector x 4782 – 4786, y 6496 – 6492, chart 1.100 000 meter, edition 1986. the 42 b.br. command was partially in the village Gubavica, and partially in the village Rotimlje. The brigade was made of men from the area of Gubavica, Pijesci, Stanojevići, Rotimlje, Hodovo, Bivolje brdo, Domanovići, Počitelj and of slight number from the city area Stolac. Men, who weren't present at the first defence line, were placed in their houses.
2. On 12 April 1993, pursuant to inspection of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps command, during regular circulation of the 42 b.br., an Order number 01-2922/93 was issued, in order to remove the spotted failures and weaknesses. The Order, among others, contained instructions for splitting apart the command of the brigade and the command of the battalion, physical security of the both commands, improvement of work and units and commands control, information relation, coordination and exchange, all in aim to strengthen the subordination, order and discipline.
3. According to the report of the 42. b.br. command dated 17 April 1993, directed to the 4<sup>th</sup> corps command, after the received ultimatum by the 1. brigade of the HVO "Knez Domagoj" to leave the village Gubavica commands and units, the necessary measures have been taken in order to confront fiercely, in case of HVO attack. In Order, issued to the battalion commanders and narrow part of the 42 b.br., at the meeting held on 17 April 1993 at 2200 hours, the commander of the 42 b.br. orally stated the following:
  - a. do not act without an Order
  - b. connection with our men in the HVO has been done
  - c. with minor forces occupied are:
  - d. bridge in Žitomislići
  - e. two dominant points that dominate Buna
  - f. positions towards Domanovići
  - g. positions towards village Stanojevići
  - h. Hodbina is under control
  - i. the most of forces is in stand-by, resting from the task
  - j. to close the bridge in Žitomislići
  - k. to take the point and the bridge on Buna with one part of Blagaj forces
  - l. to take Domanovići
  - m. men from HVO Čapljina has got the task to take Tasovčići and the bridge in Čapljina with aim not to allow the forces gathering from direction Metković
  - n. villages are maximally safe and connected through the courier connection
  - o. taking the town Stolac with our men in the HVO
  - p. taking points and the villages Prenj, Nakovanj and Aladinići
  - q. bridge control on route Bregava in the village Prenj and prevention of introducing HVO forces from direction Kruševo – Prenj and Svitava – Prenj.

- r. to close the route towards villages Drinovac and Kruševo
  - s. Mortars 60 and 82 are set to act against HVO
  - t. Given targets at the right bank of Neretva to the launcher
  - u. PO materials are in stand-by
4. On 19 April 1993, an attack on the parts of the 42 b.br. has been conducted, that you were informed about through the operative report dated 19 April 1993, the report of the Intelligence organ dated 24 April 1993 as well as through the Security Sector report dated 29 April 1993.
  5. On 26 April 1993, an Order has been issued by the commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps, number 01-3427/93 with aim to connect and consolidate the 42 b.br. units and to secure the conditions for RiK. By this act, the VD – commander of the 42 b.br. and the commanders of the battalion, as well as their members, were appointed.
  6. Since the responsible men from the 42 b.br. command are in captivity, we are not able at this moment to answer the first and second question of your memo. Related to this fact, we inform you that the activities regarding the question of captured persons are current.

After the collection of all relevant facts, we shall submit to you the complete report.

Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
Arif Pašalić/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH  
Strictly confidential, number; 03-0396  
Mostar, 5 May 1993  
/handwritten 1820/

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Report at 1800 hours

1. In the zone of responsibility of the 2<sup>nd</sup> HVO brigade, we have got reinforced activities by Chetnicks in period from 0820 till 0840 hrs; they directed 20 cannon grenades towards curve by the nuns – Potoci from Veliko Pločno. At 1715 they directed 3 MB 82 mm mortar mines to Zelenika from Plužne Njive. In the zone of responsibility of the 3<sup>rd</sup> HVO brigade we encountered provocations towards Rotimlje by dispersible weapon. There weren't any provocations on the rest of the battlefield.
2. Our forces responded to Veliko Pločno with one mortar mine.
3. According to the information from the field, we have neither wounded nor killed combatants.
4. We received information from the security service that the BH Army works on trenches towards Čekrk, around the southern camp. In the so called Serbian Malo Polje, the BH Army performed engineering work for mortars and 122 mm cannons. The trenches are turned towards Buna. Yesterday, they were bringing MB 120 mm mortars on horses.

Delivered to:

- GS HVO Mostar
- ONO OZ JIH

/stamp of receipt/  
GS HVO MO  
2504  
5 May 1993, at 1810 hrs  
signed Miljko

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY H E R C E G B O S N A  
BRIGADE "EUGEN KVATERNIK»  
BUGOJNO, May 05<sup>th</sup>,1993

MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

GS (Main Headquarters) HVO Mostar

Today at 24:30 am, we were stopped on the way Bugojno on Ravno Rostov by the Army of BiH. I was accompanied with two police officers of the BH Army and two HVO police officers, Tomislav Mihalj Blazz Andricc, Vera Ccubela and security from Vitez, Ivica Tomas.

We were held until the 16:30, at which point we were transferred by truck almost to Bugojno. We all arrived in Bugojno, everything is fine. They confiscated two off-road vehicles, weapons, some personal items, cell phone, radio, camera.

Now, we are trying to get in touch with the Command of the BH Army to clear out the incident.

Please inform the commander of the OZ CB Tihomir Blasskicc about this.

Urgently disconnect my cell phone number 412-163, which was connected in Zagreb.

Once the work in Bugojno is finished, I'll be awaiting further instructions.

Best regards!

Colonel Miroslav Andricc

/receipt stamp:/

Unit name	/handwritten/ GS HVO MO
Received teleg. No:	/handwritten/ 1505
Date:	/handwritten/ 5 May 1993, at /handwritten/18:25
MF, TGR TLF__ RRV,ŽV, Rv	
By:	/handriwtten/ <u>Miljko</u>
	signed

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY H E R C E G B O S N A  
BRIGADE "EUGEN KVATERNIK»  
BUGOJNO, May 05<sup>th</sup>,1993

MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

- GS (Main Headquarters) HVO Mostar
- OZ (Operation Zone) SB (Central Bosnia) Vitez

LIST OF SEIZED ITEMS AND WEAPONS AT POINT "RAVNO ROSTOVO"

1. Colonel Miroslav Andric – notebooks, shirt, T-shirt, jacket, pants
  - Mobile phone "simonssen"
  - Pistol "Argentina Power"
  - Bulletproof vest and helmet
  - Camera, "Cannon Ava," radio-transistor
2. Tomislav Mihalj – Pistol CCZ no. 6043
  - Automatic rifle Kalashnikov 509
  - Two rounds of ammunition
  - Shirts and two t-shirts, helmets, and bulletproof vest
3. Blaz Andric – Hackler Koch with two rounds of ammunition
  - Pistol PHP no. 00935 and two hand grenades
  - Hunting Rifle "Twelve" handmade
4. Ivica Tomas: – Automatic Heckler with two rounds
  - Pistol Makarov
  - Combat vest
  - 1 hand grenade
  - Nickel dagger
5. Josip Kutlesa – Automatic rifle Kalashnikov no. 7025
  - TT pistol
6. Tihomir Raic – Automatic Rifle OZ
  - Automatic Pistol "Scorpion" with two rounds of ammunition
  - hand cuffs

Two terrain vehicles were also seized: Toyota HVO-544 M  
Isuzu HVO white

Commander  
Ivica Lucic  
/receipt stamp:/

Unit name	/handwritten/ GS HVO MO
Received teleg. No:	/handwritten/ 2506
Date:	/handwritten/ 5 May 1993, at /handwritten/18:36
MF, TGR TLF__ RRV,ŽV, Rv	
By:	/handriwtten/ <u>Miljko</u> signed

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH  
Strictly confidential, number; 03-0397  
Mostar, 6 May 1993  
/handwritten 1821/

MAIN STAFF OF HVO  
MOSTAR

REPORT TO GS at 0800 hrs

1. The Chetnicks provoked from PZS by dispersible ammunition towards Guberača and Rotimlje. At 0645, two mortar 120 mm grenades fell to Svačice. The rest of the battlefield was calm.
2. Our forces did not carry out any combat activities.
3. According to information from the field, we have neither wounded nor killed combatants.
4. Yesterday, early in the evening, as the convoy from Jablanica (5) was returning, consisting of 5 transport vehicles, the BH Army shot it on the Bijela Bridge and wounded 3 members of E. monitors. They stated the same, while they treated wounds by the school in Bijelo Polje.

Delivered to:

- GS HVO MOSTAR
- ONO OZ JIH

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

/stamp of receipt/  
GS HVO MOSTAR  
672  
6 May 1993, at 0830 hrs  
signed, illegible

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH  
Strictly confidential, number; 03-0398  
Mostar, 6 May 1993  
/handwritten 1844/

MAIN STAFF OF HVO  
REPORT AT 1800 hrs

1. It was relatively calm on the battlefield of OZ JIH today. We have no data from the battlefield part in Konjic, because we weren't able to establish connection. It was also very calm in Bijelo Polje and along Podveležje till Rotimlje. At 1700 hrs the Chetnicks fired one MB mine towards our positions. At 1740 hrs they fired 10 mines on Jewish cemetery, whereby on Kukrice 6 mines. The battlefield of Stolac was completely calm, and in part of the battlefield towards Nevesinje, elevations 634 and 640, the Chetnicks fired 5 MB mines at 1645 hrs. At 1530 hrs, at the intersection of roads to Nevesinje, the BH Army members disarmed 3 civil and 2 military policemen and took them in an unknown direction. By anonymous report we find out that one of them was eliminated by the men with black scarves, which means, Zuka's men, whose task is well known.
2. Our forces did not carry any activities I and hold their positions tight.
3. We haven't had any wounded or killed combatants.

Delivered to:  
-GS HVO MOSTAR  
- ONO JOZ JIH

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 OPERATIVE ZONE SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA MOSTAR  
 Operational number: 01-illegible 84/93  
 Mostar, 6 May 1993

#### ANNOUNCEMENT

Apart from all agreements at the highest level between Generals Petković and Halilović, as well as on the level of OZ JIH and 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army, some representatives of the BH Army want to provoke a conflict between HVO and BH Army at any price, this is, a conflict among Croats and Muslims, which can be seen from the following examples:

1. On 5 May 1993, around 1700 hrs in the immediate vicinity of the department store "Razvitak", 2 minors have been arrested  
Dražen (son of Dinko) Spajić – 17 years old  
Ivan (son of Petar) Palac – 16 years old  
 They were arrested by the BH Army members, whereby the BH Army members alienated 190 D Mercedes vehicle, driven by the minors.
2. On 6 May 1993, around 1530 hrs, the BH Army members disarmed 3 members of civil police, along with two military policemen of HVO at the intersection point towards Nevesinje, having taken them in an unknown direction. By anonymous report, we found out that one of them had been eliminated. We also found out that this has been done by the group of BH Army members, wearing black scarves, which means the Zuka's men, whose task we have already cited.
3. We will try to solve the cited case with the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> BH Army corps, as well as all futures ones in a peaceful manner, whereby we kindly ask you to use your influence in order to help us to solve this and similar cases amicably.

Delivered to:

- European monitors – Međugorje
- Spanish battalion – Međugorje
- 4<sup>th</sup> BH Army corps
- 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar brigade
- ONO

Commander of OZ JIH  
 Brigadier  
 Miljenko Lasić  
 /signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
BH ARMY  
4<sup>th</sup> CORPS  
49<sup>th</sup> MOUNTAIN BRIGADE  
Number: 02-63-2/93  
Mostar, 7<sup>th</sup> of May 1993

/stamp of receipt/  
Command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
Number: 02/1-3716/93  
Date: 7<sup>th</sup> of May 1993

To the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps

MOSTAR

1. There were no combat activities on the line of 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion (Nevesinje)
2. In vicinity of the zone of responsibility of the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion (Šargan), intersection of the road Magistrala-Nevesinje on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1993, after 1500 hours, a strong fusillade (burst) could be heard. The sent patrol established that there were no men on the point. In the afternoon, there were rumours that the BH Army police took 13 HVO members from the cited point.

Delivered to:

- 4<sup>th</sup> corps
- Files

Assistant of Chief  
For reconnaissance and intelligence  
affaires  
/signed and stamped, illegible/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH  
Strictly confidential, number: 03-0399  
Mostar, 7 May 1993  
/handwritten 1847/

REPORT AT 0800 hrs

GS HVO MOSTAR

1. It was a very calm night on the battlefield of OZ JIH. Although we have no information from the part of battlefield in Konjic and Jablanica, there hasn't been a single bullet fired on the defence line during the night. However, it was not calm in Mostar. After the BH Army members during the day disarmed 4 HVO combatants, 3 civil and 3 military policemen, having taken them in an unknown direction as well, tonight, around 2130 hrs, in Donja Mahala at the intersection for Lučki Bridge, the BH Army members fired on the vehicle with HVO members, returning from their shift in Ravni. One grenade from RPG was fired and one "WASP" as well, however unsuccessfully, which resulted in 5 slightly wounded BH Army members, according to statements. The van was hit by AP, which further resulted in 8 heavily wounded HVO members. One of them succumbed to wounds afterwards.
2. Our forces did not carry out any combat activities and hold their positions tight.
3. Within awkward event in Mahala, we had 7 wounded and one killed defenders.

Delivered to:

- GS HVO MOSTAR
- ONO

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

/handwritten Mostar, serious provocations of BH Army/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 OPERATIVE ZONE SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA MOSTAR  
 Operational number: 01-2701/93  
 Mostar, 7 May 1993  
 /handwritten 1853/

#### ANNOUNCEMENT

On the occasion of tensions growth in the city of Mostar and in broad area of OZ JIH, we bring the following sample analysis:

1. The HVO completely fulfilled commitments, obtained on the meetings with General Pelnez and other European monitors.
2. The HVO completely fulfilled agreements, agreed on the highest military level and the level of OZ JIH and 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army:
  - prisons in Čapljina, Ljubuški and Doljani have been visited
  - the mixed commission entered Doljani, Sovići and Slatina, having found exactly same conditions as in the areas that we couldn't reach (localities inhabited by Croats mostly)
  - we enabled free passage to all civilians and convoys in the zone of responsibility of HVO OZ JIH
  - there are no international conflicts in the areas, populated by Muslim as minority
3. Regarding the BH Army forces, they mostly did not fulfill their commitments:
  - the BH Army members still did not leave most of the civil objects (Kluz, "Partizan" cinema, Hygienic institute, SDK, building of the former Committee, "Home of JNA", Autotransport premises, Velmos premises, Sokara premises, Vinarija premises and many others)
  - instead of establishing connection to "Herceg Stjepan" brigade command in Konjic, it has been looted and BH Army moved into those premises.
  - The premises of HVO Jablanica headquarters have been looted and refugees moved into those premises
  - One third of the "Herceg Stjepan" brigade persists in Klis, surrounded by the BH Army
  - The bridge in Bijela is still mined and one of the UNPROFOR members has been wounded in the night of 5<sup>th</sup>/6<sup>th</sup> May 1993 by the BH Army forces
  - Tito's bridge mostly cannot be used, due to arrestment of HVO members, vehicle alienation or personal belongings impounding
  - 3 HVO members, one of them being the company commander, were arrested at the intersection by the department store "Razvitak" on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1993, vehicle and weapon being alienated and the soldiers took in an unknown direction

- part of the town on the left bank of Neretva is controlled by the BH Army forces and special groups of Zuka's men, headed by Zijo Oručević; they expel Croats from their apartments, arrest them, terrorize them, disarm the checkpoints of HVO, all in tight conspiracy with the 4<sup>th</sup> BH Army corps command
- 6 policemen have been disarmed yesterday on the checkpoint and then took in an unknown direction; there are indications that one of them was murdered
- a group of HVO soldiers was intercepted, having transported food to the first line on Guberača; everything was alienated and 4 soldiers were taken in an unknown direction
- on the right side of the town, in the area, mostly populated by Muslims (Donja Mahala), the situation is similar to one on the left bank. Last night, the defenders, members of HVO were severely attacked in Mahala, at the traffic lights, hit by "WASP" and RPG, and then by "death sower" and infantry weapon; one of the members was murdered, 2 of them are heavily wounded and 6 of them slightly wounded.
- The HVO forces are not allowed to take the corpses and to take care of wounded combatants in the area of Konjic, not even then, when the humanitarian convoy transports the highest BH Army commanders, headed by Sefer Halilović.

All the above cited is an indicator that the BH Army forces are not comfortable with peace in this area and that they don't want the Vance-Owen plan to be implemented. It seems that this kind of BH Army conduct bear resemblance to actions of the Serbian aggressor and that they want drag the Croatian people into new blood-stained conflict in order to remodel the peace plan of the World community. Unfortunately, media, controlled by the BH Army (Radio Sarajevo and War Studio Mostar) also contribute to a poisoning of international relations and hate towards the HVO and Croatian people.

It is the final moment to cross the way of rising evil and that we all contribute to long desired peace, according to individual domains.

Delivered to:

- defence department of HZ HB Mostar
- GS HVO HZ HB Mostar
- Military observers – Međugorje
- Spanish battalion of UN – Međugorje
- 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army
- communication instruments
- ONO OZ JIH Mostar

Commander of OZ JIH  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH  
Strictly confidential, number: 03-0400  
Mostar, 7 May 1993  
/handwritten 1876/

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT AT 1800 hrs

1. It was mostly calm, today on the battlefield of OZ JIH. On the part of the battlefield in Konjic, the BH Army forces continued with setting on fire and looting houses in Croatian villages today as well, which they hold under control. Starting from the early hours, there are infantry attacks going on to the villages of Vrci and Seonica, whereby the village Vrci received an ultimatum to surrender today, till 1800 hrs. They claim to have a problem with MTS and ammunition. Around 1400 the Chetnicks provoked from PZ cannon towards Kute, using the dispersible weapon. In the afternoon, 4 members of the BH Army encountered the mine field and one of them is heavily while two of them slightly wounded; the fourth one escaped the wounding. In the zone of responsibility number 3 – HVO brigade, the Chetnicks fired 5 MB mines to our positions on Guberača, whereby in the area of Rotimlje they provoked with PZ machine guns in several occasions. The Stolac and Neum battlefields were completely calm. The situation in the town of Mostar is very complicated. After exchange of all arrestees around 1530 hrs, according to the principle “all for all”, new arrestment of HVO members and civilians followed, executed by the BH Army. Till 1730 hrs, two HVO members got arrested (one on the forest hill and the other one by the Main post office), while the third was killed. As we write this report, one grenade from BS cannon has just fallen to the playground of “Tihomir Mišić” barrack, most probably directed from the BH Army positions in Zalik or somewhere in Fortica.
2. Our forces hold their positions tight and did not carry any combat activities.
3. There are no wounded combatants, whereby Miralem Kajan got killed.

Delivered to:

- GS HVO Mostar
- ONO

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

/stamp of receipt; GS HVO, 678, 7 May 1993 at 20/illegible/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH  
Strictly confidential, number: 03-0401  
Mostar, 8 May 1993  
/handwritten 1877/

-CODED-

Report at 0800 hrs

1. On the battlefield of OZ JIH, the night of 7/8 May 1993 was relatively calm. 3 MB 82 mm mines fell to Vranjevići around midnight. The enemy directed 3 MB 120 mm mines from Dobro Dublje to the area of Lišani. Vranjevići and Rotimlje suffered activities from PZS and PZT. On the battlefield of Konjic, the Muslim forces keep attacking the Croatian villages by all disposable weapons. Foreign mercenaries participate in attacks as well. Three of our combatants have been massacred (cut ears, fingers and muscles) the civilians have been arrested.
2. Our forces protect own lives as well as the civil population by infantry weapon.
3. In the area of Konjic we have got one killed, four wounded soldiers and three civilians.

Delivered to:  
-GS HVO  
-ONO (Files)

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

/stamp of receipt/  
GS HVO  
681  
8 May 1993, at 0820 hrs  
/signed/

...

## Chapter XIV. 1. The war in Mostar

It started on 9<sup>th</sup> of May 1993 in the early morning hours, as around 5 o'clock one started a severe shooting and detonations from heavy artillery. By this act, all illusions that the war in Mostar will not happen, were dispersed. That morning, the war entered Mostar by the front door.

All appeals, political agreements, warnings and international accusations became history and that history shall verify general share of some politicians – those who were pro war and those who truly worked hard for a democratic solution of the Croatian-Muslim political relation in BH.

I was the eyewitness of that war in Mostar. From the spot where my apartment is located, in settlement Centre II, I could clearly see heavy machine guns of HVO firing from the locality of Hum hill towards the locality of Šemovac, Bulevar, around health care centre and then towards the gymnasium building where units of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps cross Bulevar in infantry assault and enter small alleys towards the locality of Liska street. The most intense infantry attacks of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps combatants were Musala – new pontoon bridge – former street Korzo, as well there were some smaller attacks from Cernica Street, across Bulevar, towards the health care centre and vicinal gardens. In those moments of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps combatants infantry attack, heavy machine guns of HVO fired towards Bulevar and buildings located by the road itself. Other part of heavy machine guns fired towards localities of Vranica building in S. Radića Street, where the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps was situated. Heavy artillery weapon of HVO severely fired towards the temporary establishments of the BH Army between 8 and 9 o'clock, the building of the hygienic institute, SDK and Konak. Artillery fire towards those localities alternated in waves. At the same time, one could hear artillery explosions on localities of B. Brijeg towards Cim and Rudnik. That was coming from the left bank and one was hitting targets which were marked by previous orders of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mostar brigade commander, dated 20<sup>th</sup> of April 1993.

Already around 11 o'clock one could hear a concentrated infantry fire on the following localities: Mujaga Komadina houses, part of the former Lenin's Boulevard street, Liska park and Rondo. Later on, one could see that those were camouflaged infantry breakthroughs of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps. They were even roughly kept on that broader locality. Heavy machine guns kept concentrating its fire to the Vranica building. One was shooting, using the incendiary ammunition, and afterwards, a fire occurred in several apartments, where clouds of smoke could be seen clearly. In that locality, artillery fire continued throughout the night and the day after, in the early morning hours. At that moment, the units of HVO took this building by infantry and entered the headquarters of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps.







ORDERS BY A.PAŠALIĆ  
AND MIDHAD HUJDUR

ACCORDING TO THE  
PLAN A-BiH ATTACKED  
HVO IN MOSTAR ON  
MAY 9, 1993

\* enlarged and more  
reviewed map can be  
found in the pocket at the  
end of the book





OZ JIH Mostar  
Operational number: 03-0403  
Mostar, 9 May 1993

Report at 2000 hrs

1. The chronology of events:

- at 1420 hrs, Mario Matić, combatant from 1<sup>st</sup> battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> HVO brigade got killed while running across on Rondo.
- At 1440 hrs we were informed that the Lillies are attacking prison (Ćelovina)
- At 1445 hrs Primorac was ordered to hit the "Partizan" cinema and Ričina Street (former Šantićeva street).
- Pero Marijanović from military police got slightly wounded.
- Marinko Knezović from 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> HVO brigade got slightly wounded in Drežnica.
- Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> HVO brigade asked for BOV and transport vehicle. He reports that Jasenjani are cleansed, whereby the manpower from Ravni switches to Jasenjani.
- Rudolf Jaranić and Himzo Nazdrajić from the police management by Vranica, got wounded. Mensudin Boškailo from the police management got wounded.
- Željko Prskalo from HVO got heavily wounded.
- Dragan Džidić got slightly wounded.
- It has been demanded to fire on Brankovac and the area around the Old Bridge. A reinforcement for Drežnica has been demanded, counting two groups of 20 men, transport vehicle and PAM 14,5 mm. Barrage fire for the area around hotel "Ruža" has been requested.
- Dragan Marić from 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion got killed.
- Dražen Buhovac got heavily wounded.
- Dražen Komadina got slightly wounded.
- Ivan Babić got killed.
- Around 1700 hrs we managed to repulse an attempt of the BH Army to climb the hill Hum.
- Marin Vidović got slightly wounded.
- Robert Miljko succumbed to wounds.

General situation in Mostar is very difficult and the fights are still going on. HVO shall try to fortify position on Boulevard. According to Chief of In.Sl. OZ JIH report, the situation in HVO is the following:

- |                      |                        |
|----------------------|------------------------|
| - killed combatants  | 6 defenders            |
| - wounded combatants | 17, 5 of them heavily  |
| - civilians          | 1 killed and 4 wounded |

2. As far as the line towards the Chetnicks is concerned, the situation is the following:

- at 1215 hrs, three grenades fell to Ravnice (Podveležje)
- at 0830 hrs one MB mine to Ošanići (Stolac)
- around 1630 till 1700 hrs, 7 MB mines fell to Kute (B. Polje)

3. Bokševica in Konjic is attacked from all sides. They seek for cannon fire, help in manpower and ammunition.

## Delivered to:

- GS HZ HB Mostar
- Grude, fax 662 384
- OZ JIH (Files)

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

/stamp of receipt/  
GS HVO MO  
2597  
9 May 1993, at 2015 hrs  
signed Miljko

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNA  
*/Croatian checkerboard/*CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
SOUTH- EASTERN HERZEGOVINA OPERATIONS ZONE

Number: 01-2742/93  
Mostar, 09.05.1993

Defence  
Military Secret  
Strictly Confidential

Having in mind the development of the situation in Mostar, I hereby

O R D E R

1. To be sent to Mostar hundred and twenty (120) well armed and trained people.
2. The movement direction to be via Čitluk. Call the OZ JIH / South-Eastern Herzegovina Operations Zone/ Command.
3. Upon coming to Balinovac, announce yourself to the OZ JiH Command.

## Submitted to:

- 1<sup>st</sup> HVO "Knez Domagoj" Brigade
- 4<sup>th</sup> HVO "Stjepan Radić" Brigade
- ONO /extension unknown/

Commander:  
Brigadier  
Miljenko LASIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

/stamp of OZ JiH Defence Department, Mostar/

**OPERATIONS ZONE /OZ/  
SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA /JIH/**

Delivery number: 01-2910/93  
Mostar, 9 May 1993

In view of the situation in Mostar, I hereby

**ORDER**

1. Urgently send a 120 mm MB /mortar/ platoon with a combat set of shells, and one 107 mm LRL /light rocket launcher/ squad with a combat set of rockets to Mostar.
2. Report to the chief of artillery of the JIH OZ in the village of Vukodol for further instructions.
3. Take the Ljubuški - Čitluk - Vukodol village route.

COMMANDER  
Brigadier Miljenko LASIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

To:

- HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade
- ONO /Operations and Training/
- Files

**OPERATIONS ZONE /OZ/  
SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA /JIH/**

Delivery number: 01-2909/93  
Mostar, 9 May 1993

In view of the situation in Mostar, I hereby

**ORDER**

1. Urgently send a T-34 /tank/ crew to Mostar.
2. Report to the commander of the OZ JIH in the village of Rodoč - Heliodrom for further instructions. The crew should be well trained.
3. Take the Čitluk - Varda - Rodoč village route.

COMMANDER  
Brigadier Miljenko LASIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

To:

- HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade
- ONO /Operations and Training/
- Files

**SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA /JIH/ OPERATIONS ZONE /OZ/**

Delivery number: 01-2903/93  
Mostar, 9 May 1993

In view of the situation in Mostar, I hereby

**ORDER**

1. Immediately send one two-barrelled 14.5 mm PZO <sup>1</sup>/<sub>anti-aircraft defence/</sub> weapon with crew and a minimum of 3,000 rounds of ammunition to Mostar.
2. Take the Ljubuški - Čitluk – village of Vukodol route.
3. Report to the Chief of PZO of the JIH OZ in the village of Vukodol for further instructions and positioning of the weapon.

COMMANDER  
Brigadier Miljenko LASIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

To:

- HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade
- ONO /Operations and Training/
- Files

**OPERATIONS ZONE /OZ/  
SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA /JIH/**

Delivery number: 01-2902/93  
Mostar, 9 May 1993

In view of the situation in Mostar, I hereby

**ORDER**

1. Urgently send the *Grđani* Platoon to Mostar – well armed.
2. On arrival in Mostar, report to the JIH OZ Command.
3. On arrival in Balinovac, report to the JIH OZ Command.

COMMANDER  
Brigadier Miljenko LASIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

To:

- HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade
- *Grđani* Platoon - Čitluk Battalion
- ONO /Operations and Training/
- Files

OPERATIONS ZONE  
SOUTH-EAST HERZEGOVINA

No: 01-2908/93  
Mostar, 10 May 1993

Given the situation in Mostar

I HEREBY ORDER

1. Immediately, and by 2200 hours at the latest, send one PZO /Anti-Aircraft Defence/ 14,5/2 /two-barrelled 14.5 mm anti-aircraft machine-gun/, with a crew and at least 4,000 rounds of ammunition.
2. Line of movement is Ljubuški - Čitluk - Hum, where they are to report to Mr /Jozo/ MILETIĆ, the PZO 2<sup>nd</sup> Larb /Light Artillery Rocket Battery/ Commander, and place themselves under his command.

COMMANDER  
Miljenko LASIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

To:  
- HVO 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade  
- QNO /Operations and Training Organ/  
- Files

SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA /JIH/ OPERATIONS ZONE /OZ/  
Delivery number: 01-2907/93  
Mostar, 9 May 1993

In view of the situation in Mostar, I hereby

ORDER

1. Immediately send 6 ambulance teams with vehicles to Mostar.
2. After arriving to Mostar, the Chief of Ambulance is to report to OZ JIH Chief of Ambulance for further instructions.
3. For movement, take the Ljubuški-Čitluk- village of Vukodol route and stay on stand-by.

Delivered to:  
- 4<sup>th</sup> brigade of HVO  
- Chief of Ambulance of the 4<sup>th</sup> brigade of HVO  
- Files

Commander  
Miljenko Lasić  
/signed and stamped/



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

SOUTH-EAST HERZEGOVINA ZONE OF OPERATIONS, MOSTAR

Operational number 01-5926 / 93

Mostar, 10<sup>th</sup> of November 1993

TO: - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HR OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
- HR HERCEG-BOSNA HVO  
GS  
HR H-B  
- MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

R E P O R T

On 9 November 1993, between 1015 and 1020 hours, the *Stari Most* fell into the Neretva river.

I am hereby sending you the information that we have in connection with the above incident.

- 1./ The Old Bridge on the Neretva had been damaged and threatened by the ravages of time even before the war so that a few years ago a plan was made for its restoration and it was restored to a certain extent.
- 2./ The Serbian aggressor shelled the bridge and damaged it.
- 3./ The Old Bridge was in the immediate vicinity of the line of separation under the control of the Muslim army, which used it for military purposes (crossings of the army and transport and transfer of weapons, artillery and other military equipment).
- 4./ The MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ did not mark the Old Bridge according to the international regulations of UNICEF and did not demand from the HVO any special protection measures with regard to the Old Bridge. The UNICEF flag was not raised on the bridge because, in that case, they could not have used it themselves in combat operations and for combat operations.
- 5./ HVO units never targeted the Old Bridge and destroying it was not the aim. Defending themselves against numerous attacks by the MOS from the direction of the Old Bridge towards Podhum and the Franciscan church, where there were many breakthroughs of the defence line, units fired at the enemy's manpower and materiel near the bridge. The Old Bridge was destroyed as a consequence of combat operations because that area has been the scene of fierce clashes since the beginning of the conflict.

SENT TO:

- The HR H-B government
- The HR H-B Ministry of Defence
- The HR H-B HVO GS
- The Mostar ZP ONO

MOSTAR ZP COMMANDER  
FOR: Brigadier  
/a signature/  
Miljenko LASIĆ  
/stamp/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL NUMBER: 03PRPR03-04-04  
Mostar, 10 May 1993  
/handwritten/

MAIN STAFF OF HVO  
MOSTAR

Report at 1800 hours

1. On the defence line towards Chetnicks it was relatively calm through the night. Muslim forces in Konjic are in the middle of deployment therefore we expect even more severe attack to our positions in the morning. Our defenders are on the edge of power and seek help in manpower and MTS, as well as in staff (officers). The night was relatively calm in the city of Mostar, this is, without major actions. Our forces hold their positions tight, while the BH Army reinforced its positions through the night. It seems that they managed to transfer one part of forces to the right bank and we are also informed that they transferred one BST cannon to locality Šemovac. The announced reinforcement to companies from western Herzegovina municipalities did not arrive, as well as the reinforcement from 4<sup>th</sup> brigade of HVO, "Stjepan Radić"; 2<sup>nd</sup> brigade of HVO arrived till the bridge over Neretva towards Drežnica, where they were stopped and sought help.
2. Our forces hold their positions tight and wait for further orders.
3. Yesterday, we had 7 killed combatants and a certain number of wounded defenders. We are also familiar with one killed civilian.

Delivered to:

- GS HVO Mostar
- ONO OZ JIH

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

/stamp of receipt/  
GS HVO Mostar  
684  
10 May 1993, at 0930 hrs  
/signed/

Operational number: 01-2756/93  
 Mostar, 10 May 1993  
 /handwritten/  
 Public announcement

UNPROFOR Command Zagreb

Dear gentlemen,

We are surprised by the statement of UNPROFOR command, concerning the area of former Yugoslavia that was absolutely supported with no arguments whatsoever, referring to the fact that the HVO forces on 9 May 1993 started the combat actions in Mostar first, having violated 3 last agreements between Croat and Muslim commander under the protection of UN. We are amazed that Mr Wahlgreen wasn't objectively informed about the fact who actually didn't respect the above cited agreement and who in fact, after numerous provocations, started the combat actions on 9 May 1993 on the barrack of "Tihomir Mišić," which is located on the left bank of Neretva river and which the BH Army has already "tided up" as area, populated by Muslims only. To connect the authorities of the Republic of Croatia with it is also without any foundation, as well as any argument. It is true that the HVO units responded to combat actions of the BH Army in order to defend the city and its populations.

Commander of OZ JIH  
 Brigadier  
 Miljenko Lasić  
 /signed and stamped/  
 /signed Petar Zelenika/

DEFENCE  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Operational number: 01-2755/93  
 Mostar, 10 May 1993

Pursuant to conflict escalation in Mostar, between the BH Army and HVO, as well as to strengthen our defence I hereby

#### REQUEST

1. That the HVO Posušje delivers us 2 MB 82 mm or 120 mm mortars, along with trained and equipped crews to the area of Bare – Klanci. As far as the MB 82 mm or 120 mm mortar is concerned, choose among disposable ammunition or in combination.
2. Apart from crews, it is necessary to direct 30 well equipped soldiers to the area of Bare – Klanci in order to safeguard the area.
3. The cited request under paragraphs 1 and 2 is to be realized IMMEDIATELY, at latest till 2000 hrs on 10 May 1993.
4. I suggest you to safeguard the repeater on Čvrtnica, along with HVO Posušje engagement.

Organize your own arrival to Bare – Klanci, as well as every logistic support.

Delivered to:  
 GS HVO  
 ONO OZ JIH  
 Files

Commander of OZ JIH  
 Brigadier  
 Miljenko lasić  
 /stamped and signed/

OPERATIONS ZONE  
SOUTH-EASTERN HERZEGOVINA  
Delivery number: 01-2911/93  
Mostar, 12 May 1993

In view of the situation in the city of Mostar, I hereby

ORDER

1. Immediately send the JPN unit of the 4<sup>th</sup> brigade of HVO to Mostar.
2. Commander of the unit is to report to me in the OZ JIH headquarters till 1700 hrs.
3. Take the route Ljubuški-Čitluk-Balinovac. Report to the OZ JIH headquarters after arriving to Balinovac.

Delivered to:

- 4<sup>th</sup> HVO brigade
- ONO
- Files

Commander  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
GOVERNMENT / VLADA  
PRIME MINISTER / PREDsjedNIK

11 May 1993

H.E. Mr. Yuliy Vorontsov  
President of the Security Council  
United Nations  
NEW YORK

Excellency:

While I remain deeply disturbed by the recent developments in Mostar and while my offices are taking all possible measures to halt the grossly irresponsible acts of all parties and to prevent similar incidents from spreading elsewhere, I must address Your Excellency with respect to the Presidential Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25746) adopted by the Security Council in connection with the conflict in Mostar.

Members of the Presidency and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, meeting in Čitluk on 11 May 1993, have found it necessary to bring to the attention of the Security Council and the public, certain inexplicable errors and omissions from the aforementioned Presidential Statement.

The Statement's description of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) as "Bosnian Croat paramilitary units" misconstrues the role of HVO. HVO is a legitimate army, recognised by the Government and the Presidency, which for a long period of time represented the only regular defence force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. HVO's tie to the Government in Zagreb, exaggerated. No one denies that this relationship became necessary, as the last option, only when the Government and the Presidency in Sarajevo were reluctant and noncooperative in joining Bosnian Croat members of the Government in taking necessary measures to protect the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina from obvious threats of war from Serbia and Montenegro.

The Statement condemns the alleged Bosnian Croat offensive against Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica. UNPROFOR forces can easily enter Jablanica and Dreznica to confirm that no conflicts whatsoever are occurring there. UNPROFOR's access to these towns is possible, in contrast to Konjic and 18 other Croat villages in that region, in which the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABH) has forbidden access to media and all international personnel, for over a month. This, I fear, is done in an apparent cover-up of crimes committed against the Bosnian Croat population there.

With respect to the tragic situation in Konjic County, I humbly request that the Security Council take all necessary steps to end the blockade of Konjic to UNPROFOR and all other parties, with all due urgency.

The Statement erroneously describes the signatories to the cease-fire ) as the "Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the "Bosnian Croat party".

The president of the Government (Prime Minister) of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, four current ministers in that Government, the deputy and assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as three members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, meeting in Citluk, vigorously object to the Council's use of the term "Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" when referring solely to the Muslim part of that government. This objection has been previously noted in my letter to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council dated 19th of February 1993, (S/25320).

We, as Bosnian Croat members of the Government and the Presidency, dispute the legality of the extreme members of the Muslim part of the Government in Sarajevo treating the institutions of government, including the right to represent and use official titles of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the right to name ambassadors of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an exclusive domain.

We also humbly remind the Council that the "Bosnian Croat party" does not exist. The Bosnian Croats articulated their political desires in electing representatives of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) during democratic elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991. This party continues to receive a clear mandate to express the political views of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina with greater support than ever before.

Mr. Mate Boban, leader of Bosnian Croats, is a member of the Republic's Parliament, as well as the legally elected president of HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is currently serving his electorate as president of the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia.

The Statement is indeterminate in its charge that the actions of the Bosnian Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been in keeping with their signature to the Peace Plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the course of negotiations and since executing the Peace Plan the Bosnian Croat side has shown a high degree of cooperation and willingness to carry out provisions of the Plan as soon as possible. Ample evidence exists however, which suggests that the conflict in Mostar resulted precisely because extreme members of the Muslim population do not wish to have anything to do with the Peace Plan and its implementation.

The aforementioned errors contained in the Statement may be a result of limited information. However, such errors and charges are not in keeping with the noble principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

We sincerely hope that these errors will be corrected in due time. The Bosnian Croats, <sup>one</sup> of the three constituent peoples of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through its legal representatives, continue to seek cooperation with all international factors, and especially with the United Nations, in a most constructive manner, in order to promote peace in and assure the establishment of sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Further, we sincerely hope that the Council will consider the situation in Konjic Country, with all due urgency, as it rightfully did regarding the situation in Mostar.

Excellency, I regret having to be so blunt in light of the immense suffering of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims and in respecting the immense integrity of the Council's decisions. I am nevertheless compelled as Prime Minister to bring the foregoing facts to your attention.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Mile Akmadžić  
Prime Minister of the  
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

cc: Co-Chairman of the IC FY



*Mile Akmadžić*

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CONCLUDED BETWEEN GEN MILIVOJ PETKOVIC AND GEN SEFER HALILOVIC  
ON 12 MAY 93  
IN THE PRESENCE OF LT GEN PHILIPPE MORILLON  
AND ECMM/HRC JEAN-PIERRE THEBAULT

Contracting Parties :

Gen. Sefer Halilovic

and

Gen. Milivoj Petkovic

Reconfirming their will to establish peace within the territory of Bosnia Hercegovina;

Reconfirming that all persons and property should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act;

Reconfirming also that the GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 AND THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL 1) are fully applicable in the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

have agreed on the following :

ARTICLE 1

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Absolute freedom of movement to be restored and guaranteed, not only for UNPROFOR, ECMM and Humanitarian Aid agencies, but also for all logistic supply and support convoys of both parties on all routes and especially on the routes:

1. DOLJANI - MOSTAR - JABLANICA - KONJIC - PAZARIC - TARCIN - KISELJAK - VISOKO - TUZLA and
2. POSUSJE - PROZOR - GORNJI VAKUF - TRAVNIK - ZENICA - VITEZ - BUSOVACA.

Freedom of movement will also be guaranteed for civilians to travel throughout the country.

Control of routes will be maintained by civilian police only. Check Points and route patrols will be manned by mixed police units with the assistance of UNCIVPOL who, in case of necessity, will resolve disputes between the police of the two sides. Military units will not exercise any control.

On a temporary basis, until the implementation of the Vance Owen Plan, these mixed units will be established in MOSTAR, TRAVNIK and ZENICA after agreement between the existing police forces.

ARTICLE 2DEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR

One Company of the Spanish Battalion will be deployed and accommodated in MOSTAR at the airport until more suitable accommodation can be found. The deployment will be on both sides of the NERETVA river. Deployment will begin 1800 hours 12 May 1993.

The Company located in JABLANICA will continue to patrol the routes between JABLANICA-TARCIN, JABLANICA-KOSTAJNICA and start patrolling between OSTROZAC-TRUSINA-SEONICA-VRCI.

The British Battalion will continue to patrol the route JABLANICA-PROZOR-GORNJI VAKUF.

ARTICLE 3WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED FORCES

In MOSTAR, all military units will be withdrawn and confined in their barracks: the BiH Army in the Southern Camp and in Konak Barracks, the HVO units and the HQ of the Operational Zone of South East Herzegovina in the Northern Camp and at the Heliobrom. The withdrawal will take place after the deployment of UNPROFOR and by 1200 hours on 13 May 1993. In the area of KOSTAJNICA and KONJIC, HVO units will be deployed in a few villages in the area marked on the attached map. BH Army will withdraw out of this area to their own villages.


ARTICLE 4RELEASE OF PRISONERS

Both parties agree to the immediate release of all civilian detainees without any conditions and to be fully completed on 13 May 1993.

This will be followed by an exchange of all Prisoners of War. A list of all Prisoners of War will be presented to the International Committee of the Red Cross no later than 1200 hours 13 May 1993.

ARTICLE 5RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Both sides will provide all assistance in restoring displaced persons to their own properties or places of residence. Both sides also guarantee the safety and security of displaced persons.






ARTICLE 6

All areas of dispute will be solved by negotiations by both parties in the presence of UNPROFOR and ECMM.

signed:

Gen Sefer Halilovic  


Gen Milivoj Petkovic  


witnessed by:


Lt Gen Philippe Morillon  
Representative of UNPROFOR



Ambassador Jean-Pierre Thebault  
Representative of ECMM



12 May 1993



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA  
 INTERNAL AFFAIRES DEPARTMENT  
 POLICE DEPARTMENT MOSTAR  
 POLICE STATION MOSTAR

Number:  
 On 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1993

Pursuant to article 151, paragraph 2 of ZKP, the authorized official of this station, in presence of the recording secretary makes the following

#### RECORD

on notifications, given by DŽEMAL HAMZIĆ, on 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1993 in this police station:

DŽEMAL HAMZIĆ, son of Refik and mother Selma, born Hadžić, born on 29<sup>th</sup> of November 1960 in Mostar, journalist, employee of the Information centre Mostar, currently editor of the war studio Mostar, residing in Splitska Street 44, married, father of one minor child, Muslim, so far not criminally prosecuted, provides the following

#### STATEMENT

In the late April 1992, while I was still working in the Information centre in Mostar, Suad Ćupina, Commander of the Independent battalion in Mostar, came to me and asked me whether I would accept jobs concerning informing within the Independent battalion in Mostar. I previously talked to Tomo Mazalo, seeking instructions whether I would bear some unfavourable consequences for my future involvement within informing centre Mostar, whereby I was given an answer that I could freely help people in the Mostar battalion because the Mostar press Sloboda was falling apart either way. After a while, I was offered to establish the press, called the Mostarsko jutro, being editor at the same time,; I accepted it, being accredited by the Defence department of HVO HZ HB. I emphasize that back then, I wore the camouflage uniform for the first and the last time, while taking pictures for the journalist identification card. I wasn't charged with any weapon or uniforms, my brother and I merely had a gun from our deceased father. On 7<sup>th</sup> of September 1992 the members of the radio television BIH accepted the idea to establish the radio station "the war studio Mostar" at proposal of Omer Vatrić. Two days after, I was appointed main editor with full responsibility. At the very beginning of the establishment of this war studio, according to the given scheme, I was responsible to the program council, being requested to have members of all nations in their teams, members and representatives of the civil and military government from the area of Mostar. I was directly responsible to the program council, consisting lately of Dževad Kolukčija, Izudin Šahović as representative of RTV BIH, Arif Pašalić as army commander and others, Ustamujić as representative of non party organizations, vicar Ivan Ševo as representative of religious and humanitarian organizations, whereby I and Alija Behram were the only ones without right to vote and to decide. Our idea by the establishment of the war studio was to make this press a Mostar press, to inform people on the situation in Mostar objectively and correctly. I emphasize that I didn't understand myself well with Arif Pašalić, commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army, we even experienced conflict several times or the rackets argument, because he wanted to exert influence on me, regarding the editor's policy in several occasion.

Having in mind that our premises were connected to the premises of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps command of the BH Army, I tried, in every way, to dislocate the war studio from the cited premises because I felt extreme pressure by Arif Pašalić and his sympathizers, which Dževad Kolukčija, president of the council also mentioned in several occasions. It sounded as if Arif Pašalić wanted to remove me from that position by all forces, the position of the war studio Mostar editor. I would also like to mention that I managed to get the first premises for the war studio and the editorship of the Mostarsko jutro press in the time when the war government of HVO Mostar, as well as the command under Jasmin Jaganjac were residing in the building Vranica. Regarding that I noticed the path of Arif Pašalić's intentions, in the last three months, in agreement with Dževad Kolukčija, I kept disabling the Arif Pašalić's approach to the war studio, because his manners did not fit into the editor's conception, including me and Dževad Kolukčija, as well as the conception of the war studio Mostar; in other words, as objective as we could be, we were disabling the propaganda of Arif Pašalić over the war studio Mostar bands. I would also like to mention that I have always, being an editor of the war studio Mostar, signed the source of information and mentioned him during broadcasting from the war studio Mostar, therefore, in a way, I distanced myself and other employees, in the war studio Mostar. In the last month, there was a major drain of employees from the war studio Mostar, counting 57 people at the beginning and merely 38 at the end, which did not enable a proper work, regarding the increase of working hour of the war studio Mostar from 7 till midnight.

Saturday, 9<sup>th</sup> of May 1993 was the last time when I was in the war studio Mostar; I went home to my mother, around 1700 hours to have lunch and to change clothes. I wanted to go back to the war studio because I had young employees there (Mirna Pičuga, Haris Šehić and Selma Dizdar) and, concerning the tight relations in northern Herzegovina, as well as in Mostar, I wanted, once again, to turn attention to Selma and Mirna not to release poems and poetry recitation that could easily be interpreted in several ways these days; lately I wasn't even allowing to read any information whatsoever, which wouldn't get a green light from my side. As I abandoned my mother's apartment, I dropped to Tropikana where I found out about Miro Kajan's murder and remained there for a while, and, when I was about to leave for the war studio, they warned me that it was already 2005 hrs and that a curfew already came into force. Becoming convinced that a curfew has indeed come into force, I started to move, along with Omica Djukić towards my mother's apartment, bearing in mind that at least this evening, my employees would be able to perform their tasks without me.

At the end of this statement, I would like to emphasize that I censured materials within the war studio Mostar, concerning only those that I found tightness-elevators in the city of Mostar; those would be the materials, coming from unofficial sources and, in principle, not adjusted to the legal norms.

This is all I can state, in relation to the previous. Everything I stated is accurate and true, which I also attest by my signature.

Statement taken by:  
Draženko Miletić

Record secretary:  
Nela Moro

Statement given by:  
Džemal Hamzić

Header of the Croatian Defence Council  
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Community of Herceg Bosnia  
Croatian Defence Council

Office for expelled persons and refugees  
Operational number: 10-102-II/93  
Široki Brijeg, 10th of May 1993  
Phone/facsimile 088/700-143, 700-811, 700-350, 088/32-067

Logistics centre of the BH Government  
Split

Dear gentlemen,

By listening and watching the radio and TV-stations we found out that the Logistics centre of the Government of BIH in Split has got warehouses overloaded with humanitarian help, as well as plenty of perishable goods. Bearing in mind the existing cooperation and the quantity of humanitarian aid that the logistics centre in BH from Split directed to these areas, we ask to be provided with urgent help in accommodation of new expelled persons from the Northern Herzegovina and Central Bosnia.

We hope that you would, in comparison to the practice so far, come out to meet us and help people who really need help.

We want to remind you that the HZ HB office for expelled persons and refugees accommodates approximately 148,000 of expelled persons and refugees, out of which 70% are Muslims as well as we want to remind you that we haven't received one gram of humanitarian help from the Logistics centre of the Government of BIH from Split.

We also remind you that the humanitarian aid that comes to your address, comes from the Croatian people in the same quantity.

Bearing that fact in mind and in relation to the existing situation, we ask your urgent help in significant quantities of food and other necessary items, as well as in accommodation of new expelled persons from endangered areas.

