

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

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**Case No. IT-04-74-T**  
Original: English

**TRIAL CHAMBER III**

**Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding**  
**Judge Arpad Prandler**  
**Judge Stefan Trechsel**  
**Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua**

**Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis**

**Filed: 3 April 2009**

**THE PROSECUTOR**

v.

**JADRANKO PRLIĆ**  
**BRUNO STOJIĆ**  
**SLOBODAN PRALJAK**  
**MILIVOJ PETKOVIĆ**  
**VALENTIN ĆORIĆ**  
**BERISLAV PUŠIĆ**

- PUBLIC WITH PUBLIC ANNEXES-

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**SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF  
DR. VLADO ŠAKIĆ**

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**SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF  
DR. VLADO ŠAKIĆ**

1. Pursuant to and for the purposes of Rule 94 *bis* of the Rules and Evidence and Procedure, the Praljak Defence hereby submits by this pleading the following report of expert witness Dr. Vlado Šakić:
  - a. "The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995: A Socio-psychological expertise," provided in Annex A in English and Croatian.
2. Dr. Šakić is the sole author of the report provided in Annex A, and is, in the Praljak Defence's respectful submission, fully qualified to provide expert testimony should it be required in order to submit these reports into evidence. The *Curriculum Vitae* of Dr. Šakić is provided in Annex B.
3. Dr. Šakić will testify in the stead of Dr. Zvonimir Knezović pursuant to the Trial Chamber's Decision of 3 March 2009.<sup>1</sup>
4. All reference material is provided herein as Annex C. Accordingly, all reference material is now readily available to all parties.

Word Count: 340

Respectfully submitted,

By



Božidar Kovačić and Nika Pinter  
Counsel for the Accused Slobodan Praljak

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<sup>1</sup> Decision On Praljak Defence Request To Substitute Dr. Vlado Šakić For Expert Witness Zvonimir Knezović, 3 March 2009.

# **ANNEX A**

## **EXPERT REPORT**

Prof. Vlado Šakić, Ph.D.

**THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**  
**1991 – 1995**  
*A Socio-psychological expertise*

Zagreb, March 2009

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**A) SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK NEEDED  
FOR UNDERSTANDING THE WAR IN B&H 1991-1995**


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# I. CULTURE, SYSTEM OF VALUES, IDENTITY

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## 1. CULTURE AND SYSTEM OF VALUES

More recently, social sciences, in particular psychology and sociology, frequently use the concept of mental programming to explain the way in which people function. In terms of information technology, mental programming could be understood as "mental software" that helps us behave in a systematic way in different situations and makes our behaviour predictable. Mental programming is immaterial and immeasurable. It is therefore considered in the social sciences as one of the constructs yielded not by empirical knowledge but by thinking, which help us gain comprehension of complex social reality and of the ways humans behave in it. In order to facilitate understanding of this complex reality, scientists use models constructed to simplify the reality and to facilitate its visual presentation. **In view of this, Hofstede (2001) suggests a model of mental programming in the form of a three-level pyramid (Figure 1).**



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*Figure 1 Three levels of mental programming<sup>1</sup>*

The least unique but the most elementary level of mental programming is the universal level. We share it with all humankind. It refers primarily to the biological foundations and functioning of the human body and also to certain expressive behaviours such as laughing or weeping and partly to associative and

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<sup>1</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, p. 3



aggressive behaviours. The next is the collective level which is shared with people of the same group or category and which differentiates them from the members of other groups and categories. The third is the individual level and this refers to the unique characteristics of each member of humankind that are not shared with anyone else and that allow for different behaviours within the same collective culture. **Back in 1953, anthropologist Kluckhohn and social psychologist Murray anticipated this kind of model of mental programming when they expressed that every man is simultaneously "like all other men, like some other men and like no other man".**

Mental programmes can be inherited, i.e. transferred genetically or acquired by learning after birth. As a rule, the closer they are to the base of the pyramid the more likely they are the result of inheritance, which implies that the least inherited and the most acquired by learning are mental programmes at the top of the individual level. **Collective programmes are those transferred from generation to generation in certain groups; they make them different from other groups. These are primarily groups of the same cultural or national background.**

**Throughout history, the human population has developed its variety through genes, language and culture.** Based on DNA investigations, genetic diversity can be traced back to a period between ten and hundred thousand years ago, language diversity from a thousand to ten thousand years and cultural from five hundred to five thousand years. It is important to point out that scientists agree that no causal relationship exists between genetic, language and cultural diversity, although they have frequently followed the same historical paths. As an illustration, Swedes and Finns, though genetically related, speak completely different languages whereas Croats and Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina speak a similar language but belong to different cultures.

In order to understand identity, it is important to know the empirical and theoretical foundations of the constructs that serve as a framework for understanding (and to include, in addition to mental programming, culture and system of values as most important constructs), but also a model of their mutual interconnection and intertwinement at the universal, collective and individual level of human behaviour and experience. The "Onion Diagram" (Hofstede, 2001) is a schematic representation of a model for the manifestation of culture at different levels of depth (Figure 2) that provides insight into the connection between a system of values, culture and identity. Before discussing the model itself, it is useful to mention some of the definitions of culture and system of values. Hofstede (2001) defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another", and values as "broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others".<sup>2</sup> Kroeber and Parsons see the culture construct as "transmitted and created content and

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<sup>2</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, p. 9

patterns of values, ideas and other symbolic-meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behaviour and the artefacts produced through them.<sup>3</sup> Anthropologist, Kluckhohn (1967; cited in Hofstede, 2001) defines values as conceptualisations which might be explicit and implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group in relation to what is desirable and involve selection from available modes, means and ends of action.<sup>4</sup> Consistent with this definition, well-known definitions are offered by psychologists Rokeach (1973), Feather (1996) and Schwartz (1996)<sup>5</sup> who define values as desirable goals and guiding principles of life which vary in their importance. In particular, it should be mentioned that according to general belief, both culture and values are stable social categories that develop in a long-lasting process and that they do not change easily. In addition, both these social categories are developed and transmitted at the group level, and individuals internalise them as part of their social (collective) identity.