Sincerely yours,

Delivered to:

1. Public release media
2. Government of the Republic of Croatia
3. HVO HZ HB
4. Files

Head of the Office  
Darinko Tadić  
/signed and stamped/

REPORT ON THE NUMBER OF CONVOY AND THE QUANTITY OF  
MERCHANDISE FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JUNE 1993 TILL 31 DECEMBER  
1993, BEING APPROVED BY THE OFFICE FOR EXPELLED PERSONS AND  
REFUGEES OF HR HB

Under control	Number of convoys	Quantity of food (t)	Other merchandise (pieces)
Croats	330 (40,74%)	15 587 (31,22%)	65 898 (80,29%)
Muslims	462 (57,03%)	32 529 (65,16%)	16 178 (19,71%)
Serbs	18 (02,22%)	1 803 (03,62%)	
In Total	810 (100%)	49 919 (100%)	82 076 (100%)

REPORT ON THE NUMBER OF CONVOY AND THE QUANTITY OF  
MERCHANDISE FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY 1994 TILL 15 MARCH  
1994, BEING APPROVED BY THE OFFICE FOR EXPELLED PERSONS AND  
REFUGEES OF HR HB

Under control	Number of convoys	Quantity of food (t)	Other merchandise (pieces)
Croats	328 (41,73%)	8 857 (23,32%)	7 908 (74,11%)
Muslims	421 (53,26%)	26 926 (70,90%)	2 762 (25,88%)
Serbs	37 (07,70%)	2 193 (05,77%)	
In Total	786 (100%)	37 976 (100%)	10 670 (100%)

**REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Number: 02-1/1-58 / 93  
Mostar, 5th June 1993

/handwritten:/ 2487

Lord David Owen  
Co-Chairman  
International Peace Conference on  
Former Yugoslavia

Mr. Cedric Thornberry  
Director for Civilian Affairs  
UNPROFOR

General Philippe Morillon  
UNPROFOR

Chairman of Presidency of BiH  
Alija Izetbegović

Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of BiH Army  
Sefer Halilović

Dear Sirs!

Croatian people and the HVO in Travnik municipality since 4th June 1993 are open and exposed to brutal attacks by the Army of BiH.

Attacks on Croats from Travnik municipality and HVO continued today with undiminished force.

3rd Corps Command of BiH Army issued an order for a general attack on HVO units. Engaged in these attacks by 306. Brigade, were also forces of the 7. Muslim Brigade, 17. Krajiška Brigade, 312. Mountain Brigade, and from Zenica 314. and 303. Brigade.

At the negotiations held on 04th June 1993 between HVO and BiH Army in the presence of UNPROFOR and the European observers, representatives of the Army BiH stated that, "We have a state and its army and we will not allow the existence of the two armies."

The intentions of the political leadership of BiH Army are to:

- Military "cleanse" Central Bosnia " of HVO
- Arrest civilian and military leaders of HVO
- Carry out a general mobilization of Croats to BiH Army units and refer them to the toughest battlefields against the Serbs

In previous attacks there is a higher number of dead and wounded soldiers and Croat civilians. They do not allow retrieval of wounded, and they themselves do not take care of them. Men are taken to dig trenches, and women, children and elderly people are assembled at homes and kept under the house arrest.

We ask the following - if the political leadership of the Muslim nation and the BiH Army in this manner applies the STATEMENT from Zagreb and Međugorje Agreement, whether in this manner they apply the Vance-Owen Plan which was discussed yesterday on 4th June 1993 with the co-chairs?

Was 4th June 1993 accidental or planned against the highest civilian and military leaders of HVO?

We are writing to you, co-chairs of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia to hastily influence the political leadership of the Muslim nation to stop this offensive on Croats from Travnik municipality.

We address the UNPROFOR to get engaged in protection of Croats from Travnik, as they are here also for our safety and protection. We address the MCK and the European Union observers to help protect Croats from Travnik municipality within the limits of their capabilities.

We request Mr. Izetbegović and Halilović to command their forces to cease all hostilities against Croats and HVO.

Chief  
Bruno Stojić  
/signed/

/stamped:/

Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna  
Mostar  
Department of Defense  
Croatian Defense Council

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

HUMAN RESOURCE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE

Number: 02-3/1 44/93

Mostar, 09.06.1993.

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONF.

SUBJECT: Overview of the national structure  
of the members of the HVO -delivered-

On your requested, enclosed to the letter we deliver to you the „Overview of the national structure of the members of the HVO“.  
(appendix num. 1)

Records were made based on the condition with the day of 08 June 1993 for the units under ordinal numbers: 14, 15, 16, 17, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 and for the remaining units based on newly made military identification cards.

Note: For the part of the units from OZ „Central Bosnia“ due to know reasons we are not able to deliver the required records.

HEAD  
signature  
Jure Brkić

**OVERVIEW**  
of the national structure of the members of the HVO

Ord.num.	NAME OF THE UNIT	TOTAL	CROATS	MUSLI MS	% OF MUSLIMS
1.	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE	247	238	9	3,64
2.	MAIN STAFF OF THE HVO	65	64	1	1,53
3.	ZMIN	88	88	0	0,00
4.	COMMAND OF THE OZ POSAVINA	44	37	7	15,90
5.	101. BRIGADE	798	547	251	31,45
6.	102. BRIGADE	713	311	402	56,38
7.	103. BRIGADE	459	300	159	34,64
8.	104. BRIGADE	1180	992	188	15,93
9.	105. BRIGADE	214	89	125	58,41
10.	106. BRIGADE	2909	2592	317	10,89
11.	108. BRIGADE	297	254	43	14,47
12.	115. BRIGADE	1261	1135	126	10,00
13.	COMMAND OF THE OZ JIH	180	164	16	8,88
14.	1. BRIGADE	4686	3027	1659	35,00
15.	2. BRIGADE	2400	1900	500	20,83
16.	3. BRIGADE	1470	1269	201	13,60
17.	4. BRIGADE	4153	3953	200	4,82
18.	MTD	324	324	0	0,00
19.	2.lardPZO	344	344	0	0,00
20.	COMMAND OZ CENTRAL BOSNIA	89	88	1	1,12
21.	TRAVNIK BRIGADE	1224	1211	13	1,06
22.	JURE FRANCETIĆ BRIGADE	1216	1211	5	0,49
23.	MTD	84	83	1	1,12
24.	LOGISTIC BASE	37	37	0	0,00
25.	4. lard PZO	330	315	15	4,54
26.	COMMAND OF THE OZ SZH	41	41	0	0,00
27.	E. KVATERNIK BRIGADE	1537	1499	38	2,47
28.	H. VUKČIĆ BRIGADE	770	750	20	2,59
29.	ARMOURED BATTALION	8	8	0	0,00
30.	RAMA BRIGADE	2023	1552	471	23,30
31.	KRALJ TOMISLAV BRIGADE	3054	2745	396	9,69
32.	P. KREŠIMIR IV BRIGADE	3086	2312	767	24,85
33.	KUPRES BATTALION	249	244	5	2,01
34.	POSUŠJE BATTALION	266	266	0	0,00
35.	REGIMENT BRUNO BUŠIĆ	331	329	2	0,60
36.	CONVICTS' BATTALION	280	154	116	41,42
37.	ATG "BAJA KRALJEVIĆ"	107	105	2	1,86
38.	KNIGHTS	138	138	0	0,00
	<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>36797</b>	<b>30841</b>	<b>5956</b>	<b>16,19</b>



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMED FORCES MAIN STAFF  
SARAJEVO

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential no; 14/76-7  
Sarajevo, 9 June 1993

/handwritten and circled: 83/

Pursuant to item II of the Decision by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Organisation of the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ and on the appointment of officers to duty, PR: 02-011-306/93 dated 6 June 1993, the Commander of the Main Staff hereby issues a

#### DECISION

on the formation of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps of the BH Army and the zones of responsibility of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps of the BH Army

#### I

1. On the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – form the zones of responsibility of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Corps:

- the 6<sup>th</sup> (Konjic) Corps

The zone of responsibility of the Corps under item I/1 of this Decision shall encompass the territories of the following municipalities:

- Fojnica, Gornji Vakuf, Hadžići, Jablanica, Kalinovik, Kiseljak, Konjic, Kreševo, Prozor, Trnovo and Visoko.

#### II

The zones of responsibility of the existing (1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>) Corps shall be adjusted, and they shall encompass the territories of the following municipalities:

- a) The 1<sup>st</sup> Corps, with its headquarters in Sarajevo: Breza, Centar-Sarajevo, Čajniče, Foča, Goražde, Han Pijesak, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Novi Grad Sarajevo, Novo Sarajevo, Olovo, Pale, Rogatica, Rudo, Sokolac, Stari Grad Sarajevo, Vareš, Višegrad, Vogošća and Žepa.
- b) The 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps, with its headquarters in Zenica: Banja Luka, Bosanska Gradiška, Bosanska Dubica, Bugojno, Busovača, Čelinac, Donji Vakuf, Jajce, Kakanj, Kotor Varoš, Kupres, Laktaši, Mrkonjić Grad, Novi Travnik, Prnjavor, Skender Vakuf, Srbac, Šipovo, Travnik, Vitez, Zavidovići, Zenica and Žepče.
- c) The 4<sup>th</sup> Corps, with its headquarters in Mostar: Bileća, Čapljina, Čitluk, Gacko, Grude, Livno, Ljubinje, Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Nevesinje, Posušje, Ravno, Stolac, Široki Brijeg, Tomislav Grad and Trebinje.

#### III

Manoeuvre units as well as the Municipal Defence Staffs with their headquarters support units are directly subordinated to the Commands of the Corps in whose zones of responsibility they are.

KM/KM

COMMANDER  
OF THE BH ARMED FORCES MAIN STAFF  
Rasim DELIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC CROATIA  
 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
 MAIN HEADQUARTERS  
 COMMAND OF MILITARY DISTRICT ZAGREB  
 Ilica 242

Class: 032-03/93-01  
 Reg No: 1075-03/93-147  
 Zagreb, June 10th, 1993

DEFENSE  
 MILITARY SECRET  
 CONFIDENTIAL

/receipt stamp/  
 REPUBLIC CROATIA  
 145. BRIGADE

Received: /handwritten/ 13.6.1993  
 Classification:  
 Registration no:  
 /handwritten/ 3002/93-1773

## Subject: Information

Based on data from Bulletin No. 70 of Political Administration of MORH (Ministry of defense of Republic of Croatia) information department, we submit an extract material which can be used in consideration of the current political situation in your unit.

### 1. Events in Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Interview with Carl Gustav Strohm with President Dr. Franjo Tuđman carried out in Die Welt issue dated May 24th, 1993.

DW - You were recently in Herzegovina in attempt to influence the termination of conflict between Muslims and Croats. How did sudden mutual attacks from former allies?

- Between Bosnian Muslims and Croats there is a profound distrust. There is a lack of understanding for need to cooperate.

D. W. - What is the reason for this distrust?

- Croats in BiH fear that Muslims only goal is Islamic Bosnia. In addition, it should be noted that about one hundred thousand Muslims from eastern Bosnia, which was occupied by Serbs, had fled in the areas that according to Vance-Owen plan was to become the province of number eight and ten. Refugees have completely changed the demographics of those areas inhabited mostly Croatian population, changing the relationship ratio in favor of Muslims. And Muslims in those areas started campaign against the Croatian population in the intention to occupy the area from Mostar, Konjic, Jablanica to Travnik, which according to the Vance-Owen plan should become Croatian region. Muslims probably do not believe that they will retain the provinces occupied by Serbs.

DW - Well, these are probably not the only reasons?

- Of course there are extremists on both sides. For example, on Muslim side there are "Mujahedeen" forces. They want at all costs to cause and prolong the war. Individuals on the Croatian side consider that such a policy should be opposed by force. While the world was watching horrific

consequences of Serbian campaign against Srebrenica, hostilities broke out between Muslims and Croats. It was a welcomed opportunity for an excuse not to blame only the Serbs but also Croats, and therefore that military intervention in Bosnia is not required.

DW - But how do you interpret the changes in the Muslim block?

- There is much evidence that there are former member of KOS (Yugoslav intelligence service) among Muslim leadership, which were deliberately inserted there. They made a truce with the Serbian general Mladić. After that, thousands of Muslim soldiers were withdrawn from the Muslim-Serbian battlefield and launched in the campaign against the Croats.

DW - But in the ranks of the Bosnian Croats there have also been noted some unpleasant occurrences ...

- Yes. British TV showed a unit, which allegedly belonged to HVO, which bears marks of the Ustasha and Hitler regime. This was a provocation aimed at compromising Croatia.

DW - How strong is your influence on Bosnian Croats?

- This conflict is primarily a problem of Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. Croatia has some impact because it helped Croats and Muslims in the fight against Serbian aggression. The local Croatian population agreed with our suggestion for referendum on independence of Bosnia. However, the misconception must be eliminated: Croatian army units were not present in the areas where the conflict broke out. I summoned Lord Owen, Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Peterson that we all together put an end to the conflict. The result of these initiatives was a conference which was not held in Mostar, because of the ongoing conflict, and therefore the conference was held in Međugorje. Russian min. of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev arrived with me in Split. I accepted his proposal on border control - not just the border between Serbia and Bosnia, but in general including international border control of the border between Serbia and Bosnia, as well as the international border control between the Serbia

and Croatia, and between Croatia and Bosnia.

DW - What kind of agreement was reached between Croats and Muslims in Međugorje?

- The Croatian side has once again confirmed that it accepts the peace plan. The Croats stated they were willing to immediately release all Muslim prisoners - Muslims have not done this with Croatian prisoners. Croatian and Muslim delegations were immediately able to visit parts of the city of Mostar, which are under Croatian control, but were not able to visit the parts under Muslim control.

DW - What did you say to your Bosnian counterpart Izetbegovic?

- To him and other Muslim representatives I said the following, and Lord Owen said the same at the conference: if the cooperation agreement between Muslims and Croats is not possible, how can anyone talk about the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Under this pressure, Muslims have also agreed to Vance-Owen plan and to stop hostilities. We'll see what happens. Muslims do not accept the proposals on the equal representation of people in different positions in the government. This is going to be a suicidal policy.

DW - You are constantly addressed with accusations that you are working on dividing Bosnia and that in collusion with Serbs, you have already started with its implementation. Is this true?

- This is a very widespread deceit. It is true that I have met with Milošević and Izetbegović before the war broke. Even then it was clear to me that the whole crisis of former Yugoslavia, will be focused on Bosnia and that war need to be prevented, which later took of such a barbaric genocide - worse than the one in Croatia. There are no secrets here. I said even then: if Yugoslavia was only able to survive as a confederation union, BiH can only exist as a community of three constituent nations.

D. W. - What were your counterparts' reactions?

- Mr. Izetbegovic evaluated that confederated arrangement would lead to the disintegration of Bosnia. My evaluation was quite the opposite. After the experience of this war, I'm even more convinced that BiH can only exist on a confederation basis - as a community of three people under UN supervision. However, we must also ask why did Europe and United States allow for Serbian aggression in Bosnia to takes such barbaric dimension and why Serbia even today, under the burden of stricter sanctions and under threat of military intervention, continues this aggression?

D. W. - Can you give an answer to this question?

- On one hand, the West probably does not want an Islamic state in Bosnia. On the other hand, the West is very sensitive to Serbia because it fears that tougher position would provoke certain forces in Russia - whether they are Bolshevik

or conservative orthodox forces. In Bosnia, on Serbian side Russian volunteers and on Muslim side Islamic volunteers are fighting.

DW - How do you assess the political viewpoint of the Muslim leadership of Bosnia today?

- It, unfortunately, does not support a moderate influence of Turkey, but the influence of radical Islamic currents from other countries that want war.

DW - In the West, it is a widespread opinion that in Yugoslavia all nations and nationalities lived together in peace - until the arrival of nationalism which destroyed everything.

- West continually shows that it doesn't understand the situation in this area. The former Yugoslavia was an artificial creation, and consisted of people who embedded different national individuality, and belonged to different civilizations. The old Yugoslavia in 1941 disintegrated without any resistance due to national differences.

Tito as a Croat understood the problem of nationalities. With his internationalist, Marxist views he tried to offer equality of all nations. With such a policy he provoked Serbia's animosity. Already in the Second World War, Tito was not successful in Serbia. At that time Churchill found Partisans have been active in Croatia, and Chetniks in Serbia. After Tito's departure from the stage, Belgrade is dominated by anti-Tito atmosphere. Serbs wanted to turn Yugoslavia into a centralized Great Serbia. Under the concept of Yugoslavia, Serbian policy has always implied Great Serbia. All this caused a general opposition of other nations. All perceptions of the West on the possible renewal of some sort of Yugoslavia are totally unrealistic. It is not the only multi-ethnic Yugoslavia fell apart, but also multi-ethnic Czechoslovakia. But there, this process proceeded in peace as both nations belonged to the same civilization.

DW - Why among all the peoples who live in the area, only Serbs who only count 12 million - have developed this will for power and warrior features?

- I do not agree with your opinion on their warlike qualities. During the preparations for war against Yugoslavia, the German General Headquarters counted on strong resistance on the basis of the Serbian military traditions. But the fact is that Germans and Italians in 1941 have not encountered a noteworthy resistance. And now it turned out: Serbia had under control the whole Yugoslav-Communist army. It was one of the strongest armies in Europe.

Although JA possessed the most advanced battle technology, which included 1500 tanks, missiles and heavy artillery, it could not break Croatia. Despite the superiority of the Serbs in Bosnia they were only able to win in the areas where Muslims were not ready for defense. In areas where the Croats have prepared for defend Serbs had no success.

One of the key goals of the Serbian side was moving Serbian border to the Neretva River, and the conquest of Mostar and Dubrovnik. They did not succeed in spite the fact that Croats were not armed as well. The notion that Serbian soldiers are fearsome is actually a myth.

DW - Where, then, lies the secret of Serbian dynamics?

- Serbs like seldom few nations, follow irrational, nationalist, imperialist ideology. They imagined that all Serbs must live in one state. Based on this ideology they started a war against Croatian and against Bosnia. They considered it to be unthinkable that after the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia will have to live outside their state. Another factor should be noted: their intransigent attitude towards Muslims. Shortly before the outbreak of war, the Bosnian Muslims were negotiating with Belgrade, with the intention that Bosnia along with Serbia is joined in a common state. In this way all Muslims in this region - from Kosovo over the Sandžak to Macedonia - would also be united in one state. This would create optimum conditions for Muslims in respect to their tendency to increase birthrate. Serbs have rejected this idea because of their historically irreconcilable attitude towards Muslims and went to war in order to eliminate them.

DW - After these experiences, have Muslims changed their opinion?

- After the brake of war, and Serbian genocide and ethnic cleansing, and after the defeat of Serbia in the war with the Croatian, Muslim leadership has begun to change its position: wanting, relying, inter alia, in power in Muslim countries, to resolve the Serbian question in the Bosnia with war to extreme consequences.

D. W. - And Serbs?

- Besides the irreconcilable attitude towards Muslims, Serbs are marked with another complex: they think that in all the areas where they live in, they must be a constituent people. Even in areas where they are a minority they are not willing to come to terms with the role of minorities. So, even if the number of Serbs in Croatia is twelve, ten, or only eight percent of the total Croatian population, they want to be constituent nation. At the same time they are not willing to acknowledge equal rights to other nations in Serbia - such as the Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo.

DW - How do you intend to solve the problem of the Serbian minority in Croatia?

- The Serbian minority in Croatia is not unique. In its ranks there are about ten percent of the extremists who have embraced the ideology of Great Serbia. Most of the Serbs were being cheated. They were told that the new Croatian government is preparing a prosecution - at the same time, crimes done by Ustasha in the Second World War were magnified tenfold. We had the impression that even in the

leadership of those Serbs, the notion that they have found themselves in dire hopelessness is getting stronger. We have created the prerequisites for the solution of the problem with local governments, which should be assigned to the Serbian minority. But no country can tolerate an armed uprising on its territory. Areas of Croatia occupied by Serbian forces were never part of the Serbian state.

DW - But why were Croats accused of aggression even after the fall of Maslenica bridge and the attempt to recovery the territory that the Serbs have occupied?

- UN peacekeepers arrived in Croatia after the agreement was signed with the Croatian and former Yugoslavia. UN forces have enabled JA to leave Croatia. But, mentioned JA has handed their weapons to local Serbian volunteers in these areas. In this way, armed Serbs prevented the implementation of the Vance Plan for peacekeeping force in Croatia. Since the UN forces were not allowed, in case it was necessary, to carry out their task and with armed forces, so they were forced to passively watch as JA is handing down guns, tanks and other weapons to local Serbs.

DW - When visiting Zagreb, German Foreign Minister Kinkel said he has requested from you to "bring things in order" in Mostar or that Croatia would otherwise bear the consequences?

- If this is really what he said to the press, it is a one-sided view. Croatia as a state and I as President surly have an influence on the Croatian people in BiH. But this in no way means that we manage local affairs.

The local conflicts are primarily the problem of Bosnian people. I offered my services and said that I would try to influence the Croats. They have the right to represent their interests, but their actions must not jeopardize the interests of the Croatian state. However, I also told the Muslims that they cannot expect that the Croats would let through the shipment of weapons that they will then use against the Croatian population.

DW - Some circles in the West demanded the extension of sanctions targeted against Serbia to be applied also on Croatia?

- No serious politician could present such a proposal. Such a move would only serve to conceal the policy of EC, U.S. and UN, who do not know what to do with the "Bosnian pot", Croats in Croatia and Croats in Bosnia did not set out to conquer other people's territory - they are just defending the areas where they live.

DW - Why do Croats in relation to the West have greater difficulty than other post-communist nations?

- Not only Serbian propaganda, but also a certain powers in the West who want to rebuild the former Yugoslavia, insinuated that the Croats were the main culprits for the collapse of Yugoslavia. We should not forget the mortgage

of the Second World War and the former Croatian state under the leadership of Pavelić. But the truth is that in the Second World War there was far more powerful anti-fascist movement in Croatia than the one in Serbia and other countries. If we consider the position of a part of German media towards Croatia, I cannot get rid of the impression that Germany is burdened with the complex of the Third Reich.

DW - How long could war in Bosnia take?

- I believe that already this year could be decisive. Serbia is so exhausted that they cannot fuel the war neither in Bosnia nor in Croatia. Therefore, there must be a political solution. However, Europe and the United Nations and the United States and even Russia have all been compromised.

## **2. Defense Minister Gojko Šušak on the events in Bosnia - in the show “Slikom na sliku” (image on image)**

When asked how it can be expected that the agreement signed between Croats and Muslims from Međugorje can be sustained, Šušak has expressed hope that the Croats and Muslims find enough wisdom to realize that their conflicts are useful only to the opposing side. Šušak said that an essential condition for the existence of Bosnia as a state is the co-operation of Muslims and Croats. When the journalist suggested that because of the Croatia policy towards BiH is threatened with sanctions and his question whether there is built also on Croatian side, Gojko Šušak, said: “If there is, I do not see it. We had a clear position towards Bosnia. We have represented and supported this attitude before the United Nations and other international actors. Everything that was offered as a solution of problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia was the first to accept and sometimes even forced the Croats in BiH to accept. “

When asked about the offer of President Tudman to A. Izetbegović that Croatia and Bosnia should conclude a military alliance, Croatian Minister said that Izetbegović concluded that the alliance would “irritate the third party” and therefore the offer was not accepted.

Supreme Command Staff Communications Centre  
Cryptographic protection department  
Date and time:  
25 June 1993, Friday, 2323 hrs

Source file: FAFGP6UC  
Act received and filed by  
Hari

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMED FORCES SUPREME COMMAND STAFF  
FORWARD COMMAND POST  
Str. conf. No. 102/03-67

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
VERY URGENT

Attn: PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF RBiH  
RBH ARMY SUPREME COMMAND STAFF COMMANDER

Pursuant to note Str. conf. no. 102/03-51 which I sent you on 15 June 1993, I take the liberty to insist again on your visit to Zenica. Here are some additional reasons I have not cited in my note of 15 June 1993.

1. On 23 May 1993 the Supreme Command Staff Chief Sefer HALILOVIĆ said in the presence of DELIĆ and KARIĆ and before going to Sarajevo, that he had ordered the following:
  - the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps must find and appoint to its Command several Croats within the next 24 hours;
  - within 48 hours illegal groups and formations (everyone knows who they are) must leave Zenica through Igman. (Responsible person: DELIĆ, assistant: MAHMULJIN);
  - the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps must mobilise additional units;
  - the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps must introduce 24-hour working, like in the Supreme Command Staff and other corps.
 So far, nothing has been done.
2. On 26 May 1993 the president of municipal government, Ramiz DŽAFEROVIĆ, said in the presence of ŠIBER, KARIĆ and VRANJ:
  - as a citizen, I am disappointed with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps, and its commanders are involved in looting and crime;
  - there are officers who liquidate people after looting;
  - "I will not do anything in the name of the government for the army until there is order and discipline in town".
3. On 23 June 1993, HODZIĆ, the district president, and HARAĆIĆ, the president of the district government, said the following:
  - MERDAN is the main organiser of religious units: ŠUVALIĆ's, PURIĆ's, the 7<sup>th</sup> mbbr /Muslim Mountain Brigade/, etc.;
  - HADŽIHASANNOVIĆ has been summoned to the session of the county assembly several times, but has never come;
  - Zenica and the soldiers of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps are ruled by commanders who are hardened criminals, who do not want victory over the Chetniks, but at the same time profit from conflicts with the HVO.
4. On 20 June 1993 I had a private talk with HADŽIHASANNOVIĆ and asked him the following questions:
  - do you know that the anti-sabotage battalion is under MERDAN's command and that Zenica knows that it is his own private unit, not the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps'? Answer: Yes, but not just him.
  - do you know that part of certain units are planning to secede and form the 8<sup>th</sup> Muslim Brigade? Answer: Yes, but it will not happen.
  - Do you know that preparations are being made to create a Muslim Corps, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps command will be liquidated if it opposes? Answer: Yes, but that is just

someone's wishful thinking. It will not happen.

In the meanwhile:

- On 8 June 1993, 35 Croats were executed in the village of Bikoši. Four witnesses were wounded but survived. They were shot by Mujahedin.

- On 10 June 1993, over 30 Croats were executed in the village of Šušanj near Ovnak by "some soldiers".

- On 22 June 1993, members of the Commission for the release of prisoners, ALIHODŽIĆ and NEGOVETIĆ learned from Salko BEBA from Operations group West, that on the previous day the Mujahedin executed about 50 civilians in the vicinity of the village Mehurići near Vlašić. Salko BEBA's unit is guarding 247 civilians in that village against the so-called "Death Brigade", which is mistreating even the local Muslim population, looting and killing. On the same day Mujahedin from that "Death Brigade", who are attracting our soldiers with money, almost shot at UNPROFOR vehicles carrying the Commission members with *Zolja* and *Osa* /hand-held rocket launchers/.

I emphasise: looting and crime prevail. Soldiers from the "positions" are carrying bags full of goods through Zenica, and I have received information that some refuse to go to positions unless there is something to loot (the 309<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/). The police of certain brigades are still arresting and beating up civilians in basements. The MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, that is, the Security Services Centre, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps security service are not cooperating whatsoever, as was seen by Mr. GANIĆ during his meeting at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps on 15 May 1993.

On the basis of the above, I ask you again to react urgently, since personnel changes in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Command are essential. I have specific suggestions regarding this matter. I have asked from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps commander to replace the assistants for morale, security and organisational, mobilisation and personnel issues, but he has not reacted.

Please appoint to the Joint Command, together with KARIĆ and ŠIBER, someone like KARIŠIK, VRANJ or NAJETOVIĆ instead of MERDAN, since MERDAN is a member of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps and because of what has been said about him above.

Best regards,

SŠ/AČ

DEPUTY COMMANDER  
Stjepan ŠIBER

Jovan DIVJAK

Deputy ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ Commander

Sarajevo, 28 August 1993

Objection with regard to my involvement      To R BH OS ŠVK Commander  
in the work of the R BH /Republic of      Mr Rasim DELIĆ  
Bosnia and Herzegovina/ OS /Armed  
Forces/ ŠVK

With regard to the responsibilities and duties of the ŠVK Deputy Commander and your assurances that you would fully include members of the Commander's inner collegium in the management of the R BH Army, I would like to lodge my objection against my inadequate inclusion in the work of the R BH OS ŠVK.

Regardless of your resolute position that the involvement of the deputy in the ŠVK activities shall be aimed at our joint contribution to the management of the R BH Army, in my opinion this is not being realised to the advantage of the R BH Army, our joint struggle, the responsibility and unity of the R BH Army. I will outline only a few, in my opinion, important activities in which I should have been included.

I. I would like to remind you that I offered to join you or the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ from Sarajevo when going to the free territory to carry out tasks together. It seemed to me that you willingly accepted this. I did not even know that you went out of Sarajevo, maybe as deputy I ought not to have known this, but I asked myself a number of questions, the worst being whether it was yet another proof of the lack of trust in my former, current and future work in the R BH Army. I ask you whether you felt like a real R BH Army commander when representatives of only one people sat with you at



the briefing in Zenica - and you advocate a multiethnic army?! I believe that you would have been more persuasive, stronger and prouder had there been one of your deputies at the talks with the representatives of authorities and religious institutions on the free territory.

/handwritten initials: DJ/

2. You were visited by General Bricquemont (several times), the US Ambassador in the R BH and others recently. Probably on these occasions too it would have been necessary for deputies to be with the commander because of the already mentioned assertion that the R BH Army is multiethnic.

3. Your meetings with brigade commanders in Sarajevo or with those who come to Sarajevo are opportunities for deputies to learn about the situation in those units, as well as directly contribute to seeking favourable solutions to remove flaws and participate in managing the R BH Army.

Your appointment to the duties of the R BH Army Commander has to a degree improved the work of the ŠVK and I am convinced that it will be increasingly efficient. However, I believe that the following issues should be solved as soon as possible:

- organisation and staffing establishment of ŠVK administrations;
- determining establishment positions for Mr KARIĆ and Mr BILAJAC because their present job is at deputy level (if this is to ŠVK's benefit, - *aferim* // applaud it!);
- the issues of commands and the following units: *Delta* (to my knowledge they did not become part of the 1st Corps) *Zulfikar*, the 9th and 10th brigades etc. should be resolved;

- complete organisational, staff and materiel establishment of the SVK bVP /military police battalion/ as a basis for fighting breaches of discipline, criminal activities etc. successfully;

- establishment of the OS ŠVK headquarters administration;

- make the newly formed housing organ fully operational (I know that the inner collegium agreements are not being implemented!)

I am determined to remain in our common struggle for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, irrespective of how I am treated in the OS ŠVK. But it must be accepted that R BH OS ŠVK deputy commanders have somewhat different responsibilities, rights and obligations from those in other armies.

/handwritten initials: DJ/

because they are here to represent the multiethnic composition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a statistics detail.

DJ/SO

/handwritten initials: DJ/

DEPUTY COMMANDER  
RBH OS ŠVK

Jovan DIVJAK

**Arif Pasalic speech on the War radio BiH on June 30<sup>th</sup> 1993 at 11:00**

I am turning to citizens of Mostar, Muslims, honest Croatians and loyal Serbs, and other people and citizens of BiH and I am introducing you to the following:

Ustasha's forces, early this morning, kept with their aggression on ARBiH and citizens of Mostar by strong artillery fire and infantry attack at the positions of ARBiH 4<sup>th</sup> Corps units. We are determined in our defence and loyal to BiH and Muslim people and other honest citizens. We retaliated fiercely and we beat ustasha's forces. We took over notorious "Tihomir Misić" barracks, liberated confined citizens and imprisoned large number of ustasha soldiers, confiscated significant quantities of equipment and materials and ammunition.

At the notorious "Tihomir Misić" barracks we found a significant documentation with signature of gentleman, war criminals, Petkovic, Lasic, Ilić Vrlic – of my friend until yesterday with whom I sat at the bar in the free time – about planned attacks and conducted battles against enemy forces of ARBiH as they called us from the April 16<sup>th</sup> of this year. Mr. Vrlic – Corak

Loss of the Midhat Hujdur Hujke Commander of the Famous 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade is a irrecoverable loss for us, but from today Mostar is richer for hundreds and thousands of likes of Hujko, who are going to fight against ustasha war criminals, against ustasha who in my opinion spawned again after 1944 - 1945 in our homeland. This city, these people, this Army will never forget our celebrated, legendary commander "shhid" (fallen Islamic fighter) Hujko, but they are not going to forget you, ustasha whose mortar shell infamely hit him.

Citizens of Mostar, Muslims and other honest citizens, beat ustasha on every step. Cant you see that this is about your survival, cant you see that they are extraditing you, cant you see that they are taking you under arrest, cant you see that they are holding press conferences and weep on humanitarian organizations and they do not allow the same to bring food to the left side of the town, not to the left bank, gentleman, we hold right bank too, cant you see that they are humiliating you. Cant you see that in the figure of ustasha Boban they trade with leader of chetnik's Karadzic they trade with Muslims with honest Croatians and loyal Serbs. Gentleman they sell and they offer an exchange of Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno for Jablanica. From whom that is gentleman. Poor are those who are willing to trade their people and their land. They are miserable. And even more miserable are people who follow them. Ustasha forces announcement in the Mr. Puljic Slavko speech in exclusive speech, I salute you Mr. Puljic, until yesterday we worked together in the function of joint mixed commission. Did duty to give an exclusive announcement about this morning's shameful defeat fall on you? Understand that we finished same schools. We did not learn that you are mine and I am your aggressor. Others forced us in to that. Think about it and if exclusive conference of HVO, actually of ustasha forces fell on you Mr. Puljic then it is clear to me what is your level in governing and commanding. We are going to fight against you, you can be sure of that; you announced a war against us. You announced a war this morning by chasing away UNPROFOR, military observers and other officers of international factors. Actually you did not give them any evidence. You beat them with snipers, you killed them, and I am inviting them to come to me, to deploy and to observe how you shoot at the poor and innocent people.

Not for long, be sure of that, because your own people are going to prosecute you as a criminal, which I told to you, and Mr. Petkovic, and Mr. Lasic, and Mr. Vrlic, and Mr. Tuta for many crimes and homicides.

People, citizens of Mostar, you have to understand that this is a judgement day when you have to start with fight. I am inviting each citizens who can to bear a rifle, who can bear a rock, to kill ustasha criminals because there is no life with ustasha here accept life with Muslims, honest Croatians and loyal Serbs. We, citizens of Mostar announce a national sorrow, for the loss of our soldiers, who honorably, and especially loss of legendary commander Hujko. But gentleman, you have to know hundreds and thousands of likes of Hujko are going to be born tonight directly in in the fight against you who imposed a war on us.

/All handwritten/

Strictly confidential No: 03-0420

Mostar: May 16th, 1993.

GS (Main Staff) Report at 8:00 am

1. As far as Mostar is concerned, Serbs and Muslims are attacking. We must defend ourselves.

Delivered to:

GS Mostar  
ONO OZ BiH

Commander  
brigadier  
M. LASIĆ  
/signed/

/circled 51/  
/circled 395/

/handwritten/ ONO/Files

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
3<sup>rd</sup> corps command  
Strictly confidential, no. 02/33-1340  
Zenica, 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 1993 Mostar

Defence of the republic  
Military secret  
Strictly confidential

Exception of howitzers from BMT /factory/

Attn: commander of the 308<sup>th</sup> brigade

You have to immediately execute activities in order to create conditions for pulling out 5 howitzers that are to be found in the factory "BMT".

Try to pull out weapon imperceptibly for other side, using all means and deploy them to the positions of fire according to your decision.

Report regularly on the executed activities.

MM/VA

Commander  
Enver Hadžihasanović  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE

#### THE TRUTH ABOUT ARIF PAŠALIĆ AND HIS "FIGHT"

This morning at 11 o'clock, across the Muslim radio station in Mostar, Mr. Arif Pašalić, commander of the 4. Corps of the Muslim army or what is pompously called the Army of BiH addressed his people. The reason for his speech is that this morning at 3:45 am started the Muslim offensive, undertaken with the goal of controlling the entire urban area of Mostar. To avoid any possible confusion about who is who in this tragedy, we consider it to be appropriate to present the average Croatian reader and listener what has Mr. Pašalić said this morning.

For those, however, that even after reading or listening to this angry pamphlet, it is not clear what and who is the man for whom there is only coexistence "of Muslims, honest Croats, and loyal Serbs", someone who believes that the "Ustashas have spawn back again in our homeland after the 1944-45, "one more information should be added. Mithad Hujdur - Hujke, about whose death by "Ustasha" shell Mr. Pašalić is talking, is actually in reality the victim of Mr. Pašalić conflict with those who were engaged in fighting for Mostar during the Serbian aggression, that is with all those in Muslim ranks who have raised hopes in the possibility of peaceful resolution of existing conflicts. In all this, the same Hujke was the first person who Mr. Pašalić encountered when in JNA officer uniform and with officer's bag over his shoulder, at the end of July 1992 have crossed the old bridge. On this occasion Hujke was merciful. And year later Arif showed his gratitude by shooting him in the back (according to statements of four captured soldiers of the Muslim army: Mirsad Bektić - Pike, Safet Bijedić - Nuno, Abdurahman Spahić - Didi and Dželaludin Junuzović - Dželo).

We submit Mr. Pašalić speech in full. Conduct the processing in a way your professional awareness and conscience requires.

Information Department  
Slobodan Lovrenović  
Mostar, 30 June 1993, 16:45  
Ref.: 01-010/93

Observers of the international community had a very accurate insight into these events and knew with certainty that BiH Army during the night carried out the assault on the northern part of Mostar and that fighting continued throughout the day, and that the shelling temporarily weakened in the afternoon.

The same day observers of the international community knew with certainty that during the night hours, coordinated attacks with the support of the Mostar First Brigade(BiH Army) were carried out, in which Muslim soldiers of the HVO Battalion located in Bijelo Polje, attacked Croatian troops and their positions in village Raštane and North military barracks.

The commander of the Mostar First Brigade (BiH Army) Midhat Hujdur died in the battle.

According to the medical information that the observers of the international community had, during the same day there were many more dead soldiers, three dead soldiers of HVO - who were brought to the HVO hospital, in which during that day another 30 wounded soldiers and 2 wounded civilians were brought.

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna  
Croatian Defence Council  
Department of Defence

MAIN STAFF  
Number: 02-2/1-01-1245/93  
Mostar, 30 June 1993

DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Report on the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/  
attack north of Mostar

At 0300 hours this morning, the Muslim forces attacked the North Camp barracks and the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units in Bijelo Polje. The Muslim forces in Bijelo Polje have been together with the HVO so far and did not take part in earlier fighting.

At 0300 hours, the Muslims from Bijelo Polje attacked HVO soldiers at rest and soldiers on the lines facing the Serbs.

There was also an attack on Croatian civilians. The balance of forces in the Bijelo Polje area is 60:40 in favour of the Muslims, while the ratio of the population is 80:20 in favour of the Muslims.

In the course of the day, the Muslims "took control" of the area north of Mostar to the Salakovac dam, while the HVO is holding positions in the northern part of Bijelo Polje (Željuši, and the convent).

We had to pull the HVO forces, about 90 men, out of the barracks because of the encirclement (the barracks is on the left bank).

We still do not have precise details of the soldiers and civilians that have been killed.

The HVO forces have set up defence on the right bank, from the village of Raštani to the village of Vrđi, and on the left bank of the Neretva, in the area of Bijela and Ravni.

The main task is to prevent the Muslim forces from Jablanica and Mostar from joining up.

In all units, measures have been taken to remove Muslims from the HVO.

Additional mobilisation has been carried out in the municipalities of Široki Brijeg, Čitluk, Ljubuški and Grude.

Chief of the Main Staff of the HVO  
Major General  
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna/

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/

Defence Department

No. 02-1-765

30.06.1993 Mostar

Faced with the new attack of Muslim forces on the HVO positions and Croat people in this region, which represents a continuation of the war of conquest now waged in Central Bosnia, chairman of the Croatian Defence Council, Dr Jadranko PRLIĆ and head of the Defence Department of the Croatian Defence Council, Bruno STOJIC, have sent the following message to the Croat people of Herceg-Bosna:

Croat people of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, Croats, our brothers from the Republic of Croatia and the entire diaspora:

Initially concealed and lately open intentions of the Muslim leadership and their army to compensate for their losses against Serb aggressors and for their historic frustrations by conquering what has traditionally been the territory inhabited by the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have now become evident in Mostar as well. Early this morning powerful Muslim forces attacked the HVO positions in Bijelo Polje, *Tihomir Mišić* barracks and the frontline in the town itself. The scenario is completely identical to the one in Travnik, Kakanj, Vitez, Busovača. They attack the HVO positions, kill and terrorise civilians, erase any trace of Croatian nation. Existence of Croats in BiH is threatened. As a nation, we have to defend every one of our homes, hearths and churches. We have to defend them if we wish to survive in this region where we, our fathers and ancestors were born; Muslim soldiers, among whom there are many *mujahedin* and foreign mercenaries, leave nothing but graves, razed houses and mined churches behind them.

Fellow Croats, in this fateful moment for our nation the only things that can sustain us are the supreme patriotism and noble goal of Croat survival in all areas where we have built our homes for centuries.

Let us unite our forces, in every village, every Croat settlement, in every part of our Herceg-Bosna, in order to stop the Muslim aggression. Croats of Široki Brijeg, Posušje, Čitluk, Grude, Livno, Tomislavgrad, Čapljina, Stolac and other municipalities of HZ HB: Mostar has been and is a Croatian town. Even the officials of the international community designed Mostar as a capital of all Croat territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

New Muslim aggression against Mostar has also brought about changes in the lifestyle, behaviour and operation of the military and civil system in this area.

Pursuant to his authorities and based on the newly created situation, the head of the Defence Department of the HZ HB HVO, Bruno STOJIĆ, hereby issues the following order:

1. All military conscripts in the territory of Herceg- Bosna, regardless of their current place of residence, shall report to the Defence Bureau in the municipality of their original domicile or to their unit within the following 24 hours.

2. The operation of all restaurants/pubs and sale of alcohol in public places between the hours of 00-2400 is hereby explicitly prohibited.

3. All municipalities of HZ HB shall introduce a curfew between the hours of 2100 and 0600, whereas in the city of Mostar the curfew shall be enforced between 2000 and 0600 hours. Citizens are hereby urged to abide by the curfew hours at all times. In all cases of curfew violation relevant authorities of the military and civilian police shall undertake appropriate measures within the scope of their authority.

4. Grocery stores may continue operating, but the sale of alcohol shall be prohibited. All other stores, including department stores, shall remain closed until such time when this order is suspended.



5. Individuals and entities who have not regulated their status in the  
Defence

Bureau of the municipality of their original domicile are hereby prohibited from performing any kind of work.

Individuals and entities to whom this order applies are responsible for its implementation; the military and civilian police shall oversee the implementation.

Forwarded to:

- a) all representatives of the HVO in municipalities
- b) all Defence Bureaux in municipalities
- c) Military Police command and civilian police administration
- d) Media

Chairman of the  
HZ HB HVO  
Dr Jadranko PRLIĆ

Head of the  
Defence Department of the HZ HB  
Bruno STOJIĆ

*Considering current situation in Mostar, Executive Committee of the SDA Mostar and Muslim democratic party Mostar, at the joint emergency meeting held on June.30<sup>th</sup>.1993 in Mostar, are issuing a following*

*ANNOUNCEMENT*

1. *Regarding the ARBiH attack AT the HVO units in Mostar, which was announced yeasterday, on June 29<sup>th</sup>.1993, at the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of ARBiH Command press conference, uncovers all dirty political games by which Muslim people are to be brought inside some new Jugoslavija or Great Srbija.  
Muslim people and its politics, at the BiH territory, shall never accept political solution exacted by force, by suffering and loss of life of innocent ones among the Muslim and Croatian people.*
2. *At the moment when leadership of SDA Mostar and Muslim democratic party Mostar in coperation with leadership of HZ H-B, HVO Main Headquarters, HDZ County Comettee Mostar as well as the representatives of the international institutions are undertaking particular activities to end the hostilities, creating conditions for communication between two sides in town, delivering humanitarian help, electric power and water, it comes to new confrontation, new casualties and destruction of the city by which Muslim and Croatian people at Mostar are brought to the state of hopelessness.*
3. *We are asking of Muslims in Mostar to recognize on their own those who are leaders of confrotations and divisions between Muslim and Croatian people and are turning Mostar in to Beirut, and are artificially dividing, not only the city itself, but also muslim people among themselves, and we are asking that you take your own stand towards those.*

*In such conditions, political scene should be entered by people who are prepared to peacefully resolve all issues in Mostar.*

*Number 883 93  
Mostar June.30<sup>th</sup>.1993.*

*Democratic Action Party (SDA)  
Dr. Ismet Hadziosmanovic  
"Signed"  
Muslim Democratic Party Mostar  
Dr. Muhamed Alic  
"Signed"*

*"Round Seal"*

*"Round Seal"*

*To the General Secretary of the UN /United Nations/  
To the Chairman of the Security Council of the UN  
To Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on  
the Former Yugoslavia*

*Dear Sirs,*

*This is to inform you that the Muslim forces of the Army of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ conducted an armed attack on the town of Mostar and the surrounding area. The attack commenced on 30 June 1993 and is still ongoing, with all available weaponry and equipment being used, and over 4,000 soldiers participating.*

*In the said aggression on Croatian people and a province predominantly populated by Croats, a large number of people have already been killed or wounded, and more Croats have been expelled from their homes.*

*After a similar aggression in Central Bosnia, this is yet another attempt by the Muslim army to use military force to seize control of provinces considered predominantly Croatian, according to the Vance-Owen plan.*

*The objective of this aggression is to impede implementation of the already existing peace agreements, prevent further development of the peace process, and postpone talks on the future political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In its essence, this is a battle for territories in which results of ethnic cleansing could be considered fait accompli at future peace negotiations.*

*We, representatives of Croatian people in state organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereby express our commitment to finding a peaceful solution to all conflicts, and our support for a sovereign and independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which all three constituent nations will have equal rights and decide on the internal structure of their state through negotiations.*

*We ask that you review the current situation and take all necessary measures to prevent further aggression on Croatian people and its territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that the peace negotiations under your auspices could continue.*

*Mostar, 1 July 1993*


*Prime Minister  
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

*Mile AKMADŽIĆ  
/signed/*

## Location of the ABiH military premises in Mostar after June 30, 1993

## Military units ABiH – Bulevar, Cernica

1. Arms and Ammunition storage – M.Tito Street across the street from the „Standard“ store
2. Military and Civilian Prison – IV Elementary School – M.Tito Street
3. Garage for repairment of military vehicles – Fejić Street (building in which the Secretariat for National Defence is also located)
4. Arms and Food storage of ABiH – Fejić street – „Šipad“ store
5. Headquarters of ABiH – „Stari grad“, behind the building of „Šipad“ store
6. Military equipment storage and military uniforms production plant for ABiH – basement of the „Razvitalak“ department store
7. ABiH artillery grenades storage –Ivan Krndelj Square – building “Bejrut” – tunnel
8. ABiH military store equipped with lathes – Opine, behind Modna konfekcija „Zlatka Vuković“, owned by Tofa Sefić
9. The mentioned military workshops of ABiH were moved into premises of:
  - a) Tobacco factory
  - b) Lesnina
  - c) Unis
10. Artillery unit of ABiH motorized brigade– IV Elementary school in M.Tito Street
- 11.a) The artillery unit of ABiH motorized brigade was moved to Brankovac
12. Warehouse „krmača“ – explosive weapons of great destructive power – shed in North Camp
13. Warehouse „krmača“ ABiH – explosive from the mentioned bombs was used for making car-bombs -Hotel Ruža
14. 1100kg of explosives ABiH, Hotel Ruža
15. Artillery unit MB ABiH – above Sanitary Bureau – War Hospital building ABiH
16. Artillery unit AM ABiH – Fejić Street
  - 16 a) Artillery unit MB ABiH – Mladen Balorda Street
17. ZIS ABiH on the truck FAP – location Šehovine
  - 17 a) ZIS ABiH on the truck FAP – location Orthodox cemetery
18. Artillery unit MB and BST – Šantić Street
19. Position of ABiH in Adem Buća Street – use of „bosanski lonci“ by throwing them in front of the „Colorservis“ shop
20. Bunker ABiH - Restaurant Petica
21. Bunker ABiH - Corner of Adem Buća Street – between „Borovo“ shop and the Mosque
22. Bunker ABiH – Krpić Street – Aero club
23. Bunker ABiH – Krpić Street – Velmos building
24. Position of ABiH – Bulevar – Mikačić house
25. ABiH Soldiers – Cafe Benon – Adem Buća Street Cernica
26. ABiH Soldiers – house of Karlo Džeba – Cernica
27. Snipers– demolished buildings on Bulevar – near Health Care Centre







Karta 1:100 000


FROM ITS POSITIONS, THE (HK) VRS WAS ABLE TO TARGET THE OBJECTS IN THE CITY, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TARGETS WITH ANTI AIRCRAFT GUNS, CANNONS IN ALL CALIBRES, 82 AND 120MM MORTARS, AUTOMATIC GUNS OF ALL KINDS AND CALIBRES AND ROCKETS OF ALL TYPES

DISTANCE OF SEPARATION LINES BETWEEN ARBIH AND HK VRS:

- 300m AT LEAST
- 1000 to 1200m AVERAGE
- 2500m AT THE MOST - sporadically

MEANS OF VRS(HK):

- VBR
- TANKS
- HOWITERS 105 I 122mm
- FA GUNS 20/4-3
- B&T
- 82 AND 120 mm MORTARS



**INDEX:**

ARBIH POSITION

HVO POSITION

VRS POSITION

AREA CONTROLLED BY 41. MTBR – 4.K ARBIH FROM MAY 5, 1993 UNTIL JUNE 30, 1993

AREA CONTROLLED BY ARBIH (4TH CORPS) FROM JULY 01, 1993 UNTIL THE EDN OF THE CONFLICT

AREA RETURNED UNDER HVO CONTROL – AUGUST 1993

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA  
HVO FIRST BRIGADE „KNEZ DOMAGOJ“  
INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT

Class: /handwritten/ 893-09/93-03/18-1  
Number: /handwritten/ 1100-09-11-93-50  
Date: 3rd July 1993

MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly confidential

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Based on the intelligence and knowledge, derived from intelligence sources of intelligence work, in conjunction with the latest developments in the area of responsibility of the First Brigade “Knez Domagoj” we present an overview assessment of the intelligence security situation in zone of responsibility of the First Brigade “Knez Domagoj”

- Despite the significant results achieved in the control of former and potential members of the Army, we assess that a considerable number of military capable remained hidden in the area.

- In relation to the above there is a real possibility of group and individual subversive-terrorist and intelligence activities of these individuals and groups.

- In particular, we wish to point out the possibility of action of these individuals and groups to connect and organize themselves with the intent of their “breakthrough” in the direction of the Army troops in the wider area Blagaj. In this regard:

- It is likely they will try to establish connections / e.g. courier / with the members of the Army units from a wider area of Blagaj, as well as organized and coordinated action towards our front line of defense.

- Given all the above, we suggest:

1. Inform all units and responsible personnel in the zone of responsibility of the First Brigade “Knez Domagoj” with this assessment and possible activities by the members of the Army.
2. Take all necessary measures of intelligence and security and other forms of security of individuals, units, resources, facilities, routes and areas, particularly in the first line of defense. Continue with planned activities to put under control former and potential members of the Army, with a focus on difficult and wooded areas in accordance with the intelligence and security assessments and findings:

Head of Department of Defense operations  
/signed and stamped/



**REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA  
HVO FIRST BRIGADE „KNEZ DOMAGOJ“  
INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT**

Class: /handwritten/ 833-05/93-01/19-1  
Number: /handwritten/ 1100-05-11-93-52  
Date: 11th July 1993

MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly confidential

**INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

With analytical processing of intelligence information received from intelligence sources, we reached the following findings:

1. 3 groups are spotted / total of about 150 people / in the forest tent above the Šatorova gomila in the area towards Stanojevići.
  2. The age of the majority is between 25 and 30 years.
  3. All members of these groups have automatic rifles, and some “Zolja” and RPG’s.
  4. At the entrance to the forest, there is an organized guard.
  5. Another large group of fugitive members of BiH Army that lies in our depth is located in the hills Vjenac, which adjoins the area of the riverbed Bregava.
  6. We especially emphasize that members of these groups have no intention to surrender to units of HVO without fight.
  7. The basic communication between the runaway groups - is a courier connection, there is a possibility that one / or more / of them owns the means of wireless / i.e. radio / connection.
  8. Based on the foregoing, there is the possibility of links between members of these groups with the majority of army forces in line Mostar - Blagaj, therefore, organized and synchronized operation can be expected.
- 2-
9. One of the chief commander and organizer of the listed fugitive members of the Army, which are hiding in depth of our area of responsibility - is Tahir Turajlić. In connection with this information, we would like to indicate that we have previously warned of the contents of captured message: “Let Tahir and his men position themselves in the area Lokve”.
  10. Some group commanders, consistently insist on sabotage-terrorist actions and activities.  
/ One of these is Asim Bilal /.
  11. All these findings, we can connect to information from our ET, that in the zone of responsibility of 41. NtBr. - Mostar: “Zuka arrived with his men.”

- Based on all of the above information and past experience on methods of combat offensive of the member of BiH Army /focus on the activities of the infiltrated group violent reconnaissance and sabotage-terrorist activities/ be advised of the possibility of stronger, organized and coordinated actions of members, units and army forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the first line and in depth, on important objectives, resources and HVO units, in the area of responsibility of our first HVO Brigade “Knez Domagoj” and in zones of responsibility of other HVO units that are near the combat zone of immediate combat contact with the forces of IV Corps of the BiH Army.

HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT  
FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES  
Bruno Krvavac  
/ signed /

Čapljina, 08th February 1996

/stamped upon receipt:/  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERCEG-  
BOSNA  
**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**  
SECURITY AND INFORMATION SERVICE  
ADMINISTRATION  
20<sup>th</sup> November 1996  
11837/96

Subject: **Sabotage committed on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1993 by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /ABiH/ in the area of Gubavica – the Dubrava Plateau: the result - twenty-three killed and a dozen wounded.**

The dreadful event that occurred on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1993 in the area of the Dubrava Plateau, which resulted in twenty-three killed and a dozen wounded could have been prevented if everyone had understood and done his job with full responsibility. This allegation stands knowing that the intelligence service has done its job right by informing its superiors in written form on two occasions (first on 3<sup>rd</sup> July and on 11<sup>th</sup> July 1993 just before the event occurred).

Through intelligence work and reconnaissance, the intelligence service headed by Bruno KRVAVAC, Head of the Military Intelligence Service /VOS/, had obtained information that the ABiH was planning sabotage-terrorist actions in that area in co-operation with the members of the Army of BiH who had remained in the area of Dubrava.

From the report dated 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1993 it is noticeable that the security of facilities was being emphasised particularly, as well as the intelligence form of security.

According to what has been seen and what had happened on 15<sup>th</sup> July, it's obvious that someone had failed; either the then Commander, Mr Nedjeljko OBRADOVIĆ or his immediate associates, first and foremost the then Head of the Security Service, Mr Žara PAVLOVIĆ.

Not only that nobody answered for their irresponsible conduct and casualties and materiel damage inflicted thereupon, but nobody has even been singled out not to mention called to account; they have been promoted instead.

Enclosed:

Two reports by the Military Intelligence Service of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade "Knez Domagoj" to the superiors, which show that the dreadful event could have been diminished if not prevented, if the duties had been taken seriously.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE

HVO GENERAL STAFF  
MILITARY INFORMATION SERVICE  
Strictly Confidential Ref. Num: 03-546/93  
Mostar, July 13, 1993

DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Information

From the statement taken from MOS member that was apprehended today at 11:00 AM I have found out the following:

The apprehended person, Mustafa Beso, born on August 20, 1953 in Barave village stated that he was a member of the Army since May 1993. According to his statement a meeting was held on July 12, 1993 on Gubavica where they were assigned with the tasks that were read out by Alija Djulic (we know him as "Ale", commander of the unit comprising of approximately 70 soldiers chosen from local people). Meeting was attended by about 50 soldiers that were assigned with precise task – conquering the barracks on Gubavica. We think that the tasks were assigned to the Muslims in a way similar to scenario in Bijelo Polje (White Field). Mustafa Beso's group was assigned with the task of attacking the house where the Anti-Aircraft Defense manpower from 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade "Prince Domagoj" was located. There were 5 known people with them from the region of Gubavica, and out of them he knows Hamo Suto.

Commando group comprising of 15 soldiers was established from the region of Dubrava with the tasks of cleansing the terrain and merging with the group on Gubavica.

From the region of Opljici, group of 50 soldiers was assigned with the task of neutralizing the HVO platoon deployed in the region of Satorova gomila (Tent's heap).

From Lokve village one commando group was formed comprising of 25-30 people with the task of having one commando group to intercept the communication from Domanovici towards Stolac, precisely in "NURKOVINA", while the other commando group (of 12-15 people) should cut off the communication Domanovici – Bivolje Hill next to ....<sup>2</sup>

Out of MOS members from Pocitelj, Tasovcici and Motnjo village a commando group was formed in a size of a platoon, with the task of taking over the Hotanj and mining the road not far away from ZM<sup>3</sup>. The road was mined at 0....<sup>4</sup> on July 13. According to arrestee's statement, upon fulfilling the tasks in wider region of Gubavica they should have get the reinforcement from Mostar in the form of the unit size of one battalion (approximately 700 soldiers) with the intention of keeping the occupied territories, fortifying at achieved lines and creating the preconditions for advancing towards Stolac and Capljina along with obtaining the full control over Dubravska Plateau.

Introducing of fresh forces was planned to be carried out after the dark from direction of Mostar (through Laksevina and Buna towards Gubavica).

According to statements of interrogated person, the order for assault was issued by Arif Pasalic, and Alija Djulic announced it (I doubt it since A.P. is in Jablanica for a longer time now, Zuka is in Mostar, and Tetak / Uncle is in Bijelo Polje (White Field) for coordination and operationalization of the earlier created plan for offensive activities).

I think that the order was issued by Zuka who is currently in Blagaj at ZM of 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the Army of BiH and he coordinates all the missions which will probably continue into the night and tomorrows day.

Deliver to:

1. Defense Department, Attn: Mr. Bruno Stojic
2. Commander of Operational Group-2, Major-General S. Matic
3. Head of Military Intelligence Service, Zarko Keza
4. Archive

*Signee:*

Deputy Head of Military Intelligence Service  
Nikola Mikulic


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
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA

*Coat of Arms*

2

MOSTAR  
GENERAL STAFF  
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT





**LEGEND:**

- Places with extreme population
- Possible places of gathering of armed extremists and number
- Headquarters of MUP /Ministry of internal affairs/
- Alternate checkpoint of VP / Military Police/
- Checkpoint of VP / Military Police/
- Control pass checkpoints of VP /Military Police/
- Control pass checkpoint
- Checkpoint of MUP /Ministry of internal affairs/
- Alternate control pass checkpoint of VP/Military Police/
- Patrol of VP/ Military Police/
- Minor conflicts

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
ARMED FORCES  
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 1/297-72  
Sarajevo, 27.07.1993

To: Commands of the 4<sup>th</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps

Based on the current combat situation and the demonstrated need to visit and offer professional assistance to organs of the SVB /Military Security Service/: Igman OG /Operations Group/ and the 4<sup>th</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army, I hereby

O R D E R

1. That Namik DŽANKOVIĆ, on behalf of the UB /Security Administration/ of the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/, be sent to the area of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> corps.
2. The Chief of the UB ŠVK will determine specific and detailed tasks in an order.
3. All units, staffs and commands of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army must offer their assistance in carrying out the given tasks. (Crossing over from Dobrinj to Butmir and transport from Igman to Mostar and so on).
4. You should set off to /carry out/ the task immediately and return by 15 August 1993.
5. This order is effective immediately.

FORWARDED TO:

1. Security Administration;
2. Commands of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> corps;
3. Files of the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff / of the BH OS /Armed Forces/.

C O M M A N D E R  
Rasim DELIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

Republic of BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/  
BH Army  
Command of the OG /Operations Group West  
Strictly confidential number: 01/546-93  
Bugojno, 30 July 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly Confidential

O R D E R

To: Commander of the Gornji Vakuf  
OKM /main command post/

During the day I received information that the Ustashas had left Pajić Polje. We are currently reconnoitring that area. Jupi has also come today to the area of Voljice, so you do not have to worry about that direction. I ordered Senad ABAZOVIĆ to increase the intensity of sabotage actions on Marjanove Kuće and to prepare by tomorrow offensive operations on the entire area. I have sent Hasib JUSUFSPAHIĆ again to Bistrica village with the old assignment. I will free up one of the units during the day which I will send to the Grnica-Bistrica sector tomorrow with the task of attacking the Alibegova Gruda-Krupa line. In order to increase pressure and to create more favourable conditions to drive back successfully the remaining HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ forces.

## I HEREBY ORDER:

1. The 317<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/ Commander – Carry out an attack in the morning on the area of Crni Vrh, which is currently under HVO control, and after carrying out your operations man the captured lines with our forces.

2. Gornji Vakuf OpŠO /Municipal Defence Staff/ Commander – If my previous order is not implemented by the end of today, prepare forces and equipment for operations on Glavica, Grebine and Zvizde.

3. The persons charged with carrying out these assignments shall be responsible for the implementation of this order. You shall be responsible for supplying me with a report on the completed preparations and the readiness to go into action today, by 2300 hours at the latest.

Till our meeting!

KJ/EI

Commander of the OG West  
Selmo CIKOTIĆ

To:  
Commander of the G.V. OKM  
Files

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URGENT

IMMEDIATELY fire artillery at Raduški Kamen.

COMMANDER  
Selmo CIKOTIĆ

ARMY OF THE R BiH  
42<sup>ND</sup> MOUNTAIN BRIGADE  
1<sup>st</sup> mountain battalion  
Number: 01-01/62  
Date, 9 August 1993

MILITARY SECRET  
TOP SECRET

PROVISIONAL ORDER Op. No. 1  
Map of Mostar 4, section 1 : 50 000  
Edition 1982


By 24,00h 13 August 1993 prepare groups for carrying out an attack. Carry out reinforcement of MTS (material and technical means) pursuant to requests and select men. Immediately carry out reconnaissance activities in order to verify information on the HVO forces on the direction M. Polje – Buna, especially in the sector K-1 and TT 182.

Inform me on the performed preparations by 10,00h on 13. August 1993.

Delivered:

- commanders of the groups
- a/a

COMMANDER  
Esad Sejtanic  
/signed and stamped/



dok. br. 428

ODBRANA REPUBLIKE  
BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE  
STROJNO POMOĆIŠTVO

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL


# OPERACIJA NERETVA

OPERATION  
"NERETVA"

Approved  
Commander  
ŠVK OS /Supreme  
Command of  
Armed Forces/  
Rasim Delić

OPERACIJA:  
Komandant ŠVK OS  
Rasim Delić







**LEGEND:**

- ARBiH forces
- HVO forces
- Aggressor forces

**CHIEF OF ŠVK OS**  
/Supreme Command  
of Armed Forces/  
**Sefer Halilović**

A-BIH PLAN FOR THE OCCUPATION OF THE CENTRAL BOSNIA  
AND BREAKING INTO NEUM AND PLOČE





SPRING – AUTUMN 1993

HZ HB (Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna)  
OZ JIH (Operation Zone South-East Herzegovina)  
Strictly confidential number: 03-0588  
Mostar, August 14th, 1993

R E P O R T  
At 07:00 p.m.

1. ENEMIES COMBAT OPERATIONS

1.1. Muslim forces during the day provoked on a larger part of the front of OZ JIH (South east Herzegovina) and this morning at 4:30 on the line of defense between Buna and Blagaj have undertaken a very strong infantry attack, which allegedly suppress part of our forces towards the interior, and occupied our positions on the Kičine. In the afternoon we received an alert from North sector that the level of water in the lake HB Mostar has reached a critical point and threatens to undermine our position in this area. We have also learned that Muslim aggressor is regrouping its forces in Drežnica with intent to take control over connection Jablanica-Mostar. In other parts of the front day was marked by the usual provocation by infantry weapons and snipers.

1.2 Serbian aggressor has today twice fired from tanks and ZIS on our positions on the Dubravska plateau. At 15:10 2 shells have fallen on Trijebanj, 1 on Jasoc and 1 on Hodovo, and 19:55 two shells fell on Osanjice.

2. OUR FORCES

Our forces from Brigade "Knez Domagoj" with the help of company of the third HVO Brigade and company from 1. Brigade in a relatively short period of time performed regrouping and using long distance and brigade artillery of 1. and 3. brigade during the daylong battle, managed to recover all lost positions except Hadajlica Kičina for which the battle is ongoing. In other parts of the frontline defenders occasionally retaliated to provocation of the Muslim invaders, mostly with infantry weapons, while they did not respond to the fire from Serbian aggressor.

3. DECISION ON FUTURE ACTIONS

At 19:00 all units were given orders for the full readiness, and in progress is intensive observation and engineering fortification.

4. STATUS OF FORCES AND LOSSES

During today's fights according to present knowledge we had three killed and five wounded soldiers.

5. REQUIREMENTS

We have big problems with the fuel, and other requirements as in previous reports.

DELIVERED:

- GS HVO
- ONO

COMMANDER OZ JIH  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

HZ HB (Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna)  
OZ JIH (Operation Zone South-East Herzegovina)  
Strictly confidential number: 03-0560  
Mostar, August 15th, 1993

R E P O R T  
At 07:00 p.m.

## 1. ENEMIES COMBAT OPERATIONS

1.1. Muslim aggressor throughout the day provoked on most parts of the OZ JIH front. For the larger part of the front there are reports of usual occasional provocation with infantry weapons and snipers and attack operations of stronger intensity, aggressor was undertaking in the area of Kičina between Buna and Blagaj, where during the day in 4 occasions they tried to take Kajdin Kičin, but each time unsuccessfully. On the front part of Stolac day passed relatively peacefully, there were several fires of smaller plants.

1.2 During the day there were no actions from Serbian aggressor.

## 2. OUR FORCES

Our forces if necessary responded to the provocations of the Muslim aggressor. All attacks on Kajdin Kičin were successfully rejected, and all occupied positions are now back under our control.

## 3. DECISION ON FUTURE ACTIONS

Intensive fortification in all positions, especially in the recovered positions in accordance with the orders of GS HZ HB.

## 4. STATUS OF FORCES AND LOSSES

During today's fight, we had five wounded soldiers, and no killed. Soldiers' morale is high.

## 5. REQUIREMENTS

As in previous reports.

DELIVERED:  
GS OS HZ HB  
ONO

COMMANDER of OZ JIH  
Brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

REPUBLIC OF BiH  
HZ HB  
HVO

OZ JIH  
No.: 03-0562/93

MAIN STAFF

R E P O R T  
At 07:00 p.m.

1. ENEMIES COMBAT ACTIVITIES

1.1. In the northern sector, in addition to the normally Muslim provocations with infantry weapons on our positions, along the battlefield line we recorded artillery operations with 5 mines on the area Vrđi in the region of Drežnice. The fire that broke out on location Klak-Humac endangered our minefields. This morning around 8:00 am Muslim forces tried to break through the city part of battlefield in vicinity of the III elementary school, but it all ended at the attempt. In the zone defense of the city, today was as usual with small provocation, Muslims are also occasional fired on the city with the artillery.

Around 16:30 they fired from PZT (anti air technology) and with PZS (anti-interdiction means) at Visnjic. Around 11:00 a.m. Muslims have ignited a hill with one mine above the Jasenice. Today, the Muslim artillery was most active in the area of Buna, where they fired close to 100 different mines from mortars caliber 120, 82, 62 mm, LRLs and BSTs. Today on three occasions they engaged in infantry attacks from Malo Polje to take Kajdin Kičin but without success. The first attack was between 08:30 and 10:00 p.m., second between 12:00 and 13:00 p.m., and third between 14:30 and 15:00 p.m. Otherwise, the characteristic of today were several fires on locations of Laksevina, Ortiješ and Buna. The fire on Buna has temporarily disabled our inductive phones, but the defect was removed after 2 hours.

1.2 The Chetniks fired one artillery mine from Hrgud on Osanica at 09:30 a.m. Around 09:45 a.m. under Begovina in Stolac 7-8 Chetniks were detected and after our scouts started to approach and fire at them, they fled.

2. OUR FORCES

Today our forces in the northern sector responded with 2 mines on Dražnić. In the afternoon our artillery operated on HC (Hydro-power plant) Mostar. In the town zone of defense we rebuffed Muslim infantry attack around 08:00 a.m. near III primary school. Around 11:30 am our artillery was active at Musala with 6 120mm mortar mines. In the area of Buna our forces have rejected the infantry attacks on Kičin and also operated with artillery on Muslim positions in Blagaj, M. Polje, around 12:00 hours we operated with 15 120 mm mortar mines on Postre under Kriz. Our air defense weapons also operated on Muslim positions.

3. DECISION ON FUTURE ACTIONS

Maximally fortify obtained positions and prepare for future combat activities.

4. STATUS OF FORCES AND LOSSES

Our unit firmly hold obtained positions. Manpower in some units is exhausted. According to information from the field today, we had one wounded members of HVO, and one wounded Muslim prisoner. In combat operations on wider area of Buna today, two of our soldiers were captured.

REPUBLIC OF BiH  
HZ HB  
HVO  
OZ JIH

Strictly confidential number: 03-0564

REPORT AT 07:00 p.m.

#### 1. ENEMIES COMBAT ACTIVITIES

1.1. Muslim aggressor during the day provoked on most parts of the OZ JIH front. In the northern sector and in the zone of responsibility of the 3. Brigade of HVO, the enemy was operating with infantry weapons and sniper fire, a stronger enemy activity was expressed in the town sector and the area between Buna and Blagaj, where also today tried several times to regain lost positions. In the town sector by Carinski Bridge, Muslim forces have tried infantry penetration, but to no avail, while in other parts of this sector usual fierce fire was recorded from snipers and infantry weapons.

1.2 During the day Serbian aggressor was not active.

#### 2. OUR FORCES

Our forces have occasionally responded to the fire by Muslim forces, and in the street Rižina they occupied another building. All attacks by Muslim forces, with the support of our artillery were successfully rejected.

#### 3. DECISION ON FUTURE ACTIONS

Intensive fortification of obtained positions and preparation for active operations.

#### 4. REQUIREMENTS

As in previous reports.

DELIVERED:

- GS HVO
- ONO OZ JIH

COMMANDER OZ JIH  
brigadier  
Miljenko Lasić

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MAIN HEADQUARTERS OF HVO  
Reg. Number: /handwritten/ 02-211-01-2012/93  
IZM Čitluk, August 17th, 1993

DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT  
On MOS attacks on HVO

On 14 August 1993 at 4:30 a.m. MOS forces carried out attack operations on HVO positions on line Buna-Kičin-Kranj in the area of Malo Polje. MOS line of attack was: Blagaj-Kosor-Buna, Blagaj-Ovah-Palanka-Brijeg-Kičin. The attack was made by inserting DTG in the area of Malo Polje with focus of attacks on Hadžiajlagić-Kajdin-Kičin, v. Brijeg, v. Marići, elevation 199, elevation 403 with the intent to cut the communication between Buna-Rotimlja and further control of direction and area-Gubavica Domanovići. Due to the sudden and strong attack our forces with much smaller number of forces had to retreat from established lines and have maintained the reserve position and resisted further attacks of MOS forces.

This happened at 07.55 a.m.

The counter attack was strong on elevation 199, 171, 182 and 108 and immediately backup force-reserve was established. As part of our forces remained surrounded in s. Brijeg, and we had four killed, we were forced to move in a counter-attack, in order to make the blockade forces surrounded, we drew out our dead soldiers and regained positions which were lost in MOS attack.

At 08:59 hours we drew out the bodies of the deceased, broke the blockade of our soldiers in v. Brijeg and regained positions Gorice elevation 108. Fierce infantry and artillery battle continued and at 10.10 a.m. communication Buna-Rotimlja is under our control.

At 14.21 p.m. our forces have been placed on elevation 199, and at the same time whole of Gorica was occupied, therefore our forces regrouped and move to Kičin tt 171.

-2 -

At 16.28 p.m. South Kičin tt 182, is in our hands. At all times the MOS forces operated with the mortars in the areas where HVO forces were positioned and in the village Buna. By the end of the day a fierce battle was fought throughout the Buna battlefield.

Simultaneously with this struggle and throughout the night MOS forces fiercely attacked the city's front lines on Boulevard in order to penetrate into the city area, controlled by HVO. When performing this operation MOS forces were using the means of mass destruction (Bosnian pots, a sample of which we have in OZ J / IH, incendiary bombs and mixtures) and with artillery weapons operated on civilian population.

At the same time, MOS forces made an organized move towards the positions of HVO forces in front line Bijelo Polje, and as the counter attack was fierce and we prevented the realization of an imaginary target they closed exhaust openings of Mostar dam 1. which caused water to spill out of the reservoir. Despite all undertaken combat and other actions by the MOS forces frontline remained unchanged.

Night of 14/15 August was relatively calm, except in the town battlefield, where MOS forces throughout the night vehemently attacked.

In the early morning hours of August 15<sup>th</sup> MOS forces have again started combat operations on HVO positions. The attacks are fiercely counterattack and move to conquer elevation point 171, so that this point was under HVO control at 08:23 am. During the entire day fierce fighting take place east of the elevation point 182 and 171 and MOS forces receive direct instructions from Arif Pašalić, and they receive additional quantity of ammunition and manpower.

At 12.38 our forces enter first houses at v. Brijeg. Since that time, MOS forces significantly enhance mortar and artillery fire on positions of our troops. With a continuous battle until the nightfall our lines of defense have remained unchanged.



Simultaneous with these attacks, MOS forces perform attack on HVO forces in the region Doljani and these attacks were successfully rejected.

On 16 August again in the morning hours MOS troops begin with the attacks on our forces, which our troops successfully rejected and slowly create free space.

Again on all the previously mentioned parts of the battlefield MOS forces perform active combat operations, but HVO lines remain unchanged.

The same combat attacks continue on August 17<sup>th</sup> - our forces respond with all resources and at this HVO achievements are evident.

-3 -

Current status of defense lines is favorable and we expect very soon to establish the line as it was before the aggression.

/ signed and stamped /

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF  
No.: 02-2/1-01-2010/93  
Mostar, 17 August 1993

Violation of agreement on cessation  
of hostilities in BiH

UN Medugorje

The Sarajevo agreement on the cessation of hostilities in BiH is violated by BH Army forces daily.

On 14 August 1993 BH Army forces violated the agreement to such an extent that they went into an all-out offensive on the Blagaj-Buna-Gubavica-Domanovići axis with only one goal – to capture the area of the Dubrava plateau.

The attack by BH Army forces began at 0430 hours on 14 August 1993 against the features of Hadialagića Kičin, Buna and Gubavica. By 0900 hours BH Army forces succeeded in capturing these parts.

In order to frustrate the intentions of the BH Army, HVO forces went into a counter-offensive and by 2100 hours on 14 August 1993 succeeded in recapturing the lost positions.

Unable to come to terms with their failure, BH Army forces went into a new offensives in these parts, and on 15, 16 and 17 August 1993 more intense battles took place.

HVO units have no intention of going into an offensive in the direction of Blagaj, but they will defend the line on River Buna and Bunik with all their might.

We are not expecting the BH Army to stop its attacks, because we have information that it has been issued an order by Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ to capture the Dubrava plateau at any cost and to break through to Tasovčići and Klepci and then to continue to Neum.

Please inform the co-chair of the Conference in Geneva about this and send a warning to the BH Army Staff to respect the agreement.

We also ask you to prevent unscheduled BH Army helicopter flights, which are not for humanitarian but for combat purposes.

Yours faithfully,

HVO MAIN STAFF  
Major General  
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ  
/stamped and signed/

Hodžić, Šefko „UNSEALED ENVELOPE”  
Sarajevo, DES 2000.

### **The Last Supper at “Ark”**

It is Saturday, 4 September '93. Following the agreement we gathered in the garden of Dr Safet ČIBO in Jablanica, beneath a grape arbour with ripe grapes: Sefer, KARIĆ, BILAJAC, SULJEVIĆ, ČIBO, Hamo MASLEŠA and myself. KARIĆ immediately informed Sefer that a telegram came for him from Arif PAŠALIĆ from Mostar. PAŠALIĆ wrote that “the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ was preparing an all-out attack on Mostar” and that the attack “was to take place within five to seven days”.

- We will hit them first - says Sefer. - Units are gathering on Sunday, reconnaissance is taking place on Monday and Tuesday, and we are starting off on Wednesday.

That was the first time I heard that some units should have arrived from Sarajevo, as reinforcement, but that they failed to arrive, and that Sefer, when requesting some Sarajevo units, he had difficulties to get them, for that would weaken the defence of Sarajevo. Immediately upon our arrival in Jablanica, on 2 September, Sefer sent a dispatch to the First Corps Commander Vahid KARAVELIĆ about exceptionally serious situation in Mostar, about the expulsion of Muslims, about how the HVO have proclaimed Mostar their capital and how they are taking measures to seize it.

For that reason Sefer ordered KARAVELIĆ to dispatch “a Delta Brigade, parts of the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade and SOLAKOVIĆ’s unit - manpower totalling to over 300 combatants, with complete equipment and weapons” to Herzegovina. In conclusion of the dispatch Sefer wrote this as well: “If you reckon that the Sarajevo defence is jeopardised through this secondment - I shall take the full responsibility.”

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DELIC and Sefer agreed to meet again at 12 hrs at the Command of the unit "Zulfikar" in Donja Jablanica. DELIC proceeded towards Jablanica, and we did so towards Neretvica.

DELIC's arrival put Sefer in a bad mood. From the front seat he turned towards Dr ĆIBO and me and we could clearly observe his fine facial features changing. He addressed ĆIBO:

- ĆIBO please tell DELIC to go to central Bosnia. I do not need him to mess around here. I am the one coordinating combats and I do not need him. I will take responsibility too should I fail. I will not be here if DELIC will. Let him go to central Bosnia.

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We returned to the base of the unit "Zulfikar" in Donja Jablanica, where DELIC, VRANJ, BILAJAC, SULJEVIĆ, KARIĆ, ZUKA and several low-ranking commanders, came earlier. They held a meeting in a separate room. In a lobby with me sat commanders of units "Akrepi" /Scorpions/, "Silver Fox", Handžarci" and Drežnica Battalion. All those units were to be joined and, in the operation "Neretva", put under the command of the unit "Zulfikar". Everyone agreed to it save for Džeki, Handžarci Commander. In vain were attempts of Sefer and KARIĆ to persuade him.

- You want to have a private army -- Sefer told him.

- I waged war in Croatia, I am on the warpath in Bosnia, but the true war for me will be in Kosovo -- replied Džeki, who was an Albanian.

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We were also talking about combats and commanders. I asked DELIC if he believed that these peace negotiations were really going to bring peace, or they were just "war ornaments".

- I reckon they are ornaments and that the war continues - he replied.

- From negotiations we suffer damage only -- Sefer added. -- The morale of combatants is dropping...

- Sefer and what you say: "We will reach Ploče too!", DELIC, smiling, says to Sefer, alluding to the recent Sefer's statement on how our army was going "to reach Ploče". Because of that statement of his huge fuss was created in Croatian press.

Sefer, also smiling, explained how that gaffe had occurred.

-I took the stage at a rally in Podrinjača -- he narrated to us. -- I was talking how we were going to liberate every part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and how our army was going to reach Bosnian borders, reach Neum... Then someone from the front row added: "Ploče too!" So I said, so be it, "Ploče too!"

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In Dobro Polje Sefer held a meeting with commanders on preparing an offensive along the Prozor axis. Salko GUŠIĆ, Selmo CIKOTIĆ, Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, Haso HAKALOVIĆ, Zaim BEŠOVIĆ, Munib MILIŠIĆ Barba and the host Enver BUZA, Prozor Battalion Commander, were there. As they were planning the combat, ĆIBO and I went with a Prozor combatant to Boban's "salvation path" which crossed through this part of the Zec Mountain.

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Caco told us how he had problems with the enrolment of his combatants and their children to university and high schools and that he had to intervene personally and then they would be all admitted.

We asked him how he intervened.

- Well, fine – he said. – For instance thirty people of mine competed for a university. Afterwards they complained to me – nobody was admitted. How come? No? "Make me a list of all those who competed!" – I told them. They brought the list and I wrote few words with it and sent the letter to the dean through messenger.

- "What did you write to the dean, Caco? – we interrupted him.

- Two, three words to inform me through the messenger in writing that all of them were admitted. He signed it and really the messenger came and brought it in.

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From the War Hospital, I went down to Jablanica centre. I met two acquaintances from the Jablanica MUP.

- "Have you heard what happened in Grabovica this morning?" they asked me.

- "No! What happened?"

- "Someone killed five-member Croatian family."

We went to MUP together. I asked if any of them would go to Grabovica, that I would go too.

- "No one can enter Grabovica" they told me. – "The army has blocked the road and they don't let anyone go through."

I went to the Command of the Zulfikar Unit in Donja Jablanica. Soon after Sefer HALILOVIĆ arrived and sat next to me. On that day he was going to Konjic, that is Buturović Polje. As some soldiers and commanders were coming close to our table, I asked him silently if he had heard what happened in Grabovica. He said he did.

Back then, we both thought that the motive of that crime was probably someone's personal revenge on the Croats from Grabovica who didn't have anything to do with his destiny, the destiny of the expelled Muslims or the released prisoners.

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Before long, Sefer HALILOVIĆ and Dr Safet ĆIBO came to our base in Donja Jablanica. We went together towards Dobro Polje near Prozor and to Voljevac, where the Command of the Battalion of the 317 Mountain Brigade from Gornji Vakuf was located.

While we were travelling towards the northern part of the battlefield, I asked Sefer and ĆIBO about the massacre and the meeting in Konjic that was held two nights before. They both condemned the massacre, but they didn't agree with Bakir ALISPAHIĆ who they said, at the meeting in Konjic suggested to stop the operation because of the massacre and to pull back the Sarajevo units to Sarajevo. Dr ĆIBO said that he interrupted ALISPAHIĆ and told him, "Are you crazy? To stop the operation? The destiny of 100.000 Bosniaks from Herzegovina is at stake."

- "Let's make it clear", said Sefer. "I don't approve what happened in Grabovica. However, there is a sequence of moves. First, the offensive should be carried out and..."

- "And 100.000 people saved" said ĆIBO.

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People are talking a lot about our offensive "up to Neum", and it is still far from being launched.

The time limit, during which it ought to have been terminated, had already expired, and it has not started yet.


As I was hungry, I stopped at the Command in Donja Jablanica. Sefer also came. He was also hungry. They brought us tomato salad, and we ate from the same plate. I asked him why we were running behind schedule.

- We have been carrying out final preparations – he said. – We are currently resolving some disagreements in Konjic, primarily those between Salko GUŠIĆ and Doctor Safet ĆIBO. ĆIBO wants to be in charge and to interfere with the Army, but he should be a logistical support to the army instead.

- Sefer, I have heard many versions about the scale of the offensive – I said to him. – That the plan is to go all the way to Neum. What is the truth in that?

This has hitherto been our greatest operation – Sefer said. – If we succeed, it will completely change the strategic situation in our country. For the first time, President IZETBEGOVIĆ will also have a strong hand during the negotiations.

Sunday morning, September the 12<sup>th</sup>. Sefer HALILOVIĆ with an escort, Doctor ĆIBO and I set off towards Dobro polje and Voljevac. We visited Haso HAKALOVIĆ in Neretvica. Haso went to Dobro polje, since one of his battalion, which was to take part in a battle along the Prozor axes, was already up there. Sefer advised Haso and an intelligence officer, Jusuf HADŽAJLIJA HOMEINI, to be careful to whom they were selling ammunition because "that ammunition can easily end up in the lake with the intention of making our army weaker".



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Let us go back to Dobro polje and September the 12<sup>th</sup>, 1993.

We left the combatants from Neretvica and went to see the soldiers from Prozor, who were being deployed some hundred metres further down all over the plateau, and were taking target practice. When we approached them, they stopped with the practice and gathered around Sefer and their commander Enver BUZA.

Sefer held a brief, effective speech before them. He just told them:

- You must carry out this assignment. You must liberate Vilić guvno and Makljen, and then Prozor as well. I have nothing more to say to you.

We continued towards Voljevac, up to the combatants of the Second Battalion of the 317<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade from Gornji Vakuf. Together with them, there was a unit, comprised of Foča men who fought at Proskok, on Igman. The combatants lined up on a clearing by a rivulet. Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, the 317<sup>th</sup> Brigade Commander, was also with them. Sefer held a brief speech before them, as well.

- Can we carry out what we are expected to do? – Sefer asked the formation.
- We can! – the combatants answered with one voice.
- So, shall we join the offensive?
- We shall!
- Your task is to liberate Crni vrh tomorrow – Sefer told them. – You will

be accompanied by the combatants from Neretvica.

Sefer thought that he should meet again with the combatants and the commanders of the Prozor Battalion and Neretvica. Therefore, we immediately returned to Dobro polje.

In front of the Command of the Prozor Battalion, Sefer held another speech before the combatants from Prozor and Neretvica. He talked about the importance of this “first offensive” of ours. Then he added that that offensive, which was to start the day after, “coincidentally coincides with the date when I began to clandestinely organise The Patriotic League with my friends two years ago, on 13 September 1991.”

That coincidence between the date of our first offensive and the date of the PL /Patriotic League/ founding was also effective. But Sefer was not telling the truth. Because, afterwards, in the course of that great interview with them, he stated that he had left JNA on 18, 19 and 20 September 1991, and that he joined the PL not until after a few days of checking. Therefore, it is not exactly on “the next day when the offensive is to be launched”.

When Sefer finished his speech, there was a silence prevailing for a while. And then one of the combatants exclaimed: “Long live Comrade Tito!” We all laughed. The combatants were pleased to have Sefer there, and Sefer was pleased to be with them. Sefer told me:

- This is the real thing – to be with the combatants in the field! I am tempted to take over the brigade and the command.

He was thrilled with the combatants' motivation to fight.

- We will liberate the whole Bosnia, won't we, Čibo? – he addressed Čibo who was standing next to us, – Bosnia will not be divided. We will make war for ten years but we will liberate it entirely.

- Out of the question! Forget about division! - Čibo said.

III

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- From the beginning of the war to this point, there has not been a greater operation – Sefer said. – And this is, in fact, our first offensive. Because, tomorrow morning, fighting will break out on the front from Bugojno to Mostar.

We have reckoned that there might be five thousand combatants taking part in the offensive. Vilić guvno is to be attacked by the combatants from the West Operative Group from Bugojno. The combatants from Neretvica and Gornji Vakuf, as well as the unit of Foča men, will be engaged at Crni vrh, and the Prozor people somewhere between Vilić guvno and Makljen.

And some units of the Sixth Corps, reinforced with the soldiers from Sarajevo, will be engaged on the southern part of the front, as well as the entire Fourth Corps. And those are many units, small and big ones.

Sefer appointed Zuka commander of the units that are to attack Mostar from Jablanica. I asked Sefer what his role would be the following day.

- I co-ordinate combat activities from Bugojno to Mostar – he said.

And he chose to observe the battle of Vrđi the next day.

And Čibo has begun to imitate my combat reports, which “we will hear tomorrow”.

“Ustashas are attacking with all their strength! Where is the NATO pact, where is the world community?.. Nevertheless, our men are fighting bravely” – he repeated a couple of times those “reports” of mine, while we were driving through the night.

IV

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### Why BUZA failed to move

Operation “Neretva” began on Monday morning, 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1993. Hollow shelling detonations that could be heard from the direction of Prozor were a signal that our guys had moved on the north-west part of the front towards Crni Vrh, Makljen and Vilića Guvno.

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Crni Vrh was on fire with explosions and infantry fighting. We arrived in Voljevac, which was also being shelled.

At the Command of the Gornji Vakuf 317<sup>th</sup> Brigade's 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion were Vehbija KARIĆ, Zičro SULJEVIĆ, Rifat BILAJAC, Haso HAKALOVIĆ and Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ. They announced the happy news: our guys at Crni Vrh were holding up well. They liberated an important elevation of Gvozd and were advancing. However, they were all angry with BUZA who "once again failed to move". Sefer told SULJEVIĆ that tonight he goes with the men from Prozor, because he does not trust BUZA to move if one of us is not with him.

SULJEVIĆ accepted this unreservedly.

I asked Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, the Commander of the 317<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade, to find me a soldier whom I could go to Crni Vrh with and monitor the battle.

"What Crni Vrh?", ZEJNILAGIĆ asked. "I need a whole company of men to get you to Crni Vrh alive. Can't you see it is hell now at Crni Vrh?"

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Towards evening at the IKM /Forward Command Post/ in Voljevac new unpleasant news arrived. In the battle at Crni Vrh, our soldiers came across a minefield and there were both dead and wounded. Ahead of that minefield the soldiers paused. The second unpleasant piece of news: the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ was attacking with tanks from the flank, which was unprotected because the Prozor men did not move in and close that axis. The HVO was firing from tanks not only at our guys at Crni Vrh, but also at Voljevac.

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Tuesday, 14<sup>th</sup> of September '93. I got up early and got ready to go to Glogova and find Zuko, whom Sefer had appointed to command over the southern part of the front - towards Mostar. However, not a single shot could be heard from the south even though the fighting was to start early. The unit's logistics officer "Zulfikar" ŠPAGO told me that the communications men hadn't rolled out the telephone cable yet, but that the fighting will most certainly start today in the direction of Mostar as well.

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"All quiet at Zuko's, while Prozor is on fire. Prozor is "calling" me again."

I wanted to persuade Sefer to change the decision and to set out today towards Dobro Polje and Voljevac, instead of Mostar. He phoned to check the situation at the southern part of the front.

"Nothing is going on down there yet. We are going to Voljevac" - he said. And we all set off.

At about 1 o'clock in the afternoon we reached Dobro Polje. There were only a few

older soldiers and women gathered in front of the headquarters of the Independent Prozor Battalion. They immediately started bragging about how their soldiers had captured the village of Uzdol that morning. We went to the Prozor Battalion Communications Centre.

The communications officers confirmed that early that morning their soldiers had “surprised Ustashas at Uzdol, found them in their pyjamas”, how they “killed quite a few Ustashas” and liberated the whole village, but that the HVO reinforcements were on their way to help Uzdol, so that the soldiers from their battalion had to withdraw. That was the latest news from “the field”.

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HAKALOVIĆ, who did not have answers to many of the questions the soldiers were asking, told Sefer how his soldiers had withdrawn from Crni Vrh. This was shocking news. Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, who was standing beside me, said: “My men had withdrawn too.” But seeing how furious Sefer was about the withdrawal of soldiers from Klis, he didn’t dare tell him at that moment that the soldiers from Gornji Vakuf had also withdrawn from Crni Vrh.

“ZEJNILAGIĆ, where are your soldiers? Are they at least holding what we liberated yesterday?”, Sefer asked, all shocked and pale.

“My soldiers retreated, too”, ZEJNILAGIĆ answered in a low voice.

A hush fell.

“So, we’re now back at our initial positions?” - asked Sefer, looking at ZEJNILAGIĆ.

“At the initial ones”, ZEJNILAGIĆ answered in a low voice.

But then the Neretvice soldiers took the floor.

“Our reconnaissance was insufficient”, said one soldier. “We should have spent longer on reconnaissance. Even late Seid had asked for another day or two of reconnaissance before the move. Once the fighting had started, they should have at least sent us to the side of the Crni Vrh we had carried out the reconnaissance on. Instead we were sent to a completely different area.”

“We didn’t even get the stretchers and we had both killed and wounded men”, another soldier added.

“And why did you withdraw from Crni Vrh?”, Sefer asked.

“We want to go to Seid PADALOVIĆ’s funeral”, soldiers replied.

And they all want to go to the funeral in Klis.

“There will be no retreat, the action continues”, Sefer told them. “Who else will liberate us if we do not do it ourselves?”

Sefer managed to calm the soldiers.

We continued towards Voljevac. We saw Vehbija KARIĆ and Rifat BILAJAC beside a small river washing their feet.

“We just took our shoes off after three days”, KARIĆ said.

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And what did happen in Uzdol on 14<sup>th</sup> of September 1993? I know only what I read in the Croatian press, which mentioned a massacre of 41 Croats from Uzdol (12 HVO soldiers and 29 civilians), and what Enver BUZA and Ziéro SULJEVIĆ had publicly said. They claimed that there was no massacre and that instead “it was a military victory”.

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Thursday, 16 September 1993. Despite the fact I was tired and sleep deprived due to yesterday's events in Drežnica and due to last night's slow and dangerous drive in transportation vehicle to Zuki base, I went to the command of 44. Mountain Brigade in Jablanica to write and send to redaction a broader report on the battle for elimination of blockade of Drežice. And to see what is happening around Lake Jablanica. Because, roars are coming from this direction.

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After the meeting, Sefer told me that tomorrow we would attack all together: soldiers from Bugojno towards Vilića Guvno, men from Gornji Vakuf, Klis and Prozor towards Makljen, and these units towards Mostar. Since Valter was hanging about, he gave him some order and Valter left.

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### **Silent war Sefer-Pašalić**

Saturday, 18<sup>th</sup> of September 1993. This morning I again stopped by the Command of the 44<sup>th</sup> Brigade in Jablanica. At the Communications Centre they showed me a telegram sent to Sefer by Selmo CIKOTIĆ, Commander of the Operative Group “Zapad”. In his telegram CIKOTIĆ wrote about his soldiers' triumph in a battle towards Vilića Guvno, stating that they had liberated the 1409 metres high Karaulica elevation, dominating over Vilića Guvno.

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Since the length of the front line in Operation “Neretva” was approximately 200 km, I decided to monitor the battles from the forward command posts where information poured in, which I could then immediately send to the editorial office. It was completely different to monitor the battles at Žuč where the commanders had led the battles from the front lines.

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“Operative Group “Zapad”, in the context of joint activities of 6<sup>th</sup> Corps units, was tasked with breaking through towards Vilića Guvno and taking over Vilića Guvno. The 6<sup>th</sup> Corps units were to take over Makljen, hence practically liberating the territory of Gornji Vakuf. During the Operation “Neretva” the units of OG “Zapad” took over the region of Maljevina, AREŽAN's and PRSKALO's stables, captured Ostrožac, Barakovac, Tica and Karaulica and by doing this practically reached Vilića Guvno. The fighting was constant for three days and the activities stopped when we found out that the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps units did not take Crni Vrh, so we, afraid of being wedged

in, stopped at those lines. We kept all the liberated elevations and heights until winter when we withdrew from Karaulica, Barakovac and Tica. We kept the other elements as a basis for the next potential battle for Vilića Guvno.”

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In the afternoon of the 18<sup>th</sup> of September 1993, the fighting continued on the southern part of the front, towards Mostar. I went with Sefer to a 105 mm howitzer artillery position at Grabovica. We listened to the explosions and infantry fire. Sefer failed to establish connection with Zuka and Nihad BOJADŽIĆ. In the evening, Nihad returned to the base and said that it was “impenetrable”, that we had not broken through any HVO lines, that two soldiers were killed and quite a few wounded. Nihad also was lightly wounded.

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Besides, during the Operation “Neretva” and even before, there was some sort of “silent war” going on between Sefer and PAŠALIĆ. Since we embarked on Herzegovina, some soldiers from Mostar would visit Sefer and there was always talk of PAŠALIĆ. Sefer was on the side of those who were against PAŠALIĆ and did not get on well with those who praised him. Even during the preparations for the offensive, Sefer told me how in March that year he had given Mithad HUJDUR Hujka 300.000 marks to “buy weapons from Ustashas, without PAŠALIĆ knowing”, but with the agreement of the President IZETBEGOVIĆ.” With that money, he said, Hujka bought weapons from the HVO (“Ustashas took weapons off APCs and sold them to Hujka”) And, he added, Mostar was saved with those weapons. “It is true that Sefer gave Hujka money, but it was 600.000, not 300.000 marks”, PAŠALIĆ later told me. “When I found out that Hujka got that money, I called him and he admitted that Sefer had given him the money, but “without PAŠALIĆ knowing.” “I immediately went to Sarajevo with Hujka, past the runway, to see Sefer. “Tell me, who gave you the money”, I asked Hujka in front of Sefer. Sefer told Hujka: “Well, I told you to tell PAŠALIĆ!” “You told me that PAŠALIĆ must not know”, Hujka replied. Sefer could not say a word.

There are more interesting stories about the “silent war” between Sefer and PAŠALIĆ. I spoke to both of them about it, but here I will only mention that part of their “war” which took place during the Operation “Neretva”.

Of course I spoke to PAŠALIĆ on a number of occasions about Operation “Neretva”. “I participated in the planning of this operation in Sarajevo”, PAŠALIĆ said. “BILAJAC, Sefer and I planned it, and partly Commander DELIĆ who signed it. However, Sefer was late to come out of Sarajevo.”

The impression I got was that there was no communication between Sefer and PAŠALIĆ during this offensive, the main aim of which was to break the blockade, that is to liberate entire Mostar. I asked PAŠALIĆ about it.

"I had no contact with Sefer and this was strange to me", PAŠALIĆ said. "Something strange is going on", I told my associates and wanted them to witness it all. In fact, we too were guided by your reports which we listened to over the radio. When you reported that Medved was liberated, I concluded it was time for us to move and I issued an order to attack Hum. And we liberated it. However, the units from Jablanica stopped and the plan of Operation "Neretva" was that when I reach Hum, Sefer should be in Đubrani. Since the units from the Jablanica direction stopped, we also had to retreat from Hum. We lost a few soldiers, one brigade commander, had quite a few wounded."

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Later on, I again asked Sefer why he returned to Sarajevo after a series of brilliant victories and the liberation of Medved.

"To ask for reinforcements", he told me. "Because the soldiers down there were already tired of fighting and we needed to introduce fresh forces to finish the job. It seems to me that at that point the most ideal opportunity to "finish the job" in Operation "Neretva" was missed.

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### False news on truce

Even the ABiH Main Staff reported on fights. The Main Staff gave more information than me on Tuesday, the 21<sup>st</sup> of September: together with liberation of Medved, they informed on the liberation of Velika Vlainja and the village of Vratnica.

Of course, they informed on the liberation of Hum, Raštani and Šemovac In Mostar and on the rejecting of HVO forces from the Vojno hill that was the only base of "the HVO extremists on the left side of the river Neretva from Drežnica to Blagaj".

But as soon as we returned to Sarajevo, the BiH radio announced on Wednesday, 22<sup>nd</sup> of September at 13.00 hrs that the truce has been signed between ABiH and HVO in Vrđi and that the fights in Herzegovina had been stopped. It was mentioned that the present Zagreb Mufti Šefko ef. OMERBAŠIĆ participated in the discussions on the truce in Herzegovina.

We got confused by that news. Following that information, the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps requested the explanation from the Main Staff on the same day about "the meaning of that for the further activities in the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps area of responsibility". It was never known who announced that false news.

In the evening of that same day, I met dr. Safet ĆIBO. He went to visit Sefer. Dr. ĆIBO told me that he spent four hours yesterday evening in president's IZETBEGOVIĆ'S residence.

"The president is aggressive", said ĆIBO and it seems that president IZETBEGOVIĆ told him last night: "Liberate Stolac as soon as possible!" And then he added several times: "Hurry up, hurry up!" ĆIBO then went to see Sefer to inform him on his

discussion with president IZETBEGOVIĆ.

That means no discussion about the truce that was allegedly signed.

I went to the Main Staff on Friday to see Sefer HALILOVIĆ. He sat in his big office where fateful decisions for the defense of the country had been made for over a year. Three to four months ago, there were always many commanders there. In the office and in the hall. One could reach Sefer with great difficulty.

Now there was only his little son Samir in his office, with whom he was playing. Although it was day, his at this moment "peaceful" office was dark, with the candle burning. The atmosphere was mystic. He was happy to see me. I asked him when we shall go to Herzegovina.

-We won't go before Monday, he said.

And then he started immediately to complain that the politics and the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Command are plotting against him.

-I can not find 300 fighters for Herzegovina. They won't let me!, Sefer said.

I went to Holiday Inn on Monday, 27<sup>th</sup> of September where the Bosniac-Muslim congress had to begin with the main topic whether to accept or reject the newest peace plan for BiH. I approached the commander DELIĆ, who was sitting in the first row, between Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ and Sulejman VRANJO before the start of the Congress.

-What you did is no good, I heard it on the radio, DELIĆ said to me.

In other words, I was reporting from the battlefield not only for "Oslobodjenje", but also for BiH radio. On this very morning they broadcast one of my programs from the Herzegovina battlefield.

-What was not good?- I asked commander DELIĆ.

-Well, that direct broadcasting of the combat with Sefer- explained DELIĆ.

-That was not a direct broadcast of the combat. The program was broadcasted several days after the combat-I said.

-You are broadcasting the combat as if it was a football match, and that is not good- Djedo added.-I was always against such reporting from the battlefield.

In the congress break I approached Fikret MUSLIMOVIĆ and Osman BRKA.

-This thing with Sefer was not necessary. Some people reproached it to you. When I listened to your reports from Herzegovina and when you mentioned some commanders, I thought whether it was the same reporter who reported from Žuč about ŠEHOVIĆ and ZAJKO...

-No, you didn't have to write in that way about Sefer- said BRKA.

-But, there are big combats in Herzegovina, a big area was liberated and I reported the same way as I did it from Žuč- I said.

-One more thing- continued MUSLIMOVIĆ. -Sefer is saying bad things about the president and you are listening to that. You should have returned from Herzegovina when you heard it for the first time.