Figure 2. The "Onion Diagram": manifestation of culture at different levels of depth<sup>6</sup>

**According to Kluckhohn a system of values is a core element of culture.<sup>7</sup>** Out of the four elements in the diagram, only values are not visible and cannot be observed. They are only apparent through behaviour, whereas rituals, heroes and symbols represent visible elements of a culture that can be

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<sup>3</sup>Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, p. 9

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 5

<sup>5</sup> Rohan, Meg, J., *A Rose By Any name: A Value Construct*, in journal "Personality and Social Psychology Review", Vol. 4, No. 3, 2000, p. 257

<sup>6</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, p. 11

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 10

identified from inside or outside of a group. **Characteristically, visible elements are contained in human practice and can be observed outside a group, but their meanings are only recognisable to group members.**

**Within a global framework, culture is most frequently positioned within the framework of society in national, supranational, regional and ethnic groups,** although, as stated by Hofstede (2001) culture can be connected to any human collective or category such as an organization, occupation, gender and age groups, family, etc. At the national level, cultural homogeneity may range from very low which is characteristic for new nations, to very high which is characteristic for stable long-standing nations. The latter type of cultural homogeneity is relevant for this expertise. Figure 3 offers a schematic representation of a model for stabilization of cultural patterns at the national level.




Figure 3. Stabilization of cultural patterns at the national level<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures 's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, p. 12

**As indicated by the author and shown in the scheme above, the centre of the process of stabilization of national culture is occupied by a system of societal norms based on the system of values of a dominant group.** Their origin lies in ecological factors that are important for the physical and social environment. Societal norms facilitate the development and maintenance of social institutions of different structures and functioning modes (family, educational, political, legal system, etc.). Once established, these institutions reinforce the societal norms and the ecological conditions responsible for their development, which makes the process a closed circle. When the process becomes stabilized it is hard to change it, especially in relatively closed societies. Namely, institutions can change but without influence on societal norms that remain unchanged. Thus, the system of values of the dominant group gradually becomes more dominant in new institutions as well, which facilitates the establishment of the same or similar societal norms.

In further dealings with this model, **the author emphasizes the importance of a historical perspective in order to understand not only the process of cultural pattern stabilization, but cultural diversity at the world level.** Within a historical context, culture can be understood as the crystallization of history in the mind, heart and hands of the living generations. Explanations of cultural differences among different national groups therefore require a comparative study of history. At the general level, historical analysis shows that with this system certain peoples have retained their identity for thousands of years although they were faced with the loss of independence, deportations and loss of language (e.g. Jews, Basques, Roma) whereas other populations in identical circumstances have vanished under the pressure of outside influences (such as the Celts and Romans). In other words, for a complete understanding of the process of the cultural pattern stabilization at the national level within a historical context, it is necessary to know both the strength of self-regulation of the process and the strength of exterior influences. It is important to mention that Hofstede built his model on the basis of an empirical comparison of fifty different national cultures at the world level, taking into account the necessity for multidisciplinary and an interdisciplinary approach to studies of culture and system values. Therefore, this model is globally applicable.

The basic reason for extensively referring to Hofstede's model was to highlight the importance of understanding the relationship between culture and a system of values and their role in understanding identity. **It is also important to mention that culture, a system of values and identity are interdependent, but not identical categories.** Thus, for example, it is possible that groups or

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populations of different identities that have a related system of values are in constant conflict (example of language identities in Belgium and of religious in the Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina). In addition, the same cultural group may often represent its identity in several ways; Herzegovians of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent themselves as Croats in Europe and as Europeans in the United States.

## 2. IDENTITY

Over the past three decades identity has been a central topic of social psychology to many social psychologists (see Descamps & Devos, 1998). This also applies to sociology within the framework of symbolic interactionism and the sociocultural theory perspective, whereas in the area of anthropology, special attention has focused on the relationship between culture and the individual, i.e. the aspect of cultural identity is one of the central concerns of cultural anthropology. From a historical perspective, there is a prevailing interest in the analysis of national and ethnic identities, which is also a theoretically important topic from a political point of view.

Why has the topic of identity gained so much attention in social sciences and humanities? The socio-psychological and sociological perspectives seem to offer the most accurate answer. During the seventies, a research tradition known as "social identity theory" (SIT) developed in social psychology, while in sociology, partly in opposition to symbolic interactionism, theories of identities based on the roles and identity theories were developed. Recently, some sociologists have suggested the integration of sociological and psychological approaches to identity within the framework of a scientific perspective under the title of sociological social psychology.<sup>9</sup> In both perspectives, the basic assumption is that identity is a response to questions related to "who we are", "which groups do we belong to", "what makes us different from others" and "how we see ourselves". To a certain degree, the questions themselves contain an explanation for interest in examining identity. Namely, in modern societies, market-oriented individuals are mostly being offered a number of acceptable individual identities like never before, based on their social interaction with various social groups, roles that determine them as well as possibilities to develop them. In other words, identity is no longer defined by place of birth, social and religious affiliation and parental status to the same extent as before. Globalisation and the market economy along with a prevailing media influence are shaping the social environment where individual differences and similarities are often shown through a choice of clothes, things, media idols etc. Web communication imposes an additional burden to the process of individual identity formation. Therefore,

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<sup>9</sup> Stets, Jane, E., Burke, Peter, J., *A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity*, In Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, p. 133- 134

the adoption of identity styles in contemporary circumstances is among the more demanding of life's challenges and lasts a lifetime.<sup>10</sup>