-Sefer did not say anything against the president, but about the conceptual differences between the two of them regarding the defense of the country- I said.

Commander DELIĆ approached us and I told him that these people are criticizing me too.

-They shouldn't have to, said DELIĆ.

BRKA had a disagreement with Sefer on the 15<sup>th</sup> of April 1993 when there was a celebration of the first anniversary of our Army, where Sefer had a speech. Sefer approached BRKA after the celebration and asked him if he liked his speech. "Half of it was good, half of it was bad", said BRKA. "What is not good?" asked Sefer. "You did not mention the role of SDA and Alija in the defense of the country", replied BRKA.

I reached an agreement with Djedo to come and see him in Central Bosnia right after the congress and follow the combats, but not to report on the war as if it was "a football match". I gave up on going to Herzegovina consequently.

But in the evening, while the congress was still going on, Safet ĆIBO told me that one of the Sefer's men was looking for me regarding Sefer's departure to Herzegovina on the same evening; so if I am willing to go with him, I should get ready immediately since he is leaving at eight. I immediately remembered what ĆIBO told me few days ago. In this new combats in Herzegovina they could not only de-block Mostar, but also liberate Stolac. There was no force so strong to stop me going again to Herzegovina.

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We arrived to Donja Jablanica at the dawn of 28<sup>th</sup> of September.

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Sejo DJULIĆ said that they were all the time broadcasting my reportage on the battle for Medved on the radio that caused the people in western Mostar to "panic and run away". He said that the Croatian Radio in Mostar tried to calm the people down saying the truce was signed and that IZETBEGOVIĆ pulled Sefer HALILOVIĆ to Sarajevo.

-Two or three days later, said DJULIĆ, the Croatian radio from western Mostar started to talk about the victory against the units commanded by Sefer.

Djulic told me that "the Ustasha's legs are shaking" when Zuka and Sefer are mentioned and that it would be good if I could mention them more frequently in my reportages.

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### A new deception on Neretva

Wednesday, 29 September 1993. I went again to the Command of 44. Mountain Brigade to see what's going on Pisvir, most of which is now in the hands of HVO. Since yesterday people in Jablanica live in fear. Because, if HVO takes the entire Pisvir, Jablanica is also threatened. But Chief of Staff Semiz Čilić and security Zajko Sihirlić say that today there are no fights in Pisvir, our troops as well as HVO are

digging in. They say, tomorrow, our troops will move into action to regain lost positions on Pisvir.

Sihirlić gives me the paper across the table says: "This we have just received from the Commander Gušić. Read "

It is the order from the Commander of the Sixth Corps Salke Gušić to all units of the Corps to terminate the combat operations on HVO forces. The order comes into force tomorrow on 30 September 1993 at 6 p.m.

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I asked Čilić and Zajko if they will comply with this order and whether they will attack tomorrow HVO on Pisvir.

- We do not believe that HVO will comply with the ceasefire. Do you? - Said Čilić.

I went to the Zulfikatr unit headquarters in Donja Jablanica to ask Safer, who probably received the order for ceasefire between the Army and HVO, if we are returning to Sarajevo. Safer was not at Zukin's basis. But Nihad Bojadžić was. He tells me that for this new battle towards Vrda and Mostar they have developed a "cunning deception".

- What kind? I ask.

- The kind Tito here prepared in the Fourth offense - Nihko says.

He explained to me what's the reasoning behind this new deception on Neretva River.

We will not start the operation with attacks on Vrda and Mostar, where HVO expects us, but towards the West - by Rakit's and Boban's "road of salvation." Croats would think that the Bosnian army is moving to Lištica and Posušje, and we expect them to transfer their troops from Mostar and Vrda to the west in order to stop the progression of our units. And then in a day or two we'll strike with full force towards Vrda and Mostar.

As reinforcements from Sarajevo, 150 soldiers from the First Mountain Brigade arrive in Jablanica. On Thursday, September 30<sup>th</sup>, they were waiting for helicopter from Zenica the whole day in full combat readiness on helipad below Zukin base. But the helicopter was not coming, which made soldiers angry. They were led by Samir Muhić Švabo. He tells me that they were looking for 150 volunteers for Herzegovina and that even more soldiers volunteered.

Their assignment was to attack Vrda together with units of the Fourth Corps from the east side. They were supposed to be transferred by helicopter this morning to Glogovo, and then continue on foot.

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

### ***Mutual accusations of the commanders***

Friday, 1<sup>st</sup> October 1993.

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Since at 18:00 hours last night the ceasefire against HVO indeed went into effect, and the Radio was continuously reporting on that last night and this morning, I had to start the report telling that HVO was the first to attack. Otherwise, it was still a rule of reporting on the war by saying that "they always attack first, and we are always on the defence".

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In the feuilleton published in the autumn 1993, which devaluated results of the operation "Neretva", "Ljiljan" announced that, due to that and the next report, President IZETBEGOVIĆ contacted the BiH RTV Director Mufid MEMIJA. MEMIJA indeed confirmed that to me. The President told him then that my reports from Herzegovina were "fanning the war-flame".

A close associate of President IZETBEGOVIĆ also told me that he had been in IZTEBEGOVIĆ's cabinet when my report was broadcast. Several high-ranking military officers were present too. When the report was broadcast, Fikret MUSLIMOVIĆ, the then Counsel of the President, said: Ah, my Sefer and my reporter, what are you doing on those mountains? Why aren't you going towards Mostar?"

Everything was therefore happening at an inconvenient time (several hours after the ceasefire), like in a Shakespearean "tragedy of errors". And even those elevations were "dubious", so that in the preparations of the "Sefer affaire" the news was launched that not only had the elevations not been liberated, but that they had not existed at all!?

From the 44<sup>th</sup> Brigade Command I returned to Zuka's base in Donja Jablanica and found Sefer there. Sefer was enthusiastically telling me how everything was "exceeding the plan" and talked about the main attack in the direction of Mostar that was to begin the next day. We were alone and he took two documents out of his briefcase.

Take a look at this, please, he said to me.

He first read to me a telegram that Commander Rasim DELIĆ sent him on 25<sup>th</sup> September. DELIĆ wrote: "I received an alarming telegram from Arif (Pašalić, note by ŠH) regarding the situation and the pressures he endures on the part of HVO and HV. He claims that you are doing nothing on that line of attack to alleviate his position. Do everything you can to help him, if not by a combat on the Drežnica -Vrdi line, then by sending manpower directly to Mostar."

Sefer also read to me the answer he sent Commander DELIĆ as late as today, on 1<sup>st</sup> October.

At the beginning of the letter Sefer stated that Arif PAŠALIĆ's telegram on the whole did not reflect the true situation in the field, "because, in the last five-six days, HVO was unselectively shelling Mostar and with a much lower intensity than before." Sefer then wrote to DELIĆ that the "Ustasha and Croatian Army focused their attacks on Jablanica via Pisvir", and that they were continuously targeting Jablanica. "Pisvir, as a domineering facility", wrote Sefer, "was almost seized twice and reclaimed by the engagement of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps' Reconnaissance-Sabotage Brigade (Zuka's unit), and partially by engaging the units that had come out of Sarajevo, so that a very small force was left for the offensive actions due to the subjective

weaknesses of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps.“

Sefer then listed all “subjective weaknesses of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> corps commands.

“Now, listen”, Sefer told me and continued reading slowly, emphasizing every word.

He read: “From the 1st Corps, 300 soldiers (one battalion) were to come to this area so as to complete the Vrđi action, although one to two brigades were needed for taking Vrđi. Around 150 men came to Hrasnica, of whom 50 returned to Sarajevo due to the shortage of fuel.

Although, with your agreement, I told 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Commander Salko GUŠIĆ to meet me in Jablanica on Saturday, he has not appeared by the present day and there are no contacts from him either. That has become his practice. For 4-5 days I was looking for him in the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps zone of responsibility, and on the sixth day I accidentally met him in the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command, although if Pisvir is lost, it will be difficult to defend Jablanica and the Neretvica valley. It seems that he quite seriously understood that I cannot issue orders to him, which basically I neither will nor want to do. But, it would be a matter of courtesy for him or someone from the Command to contact me at least because fierce combat actions are in progress here.”

Sefer briefly stopped reading and said:

“Something is wrong with GUŠIĆ. While I was creating the Patriotic League, he was in JNA.”

Sefer continued reading his letter to DELIĆ: “I have sent four orders, and even requests, for a helicopter to come to transport heavy wounded soldiers and one company to the region of Bijelo Polje, and it came at last after my and your interventions. A company of 150 men was transported to Bijelo Polje for the purpose of helping Mostar.

A lot more could have been done in the 44<sup>th</sup> and 45<sup>th</sup> brigades’ zone of responsibility and in the direction of Prozor and Mostar too. The 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Commander and Command organs avoid any contact with me only to prevent any advance while I am here. It seems to me that someone, and I do not who, does not want success while I am in this region. If that is indeed so, I am immediately going back to Sarajevo, but it is a pity for several thousand men (around 7.000) to sit still in the Neretvica valley and Ustashes are at Gašino Brdo so that the Jablanica – Konjic road cannot be used.”

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What a lucky day on the eve of tomorrow's decisive battle for Mostar!

But Sefer's letter to DELIĆ was on my mind all the time.

Later on I spoke to General Rasim DELIĆ about Sefer's letter and the accusations, that circulated for a long time, that it was "Sefer HALILOVIĆ's private operation".

"A private operation does not exist in the Army", said DELIĆ. "HALILOVIĆ was the Chief of Staff and did not act privately, even if he had organized something in my absence. However, that operation had been planned. He was the head of the team that planned it. It was approved on the meeting of the commanders in Zenica. The goal was to help the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps as much as possible, since, in respect of the opening of another frontline, it was in a very difficult situation. I signed the Order and it defined the obligations of the team in the domain of the preparations, command and control. The operation lasted for some time and produced some results. It ceased because of the signed ceasefire which we had to observe. And we wanted to end it."

DELIĆ also rejects Sefer's thesis about the obstruction of the operation. He says that the group with Sefer HALILOVIĆ departed for Herzegovina with all the good wishes. "Sefer got the units from Sarajevo he had asked for", says DELIĆ, "although the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Commander suggested to him to take other units. From the Konjic-based "Igman", he got a maximum quantity of ammunition, he got helicopters at his disposal and mortars. I don't know what else! It was not enough, but it was the maximum in that situation when we were all under a full blockade, so that our possibilities were limited. Now, Sefer's feeling that someone did not want his success...If only God had been willing for him to succeed! But, the time, conditions and the manpower he had at his disposal were not sufficient for him to do it. That is why in one Order I asked him to adjust the swing of the operation to the realistic possibilities."

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And while the two of them were talking "Zoka" jumped into the communication and informed Sefer that Haris Silajdžić who was at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs, wanted to talk to him. So "Zoka" connected Sefer and Silajdžić.

"Please Sefer decrease those activities down there. That does not go along with the peace initiative of President Izetbegović. You know that the President is leading peace negotiations with President Tudman..."

"But, the HVO attacked us first and we had to respond" Sefer interrupted him. We had a laugh.

"I still ask you to decrease the activities and stop them if possible. We have a chance to establish truce with the Croats and we should use it", continued Silajdžić.

Silajdžić said to Sefer that DeliĆ Rasim was there with him and wanted to talk to him too.

IX

Delić repeated to Sefer what Silajdžić already told him on peace talks between President Izetbegović and Tudman.

“That’s why the activities should cease immediately and return to Sarajevo” said Delić.

“Fine. I will be back in Sarajevo tomorrow” responded Sefer.

That’s how the operation “Neretva 93” was definitely stopped. The order on stopping the operation was made through the radio amateurs. It was precisely 19.00 hours on 4<sup>th</sup> October 93 when Delić and Sefer finished their conversation.

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**On 21 and 22 August 1993 a military conference was held in Zenica, where I contributed to the discussion.**

Present: ŠVK Commander Rasim DELIĆ; NGŠ /Chief of the Main Staff/ Sefer HALILOVIĆ; Chiefs of Administrations: Zičro SULJEVIĆ, Rifat BILAJAC, Rašid ZORLAK, Vehbija KARIĆ, Mustafa POLUTAK, Sulejman VRANJ; Corps Commanders: Vahid KARAVELIĆ, Hazim ŠADIĆ, Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ, Arif PAŠALIĆ, Salko GUŠIĆ; some of the officers from 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Commands, Mevludin BEŠIĆ from Tuzla; and NURKIĆ from the RV and PVO Administration. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of the Interior, Bakir ALISPAHIĆ.

Honourable colleagues, dear comrades-in-arms,

My warmest welcome to you all, and at this meeting I should like to set forth my conclusions and, naturally, proposals to resolve these problems.

In these times when the survival of the state of BiH and the Bosnian people hangs in the balance, we need find the answers to some fundamental questions today, from which we must determine the tasks, through the execution of which we could turn the situation greatly to our advantage and thereby **seize the strategic initiative, which we have largely lost, and after that proceed to a certain goal – the crushing of Chetnik and Ustasha fascism and the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.**

I am thoroughly convinced that the basic reason for our defensiveness and the loss of the strategic initiative lie in our weaknesses, not at all in the strength of the Chetniks. An analysis of the situation in the theatre in the last two months suggests a few unambiguous conclusions:

1. The loss of much free territory in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps’ zones of responsibility, stretching from Rudo to Igman, and parts of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps’ free territory around Žepče is not the result of Chetnik strength and power. If that were the case, the

the Chetniks would be more successful in the Brčko corridor, and particularly at the Sarajevo front where they are using their most powerful forces, and credit for this must be given to the commanders and units defending Žuč, Golo Brdo, Stupsko Brdo, etc. The loss of these territories is the consequence of failures in command and control from the Presidency, which gave the order to form the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps at an inauspicious time, that is, at the time the Chetnik offensive was in progress. And then Commander GUŠIĆ took the entire body of the Igman Operations Group away from Mt. Igman.

Zaim IMAMOVIĆ, the newly-appointed commander of the Igman Operations Group, could not find his feet, and this is only one of the reasons. They are innumerable – from Igman, all the way to Staro Rudo, as far as our free territory in eastern Bosnia extends, and there are indications which suggest there was blatant treason. The commanders of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps are responsible for all these matters, the consequence of which was the loss of free territory in eastern Bosnia and Žepče. I have to tell you that the information that the main job in eastern Bosnia was carried out by Chetnik forces of three battalions' strength is shocking, and what is especially shocking is the fact that we lost on the Žepče and Maglaj front because of late intervention by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps commander. The success of the commanders of the Mostar Brigade at the Neretva front and the liberation of some of the territory deserve congratulations, and indicate how defence, losses or gains take place at the front.

2. Our Army came into being in circumstances which are unparalleled anywhere in the world: a dual aggression from two aggressors, a powerful internal Chetnik and Ustasha rebellion, and the creation of an army in such circumstances, with a completely confused leadership. Our Army, then, deserves historic credit for the survival of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks/Muslims in this part of the world, and recognition for this needs to be given to the keen workers of the PL /Patriotic League/, all those present here, commanders ~~the length and breadth~~ of our country, and eternal thanks need to be given with particular respect to all the brave soldiers in our Army. Our Army, then, deserves historic credit, but also the responsibility for its own weaknesses and shortcomings that it contains, which we have to confront courageously, and about which I would like to say a few words.

We have created a large and unwieldy Army of about 260,000 people, which in the majority of cases behaves like a unit of a locally-based Home Guard, and we have a small number of flying manoeuvre units and a very small number of reconnaissance and sabotage units.

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REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
TOP SECRET

Number: 625-06  
Mostar, 25 August 1993

#### PROVIDING SECURITY TO VITAL OBJECTS

- ORDER -

Based on the self-developed combat situation in the zone of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the R BH Army, particularly in the area: north camp, the road leading to the HE (hydro-electric plant) Mostar and further along Neretva river close to Sljunkara (gravel pit) and elementara (cementara - concrete-elements plant) r. Bocina to the HE (hydro-electric plant) Salakovac, and the ceasefire agreement with the HVO, I hereby

#### ORDER

1. Suspend fire from all weapons, as well as the movement of the troops.
2. On the achieved defence lines carry out entrenchment, make bunkers (reinforced dugouts), observation posts, trenches and other shelters for men.
3. Perform an analysis of the newly established zone of responsibility of the units and issue the concrete tasks to the commanders of the battalions, especially on the direction of north camp-Zalik-HE Mostar I-Sljunkara-Bocine-Salakovac. Determine, for every soldier individually, exact place where and what kind of the shelter-trench-bunker he will make.
4. Respond exclusively by fire at the HVO fire, in case of their attack.
5. Exceptionally vital objects for safeguarding we consider: HE Mostar I, north camp, Salakovac and the right bank of Neretva (Santiceva, Cernica, Semovac and Mahala).

We estimate that E.K. HVO and HV in their further b/d (combat activities) will for sure attempt to capture the HE Mostar I and Salakovac in the direction of Vrapcici VTI and the right bank of Neretva.

From 15,00h 25 August 1993 focus the defence on the safeguarding of the mentioned objects and the arranging of the shelters and other objects.

6. Above all, ensure by manpower north camp, hydro-electric plants and the area between Zalika and HE Mostar, and around Sljunkara and elementara. We have intelligence information that the priority and the focus of the attack of the aggressor will be on the direction HE Mostar I towards Vrapcici, and therefore the commanders of the 47<sup>th</sup> mountain brigade and the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade must defend the objects and this direction in coordination and in direct co-operation of the units.
7. Commander of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade will order tasks to the commander of the engineer platoon to examine the possibility of crossing of the direction streliste-Suhido and to submit a report on the possibility of building a road.

DELIVERED:

- Commander B V/P
- Commander of 1/42 bbr.
- Commander of "Nevesinjski" battalion
- Commander of "Sargan" battalion
- Commander of 41 smbr.
- Commander of 47 bbr.
- Commander of 48 bbr.
- Commander of engineer platoon of 41 smbr.
- a/a

COMMANDER:  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS of the R BH Army  
Mr. Arif Pasalic  
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /RBH/  
RBH OS /Armed Forces/ SUPREME COMMAND STAFF  
SARAJEVO

Strictly confidential number: 02/1029-1  
Sarajevo, 26 August 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command  
The Commander, personally

Despite the agreed truce, HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/ forces continued to besiege and attack Mostar. They have deployed their main forces towards the *Mostar I HE* /hydroelectric plant/, which they captured during the night of 25/26 August 1993, destroyed the sluice at the dam, and destroyed bridges downstream in Mostar by releasing a large volume of water.

A large build-up of HV and HVO forces in the western part of the city of Mostar continues. An even stronger attack on the defenders of Mostar is expected. In order to provide URGENT help to the defenders of Mostar, I hereby

#### ORDER

1. Engage your forces that have been sent to the defenders of Mostar as soon possible in a joint attack with 4<sup>th</sup> Corps forces on HVO units on the Vrđi village – Domazet village axis. Crush enemy forces on this axis and advance as soon as possible to the Planinica village – Podine village line. In further operations, attack the northern outskirts of Mostar and the village of Raštani.
2. Allocate as many appropriate artillery pieces as possible from your units and support as successfully as possible the attack by forces engaged as per item 1 of this Order.
3. Establish the closest possible cooperation with the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Command in implementing the above tasks.
4. In the areas of responsibility of the 44<sup>th</sup> and 45<sup>th</sup> bbrs /Mountain Brigades/ engage the HVO as closely as possible with the objective of tying down their forces and, if possible, achieving success on the axes of operations of these units.
5. Report to this Staff on the measures undertaken and the implementation of this Order.

ZS/SB

/handwritten:  
RBH OS ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/  
CV /Communications Centre/  
KZ /Cryptographic Protection/ DEPARTMENT  
Sent:  
26 August 1993 at 1409 hours/

COMMANDER  
Rasim DELIĆ /signed and stamped/



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE R BiH  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

DEFENCE OF REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
TOP SECRET

Top secret No: 635-06  
Mostar, 27 August 1993

MISSION OP No.

1. ENEMY

Forces of the extreme wings of the HVO are positioned in the sector Rastana-Brane-Sljunkare-Betonare, of the strenght: /handwritten: ANNEXE/

2. Our forces: part of the 3b/41 MTBRS (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade), part of the 1/42 bbr (1<sup>st</sup> battalion of the 42<sup>nd</sup> mountain brigade), part of the R MUP forces (Republic Ministry of Interior) and parts of the 48<sup>th</sup> bbr (48<sup>th</sup> mountain brigade).
3. Mission: 41<sup>st</sup> MTBRS with the subordinated and co-operating units has the mission,
  - a) to crush HVO forces on the directions of Vejzovica hause above the road and bellow the road – Hydro-electric power plant Mostar dam – military storage (former military barracks)
  - b) to take control of the objects and directions of the attack Vejzovica house – HE dam and military storage.

Crossing over Neretva is to be determined by reconnaissance.

- take control of the HE Mostar dam
- take control of the sector Vejzovica house and military storage (former military barracks)
- after taking possession of the objects establish L/O (line of defence).

4. Mission of the 47<sup>th</sup> bbr – with the co-operating units it has the mission to

- c) simultaneously with the 41<sup>st</sup> SMTBR carry out the attack and crush HVO forces on the directions of Sljunkara (gravel pit) and Betonara (concrete-elements plant)
- d) take possession of the objects and directions of attack Sljunkara-Betonara.

After taking possession of the objects establish firm L/O (line of defence).

5. Incessantly coordinate the work with the 41<sup>st</sup> SMTBR.
6. Readiness for the attack will be determined by the commanders of the 41<sup>st</sup> SMTBR and the 47<sup>th</sup> bbr.
7. Commander of the 47<sup>th</sup> bbr Mr. Jugo Miralem. will be responsible for carrying out the attack in the given directions, and the 41<sup>st</sup> SMTBR will determine (responsible person) later on.
8. Carry out the assessment of the situation and prepare the units for carrying out the mission (the attack).
9. Following the performed assessment and preparation of the units report on the readiness for the attack.

After the report on the readiness for attack be prepared for the attack.

Delivered:

- 41<sup>st</sup> MTBRS
- 47 bbr.
- 1/42<sup>nd</sup> bbr.
- R MUP
- A/a

DEPUTY COMMANDER  
of the 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS of the BH ARMY  
Mr. Isovica Mustafa  
/signed/

COMMUNICATION CENTER OF THE SVK (Supreme Command Staff) - Department for  
crypto-protection

Sarajevo

Date and time:

29 August 1993, Sunday 01:02

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMED FORCES OF THE R BH  
COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

Top secret No.: 666-06

Mostar, 28 August 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
TOP SECRET

/Stamped: Supreme Command Staff of the OS R BH (Armed Forces of the R BH)

Number 02/881-16

28 August 1993

2/

Delivered

Supreme Command Staff of the OS R BH

Failure of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps of the BH Army to carry out orders  
Information

Based on the top secret order no.: 02/1024-1 of 24 August 1993 from Mr. R. Delic and the top secret order no.: 02/1024-1 of 24 August 1993 from Mr. S. Halilovic, it was ordered rapid introduction of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps of the A R BH forces of the strength of one "strengthened battalion" with the support of "heavy artillery" with the best command personnel. I inform you that I sent a document to the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps of the R BH Army with the question when will they place at the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps disposal the larger-calibre artillery and the "strengthened battalion". I received an unsigned document in which I was informed that the "Zulfikar" unit has been placed at the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the R BH Army disposal and that this unit already co-operates with us. One 105 mm howitzer, 128 mm rocket launcher and two 120 mm mortars with 5-10 shells have been deployed in Jablanica. Also, they suggest us through the Supreme Command Staff the engagement of the Supreme Command Staff artillery group that currently has no mission.

This is not in the spirit of your orders. I request from you to take appropriate measures in order to help the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the R BH Army, due to the importance of b/d (combat activity) in our zone.

Chief of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the R BH Army  
Budakovic Sulejman

**THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /RBH/  
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES  
S A R A J E V O**

**DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
Copy No. 1**

Strictly confidential No. 1/297-230  
Sarajevo, 29 August 1993  
File No. 31-2-03-302-7/6-42/99

**Conclusions and tasks adopted at the meeting of senior officers of the Main Staff and Corps Commanders, held in Zenica on 21 and 22 August 1993**

On 21 and 22 August 1993 in Zenica a meeting was held with the topic "Most prominent achievements, problems and development perspectives in the armed struggle of the Army of RBH".

Those from Supreme Command Main Staff present:

Commander Rasim DELIĆ, Chief Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Chief of Operative Command Centre Ziéro SULJEVIĆ, SSC /Staff of Supreme Command/ member Rifat BILAJAC, SSC member Vehbija KARIĆ, deputy chief of combat arms administration Zaim BACKOVIĆ, chief of logistics administration Rašid ZORLAK and chief of personnel administration Sulejman VRANJ.

Those from Corps present:

Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Vahid KARAVELIĆ, Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps Hazim ŠADIĆ, Commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ, Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Arif PAŠALIĆ and Commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Salko GUŠIĆ, Commander of the Tuzla military garrison Mevludin BEŠIĆ, Ešef NURKIĆ from Zenica hydroelectric power plant, Chief of combat arms administration Mustafa POLUTAK.

The first day of the meeting, Minister of the Interior of BH Bakir ALISPAHIĆ was also present.

After an introductory speech by the Main Staff Commander, Corps commanders reported on their Corps' personal achievement and the situation regarding combat activities in their respective responsibility zones.

**I. CONCLUSIONS**

1. The war we have been waging for the last 17 months against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor and the former JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ has been in essence a liberation war, deeply humane and founded on the awareness and choice

of the people of BH that they must defend their country with dignity and earn the right to bare survival. The war imposed on us by the extreme faction of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ is actually a knife in the back of the RBH Army, and its brutality is even worse than the war waged by Chetniks.

The HVO attack has seriously slowed down the impetus of our liberation struggle.

2. The goals of our Army's fight remain the same: a struggle for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indivisible and within recognised borders.
3. The war for territories will continue, even if peace on the basis of Geneva Agreement is reached. The continuing war will be aimed against both types of fascism, Serbian-Montenegrin and Croatian, either individually against each of them or against the joint forces of both aggressors.
4. To continue the war with greater success, it is necessary to put all personnel, material and functional resources of the country at the service of the armed struggle of our Army.
5. The previous content and forms of performing combat actions must be critically analysed with the aim of carrying out more successful combat operations. Technical inferiority must be compensated for by applying various content and forms of armed struggle. Intelligence and sabotage operations aimed at the aggressor's front line, behind the front line and deep in his rear, should be used more frequently than before.
6. The loss of free territory in Drina river valley, on the territory of Trnovo municipality, Bjelašnica and Igman is not the result of the aggressor's strength, but more due to rather unsuccessful command in our units and individual cases of treason and cowardice in certain Army units in those areas.
7. The units of our Army are hampered by a lack of discipline, both individual and group, and general military lack of structure. Training of senior officers at all levels (KO /detachment commander/, KV /platoon commander/ and KČ /company commander/) is incomplete, which has a negative impact on discipline and successful execution of combat actions.
8. Logistical support of the Army may continue along existing lines. Weapons supply will concentrate as before on war booty and local production. Purchase of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, despite complicated delivery across the aggressor's territory, may be effected through the involvement of all available factors and methods – from friends to enemies, from patriots to war profiteers and traitors from the aggressor's armed units.
9. Collection of financial resources has, up to now, been extremely disorganised, open to question, and uncoordinated with actual needs. There are also suspicions about people handling these issues for their own profit. These resources were not reaching the state budget, and their amount remained a secret. There is no doubt that larger sums of money have been collected and that the major part of that money is now in Zagreb. To get hold of that money and to use it in the most efficient way for equipping the RBH Army would be one of the most important tasks of the Main Staff of Supreme Command in the near future.
10. The existing media in RBH (TV, radio and the press) so far have not been active

enough in popularising our struggle. Their lack of professionalism, principles and patriotism were more damaging than useful to the RBH Army.

11. The organs of state authority of the RBH Army have, throughout the period of armed combat, been out of touch with the general directions of the armed forces. State authorities have only partially switched to wartime functions, which has resulted in inadequate logistical support of the armed forces.

In certain areas, state authorities were acting in a destructive way, detrimental to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by siding with separatist forces, especially the HVO.

\*\*\*

## II. TASKS

\*\*\*

5. The combat morale of soldiers and units shall be built on the patriotism and traditions of the Bosnian nation and heroic examples of combatants and units from this war.

\*\*\*

9. By a special order of the Main Staff, the previously independent units "*Zulfikar*", "*Crni labudovi*", "*Silver fox*", "*Akrepi*", "*Muderiz*" and other independent units shall be attached to Corps. If necessary, Corps Commands shall put forward a plan of reforming and enlarging the units in question.

10. For forthcoming combat actions alterations to corps' zones of responsibility have been made as follows:

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15. Corps Commands and administrations of the Supreme Command Staff shall regularly report on the execution of tasks discussed at this meeting.

/illegible/ /JD

COMMANDER  
OF THE STAFF OF SUPREME  
COMMAND OF ARMED FORCES OF RBH  
Rasim DELIĆ

/signed and stamped/

Copied in \_\_\_ copies and delivered to:

Commands of the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps (KZ)  
Command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps  
Deputy commanders of Supreme Command Staff (3)  
Education administration  
Morale, information and propaganda activity administration  
Combat arms administration  
Operative Centre of Staff of Supreme Command  
Organisation and mobilisation administration  
Security administration  
Intelligence administration  
Personnel administration  
Legal administration  
Files

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /BH/  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BH  
44<sup>th</sup> MOUNTAIN BRIGADE COMMAND  
J A B L A N I C A

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Jablanica, 29 August 1993  
Number: 01/1015-1/93

Proposal for planning and carrying out b/d /combat operations/

To: 6<sup>th</sup> CORPS COMMAND  
- personally to the Commander -

Based on data gathered on Ustasha forces in the z/o /zone of responsibility/ of the 44<sup>th</sup> and 45<sup>th</sup> bbr /mountain brigades/ and the *Prozor* SB /independent battalion/, and activities of the command organs of the above-mentioned units, in order to carry out coordinated offensive b/d in the general area and take part of the temporary occupied territory, I

## PROPOSE

1. To carry out an attack on Ustasha forces in order to cut off parts of the Ustasha destroy them part by part and seize parts of the occupied territory.

### Axes of Attack:

1. for the *Prozor* SB
  - Here – Jurići – Glibe – Blace
  - Šćipe – Uzdol – Kranjčići
2. for the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr
  - Urijina ravan – Kućani – Klečke Stijene
3. for the 44<sup>th</sup> bbr
  - Rodići – Duvnice – Ustirama

The axis of the dam - Gornja Slatina is being prepared and will be activated, depending on the achieved results at this axis.

By attacking along these axes, the forces on Bukva, Lisina, Popove Glave, Majan and Hudutsko would be cut off and the axis of Pisvir – tt. 889 /trig. point/ – Klečke Stijene – Kranjčići – Blašačko Brdo would be taken. This creates conditions for further operations towards Prozor (to reach Blašačko Brdo is to reach the gates of Prozor) and Risovačka Visoravan. At the same time, pressure would be taken off some of the forces because the line would be "straightened" and I also believe that there would be positive effects on raising morale.

2. Time of carrying out operations:
  - As the 1/sb /?1<sup>st</sup> company of the *Prozor* independent battalion and the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr, which were planned to carry out these operations are active at the Konjic front, the time of carrying out operations depends on the time of their return to their original units.
3. Manner of carrying out operations:
  - On D-1, our forces would be inserted along these axes behind the lines of the Ustasha forces and surprise attacks would be carried out on Ustasha (intervention and mobile) forces at places where they are stationed, with

security provided for these groups, who would then emerge at the lines planned.

Simultaneously, as the surprise attacks begin behind the lines, artillery attacks would commence on Ustasha artillery positions. Infiltration of forces behind the lines would block and tie up the prominent features seized by Ustasha forces, such as Bukva, Lisina, Popova Glava, Kostreš, Majan, Gornja Slatina. I believe this manner of carrying out operations enables forces small in number to achieve substantial results and at the same time minimum casualties are to be expected.

4. Engagement of forces:

a) for the *Prozor* SB axis

- along the Here – Jurići – Glibe – Blace axis, infiltration of forces /of the strength of/ around one company, which would be active in 3 groups for setting up obstacles on roads in the enemy's depth.
- along the Šćipe – Uzdol – Kranjčiči axis, forces /of the strength of/ around one company would be infiltrated to carry out surprise attacks, set up obstacles on roads and ambushes.
- Simultaneously, forces from the existing defence lines and setting up ambushes would block off and tie up prominent the features of Lisna and Bukva.

b) for the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr axis

Forces of the strength of about 1 company would be infiltrated along the Urijina Ravan – Kućani – Klečka Stijena axis, attacking the forces in Kućani, setting up obstacles on roads in the depth and seizing the positions in Klečke Stijene. Simultaneously, forces from the existing defence lines would be tying-up forces in Popove Glave and Kostreš.

c) for the 44<sup>th</sup> bbr axis

Infiltration of around one company on the Duvnice – Ustirama axis, attack on the Ustirama sector.

Depending on results achieved on this axis, attacks on Gornja Slatina from the direction of Ilijine Grude and the HE /hydro-electric power plant/ Rama dam are planned.

d) Artillery fire on Ustasha artillery and major Ustasha strongholds, which is regulated by artillery fire plan.

5. Materiel support:

- The above-mentioned units sent their requests to the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command for materiel replenishment.

6. Command and control

- These combat activities would have to be controlled from the central KM /command post/ (probably in the sector of the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr) and along the attack axes, each unit by its own command.
- Communications for all units would be organised in four radio networks.

7. Requests to the superior command:

- Provide replenishment of ammunition and explosives to units in accordance with the requests already sent.
- Provide replenishment to the above-mentioned units of PTM /anti-tank mines/, 20 per unit.
- Provide replenishment to the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr with 1 PAT /anti-aircraft gun/ and crew because of the operation at Popove Glave and Kostreš.
- Provide 105 mm Howitzer shells for the 44<sup>th</sup> bbr and 105 mm Howitzer shells for the *Prozor* SB

- Bearing in mind the existing equipment in units (support equipment), I would ask you to increase the replenishment of MB – 82 /mortar/ shells.
8. After success has been achieved, counterattacks by Ustasha forces, particularly against the forces of the *Prozor* SB are to be expected, where possible air attacks should not be excluded.
- In this proposal I am also presenting the basic concept for the implementation of this task.

#### Basic Concept

By taking advantage of the terrain and gaps in the deployment of the Ustasha forces, insert forces along the axes of Here – Jurići – Glibe – Blac; Šćipe – Uzdol – Kranjčiči; Urijina Ravan – Kućani – Klečke Stijene and Duvnice – Ustirama, block and tie up the forces in Bukva, Lisna, Kostreš, Popove Glave, Gornja Slatina, and Pomen, set up obstacles along the roads in the enemy's depth, split Ustasha forces by surprise attacks and destroy them part by part, surround the Ustasha on these features and then seize the line of Pisvir - tt. 889 – Klečke Stijene – Kranjčiči – Blašačko Brdo and dig in there to carry out defence.

Combat formation: forces for insertion, forces for setting up ambushes, forces for surprise attacks, forces for security, blocking forces, support forces, forces for PVO /anti-aircraft defence/, KM /command post/ and logistics units.

Member of the ONO G.K. /Operations and Training, Main Command/  
Enes ZUKANOVIĆ  
/signed/



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF /ŠVK/  
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE R BiH  
SARAJEVO  
No: 02/1047-1

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly confidential

Sarajevo, 30 August 1993

In accordance with the conclusions reached at a meeting of the officers of the Main Staff and corps commanders, and with the aim of eliminating current shortcomings and weaknesses in the zones of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> corps,

**I H E R E B Y O R D E R**

1. Form a professional inspection team to coordinate the work and tasks in the zones of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps.  
**The main tasks of the team are as follows:**
  - review of the combat readiness of the commands and units in the field, and control of combat operations,
  - an estimate of the capabilities of forces and equipment and their use in keeping with this /estimate/
  - resolution of problems of personnel and logistical support in all segments,
  - the functioning of civilian authorities and their co-ordination with the requirements of /?general security/ and the war of liberation.
2. - I appoint Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces /GŠ OS/, as team leader, and the following representatives of the GŠ OS as team members:
  1. Žižo SULJEVIĆ
  2. Rifat BILAJAC
  3. Vehbija KARIĆ
  4. Džemal NAJETOVIĆ
  5. Edin HASANSPAHIĆ
  6. Namik DŽANKOVIĆ
3. - The Chief-of-Staff of the ŠVK of the Armed Forces should, in keeping with his authority, solve the problems in the field by issuing orders and should regularly report to me on the orders issued. In the case of more drastic proposals and solutions, he must consult with me.
4. - The monitoring should begin on 31 August and be completed by \_\_\_\_ 1993. Submit a written report on return, but report orally on important questions during the inspection.

ADŽ/TH

COMMANDER  
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF /illegible/  
Rasim DELIĆ

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR  
SECURITY SERVICES CENTRE  
MOSTAR  
Number 16-31/93  
Mostar, 1 September 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
CONFIDENTIAL  
URGENT

/handwritten: /PANJETA/  
Send a dispatch to Mostar  
telling them to give GODINJAK  
information  
/?on/ the unit  
/signed/ /

-SARAJEVO CSB /Security Services  
Centre/  
To the chief personally

/handwritten: Agreement!/  
.

Pursuant to our agreement please reply to us as a matter of urgency on whether you have agreed with Edo GODINJAK /as printed/ on the engagement of your *Lasta* unit, in the strength of one company. We are informing you that we have arranged for them to be accommodated and receive their meals in Jablanica. The engagement of your unit, or their use, shall be determined in line with our agreement.  
Please send your reply as a matter of urgency.

Chief of Mostar CSB  
Ramo MASLEŠA

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES  
SARAJEVO

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential no: 14/75-100

Sarajevo, 1 September 1993

Order on organisational changes in the zone of responsibility  
of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps

- To the Forward Command Post  
of the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces  
(for your information)
- To the Command of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps

Pursuant to the decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organisation of the BH Armed Forces no. 02-011-461-/92 of 4 July 1992, I hereby issue the following

## ORDER

### I. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES

1. The following units shall form part of the structure of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps:

a) The Sabotage-Reconnaissance Brigade, military unit 5686 (established in the zone of responsibility of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps – Commander Ibrahim PURIĆ). The unit should be stricken from the list of the basic mobilisation plan of the BH Armed Forces – abstract for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps and put in the abstract of the basic mobilisation plan for the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps.

b) The *Crni Labudovi* /black swans/ Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment, military unit 5688 (pursuant to our Order, strictly confidential no. 14/75-96 of 29 August 1993, this unit was reincorporated within the structure of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps, and should be put in the abstract of the basic mobilisation plan for the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps).

2. The following units shall form part of the structure of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps:

- a) The *Zulfikar* special-purpose detachment, military unit 5683;
- b) The *Silver Fox* independent platoon, military unit 6010;

(The units cited under a) and b) were listed thus far as belonging to the structure of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps and are currently resubordinated to the *Igman* Operations Group –

Forward Command Post of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps). They shall be stricken from the list of the basic mobilisation plan – the abstract for the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps and put in the abstract of the basic mobilisation plan of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps.

c) The *Akrapi* independent unit;

d) The *Mederiz* independent unit.

The units under c) and d) shall be put in the list of the basic mobilisation plan, abstract for the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps.

3. With this Order, the Order of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, strictly confidential no. 14/75-63 of 5 July 1993, in the section which pertains to the resubordination of units referred to in item 2 under a) and b), to the Command of the *Igman* Operations Group – the Forward Command Post of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps shall no longer be in force.

4. The commands of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps shall take over the units referred to in items 1 and 2 of this Order, with respect to all elements of combat readiness, combat use, organisation and so forth.

5. The commands of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps shall provide financial and logistical support with all combat and non-combat needs for the units referred to in item 2, and the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command for the units referred to in item 1 of this Order.

6. The commands of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps, in cooperation with the commands of units which shall become part of their structure, shall review the organisational and establishment structure of the said units and submit to this Staff proposals for their transformation in terms of restructuring them according to new formations (provide the name and number of the formation), their incorporation within the structure of already established brigades (state which units shall become part of which brigade) or disband them and assign the troops, materiel and technical equipment to already

formed brigades (state the exact names and number of the military units in brigades to which conscripts, materiel and technical equipment are being assigned).

7. Officers from the Forward Command Post – Staff of the Supreme Command shall provide the necessary specialised assistance to the commands of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps in executing the tasks set forth in this Order. To this end, the commands of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps shall establish the necessary contacts with officers at the Forward Command Post – Staff of the Supreme Command of the BH Armed Forces.

8. This Order shall be carried out IMMEDIATELY. Submit a report on the implementation of this Order and the proposals set forth in item 6 to this Staff by 15 September 1993 at the latest.

9. Enter the Order in the log of mobilisation documents.

KA/AM

COMMANDER  
OF THE SUPREME COMMAND  
OF THE ARMED FORCES

Rasim DELIĆ /signed and stamped/

/handwritten:/

Communications Centre of the Staff of the Supreme Command  
of the BH Armed Forces – Cryptographic Data Protection Department

Sent to:

- The 1<sup>st</sup> Corps 1 September 1993 at 2255 hours

- The 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps 2 September 1993 at 0149 hours

- The 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps 2 September 1993 at 1152 hours

Forward Command Post Vi /expansion unknown/ 1 September 1993 at 2359 hours

/a signature/

COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF THE ŠVK  
/Supreme Command Staff/ -  
Cryptographic Data Protection Department  
SARAJEVO

Date and Time:  
3 September 1993, Friday 01:09 /handwritten:/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /R BH/  
ŠVK of the OS /ARMED FORCES/

Strictly Confidential Number: 2-1 /stamp:/  
Date, 2 September 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET

STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND  
OF THE OS OF THE R BH

Number 02/079.111  
2 September 1993  
URGENT !!!

2

/handwritten:/ archive no. 226/5

Request for units of the  
1K /1<sup>st</sup> Corps/ to move, to

1<sup>st</sup> Corps Command  
(personally to the Commander)

We request that you send us an urgent response regarding the order for your units to move into the Neretva valley. Indicate when a unit will move and state its numerical strength so that its reception and transport can be organised.

SH/VK

CHIEF OF THE ŠVK

Sefer HALILOVIĆ

/handwritten:/ SENT /4<sup>th</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup>K/

030993 /illegible/ 0/12

/signed/

ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE – Department of  
Cryptographic data protection  
SARAJEVO

Source file: FAMB29/?1/  
Document received and processed

Date and time:

2 September 1993, Thursday 1114 hours

/circled/ 254

/handwritten/ Vejzagić !?!

/signature/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /RBH/  
RBH Army  
44 / 6<sup>th</sup> CORPS

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Str. conf. no.: 01/563-1-3/93  
Jablanica, 2 September 1993

/stamp/

RBH ARMED FORCES SUPREME COMMAND STAFF

Number: 02/1594-469

1 March 1994

TO THE 6<sup>TH</sup> CORPS COMMAND

Pursuant to Decision of GŠVK /Supreme Command Main Staff/ of 21 August 1993 in  
Zenica, and with the aim of building up the units, I hereby

#### ORDER

1. The units: *Handžar divizija* and *Silver-Fox* shall become part of special purposes detachment (*Zulfikar*).
2. The above-mentioned units shall join the ranks of the *Zulfikar* unit with all their equipment and weapons.
3. The deadline for these units to join up with the *Zulfikar* unit is 2000 hours on 3 September 1993.

DELIVERED TO:

1. GŠVK (for information)
2. 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command
3. Commanders of units:
  - *Silver-Fox*
  - *Handžar divizija*
  - *Zulfikar* detachment

CHIEF OF GŠVK  
(deputy commander)  
SEFER HALILOVIĆ

/handwritten/

SENT TO THE COMMANDER ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1993. /signature/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
1<sup>st</sup> Corps Command – Sarajevo

Military Secret  
Strictly Confidential

Strictly confidential number: 05/7-402

Sarajevo, 06.09.1993.

In accordance with the entire combat situation in the area of Jablanica and Mostar, and in accordance with the written order of the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ of the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ Strictly confidential number: 01/563-1-2/93, dated 02.09.1993. from Jablanica, I

ORDER To the 2<sup>nd</sup> Independent Motorised Battalion Command  
To the attention of the Commander.

1. Immediately carry out all organisational preparations, prepare and send a company with between 100 and 120 soldiers to the area of Jablanica on 06.09.1993.

ASSIGNMENT: In co-operation with the units of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps, in that area, carry out offensive combat operations with the purpose of liberating the Jablanica – Mostar communication. Combat activities in that area are carried out under the command of a group from ŠVK, led by NŠ R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ OS /Armed Forces/ VK /Military Command/.

2. Realise movement along the Sarajevo – Hrasnica – Igman – Pazarić – Konjic – Jablanica direction using the /above-mentioned/ company. Movement is to be carried out at 1900 hours on 06.09.1993. Movement in both ways is to be carried out using motor vehicles in accordance with the verbal order.

3. Company carries out the stated assignment not longer than 7 days after the day of reporting to the ŠVK IKM /Forward Command Post/ in Jablanica.

Commander

Vahid KARAVELIĆ  
/signed/

/Illegible stamp. /



/stamp:/

ECV, title of organ: C /illegible/ Jablanica
Sent-received telegram no. ETC/154 /illegible/
Date: 6 September 1993 at 10 /illegible/ hrs
TLP, TGR, TLF, ..., RRV, ŽV, Rv
Processed by: /signed/

ECV = electronic communications centre

TLP = teleprinter, TGR = telegram, TLF = telephone, RRV = radio-relay communications,

ŽV = wire communications, Rv = radio communications

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

Main Staff of the Supreme Command

MILITARY SECRET

Jablanica, 6 September 1993

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential number:

\*\*

ORDER Number:

Scale 1 : 100,000 sheet Konjic and Mostar

With regard to previous 6<sup>th</sup> Corps units' tasks-combat operations in the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps' zone of responsibility, and the engagement of the Zulfikar Reconnaissance-Sabotage Brigade on the axis Vrđi village – Goranci village towards Mostar, the following units are resubordinated to this brigade:

Dreznica Battalion and

Units from the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps

- Artillery weapons with crew: two 120 mm mortars, one 105 mm howitzer and one 132 mm howitzer, two 76mm B-1 cannon and one 107 mm LRS /rocket launcher system/.

During the execution of the combat task an encounter with a "human shield" of Muslim prisoners may be expected. In that case have a group of snipers ready to eliminate those herding the human shield.

Even if there is an encounter with a human shield, the execution of the task may not be abandoned.

The 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command will supply the Zulfikar unit with 6 (six) field telephones and 6 (six) reels of PTK /field telephone cable/ cable.

The commander of the Zulfikar Brigade, with the director of the Hydroelectric Power Plant enterprise on the Neretva river, will settle the time and method of lowering the level of the water from the Sarakovac HI<sup>9</sup> /Hydroelectric Power Plant/ reservoir, which is one of the matters vital to the execution of the task ordered.

Use the distributed MTS /technical equipment and materiel/ in the most sensible and efficient way so that the task be as successful as possible.

/stamp:/

ECV, title of organ: C CB /expansion unknown/ Jablanica
Sent-received telegram no. 669 /illegible/
Date: 6 September 1993 at 10 /illegible/ hrs
TLP, TGR, TLF, ..., RRV, ŽV, Rv
Processed by: /signed/

ECV = electronic communications centre

TLP = teleprinter, TGR = telegram, TLF = telephone, RRV = radio-relay communications,

ŽV = wire communications, Rv = radio communications

To:

Zulfikar Reconnaissance-Sabotage Brigade Commander

6<sup>th</sup> Corps Commander

4<sup>th</sup> Corps Commander

Archives

NŠ /Chief of Staff/ Sefer HALILOVIĆ (personally)

1<sup>st</sup> Oreznica Battalion/47<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/

Chief of the VK /Supreme  
Command/ Staff

Sefer HALILOVIĆ

We request colleagues in the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps to forward this document urgently: for Mostar

/illegible/ Corps

Thank you in advance

/stamp:/ STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND  
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BH  
Number: 0261595-530  
7 September 1993

REPUBLIC OF BiH

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH

MILITARY SECRET

COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential no: 837-06

Mostar, 7 September 1993

/handwritten: To: IKM /Forward Command Post/, for  
information/

LINKING UP OF THE FORCES OF  
THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS OF THE BH ARMY

To: Commander of the *Zulfikar* Special Units,  
Zulfikar ALIŠPAGA, personally

Based on the order strictly confidential no: 14/75-100 of 1 September 1993 by the  
Supreme Command Staff /ŠVK/ on placing under the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the  
BH Army the following special units:

- a) *Zulfikar*;
- b) *Muderiz*;
- c) *Akrepi* and
- d) *Silver Foks* /as written/

and in order to unite and improve control and command in the conduct of combat activities  
against the aggressors, I hereby

## O R D E R

1) The units under a), b), c) and d) with the Drežnica Battalion shall comprise the NORTH-2 OG /Operations Group/. The Commander of the NORTH-2 OG is the Commander of the *Zulfikar* Special unit.

2) The area of responsibility of the NORTH-2 OG is: Jablanica to the north, up to Salakovac HE /hydro plant/ (extended) to the south, and the border with the enemy to the west and east.

3) The NORTH-2 OG will receive tasks from the SVK IKM in Jablanica.

4) The Commander of the NORTH-2 OG will inform all commanders *komandanti* and *komandiri* of the units comprising the NORTH-2 OG of the provisions of this order.