**According to the mentioned perspectives, there are two basic identity components - social and individual. Individual represents a psychological aspect of identity that refers to determinants which make an individual unique within a group, whereas a social or collective component represents the sociological aspect of identity which refers to the determinants of resemblance among group members.** Turner (1987)<sup>11</sup> in his theory of self-categorisation distinguishes three levels at which individuals can define themselves in terms of identity: subordinate, intermediate and superordinate level. At the superordinate level of self-categorisation, all people belong to the same group - humankind and are compared to other species and forms of life. At the intermediate level people belong to certain social groups (cultural, national, religious, sex, age, occupational etc.) and are compared to other groups within the human race. At the subordinate level individuals define themselves in terms of their unique characteristics and are compared to other individuals within a group they belong to. According to Turner, there is a fundamental antagonism between emphasis of separate levels which means that emphasis of one causes reduction or inhibition of the other two levels. For example, if individuals highly identify themselves with a certain group, that will lead to an increased in-group similarity at the intermediate level and inter-group differences. According to Tajfel (1972)<sup>12</sup> the social identity of an individual is associated with their recognition of belonging to certain social groups as well as of emotional significance and the value attached that arises from the membership. Through membership in different groups an individual actually adopts their own social identity that defines their particular place in society. The author, however, warns that belonging to certain groups contributes to the development of a positive social identity only if this involves membership in a group that is favoured in comparison to other groups. Comparing their own to other groups, individuals therefore attempt to increase differences for the benefit of favouring their own group.

As an introduction into the next section dealing with national identity, it is useful to mention several more theoretical insights with relation to culture and identity. **More recent approaches to culture in the frame of sociocultural theories do not perceive culture as a system of meaning only, but also as a process of constant creation and reproduction of cultural patterns through practice and**

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<sup>10</sup> Ryan, Richard M., Deci, Edward, L., On Assimilating Identities to the Self: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Internalization and Integrity within Cultures, In Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, p. 255.

<sup>11</sup> Stets, Jane, E., Burke, Peter, J., *A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity*, in book Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, p. 145

<sup>12</sup> Devos, Thierry, Banaji, Mahzarin, B., *Implicit Self and Identity*, in book Leary, Mark, R., Tangney, June, Price, *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, p. 156

activities of an individual in a given situation.<sup>13</sup> Culture understood in this way presumes the interrelationship of culture and the social aspect of an individual's identity. Namely, cultural context facilitates and influences adoption of the social aspect of individual's identity whereas social identity regulates aspects of cultural cognition which are prominent in a certain context.<sup>14</sup> In terms of individual cognitive processes, this implies that certain social identities and cognitive cultural patterns may represent a psychological set simultaneously activated in certain social situations affecting individual perceptions of social environment and of the world in general. Furthermore, various threats can increase the probability of strengthening or weakening the network of cultural cognitions in time and space. In addition, these statements support the explanation of the way individuals express themselves within their membership groups. Depending on cultural cognitions maintained by the group in a certain society, social identity may in individuals give rise to opinions that reflect their individual uniqueness as group members. Halloran and Kashima (2006)<sup>15</sup> conclude that these recent approaches in the framework of socio-cultural theories and theories of social identities, and especially Turner's theory of self-categorization provide an opportunity for further theoretical and empirical insights that will help in gaining a clearer understanding of the relationship between culture, society and the individual.

### 3. NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity is a contemporary construct developed in social psychology and sociology within the context of the mentioned theories. Within the concept of social identity, national identity is seen as an important component of the social aspect of an individual's identity. The approach has been developed from numerous empirical insights especially over the past twenty years. However, interest for discussions and analyses of dominant characteristics of individual nations has been present in philosophy since the very beginning. In the 14<sup>th</sup> century, Ibn Khaldun, an Arab philosopher held by some to be the founder of sociology, in his book *Al Muqaddima* analysed various characteristics of nomadic and sedentary tribes such as their mentality, education, social and political behaviour, architecture, etc. Among the European philosophers, many have discussed what will be later included in anthropology under the concept of "national character"; most distinguished were Hume, Montesquieu and Kant. During the first positivistic phase, Wilhelm Wundt (1911-1920) the founder of experimental psychology wrote a 10-volume book *Völkerpsychologie* (Psychology of Peoples). As a valuable contribution, this

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<sup>13</sup> Halloran, Michael, J., Kashima, Emiko, S., Culture, *Social Identity and the Individual*, In Postmes, Tom, Jetten, Jolanda (ed.), *Individuality and the Group*, London, 2006, p. 140

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 140 - 141

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, pp 141-145

book deals with the cross-cultural, comparative psychological analysis of different countries based on language, myths, morals, religion, art and law.

The concept of "national character" was also developed in anthropology and became a central theme of anthropological studies and debates in the period between 1930 and 1950. According to one of the numerous definitions national character represents "relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of the society".<sup>16</sup> In that context, a term "*modal personality*" was used as an alternative for "national character", which methodologically facilitated anthropological research within the "culture and personality" perspective as it was called. The extent of interest in and popularity of that kind of research during the mentioned period can be best illustrated by the example of Ruth Benedict, the author of a well known book *Patterns of Culture* (1934/1959).<sup>17</sup> Along with her colleague, she was frequently invited by the U.S. Government during and after World War II to help them understand the psyche of enemies: Germans, Japanese and Russians.

The concept of national character ceased to be a central theme after the introduction of psychological and sociological research in the framework of anthropology. General objections to traditional anthropological methods entailed their inability to encompass the whole complexity of a nation, leading to oversimplified and historical theories which have not allowed a comparison of differences in behaviour. Approached in this way, national character was often described in stereotypes which are known to be a false projection of reality. Over the sixties and later, these objections resulted in methodological consensus stating that information about a population can be considered scientifically valid only when it fulfils several criteria. First, it must be of descriptive and not evaluative nature. Second, it must be verifiable from several independent sources. Third, it must apply at least to a statistical majority in the investigated population. Finally, it must be discriminative, that is, to indicate those characteristics that distinguish one population from another. Following that methodological path, contemporary theories of social identity and socio-cultural theories within psychology and sociology were developed.

**Modern approaches see national identity as a component of social or collective identity of the individual that is adopted in a determined social and cultural context.** According to Halloran and Kashima (2006)<sup>18</sup> a segment of cultural cognition is mediated by individuals' social identities and the more emphasised are those social identities, the more significant part of cultural cognition they mediate. On the other hand, except within the boundaries of one's national state, national attachment as an

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<sup>16</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, p. 13

<sup>17</sup> Ibid

<sup>18</sup> Halloran, Michael J., Kashima, Emiko S., Culture, *Social Identity and the Individual*, In Postmes, Tom, Jetten, Jolanda (ed.), *Individuality and the Group*, London, 2006, p. 142



emotional expression of national identity may develop outside the national state (for example Kurds), at the regional level, or it may outgrow one's national state boundaries to the supra-national level (for example Latinos in Central and South America).<sup>19</sup>

As national identity has its origin in the nation it may be helpful to explain the meaning of the construct "nation" within the context of national identity as discussed in contemporary theories of identity. It is important because there are a number of definitions of "nation" from different perspectives. **The most frequent understanding of nation, which is considered traditional in modern theories, is associated with the category of so-called "national sentiment" the base of which is made up of four components: territory, cultural connectedness, ethnicity and existence of national state. The formation of a nation and the majority of nation-states on those foundations took place in a historical process that ended in the middle of the 19th century.**<sup>20</sup> It should be mentioned that the term "nation" has been in use much longer and its use with other meanings has been older than the meaning ascribed to it today. Thus, in the Middle Ages, the Hebrew translation of "nation" had two possible meanings - predominance and lineage. It is also used as an expression for "natural quality" or "inborn quality". At universities during the Middle Ages the term was used to denote a group of students from the same region, and corresponding use with reference to membership in groups sharing common origin, was used even before the term assumed its modern meaning. In the era of positivism, after national states had developed from the roots of "nations", nation-related constructs evolved, such as national community, national belonging, nationalism, national character, national attachment, national sentiment, national stereotypes, national identity, etc. Within this general context, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) **summarized theories which analyse the relationship between nation and individuals with traces of Anderson's thesis on nation as an "imagined community". Considering the strength of separate national categories such as nationalism, national stereotypes, national attachment, they warned that certain categories in modern communication should not be used in ways that would devalue or reward a member of any nation, but should be seen in interrelationship of action and its consequences, that is, communication should be based on arguments.**<sup>21</sup> As an illustration they cited Anzulovic<sup>22</sup> who maintains that one of causes of ethnic cleansing committed by Serbs in the 1991 aggression on Croatia was the persistently repeated thesis

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<sup>19</sup> Salazar, Jose Miguel, *Social Identity and National Identity*, In Worchel, Stephen, Morales, J. Francisco, Paez, Dario, Deschamps, Jean- Claude (ed.) *Social identity- international perspectives*, London, 1998, p. 116

<sup>20</sup> Korunić, Petar, *Nacija i nacionalni identitet*, (Nation and National Identity). In journal „*Zgodovinski časopis*”, 57, 2003, p. 2, downloaded 20. January from <http://www.filg.uj.edu.pl/~wwwip/postjugo/files/273/Etnicki-i-nacionalni-identitet.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Reicher, Stephen and Hopkins, Nick, *Self and nation*, Gateshead, 2001, p. 3- 5

<sup>22</sup> Ibid p.6

about Croats as "killers and incurably dangerous" created by Serbian politicians and intellectuals.

## II. GROUPS AND GROUP CONFLICTS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ETHNOCENTRISM AND NATIONALISM

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### 1. GROUPS AND GROUP PROCESSES

Groups are an important part of identity, helping people to define who they are. **A group consists of two or more individuals who interact and depend on each other.**<sup>23</sup> This means that they, due to their needs and goals influence one another. During their lifetime, people belong to primary and secondary groups. **Primary** groups are those whose members are in frequent interaction and which exert strong influence on the identity of its members. The members are mutually tied with strong, multiple bonds and tend to permanently belong to a given group.<sup>24</sup> These are, for example, family and groups of friends. **Secondary** groups are characterized by less intimate interaction of their members who are less likely to identify themselves with other group members<sup>25</sup>. Behaviour of these group members is directed towards goals they want to achieve, and prevailing relationships are those of subordination and superordination. Secondary groups are, for example, political parties or professional associations.

All societies have **norms on what behaviours are acceptable**, some of these norms are shared by all members of the society, and some differ from one group to another.<sup>26</sup> Social norms are strong determinants of human behaviour which is seen from what happens when people frequently violate them: other group members avoid violators and in extreme cases force them to leave the group.

Along with norms, **social roles** are a very important concept associated with groups. While norms define how all members of a group should behave, roles determine behavioural patterns of persons who occupy a particular position in a group. As well as social norms, roles can be helpful because people may know what to expect from each other. When group members follow a set of clearly defined roles, they are usually satisfied and their performance is good. However, roles may also give rise to certain difficulties. The greatest problem is that people may "engage" in a role to the extent that

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<sup>23</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Wilson, Timothy, D., *Social psychology*, New Jersey, 1998, p. 329.

<sup>24</sup> Calhoun, Craig, Light, Donald i Keller, Suzanne, *Sociology*, New York, 1994, p.188.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 189.

<sup>26</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*p. 340.

they lose their own identity and personality.<sup>27</sup> An example of this was provided by Philip Zimbardo in his well-known experiment in a simulated prison.<sup>28</sup> This highly respected social psychologist testifies even today in various court cases in order to explain that **momentary role frequently shapes the entire behaviour of a person** and that persons engaged in certain roles may behave in a completely incompatible way to their moral criteria.