C O M M A N D E R

Mr Arif PAŠALIĆ

/signed and stamped/

*/hand-written/*      02/1595-531  
07.09.1993

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS COMMAND

REPUBLIC DEFENCE /DEPARTMENT/  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential number: 838-06

Mostar, 07/09/93

IKM/forward command post/ ŠVK/Supreme Command Staff/  
Jablanica

- 1.) I have received and completely understood your strictly confidential document 6-1 dated 05.09.93 and the document dated 06.09.93.
- 2.) It cannot be seen from the document when and which units (their names) (number of units) were sent to the area of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the Army of the Republic of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/, as it was decided.  
As agreed, one or two companies of the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslimanska Brigade of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps of the R BiH Army are supposed to be sent to the zone of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the Army of the Republic of BiH.
- 3.) The battalion units: "Drežnica", "Zulfikar", "Muderiz", "Akrepi" and "Silver Foks", were assigned to the SJEVER-2 OG /operations group/ of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of the Army of the Republic of BiH. Commander of the SJEVER is the commander of the "Zulfikar" special unit.
- 4.) For the purpose of more efficient carrying out of the planned assignments and with the aim of mopping up the enemy forces in the Neretva Valley, I propose that one of the dominant targets to be attacked be the HVO forces in the Čordina Kula - Jedrenje sector. In our estimate the HVO forces in that sector have the following strength:
  - one platoon of Prikojci soldiers
  - one canon (ZIS or B-1)
  - one platoon of Čordina Kula soldiers
  - one 120 mm mortar
- 5.) Concerning the coming planned activities, give us a timely signal - a sign of their beginning, that is, when you start with them because of our activities. /as written/

*/stamp reading: The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; The 4<sup>th</sup> Corps; Mostar/*

Commander:  
Arif PAŠALIĆ  
*/signed/*

REPUBLIC OF BiH

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

BH OS /Armed Forces/ ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ MILITARY SECRET

JABLANICA IKM /Forward Command Post/ STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential 18-1

9 September 1993

O R D E R : TO THE 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS COMMAND MOSTAR  
(to the Commander, personally)

Please inform Minister of Internal Affairs Mr Bakir ALISPAHIĆ to head for Jablanica tonight because he has a meeting tomorrow, 10 September 1993, at 1900 hours in Konjic with Mr Ruzmir MAHMUTCEHAJIC.

CHIEF OF OS ŠVK

Sefer HALILOVIĆ

/handwritten: IMPORTANT! [initialled]/

/stamp illegible except for handwritten entries:/

/Intelligence Centre/ /illegible/

no. 780/PANB79UD

9 September 1993

/a signature/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
 BH ARMY – 6<sup>th</sup> CORPS MILITARY SECRET  
 Dobro Polje: 11 September 1993  
 AUTHORISED BY: /a signature/

ORDER TO ATTACK, Op. no. 01/1500-27  
 Section: 1:50,000 Konjic, 1971 edition

1. The enemy has been forced into defence on the Gradina – Jurići – Glibe – Blace – Golušnica – Zgon – Brdo – Sljeme – Hasičko – Ferhatov Brijeg line. Their probable objective is to regroup their existing forces and bring in fresh ones and to continue the attack on Here village – Kute village – Šćipe village – Studenska Planina. On the battalion's axis of attack the enemy is defending at a probable strength of two pč /infantry companies/:

1 pč in the Gradina – Jurići – Glibe – Blace sector

2 pč in the Zgon – Brdo – Sljeme – Hasičko sector, but their ČVG /company fire support groups/ are in the Uzdol sector. There is a mixed minefield in front of the forward line. Their psychological propaganda activities are exceptionally active.

2. One battalion comprising one pč of the *Prozor SB* /Independent Battalion/, one pč of the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/, two bbat /Mountain Battalions/ of the 317<sup>th</sup> bbr and two platoons of the *Sutjeska* Battalion, with the support of forces that are in contact, shall go on the attack on the Zgon – Brdo – Sljeme axis.

Task: Moving in from the left, destroy the enemy in the Gradina – Jurići – Glibe – Blace sector, continue the attack and in combined action with forces of one pč from the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr break out as soon as possible on the Krča – tt /trig point/ 1302 line. The other pč from the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr shall go on the attack from the Milanteg – Branovac line and occupy the Brizovača tt 1274 – Ferhatov Brijeg tt 1134 – Brdo tt 1376 – Zgon tt 1370 line.

The third pč from the 2<sup>nd</sup> bbat of the 317<sup>th</sup> bbr and the *Sutjeska* Battalion shall go on the attack from the Milanteg – Branovac line and take over the Zgon – Brdo – Sljeme line.

KM /Command Post/ in the Here and Kapica sector.

3. To the left of the battalion's axis of attack the second pč from the 44<sup>th</sup> bbr will work in combined action with the main forces on the Doljani – Risovac axis, securing the left flank in the Drinča tt 2038 sector.

To the right of the axis of attack, there will be combined action from OG /Operations Group/ West with the task of destroying the enemy on the axis of attack and combined action to continue executing the battalion's task.

4. I have decided to go on the attack on the Gradina – Jurići – Glibe – Blace – Zgon – Brdo – Sljeme axis in order to destroy the enemy in the general Crni Vrh sector as the primary task and then to continue with offensive b/d /combat operations/ to take control of the Makljen feature.

Group the main forces on the Zgon – Brdo – Sljeme axis, and auxiliary forces on the Gradina – Blace axis.

Readiness to attack at \_\_\_\_ hours.

Combat disposition: forces for attack, forces in reserve and sabotage groups.

5. Companies' task as above.

6. POB /anti-armour combat/

Focus POB on the main axes that are passable for tanks. Keep POG /anti-tank shells/ in each individual platoon.

7. PVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence/

Focus PVO on protecting possible landing areas in Krančičko Polje – Draševo. All units will run PVO for themselves.

8. Moral Support:

Focus this on preparing units to execute tasks and explaining the purpose of the enemy's propaganda. Over the course of 12 September 1993 hold meetings with the troops.

9. Intelligence Support:

Over the course of 12 September 1993, all units are to send IP /reconnaissance patrols/ and IG /reconnaissance groups/ to reconnoitre the axis of attack towards the enemy.

10. Security Support:

Focus this on the BoOs /combat security/ of units and protect the wings and flanks of units. Ensure complete protection of existing KMs and CV /communications centres/. Looting, and slaughtering and killing of innocent civilians is most strictly prohibited, and proceed with prisoners-of-war in keeping with the regulations on prisoners-of-war.

11. Engineering Support:

Focus this on securing movements and manoeuvres. Each unit is to make passage through obstacles for itself.

12. PNHB /Anti-Nuclear-Chemical-Biological/ Support:

Focus this on possible use of h/o /chemical weapons/. Develop ABHO /Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Defence/ at battalion KM.

13. Logistical Support:

Logistical support of the battalion to be provided by:

SnSt /Medical Station/ in the following sectors: \_\_\_\_\_

StTob /Technical Support Station/ in the following sector: \_\_\_\_\_

InSt /Quartermaster Station/ in the following sector: \_\_\_\_\_

Routes for supplies and evacuation: \_\_\_\_\_

- ammunition and infantry weapons 1 b/k /combat set/

- equipment 0.5 b/k

During the attack, use dry rations. For supplies give priority to the replenishment of ammunition.

14. The pč of the *Prozor* SB to secure the left flank up to the line of the immediate task, and then the third pč of the 2<sup>nd</sup> bbat, 317<sup>th</sup> bbr in the next task.

15. Command and Communications:

KM in the Here and Kapica sectors. Next sector KM in the Brdo sector. Communications readiness IMMEDIATE. Send regular reports every two hours, and orders as necessary.

COMMANDER  
/a signature/



/header/  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

HEALTH CARE SECTOR

Number: 02-5/1-212/93  
Mostar, 6 May 1993

WAR HOSPITAL HVO MOSTAR

### ORDER

The following surgery team is determined to work in the war hospital Jablanica:

1. Taslaman dr Edin, surgeon
2. Omerović, dr Safet, urologist
3. Sefo dr Haso specialist in neurosurgery
4. Grumić Đuro, medical technician

The team shall shift the surgery team that operates in war hospital Jablanica, which returns to the regional war hospital Mostar in composition of:

1. Hajdarević dr Braco, surgeon
2. Sarić dr Zaim, orthopaedist
3. Sijerčić dr Nasiha, anaesthesiologist

This order comes into force IMMEDIATELY!

Assistant of Chief of defence department  
of health sector  
Dr Ivan Bagarić  
/signed and stamped/



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF HEALTH  
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND RESEARCH

41000 ZAGREB  
SALATA 3

TEL. 041 27 13 04  
FAX. 041 27 12 54

A CONCISE REPORT ON CASUALTIES IN MOSTAR  
FOR THE PERIOD MAY 9-18, 1993  
(DURING THE OFFENSIVE ATTACKS OF MUSLIM  
FORCES OF "ARMY OF BIH" ATTEMPTING TO  
CONQUER THE TOWN OF MOSTAR)

In accordance with the report of Dr. Marija Brajko-Brnčić (Medical Headquarters of the Croatian Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina) as well as reports of medical doctors volunteering in a humanitarian mission in this region, we submit the following information:

On May 9, 1993 early in the morning, Muslim forces attacked the HVO Army barrack "Tihomir Mišić" situated at the left bank of the Neretva river. In the period from May 9 to May 18, 1993, Medical Headquarters of HZ Herceg-Bosna have recorded 35 killed HVO soldiers and 15 killed civilians, as well as 233 wounded HVO soldiers, 54 wounded civilians and 5 wounded BiH Army soldiers.

**ATTACKS ON MEDICAL PERSONNEL:**

On the same day, Muslim forces have occupied the Medical Center in Mostar; they abducted 5 members of the medical and assisting personnel (dr. Zdravka Šarac, technician Arif Jelovac, and three ambulance drivers - Mumin Puce, Hazim Gosto and Stipe Medić) and took one ambulance. On May 10, 1993, dr. Šarac was released together with the ambulance driver Stipe Medić, while remaining three persons are still missing; Dr. Šarac was severely beaten and maltreated.

On May 12, 1993 around 10 a.m., ambulance driver Marko Bogdan (born 1936, from Mostar) was wounded by sniper fire (gun shot wound to the right foot) in the street of A. Šantić, while he was transporting a wounded patient - he somehow managed to escape to the safer area.

On May 12, 1993 another ambulance driver (Ismet Hubanić, born 1950, from Mostar) was wounded in the same street while he was transporting another wounded patient. He was wounded by a sniper bullet in the leg while he was driving and by another sniper bullet to the arm after he tried to escape. The ambulance itself was hit by a number of rifle bullets fired by Muslim forces.

Furthermore, on the same day (May 12, 1993) ambulance driver Mirko Naletilić Čupo (born 1960, from Mostar) was wounded by sniper bullet (gun shot wound to the neck) around 3 p.m. near the Catholic church while he was transporting the wounded combatant. However, he managed to reach the hospital (together with the wounded patient) - after that he lost the consciousness due to the shock and was surgically treated immediately afterwards.

On May 16, 1993 around 8 p.m. ambulance driver Ante Vučić (born 1964) was killed by one sniper shot to the neck and three sniper shots to the chest, while he was trying to transfer one severely wounded person from the Urgent Medical Care Station to the hospital. At the same occasion, another ambulance driver, Ante Bevanda from Mostar, was wounded while he was attempting to evacuate a wounded patient, too.

**ATTACKS ON HOSPITALS:**

On May 12, 1993 three mortar shells launched by Muslim forces hit the old hospital building, causing a serious damage of Ophthalmology ward, ORL ward and Transfusiology Station. On the same day, Muslim snipers fired repeatedly at the Internal Medicine and Radiology Ward of the hospital on Bijeli Brijeg. Furthermore, one mortar shell hit the main entrance of the hospital, while several shells hit the close vicinity of the back entrance of the hospital on Bijeli Brijeg.

On May 17, 1993 Muslim sniper killed a woman S.N. (born 1955) in front of the psychiatry ward (presently a shelter for mentally ill patients who were previously expelled by Serbian forces from the village of Domarovići).

On May 17, 1993 Muslim forces launched 6 mortar shells on the Medical center - a serious damage was inflicted to the Dentistry ward and to the Laboratory.

M.A.S.H. unit of Mostar has reported that out of 16 ambulances at their disposal, all have been damaged and 4 completely destroyed, while one ambulance was abducted.

Zagreb - Mostar, May 20, 1993

Dr. Miloš Judaš:



**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT**

**HEALTH SERVICE DIVISION**

No.: 02-5/2-66/93

Mostar, 16 June 1993

**HVO MOSTAR WAR HOSPITAL**

**HZ HB CENTRAL STORAGE DEPOT OF MEDICAMENTS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES  
CONSIGNMENT FOR B-H ARMY**

\*\*\*\*\*

1. DTP VACCINE 10x5ml	8pc
2. MONOCID amp 1gr	1 box
3. CLAVUCAR inf 3.2gr	50pcs.
4. INFUSION solutions	1 pallet
5. CANNULAS	100pcs.
6. MASKS	3boxes
7. GLOVES	250pcs.

for COMMANDER OF HZ HB GSS /Supreme Medical Headquarters/  
Colonel TUGOMIR GVERIC  
/signed and stamped/

/header REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 /coat of arms/  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 DEFENCE DEPARTMENT  
 MEDICAL CORPS  
 Number: 02-5/1-267b/93  
 Mostar, 3 June, 1993

To the Command of 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
 Of the BH Army

Referring to information on lack of medicaments and sanity material in the eastern part of the town under your control, we are ready to provide you with necessary help, according to specification, immediately and unconditionally. If you are interested to realize this humanitarian aid from the central storage of GSS HZ HB, we kindly ask you to reply as soon as possible through the negotiation commission.

Assistant of Chief of Defence department  
 For the medical corps of HZ HB  
 Brigadier  
 Dr. Ivan Bagarić  
 /signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY  
 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS COMMAND

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

No.: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mostar, 05 June 1993

**Need for medicaments  
 and medical supplies**

**/handwritten:** Medical Headquarters HVO  
HVO hospital/

**The Mostar Hospital of the Republic of BH Army (former Public Health Institute) has need of a supply of medicaments and medical supplies, and we ask you to enable us the procurement of these items.**

**Enclosure: List of medicaments which are indispensable for the hospital's operation and of medical supplies.**

**COMMANDER**  
**Mr. Arif Pašalić**  
**/signed and stamped/**

/header/  
 REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 DEFENCE DEPARTMENT  
 Health care sector  
 Number: 02-5/1-275/93  
 Mostar, 7 June, 1993

Central storage of GSS medicaments of HZ HB

O R D E R

To issue medicaments according to BH Army request. Specification enclosed. The quantity should be sufficient for 7 days period.

Chief of Sanity Staff of HZ HB  
 Colonel  
 Dr. Tugomir Gverić  
 /signed and stamped/

---

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 /coat of arms/  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
 DEFENCE DEPARTMENT  
 MEDICAL CORPS  
 Number: 02-5/2-65/93  
 Mostar, 8 June, 1993

WAR HOSPITAL OF HVO MOSTAR  
 CENTRAL STORAGE OF MEDICINES AND AMBULANCE MATERIAL OF HZ HB  
 MEDICINES AND AMBULANCE MATERIAL SHIPMENT FOR THE BH ARMY

1. Penbritin amp 500mg 9x50 pieces 3sc
2. ....
3. ....
4. ....
5. ....
6. ....
7. ....
23. Canesten vag crème 1% 35 gr 5sc
24. Infusion saline 1 palette
25. Current medicaments 2 boxes

Chief of Ambulance Staff of HZ HB  
 Colonel  
 Dr. Tugomir Gverić  
 /signed and stamped/

REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA  
 HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA  
 HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE  
 ODJEL OBRANE

## SEKTOR ZA ZDRAVSTVO

Broj: 02-5/2-65/93

Mostar, 08.06. 1993. god.

RATNA BOLNICA HVO MOSTAR

CENTRALNI MAGAZIN LIJEKOVA I SANITETA HZ HB

POSILJKA LIJEKOVA I SANITETSKOG MATERIJALA ZA ARMIJU BiH

1. Penbritin amp 500mg	9x50kom	3sc
2. Penicilin VK tbl 500mgx500		1sc
3. Zinnat susp 125mg/5mlx35kom		4sc
4. Axoren tbl10mg	15x360kom	2sc
5. Nefimicin amp		40kom
6. Phenobarbiton amp 200mg x 100		1 sc
7. Phenobarbiton tbl 30mg x 1000		1sc
8. Phenitoin tbl 100mg x 1000		1sc
9. Heparin amp		80sc
10. Nitatidin amp 100mg x 60		1sc
11. Trental amp 4 x 15ml		4sc
12. Lardol amp 900mg x 100		1sc
13. Syntocinon 5	6x1ml	20sc
14. Methergin amp	6x1ml	20sc
15. Paracetamol tbl	48kom	50sc
16. Ergomet tbl 5mg x 10		20sc
17. Metronidazol sol	35 x 100ml	2 sc
18. Dettol sol	12 x 500ml	5sc
19. Amenij sol 1%	5l	2sc
20. Citrosil sol	12 x 1l	1sc
21. Benzalkonij klorid 50%	1l	2 kom
22. Benzil benzoat sol	1l 2kom	
23. Canesten vag krema 1%	35gr	5sc
24. Infuzione otopine		1 paleta
25. Rinfuz lijekovi		2 kutije



NACEINIK SANITETSKOG STOZERA HZ HB

pukovnik

dr Tugomir Gvaric

*Nedeljko*

## REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Army  
4<sup>th</sup> Corps COMMAND  
No.: 01-22/93  
Mostar, 09 June 1993

HVO MEDICAL HEADQUARTERS  
/Att. COMMANDER OF HVO WAR HOSPITAL/

## SUBJECT: REQUEST

As in the media you have announced medical cooperation and aid to the wounded and sick, we address you:

1. URGENTLY ENSURE FREE and guaranteed passage /RELIEF/ of the surgical team of volunteers or, as agreed, from the TOWN WAR HOSPITAL, under the protection of CMK /International Red Cross/ and UNPROFOR. RELIEF IS NECESSARY EVERY 15 days /team: 2 surgeons, PHYSIATRIST, anaesthesiologist.
2. WE ASK FOR URGENT REALISATION OF THE LIST OF MEDICAMENTS AND MEDICAL supplies.
3. SINCE WE POSSESS ONE AMBULANCE VEHICLE, WE ASK TO BE ASSIGNED FOR COOPERATION 2/TWO/ AMBULANCE VEHICLES /or to be returned the ambulance Mercedes "diesel".

WE ASK FOR URGENT REALISATION!

4<sup>th</sup> Corps COMMANDER  
for Mr. Arif Pašalić  
/signed and stamped/

Mostar, 09 June 1993

DELIVERED TO: 1. ADDRESSEE  
2. 4<sup>th</sup> Corps logistics  
3. Medical Corps

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
/coat of arms/ Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna  
Croatian Defense Council

Defense Department

Health Sector

Number: 02-5/1-286/93

Mostar, 11 June 1993

In respect to the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps BH Army request no. 22/93 dated 9 June 1993, addressed to the HVO Main Medical Staff, we are obliged to respond.

The implementation of the list of medicines and medical material is in progress. Medical material is ready and awaits transport to the left bank by the UNPROFOR. In respect to the request for medical vehicles, we have to warn you that during the conflict, that is aggression on the town of Mostar, you deliberately destroyed 19 medical vehicles, wounded 6 drivers and killed one. We are not in a possibility to satisfy your request, although we would gladly do so, since we ourselves do not have enough vehicles.

In respect to the doctors specialists you requested to be transferred to the left bank, we inform you that we have no volunteers neither among Muslims nor Croat personnel. Our personnel capacities are not big, but they are sufficient for the operation of the War Hospital in Mostar exclusively. Since, according to our opinion, we have far better conditions for providing care for the wounded population and soldiers here than you, we suggest, as we did so many times before, that you send your wounded to the HVO war hospitals where they will have completely identical treatment as our soldiers, which is in accordance with the Hippocratic oath and medical ethics. The HVO Main Medical Staff and I personally guarantee for the completely identical treatment.

Chief of the Main Medical Staff of HZ HB  
Colonel Dr. Tugomir Gveric  
/signed/

/the round seal/



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

HEALTH SERVICE DIVISION

No.: 02-5/1-1233/93

Mostar, 2. 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1993/93

REGIONAL . WAR      HOSPITAL HVO MOSTAR

COMMUNICATION

At the meeting held on 23 April 1993 at 14 hours with the Command of ABH Mostar, Head of 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Medical Staff Prim.Dr. Nušet Đeko, and Assistant Commander of HVO Defence Department – Health Service DIVISION Mr. Ivan Bagarić, it has been agreed:

1. It has been agreed that, upon call for ambulance vehicles by any unit or citizen, or even upon call for mobile surgical team, this shall be ensured, and that access to the hospital by wounded and sick shall be safe and accessible .  
When entering the War Hospital, all persons have to observe the provision on non-carrying fire-arms and cold steel into the hospital.
2. It has been agreed that one personnel carrier shall be made available by Unprofor for getting out wounded civilians and soldiers, /handwritten: killed/
3. All current problems shall be submitted, on the same day, by B-H Army and HVO for agreement and solving at the level of the commander of HVO Sn.SI. /Medical Service/ and the head of B-H Army 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Sn.SI. /Medical Service/.
4. The signatories appeal for the above to be observed also in other war hospitals in the area of conflicts between B-H Army and HVO.
5. It has been agreed that on behalf of the Health Service Division of HVO Defence Department Dr. Toni Kolak in the care service of SN.SI. /Medical Service/ and the responsible person of B-H Army Sn.SI. /Medical Service/ visit all locations of conflict and enable getting out all the wounded and killed.

ASSISTANT HEAD OF DEFENCE DEPARTMENT  
HVO HEALTH SERVICE DIVISION  
Dr. Ivan Bagarić  
/signed/

COMMANDER OF 4<sup>th</sup> CORPS  
Sn.SI. /Medical Service/  
Prim.Dr. Nušet Đeko  
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO

Number: 02-2/1-01-2239/93

Mostar, 1<sup>st</sup> of September 1993

A P P R O V A L

Whereby Miss Sally BECKER, the humanitarian aid worker is allowed to cross the checkpoints, and depart to the left side of Mostar controlled by Muslims forces, during the day.

On her way back, Mrs. Sally BECKER will bring children, ill and powerless persons with two sanitary vehicles.

All HVO soldiers are ordered to make this humanitarian action of Mrs Sally Becker possible and to render help.

HVO Commander  
Major General  
Slobodan PRALJAK  
/signed and stamped/

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HR H-B  
HEALTH DEPARTMENT  
MOSTAR SEPTEMBER 2<sup>ND</sup>.1993

LIST OF WOUNDED AND DEAD

WOUNDED SOLDIERS

September 1<sup>st</sup>.1993

1. Alpeza Mladen 1964 ZMIG "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 5 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

5. Dedic Zelimir 1947 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 5/*

September 2<sup>nd</sup>.1993

6. Mandic Miroslav 1948 ATG VP "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 5 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

10. Marjanovic Tihomir ATG VP "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 10/*

September 3<sup>rd</sup>.1993

11. Kvesic Vinko 1944 Hmg. Regiment "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 12 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

22. Ivankovic Ante 1968 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 22/*

September 4<sup>th</sup>.1993

23. Vasilj Zdravko 1959 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 4 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin"*

26. Zidaric Idriz 1971 ATG VP "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 26/*

September 5<sup>th</sup>.1993

27. Martinovic Jakov 1965 Convicts Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 9 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

35. Pinjuh Zeljko 1960 MUP "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 35/*

September 6<sup>th</sup>.1993

36. Tosum Mili 1967 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

37. Gvozdencovic Nebojsa 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

38. Busic Mario 1962 PZO Grude "Diagnosis in Latin"

September 7<sup>th</sup>.1993

39. Rozic Vinko 1943 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 12 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

49. Pilavdzic Osman 1963 ATG VP "Diagnosis in Latin"  
1<sup>st</sup> Light Assault Brigade

*/List concluded with sequence number 49/*

September 8<sup>th</sup>.1993

50. Pavlovic Borislav 1953 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

51. Kozul Zoran 1965 Convicts Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

52. Tomic Zdenko 1963 District prison "Diagnosis in Latin"

September 9<sup>th</sup>.1993

53. Kolenda Miralem 1969 ATG VP "Diagnosis in Latin"  
1<sup>st</sup> Light Assault Brigade

*/List of 6 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

57. Arapovic Zdenko 1959 Engr.Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 57 – number 56 repeated twice/*

September 10<sup>th</sup>.1993

58. Kreosic Dragan 1962 HVO "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 5 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

62. Peric Vinko 1940 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 62/*

#### EXCHANGED HEAVILY WOUNDED HVO MEMBERS

63. Vidovic Branko 1940 "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of names including year of birth and diagnosis in Latin/*

72. Sunjic Marinko 1961 "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 72/*

September 11<sup>th</sup>.1993

73. Sunjic Stanko 1960 ATG VP "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List of 9 names including year of birth, brigade and diagnosis in Latin/*

81. Vidovic Miroslav 1957 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion "Diagnosis in Latin"

*/List concluded with sequence number 81/*

September 12<sup>th</sup>.1993

82. Livaja Pero 1969 MUP "Diagnosis in Latin"

#### CASUALTIES – SOLDIERS

September 2<sup>nd</sup>.1993

1. Novak Mario 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 2<sup>nd</sup> Mostar Brigade

September 7<sup>th</sup>.1993

2. Miletic Hrvoje 1971 VP HVO

September 8<sup>th</sup>.1993

3. Ostojic Pero 1969 HVO Citluk

September 10<sup>th</sup>.1993

4. Mazo Miroslav 1974 9<sup>th</sup> Battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Mostar Brigade

#### WOUNDED CIVILIANS

September 1<sup>st</sup>.1993

1. Handzar Azer 1975 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

September 2<sup>nd</sup>.1993

2. Lulic Sasa 1973 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

3. Aleckovic Husein 1952 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

4. Ritz Thomas 1970 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

September 3<sup>rd</sup>.1993

5. Maric Marijana 1982 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

*/List of 13 names including year of birth and diagnosis in Latin/*

17. Martinovic Anica 1957 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

*/List concluded with sequence number 17/*

September 4<sup>th</sup>.1993

18. Janina Jelena 1928 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

19. Jelas Toni 1989 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

20. Jelas Ivana 1986 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

September 5<sup>th</sup>.1993

21. Camdzic dr Almira 1943 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

September 6<sup>th</sup>.1993

22. Rizvanbegovic Zulfikar 1953 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

*/List of 3 names including year of birth and diagnosis in Latin/*

24. Culic Mehmedalija 1950 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

*/List concluded with sequence number 24/*

September 7<sup>th</sup>.1993

25. Guja Muhamed 1962 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

26. Krhan Mujo 1953 */Diagnosis in Latin/*

27. Razic Adis 1972 /Diagnosis in Latin/

September 8<sup>th</sup>.1993

28. Maric Ivanka 1951 /Diagnosis in Latin/

29. Pavlovic Mara 1953 /Diagnosis in Latin/

September 9<sup>th</sup>.1991

30. Anes Mehmetovic 1973 /Diagnosis in Latin/

31. Crnjac Ante 1939 /Diagnosis in Latin/

September 10<sup>th</sup>.1993

32. Martinovic Mario 1980 /Diagnosis in Latin/

#### CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

September 3<sup>rd</sup>.1993

1. Pehar Kata 1928 Mostar

*/List of 5 names including year of birth and city of residence/*

5. Cican Mensur 1964 Mostar

*/List concluded with sequence number 5/*

September 4<sup>th</sup>.1993

6. Sabljic Remzo 1957 Mostar

REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA  
 HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA  
 HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE  
 ODJEL OBRANE

## SEKTOR ZA ZDRAVSTVO

Broj: .....02-5/2-162...../93

Mostar, 03.09.1993. god.

Dear Sonja Hagel,

Today, on 03.09.1993. had to start the evacuation of all wounded from Moslem hospital and from hospital from Nova Bila. The negotiation was established between Moslem forces and Croatian Council of Defence, and it is signed on 31.08.1993. in Sarajevo. Details were negotiated on 02.09.1993. in Medugorje. The evacuation had to be 03.09.1993. from both hospitals. At 3 o'clock p.m. on 03.09.1993. Moslem forces shot several grenades on the Croatian part of Mostar and they killed two children and one civilian, and they injured four children (about ten years old) and four civilians. Because of this tragic incident I am not assured that the evacuation will be done. The break of the fightings which is negotiated because of the evacuation of the wounded was interrupted by the Moslem forces on the most insolent way with the attack at the children and civilians. I hope that information I send You will instigate on the consideration of the people with whom You contact to understand that the greatest victim from the beginning of the war in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Croatian people.



CHIEF OF MEDICAL AND HEALTH - CARE  
 DEPARTMENT

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
 dr. Tugomir Gverić

/handwritten 1001 Ivančić/

/fax marks/

from \*\*\*\*\* with G3 standard SEP 06.93 2:29P /handwritten 10:31/

total page : 001 failure page : none

4969 253151 PHINBERT IMPORT-EXPORT GMBH 541 P01 06.09.93 13:  
illegible

/header/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF

Number: 02-2/1-01-2338/93

IZM (Forwarded post) Čitluk 6<sup>th</sup> of September 1993

/handwritten approved/

Demand for the transfer by helicopter

OS HRZ Zagreb

We ask you to accomplish the transfer of the heavy wounded Almira Čandžić  
/handwritten doctor/, born in 194/illegible/ dg. Status post amputatione numeri dex,  
Vulus eksplozivus abdeninis.

For the heavy degree of the wound, it is necessary to transfer her from Mostar (Mostarsko  
blato) KBC Zagreb. /handwritten Split illegible/

Respectfully yours

Commander of the GS HVO  
General Major  
Slobodan Praljak  
/signed and stamped/



/illegible stamp/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERCEG-BOSNA

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, HEALTH SECTOR

MOSTAR, 7 SEPTEMBER 1993

HR HB /Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna/

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

n/r /personally to/ MATE BOBAN

HR HB DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

n/r Mr. BRUNO STOJIC

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN

STAFF

n/r Brigadier ŽARKO TOLE

HEALTH SECTOR

n/r Dr. IVAN BĀGARIC

REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH  
THE MUSLIM SIDE IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVACUATION  
OF THE WOUNDED

MEĐUGORJE, 1 SEPTEMBER TO 6 SEPTEMBER 1993

At 1000 hours on 1 September 1993, in the Spanish Battalion base in Međugorje, negotiations started about the implementation of the Agreement on the Evacuation of the Seriously Sick and Wounded from Nova Bila and Mostar, which had been signed at the Sarajevo airport on 31 August 1993 by General PETKOVIĆ, General DELIĆ and General BRIQUEMONT as the witness.

Mr. Berislav PUŠIĆ, Mr. Stanko MARIĆ, Mr. Božo RAGUŽ and Dr. Ivo ŠANDRK represented the HVO negotiation team. Mr. Mujo ISOVIĆ, Mr. Alija

ALIKADIĆ aka Cakan and Dr. Dragan MILAVIĆ represented the Muslim side. On behalf of UNPROFOR, General BRIQUEMONT called the meeting to order and greeted those present. Mr. TORNBERRY later joined the meeting, and General FELIU chaired the meeting. The principles of evacuation, the equipment to be used for it and the destination where the wounded would be evacuated were agreed at the meeting. The Muslim side could not secure the equipment for evacuation and the hospitals to which to evacuate the wounded, so they asked UNPROFOR for help. On behalf of UNPROFOR, Mr. Albert BENABOU promised help with the evacuation and possible accommodation of the wounded in the American Hospital in Zagreb. I insisted that wounded HVO members also be evacuated to the said hospital and it was agreed that an equal number, or 30 wounded members of the HVO and the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ respectively be evacuated to the American Hospital. The meeting finished at 1430 hours. The continuation of the talks was scheduled for 1000 hours on 2 September 1993, when both sides must present lists of the wounded divided into evacuation groups on a priority basis.

At 1000 hours on 2 September 1993, the talks continued. The composition of either delegation was unchanged. The HVO medical corps presented a list of the wounded from Nova Bila divided into evacuation groups on a priority basis:

Group 1: top priority wounded	16 wounded
Group 2: priority group	19 wounded
Group 3: sick civilians	26 sick people

The Muslim side presented their list of 85 wounded and sick people. Colonel MORALES and Mr. Albert BENABOU chaired the meeting. After a long discussion, UNPROFOR representatives proposed for adoption the Memorandum of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Agreement on Evacuations in Mostar and

Nova Bila. Technical details of the evacuation were worked out in it. Each side must secure the following:

- evacuation equipment
- routes to be used
- final destination where the wounded would be evacuated.

The provisions of this Memorandum were to take effect as soon as possible, no later than 1100 hours on 3 September 1993. It was also agreed that, if any one side could not secure the evacuation of their wounded by that time, it must allow the other side that fulfilled the evacuation conditions. The signatories were Dr. Ivo ŠANDRK, on behalf of the HVO medical corps, Dr. Dragan MILAVIĆ, on behalf of the MOS medical corps, and Colonel A. MORALES and Mr. Albert BENABOU as witnesses on behalf of UNPROFOR.

On 3 September 1993, a meeting started again at 1000 hours in Medugorje. The composition of the HVO delegation was unchanged, while Mr. Điho ŠEFKIJA, chief of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps security service, replaced Mr. ISOVIĆ in the Muslim delegation. Dr. MILAVIĆ was also absent. Colonel MORALES chaired the meeting. Equipment was requested to evacuate wounded MOS members. When the time set for the start of the evacuation was up (1100 hours on 3 September 1993), Colonel MORALES asked the HVO delegation to wait until 1200 hours. We agreed. Since the Muslim side again failed to secure equipment for the evacuation of their wounded, UNPROFOR allowed the start of the evacuation from Nova Bila. Two medical corps helicopters took off from Split to Kiseljak at 1230 hours.

The Muslim side informed those present that it had secured helicopters and it proposed that the evacuation of their wounded start at 1500 hours from the open area

at the former bus station, with two helicopters. UNPROFOR and HVO representatives, after consultation with the HVO GS /Main Staff/, agreed but warned of possible incidents by MOS members.

I went to Mostar to be present with UNPROFOR when MOS wounded were taken on board. At 1430 hours MOS forces attacked the HVO-controlled part of the town with mortars. On that occasion, 18 civilians were wounded, five of them children, and five civilians were killed, two of them children. Among the wounded civilians, eight were Muslims. It is clear that the aim of the attack was for the MOS to show the public that the evacuation could not be carried out for security reasons. On the same day, two medical corps helicopters evacuated 29 seriously wounded HVO /members/ and about a dozen sick children and civilians from Nova Bila to Split.

On 4 September 1993, a meeting again at 1100 hours, chaired by Major DE SALOS. The composition of the HVO delegation was unchanged, and Dr. Dragan MILAVIĆ was again absent from the Muslim delegation. The Muslim side presented a list of 26 wounded they wanted to evacuate first, including 20 who could sit and 6 who had to lie down. For security reasons, UNPROFOR proposed, and sought approval from HVO representatives, that MOS wounded be evacuated by UN personnel carriers to Medugorje and from there by MOS helicopters to Zenica. Approval was received from the HVO GS to allow such evacuation. In spite of all guarantees, the Muslim side again could not or did not want to secure helicopters, on the excuse that weather conditions were unfavourable. From an earlier conversation with Dr. MILAVIĆ, I found out that three seriously and about a dozen slightly wounded Croats were in the MOS hospital on the left bank. I proposed evacuating them too and wounded Muslims, if any, from the HVO hospital. Both sides agreed. Late in the evening, around 2200 hours on 4 September 1993, Colonel MORALES

asked the HVO delegation to allow the evacuation of the seriously wounded Dr. Amira ČAMDŽIĆ from the MOS hospital to the RR /Regional War/ hospital of the HVO. After consultation with the HVO GS, authorisation was given to Colonel MORALES. The authorisation was signed by Brigadier Žarko TOLE, on behalf of the HVO GS, and Dr. Ivo ŠANDRK, on behalf of the Health Sector.

The talks continued again at 1100 hours on 5 September 1993. The composition of either delegation was unchanged. In Colonel MORALES'S office, the German and Spanish ambassadors to the EC attended the meeting. They came to check on the spot who obstructed the evacuation of the wounded because they had been informed that it was the HVO. I informed the gentlemen ambassadors of the contents of the Memorandum, of the developments in the current talks, and of the fact that the HVO had not obstructed and would not obstruct the evacuation of wounded MOS members from Mostar, and that it would strictly adhere to the provisions of the Agreement. I also told them that the Muslim side simply could not or did not want to secure the equipment for the evacuation of their wounded. After that, Colonel MORALES resolutely asked the Muslim side to say "yes or no" if they wanted the evacuation. Having tried to evade giving a concrete answer to the concrete question, they said "yes". When asked a second question, by when they could secure helicopters in Medugorje, they said by 1600 hours. In trying to realise their promise, MOS representatives used the telephone, but they came at 1600 and informed those present that they were unable to secure the helicopters. It was obvious again that the Muslim side again did not want to evacuate their wounded, but they could no longer blame it on the other side. They expressed their apology, but /said/ they were powerless. Around 1700 hours, with the help of the Spanish Battalion, the seriously wounded Dr. ČAMDŽIĆ was evacuated from the MOS hospital on the left bank to the RR hospital

of the Mostar HVO. She was put in the intensive care unit of the surgery ward in a very serious condition, with gangrene of the hand, sepsis and in a medically rather neglected condition.

At 1000 hours on 6 September 1993 the negotiations continued again. The composition of the HVO negotiation team was unchanged, while Mr. Džih ŠEFKIJA and Mr. Zlatan BULJKO represented the Muslim side. Evacuation of 31 members of the MOS was agreed. The wounded were evacuated to the Međugorje heliport by Spanish Battalion personnel carriers in two trips, and from there to Zenica by MOS helicopters.

During the first flight at 1700 hours, HVO representatives were not present for the inspection of either the helicopter or the wounded because representatives of the Spanish Battalion had not informed them. Colonel AKRAP of the HVO GS was immediately informed of this. A strong protest was lodged with the Spanish Battalion. They admitted the blame and promised that this would not happen again. The second helicopter and the wounded were inspected. Another meeting and the continuation of the evacuation have been scheduled for 1100 hours on 7 September 1993. The continuation of the evacuation of HVO wounded from Nova Bila has been scheduled for 1000 hours on 8 September 1993.

CHIEF OF THE HVO CONTROL AND  
INSPECTION SERVICE

Dr. IVO ŠANDRK

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERCEG BOSNA  
SERVICE FOR WOUNDED PERSONS' CARE  
MOSTAR, 11 September 1993  
No: 02-5/3-39/93 HR HB

Chief Assistant of OO  
Health sector  
Attn Brigadier Dr. Ivan Bagarić

Subject: report on Muslim nationality child transport (exchange) and his evacuation to Split regarding further medical treatment

On 11 September 1993, by the Order of Chief of Control-security service in the Sector for health care, Dr. Ivo Šandrk and by the Order of Mr. General Praljak, I, as Doctor, escorted the sick child (leukaemia in remission), Silajdžijja Haris, 4, 5 years old along with his mother, Silajdžija Enisa and younger brother, 2 years old, from the locality War Hospital Rama Rumboci to Split.

The mother and children were transported by UNPROFOR and European observers, Mr. Rudy Gerritsen from the Netherlands (540509115) and Mr. David MacIver from Canada (1496) – European observers, and in Mr. Tomić's presence at 14:30 hrs, they consigned the mother and children to my care.

The HTV crew witnessed the moment, having it recorded.

At 14:45 hrs we moved to Split and arrived there at 18.45 hrs. Dr Škrabic took further care on them in KBC Firule Split.

STR. Co-operator of service for  
Wounded persons' care  
Dr. Pero Marić  
/signed and stamped twice/

/coat of arms/  
(on the right side Croatian text, on the left English)  
CLINICAL HOSPITAL SPLIT  
58 000 SPLIT, Spinčićeva 1  
CROATIA  
Telephone (058) 515-055  
Fax: 365 738

Split, 29 October 1993

### C E R T I F I C A T E

That hereby confirms that the below cited children, victims of war, being treated in KBC Split, according to Decision of Supreme Medical Commission, are recommended to continue the medical treatment abroad.

Nevertheless, all of them were registered as urgent cases from the battle fields, without personal identification. Since they must continue their treatment abroad, it is necessary for them to be provided with a passport. Therefore, we kindly ask you to issue the passports so they can become healthy citizens already tomorrow.

The above cited is related to:

1. ALEKSANDRA VUJICA, with family
2. IVANA MARTIĆ, with family
3. HARIS SILAJDŽIĆ, with family
4. MERSIHA VELEDAR, with family
5. GORAN BOŠNJAK, with family

Civilians, victim of war, adults:

1. FRANCISKA MARTIĆ, with two children
2. SENAD ZEC

Members of the BH Army and HVO:

1. MARIN BAČIĆ
2. BERNARD MATOŠEVIĆ
3. ZORAN KASALO
4. SPASOJE JEREK
5. FIKRET HODŽIĆ

Thank you in advance!

Main nurse:  
M. Županović, vms  
/signed and stamped/

Principal:  
Mr.sc. dr. Goran Dodig  
/signed/



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

HEALTH SERVICE DIVISION

No.: 02-5/1-567/93

Mostar, 15 September 1993

Head of transport service of HVO RR /Regional War/ Hospital  
Att. Mr. Mirko Čavar

ORDER

Send one ambulance vehicle to Čitluk and hand it over to Mrs. Sally Becker with regard to the transport of wounded from the left bank of Neretva River to HVO War Hospital Mostar.

This order is to be carried out immediately!

ASSISTANT HEAD OF DEFENCE DEPARTMENT  
OF HEALTH SERVICE DIVISION OF HR HB

Brigadier

Dr. Ivan Bagarić

/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNIA  
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO

Number: 02-2/1-01-2478/93

Mostar, 15<sup>th</sup> of September 1993

A P P R O V A L

Whereby a free pass with a police escort on relation Čitluk – Žitomislić – Vinjani Gornji is to be secured, as well as the departure route to the Republic of Croatia:

1. Sally Becker
2. Mirsad Handžar (wounded)
3. Tanja Kaniža
4. Nina Kaniža
5. Damir Kaniža
6. Mirza Kaniža
7. Roger Lucey
8. Elvis Barunčević

HVO Commander  
Major General  
Slobodan PRALJAK  
/signed and stamped/

## HVO RETRIEVES WOUNDED BiH ARMY SOLDIERS - MOSTAR 1993

September 1<sup>st</sup>

- Transportation of 34 wounded from the Muslim part by helicopter from Medugorje for evacuation in Zenica, together with 5 wounded prisoners who were in the HVO hospital in Bijeli Brijeg.

September 4<sup>th</sup>

- Evacuation from Mostar to Zenica with BiH helicopter was not possible due to weather conditions.

September 6<sup>th</sup>

- Meetings of the mixed commission are continued in order to organize the exchange of prisoners

- Negotiations for evacuation of wounded from Mostar hospital (Muslims) to Zenica were successfully concluded. During the evacuation 31 wounded were transported.

September 7<sup>th</sup>

- Evacuation of three children and their mothers from Jablanica.

September 8<sup>th</sup>

- Sanitary evacuation of 38 wounded persons by helicopter from the eastern part of Mostar to Medugorje and later in armored vehicle to Zenica.

September 12<sup>th</sup>

- Evacuation of 38 wounded Muslims from Muslim hospital in Mostar to Medugorje, where they were collected and transported by helicopter to Zenica.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  
BR.02-5/1-781/93  
MOSTAR, 20.12.1993.godine

UNPROFOR  
UNHCR  
ICRC

SITUATION ABOUT WOUNDED PERSONS, PATIENTS AND  
MEDICINES SUPPLY AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT IN B I H  
- THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CROATIAN AND MOSLEM SIDE  
( HVO AND B I H ARMY)

## WOUNDED PERSONS

- 
1. From the beginning of the conflicts between Croatian and Moslem side we have this situation with the wounded persons:
    - a) Both sides have large number of the wounded persons
    - b) Both sides have wounded prisoners
    - c) HVO have wounded persons in hospitals which are surrounded and from which is impossible to evacuate wounded persons (Nova Bila, Zepce, Kiseljak).
    - d) B i H Army has the wounded persons in the hospital in Mostar, on the left side, and they can be evacuated (but with a difficulty because of mountain hardly passable roads).
    - e) Because of the impossibility of the evacuation in the real time, large number of wounded persons died.  
Between deads, Croats are larger number.

f) International humanitarian organisations and world media endeavoured extraordinarily to help to the Moslem side. (For example the operation IRMA, installations of many international health institutions in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and so on...). We estimate excellently this endeavour.

In the same time Croatian wounded persons are mentioned only sometimes, and for them is not done practically anything.

2. From the beginning of the conflicts (almost every day) we proposed constantly to the Moslem side next:
  - a) To evacuate the wounded persons from all hospitals according to medical criteria, and without especially negotiations, fast as possible.
  - b) To exchange the wounded prisoners - all for all.
  - c) If Moslem side does not agree with this, they can one-sidedly evacuate their wounded persons wherever they want.
3. Moslem side postponed all negotiations and they found always some reasons for that. The wounded persons had less chance to live and many of them died.
4. Now, we propose to the Moslem side urgent achievement of the negotiation for the wounded persons from hospitals to be evacuated immediately, and for all wounded prisoners to be exchanged as soon as possible, in principle all for all.
5. We propose international organisations to control the execution of this negotiation, evidence the side which would break the negotiation and accuse the side in public for breaking the laws.
6. I remark that in the war actions, wounded persons are frequently women and children, those who are unhelpful.

7. I especially remark that in many hospitals of B I H which are held by Moslems (Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Travnik) are strongly discriminated the wounded Croats in medical help.

#### PATIENTS

-----

1. The war in B i H, with all what war cares with itself, enlarged the number of patients and the difficulty of the illness in the population. At the other side it is reduced the possibility of diagnosis and therapy of all diseases. The result of these two facts is the real catastrophe of people's health.
2. From the beginning of the war we strived to correct this situation. We proposed constantly and we propose now:
  - a) Make use of all disposed institutions and physicians for the treatment of all people, in sense with physician's ethics, without regard to all differences between people.
  - b) With help of all international organisations can be improved possibilities of the Health institutions.
  - c) Make use of the Health institutions of the Republic Croatia what we negotiated with Ministry of health of the Republic Croatia.

#### HEALTH INSTITUTIONS AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

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1. In the war in B i H many health institutions and medical equipment were destroyed at all.
2. Because the need for health services enlarged, many unadapted rooms were transformed into health institutions.
3. Because of this we proposed constantly and we propose now:
  - a) Because of bad situation in the hospital in Mostar on the left side of the river we propose Moslem side can make use the hospital in the centre of the town for care of wounded persons and patients

the centre of the town for care of wounded persons and patients. The whole process of treatment would be controlled by international organisations. Although numberless times this proposal was repeated it stayed only proposal.

- b) We also proposed that Croats from the Central Bosnia, wounded persons and patients, can be cured in Travnik and Zenica, also under control of international organisations, but this proposal is also refused.
- c) We propose that international organisations would be monitors in the hospitals so that they can not be shot by artillery, and the side, which would break this, can be accurated for a breaking of War law. (this is understood that Moslem side would remove all artilery and soldiers from rooms of hospital in Mostar)
- d) We are consonant that international humanitarian organisations can install on the left side of the river in Mostar an adaptable health institution. There is a need to install the same in NOVA Bila. This reason why containers with medical equipment are in Ploce is because of the technic and it must be presented to the public.

#### MEDICINE S SUPPLY

-----

During the war we tried to supply enough all institutions with medicine without regard to whom that institutions belong and whose patients they cure.

Whenever Moslem side asked for medicines from us they got them during the same day. We enclosed only several dispatches of medicines. We do not need to mention that there were negative reactions at our side because of our attitude toward Moslem side. Because when we gave the medicines to the Moslem side, Moslem soldiers who took these medicines killed horribly our civilians on the left side. But we have further the same attitude toward Moslem side.

What would we say at the end

During this war we endeavoured maximum to help to all people and we shall do this furher. We shall never permit to be abused the work of the health service in political or military purposes. But we were active and we shall be more active in every kinds of conflicts in order to stop the war and to restore the peace. I hope that we shall have more support of international organisations than we had til now.

MINISTER'S COOPERATER OF DEFENCE OF HR HB  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  
brigadier dr IVAN BAGARIC

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Army of BiH – 6<sup>th</sup> Corps  
 Military Police Battalion  
 Register number: 01/P-05-319  
 Konjic, 13. 09. 1993.

Defence of the Republic  
 Military Secret  
 Strictly Confidential

Submitted to,-  
 - 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Security Organ  
 - to the attention of Nermin EMINOVIĆ

I was in Jablanica on 10.09.1993. with the intention to control and assist in the work of the subordinated unit (Jablanica Military Police Company and Military Police Department for Service).

While I was in the Department for Service, Comander Đelmo ZENAID informed me that allegedly, a genocide over Croatian population occured in the town of Grabovica, done by the unknown perpetrator from the ranks of the Army of BiH. We immediately went to Grabovica and found out from our source that the genocide indeed took place and that, on that occasion, 20/twenty/ civilians were „slaughtered“ and „killed“. He also showed us (from distance) houses from where the civilian victims were and he claimed that there were fresh graves below the houses and traces of blood on the bridge. This confidential source pointed our attention to the fact that it was dangerous to do that now because the military that was in that area, kept everything under control, which we verified ourselves. We went to Jablanica, where I carried out consultations with Namik ĐANKOVIĆ from Sarajevo UVB /Military Security Administration/ and he told me that ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ IKM /Forward Command Post/ knew that and that it had been ordered not to do anything because of the planned operation.

He received this order from Vehbija KARIĆ.

Commander  
 /signed/  
 Mr Nusret ŠAHIĆ

/Stamp, reading: “Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 /illegible/ Corps  
 /illegible/” /

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
BH ARMY  
SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS /illegible/

Defence  
Military secret  
Confidential

JABLANICA

Jablanica, 13 September 1993

Information,

Forward to - Military Security Service of the BH Defence Forces (to Jusuf JAŠAREVIĆ personally)

On 8 September 1993, BH Army units from Sarajevo came to the village of Grabovica within the scope of a planned operation towards Mostar. Their commander was Ramiz DELALIĆ aka Ćelo.

The units were put up on the right bank of the river Neretva in houses owned by Croats, since the majority of the village was Croatian. After the operation to gain control of the Grabovica hydro-electric power plant had been carried out, a part of the Croats - HVO members from the Bijelo Polje battalion with Croats from Grabovica among its ranks - left the area, some were killed and others remained in the village, mainly elderly people and women with children.

The behaviour of BH Army members, and in particular that of the commander of the Zulfikar special purposes unit and of the civilian authorities as well, towards the Croatian population was correct and there were no incidents in which their security was drastically endangered. On arrival, the new units from Sarajevo set up an improvised check-point near the MARIĆ houses at the entrance to the village where they exercised control over people entering and leaving the village.

In the night between 8 and 9 September 1993, rifle shots were heard in the village which went on almost the whole night. In the morning, on 9 September 1993, news spread that the civilian population – the Croats - had been massacred by BH Army members from Sarajevo. Jablanica police station Chief Emin ZEBIĆ, having been informed by two female Muslim refugees from Čapljina, contacted Edib SARIĆ, commander of the "Igmanski vukovi" /Igman Wolves/ unit who confirmed that several murders had been committed on the right bank of the Neretva but that he did not know the scope of the crime nor who the perpetrators were. The deputy chief of the Jablanica police station accompanied by the Jablanica military police commander went to the scene of the crime on 9 September 1993 at about hours where they were stopped by BH Army members from Sarajevo at the improvised check-point. After checking their credentials they were allowed to enter the village. They went to the house of Ivan PRANJIĆ and his wife Stoja, who confirmed that the shooting had been going on the whole night in the village and that the following persons were probably killed: Marinko Marić, born in 1941, his father Martin born in 1911, his wife Luca, born in 1944 and their neighbours ..... Marić, her daughter Ružica, born in 1956. The commander of the Independent Sarajevo Battalion and a refugee from Čapljina by the name of Zulfo were also present in Ivan PRANJIĆ's house. The commander of the Independent Sarajevo Battalion insisted that Ivan PRANJIĆ and his wife Stoja be evacuated because he said he would not be able to protect them without weapons.

On 10 September 1993, the deputy chief of the Jablanica Police Station again interviewed Ivan PRANJIĆ and learned that he and his wife Stoja were in the house when the army arrived from Sarajevo and that Marinko MARIĆ was with them in the house when Marinko's wife arrived and said to him: "Why are you sitting here while the army is throwing us out of our houses?" After that Marinko left towards his own house and the PRANJIĆs did not see him again.

On the morning of 9 September 1993, some Muslim refugees came to PRANJIĆ's house. /Illegible/ said they had gone to get head on the right bank and that between the PRANJIĆ house and a place called Crno Vrelo they had seen the body of a man, probably Marinko MARIĆ and three female bodies on the of land above Marinko MARIĆ's house.

On 9 September in the morning at about 5:30 A.M. two elderly Croat men came up to the security guards at the Grabovica hydro-electric power station and asked that the BH Army command he informed that Ivan SARIĆ and Franjo PRANJIĆ had been taken away by force in an unknown direction.../illegible/ I want to emphasise that only ZUKA had access to the area without any consequences, that he wrote a report about the event, the contents of which I do not know, and that he will forward the report to Supreme Command in Sarajevo.

According to my reports, eleven Croatian civilians were killed. I assume that some of the bodies has been were thrown into the reservoir of the Salakovac hydro electric power plant.

Fourteen adults and two children, all Croats, have been evacuated from the area and sent to Jablanica.

According to my information, a man called Ivica, a Croatian member of the Zulfikar special purposes unit, was also killed near the barrier at the entrance to the village. His butchered corpse was found in the Salakovac reservoir, at a place called Sjenčina. /illegible/ on the left bank of the river Neretva, in a village where refugees from Čapljina have been put up. A woman has been raped and there was an attempt to rape another woman. An interview with this woman will be conducted and a written statement taken by /illegible/. /illegible/ The entire Supreme Command's forward command post of Jablanica has been informed of this event, as well as the civilian authorities and the Ministry of the Interior. An investigation into the event, ascertaining the exact number of people killed, how they were killed and who the perpetrators were will be jointly conducted by officials of the Military Security Service and the Ministry of the Interior. A detailed inspection at the scene of the crime is currently impossible because of the large number of units and people in Grabovica, the attitude of the unit lead by Ramiz DELALIĆ, and the fear that to attach too much importance to the event would cause the immediate return of the complete unit to Sarajevo, which would jeopardize the planned operation towards Mostar. This was by Ramiz DELALIĆ himself during a conversation in ZUKA's apartment. Present on this occasion were: Edib SARIĆ, commander of the "Igmanski Vukovi" unit; Ahmed SALIHAMIDŽIĆ, Jablanica police station deputy chief and Sead BRAKOVIĆ, official of the Mostar office of the State Security Service. /A detailed inspection/ is also impossible out of justified fear that it could cause open conflicts between /illegible/ unit members and persons who are to conduct the inspection and who might try to identify and arrest the perpetrators.

The present situation in Grabovica is under control. The fact that Ramiz DELALIĆ executed one of his soldiers has contributed to this. In Jablanica this unfortunate event is being kept a secret as far as possible in order to enable the success of the combat operation currently being prepared. The Chief of the Main Staff Mr. Sefer HALILOVIĆ, who has dissociated himself from the crime, has ordered me personally to work together with other Military Security Service members and MUP officials to collect as much information as possible about the infamous event. Pursuant to the above, I propose the following:



1. To continue to collect information in an operative way.
2. By decree to establish a mixed commission consisting of MUP officials and the Military Security Service led by military investigation organs. The presence of a doctor and other experts is obligatory in order to exhume the bodies and establish the cause of death. (There are indications of savagery-heart extraction, slaughter).
3. Conduct interviews with members of Adnan SOLAKOVIĆ's unit who were lodged in the direct vicinity and who must have seen at least a part if not all the killings and the perpetrators. (This should be undertaken after the units have returned to Sarajevo for the reasons stated above).
4. Request a report from Zulfikar ALISPAGO, commander of the ZULFIKAR unit, who, as he says himself, has written a report and forwarded it to Supreme Command in Sarajevo. Under the prevailing circumstances, ZUKA was the only person who could go to the scene of the crime to confirm at least some of the facts without fearing for his life.
5. Request a written report from commander Ramiz DELALIĆ aka Ćelo on the events in Grabovica.
6. Exercise strict censorship over the media's reporting of the events in view of the present military and political situation.

Enclosed: Official note of the Jablanica police station deputy commander

/handwritten:  
MILITARY SECURITY SECTOR  
Number: 08-21-67/93  
Date: 20 September 1993/

/crossed out: REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
R BH ARMY – 6<sup>TH</sup> CORPS DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
PROZOR SB /Independent Battalion/ COMMAND MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly confidential number: 1-01-400/93 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten: Files, Prozor SB/

/crossed out: 6<sup>th</sup> CORPS COMMAND/

/crossed out: Commander's report/

Pursuant to attack order operative number 01/1500-27 of 11 September 1993, Prozor SB units infiltrated deep into the enemy territory as planned in the night between 13 and 14 September 1993, with the aim of taking control of the general Uzdol sector, Križ, Zelenike and Bobari villages and the school (Cer), where the majority of the intervention company of the Rama brigade was located.

In another direction, two platoons were infiltrated into the Klupa sector and the Blace village sector.

The following units participated in the attack: two platoons of the 1<sup>st</sup> company, two platoons of the 2<sup>nd</sup> company, one platoon of the 3<sup>rd</sup> company, one platoon of the 4<sup>th</sup> company, the Military Police, part of the Prozor MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ forces, all company commanders, PK /Assistant Commander / for Moral Guidance, PK for Security, operations officer and other Command members. A total of 156 soldiers participated in the attack.

The right wing, whose task was to take control of the general Blace village sector, was led by the guide from the 317<sup>th</sup> bbr of the 2<sup>nd</sup> bbt /Mountain Battalion/ (Voljevac). They ran into a minefield and so one soldier and the company commander were killed and eight soldiers were wounded, some slightly and some seriously. I therefore ordered this unit to withdraw to the sector of its initial position (Pridvorci village) because I could not communicate with the right wing and I did not notice any activity of the neighbour on the right-hand side from the observation post in Here village (Glavica).

Along the attack axis in the Uzdol sector, the main attack was carried out on the concentrated forces of the intervention unit in the Uzdol school. One tank was destroyed. The hamlets of Križ, Zelenike and Bobari were surrounded and asked to surrender.

From the direction of Kranjčići village and Prozor, the surrounded Ustasha forces received assistance consisting of 200 HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/ soldiers in four buses, supported by two BOV /armoured combat vehicle/, a tank from Ošljani, mortars from Kranjčići and Dobroša and ZIS /divisional gun/ and howitzers from Crni Vrh.

The armed soldiers and civilians in the surrounded villages even held armed women in front of themselves and started to put up resistance. Fire was returned. The entire Uzdol, Here, Kute and Ščipe sector was under heavy artillery fire.

I could not send assistance /?to/ the forward /defence/ line and so I ordered the forces to withdraw. This was carried out in the regular combat formation, and seven soldiers were pulled out, some slightly and some seriously wounded. Four soldiers, who were sent to pull out a dead body of a fellow-soldier, were killed with a PM-84 heavy machine-gun, which fired from a room in Uzdol school where communications were located.

By my estimate, about 65 Croatian soldiers and about 30 civilians, mostly armed, were liquidated during the operation. One should bear in mind that the Ustasha artillery was literally destroying the entire Uzdol sector the whole time.

Some MTS /materiel and equipment/ - AP /automatic rifles/ and PAP /semi-automatic rifles/ - was seized during the operation. One tank, one battery of 82-mm and 120-mm MB /mortars/, a number of vehicles and a truck loaded probably with mortar shells were destroyed.

It was impossible to pull out the said MTS because, according to a statement from a captive, there was no fuel in the vehicles as the Ustashes took it out of the vehicles every evening, fearing that some units might desert.

**CONCLUSION:** This report and the overall data have been made available to ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ Chief Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Colonel Vehbija KARIĆ, and Colonel Zikrija SULJEVIĆ, who monitored the whole operation from the observation post.

TO:  
- The 6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command  
- Files

COMMANDER:  
Enver BUZA

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND  
HERZEGOVINA /R BH/  
R BH ARMY  
6<sup>th</sup> CORPS COMMAND

No. CV-92-09  
Date: 16 September 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/circled:  
To:  
3<sup>rd</sup> CORPS COMMANDER/


According to the official operative report from the site of the battles for Uzdol village in Prozor municipality, about 60 HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ members were killed. Among the dead there were civilians who had weapons in their hands, and probably due to a shortage of soldiers, they fired on R BH Army members. All other statements and fabricated facts in the above information are not true.

/circled:  
COMMANDER  
Salko GUŠIĆ/

/handwritten: IMPORTANT: Uzdol!//


BiH municipalities in which some members of the A-BiH (muslim units) committed crimes against Croats









**Gagrice – Lokve - ČAPLJINA**  
**10.10.'93. - STIPE (Blago) DRAGIČEVIĆ**



**In Mostar municipality 43 persons were  
killed in:  
Đikovina, Rodoč i Grabovica**


**MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY**



**DOLJANI**  
28.07.'93. – 63 victims

- IGOR (Nediljko) LEBO r. 1978.
- IVAN (Tadija) TOPIĆ r. 1969.
- ŽELJKO (Ivan) MIŠKIĆ r. 1968.
- MILAN (Jure) POLE r. 1972.
- ANDRIJA (Jure) GROZNICA r. 1972.
- NEDJELJKO (Josip) SOLDO r. 1933.
- ANICA (Ivan) RIPIĆ r. 1934.
- IVA (Srećko) PAVLOVIĆ r. 1930.
- PAVA (Pero) STIPANOVIĆ r. 1942.
- MARTIN (Ivo) RIPIĆ r. 1933.
- RUŽA (Pero) ČOLIĆ r. 1921.
- ANDRIJA (Stipe) STIPANOVIĆ r. 1931.
- TOMISLAV (Ivan) JOSIPOVIĆ r. 1974.
- ZDRAVKO (Marija) NIŽIĆ r. 1940.
- JOZO (Luka) MILIČEVIĆ r. 1929.
- ANICA (Jure) ŠITUM r. 1913.
- NIKOLA (Vido) DRINOVAČ r. 1971.
- ILJA (Ante) ZELENKA r. 1960.
- ANDRIJA (Jozo) PERKOVIĆ r. 1967.
- JELA (Stipe) STOJANOVIĆ r. 1962.
- IVICA (Stjepan) TOMIĆ r. 1954.
- SLAVKO (Stipan) VRLJIĆ r. 1968.
- ANDJELKO (Pero) MARTIĆ r. 1964.
- MARINKO (Kazimir) BOŽIĆ r. 1960.
- LJUBOMIR (Kazimir) BOŽIĆ r. 1966.
- ŽELJKO (Slavko) BOŽIĆ r. 1960.
- MATO (Ivan) DOGAN r. 1961.
- ZVONKO (Bosiljko) PINJUŠIĆ r. 1967.
- MATO (Tadija) BILOŠ r. 1950.
- ANTO (Ivan) ŽARIĆ r. 1965.
- SLAVKO (Jure) MILIČEVIĆ r. 1955.
- MILENKO (Pero) GAGRO r. 1954.
- DRAŽEN (Tadija) PAVKOVIĆ r. 1971.
- IVAN (Mirko) ZOVKO r. 1973.
- MARINKO (Ivan) ZELENKA r. 1959.
- MARKO (Jure) CVITKOVIĆ r. 1954.
- PERO (Ilija) SOLDO r. 1967.
- IVAN (Ilija) SOLDO r. 1969.
- JURE (Ilija) SOLDO r. 1970.
- STIPO (Marijan) BRADARIĆ r. 1958.
- DAVOR (Pero) MARIĆ r. 1974.
- IVAN (Anto) ŽARIĆ r. 1935.
- ANDRIJA (Ivan) MILIČEVIĆ r. 1948.
- MATE MARKIĆ r. 1967.
- DRAGAN ANDRIĆ r. 1976.
- BORISLAV BARBARIĆ r. 1959.
- MARIO HRKAČ – ČIKOTA r. 1971.
- MARKO MILJKO r. 1951.
- MARINKO MARUŠIĆ r. 1942.
- ZDENKO KOLOBARIĆ r. 1969.
- ANTONIO LASIĆ r. 1968.
- MARKO LJUBIĆ r. 1959.
- MILIJAN ZELJKO r. 1962.
- BRANKO (Josip) TOKIĆ r. 1964.
- DRINKO (Petar) GALIĆ r. 1971.
- ŽELJKO BOGDAN r. 1949.
- PERICA KUTLEŠA r. 1961.
- LJILJANA ZRNO r. 1962.
- MARTIN BAČAK r. 1968.
- IVAN RADOŠ r. 1964.
- IVAN PETROVIĆ r. 1961.
- LUCA BREKALO r. 1942.
- JOSIP BREKALO r. 1939.

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**Uzdol - PROZOR**  
14.09.'93. - DRAGICA ZELENKA b.1934.





**Uzdol - PROZOR**  
14.09.'93. - STJEPAN ZELIĆ b. 1983.







<p><b>BUGOJNO - Od 19.07. do prosinca '93. - 31 victims</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-MARICA (Stipo) MARINA r. 1945.</li> <li>-NIKO (Pero) GRABOVAC r. 1940.</li> <li>-PAVKA (Frano) MAROS r. 1934.</li> <li>-SLAVKO (Mirko) MRŠE r. 1934.</li> <li>-TEREZA-VOJNA (Zvonimir) MRŠE r. 1941.</li> <li>-JELA (Ante) MRŠO r. 1910.</li> <li>-MIRKO GALIĆ</li> <li>-FRANO (Frano) KIRIN r. 1907.</li> <li>-IVICA (Stipe) JEZIDŽIĆ r. 1948.</li> <li>-DARKO (Stanislav) SKOKOVIĆ r. 1966.</li> <li>-LJUBOMIR (Franjo) KOŠAK r. 1929.</li> <li>-ANA (Ivo) DOLE – JOZIĆ r. 1927.</li> <li>-LJUBA (Ikan) DUJMOVIĆ r. 1958.</li> <li>-DARIO (Miroslav) BARIŠIĆ r. 1983.</li> <li>-JOSIP (Jure) KRSTANOVIĆ r. 1928.</li> <li>-JURE (Niko) ŠUTA r. 1932.</li> <li>-VINKO (Ivo) KASALO r. 1973.</li> <li>-MLADEN (Stanislav) HAVRANEK r. 1968.</li> <li>-MIRO (Alojzije) KOLOVRAT r. 1945.</li> <li>-DAVOR (Pero) JEZIDŽIĆ r. 1969.</li> <li>-ŽELJKO (Draško) TABAKOVIĆ r. 1966.</li> <li>-BRANKO (Ante) JURIČIĆ r. 1956.</li> <li>-NIKICA-NINE (Ivica) GRLIĆ</li> <li>-RATKO (Ivan) CRNJAC r. 1942.</li> <li>-DRAGO (Ante) ALVIR r. 1951.</li> <li>-ZDRAVKO (Branko) BODRUŽIĆ r. 1971.</li> <li>-TOMISLAV IVKOVIĆ r. 1970.</li> </ul>	<p><b>-NIKICA (Augustin) LUČIĆ r. 1961.</b>  <b>-ŽELJKO (Marko) MILOŠ r. 1969.</b>  <b>-TADIJA (Luka) PAUREVIĆ r. 1937.</b>  <b>-PERO (Stipo) VISKOVIĆ r. 1940.</b></p>	<p><b>KULA</b>  <b>20.08. i 24.11.'93. - 4 victims</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-IVO (Pero) VISKOVIĆ r. 1906.</li> <li>-PERO (Frano) PALINIĆ r. 1933.</li> <li>-LJUBA (Ivo) PALINIĆ r. 1934.</li> <li>-VINKO (Ivo) PALINIĆ r. 1934.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>GLAVICE</b>  <b>18. i 21.07., '93. - 2 victims</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-VLADO (Ratko) MARIN r. 1963.</li> <li>-KRASNODAR (Ivo) BRKANOVIĆ r. 1972.</li> </ul>	
	<p><b>VUČIPOLJE</b>  <b>Srpanj '93. - 10 victims</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-MARIJAN (Jozo) BEKAVAC r. 1943.</li> <li>-STIPO (Ivo) GVOZDEN r. 1964.</li> <li>-ANA (Marijan) CRNJAK r. 1937.</li> <li>-SLAVKA (Blaško) ŽIVKO r. 1910.</li> <li>-ANĐA (Marijan) NINKOVIĆ r. 1936.</li> <li>-PERO (Stipo) BRKANOVIĆ r. 1928.</li> <li>-STIPO (Anto) KASALO r. 1938.</li> <li>-JOSIP (Vinko) ŽULJ r. 1961.</li> <li>-IGOR (Ivo) KOLOVRAT r. 1975.</li> <li>-IVO (Stojko) KOLOVRAT r. 1949.</li> </ul>	

<http://www.slobodanpralj.com>





151. MKBJ: Secret agreement on the confederation of President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman and the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović (Geneva, 14 September 1993)\*

#### Secret agreement on the confederation

“Starting from the results of the Peace Conference on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its constitution as Union of the Republics, as well as the general regional and international fluctuations and historical interests of the Croatian and Muslim people in the area of the South-East Europe, the Presidents Dr. Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović are in accordance that:

the relations between the Bosniak-Muslim Republic and the Croatian Republic within the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina develop in all areas in order to create a joint state that shall enter the co federal relation with the Republic of Croatia at the same time.

In light of this aim the both Presidents shall enable an urgent and integral implementation of all regulations from the Joint declaration unable to be postponed, signed on 14 September in Geneva.

The both Presidents are in accordance to maintain the ongoing consultations regarding the development of the regional and international opportunities in light of the emphasized readiness to establish the joint state of Croats and Muslims within the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its contemporary entrance into the co federal relation with the Republic of Croatia.

The both Presidents are in accordance to start the adequate political and diplomatic activity in order to question the international circumstances and support this joint initiative.

The both Presidents are in accordance to found a permanent working group in order to create political, legal and other institutional assumptions for the concretization of this initiative.

(Signatures of the President Tuđman, President Izetbegović and their associates)

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\* Source: Večernji list, 30 January 1994

**MKBJ/International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia/  
Joint Serbian-Muslim Declaration of  
Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK  
(Geneva, 16 September 1993)\***

**Joint Serbian-Muslim Declaration**

Adopting the principles of the London Conference and taking into consideration the solutions proposed at the Geneva Peace Conference for the constitutional order of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, determined to put an instant end to hostilities and to create conditions for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and convinced that the crisis must be resolved by political and not military means, we are prepared for an immediate normalisation of relations with the Croatian people in light of the solution proposed at the Peace Conference in Geneva, we have agreed to the following:

**I**

1. Ensure an instant end to all hostilities and military conflicts between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with the agreement of 30 July 1993, immediately if possible and no later than by 1200 hrs on 18 September, and ensure the establishment of direct communications (hotline) between the military commanders at all levels.
2. Ensure the bilateral and unconditional closure of all prisoner-of-war camps and the release of all prisoners in territories under the control of the Army of BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and of the Bosnian Serbs, and immediately, starting from the release of the prisoners in Tarčin camp (207 prisoners) and Kula (207) prisoners. This ought to be done no later than by 1200 hrs on 21 September, on the proviso that both sides take full responsibility for the protection and care of the prisoners.
3. Create conditions on both sides for an unhindered and safe passage of humanitarian convoys and for the activities of humanitarian organisations, and for the safe and unhindered movement of all civilians.
4. Form working groups for the supervision and insurance of human rights in the territories under the control of the Army of BH and the Bosnian Serb army, in accordance with the principles and solutions proposed at the Peace Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5. Form a working group for unresolved issues pertaining to territorial demarcation between the two republics in the imaginary Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the territories of Brčko, Bosnian Krajina, the Neretva valley, eastern Bosnia and Mt Ozren, and taking into consideration the natural right of access to the sea of these two republics. This is added to the already undertaken obligations to seek a permanent solution for administration of the territory of Sarajevo in the next two years. After finding a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial demarcation of the three republics making up the Union, and in the first two years of the existence of the Union, a referendum must be prepared and held. All three sides must agree to the date of its holding



and the question posed to the citizens of each of the republics will be whether they agree to remain in the Union or want to leave it.

In the event of a break-up of the Union, all the rights of the Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including membership in the United Nations, shall automatically be transferred to the republic with a majority Muslim population.

## II

In order to create stable relations and as a joint contribution to peace in the region, the signatories decided to form the following:

1. A working group which will deal with the humanitarian status and material and financial issues related to refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. A working group for drafting agreements, including agreements on the use of energy, harbours, arterial roads, communications and other economic potential.

## III

With a view to a speedy, comprehensive and authentic implementation of all the measures and activities envisaged by this Joint Declaration, the signatories decided to appoint commissioners with full powers and responsibility for the implementation of the agreements envisaged by this Declaration. Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ has appointed Haris SILAJDŽIĆ as his commissioner and Radovan KARADŽIĆ has appointed Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK as his commissioner. The signatories and the commissioners shall request and shall be ensured assistance and cooperation with international political, humanitarian and other organisations and factors, and all with the aim of a comprehensive implementation of all measures envisaged by this Declaration and in the interest of lasting peace and stability in that part of the world.

Finally, an agreement was reached for the co-chairmen of the International Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to invite the three sides in BH to a meeting to be held at the Sarajevo airport at 1100 hours on 21 September, which will review the signing of a peace package as a whole, and which will, among other things, contain this Joint Declaration and the Joint Declaration the Croats and Muslims signed on 14 September. The co-chairmen will meanwhile tour the sides in the former Yugoslavia in an endeavour to reach further agreements.

(The Declaration was signed in Geneva on 16 September 1993 by Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK instead of Radovan KARADŽIĆ. Thorvald STOLTENBERG and David OWEN signed as witnesses. The signatures of Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ and Momir BULATOVIĆ are not on this Document. A facsimile of the signatures was published in *Večernji List*.)

## JOINT DECLARATION

Momir Bulatovic, Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic and Slobodan Milosevic

Accepting the principles of the London Conference and taking into account the solutions proposed by the Geneva Peace Conference on the constitutional arrangement of the future Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Determined to immediately arrive at the cessation of hostilities and to create the conditions for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Convinced that the solution of this crisis has to be found through political, not military, means

Prepared to immediately approach the normalization of relations with the Croatian people in the light of the solutions proposed by the Peace Conference in Geneva

Have hereby agreed to:

### I

1. Provide for the prompt cessation of all hostilities and military conflicts between the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with the Agreement of July 30, 1993, immediately and by no later than September 18, 1993 at 12.00 hours, and establish direct communications (hot lines) between military commanders at all levels.
2. Provide for the bilateral and unconditional disbanding of all detainee camps and for the release of detainees in territories under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army immediately, commencing with the release of those detained in Tarcin (207 detainees) and Kula (207 detainees), and by no later than September 21, 1993, at 12.00 hours, and bilaterally assume the responsibility for their protection and care.
3. Create bilaterally the conditions for free and unhindered passage of all relief convoys and activities of humanitarian organisations, and the free and unhindered movement of all civilians.

4. Form a working group for the supervision and safeguarding of human rights in territories under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with the principles and proposed solutions of the Peace Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Form a working group for outstanding matters related to the territorial delimitation between the two Republics in the envisaged Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the areas of Brcko, Bosanska Krajina, the Neretva Valley, Eastern Bosnia and the Ozren mountain, including the natural right of the two Republics to access to the sea. This is in addition to the commitment already made to find a permanent solution to the governance of the Sarajevo District within two years. After reaching a mutually acceptable resolution to the territorial delimitation of the three republics within the Union, and during the initial two year period of the Union's existence, there shall be a provision for a referendum to be held on a mutually agreed date within the Republics of the Union on the question of whether citizens of any particular republic agree to remain in the Union or to leave the Union.

In the case of a dissolution of the Union, all the rights of the Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including membership of the United Nations, shall be automatically vested in the Republic with a predominantly Muslim majority.

### III

For the sake of a prompt, comprehensive and credible implementation of all the measures and activities envisaged in this Joint Declaration, the signatories have decided to appoint trustees having full authority and responsibility for the complete implementation of the accords envisaged in this Declaration.


Alija Izetbegovic has appointed as his trustee Haris Silajdzic.

Radovan Karadzic has appointed as his trustee Momcilo Krajisnik.

The signatories and the trustees will seek and secure the assistance and cooperation of international political, humanitarian and other organisations and factors for the sake of the comprehensive implementation of all measures envisaged in this Declaration, and in the interest of establishment of permanent peace and stability in this part of the world.


To this end, it is agreed that the three Bosnian parties will be invited by the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to meet on Tuesday 21 September at 11am at Sarajevo Airport to consider signing the peace package as a whole with this Joint Declaration and the Joint Declaration signed on Tuesday 14 September by the Croats and the Muslims annexed to the Peace Package. The Co-Chairmen will, in the intervening days, seek further agreement by shuttling among the parties in the former Yugoslavia.

Momir Bulatovic




Radovan Karadzic

Alija Izetbegovic




Slobodan Milosevic

Witnessed by



Thorvald Stoltenberg



David Owen

Cyberbulevar forum - See subject - Bosnian parliament, 1993 and story of dividing

## BOSNIAN PARLIAMENT, 1993 STORY OF DIVIDING

Two definitions of Bosniaks,

Another important issue is the manner in which they define Bosniaks as a nation at this meeting. In his opening speech Alija Isaković said: "I do not feel the need to explain to myself or to you, our traditional name Bosniak, name of our Bosnian language and name of our country Bosnia and Herzegovina. I just promote it as a natural right to tradition." Professor Muhamed Filipović in his opening speech remained only on the interpretation of the existence of an integrated, original Bosniaks and partial segments of the nation at present. "Who are we, Bosniaks? We, the Bosniaks, we are part of our original Bosnian nation, who continues the properties of national being of this country, realizes within this being the historical meaning and content of this land, and carries its historical and state rights. We are, therefore, the heirs of what Bosnia as a country, as a state, as a historical subject always was," said Filipović, arguing that such identification is made impossible by decision" part of the original Bosniak population to identifies and binds to the ethnic idea, interests and state rights of some other states and nations. " "Their decision, on the contrary, not to limit ourselves, as we are often imposed under the pretext of 'but you cannot be Bosniaks because with this you would appeal and assume Bosnia and its traditions for yourselves', but it authorizes us for this step, ordering us to be Bosniaks, to ensure and preserve what history has created over a long time and long activities of historical powers and that as such has survived from the eighth century until the present. If there was no deep historical logic in this, it would not have happened, if Bosnia was not a millennial creation of the history spirit of the world, it would not have survived despite so many adversaries," said academic Filipović. "Bosnia is not created by any constituent, but Bosnia produced its entire people and all its nations, gave them a shelter in which they live and grow," said the academic.

This integral Bosniaks nation was not the only definition of Bosniaks. In the second definition offered Bosnia is determined not as a country of origin but as a country that is accepted by Slavic Muslims of Southeast Europe as their homeland. The second offered definition, therefore, represents Bosniaks as a sublimite of Muslims in Southeast Europe: "**We, the Muslims - now here for the first time, outside of my custom, I am not saying Bosniaks -here we are in fact Muslims of the whole southeastern European area. Among us there are Paloš and Hiloš and Hadžiegrić and Udžvarlić, among us there are Dalmatians, Croats, and Serbs, we are sublimated in the Bosnian people, now forced into a small space, but for the first time our space. This will be our space,**" said prof. Dr. Mohammed Nezirović. Thus, the definition of Bosniaks is changed depending on how they define the national territory.

*Dani, 23 October 2008:*

*Feljton Dana: Exclusive - Bosnian Parliament, 27 and 28 September 1993 (II)*

### **Bosnia of three nations is no longer possible**

The public for 15 years was unfamiliar what what happened to the two-day closed Bosnian parliament session, when the Bosniak politicians, left alone, without guest and journalists, began to discuss how to actually define Bosniaks, whether to build a Bosniak national state and at what territory. Transcript of discussion at the Bosniaks' parliament session, conducted before the meeting of the RBiH Assembly on acceptance or rejection of Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which envisaged

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /R BH/**

Armed Forces Supreme Command Staff

R BH OS /Armed Forces/

Office of the Commander

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

SUPREME COMMAND STAFF



MILITARY SECRET

/handwritten: 267

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 02/1594 - 214

01 March 1994

No 1/297 - 298

Sarajevo, 17 September 1993

Accepting the principles of the London Conference and determined to cease hostilities and create conditions for peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, convinced that the solution of this crisis must be achieved by political and not military means, and ready to begin the normalisation of relations with the Croatian people, the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, the President of the so called SR Yugoslavia /FRY/, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, the President of Montenegro Momir BULATOVIĆ and the President of the so called Republika Srpska, Radovan KARADŽIĆ signed a JOINT DECLARATION in Geneva on 16 September 1993, With a view to its realisation I hereby

ORDER:

1. R BH Army units shall cease all combat operations against the Serbian paramilitary aggressor formations in keeping with the Agreement of 30 July 1993, immediately and no later than 18 September.

2. R BH Army units can open fire only in case of violation of this Agreement by Serbian paramilitary formations or joint forces of Serbian paramilitary formations and HVO / Croatian Defence Council/ units, i.e. it is necessary to open fire when unit positions and R BH Army members' lives or the territory and features under their control are at risk or if the population on the territory controlled by the R BH Army units is at risk from the Serbian aggressor paramilitary formations or joint forces of

these formations and HVO units.

3. All prisoners from collection centres and R BH Army detention centres should be released with the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross /MKCK/, except for individuals subject to criminal proceedings and those who have been sentenced. The deadline for the realisation of this task is 1200 hours on 21 September of 1993.

4. Movement of humanitarian convoys and humanitarian organisations' activities shall be unimpeded on the territory under the R BH Army control.

5. Corps commanders shall specify the obligations of subordinate commands and units in their orders, with a view to the realisation of this Order.

6. Corps commands shall forward daily reports on the realisation of this Order to the OS /Armed Forces/ ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ OCK /Operations Centre Command/.

7. Unit commanders who violate this Order shall be relieved from duty, and court action and appropriate measures shall be brought against them.

Corps commanders are responsible for the realisation of this Order

The Order shall be implemented - immediately

SM/FH

To:

Standing in for the COMMANDER

DEPUTY

- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps

Stjepan ŠIBER

- Ministry of the Interior

/signed and Stamped/

(for information)

- Ministry of Defence (for information)

- OS ŠVK OCK

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND OF THE 317<sup>TH</sup> MOUNTAIN BRIGADE

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential number: 02/2-337  
Date: 15 September 1993

On the basis of the Order of the NGŠ /Chief of General Staff/ and the Command of the Commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps OP /operative/ 01/1500-27 of 11 September 1993, as well as the intelligence collected from contact with the Ustashas, I hereby i s s u e a

ORDER TO ATTACK

section 1:25000 Sheets Konjic 1, 2

1. The Ustashas took up a line for defence on time on the Jurići village, Glibe village, Brizovača (tt /trig point/ 1274) features, with the probable deployment of firing positions and troops the strength of one reinforced company. The firing positions noticed are in the Jurići village, Mejnik village, Brizovača and Brajke village sectors. The firing positions are probably PAMs /anti-aircraft machine guns/ and PATs /anti-aircraft guns/ and there is a possibility of armour being brought in from the Makljen and Dobroš sectors. The Ustashas have most probably laid groups of mines in all the above-mentioned sectors.
2. Our forces consist of the 2/317 bbr /2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 317<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade/, the Sutjeska Battalion, the Prozor SB /Independent Battalion/ and one battalion from the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/.

Task: After prior reconnaissance and timely infiltration of our forces close behind the line, by encircling actions from the wings and flanks, rout the Ustasha forces, inflict as many casualties on them as possible, capture the Jurići village, Lopatačka Glava (tt 940), Glibe village, Klupa, Stožine (tt 1078), Brizovača (tt 1274) and Golušnica (tt 1301) features, create conditions for the main operations on the Zgon, Slime, Makljen axis and in that way coordinate actions with the forces acting towards Vilića Guvno. Begin fortifying on the lines reached and constructing obstacles in front of the forward line immediately.

3. Neighbours: forces of OG /Operations Group/ West shall operate on the right on the axis towards Vilića Guvno, and the 44<sup>th</sup> bbr shall operate on the Doljani axis.
4. I have decided to draw as close as possible to the targets of the attack under the cover of night, grouping the main forces on the Mejnik, Brizovača, Zgon, Makljen axis, and the auxiliary forces on the Klisac, Jurići, Stožine, Gmić axis, while



securing the flank of the main forces in the Stožine (tt 1078), Tribelj (tt 1032) and Debelo Brdo (tt 1321) sectors

Goal: To rout the Ustasha forces on the axes of attack, inflict as many casualties on them as possible and break out as soon as possible to the Makljen and Gradina sectors, cut off the Prozor – Gornji Vakuf road and dig in on the line reached.

Combat disposition: Forces to create conditions for the attack by the main forces, forces of the 1<sup>st</sup> echelon, support and reserve forces. Readiness for attack at 0600 hours on 16 September 1993. Command post in the Voljevac sector, next command post, Brdo sector.

## 5. TASKS OF THE UNITS

### 5-1 Tasks of groups

5-2 Tasks of the 1<sup>st</sup> echelon: to regroup during the night, secure the left flank, extend operations from the Brizovača, Golušnica line on the Zgon, Slime, Makljen axis.

Reserve 1<sup>st</sup> bč /Mountain Company/ of the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr in the Lokve sector on standby to be introduced on the following axes: a) Cvitkovine, Zgon, Slime, b) Lokve, Brizovača, Klupa, c) Lokve – Brdo (tt 1376), Stubić (tt 1303), and d) Slime -Makljen.

5-3 Support: the mixed 120 mm and 82 mm MB /Mortar/ Battery from the basic V.P. /firing positions/ in the Kolića Vrilo, Begina Krča, Gradina and Tura sectors shall provide fire support according to the plan of artillery fire, the next firing positions in the Lokve sectors /as printed/ MB 120 mm and MB 82 mm in the Repušnice sector to provide support for our forces in the general Makljen area.

6. POB /anti-tank combat/: POB shall focus on the main axis of the attack, while intervention groups shall be kept on other axes passable by tanks.
7. PVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence/: focus PVO protection on the axis of operation of the main forces.
8. Moral Support: in the course of the day, provide detailed information to all the soldiers in the units in order to ensure that the forthcoming combat task is clear to all of them. Most vigorously oppose the spread of rumours and the destruction and weakening of our morale. Forcibly isolate and take legal measures against all individuals who act destructively in units and develop a competitive spirit of patriotism among all the soldiers.  
I most strictly prohibit unauthorised abandonment and withdrawal from combat. Most vigorous measures should be taken to disarm and arrest perpetrators. Maximum care should be devoted to all soldiers and especially to pulling out the wounded and sick. A wounded soldier must not be left in the battlefield without an attempt to pull him out.

## 9. Intelligence Support:

In the course of 15 September 1993, all units shall send IP /reconnaissance patrols/ and IG /reconnaissance groups/ to reconnoitre the axis of attack towards the enemy.

## 10. Security Support:

The focus shall be on providing Bo Os /combat security/ for units and protecting the wings and flanks of own units, and ensuring full protection of the existing KM /command posts/ and CV /communications centres/.

I most strictly prohibit looting, slaughtering and killing of innocent civilians, while prisoners of war shall be treated according to the regulations on prisoners of war.

## 11. Engineering support:

Focus on supporting movements and manoeuvres. Each unit shall make passages through obstacles for itself.

## 12. PNHB /Anti-Nuclear, Chemical and Biological/ Support:

Focus on the possible use of h/o /chemical weapons/. Develop ABHO /nuclear, biological and chemical defence/ at the battalion KM.

## 13. Logistics Support:

Logistics support for the battalion shall be established as follows:

Sn St /Medical Station/ in the \_\_\_\_\_ sectors

St Tob /Technical Support Station/ in the \_\_\_\_\_ sector.

In St /Quartermaster Station/ in the \_\_\_\_\_ sector.

Supply and evacuation routes \_\_\_\_\_.

- ammunition and infantry weapons 1 b/k /combat set/

- po /?anti-armour/ equipment

During the attack, use dry rations. The priority in supply shall be on replenishment of ammunition.

14. To secure the left flank up to the line of the immediate task, the Prozor SB KM in Voljevac village, the next sector of the KM in the Brdo sector. Readiness of communications IMMEDIATE. Regular reports shall be sent every two hours and special reports according to need.

Sent to: requiring signature

- Prozor SB Commander

- Sutjeska Battalion Commander

- 2/bbt /?Mountain Battalion/ Commander

- 45<sup>th</sup> bbr Commander

- NGŠ

- 1 x files

- 317<sup>th</sup> bbr Personnel Service

Axis commander

C O M M A N D E R

317<sup>th</sup> bbr

/a signature/

Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ

No. 5

- TASKS OF GROUPS -

2/317<sup>th</sup> bbr /2<sup>nd</sup> Company of the 317<sup>th</sup> bbr/

- The first group, Sevko OŽEGOVIĆ, consisting of 25 soldiers from the 2/2<sup>nd</sup> bb /2<sup>nd</sup> Company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Battalion/ and 15 soldiers from the Prozor SB. Task: to destroy VT /firing positions/ in Jurići village and, in coordinated action with parts of the company from Here village, capture the general area of Jurići village.  
Position a POG /anti-tank group/ in Poda village in order to obstruct and destroy armour and p/n /infantry weapons/ from that axis.
- The second group from the 45<sup>th</sup> bbr 30 soldiers strong, with five soldiers from the 2/2<sup>nd</sup> bb. Task: to cut off the Jurići village – Glibe village road, cover the area in the Lopatična Glava (tt 940) sector and secure fire support in the Jurići village and Glibe village sectors.
- The third group, Muhamed MUSLIĆ, consisting of 20 soldiers from the Sutjeska Battalion. Task: to rout the Ustashas in Glibe village and secure the left flank of our forces entering the Klupa and Stožina sectors.
- The fourth group, Ekrem KORMAN, consisting of 50 soldiers, 20 from the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim Brigade and 30 from the 2/317<sup>th</sup> bbr, including ten for pulling out the wounded.  
Task: to capture the Klupa and Stožine (tt 1078) sectors and create conditions for the introduction of the main forces on the Makljen feature.
- The fifth group, Nedžad KIČIN, consisting of 20 soldiers from the 2/317<sup>th</sup> bbr, has the task of coordinating action with the fourth group and capturing the Brizovača (tt 1274) - Golušnica (tt 1301) line and creating conditions for further operations towards the Makljen feature.
- The sixth group, consisting of 14.5 mm PAM /anti-aircraft machine gun/ crews in the Tur (tt 1072) sector. Task: to neutralise the Ustasha PAM in Brajke village and provide support for the operations of other groups, and especially the group in the Brizovača sector.

Keep a strong reserve for intervention purposes on the level of all groups.

Command of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps  
Strictly confidential no. 958-06  
On 15<sup>th</sup> of September 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten 307 06-746-2/

COMBAT ORDER OP. 2-9/93

1. The enemy-the Ustasha forces of HVO carried out heavy artillery fire on positions of our forces in order to disable the active defence, by causing losses in men and MTS. Destructions are huge and the number of killed civilians is still not familiar. We can expect that the enemy would use all weapon at disposal ever more in further activities; VBR, tanks and especially the mortar fire on all positions of 4<sup>th</sup> corps units of the BH Army. After they fire from artillery, they will try the breakthrough at all directions that enable them to divide and encircle our forces in parts.
2. Our forces, command and 4<sup>th</sup> corps units of BH Army have taken the protection measures and reduced the number of wounded and killed persons to a minimum. The measures of combat readiness are at the highest level in all units. The forces of OG SOUTH – 1 and 1/42 bbr have caused significant losses in manpower and MTS to the inserted groups in deep enemy background. The forces of OG NORTH, along with forces of 6<sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army started with activities at direction Vrđi – Goranci, directed towards Đubrani – Planinica and Mostar ravine.
3. TASK OG NORTH – 1 a) hold the existing lines towards the Chetnicks with forces of 47<sup>th</sup> bbr and Self-Standing battalion Nevesinje only to observe and, if necessary, to stop the Chetnicks. The lines towards the Ustashes are to be active at following directions: - after arrival of OG NORTH – 2 forces in grip of river Neretva: - perform the combat activity from direction of HE Solakovac – Vojno – Raštani. Perform the activity towards Đubrani with one group, and with the other, towards Planinica (group force, up to one platoon), cooperation from the left wing is performed by the 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade – The Glorius. After arrival to Raštani, direct the main forces to control the object Orlac. In the closer task/as written/, control the line : Đubrani – Raštani and in the next one the object Orlac.  
B) OG CENTRE: Hold the line towards the Chetnicks with forces of 41<sup>st</sup> motorized brigade – The Glorious, by observing the situation; be on stand by to be able to refute the possible attack by one part of forces. The lines towards the Ustashes are to be active according the following: perform the combat activities in cooperation with the 47<sup>th</sup> bbr at direction: HE Mostar-Raštani-Orlac water-gate. At the left wing in cooperation with OG SOUTH – 1 forces (force of one

company) and OG SOUTH – 2 (force of one reinforced platoon) perform the activities at direction: Stotina – Hum. At the right wing in the closer task, control the line Raštani and in the next task, the line Orlac. At the left wing in the closer task control the line Stotina and in the next one the object Hum.

At the central part of line towards the Ustashas, perform the activity in the following: plan the attack at direction Podhum and attack at direction Šantičeva, with usage of AG-1 and AF-1. The battalion of the military police uses the AG-1 and AF-1 that carries out the task at direction of city line towards the Ustashas. C) OG SOUTH-1 – hold the line towards the Chetnicks only by observing and stopping the possible attack. The line towards the Ustashas is to be active at direction: Kosor-Buna-Lakševine with task to control the Ortiješka Kosa and break out to the left bank of Neretva River. Perform the activity in cooperation with OG SOUTH -2 from the right wing. In the closer task control with Lakševine and in the next one secure the left wing and disable the breakthrough of Ustasha forces. Keep the forces on the left wing in the zone of responsibility active only to stop the breakthrough of the Ustasha forces. Subordinate one reinforced company OG CENTRE for activity at direction: Stotina – Hum. After breaking out to the Neretva bank, demolish the bridge in Žitomislići that makes the road to Čitluk. D) OG SOUTH -2: hold the line towards the Chetnicks by observing and be ready to refuse the possible attacks by the Chetnicks. Separate one reinforced platoon and subordinate it to the OG CENTRE for activity at direction Stotina – Hum.

TASK: perform activities at direction Ortiješ-river Neretva and in the closer task control Ortiješ, whereas in the next one, break out to the left bank of Neretva river.

4. The activities of 4<sup>th</sup> corps units are supported by the artillery group from the area of Rošac Mountain and artillery unit at disposal, by the activity according to artillery fire plan and request of the subordinated units to newly spotted targets.
5. SECURITY of the b/d – a) Before the beginning of combat activities at level of basic tactical units and sabotage groups, hold short meetings and introduce the soldiers to the situation and significance of the forthcoming activities. Introduce the soldiers to successes of our units in the area of s. Vrđi and Makljen passage. B) From the level of operative groups till the lowest level of units exchange the intelligence information and the rest of the time till the beginning of combat activities use for completion of data on disposition of Ustashas by observing and reconnaissance by force. C) Details on the preparations and time to begin with the activities, as well as the tasks to units are to be hold in absolute secrecy. Especially pay attention, within units, to hesitant and hectic soldiers in order to prevent fear and panic. Collect all combat documents and plans, captured from the enemy by the soldiers and hand them over to the Safety body of the corps. D) Before the units begin with the attack, prepare substantial engineering tool for fortification among companies. During the attack, use the natural shelters up to the maximum in order to be able to move, open fire and protect men. After the general task is carried out and after you break out to the ordered lines, set the engineering equipment on reached positions as soon as possible, manage the fire system and defend the taken line in absence. In case of organized counterattacks of the aggressor, request the artillery fire from the principal senior. E) Before you

start the attack within basic tactical units, examine and prepare all protection resources at disposal. Usage of chemical weapon of short term effect is expected during fight, therefore, keep the protection instruments ready and order the usage of those instruments by the slightest suspicion of chemical warfare usage. If possible, provide the sabotage groups with these devices. Organize the decontamination systems for the operative groups in cooperation with ABHO corps body, if necessary. F) Be maximally precise in determination of background safety system within the operative groups. Organize liquid meals within units till the beginning of combat activities and before performance of attack, divide SDO to the soldiers for.....days. to carry out the task, I approve the following amount of ammunition and fuel:

For the artillery weapon .....

For the weapon, determined to shoot.....

For vehicles..... reservoir load

Pay special attention to organization and functioning of ambulance service before and during the b/d.

Pursuant to regulations, organize and dispose the temporary ambulance behind the front line, and direct one paramedic- cursor manager within each sabotage group, with ambulance set. Organize ambulance accommodation and evacuation of wounded soldiers; the Chief of ambulance service of the corps and command OG are personally responsible to me regarding this matter.

6. Collect the war prey, captured by the units, register it at logistics and store it as such in magazines or use for combat purposes if necessary. Use the fire weapon against those who treat the war prey illegally.
7. Attack readiness in...../handwritten: perform activities only by the signal "WEST"/
8. My command post – the basic one shall be in the area of.... And the KM-forthcoming in the area of.....

In the corps, I shall command according to the communication plan.

Made in 6 examples and delivered to:

-OG CENTRE

OG SOUTH-1

OG SOUTH-2

OG NORTH-1

OG NORTH-2

Files

Commander

Arif Pašalić

/signed and stamped/

/hand-written:  
15.09.1993./

I HEREBY APPROVE  
COMMANDER Arif PAŠALIĆ

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 5

/stamp reads:  
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
4 Corps; Mostar/

ORDER FOR ATTACK

Operative number: 02-174-15

Section: 1 : 25000

1. On the line of attack covered by Operative Group CENTAR /Centre/ there are: HVO 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade; parts of HVO 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade which has been reinforced by a battalion from Osijek of the "Bruno Bušić" Regiment; "Tigrovi" /Tigers/ Company; and several ATGs /Anti-Terrorist Groups/, each consisting of 20-40 soldiers. They are most probably deployed in the following way:
  - In the Sector of Raštani-Electric Power Plant Mostar: reinforced Company equipped with 60 mm and 82 mm mortars, two anti-aircraft machine-guns 12,7mm, T-55 tank and recoilless gun;
  - In Šantićeva Street Sector: 2nd Battalion of HVO 2nd Brigade, reinforced with an anti-terrorist group, with 82mm and 120mm mortars and occasional engagement of a tank from the sector of Mita and armoured tank from the sector of the Home for Retired;
  - In Sector of HIT /department store/- health Care Center-Šemovac: 4th Battalion, reinforced with HR HB MUP /Ministry of Interior of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/, two anti-terrorist groups, a Battalion on stand-by; 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars; and powerful POG /anti-tank shell/;
  - In Sector Hum: gun, each consisting of four soldiers, and three bunkers with three soldiers each. The artillery pieces were positioned at trig points 412, 379, 436, 393, Pivorac.
  - In Sector Stotina-Rodoč-Heliodrom: 9<sup>th</sup> Battalion and parts of HVO 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade.

The most probable objective of the enemy is to prevent a breakthrough of our forces by persistent defence, establishing conditions for offensive activity.

Hastily performing engineering work to fortify the defence sector and for that purpose they are using civilians and prisoners of war. In their activities so far, the enemy used prisoners of war as a human shield and they are expected to do the same in their forthcoming combat activities.

Should HVO engage human shields, attempt must be made to eliminate guards and if guards cannot be incapacitated – the assignment still must be accomplished at any cost.

In their activities so far, the enemy forces have suffered great losses, which - in view of the general situation has affected the morale, (both militarily and politically).

The enemy forces have at their disposal chemical combat equipment, which they have been using so far, therefore it is to be expected that they will use it again.

In their activities so far, the enemy forces have been using pieces of artillery of all calibres, engaging them selectively against the entire town area.

2. The task of Operative Group CENTAR is to launch an attack on the downtown area and to take over the following lines:
  - Electric Power Plant Mostar – Raštani – Orlac
  - Šemovac – Podhum – 1<sup>st</sup> Elementary School
  - HUM facility
  - Donja Mahala – Stotin – Rodoč.

The following units have been attached to the Operative Group CENTAR to assist them in completing the assignment:

- from the formation of Operative Group SOUTH - 1      120 fighters
- from the formation of Operative Group SOUTH - 2      40 fighters
- from the formation of Operative Group NORTH – 1      40 fighters
- from the formation of MUP BiH                              80 fighters

Upon the takeover of the above-mentioned directions, start engineering work on Positions and get ready for ready for repelling the counter-attack-  
Readiness for attack is scheduled for 2400 hours on 19.09.1993.

3. On our right side: combat activities are to be carried out by Operative Group NORTH – 1 , which is tasked to take over the Đubrani-Krčevine-Platido /as written/sector;  
To our left side: combat activities are to be carried out by Operative Group SOUTH – 2, which is tasked to take over the sector Aviation Bridge- Mostar
4. Having assessed the situation and the submitted proposals, I decided to launch an energetic attack by concentrating the main forces along the lines:
  - Hum facility left of Stotin – Rodoč - Podhum to the right;
  - Electric Power Plant Mostar – Raštani - Orlac; and auxiliary forces on the axes:
  - Šantićeva Street – Home for Retired
  - BNR /expansion unknown/ - High School Health Care Centre.

The enemy forces are to be crushed along the lines of advance of our forces, inflicting losses in manpower and technical equipment and materiel, and at the same time creating conditions for launching final operations, the purpose of which is definite liberation of the town.