All members of a group have their own role and all these roles are interconnected. Each role has a certain position, determined by the importance of a role in the group. **Some roles in a group are officially determined, while others may be accepted by any member.**<sup>29</sup>

Different group members join a group with different characteristics and they may join a group for very diverse reasons. In Straker's study of violence (1992)<sup>30</sup> the following types were identified among violent groups of young people: **leaders** (well-balanced, idealistic, dedicated to group, skilled and popular), **followers** (unstable, want to become heroes, potentially reckless, could become leaders), **conduits** (lacked sense of self, use group to define it, could lead, but would not intervene or change the course of the group), **conformists** (motivated by social conformity rather than by ideals, seek group acceptance, but passions not engaged), **psychological casualties** (antisocial, acts of aggression are due to their own antisocial impulses, not accepted by group). It can be noted that groups may be composed of very diverse personalities; it is therefore hard to control each of them individually. For example, since group acceptance is most important to conformists they probably do not have the courage to rebel against the wrong acts of an in-group member. Followers are prone to risk and to following the behaviour of others but, as previously mentioned, it is possible that others will begin to perceive them as leaders. Conduits are also individuals who do not have a sense of self; hence they have no personal responsibility.

Although a group consists of diverse personalities and carriers of different roles, group members demonstrate a tendency to **become more similar to each other** over time in their ideas, attitudes and behaviours, and this is called group cohesion. **Group cohesion** refers to characteristics of a group which connects its members and encourages mutual likeness.<sup>31</sup> The more cohesive the group, the greater is the probability that members will remain in the group (if they have choice), participate in group activities and attempt to attract new members who are like-minded. The same group usually

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<sup>27</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*, p. 340

<sup>28</sup> Ibid pp. 340- 341

<sup>29</sup> Rijavec, Majda (2000). *Vojna postrojba kao skupina*, In Pavlina, Želimir & Komar, Zoran (Ed.) *Vojna psihologija-knjiga prva*, Zagreb, 2000, p.202.

<sup>30</sup> Hinde, Robert & Pulkinnen, Lea, *Human aggressiveness and war*, in Boutwell, Jeffrey (Ed.) *Eliminating the causes of war*, Pugwash occasional papers, 2(3), 2001., p. 17, downloaded 12.2.2009. from [http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers\\_2-3.pdf#page=7](http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers_2-3.pdf#page=7)

<sup>31</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Willson, Timothy D. & Akert, Robin M., *Socijalna psihologija*, Zagreb, 2005., p. 304.

involves people who are similar according to some important characteristic, one or more of them, even before they joined the group, but, as previously stated, groups usually act in a way that encourage likeness among members<sup>32</sup>. A group of non-connected individuals becomes a highly cohesive group when its members **frequently interact**, that is, when they are in everyday contact.

High group cohesion functions in a way that goals, successes and failures of the group become personal.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the group begins to respond to events in its surroundings as a whole. **Threat and attack on one of its members is seen as threat and attack on the entire group.**<sup>34</sup> This can lead to so-called collective behaviour. **Collective behaviour** can be described as a development of unpredictable, quickly created norms and social structure in relatively spontaneous situations.<sup>35</sup> Collective behaviour is often seen in situations that are **outside usual situations**, such as those that require “redefining the situation, making sense of confusion”.<sup>36</sup> Groups make the development of certain forms of collective behaviours possible, which aid group members to become closer to each other. Collective behaviours are more common in groups with friendly relationships.<sup>37</sup> Collective behaviour are most frequently directed to some other group and **behaviours of that other group influence collective behaviours.**<sup>38</sup> For positive social identity, i.e. for positive evaluation of self as a member of the in-group it is important that the group can be favoured in relation to other groups,<sup>39</sup> i.e. that the in-group can be seen as better and stronger. Thus, if another group significantly threatens the positive identity of the in-group, their members often tend to engage in collective behaviours.

Being in a group may also lead to **deindividuation**, which is a state that may occur when a person is in a crowd, and refers to **the weakening of normal behavioural constraints**. A loss of identity experienced in a crowd may result in serious crimes a person would never think of doing if alone.<sup>40</sup> In the course of history, there have been numerous examples of groups who committed atrocious crimes. One such example is a terrible incident committed during the Vietnam War in **My Lai** village, when a group of American soldiers systematically killed hundreds of defenceless women, children and older men. In Europe, groups of football fans sometimes attack and beat one another. In

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<sup>32</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Willson, Timothy D. & Akert, Robin M., *Socijalna psihologija*, Zagreb, 2005., p. 302

<sup>33</sup> Rijavec, Majda (2000). *Vojna postrojba kao skupina*, In Pavlina, Želimir & Komar, Zoran (Ed.) *Vojna psihologija-knjiga prva*, Zagreb, 2000, p..203.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid

<sup>35</sup> Neal, David M., *A further examination of anonimity, contagion, and deindividuation in crowd and collective behavior*, “Sociological focus”, vol. 36, no 2, 1993, p. 100. [EBSCOhost Online Research](#) databases.

<sup>36</sup> Reicher, Stephen, *The psychology of crowd dynamics*, in Hogg, Michael A. & Tindale, R. Scott. (Ed.) *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes*, Oxford, 2001, p. 192.

<sup>37</sup> Neal, David, M. *A further...*, p. 105

<sup>38</sup> Reicher, Stephen, *The psychology...* 2001, p. 200

<sup>39</sup> Turner, John, C., *Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories*, In Ellemers, Naomi, Spears, Russell & Doosje, Bertjan (Ed.), *Social identity*, Oxford, 1999, p. 8.

<sup>40</sup> Aronson et al, *Social...*, p. 337.

the United States, hysterical fans at rock concerts have trampled one another to death. In the history of the United States, there were shameful examples of whites, who frequently wrapped up in the anonymity of white hoods, lynched African Americans.