5. 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the Glorious /Slavna/ 41<sup>st</sup> Motorized Brigade, together with the reinforced Platoon from the 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade, attacks along the direction Mostar – Raštani – Orlac. Immediate assignment is to take over the Electric Power Plant Mostar and Raštani and get to the Savića Kuća Sector. Upon arrival at the above-mentioned Sector, conditions are to be created for introduction of



reserve forces and from there to extend the attack and take over the Orlac facility. Preparations are to be made there for repulsion of counter-attack from the direction of Rudnik .Mine/. person in charge: 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion Commander.

6. 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the Glorious /Slavna/ 41<sup>st</sup> Motorized Brigade, with the following units attached:

- Bomber Regiment Platoon	30 fighters
- 42 <sup>nd</sup> Mountain Brigade Company	120 fighters
- reinforced 48 <sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade Platoon	40 fighters
- R BiH MUP	80 fighters
- Slavna /Glorious/ 41 <sup>st</sup> Motorized Brigade special unit	45 fighters

Attack along the lines of advance:

a) Donja Mahala – Hum, the assignment is as follows: immediate assignment is to take over points of resistance at trig points 412, 379 and 436 and then, by introducing reserve forces, to take lines on the west and south-west side of Hum and get ready to prevent a counter-attack from the direction of Čitluk-Miljkovići and Mostar-Đikovina.

Upon completion of the assignment, the central town area and the sector around Heliodrom should be kept under control.

The person in charge is Deputy Commander of 42<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Brigade.

b) Donja Mahala – Sotin – Rodoč, the assignment is as follows: immediate assignment is to crush the enemy forces in the Sector of Stotin (trig point 81) and, in a co-ordinated action with 1st Battalion of Glorious 41st Motorized Brigade, take over the sector of Gatačka Kuća – „Soko“ Hotel – Višnjice: conditions should then be established to introduce reserve forces and extend the attack towards the sector Štamparija /Printery/ - Eementary School – settlement above the school and then fortify there and be ready to repel a counter-attack from the direction of Heliodrom.

Person in charge: Commander of 2nd Battalion

c) Šemovac – Podhum. Immediate assignment is to take over the sector that covers M. Bjelavca Street, M. Gupca Street and the Monastery. Create conditions for Introduction of reserve forces and then extend the attack and take over the sector between the 1<sup>st</sup> Elementary School and the multi-storey building. Get ready to repel counter-attack from the direction of Rondo, Balinovac and Panjevina.

Person in charge: 6<sup>th</sup> Company Commander.

d) Upon receiving of a signal for attack, start demonstrative attack at the sector of Šantićeva street and sector BNR /expansion unknown/, with an objective to rout enemy forces and strike them with disorientation and panic. Following assessment of 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Deputy commander, break into the defence facilities of the enemy.

7. In co-ordination with 2nd Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion launches attack along the axis South Camp – Rodoč. Upon forcing the river, the immediate assignment is to take over the sector of Gatačka Kuća, and then the sector of the Printery building and link with 2 Battalion.

Get ready to repel a counter-attack from the direction of EAL /Aluminium Factory/.

Person in charge: Commander of 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion.

8. Artillery support for the attack will be provided by BVG /Battalion Fire Group/ along all lines of their battalions, while Motorized Tank Division of Glorious 41st Motorized Brigade will provide fire support in accordance with the plan worked out by Operative Group CENTAR Command.

9. Auxiliary Company of Glorious 41<sup>st</sup> Motorized Brigade will provide support as follows:

- in the direction of Raštani: Sagger anti-tank missile *Imaljutka* and one recoilless gun, as per decision of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion Commander;
- in the direction of Šantićeva /Street/: nine rocket-propelled grenades, as per decision of 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Deputy Commander;
- in the direction of Donja Mahala – Rodoč: one recoilless gun and one Sagger anti-tank missile, as per decision of 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Commander;
- one Sagger anti-tank missile, one red arrow, one 128mm LLR /expansion unknown/, as per decision of Operative Group CENTAR Command.

10. Anti-aircraft machine-gun – Glorious 41<sup>st</sup> Motorized Brigade Platoon provides support as per the following:

- one 14,5mm anti-aircraft machine-gun and one 12,7mm anti-aircraft machine-gun, as per decision of 3<sup>rd</sup> Commander;
- two 14,5 anti-aircraft machine-guns together with V.P. /Military Police/ provide support at the central town area, as per decision of Operative Group CENTAR Command;
- two 12,7mm anti-aircraft machine-guns provide support for 1st and 2nd Battalion, as per decision of 1st Battalion Commander.

11. Morale-related security should focus on preparation of units for completion of the assignment and explanation of objectives of the enemy propaganda-

12. All units should ensure observers on a permanent basis, and make sure that they report on every change regarding deployment of enemy forces.

13. Provide full control of deployment sector and movement directions of units. All Occurrences regarding enemy activities are to be reported immediately, while Suspicious individuals should be isolated.

Special attention is to be paid to ensuring protection against activities of sabotage-terrorist groups.

14. Engineering works must focus on setting barriers along the taken lines, including reinforcement of natural and installation of artificial barriers.

Fortification is to be built at the taken lines, in order to establish more favourable conditions for completion of future assignments.

15. Anti-nuclear chemical and biological support is to be focused on the use of protective means available for all soldiers.

16. Ensure ready-to-eat meal for all units for two days.

For completion of assignment I approve issuance of the following:

- ammunition for infantry weapons - 1,5 combat set
- support artillery – 1 combat set
- anti-tank group - 1 combat set

As regards supplying, replenishment of ammunition is a priority. Facilities should be secured for admittance and treatment of the lightly wounded, whereas heavily wounded are to be transported to the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps war hospital.

17. My Command Post will be in the Public Auditing Service building, the Forward Command Post will be in the sector of "Ruža".

Readiness of communication is scheduled for \_\_\_\_\_.

Readiness for attack is scheduled for \_\_\_\_\_.

As concerns Operative Group CENTAR, it shall operate in accordance with the communications plan.

C/c:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion
- 4<sup>th</sup> Corps Command
- Operations and Training Organ of 41<sup>st</sup> Motorized Brigade

COMMANDER  
Samir DRLJEVIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
MILITARY SECRET  
OPERATIVE GROUP SOUTH -1

TOP SECRET

Ref. Num: 01-25/93

Date: September 17, 1993  
Mostar

Stamp: Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
4<sup>th</sup> Corps, Operative Group SOUTH – 1,

### COMBAT ORDER OP. 1-2/93

1. Ustasha forces and parts of Croatian Army (HV) conducted fierce artillery attacks against positions of our forces and civilian objects in the zone of responsibility of the Operative Group for the purpose of inflicting as greater losses to our manpower as possible and to destroy as much of technical-material resources as possible.  
Devastation of civilian objects was huge; fortunately the number of killed and wounded people was minimal.  
In the days to come it is to be expected for the enemy to intensify barrage activities through utilization of all available artillery weaponry and rocket systems, probably accompanied with infantry advancement in certain directions, and all that for the purpose of cutting of, besieging and destroying our forces. They have ...<sup>1</sup> combat resources and they will probably use it against all defense regions.
2. Forces of Operative Group SOUTH – 1 strongly hold the achieved lines in the current deployment regions.  
Task: Use part of the forces to reinforce the forces of Operative Group CENTER for the purpose of launching offensive activities in the town of Mostar, use the part of the forces to strongly preserve the achieved lines towards ustashas and chetniks.  
Conducting of combat activities is supported by VG<sup>2</sup> from the region of Blagaj.  
Combat readiness at 05:00 AM on September 20, 1993.
3. On the right side, in winery-Castija coffee shop direction, attack is to be carried out by the parts of Operative Group SOUTH -2, and other parts of the forces will be used to capture lines towards chetniks and ustashas.
4. I have decided to launch operational activities at the sides and into the depth of ustasha's forces, cave in the roads to Buna, use one reinforced company to actively support offensive activities of Operative Group CENTER, and use remaining forces to conduct active combat activities in cooperation with the forces of Operative Group SOUTH -2 .  
Combat deployment in reserve line of I VG<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Text partially visible

<sup>2</sup> Original abbreviation

5. The 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Mountain brigade shall detach units equaling the size of an reinforced company, for the purpose of conducting operational activities within Operative Group CENTER. Reinforce the lines towards chetniks and be ready for joint action with forces of Operative Group SOUTH – 2 in order to conquer .....<sup>4</sup> spur and Laksevine and reach the left bank of Neretva river. Sabotage team shall cave in the roads in Rotimlje- Buna and Capljina-Buna directions, and one Sabotage team shall conduct activities in the region of Aladinici.
6. Reconnaissance-sabotage platoon shall, upon being signaled, launch sabotage attack from the current location towards ustasha forces in the region of Grab and Dolovi.
7. Mortar battalion will from its current fire position support operational activities in the above said directions and will be ready to repel infantry attacks of ustasha forces along Buna-Blagaj direction.
8. Anti-Aircraft machine gun squad will intervene from their current positions upon request made by battalion commander.
- 9.a. Prior to launching operational activities, brief meetings are to be held at the level of basic units where soldiers will be informed with the situation and the importance of upcoming activities for the destiny of Muslim people.
- 9.b. All so far collected intelligence is to be processed and forwarded in written form to unit commanders, and continue to actively recon every move and activity of ustashas in the depth of the territory and at p/k<sup>5</sup>.
- 9.c. All details on the course of preparations and operation timing, as well as tasks assigned to the units should be kept secret. All combat documents and plans that soldiers capture from ustashas during combat activities should be collected in organized manner and handed over to the security authorities of the Operative Group SOUTH -1.
- 9.d. In the course of the activities, natural covers are to be used for protection, while the defense line units will use the existing covers.
- 9.e. All units in the field are to be provided with 2 ....<sup>6</sup> for active combat activities, while the units in current regions will be provided with liquid meals.  
Soldiers who going for the tasks will get 1 b/k<sup>7</sup>, and manpower in active defense 0,5 b/k<sup>8</sup>. Medical support will be carried out by Snv<sup>9</sup>, and units will assign carriers for wounded and dead.

10. Within the Operative Group SOUTH -1, I will command through existing communications system. My command post is in D. Vranjevici and advanced command post in the region of Materj.

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<sup>3</sup> Original abbreviation

<sup>4</sup> Name of the spur not clearly readable in the original document

<sup>5</sup> Original abbreviation.

<sup>6</sup> Original abbreviation kept

<sup>7</sup> Original abbreviation kept

<sup>8</sup> Original abbreviation kept

<sup>9</sup> Original abbreviation kept

DELIVERED TO:

- battalion commanders, 3x
- commander of Anti-Aircraft machine gun squad
- commander of mortar battalion
- deputy commander for rear
- deputy commander for security

COMMANDER  
Esad Sejtanic

Stamp: Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
The 4<sup>th</sup> Corps, Operative Group SOUTH -1, Mostar

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The established defence lines towards the Serbian forces weren't active in combat sense; however, there was a black market of all kinds of goods blossoming, especially in lack of food (flour, salt, sugar, oil, rice and others).

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For this purpose, the commander of the 4. Corps stayed in Sarajevo at the end of August, where assistance in material and men was arranged for the implementation of the forthcoming combat operations, and CCCH (Chief of Command of Central Headquarters) Safer Halilović was sent to the field in order to coordinate all combat activities of forces planned for the operations.

According to combatants' findings that Sefer Halilović, along with forces from Bosnia was present in Jablanica, a spontaneous singing could be heard:

*Sefer Pasa is walking through Bosnia, cleansing Bosnia from Ustashas.*

Many things in the Command of the 4. Corps did not function very well, so at the proposal of us commanders, Miralem Jugo, commander of the 47. Mountain Brigade was supposed to take up the post of deputy commander in order to improve the operations and coordination of all units. Unfortunately, Miralem Jugo never took over this post, because he died in a car accident under very "suspicious circumstances" on highway M-17, arriving at the command post of fourth Corps. A number of incidents occurred in this period that could have resulted in the deaths of key officers of Army units, and had elements of deliberate assassination of commanders (Avdo Idriz, Esad Šejtanić, Ibrahim Demirovic - Hećim), or have caused the death of a number of officers such as death of Ahmed Špage-Doktor, safety commander at 48. Mountain Brigade and Husa Imamović, newly appointed commander of the 50. artillery brigade.

Within planned combat activities preparations, a possibility that the Serbian side helps in direct artillery support and delivery of critical MS, started to be openly discussed, as well as, primarily, selling of significant number of artillery projectiles of various calibre.

I was present at one of the meetings, at the tangent line with the Serbian forces in the village of Busak, where Safet Oručević, Fatima Leho and Šefkija Džihović defined conditions under which the Serbian side would help in our combat activities.

As expression of care / page 182/ for the existing cooperation, to the Commander of Brigade Nevesinje, Novica Gušić, Safet Oručević gave almost a brand new Golf JX as a present.

All of us expected a lot from this reached agreement and this might have stimulated us to plan the next combat activities more audaciously that, to be honest, could not provoke a great result considering our strength and conditions on the field. Nevertheless, my unit, in cooperation with the 48<sup>th</sup> Mountain brigade, has been given a task to attack the key object in HVO-hill Hum defence, the hill that was dominating the city of Mostar. Deaths of Miralem Jugo, Hus Imamović and Ahmed Špage have somewhat slowed down our preparations as well as events immediately before and after the funeral, but the complex military-political situation forced us to urgently do something, because HVO will exhaust us so much in this way, that we would probably not be able to withstand their serious attack.

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Once again, we analyzed the given information during 19<sup>th</sup> of September, summarized how the preparations were realized and informed each other on course of combat activities, performed by the BH Army units at direction Drežnica-Vrdi-Goranci. It was very important that units in Mostar valley begin with their activities as soon as possible in order to facilitate further attacks of units from the North and to bring more confusion within the HVO and HV lines.

In the night, we managed to bring units to the city of Mostar with any difficulties whatsoever; Mostar was the point they should move from in the early morning towards the attack objects. The unit that was supposed to attack the Hum hill was commanded by my deputy, Tahir Turajlić.

The combat activities started in the early morning on 20<sup>th</sup> of September and were carried out according to the planned dynamics, especially on wings, where we expected to succeed and then use it for extension of significant activities to the city core itself.

Combat activities were especially well implemented in Višnjica, Hum, Raštani, Jedreni, and objects around Vrdi. Around 6.15 pm, Tahir informed me that he gained control over the right and left tower on the hill of Hum and that only the entrance tower from direction of Brkan hill is left and that it too will quickly fall.

The units in the city core were initially successful at direction towards the settlement of Balinovac, along with substantial Serbian artillery support, the success was rather expected.

Based on listening to the conversation over the radio network, the panic was visible in HVO and HV ranks and they were further shocked to learn that the Serbian side is directly assisting us in the operations. And when it was expected to move more decisively to combat operations and make final blow, the order from the commander of the 4. Corps came that the same are seized and we are to return to the starting position. Until then, the minimum losses in the units have increased tremendously during the redraw, so in my unit I had 4 dead (Tahir and Edin Turajlić, Selvedin Đono and Adis Šabanović) and 2 seriously wounded soldiers (Zulfo Rahić and Kemal Hasić). We did not understand why commander stop successful combat operations, but we found out during the night briefing that the request came directly from President Izetbegović, who during that day led the peace talks on British warship somewhere on the Adriatic Sea. The Croatian side conditioned the continuation of negotiations with the cessation of all combat operations of the 4. Corps and other Bosnian units against Mostar and its surroundings.

We attacked commander Pašalić for the disruption of combat operations and virtually accused him of being in cahoots with the official Sarajevo policy of digging the grave for Herzegovina, and that our trust in him as commander was still questionable. The commander "justified" his actions with the fact that he as a soldier had to carry out the order of the Supreme Commander, whatever the consequences may be. A consequence of combat operations to the units of 4. Corps were truly devastating. During the retreat to the starting positions, we had more than 30 people killed, about 100 wounded more or less seriously, and the high moral tumbled to the lowest level.

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Šejtanić, Esad  
Herzegovinians at the igneous gate of Bosnia,  
Mostar 2005

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA /HZ HB/  
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/

HR /CROATIAN REPUBLIC/ OF HB

HVO GS /MAIN STAFF/

DEFENCE

Reference number: 02-2/1-01-2570/93

MILITARY SECRET

Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

20 September 1993

In view of the new situation - the infiltration of the Mostar, Buna, Žitomislić and Čapljina territory by MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ terrorist groups, and with regard to the Order from the Head of the Defence Department, number: 02-1-1296/93, dated 20 September 1993, I hereby

**ORDER**

1. Immediately mobilise all men and material means and all available military police and police forces, hunting associations and other available forces in this area in order to destroy, in an uncompromising manner, the MOS terrorist groups that have infiltrated the area.



2. Assemble these forces urgently and immediately place them under the command of the 1st Sector of the OZ JIH /Operative Zone of Southeastern Herzegovina/ which is under the command of Colonel OBRADOVIĆ.

3. Carry this Order out IMMEDIATELY.

4. The Chief of the VP /Military Police/ Department, the commanders of the Čapljina, Čitluk and Ljubuški police stations and the presidents of the hunting associations in the above-mentioned municipalities shall be responsible for carrying out this Order

5. The commander of the 1st Sector, Colonel OBRADOVIĆ, shall send me regular reports on the implementation of this Order.

Forward to:

- Colonel OBRADOVIĆ's 1st Sector
- Chief of the VP Department
- Ljubuški, Čitluk, Čapljina police stations
- presidents of the Ljubuški, Čitluk and Čapljina hunting associations

HVO GS COMMANDER

/signed/

Major General

Slobodan PRALJAK

/stamp:/ Republic of BH, HZ HB, 2, Mostar

Main Staff, Defence Department/

In ABiH terrorist action  
in the background  
the following persons  
were killed and massacred:  
Marinko Vidić  
Pero Puljić  
Rudo Pavlović  
Viktor Križanović  
Vlado Vidić



Taken from photo elaborate  
of investigation on killed  
and massacred soldiers of  
HVO



Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Army of R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/  
6<sup>th</sup> Corps Command

Republic Defence /Department/  
Military secret  
Strictly confidential

Number: 01/2628-2  
Date, 20.09.1993.

Very urgent!

Taking necessary measures in Vrđi,  
I order:

to: 45<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain brigade/ Commander,  
Buturović Polje

The situation in Vrđi is getting complicated due to your failure to carry out the agreement, reached with the Head of the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/, on sending a 150-men-strong unit to secure the frontline. Because of that and in accordance with the Order issued by the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ of the ŠVK, Strictly confidential No. 01/255 on 20.09.1993 at 1508 hrs

I ORDER:

1. Until 2000 hrs today you have to secure a unit of 150 people to report to Zulfikar ALIŠPAGA, the ŠVK Special Task Squad Commander in the Donja Jablanica sector. Otherwise, you will be responsible for any further consequences.
2. Immediately inform me regarding the execution of the task.

Commander  
Salko GUŠIĆ

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA  
STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND /ŠVK/ OF  
THE OS R BiH /the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/  
S A R A J E V O

REPUBLIC DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential, no.  
Sarajevo, 20 September 1993

With the approval of 29 August 1993, from the Commander of the ŠVK and his strictly confidential order no. 02/1647-1, dated 30 August 1993 an expert team - commission was established in order to co-ordinate combat operations and to carry out all other tasks in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps. The team is composed of the following members:

1. Sefer HALILOVIĆ OS NGŠ /Chief of Staff/, team leader, General Staff member
2. Zičro SULJEVIĆ
3. Rifat BILAJAC
4. Vehbija KARIĆ
5. Džemal NAJETOVIĆ
6. Namik DŽANKOVIĆ

The team went to the field on 29 August 1993 and was on mission until 19 September 1993.

The contacts with the Commands of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps were established. The emphasis was put on the work within the Command of the 6th Corps and its units and on the contact points between the 6th Corps and the 3rd, 4th and 1st Corps. With the aim of co-ordinating and executing combat operations, an IKM /forward command post/ was set up in Jablanica, where the team planned the operation, which covered the wide front between G. Vakuf and Mostar, in the valleys of the Neretva and Vrbas Rivers, and ensured logistic means for the operation.

The guidelines for our work were outlined in the order from the commander of the ŠVK OS.

1. - To estimate the combat readiness of the commands and units in the field and to lead combat operations. The command of the 6th Corps is not completely in control of the situation in its zone of responsibility and especially in the Konjic area. The previously set tasks, i.e. liberating the road between the villages of Dusina and Fojnica, liberating Kreševo and the road between Konjic and Čelebići were not carried out. The fact that the above stated tasks were not carried out made it additionally complicated and more difficult to implement the planned operation in the Neretva and Vrbas Valley.

The main problems which the Command of the 6th Corps has to face are:

- personnel issues as shown by the lack of the required personnel
- insufficient professional military training of the existing personnel, non-functional structure and organisational chart of the Corps Command. We found numerous problems in the zone of responsibility of the 6th Corps. They are such that the present staff of the command is not able to handle them.

The relations of the commands of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Corps towards the command of the 6th Corps as the youngest command are, to put it mildly, not good and not in line with the unity of our struggle.

Most of the organs of the civilian authorities handle many of the issues with indifference and especially the logistics, recruitment of resources and procurement of supplies.

As for the security aspect, a lot of compromised staff who faithfully served the interests of Herceg Bosna can still be found in the organs of administration. They are now obstructing all our efforts to stabilise the situation and liberate the territory. This is especially true in the case of Konjic, Jablanica and Fojnica.

The situation in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Corps is disturbing, especially the following:

- a large number of deserters from the units of this Corps daily escape to central Bosnia where they sell their weapons thus decreasing the combat readiness of the Corps;
- underestimated awareness and security in the corps Command and its units, which had as a consequence: part of the Corps Command and its files were captured during the previous combat, the intelligence officer defected to the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/, the unsolved murder of the commander of the 47th Mountain Brigade and other officers on the eve of the present operation. The fact that the Commander was absent during all significant HVO attacks on Mostar is revealing: despite the orders issued to the Corps Commander to secure the junction and the road in the area of the village of Jasenjani. This was not done. It has a direct negative impact on the implementation of the overall plan and on the security of one of the roads to Mostar.
- the Commission summoned the Commander of the 41st Mountain Brigade, "Lovac" /hunter/ to the command of the special *Zulifikar* unit and gave him concrete orders concerning the villages of Jasenjani, Raštane and Raška Gora and linked the activities of the 47th and 41st Mountain Brigades with those of the special unit, *Zulifikar*;
- according to the information received from the security service and other sources marihuana is being grown in the Blagaj area and is then smuggled through various channels into Sarajevo and central Bosnia;
- we have learned from the same source that there is constant contact between the commanders of the HVO forces at Buna and the command of the brigade in Blagaj;
- we established that the negative influence of the "emissaries" from the 4th Corps can still be felt in the zone of responsibility of the 6th Corps which is particularly true of the 43rd Mountain Brigade which ultimately requested to be integrated into the 4th Corps and leave the 6th Corps.

Together with the tactical group West from the 3rd Corps, the team has also successfully co-ordinated combat operations in the area of G. Vakuf and Prozor with the units of the 6th Corps. The 317th Mountain Brigade has still not been completely militarised which was shown in the attitude of the soldiers during combat operations. One of their weaknesses was that they abandoned the newly liberated areas and they were not sufficiently responsible when they entered combat, which is the consequence of poor commanding and control at all levels of this unit.

The independent Prozor Battalion was 24 hours late in starting a joint operation with the 317th Mountain Brigade because of the misconduct of its commander Enver BUZA. This had an immediate impact on the course of combat operations of the 317th Mountain Brigade whose left flank remained unprotected thus resulting in increased casualties and preventing them from keeping control of the newly liberated facilities in the Crni Vrh area.

The team came to the conclusion that in the zone of the 4th and 6th Corps, neither the Command nor the units have an accurate estimate of both the strength of enemy forces and their supplies because their intelligence - reconnaissance service is poorly organised.

We made an estimate of the overall situation in the Neretva valley and came to the conclusion that the situation in Konjic is the most complex where the enemy stands a real chance of taking control of the area by surprise.

Concerning everything stated above, we S U G G E S T the following:

1. Drastic personnel changes should be made in the Commands of the 4th and 6th Corps and the necessary changes in the commands and units of the 1st and 3rd Corps; therefore, replace commanders of the 4th and 6th Corps and their deputies and chiefs-of-staff by more capable staff;
2. Replace the Commander of the 43rd Mountain Brigade because of the situation in Konjic; the Command of the 6th corps should submit a complete report on that;
3. Call the Commander of the Prozor Battalion to account for misconduct and transfer him to a new post with the OG Istok /operational group East/. Appoint the present deputy commander Commander of the Independent Prozor Battalion;
4. Transfer the Commander of the 317th Mountain Brigade to a post within the 3rd Corps and look into his responsibility for the operational weaknesses on the line of attack Voljevac village - Crni Vrh - Makljen; an officer from the 3rd Corps should be appointed the new Commander of the 317th Mountain Brigade;

5. Appoint the Commander of the 45th Mountain Brigade, Hasan HAKALOVIĆ deputy Commander of the 6th Corps;
6. Transfer the present Commander of the 4th Corps, Arif PAŠALIĆ to a new post with the command of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence Corps or with the 3rd Corps;
7. Appoint Selmo CIKOTIĆ, present Commander of the OG Zapad /West/ Commander of the 4th Corps;
8. Appoint Lendo REFIK, present commander of the OG Bosna, commander of the 6th Corps; appoint Muradif MEKIĆ Chief-of-Staff of the 6th Corps; transfer the present commander of the 6th Corps Salko GUŠIĆ to the post of Commander of the OG Istok - Visoko. Transfer the acting Chief-of-Staff of the 6th Corps to a new post in the Visoko logistics base;
9. Appoint the present Commander of the special detachment - *Zulifikar*, Zulifikar ALIŠPAGO deputy commander of the 4th Corps and appoint Nihad BOJADŽIĆ commander of the Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps; his present detachment will constitute the core of that brigade;
10. Transfer the Commander of the 3rd Corps to a new post with the ŠVK OS;
11. Appoint Muhamed ALAGIĆ, present commander of the OG Krajina, Commander of the 3rd Corps, appoint Mahmut KARALIĆ deputy commander of the 3rd Corps and Sakib MAHMULJIN Chief-of-Staff; appoint the present deputy commander Džemo MERDAN deputy commander for morale, IPD /information and propaganda/ and religion.
12. Appoint Mirsad TOKIĆ commander of the OG Bosna;
13. Appoint Alija ISMET commander of the OG Zapad;
14. Appoint Nedžad AJNADŽIĆ, commander of the 101 Mountain Brigade, Chief-of-Staff of the 1st Corps;
15. Because of the importance of Igman and Bjelašnica set up the IKMs of the 1st and 6th Corps there and assure the constant presence (in shifts) of deputy corps commanders and Chiefs-of-Staff;
16. Initiate criminal proceedings against Mithat CEROVAC, Esad RAMIĆ and Mithad PIVKIĆ, all of them from the 43rd Mountain Brigade- Konjic because of obstruction and collaboration with the enemy; arrest them immediately;



17. Initiate criminal proceedings against Jasmin GUSKA, Rale and the chief of the SJB /Public Security Station/ Jablanica because of obstruction and collaboration with the HZ - HB /Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna/ and the HVO; advise the Ministry of the Interior to initiate an investigation and criminal proceedings against them, remove them from their positions; we also suggest to the MUP to promptly initiate criminal proceedings against the former President of the Konjic Municipality, Rusmir HADŽIHUSEJNOVIĆ and his brother Dževad, former manager of the socially-owned *Igman* company, because of obstruction of armed operations and collaboration with the HZ - HB and the HVO and because of the criminal activities in the *Igman* ammunition factory in Konjic.
18. We suggest to the Ministry of Defence that it replace the defence secretaries in Konjic, Jablanica and Fojnica because of obstruction of armed operations and collaboration with the HZ-HB and the HVO;
19. We propose to the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that he promptly replace the President of Fojnica Municipality and initiate criminal proceedings against him because of collaboration with the HZ -HB and the HVO and obstruction of the armed operations;
20. We propose to the Executive Council of the SDA party that it replace the President of the Executive Council of the SDA in Fojnica; we also suggest that the MUP should investigate the degree of his responsibility and involvement in obstruction of the armed operations and collaboration with the HZ - HB and the HVO and that it initiate criminal proceedings if necessary.

SC-CK-RB-ZS/NP

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

1. Sefer HALILOVIĆ, /signed/
2. Vehbija KARIĆ, /signed/
3. Rifat BILAJAC, /signed/
4. Zičro SULJEVIĆ, /signed/

/handwritten and circled:/ 11

2<sup>nd</sup> Independent motorised battalion

Military secret

1<sup>st</sup> Corps of the RBH Army

Strictly confidential

1<sup>st</sup> Corps Command

Danijela Ozme Str. bb /no number/

SARAJEVO

Number: 01-1081/93

Sarajevo, 25 September 1993

/handwritten:/ Jablanica

SUBJECT:

Report from the field for the period

from 7 September to 20 September

Section: 1 : 25000; edition 1976

Pursuant to the order of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps commander of 7 September 1993, a company of 125 soldiers was prepared for sending in the area of Jablanica. At 2130 hours the company was transferred through the "DB" object in the region of Butmir.

On 8 September 1993 the company was transferred in three vehicles from the region of Butmir to the region of Jablanica, where it arrived at 0815 hours. The soldiers were accepted in the base of "Zulfikar" detachment, while the soldiers of our company were billeted in the settlement of Grabovica.

9 September 1993 was used for rest and billeting the soldiers in Grabovica.

On 10 September 1993 the battalion Command reached the camp of our company (battalion commander, deputy battalion commander and the commander's assistant for security). On that day, the battalion Command was informed about the plan of the action called "Defence of people's rights – 93" and, in the presence of the Chief of Supreme Command Staff, received its task. The bearer of the task of the action is the "Zulfikar" detachment; its commander informed our Command about the importance of the action and with specific tasks of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Smtb. /Independent motorised battalion/ The battalion Command did not accept any resubordination of the company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> smtb., only its cooperation with other units taking parts in planned operations, which were the units from the "Zulfikar" detachment, the 10<sup>th</sup> btr. /mountain brigade/ and the 9<sup>th</sup> mtbr. /motorised brigade/

Due to insistence of the battalion Command, on 11 September 1993, command reconnaissance of the Vrđi region was performed (which was the goal of the operation). The reconnaissance was performed by the following persons: Chief of staff of the 2<sup>nd</sup> smtb., an operations officer, Commander of POČ /anti. armour company/ and the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> mtč. /motorised company/ Reconnaissance was carried

out from the region of Donje Jasenjane and the complete area of Vrđi – Golubić – Medvjed was reconnoitred. During the reconnaissance, company commanders were informed about our directions of action and dynamics of the use of units. After clearing the area Pišćat – Repetitor, our unit was included in the action on the direction Kuk – Bećaruša – Zaružje in the direction of the railway station of Drežnica.

During the meeting called on the initiative of our command with the Command of the Zulfikar detachment, we put forward the opinion that all participants in the action should receive exact tasks for all participants in the action and not deviate from that course. Such approach was accepted.

On 12 September 1993 the unit was distributed on the direction of use according to the following system – two platoons reinforced with three anti-armour groups as the assault part of the company and one platoon reinforced with two anti-armour groups for protection of the right flank from the region of Arapovo brdo.

After informing the Commander about our task and the direction of action, it was decided that all platoon commanders with operations officers perform the reconnaissance of the direction Pišćet – Repetitor – Bećaruša. This task was completed on 13 September 1993.

On 14 September 1993 the unit was introduced into the settlement of Drežnica and further to the initial positions of our forces. The planned hour of attack was postponed, since the part of the units used for capturing the elevation of Golubić did not complete the task in planned time, that is, did not on time capture the

communications from Vilino polje. At 1400 hours, after partial capture of communications from Vilino polje, the conditions for the start of the operations were met. During the first strike, parts of units from the 1<sup>st</sup> echelon managed to break through the first enemy's line and capture Mt. Piščat, as well as part of communications leading to Repetitor, the positions beneath Arapovo brdo and Šiljeva strana. Due to active resistance at Repetitor and problems of advancement in the area of Golubić, the use of part of our units on Mt. Golubić was approved.

On 15 September 1993 we introduced into combat activities one platoon of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Smtb. reinforced with two POG /anti-armour groups/ and a 60 mm mortar. The direction commander, Zulfikar ALISPAGO Zuka, decided to give rest to a part of the units and to maintain and guard the reached lines.

On 16 September 1993, due to forceful resistance on the direction of Repetitor, the core of the attack was transferred to the direction Golubić – Medvjed – Vilino polje. In these actions, units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> smtb., the "Zulfikar" detachment and the 9<sup>th</sup> mtbr. were subject to strong artillery fire from the direction of Vilino polje, but did not leave their positions. The demand of the direction Commander to use the remaining part of the unit on another direction was rejected by the Command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> smtb. and suggested to use the remaining parts of the unit with the parts of the unit already in use. It was accepted.

On 17 September 1993 the whole unit of the 2<sup>nd</sup> smtb. (with parts of the 9<sup>th</sup> mtbr. and the Zulfikar detachment) was on reached positions. Together with parts of the Zulfikar

detachment, it was receiving tasks on the direction Medvjed – Mala Vljajina. During the day, the actions were curtailed and the area of Mt. Golubić completely captured.

On 18 September 1993 at 0700 hours the 2<sup>nd</sup> Smtb with its two POG and the 60 mm mortar, together with parts of the Zulfikar detachment and the 9<sup>th</sup> mtbr. moved to capture Mt. Medvjed and crossing the road from Vilino polje. At the same time, a part of the 10<sup>th</sup> bbr. was advancing from the direction of elevation 812 towards Šiljeva strana, to connect with the units which were cleansing the terrain beneath Mt. Golubić and form there the line of defence Šiljeva strana – Golubić – Medvjed – Mala Vljajina and began installing the lines on reached positions, which was impeded by minefields set towards Mt. Golubić and Šiljeva strana.

On 19 September 1993 the direction Commander issued an order to establish the reached lines and withdraw from combat activities for units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Smtb., 10<sup>th</sup> bbr. and the 9<sup>th</sup> mtbr., which was done in the evening of 20 September 1993.

Artillery support in operations on our direction consisted of the following:

- two 120 mm mortars;
- two 82 mm mortars;
- one 107 mm launcher /?/;
- one B1 gun;
- one 105 mm howitzer.

In actions, minimum amounts of missiles were used.

During the first day, mortars, the 107 mm launcher and the B1 gun were used. For targets on Repetitor, the B1 gun was used. In further actions, the 105 mm howitzer was used for targets in Vilina polja.

On 19 September 1993 during cleansing the terrain beneath Mt. Medvjed one soldier was killed and three soldiers were wounded.

We would like to remind that the supreme Command in Sarajevo, when issuing the order for advancement of the unit, did not inform the 2<sup>nd</sup> smtb. Command with the unit's specific task, which resulted in inadequate readiness for activities in that area. We received orders for activities and the directions of attack immediately before the attack and we could not influence their possible improvement.

Chief of Staff  
Zakir OKOVIĆ  
/signed/

Commander  
Adnan SOLAKOVIĆ  
/signed and stamped/

Delivered to:  
- 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Operations Centre

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BH  
COMMAND OF THE 1<sup>ST</sup> CORPS

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential no: CV -361-09/93

Mostar, 20 September 1993

To: Jablanica IKM /Forward Command Post/

Operative report

1. HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/ extremists did not respect the ceasefire they signed. In the morning they again shelled the c/o /defence line/ in Mostar and the defence line in the area of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps from all artillery weapons at their disposal. Hundreds of shells from tanks, howitzers, mortars and other weapons supported by PAMs /anti-aircraft machine gun/, PATs /anti-aircraft gun/, sniper rifles and infantry weapons mercilessly wreaked havoc. HVO and HV extremists and Ustasha formations attempted an infantry attack, but our units carried out a powerful counterattack and inflicted enormous losses on the extremists in personnel and MTS /material and technical equipment/ in certain areas of responsibility. The free territory of the BH Army, rather the Republic of BH, is becoming bigger by the hour as a result of our troops' great morale and superhuman efforts. HVO and HV extremists are leaving their dead and wounded behind as they flee in a panic. According to our reports, dozens of their soldiers were killed.



2. Our defence lines were pushed forward in the south, centre and the north and we took some very important elevation points of great strategic significance. Street fighting is going on in the city centre and intense combat activities continue. We do not have precise data for this report on the number of our soldiers who were killed or wounded.

COMMANDER

Arif PAŠALIĆ

/stamp:/

Number: CV-2/1-153/93

Date: 22 September 1993 (1900 hours)

/hand-written/ 229

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina      Republic Defence /Department/  
R BiH OS /Armed Forces/ Supreme Command Staff      military secret  
Sarajevo      strictly confidential

Strictly confidential no.: 02/1109-1  
Sarajevo, 23. 09. 1993

To the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Command  
To the attention of the Commander

Combat activities of our forces in the wider area of the village VRDI towards Mostar are the most important on BiH battlefield at the moment of the rescuing the city of Mostar from Ustasha's rampage.

In order to improve the offensive activities of our forces on this route,

I HEREBY ORDER

1. The 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Command will immediately start organising and preparing 3 (three) companies consisting of 100 (one hundred) soldiers from their composition, which are to be sent to the "Vrdi" front.
2. Soldiers will bring their own personal and shared weapons including light machine-guns and machine-guns. If possible certain amount of anti-armoured means should be brought. At least one combat set of ammunition should be taken by each person.
3. The 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Command will choose battalion commander of this unit.
4. Battalion commander will lead the unit from Sarajevo at 1900 hours on 23. 09. 1993. Transportation from Hrasnica is organised in motorised vehicles. Direction of march: Sarajevo – Hrasnica – Pazarić – Bradina – Neretvica River – Donja Jablanica. Commander of the unit will in Donja Jablanica report with the unit to OS ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ IKM /forward command post/.

5. The 1<sup>st</sup> Corps Commander will personally inform me of conducted preparations and readiness of unit to march, no later than 1800 hours on 23. 09. 1993.

SZ/JA

R BiH OS ŠVK Chief of Staff  
Sefer HALILOVIĆ /signed/  
/stamp/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Ministry of Defence  
Army of BiH

**4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS COMMAND**  
**Strictly Confidential Ref. Num: 03-11**  
**September 26, 1993, Mostar**

**REPUBLIC DEFENSE**  
**MILITARY SECRET**  
**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

Delivers to:

Operative Group Centre

According to the report provided by your officer of the day, as of September 25-26, 1993 about mining the object in Santica Street zone of responsibilities, and for the purpose of taking measures to ensure security and protection of manpower and material and technical resources, I am issuing the following

**O R D E R**

1. IMMEDIATELY conduct inspection of the left bank in the zone of responsibility of Santiceva Street and inform me on the situation there.
2. IMMEDIATELY inform me in written form about mined object in Santica Street in the zone of responsibility of Operative Group Centre.
3. Commander of Operative Group Centre is responsible for fulfillment of the order.
4. Deadline for fulfilling this order is 11:00PM on September 26, 1993.

Delivered to:

- Operative Group Centre
- ONC<sup>1</sup>

*Signee:*  
C O M M A N D E R  
Arif Pasalic

*Stamp:*

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
*Coat of Arms*  
MOSTAR

<sup>1</sup> Original acronym

ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE Original file: /?FACASAVA/

SARAJEVO

Document received and processed by:

Date and time:

Tuesday, 5 October 1993, 0416 hours

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Please forward urgently

REPUBLIC OF BH

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BH

MILITARY SECRET

COMMAND OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential no: /OV/-578-10/93

Date: 5 October 1993, 0230 hours

VERY URGENT

To: ŠVK IKM /Forward Command Post/ Jablanica

Sefer HALILOVIĆ, personally

Zulfikar ALIŠPAGA, personally

Twenty soldiers from the 47<sup>th</sup> bbr /Mountain Brigade/ and 20 from the *Zulfikar* unit will attack towards the hills from the direction of Salakovac-Jedrinje towards you (at this moment I do not know the exact direction of attack, but it is roughly as I said).

Šuku and the remainder of the troops who had been in Bijelo Polje set off towards you yesterday morning.

I ordered KARADŽA to do everything possible to fire artillery from the hill in the Ustasha depth south of Vrdo and outside the area of our units. We will also send a DG /sabotage group/ south (Dubrave) to draw out the Ustashes. I will see with A.P. tomorrow morning what else could be done.

UNCLE

/stamp:/

ECV, Title of organ: Jablanica C Ob. /Reporting Centre/
Sent-received telegram no. 1164/MBFR5101
Date: 9 October 1993 at 0422 hrs
TLP, TGR, TLF, RRV, ŽV, /circled:/RV
Processed by: signed
(signature)

ECV = electronic communications centre

TLP = teleprinter, TGR = telegraph, TLF = telephone, RRV = radio-relay communications, ŽV = wire communications, Rv = radio communications

**4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS COMMAND**  
**Strictly Confidential Ref. Num: 03-49**  
**October 07, 1993**

**republic defense**  
**military secret**  
**strictly confidential**

Because of the operations of ustasha forces along the road Mostar – Vrapcici and of the impossibility to use that road, as it is also floodlit in the night, and for the purpose of ensuring security for manpower when carrying out combat activities in respective zone of responsibility, I am issuing the following

**O R D E R**

1. I M M E D I A T E L Y reconnoiter the field in the region of Rastani-Sutina with the goal of destroying ustasha's resistance points, that is, the floodlights along the road towards the above said.
2. Upon completing the reconnaissance I M M E D I A T E L Y perform neutralization of ustasha's firing positions in coordination with 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of military unit 5100.
3. Follow up the situation constantly and submit reports on regular basis.
4. I take following persons responsible for fulfillment of this order:
  - a. SELIM ISIC – operative of the 4<sup>th</sup> Corps of Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  - b. ERMIN AVDOVIC – NCS<sup>1</sup> of military unit 5100
  - c. SUDO MUHAREMOVIC – Commander of 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of military unit 5100
5. I M M E D I A T E L Y commence carrying out of the order.

**DELIVERED TO:**

- Military unit 5100, NCS Ermin Avdovic
- Military unit 5100, Commander of Military unit 5100 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion
- Operative of 4<sup>th</sup> Corps
- Operational Center of 4<sup>th</sup> Corps

*Signee:*  
DEPUTY COMMANDER  
Sulejman Budakovic – Tetak

*Stamp:*  
ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
*Coat of Arms*  
MOSTAR

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<sup>1</sup> Original acronym

4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS COMMAND  
Strictly Confidential Ref. Num: 03-50  
October 07, 1993

MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

ARCHIVE!<sup>1</sup>

Delivered to:

ALL UNITS

Through electronic reconnoiter and traffic tracking within our communication system as well, we have found that lately there has been some sagging among certain number of members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and anticipation of some sort of peace, and that there has been increase of violations and lack of discipline in communication system, particularly in radio traffic.

We have been pointing to this problem on several occasions so far, and regulated these issues through orders. We are pointing out again that each open conversation through communication devices, especially over radio connections, reveals important information useful to the enemy. In order to prevent revealing of confidential military data through communication system, I am issuing the following

#### ORDER

1. Any open usage of communication system, especially radio communication, is strictly forbidden.
2. Maximally utilize, in all communication lines, the existing secure system of digital communication, while transmission of spoken messages over radio devices is to be used only in emergency situations.
3. For transmitting messages, orders and reports containing confidential military information, over the telephone or radiophone, utilization of relevant code books or signal tables is compulsory.
4. When planning certain combat activities/actions, it is very advisable to build relevant table containing overview of all activities.
5. Firmly punish all noticed violations and omissions in communication system.
6. This order takes effect I M M E D I A T E L Y.
7. Persons I hold responsible for fulfillment of this order are Operative Group Brigade Commanders, Commander of BV/P<sup>2</sup> and chiefs of communication centers.

#### DELIVER TO:

- Military unit 5100
- Military unit 5093
- Military unit 5105
- Military unit 5102
- Military unit 5352

<sup>1</sup> Handwritten comment

<sup>2</sup> Original acronym

- Military Unit 5115
- Military Unit 5116
- Military Unit 5664
- Communication centre of 4<sup>th</sup> Corps
- Operative of 4<sup>th</sup> Corps

*Signee:*  
C o m m a n d e r  
Mr. ARIF PASALIC

*Stamp:*  
ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
*Coat of Arms*  
MOSTAR

4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS COMMAND  
Strictly Confidential Ref. Num: 03-81/93  
October 14, 1993

REPUBLIC DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

**Situation found during inspection  
of responsibility zone of  
Operational Group "NORTH-1"**

**Delivers to**

**CORPS COMMANDER**

Pursuant to Commander's plan, and with the goal of getting more detailed picture of the situation in the zone of responsibility of Operational Group "NORTH-1", workgroup comprising of: Esad Ramic, Selim Isic and Basri Trena, visited complete zone of responsibility of the above said Operational Group and found the following:

On its trip to Bijelo Polje workgroup first visited 3<sup>rd</sup> Company of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of 41<sup>st</sup> Independent brigade. Through the conversation with Company Commander, Mr. Omer Maric, we found out that morale of the company and of the command in the first place, are not at necessary level. On several occasions Company Commander requested from battalion to provide prisoners who would be used for fortification of company's defense area. Despite the fact that the area of this company is located in a very delicate and important place, fortification has not been done. Firing covers are not interconnected with connection trenches, first and second defense line are not connected by roads. Company Commander insists on being provided with prisoners who would build connection trench from "HEKOM" to Hydro-electric dam "Mostar". In the defense area of this company there is one Anti Aircraft machine-gun "BROVING" above Sutina and we think that it would be necessary to have here one more Anti Aircraft machine-gun or Anti Aircraft canon and to position it Kandiljan, while existing Chinese machine-gun already positioned at Kandiljan should be moved to the company's right wing to target area towards Hydro-electric dam "Mostar" and floodlights floodlighting it. We checked and found that Commission appointed by Corps Command and headed by Corps Intelligence and Propaganda Service has not visited the whole of company although Corps Commander has ordered the visit a month ago. Beside this it was found that, due to intensified activities of the enemy against manpower and vehicles, it is necessary to stop the traffic on the main road while relieving personnel at positions held by this company. Due to the more difficult maneuver towards the town it is necessary to cut down trees and clear the way across Kandiljan. It is necessary to engage Civil service to do this. Company Commander pointed out that deputy commander of the Corps, Sulejman Budakovic – Tetak (Uncle), ordered them six days ago to stage assault against the dam area by utilizing all available weaponry in order to disencumber our units operating towards Vrde. Because of that we have spent the ammunition and soldiers are now going to their positions with 20 – 30 bullets.

We also visited the 4<sup>th</sup> Company of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, which partially controls resident building next to the dam. Soldiers and commanders of this company point out that they are logistically supported by 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade, but are treated differently from members of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade.

We instructed Command of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade, right there at the spot, to eliminate this type of conduct. These soldiers are asking for uniforms to be sewed from anything, because they are poorly dressed and facing cold days ahead. Soldiers are pointing out that they are inadequately informed, and that not enough is being done in terms of raising combat morale. This company



points out that commands are not showing adequate care for wounded persons and families of fallen soldiers (cigars, food, visits, memorials, etc.) Soldiers are requesting information on general situation and political and military events in the country and in the world, and not on shells hitting their positions, because as they said [quote] ' We are the ones who experience them the best'. [End of quote] Soldiers say that because of the lack of information population is in panic, and it has negative effect on combat morale of soldiers. Wired communication in these two companies that are closing the most delicate route is very bad and it is necessary to ensure supplements in PTK<sup>1</sup> and inductor telephones. Neither of these companies have ambulance car. Soldiers at combat positions of these companies are raising the issue of so called "private armies". There is an Anti Aircraft machine-gun at this position with faulty initiator. It is a DSK<sup>2</sup> with plenty of ammunition but practically unusable.

When we came to Operational Group "S-1", focus of our work was to have insight into functioning of Command and situation at the front defense area, but we have also gained an insight into other segments that are important for military organization.

Great problem for Command of Operational Group is transport of civilian population and others marching in direction of North and South. That is why it is necessary for civil authorities to take over the transport of civilians. There are great problems with transport of wounded people and other things to town, and there is a need for repairing armored transporter for this purpose and its usage in nighttime. Operational Group Command stresses out the necessity of redeploying "Sargan"<sup>3</sup> battalion to the responsibility zone of Operational Group "S-1", provided that this area is widened down to Sutina, while responsibility zone held thus far by "Sargan" would be reassigned to Operational groups "SOUTH" and "CENTRE". There is a military prison in this Operational group, but it is not legal or supported by documents. There is a big problem with bread supplies for this unit since the firewood for the bakery has to be transported to Mostar and then the bread from Mostar transported to Bijelo Polje, while at the same time there is a bakery in Vrapcici that could start operating and needs only some minor reparations. In terms of medical support there is a need for at least one more medical doctor because the current one treats both, army and civilians. Operational Group Command should have better functioning in operational terms. Operational centre of the Operational Group command is not fully established, and combat operational documentation is not orderly filed. One example is lack of artillery targets map in the moment when I asked for it. During the inspection of front end of defense we found certain omissions related to poor fortification of units and poor barriers.

Situation in second battalion of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade is as follows:

- Battalion Commander, Ibrahim Ljevo, points out that conscription of local population fit for military service was conducted at almost 100% rate, but that there are refugees who are hiding and keep avoiding conscription. There are situations where number of families took over houses in battalion's zone of responsibility, but men fit for military service are allegedly in Blagaj, etc.

They point out that civilian service does not function at all. There is acute problem of burden squad in this battalion. There are occurrences of privatization of burden squad. Horse work regime is absolutely irregular.

Nourishment of horses is insufficient and inadequate to their burden.

When they are transporting oil it drips down on them and big wounds appear on their bodies and they are then put out of action. General problem is that it is not determined where the burden squad belongs to, who is commander and whom is he subordinated to. It should be determined by issuing order.

Situation in front of defense area of this battalion is good. Soldiers' morale is at satisfactory level. There is a huge space (approximately 1.600 m) between Prigradjani Company and Podgorani Company, and there is danger of infiltration of enemy's

<sup>1</sup> Original acronym

<sup>2</sup> Original acronym

<sup>3</sup> *Vipera berus bosniensis*

sabotage groups. There is big grouping of soldiers along the first line. Observation post in defense area of second squad of Podgorani Company is located at the top of one house and has very poor fortification. Terrain in front of the front defense end of this battalion has very poor barriers. Part of defense position surrounding Orthodox Church is quite well fortified, and that is how whole of battalion's region should be fortified.

During the day soldiers are deployed at positions east of main road, and at night they move to the line on left bank of Neretva. There is shortage of binoculars and telescope sights. There are occurrences of soldiers not responding to call for deployment to positions, and because of two soldiers from Prigradjani who did not come to position there is a vacant bunker between Prigradjani and Podgorani companies and this interspace is inadmissibly big. Soldiers at first defense line of this battalion are expressing resentment in large scale because of the so called Special groups and units from Mostar and massive departure of civilians as well as soldiers towards North.

Situation in third battalion of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain brigade is as follows:

Battalion Command is organized and functioning. Battalion Commander is not harsh enough and shows lack of military attitude towards soldiers. Situation at front line is similar to those of other battalions. They are currently building very important connection trench leading towards ustasha's positions at Bocine.

Situation in independent battalion "Nevesinje" is very good. Battalion commander says that there are eleven "death sowers" in 41<sup>st</sup> Independent Brigade and that it is necessary to temporarily transfer three of them in the region of Bijelo Polje.

Deputy Commander for morale, Intelligence and Propaganda Service and Military Police, states out during the conversation, that it is necessary to send political information to this Operational group on daily basis and provide people with information on destiny of Herzegovina in political terms, and in the extent of information available to political authorities in Mostar.

During the insight into situation with communication system, chief of communication centre points out that it is necessary to mount switchboard in Vrapcici village for transferring signals from ATC to inductor line.

Chief of technical service pointed out, during the inspection of his department, that there is necessity for one computer for Operational Group, and he suggests that he gets back the computer he gave to Sefkija Dziho.

For the purpose of overcoming the found weaknesses I

#### SUGGEST

1. Approve usage of prisoners for building road from "Hekom" to Hydro-electric dam "Mostar".
2. Issue order for building bunker for Anti Aircraft 20mm gun, and its emplacement at Kandiljan and for taking measures for ammunition procurement for this gun.
3. Move death sower from Kandiljan to the right wing of third company in dam area.
4. Immediately issue order to Commission from Intelligence and Propaganda Service to pay a visit to this company as it was ordered earlier.
5. Issue order to stop the traffic along the main road through Sutina during relief of personnel.
6. Issue order to civil service to fix and cut down the trees and thus make a road across Kandiljan.

7. Supply 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> company of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of 41<sup>st</sup> Independent Brigade, with ammunition.
8. Issue order to logistics to collect all thick fabrics (from tents, military tents and similar) and make winter uniforms for soldiers.
9. Issue order to Intelligence and Propaganda service to intensify and improve methods and contents of information provided to units and to work on boosting combat morale.
10. Provide better care for wounded and families of fallen soldiers.
11. Issue order to logistics to fix the malfunctioning Anti Aircraft machine-gun emplaced at position of 3<sup>rd</sup> company of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of 41<sup>st</sup> Independent Brigade.
12. Take measures to ensure that competent service of civil authorities takes over the transport of civilians across the responsibility zone of Operational Group "S-1" towards Ravni and the other way around.
13. Issue order to Command of Operational Group "S-1" to bring differential from TAM 2001 and install it in armored transporter captured in Rastani village and to put the armored transporter in working order and use it for transport for Vrapcici.
14. Consider possibility, make preparations and redeploy independent battalion "Sargan" to responsibility zone of Operational Group "S-1", and assign the thus far responsibility zone of that battalion to Operational Groups "Centre" and "South". In this case move the responsibility zone of Operational Group "S-1" to barracks "North Camp" in the South.
15. Issue order to Department for legal issues to issue necessary documents and orders for military prison in Operational Group "NORTH-1".
16. Issue order to Operational Group "S-1" to establish bakery in Vrapcici village for their respective soldiers.
17. Send one more general practice medical doctor to Bijelo Polje.
18. Consider possibility to procure grain for horses through UNHCR.
19. Issue order to regulate status of burden squad.
20. Procure Anti-Aircraft machine-gun and issue order for building barriers in front of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade's front end of defense.
21. Issue order for re-emplacment of death sowers in a way that Operational Group "Centre" give 3 death sowers to Operational Group "S-1".
22. Issue order to Intelligence and Propaganda Service to provide the newest standpoints related to destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially of Herzegovina.
23. Issue order to mount switchboard in Communication centre in Vrapcici, for transmission of signal from ATC to inductor line.
24. Issue order to return the PC that was given to Sefkija Dziho during liberation of Bijelo polje, to Operational Group "S-1" due to need for automated data.

Created in three copies  
and delivered to:

- Corps Commander
- Command of Operational Group "S-1"
- Operational Centre Archive

*Signee:*  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
Mr. Esad Ramic

*Stamp:*  
ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
*Coat of Arms*  
MOSTAR



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND  
HERZEGOVINA  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS



Republic Defense  
MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly confidential

To:  
- Commander of 42<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Brigade  
- Commander of 48<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade

Your mark: 03-133  
Our mark:  
Mostar, October 26, 1993

Operational order –

1. At early morning hours yesterday, ustashas have carried out intensive artillery barrage against wider region of Malo Polje, and after that, supported by artillery and tanks, they launched assault along the route of Hill 199-Parila-Krc village. In the course of that attack they took possession of Parila village and they reached left banks of Bunica River. This is the line where aggressor is fortifying now. The next most likely target of ustasha's is taking possession over Gradina object.
2. According to available information our forces have retreated from Dracanje to south edge of Krc village.
3. Task:  
Immediately reconnoiter strength, structure and deployment of ustashas at Hills 403, 443, 413 and 508 and at the accesses routes to these objects.  
Upon completing the reconnaissance brigade commanders shall organize sufficiently strong forces and through maximal utilization of surprise and sabotage activities launch combat activities and conquer the line: Ogradje (Hill403)-443-413-508 and perform engineer fortification of positions and maintain readiness in order to repel advancing attempts of the enemy.  
Assault readiness on: October 30, 1993 at 05:00AM.
4. Keep me informed:
  - a) by telephone on readiness (signal: "PUMA")
  - b) in written upon task completion
  - c) exceptionally as necessary
5. Signals:

Launch attack "FLAME"  
stop attack "AVALANCHE"

fortify oneself at achieved line "BULWARK"

Created in three copies and delivered to:

- Commander of 42<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Brigade
- Commander of 48<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade
- Archive

COMMANDER  
Mr. Arif Pasalic

Stamp:  
HERZEGOVINA ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND  
4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS  
Coat of Arms  
MOSTAR

**4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS COMMAND**  
**Strictly Confidential Ref. Num. 03-131**  
**Mostar, October 26, 1993**

**REPUBLIC DEFENSE**  
**MILITARY SECRET**  
**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

**Line reinforcement**  
**Order –**

**To: Command of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade**

Pursuant to the act of SO<sup>1</sup> for PN<sup>2</sup> of Supreme Command Staff Ref.Num. 1-10/87-93, and in accordance to security assessment for the purpose of reinforcing the lines Kuci-Bijela creek and preventing the infiltration of ustasha's sabotage groups to left banks in the region of Salakovac – Bijela creek, I am issuing the following

**O R D E R:**

1. Commander of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade shall assign a unit comprising of 20 soldiers that will visit positions at Kuci (Hill 545) – Bijela creek.
2. Immediately fortify the above said positions in terms of engineer fortification and build huts/tents to accommodate manpower.
3. Diet and manpower relief at the above said positions will be regulated by Commander of 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade.
4. On a daily basis, assign 6-8 people from reconnaissance-sabotage platoon, who will search the terrain in the above said region and thus prevent sabotages of ustasha's forces at left banks of Neretva.
5. Deadline for fulfilling the task is October 27, 1993 before 08:00PM.

Delivered to:

- 47<sup>th</sup> Mountain Brigade
- Operative Centre

**C O M M A N D E R**  
**Mr. Arif Pasalic**

*Stamp:*

**ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**  
**4<sup>TH</sup> CORPS**  
*Coat of Arms*  
**MOSTAR**

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<sup>1</sup> Original acronym

<sup>2</sup> Original acronym

Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna  
 Croatian Defence Council  
 Zone of Operations south-eastern Herzegovina Mostar

Number: 01-5862/93  
 Mostar, November 04<sup>th</sup> 1993

Reference: Protest letter of military observers  
 From Medugorje from November 03<sup>rd</sup> 1993

Military observers Medugorje

Several times Command of ZP /Military District/ Mostar was informed by military observers that, as they alleged, HVO snipers were shooting upon and around the house in which their team was accommodated. The house itself is located in the eastern side of the town (Šehovina) and UN flag is hoisted above it.

In reference to that, HVO from its highest instance has issued orders and instructions about the conduct of its units and their members towards the members of international organizations. These orders and instructions have been laid upon all of the units. Other than that, these problems have been pointed out verbally many times during meetings of the commanders, which was introduced to the soldiers in appropriate way, as well as through „AKTUALNOSTI “ newspaper, as you are aware. Activity of putting our actions under control is undergoing even now. So from the highest instance down to the lowest unit. HVO did and still does everything to make its soldiers behave towards UNPROFOR according to the issued orders and instructions. Yet, we cannot quite dismiss the possibility that MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ carry out activity in order to pin the blame on HVO.

Command of ZP Mostar requested the army observers not to let MOS soldiers gather around the house in which they stay as it was the case so far. We did it in order to eliminate supposition that some irritated and uncontrolled individual, who is a member of HVO, might happen to shoot upon that place. Since we are convinced that the army observers as well as other UNPROFOR detachments realize that is the matter of aggression of Muslim Army on HVO and Croat population and that HVO only defends centuries old Croat hearths, land, and people, we only have the need to request UNPROFOR to keep informing the United Nations impartially.

We hope that HVO and the army observers will keep working under normal conditions for the benefit and pleasure of both sides.

Commander of ZP Mostar  
 Brigadier Miljenko LASIĆ

/stamp/  
 Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna  
 Mostar  
 Zone of Operations south-eastern Herzegovina  
 Defence Section

## TAPE RECORDING

## STATEMENT

by

PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND  
HERZEGOVINA  
14 NOVEMBER 1993

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

The beginning itself was not recorded.

It cannot be like that any more. It can be like this, but not like that as ... a Serbian-Croatian-Muslim Bosnia as a joint state, with joint governments, joint Presidency to which these would delegate Chetniks, those would delegate Ustasas, to the government that we have been trying to maintain because of some legitimacy, it is impossible. That is my conviction after all hardships that we have experienced with them. This is only a detail. Listen, we are forming the government and they say - here minister of finance is this person, he is a true Bosnian etc. Then he comes and we have obstruction after obstruction, PELIVAN, then the bank governor ANDRIJIĆ. A state in which there is no loyalty of a large, a huge number of people cannot exist, it cannot function. This is not only about loyalty; this is about the fact that a whole series of people homed in on this state. Those who should protect it have gone to the mountains and started shooting, destroying. And there is still insistence that this is possible. I am telling you that it is impossible. A new Bosnia and Herzegovina is possible, one day, a different one. But with them it is impossible. I was for a year-and-a-half in peace-time and a year-and-a-half in war-time and my experience, and I think it is also your experience, you have to be honest to yourselves, is that such a state is impossible. Here, I would like to take this opportunity to tell you how I think it is possible. I do not think that we should give up on BiH, god forbid. When we made such sacrifices, when we experienced all that suffering, we should continue to fight to have BiH finally as a state, we have a right to it. We have paid a very high price for it. I think that we should wage that battle in two phases. In the first phase we should secure the military liberation of the areas in which a majority Muslim population resides. Because that is the people that suffered most, after all, it is most interested in that kind of BiH. The people that is definitely loyal, as it does not have another homeland and the people that paid the highest price for that BiH

The second part of the battle for BiH, because of BiH's integration, should be fought, in my opinion, by political means. I am not sure whether we shall be able to capture Drvar, Banja Luka, Trebinje etc by military means. I am not sure. Maybe we shall be able to. I am even sure that we would be able to if we had weapons. However, if the same international situation, better to say adverse situation, continues, we shall most probably have to wage this second part in a way, taking into consideration a factor that is called time, in the same way as West Germany for example fought for the reintegration of Germany. Not by military means, but by the supremacy of the political model that was in place there. Now, when we look at Bosnia, we have the so-called bright and dark parts. Those dark ones, they are under fascism, one or the other,

does not matter, Serbian or Croatian fascism. Here we have what is controlled by our army and our government, that part in which... not with complete result, but a certain result to maintain some level of democracy, civilization, a level of human liberties which naturally is subject to the same limitations because of the objective war conditions, but in which attempts are persistently made /to prove/ that it is possible to build a civilized life. In Vareš, despite the fact that they evicted that population, not we, but they, they drove the population away. I will tell you why. There are 1,000 Croats there. A number of Croats are returning there. Nobody will be hurt. We would not be what we are, we would not be the democratic government if we evicted these people. We shall try, in the liberated part of BiH, never giving up on the remaining part, we shall try to organize a government which will be dignified and which will respect a minimum of fundamental, elementary standards of civilization, a civilized way of living. That means, translated into political jargon, that we have a Bosnia and Herzegovina in which nobody will be persecuted because of their religion, because of their ethnicity or their political affiliation. Nobody will be persecuted because of these three things. That could be the constant nature of it. Everything else can perhaps change here and there and be somewhat differently defined, but I think that this will remain and I think that this, coupled with the principle of a free market and what it can produce, because we hold the most industrialized part and the most developed part of BiH, can defeat that darkness in which parts of Bosnia live nowadays. This is approximately the reasons to tell you that we cannot live like that. Because, to have that kind of BiH again, because what does a Muslim-Serbian-Croatian BiH or a Bosnia of three constituent nations mean today; we are not those who will appoint the Serbs who will be part of it, they will determine it. They will appoint Chetniks. Others will appoint Ustashas. How can you have a democratic government with Ustashas and Chentiks who will then either directly destroy that state, or obstruct it every step of the way. Drill holes wherever they can. And you will they take pains to fill up that bottomless pit. You will never be able to create a relatively normal level of life there, a standard, because that will constantly be stolen, obstructed etc. I think that we have to, as a very good journalist of ours has said, unfortunately we have to burn down some dear illusions. If we fail to do so I am afraid that we shall continue to pay a high price. We have to /give up/ some illusions, no matter how dear, finally look reality in the face and I think that we do not owe anything to anybody. We do not owe anything to anyone.

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE HSS BH /Croatian Peasant's Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

The content and messages of the statement given by Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ, the President of RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Presidency, on 14 November in Zenica, and in the interview that followed on BHTV on 18 November, caused a great deal of mistrust and even serious fear among the members of the HSS and a large segment of the Croatian population. The assessments and statements uttered by Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ on these two occasions have been interpreted by the HSS and the Croatian population as advocating the continuation of the war, primarily against the Croats, but also as a serious about-turn in the defining of the BH state and legal system.

Not only did IZETBEGOVIĆ's statements dwell on mere explanations of the organisation of power in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic, they also expressed a number of opinions on individual peoples without necessarily separating wheat from the chaff.



He thus did not merely imply but spoke explicitly of the “most interested” and “most deserving” peoples, excluding others and their rights to and interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a common and democratic community of equal peoples with indivisible collective and individual rights and freedoms.

Members of the HSS are wondering what it means to advocate a “reduced” Bosnia and Herzegovina and whether, once reduced, it will still be Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ denying other people the benefit and the right of building Bosnia and Herzegovina as their own state - because he wonders what a Muslim-Serb-Croat Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of three constitutive peoples, means today, but the answer he provides is not in keeping with the position he occupies. He says, you see, that “it cannot be that”.

This may be inappropriate, but the HSS must warn the President of the Presidency that Bosnia and Herzegovina can only exist as a unity of three equal peoples, three constitutive peoples, because the right of the Muslims to their own state is equal to the right of the two other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that the leaders of this or that people “went to the mountains and started shooting” does not mean that the people no longer have the right to and interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina being their homeland and their state.

The HSS qualifies Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ’s persistent use of terms such as “we” and “they”, i.e. his failure to refer to the Croats and the Serbs by their real names, as offensive. Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ has the right to represent the interests of the Muslim people but the position he fills still obliges him to protect the rights of the other two peoples. Particularly unacceptable are his imputations that the Croats and the Serbs would “appoint Ustashas and Chetniks” to the future bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shows that the President is unable to distinguish between normal people and degenerates. Members of the HSS and Croats in general are wondering whether this reveals his intention to have somebody else, somebody who is not a member of these peoples, determine who is suitable to represent the interests of the Croats or other peoples.

In our view, IZETBEGOVIĆ’s opinion that “we will break them in Bosnia” encourages further war against the Croats and a definitive settling of accounts between the Croats and the Muslims. Even when Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ says that he will regain the majority Muslim territories by war, he /?is still not referring to/ Zvornik, Foča, Kozarac or Prijedor but the Croat enclaves in central Bosnia. If we add to this his claim that the Croats have “committed worse acts than the Chetniks” we cannot but notice that he has crudely falsified facts on the number of the killed, auctioning off victims and forgetting statements he has given but a month or so ago.

Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ’s claim that “everyone owes us” leads one to conclude that the “debt” has to be collected, which instills additional fear of revenge and persecution that will not flinch even from repeating what happened in Fojnica. At the same time, his “attempts” to create “a degree of democratic civilisation” and respect for “minimal” civilisational standards in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic provide no comfort at all. A president should not attempt but guarantee human and ethnic rights and freedoms, and not just minimal ones – those we already have!

At best, we consider the President’s comparison of the position of the Croats and the Serbs in the future Bosnian (Muslim) Republic to the position of the Arabs in France inappropriate because the Muslims cannot and must not have such rights in the future two states. The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not, nor will they ever be, an ethnic minority but a people, regardless of whether they are a statistical minority.

Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ has shifted his positions many times so far. What is new this time is that for the first time ever, he has fully declared himself a Muslim leader, announcing the organisation of the future central republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a purely Muslim one, without other peoples sharing in the power. This not only imitates the BOBAN-KARADŽIĆ model, but could have far-reaching political consequences too. This orientation obliges the HSS to adopt a position and decide whether it is useful for HSS representatives to remain in the bodies of authority, and

to launch an initiative in the international community for the protection of Croat interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The HSS cannot but notice that Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ has promised democracy to the Croats who remain in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic, telling them that “not a hair on their heads will be harmed”. At the same time, we have information that the Croats are being persecuted, robbed and detained in Travnik, Kakanj, Zenica, Bugojno where not even the International Red Cross has managed to enter, let alone any foreign journalists.

We do not what the simplified story of Chetniks, Ustashas and Partisans, or the statement that “we will not kill women and children”, means. Does it mean that it is open season for hunting men, i.e. other civilians like, for instance, the shooting of civilians in the villages around Zenica, the case of the Franciscans in Fojnica, the cases in Bugojno.

The global media have already reacted to the President’s visit to the *El Jihad* unit, the UNHCR is pointing to *Merhamet’s* inappropriate behaviour, the Bugojno

Croats are not receiving humanitarian aid (they are being told to go to their *Caritas!*), and we are linking all this to Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ’s statements that the Croats in Bosnia are in the same position as the Arabs in France. How can we otherwise explain that the discussion on the legal regulation of the Sarajevo HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ took place only after HVO had been abolished? Is somebody here privileged or above the law?

Unfortunately, the HSS would like to point out many cases where behaviour in practice coincided with the most recent statements of Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ, seriously restricting the rights, and consequently also the safety, of the Croats in Bosnia. The interview where Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ plays down certain issues but does not even try to refute others, proves that things that were said in Zenica were not mere lapses or accidental imprecisions. We have observed that he has given such statements in Zenica but not, for instance, in Tuzla, which in all probability indicates a new political philosophy of the ruling party and its leaders.

All this has forced us to make serious conclusions and rethink our overall position. This is our duty, not only because of all the Croats who have died for this country as members of the HVO, the BH Army and the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, but also because of all those who are still fighting for these ideals, because of all those religious, cultural and political institutions which have invested all their authority and moral credibility on behalf of this country, and last, but not least, because of our history, for the Croats have been living in this area for more than 1,300 years, much longer than anyone else.

HSS MAIN BOARD  
/stamped/

**DREKOVIĆ, RAMIZ: In the stranglehold: Krajišniks and Herzegovinians in battle on two fronts  
Zenica, Dom štampe, 2004**

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In autumn 1994, president of the presidency visited the zone of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps with the staff commander, especially considering the situation in Mostar. The plan of visit and stay embraced the visit to 45<sup>th</sup> brigade in Buturic Polje. Escorted by Mr. Izetbegovic, along with general Delic, there was Minister of MUP, Bakir Alispahic, me and my associates, associates of General Delic as well as associates of Minister Alispahic. By arriving to the command post of the 45<sup>th</sup> brigade, commander of the brigade Hakalovic reported to Mr. Izetbegovic. Before the meeting in the office of the brigade commander, Homeini stepped forward and said:

“Commander and I will have a meeting with the president exclusively! Nobody else can attend the meeting! Neither General Delic, nor the Minister Alispahic! I hope General Drekovic will not be offended, for he can't be present as well. We want to present the president personally with some issues which do not allow your presence. It is not about you, general Drekovic and we kindly ask you not to blame us!”

While Homeini was saying those words, Mr. Izetbegovic already entered the office and the military police placed themselves on doors. The meeting lasted for hour and a half. Commander of the army staff, commander of the corps and Minister of MUP of one country remained standing in front of the doors.

We were looking at each other with distrust.

“Is this possible? I asked general Delic and he responded, as you can see, it seems to be so!”

General Delic was most hit among us in front of the doors, so it seemed to me. It is something that couldn't happen in my 5<sup>th</sup> corps. Delic said he will address Mr. Izetbegovic. Whether he did it, he knows it. After the visit, I asked commander Hakalovic and his assistant, Hadzajlija to talk. I told them not to do it again and this is not the way to behave.

I did not have problems in further management and commanding of this brigade, while I remember the episode with Homeini from Herzegovina in order to illustrate problems that we met during establishing our army.

#### 6<sup>th</sup> corps

The 6<sup>th</sup> corps, save the corps command that counted 112 members, had 5 brigades, 4 independent battalions, mixed artillery division (MAD), logistic base and educational centre on Bradina. In the composition of the 6<sup>th</sup> corps there were the following units: 43<sup>rd</sup> mountain brigade, 44<sup>th</sup> mountain brigade, 45<sup>th</sup> mountain brigade, 649<sup>th</sup> light brigade (lbr), 601<sup>st</sup> olbr, SB /independent battalion/ “Prozor”, SB “Bjelasnica”, 6<sup>th</sup> bVP, 609<sup>th</sup> independent engineering battalion, 6<sup>th</sup> mixed artillery division and logistic base.

The numeric situation of the BH Army 6<sup>th</sup> corps units on the day of duty takeover was 8 463 members.

#### Table

Overview of number of manpower of 6<sup>th</sup> corps units on 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1994

Unit	Number of manpower
1. corps command	112
2. 6 <sup>th</sup> bvp	174
3. 609 <sup>th</sup> independent engineering battalion	331
4. 6 <sup>th</sup> MAD Igman	244
5. 6 <sup>th</sup> loB	88
6. 43 <sup>rd</sup> mountain brigade	2 451
7. 44 <sup>th</sup> mountain brigade	1 545
8. 45 <sup>th</sup> mountain brigade	1 631
9. 649 <sup>th</sup> l brigade	976
10. 601 ol brigade	186
11. independent battalion “Prozor”	599
12. Independent battalion “Bjelašnica”	126
Total	8 463

\*\*\*

The 6<sup>th</sup> corps artillery men

The 6<sup>th</sup> mixed artillery division "Igman" (6. MAD) was established on 23<sup>rd</sup> of October 1993, with the command post on Bradina and in Konjic. Reuf Sidran commanded the division. On 13<sup>th</sup> of February 1994 the division was re-established into 4<sup>th</sup> mixed artillery regiment (MAP), 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> mixed artillery division is in the composition of. The 4<sup>th</sup> mixed artillery regiment, after establishment, was commanded by a young and experienced senior, professional artillery combatant, Edin Cajic. Under his command, this regiment became a strong artillery unit. Combatants and seniors of the 6<sup>th</sup> MAD, up to the establishment of 4<sup>th</sup> MAP, had a remarkable credit for the artillery support to units of the 6<sup>th</sup> corps.

\*\*\*

#### Overview of total losses off the sixth Corps until January 19th, 1994:

UNIT	1992		1993 until Jan 19th 1994.		Total	
	dead	wounded	dead	wounded	dead	wounded
1. Corps Command		2		13		15
2. 6. bVP	1	1	10	47	11	48
3. 609. ind. eng. bat.						
4. 6. MAD						
5. 6. LoB						
6. 43. bbr.	47	49	93	93	140	142
7. 44. bbr.	5	13	87	182	92	195
8. 45. bbr.	38	13	53	75	91	88
9. 649. lbr.	11	18	29	22	40	40
10. 601. olbr.						
11. SB «Prozor»	1	3	40	91	41	94
12. SB «Bjelašnica»						
<b>UKUPNO</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>622</b>

Realizing the importance of the Washington Agreement and the future coexistence with the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while respecting human relations during the struggle, and after them, the Corps Command, after the release of dominant structures and positions in which HVO soldiers were located, has taken all measures to avoid revanchism. It was not at all easy, but we have succeeded.

Command of the 56. dp. HVO has not accepted any cooperation with the Fourth Corps. Their sole demand was departure from these areas in the zone of responsibility of the HVO military area in Mostar. I accepted their request, but I have not allowed that 56. Homeland regiment transports ordnance and weapons, with which, until yesterday they were killing innocent population of Konjic and surrounding villages, over Konjic and Jablanica to Mostar. We have for soldiers and chieftains we provided transportation with buses but they had to surrender weapons and material-technical resources (MTS) to the logistic base of the Fourth Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among other means they had to surrender mortars and canons with which they were shelling us just the night before we successfully performed this operation.

**Overview of MTS according to type and quantity surrendered by 56.dp HVO before it was dislocated**

TYPE OF MTS	QUANTITY (pcs)
1. Bullet 7,62 x 39	13.300
2. Bullet 7,62 x 54	2.400
3. Bullet 7,9	15.800
4. Bullet 30-06	4.500
5. Bullet 12,7 DŠK	34.500
6. Bullet 14,5	3.960
7. Hand Grenade	128
8. TTM	52
9. TKM	17
10. Grenade za ZIS 76 mm	58
11. Grenade za B1 76 mm	20
12. Missile za RB M57	20
13. Missile za RPG 7	46
14. Mine za MB 60 mm	128
15. Mine za MB 82 mm	146
16. Mine za MB 120 mm	180
17. Raketa 128 mm	43
18. Maljutka	4
19. Grenade for BsT	4
20. PM M53	1
21. PAM 12,7 DŠK	1
22. PAT 20/3	3
23. JLR 128 mm	1
24. Canon 76 mm ZIS	2
25. Canon B1	1
26. BsT 82 mm	1
27. RB M57	2
28. Morter 82 mm	5
29. Automatic rifle	30

\*\*\*

350 000 DEM for 56 dp HVO

On the occasion of duty takeover, Commander Salko Gusic informed me, *inter alia*, that the corps command signed for 350 000 DEM. The funds were received from the BH government. As to the query, what purpose do the funds have, he informed me that this money was intended to be paid to 56<sup>th</sup> command of the dp HVO in order to leave the villages Drecelj, Turija, Zaslivje and Zabrdje calmly, respectively that – after all what they did to inhabitants of Konjic- without fight, as gentlemen, fairly bribed, leave this area.

\*\*\*

When I received the duty of the Commander, Fourth Corps numbered 8.544 soldiers and chieftains. Regardless of the relatively small numbers, problems which they were facing, strength and force of the aggressor, soldiers the Fourth Corps didn't give up. They managed to preserve the area and did not allow the implementation of goals and agreements „the Great Serbia" and "Greater Croatia" policies on the division of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina

Overview of the number of manpower of the BH Army 4<sup>th</sup> corps units on 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1994

Unit	Number of manpower
1. corps command with communication platoon	123
2. 4 <sup>th</sup> bvp	213
3. 41 <sup>st</sup> smtbr.	2 274
4. 42 <sup>nd</sup> mountain brigade	2 386
47 <sup>th</sup> mountain brigade	1 533
6. 48 <sup>th</sup> mountain brigade	1 901
7. independent battalion "Šargan"	311
8. independent battalion "Nevesinje"	270
9. 4 <sup>th</sup> MAD	72
10. 4 <sup>th</sup> Lob	168
11. war hospital	199
12. Cargo platoon	34
Total	8 544

The units of the BH Army 4<sup>th</sup> corps, in their zones of responsibility towards the Serbian-Chetnik aggressor, on 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1994, were in possession of the following: right, including the elevation 413 (Vranjevići) – Stjepangrad – Ravnice – Guberača – Fortica – Šljeme – Potporim – Rošce Mountain – Borova Glava – Plavac, including and towards the HVO ; left, elevation 413 Malo Polje – Kosor – Velmos – Neretva River – Donja Mahala – Boulevard – Šantićeva street – Carinski bridge – Neretva river – Hydro plant Mostar – Šljunkara – convent – M17 road – bridge towards Vojno – Neretva river – hydro plant Salakovac – Neretva river – Vrda – Drežnica, including.

While visiting units, I established that positions towards the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor bear more guard but organized military activity character. I was rather surprised by it, it was especially expressed in the zone of responsibility of the former 4<sup>th</sup> corps. In the zone of responsibility of the 6<sup>th</sup> corps, save in area of Konjic municipality, a narrow area, the area of Prenj was uncovered, as well as the area of a broader part of Treskavica, which also caused problems. It seemed to me that there was accordance on mutual non-attacking. By establishing why is it so, in talks with seniors, I was introduced to something inexplicable to me so far, but probably necessary at the time, especially expressed in the zone of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps – there were such agreements and cooperation, although not in their classic forms, but there were some. There was purchase of ammunition, armament and other equipment from Chetniks, as well as coordinated activities towards the positions of HVO on the right Neretva bank. True, combatants and seniors in this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regarding the situation in which they were, were left with anything else. Actually, they remained, thanks to their wit, cunning, realistic comprehension and sagacity of combatants, senior and power bodies, as well as the firm commitment of the people to remain on one's own.

\*\*\*

It was extremely hard to take the units, combatants and senior out of their settlements and villages, put them into formation and dislocate them to Bjelimica plateau for preparations and carrying out combat activities; it was especially not easy to explain them that the fight on Bjelimica plateau is indeed a fight for the town of Mostar, or that the fight in Konjic for Konjic is harder than the fight for Konjic which takes place on Bjelimica plateau.

Such condition of relations and behaviour of the most responsible ones in the zone of responsibility of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps reminded me much of 1992 and the defence staff in Bihać, as we had problems to take soldiers and seniors to dominant positions outside of town and establish the Bihać defence. Overcome of such difficulties in the beginning period of organization resistance in further course of the war provided results. I find that we used plenty of energy to solve the internal problems, which took plenty of time and space to prepare for the fights.

The issue of establishing the system and responsibility is especially difficult. There are no results without systematic work and clear responsibility. With the system, one can win, without it, one can lose. Unfortunately, today, after 7 years of war, we encounter a non-systematic functioning, without clearly observable responsibility. Even today one feels the lack of organization among Bosniak people. This lack of organization is especially reflected in return of our people to their centenarian homes. It is constantly expected that these issues will be solved by somebody else, instead of us. There are no more central committees; there are no more federal institutions which would provide new solutions. Nobody will enable Foča people, Višegrad people, and people from Trebinje, Čapljina and other town to return if they do not organize themselves. Even today, there is lack of organization on the field. Everyone is leading high politics. An example of good organization and persistence in returning are Bosniaks from Kozarac near Prijedor. Oblivion and short memory keeps repressing us.

As an example of illustration, I asked the 42<sup>nd</sup> mountain brigade combatants: "Why aren't you accepting Nusret Šahić, a professional officer and a Bosniak from Bosnia? If you do not accept him, I am not clear how would you accept me, a Bosniak, originating from Bosnia, a man who loves Bosnia and considers it his homeland?"

I did not get an answer, but I knew it. Should it be a criterion at all? Absolutely not. During the commanding the 5<sup>th</sup> corps, I used to meet people who were saying; "Bihać to Bihać people!" I heard the same reactions in Mostar; "Mostar to Mostar people!" I repeated the question to myself; what about those who are not from Mostar, or Bihać, and were expelled from Nevesinje, Gacko, Ljubinje, Stolac, Livno, Trebinje, Sanski Most, Ključ, Bosanski Novi, Banja Luka? I couldn't not understand it regardless the explications, standing behind these slogans which did not reveal the truth actually. The time of local people with power is going away, fortunately, but there were tones of people with power in the war. The time comes in which the effort of combatants and BH Army seniors will be valorised in its full capacity. If this does not happen, it shall be necessary to erect the monument to "an unknown hero", for he would actually symbolize those who gave much but who remained unknown. I heard about a saying; "in war, the government gives cannons, rich people oxen and poor people sons". Today's social structure of federal army personnel, as it seems, fully corresponds to this popular proverb. It is our duty to make the army invitation popular in Bosnia and Herzegovina which especially refers to Bosniaks.

There is another popular saying: "Who does not want to feed the army, he will feed the foreign one." It would not be good to make this one true as well, especially not through us, Bosniaks. By looking at modern social structure of the federal army members, I haven't noticed a single soldier or a senior with a father manager, professor, prime minister, General.

Total losses of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps till 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1994, as I was appointed to duty, were the following:

Unit	1992	wounded	1993, till 19 January 1994	Wounded	Total	Wounded
	Killed		Killed		Killed	
1. corps command		4	18	27	18	31
2. 4 <sup>th</sup> bVP			20	96	20	96
3. 41 <sup>st</sup> smt brigade	119	150	340	638	459	788
4. 42 <sup>nd</sup> mountain brigade	8	24	95	126	103	150
5. 49 <sup>th</sup> ih mountain brigade	11	40	99	281	110	321
6. war hospital Mostar					7	
Total	138	218	579	1168	717	1 386

Total losses of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> corps till 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1994

Corps	Killed	Wounded
1. 4 <sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army	717	1 386
2. 6 <sup>th</sup> corps of the BH Army	415	622
Total	1 132	2 008

## R E P O R T

## FROM INDEPENDENT UNIT "HERCEG STJEPAN"-TURIIJA

In a discussion with Haris Silajdžić on 19 October 1993 regarding discussions on the exchange of prisoners of war - I was invited to speak with Silajdžić.

Discussion was attended by Mladen Zovko representing independent unit "Herceg Stjepan" and Jerko Petrović representing the Muslim side, beside Silajdžić meeting was attended by Salko Musić Commander of the 6. Corps and a member of the VK-Bosiočić, called Zagi.

In addition to discussions about the exchange they offered us to hand over our positions and in return they would enable evacuation of soldiers and civilians from our free territories through their territory.

In discussions Haris Silajdžić took on him all guarantees regarding the possible operation.

On 3 October 1993 I met with Fagrudin Fazilić - Brado and he informed me that Silajdžić authorized him to negotiate with me about our positions.

On that occasion I was offered that they would purchase 70% of our light arms, and all of our heavy weapons and food that we have left behind us, and they are willing to pay 500,000 DM.

I answered that they could maybe get our light weapons on the border line - which he accepted.

I gave Fezlagić a deadline 15th November 1993 to present proposal for the operation as well as collateral for any misunderstandings.

On 05 November 1993 I met Fezlagić again and on this occasion I was informed that as collateral we are to be escorted by the Commander of 6th Corps and Haris Silajdžić.

He suggested the shortest march route: Konjic-Jablanica-Doljani.

For route security they prepared special MUP (Police) units and BH Army in order to prevent the unforeseen activities.

Isi requests that on 12th November 1993 at 12.00 at command SPABAT in Jablanica he meets with the Commander of OZ, which controls the area, in order to make arrangements of possible evacuation.

-2 -

It would be desirable that the meeting in addition to Mladen Zovko - Kuhar is attended also by someone from GS.

Please give instructions regarding this ASAP.

Confirm arrival to Jablanica.

Delivered

- Bruno Ostojić
- Gen./Mej. Milivoj Petković
- I. Lučiću
- Ž. Keža

MLADEN ZOVKO  
KUHAR

/Stamped/

/receipt stamp:/

**Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina**  
**Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna**



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
MAIN HEADQUARTERS  
MOSTAR**

<b>Delivered /handwritten/ 09 November 1993</b>			
<b>Org. unit</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Attachments</b>	<b>Value</b>
/handwritten/ <b>02-2/1-01-33 83/93</b>			

**Dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović: The Bosniak-Croatian political reckoning**

D-140

**Mostar, 2004.**

**XXII. MEDALS AWARDED TO OFFICIALS OF BOSNIAK-MUSLIM PEOPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

On the occasion of Croatian National Day, President Franjo Tuđman, pursuant to Article 98. Of Croatian Constitution and Article 2 paragraph 1, Law on decorations and recognition of Republic Croatia (Official Gazette 20/95), on proposal by the State Committee for the decorations on the occasion of National Day and the fifth anniversary of the independent and sovereign Croatian state, on May 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> 1995. issued a decree which, among other Croatian officials, awarded the following medals to Bosniak-Muslim officials:

1. Alija Izetbegović

Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is awarded with the Grand Order of Queen Jelena with Sash and Danica "for his contribution to the establishment of trust between the Croatian and Bosniak-Muslim nations, cooperation in resistance to the aggression and the establishment of a Croatian-Bosnian Federation, and its construction of the Confederation with the Republic Croatia."

2. Dr. Haris Silajdžić

Is awarded with row of Duke Trpimir with necklace and Danica "for outstanding contribution to the independence, integrity and international reputation of Republic Croatia, for Croatian development and development of relations between Croatian and other countries."

3. Ejup Ganić

3.1. Is awarded with the Order of Duke Trpimir with necklace and Danica "for outstanding contribution to the independence, integrity and international reputation of Republic Croatia, for Croatian development and development of relations between Croatian and other countries."

3.2. Is awarded with the Order of Duke Branimir with necklace "for outstanding contribution acquired by promoting international position and reputation of Republic Croatia and its relations with other countries."

4. Muhamed Šaćirbej

Is awarded with the Order of Duke Branimir with necklace, "for outstanding contribution acquired by promoting international position and reputation of Republic Croatia and its relations with other countries."



BANJA LUKA

DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly confidential  
SOUTH LINE

— HVO, HV  
— A-BiH  
— VRS

08.10.1995.

11.10.1995

— A-BiH

DEPUTY COMMANDER  
General Major  
RAHIM ADEMI

JAJCE

COMMAND OF CROATIAN FORCES - IZM  
(divisional command post) ŠIPOVO

AUGUST 2009. Slavko Prof. 04



APPROVED BY  
COMMANDER  
Lieutenant General  
ANTE GOTOVINA

OG ZAPAD  
112.br  
113.br  
15.dp  
142.dp  
134.dp  
7.dp

OG JUG  
126.dp  
6.dp  
141.br

**CILJ NAPADNE OPERACIJE**

1. Na osnovu dostavljene i analizirane situacije...  
2. Napredak...  
3. Pomoć...  
4. Vrijeme...  
5. Na operativnom...  
6. Na operativnom...

**TEMELJNA ZAKLADA**

1. Osnovni...  
2. Osnovni...  
3. Osnovni...  
4. Osnovni...  
5. Osnovni...  
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10. Osnovni...


**OMJER SNAGA**

VR	VR	VR	VR	VR
1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30
31	32	33	34	35
36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45
46	47	48	49	50
51	52	53	54	55
56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65
66	67	68	69	70
71	72	73	74	75
76	77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84	85
86	87	88	89	90
91	92	93	94	95
96	97	98	99	100

COMMAND OF CROATIAN F...  
(divisional command post) VRE...

A-BIH  
 VRS  
 HV + HVO

08.-19



OPERACIJE

ZA BANA LUKU

DEFENSE  
MILITARY SECRET  
Strictly confidential  
MAESTRAL

1HR  
MERKONJE GRAD

JAJCE

ŠIPOVO

CHIEF OF STAFF  
Staff Brigadier  
RAHIM ADEMI

FORCES - IZM  
BA


7HR  
A-BIKI

BUGOJNO

S. IX 1995

AUGUST 2009. Serbian Profile

Positions held by the Croatian Army (HV), the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) after the ultimatum delivered by the USA - Christopher, Hoolbrooke, Galbraith / Autumn 1995



 HV HVO  
 YES  
 A:BiH



**Jesen 1995**  
 Linije na kojima su stale snage HV, HVO i A BiH nakon ultimatumu SAD-a – Christopher, Holbrooke, Galbraith  
 Autumn 1995: lines at which the forces of HV, HVO and BH Army stopped after the ultimatum of USA, Christopher, Holbrook and Galbraith

AUGUST 2019. *Salvador Profan*

I was born on January 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1945 in Čapljina.

Primary and high school education (Realna gimnazija) – 4 years – Rama, 6 years Široki Brijeg – 2 years Mostar.

University of Zagreb:

I have graduated the eight-semester studies from the following fields:

- a) Faculty of Electrical Engineering – profession, MS in Electrical Engineering (weak current – telecommunications).
- b) Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences – Professor of Philosophy and Sociology.
- c) Theatre and Film Academy – profession, Director.

Professional experience:

- As a student I worked in Stockholm company „Akla“ and I was washing dishes in restaurants, and during my student years I have worked for five summers as a waiter in Germany, Titisee.
- Head of laboratory for electronics – Technical high school “Nikola Tesla”–Zagreb.
- I taught “Fundamentals of electrical engineering”, “Theory of electrical engineering”, “Theory of automatic regulation” to Associate students.
- In 1973 – I became “Freelance artist“, living on honorarium.
- I worked as a director in theaters in Croatia and BiH, I have directed two TV movies, a serial for children, one feature film and documentaries.
- I participated in establishing HDZ (political party – Croatian Democratic Union).
- I was a General Secretary of HDS (political party – Croatian Democratic Party).
- In spring of 1991, I withdrew from political activities.
- As a volunteer soldier I went to Sunja (near Sisak) and on September 5<sup>th</sup>, 1991 I was appointed Defense Commander of Sunja.
- November 26<sup>th</sup>, 1991 – I received the rank of Colonel of Croatian Army (HV).
- March 10<sup>th</sup>, 1992 – I was promoted to Brigadier of Croatian Army (HV).
- March 14<sup>th</sup>, 1992 – I left Sunja to become an Assistant Minister of Defense of Croatia for IPD – Informative–psychological activities.
- April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1992 – I received the rank of Major General.
- From April 11<sup>th</sup>, 1992 to May 07<sup>th</sup>, 1992 I went to BiH (Herzegovina) as a volunteer and performed a duty of the Commander of Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina – Čapljina – Mostar – Jablanica –Konjic.
- On October 27<sup>th</sup>, 1992 I’ve been appointed at VONS – (Vijeće obrane i nacionalne sigurnosti RH) Croatian Council of Defense and National Security.
- June 1<sup>st</sup>, 1993 – I requested to be released from Croatian Army due to my transfer to BiH.
- June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1993 – I was released from my duties in Croatian Army.
- July 24<sup>th</sup>, 1993 – I was appointed Commander of HVO – (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane) Croatian defense council.
- November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1993 – I withdrew from my duties as a Commander of HVO.
- I returned to Croatian Army.
- Later I performed various functions in Croatian Army, including the Head of the Military Cabinet of the President of Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman.
- As a volunteer I participated in military action „Oluja“ / Storm/ on route Hrvatska Kostajnica – Dvor na Uni.
- At my personal request, I retired on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1995.
- After my retirement, I worked as a director (manager), and later as Chairman of Supervisory Board in the factory „Chromos boje i lakovi “– cooperating with “Sigma” from Amsterdam (marine paints).
- In early April of 2004, I was in custody in The Hague, accused for many atrocities.
- On May 29<sup>th</sup>, 2013, by the first instance verdict, I was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Slobodan Praljak



## **CONTENT OF THE WEB PAGE [www.slobodanpraljak.com](http://www.slobodanpraljak.com):**

- Slobodan Praljak's opening statement at the beginning of the main hearing of the criminal proceeding before the ICTY on April 27th, 2006.
- War documents – overview of war documents by monographic units (100 monographic units published so far, with 55,000 authentic documents which can be searched via search engine by title, author, place of origin and date of origin)
- 3 video galleries: war videos, video of General Slobodan Praljak's testimony, videos of cross-examination of General Slobodan Praljak's witnesses.

Total duration time of video materials exceeds 1,400 hours with over 8,000 pages of description and content of war videos with associated transcripts of video galleries related to the trial before the ICTY.

- Statements about Slobodan Praljak and wartime events – 188 statements, with English translations, published so far.
- Testimonies and expert findings of professor Slobodan Janković regarding the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, prof. Vlado Šakić regarding the socio-psychological aspects of war and prof. Josip Jurčević regarding the historical aspects of war.
- Trial documents – court decision, judges' opinions, trial transcripts, final filings (submissions), documents presented to defense witnesses of dr. Jadranko Prlić
- Slobodan Praljak's letter against Carla del Ponte, selection from books and press publications, transcripts, 58 audio recordings
- Publications on war – monographic overview of major war events in BiH and their consequences.

## **WEB PAGE STATISTICS**

Until March 2014, web page had more than 7,000,000 visits from over 140 countries, reviewing more than 12 Tb of web content in over 60,000 different files (documents, video materials, photos, texts...).

Web page [www.slobodanpraljak.com](http://www.slobodanpraljak.com) provides free download.

A BiH / BH Army	Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ABHO	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence
Allah dž.š.	Allah j.sh. /Jalla Shanuhu/
AP WB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
AP ZB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
B/D	Combat Activity
bbr	Mountain Brigade
bbt	Mountain Battalion
BH PL	BH Patriotic League / Patriotic League of BiH
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
br	Brigade
c/o	Defence Line
CCCH	Chief of Command of Central Headquarters
CLoB	Central Logistics Base
COOV	Military Training and Education Centre
CV	Communication Center
CZ	Civil Protection
DG	Sabotage Group
DM	Deutsch Marks
DŠK	Degtyaryov-Shpagin Calibre
DVD	Volunteer Fire Department
EC	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
EEC	European Economy Community
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Gbr	Guards Brigade
GS	Main Staff
GS HVO	Croatian Defense Council Main Staff
h/o	Chemical Weapons
HBNA	Herzeg-Bosnian News Agency
HIS	Croatian Information Service
HIT	Department Store
HOS	Croatian Defense Forces
HR-HB	Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
HRM	Croatian Navy
HRSS	Croatian Peasant Workers' Party
HRT	Croatian Radio and Television
HRZ	Croatian Air Force
HTV	Croatian Television
HV	Croatian Army
HVO	Croatian Defense Council
HZ-HB	Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	Executive Committee
IO	Executive Committee

IPD	Informative Political Activity / Informative Propaganda Activity / Informative Psychological Activity
IZM / IKM	Separate Command Post / Forward Post / Divisional Command Post
JNA / JA	Yugoslav People's Army / Yugoslav Army
KČ	Company Commander
KM	Command Post
KO	Detachment Commander
KOG	Counterintelligence Group
KOS	Counterintelligence Service
KOV	Land Army
KOV	Land Army
KPJ	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
KŠ	Crisis Staff
KV	Platoon Commander
KVŠ	Military Crisis Staff
KZ	Cryptographic Protection
LARD	Light Artillery Rocket Division
LoB	Logistics Base
LRL	Lightweight Rocket Launcher
M/V	Motor Vehicles
MAD	Mixed Artillery Division
MB	Mortar
mbr	Mechanised Brigade
MKBJ	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
MKCK / MCRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MO	Ministry of Defense
MORH	Ministry of Defense of The Republic of Croatia
MOS	Muslim Armed Forces
MP	Military Police
MRUD	Directed Fragmentation Mine
MTBR	Motorised Brigade
MTS / TMS / MS	Material and Technical Equipment / Technical and Material Equipment / Material Equipment
MVP	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MZ	Local Community
MZ / IC	International Community
NDH	Independent State of Croatia
NŠ	Chief of Staff
NŠVK	Supreme Command Chief of Staff
OAC	Operative Administration Center
ObP	Intelligence and Security
OG	Operative Group
Okb	Armored Battalion
OkŠO	District of Defence Staff
OKŠTO	District Territorial Defense Staff
ONO	All People's Defence
OPG	Operative Group
OpŠO	Municipal Defense Staff
OpŠTO	Municipal Staff of Territorial Defense

OS	Armed Forces
OSMP / OSPP	Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan
OZ	Operative Zone
OZ JIH	Operative Zone of South-East Herzegovina
p/m	Infantry Weapons
PAT	Anti-Aircraft Gun
Pdo	Anti-Terrorist Squad
PNŠ	Assistant of Chief of Staff
POČ	Anti-Armour Company
POG	Anti-tank shell / Anti-Armour Group
PZO / PVO	Air Defense
PZT	Temporarily Occupied Territory
RBiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RH	Republic of Croatia
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RRV	Radio Relay Communication
RS	Republic of Srpska
RSK	Republic of Serbian Krajina
RT	Rocket Artillery
RTB	Radio-Television Belgrade
RTS	Radio -Television of Serbia
RV	Radio Communication
RV / PVO	Air Force / Air Defense
SANU	Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
SAO	Serbian Autonomous Region
SAO Krajina	Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
Sb	Independent Battalion
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDAH	Party of Democratic Action-Croatia
SDB	Service of National Security
SDB / DBJ	State Security Service / State Security of Yugoslavia
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ / SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIS	Security Informative Service
SJB	Public Security Station
SKC	Split Clinical Center
SKH	Alliance of Communists of Croatia
SKJ	Alliance of Communists of Yugoslavia
SKOJ	Yugoslav Communist Youth Association
Smtb	Independent Motorised Battalion
SN.SL. / Sn.Sl.	Medical Service
SO PN	Special Unit for Particular Purpose
SPABAT	Spanish Battalion
SR BiH	Socialist Republic of BiH
SRJ	Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Crna Gora)
SVK / VSK	The Serbian Army of Krajina / Army of Srpska Krajina
SZUP	Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order
ŠVK	Supreme Command Staff
TANJUG	Telegraphic Agency of New Yugoslavia

TKT	Secret Commanding of Troops
TLF	Telephone
TO	Territorial Defense
tt	Trig Point
UB	Security Administration
UGOB	Bihać District Citizen's Association
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Forces
UZP / ZZP	Joint Criminal Undertaking
Vb	Vitez Brigade
VBR	Multiple Rocket Launcher
VEP	Military Economic Mission
VES	Military Occupational Speciality
VG	Military Garrison
VK / KV	Supreme Commander / Military Command
VOMP / VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
VONS	Council of Defense and National Security
VRS	Army of Republic of Srpska
VT	Firing Positions
WEU	Western European Union
WWII	World War II / Second World War
ZNG	Assembly of National Guard
ZRNS	Ground-based Radio Navigation System
ZTS	Aviation Technical Professions
ZZ VF	Joint Command of Federation Army
Ž/S	Living Force