### ***Massacre in My Lai***

*In 1968, North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, a U.S. Navy vessel sent on an intelligence spy task, Viet Cong launched the Tet offensive in Vietnam, Robert Kennedy was killed and demonstrations were held against the war in Vietnam all over the United States. In addition to all this, the year 1968 will also be remembered by the My Lai massacre.*

*The Quang Ngai province, situated in the west Vietnam, was a mixture of mountains, jungle, rice fields and beaches. Witnesses said that American soldiers could not move even half a mile a day because of the exuberant jungle. The Chu Lai hamlet was situated in this province in the vicinity of the only national road of South Vietnam Q1. The eleventh Brigade built a camp in the southern part of the province, in the town of Duc Pho. Until 1967, this area was dominated by the Viet Cong, and its population simply worshipped Ho Shi Min and his holy goal. The only way to drive out the Viet Cong was to clear the villages from the face of the earth. When the 11th Brigade arrived in Duc Pho, 70% of the village had already been destroyed. Without doubt, the the civilian population suffered the most, which was ruled by the Viet Cong during the night and by Americans during the day, who despite constant bombing, failed to obtain dominance over this part. The Vietnamese were getting them mostly by deadly traps that were set all over jungle. In February and March 1969 Charlie Company from the 1st Battalion of the 11th Brigade suffered considerable losses because of such traps. Patrolling near Son Mya, they came across a dense minefield. When the explosions began, instead of withdrawing they went forward, resulting in fifteen dead, and later Charlie Company lost more men, which led to the final figure of 28 dead.*

*Charlie Company leader, William Calley, was a normal young man, a typical American. Before joining the army, he worked several jobs: in insurance as an investigator, in a car washing service, as a tram conductor ... After completion of school for officers, he was transferred to Hawaii, where he trained for the aforementioned Charlie Company. When he came to Vietnam, his group became part of the 23rd Infantry Division, but Calley was not respected in his squad, and many wondered how he succeeded to complete a school for officers. On March 15 Charlie Company with commanders gathered around the 'home' of "Mad Dog" Madina, who was Calley's superior, in order to give commemoration to the slain Charlie George Cox. There Madina gave a short briefing about the attack on My Lai. Although it was never confirmed, one of the witnesses said that "Mad Dog" issued a command to shoot at civilians too; other witnesses from Charlie Company denied it.*

*On the early morning of March 16, Charlie Company went into action. At My Lai they were taken by Huey choppers of 174th chopper group. Besides Charlies, Ron Haeberle, the army photographer, who worked for the "Stars and Stripes," the U.S. Army magazine was in one of the choppers. Around 07.45 they arrived in the vicinity of My Lai, when its citizens become aware of the attack. They hid in the underground rooms built while the French*

were in this region. Calley and the 1st squad approached from the southeast, he was among the first to arrive in My Lai, and the first who suffered was an old man found in the field near the village. The first squad opened fire on nine Vietnamese farmers killing them on sight, and, according to witnesses, fired arbitrarily, or randomly at everything that moved. Some of the wounded villagers came to an American asking for help, but they were killed on the spot. "A woman came out from the 'hole' with a child in her hands; Widmar shot at her with a M-16 rifle, and she fell on the ground. Although the baby was still alive, Widmar shot at it," according to one of the witnesses. Varnado Simpson, one of the soldiers also killed a woman with a child and later admitted that he was responsible for the deaths of at least 25 people. The first squad continued deeper into the village. Although there was no enemy fire, they fired shots into 'holes' with people in them, or threw grenades. Young girls who were not killed; they were raped by Americans, sometimes forcing the whole family to watch. Pilot, Brian Livingston, wrote in a letter home that had never seen so many dead in one place and that most of them were - women and children. Other survivors, Calley murdered. While the massacre continued on the ground, Hugh Thompson operated one of the helicopters. A little farther from the village he saw a wounded woman in the field. When he approached, he saw one of the soldiers attack the woman and shoot her in the head. After he landed the chopper between the civilians and the Calley Group he witnessed several crimes. He ordered his men to shoot Calley if he tries something. After that he transferred a small number of survivors to Quang Ngai. The first squad continued to the eastern part of the village. Near the bridge, there were still forty women and children. Among them was a Buddhist priest. While Calley examined the priest on arms in the village, a child ran out from the crowd towards its mother. Calley killed him, and shot the priest as well. After that, the rest of the squad began to shoot survivors. Afterwards, the 1st squad and 3rd squad went into the action of clearing the village. Anything that survived the massacre was killed, both people and animals. However, no one can remember that any shot was fired on the 1st squad, led by Calley.

Even a **uniform** may diminish sense of responsibility for an individual's acts and increase aggressiveness. In sport, this phenomenon was reported by Rehm, Steinleitner and Lilli (1987)<sup>41</sup> - children wearing their casual clothes in team sport were less aggressive than those wearing uniforms. Deindividuation reduces responsibility for one's actions because it **decreases probability that any individual would be separated and blamed**.<sup>42</sup> It is more likely to appear when group members are anonymous in relation to those who control or those who should be controlling their behaviour.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Rehm, Jurgen, Steinleitner, Michael & Lilli, Waldemar, *Wearing uniform and aggression – A field experiment*, u časopisu "European journal of social psychology", 1987, vol. 17, p. 358. [EBSCOhost Online Research Databases](#).

<sup>42</sup> Aronson et al., *Social...*, 1998, p. 338.

<sup>43</sup> Neal, David M., *A further...*, p. 104.

A study by Tanis and Postmes<sup>44</sup> showed that in situations when individuals could not be personally identified, trusting behaviour towards other individuals depended exclusively on the fact whether an individual belongs to an in-group or out-group. This leads to the conclusion that deindividuation **increases the emphasis of social, that is, collective identity** and therefore **respect towards norms of the group** one belongs to. Enhanced social identity means that individuals perceive themselves as in-group members and not individuals. Through this behaviour, in-group members enhance their **collective identity**. Deindividuated group members perceive themselves as mutually very similar which in turn increases their mutual attractiveness.<sup>45</sup> Typical group members are liked more than non-typical ones. When in-group membership is very explicit, attraction is based upon who is and who is not a member of the group. This statement was confirmed **in laboratory in-field investigations and in-sport groups and organizations**.<sup>46</sup> Postmes and Spears<sup>47</sup> analysed sixty studies on deindividuation and confirmed that deindividuation increases conformity to group norms. Sometimes the norms of an individual's specific group may be in conflict with the norms of other groups or of society as a whole. When group members are together and when they deindividuated, **it is more likely that they will behave in conformity with group norms than with other norms**.

Thus, deindividuation decreases the probability that an individual will be separated and blamed on one hand, and enhances conformity to specific group norms on the other. The latter explanation is particularly applicable to war situations when an individual is often unable to conform to the generally accepted social norms because in this case they would not survive and would also endanger the lives of other unit members. There are examples in which soldiers were told to forget past norms if they want to fight and survive..

Deindividuation creates its **own morality**: that morality can mean exclusive love of in-group and less love for the rest of humankind. **Exposure to war has a strong negative effect on moral reasoning**.

Deindividuation may also reinforce positive behaviours, most frequently towards in-group members. Thus, deindividuation does not always lead to aggressive or antisocial behaviour. It depends on what the group norms are, but group norms in war are significantly different from those in peacetime. If a group is angry and its norms indicate violent behaviour, deindividuation will cause in-group

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<sup>44</sup> Tanis, Martin & Postmes, Tom, Short Communication A social identity approach to trust: Interpersonal perception, group membership and trusting behaviour, in "European Journal of Social Psychology", Vol. 35, 2005, p.421. [EBSCOhost Online Research Databases](#).

<sup>45</sup> Hogg, Michael, A. Social categorization, depersonalization, and group behavior, u knjizi Hogg, Michael A. i Tindale, R. Scott. (Ed.) *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes*, Oxford, 2001, p. 66.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

<sup>47</sup> Aronson, et al, *Socijalna.....*, 2005., p.313.

aggressive behaviour.<sup>48</sup> In situations of war, soldiers are ready to defend against aggression and to use aggression, so the in-group norm advocates aggressive behaviour against anyone who is perceived as an enemy.

## 2. MILITARY UNIT AS A GROUP

### 2.1. Group processes in a military unit

A military unit, though formed in order to achieve a certain goal and governed by relations of superordination and supraordination, becomes a primary group over time<sup>49</sup> which implies **strong bonds between individuals** and **strong feeling of mutual belonging**.

It is very important that the task of a military unit is well performed so it is very important to know who is suppose to be doing what and that all the necessary roles are included and well performed.<sup>50</sup> This falls within **leadership**, that is, its formal aspects. They are carried out by the commander or second-in-command, and their task is supervision, supply and communication with other units. **A role-defining task and determination of acceptable behaviour** may rest with the commander or second-in-command, but also with other more experienced unit members. A person who undertakes this task must clearly state to everyone what is expected. In war, problems may arise especially in relation to this task; in a situation of crisis, the task may be taken on by a person who is not sufficiently competent but driven by emotions or guided by incorrect information. In peacetime conditions, that person's role is to encourage soldiers to talk about their needs or wishes in order to coordinate them in their duties as well as possible, which in war conditions can hardly be fulfilled. The role of **idol** is most frequently assigned to experienced members of lower rank but in various situations the role may be also assigned to others. The role of **instructor** makes sure that members with insufficient knowledge acquire that knowledge. An important role is also that of **emotional support provider** - that person should be a good listener and help soldiers adjust.<sup>51</sup> In a war situation, one must act quickly, emotional support is prevailingly given through, for example, joint action, i.e. it is hard to find the time to listen to each person in a difficult emotional state at length.

Soldiers in a unit are **in everyday contact** which encourages **unit cohesiveness**.<sup>52</sup> They get acquainted very quickly and become familiar with the strong and weak points of each member of their group. In the beginning, public exposure of each soldier to their unit and daily interaction may lead to

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<sup>48</sup> Aronson et al, *Socijalna...*, 2005. p. 314.

<sup>49</sup> Rijavec, M. (2000). *Vojna...*, p. 203.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 202.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p. 202.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p. 201.



conflict, but as cohesion develops the tolerance becomes greater. **Soldiers have common goals and ideals.**<sup>53</sup> When people recognize that they share goals and ideals with another person, they tend to ignore their mutual differences and to emphasize the similarities. Here it is necessary to list the specifics of military units in war compared to peacetime groups: military unit members do not have a choice to leave the group if it does not suit them and they are more likely to survive if they are well connected with others and if they like them, thus **a strong cohesiveness in a military unit is crucial.** In formal groups (in which there is reduced possibility of choice e.g. military units) the psychosocial climate has a greater significance than in non-formal groups. Psychosocial climate in military units may depend on the inclusion, unity, officer's support, personal status, order and organization, clarity and officer supervision.<sup>54</sup> Here again, the importance of unity and personal soldiers' involvement should be emphasised as well as that of clarity. When chaotic situations occur, what is expected of them and the consequences of this if they do not meet these expectations is not clear to soldiers. Therefore, they seek ways to help themselves and others to increase clarity in order to feel safer in their own units.

War requires a strong focus on the task because the situation requires high control. The leader's role in a military unit is crucial at all stages. Officers' duties in the army can be categorized into six areas: supervision, planning, initiating and directing actions, administration management, overtaking personal responsibility, demonstrating belonging and loyalty to a unit and the army as a whole and implementation of immediate tasks.<sup>55</sup> Main features of the duties of a high commander are complexity of duties, duration of tasks, an international view, insight into the military system, compliance, prediction, etc.<sup>56</sup> We must note that it is important to bear in mind that the complexity of duties in a chaotic war situation in which it is very difficult to predict the actions of the other side and reactions of one's own soldiers. Predictions and prevention of negative reactions of one's own soldiers would be possible to a greater extent if the commander or their fellow-soldiers had a wide range of psychological knowledge. It is also necessary to note that, when groups become too large, interaction with all members is not possible.<sup>57</sup> Therefore the commander, due to the size of a unit under his command, has no possibility of interaction, and consequently no control over the actions of all soldiers.

It is also necessary to **specify the difference between leaders and commanders:** a leader is a person who is voluntarily accepted by group members while a commander is appointed by a commander at a higher level of command.<sup>58</sup> In a situation of war, the informal leader of a small group

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<sup>53</sup> Rijavec, M. (2000). *Vojna...*, p. 201.

<sup>54</sup> Hudina, Boris. (2000). *Psihosocijalna klima u vojnim skupinama*, In Pavlina, Želimir i Komar, Zoran (ed.) *Vojna psihologija-knjiga prva*, Zagreb, 2000, p.257.

<sup>55</sup> Jeličić, Z. et al, *Psihologijske...*, p. 269.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 291

<sup>57</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*,1998, p.340.

<sup>58</sup> Jeličić, Z. et al, *Psihologijske...*, p. 272.

may be someone who is not a formal unit commander. Leaders can sometimes be chosen because they represent group values, or they themselves shape the values of group.<sup>59</sup> Leaders can encourage aggression and limit the prospects of their successors. They may have a critical role in legitimizing violence, in equalizing violence with loyalty and in strengthening the image inside the group of "soldiers of liberation" and the external as a "danger for the group or society." In addition, leaders can reinforce hostile feelings towards an out-group to strengthen in-group integrity, to stabilize their own position and to obtain necessary resources.<sup>60</sup>

## 2.2. Military unit in conflict

The nature of a conflict and its resolution has been the topic of much socio-psychological research. There are numerous approaches to the ways people react to dilemmas that occur in a conflict, including sociological research of social movements and historical, economic and political analyses of international relations. **The socio-psychological approach is unique because its methods seek to clearly explain the causes and consequences.**<sup>61</sup> The two sides in an armed battle can assess that they cannot afford to surrender their weapons out of fear that the other side will take advantage of their weakened position.<sup>62</sup> In this case, the so-called prisoner's dilemma is the issue: a person has to choose a certain behaviour but does not know what the other side will choose. The situation of war is strongly associated with the prisoner's dilemma; the sides engaged in war conceal from one another their capacities and strategies, and each side should be prepared that the other side will not adhere to its part of agreement, e.g. truce. Distrust between conflicting sides is highlighted in war.

Conflict is easier to solve at the level of individuals than at the level of groups. Studies conducted by John Schopler and Chet Insko (1999)<sup>63</sup>, showed a greater likelihood of co-operation between two individuals in the event of prisoner's dilemma, than between two groups that need to make their decision in a given situation. This is because it is more likely that people will assume that the other individual is more willing to cooperate than a group. In war, a strong categorisation takes place, i.e. both in-group and out-group members perceive themselves exclusively as members of their groups rather than as individuals. The phenomenon that all out-group members consider themselves alike is called

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<sup>59</sup> Hinde, Robert & Pulkinnen, Lea, *Human aggressiveness and war*, u publikaciji Boutwell, Jeffrey (ed.) *Eliminating the causes of war*, Pugwash occasional papers, 2(3), 2001., p. 16, downloaded 12.2.2009. from [http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers\\_2-3.pdf#page=7](http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers_2-3.pdf#page=7)

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>61</sup> Aronson et al, *Social...*, p.359.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 361.

<sup>63</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Socijalna...*,2005, p. 328.

**out-group homogeneity.**<sup>64</sup> This leads to behaviour that none "of them" can be trusted. In war, it is important to identify the enemy and membership in an enemy group is perceived as the only relevant characteristic.

**Negotiation** is defined as a form of communication between opposed sides in a conflict when offers are given and received, wherein solutions are reached only when both sides agree. A limitation to successful negotiation is that people often assume that they are imprisoned in a conflict in which only one side may come out as a winner. This compromise is called an integrative solution which is defined as a solution in conflict where both sides exchange concessions consistent with their differing interests. Namely, each side makes the greatest concessions in areas that are of no importance to them but of importance to the other side. They will be less willing to negotiate if they have had bad experiences in previous negotiations with the other side, i.e. if they know through their experience that the other side often has not adhered to an agreement. This results in a strong distrust towards members of the other side and consequently in more readiness to engage in an aggressive response.

### 3. FACTORS REINFORCING GROUP SUBMISSION TO SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Communication among group members leads to the creation of so-called shared reality which means that communication with others influences an individual's perception of reality and it becomes almost identical to perceptions of other in-group members.<sup>65</sup> People have two basic needs for which they need other people: to have correct information on events that are not clear to them and to be accepted by their in-group. In a war situation, both needs are markedly emphasized because survival depends on their fulfilment. Therefore people in this situation become more submissive to social influence or less critical regarding information and demands put forth by other in-group members.

Existence of certain emotions to a large degree increases the likeliness of submission to social influence.<sup>66</sup> Emotions act deeply, momentarily and often cannot be diminished. Gustav Le Bon<sup>67</sup> was the first researcher who noted how emotions and behaviours can quickly spread through a crowd - this effect he referred to as **social contagion**.

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<sup>64</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*, 1998, p. 510.

<sup>65</sup> Thompson, Leigh & Fine, Gary Alan, *Socially shared cognition, affect and behavior: a review and integration*, u časopisu "Personality and social psychology review", vol.3, br.4., 1999, p. 288. [EBSCOhost Online Research Databases.](#)

<sup>66</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_pratkanis.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_pratkanis.htm)

<sup>67</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*, 1998, p. 288.

The emotions that often occur in crisis situations and which increase susceptibility to social influence, are **fear, guilt, dishonour, a threat that a person will experience insult and empathy**.<sup>68</sup> Killing 450 to 500 Vietnamese civilians in the village of My Lai can be explained by fear to a great extent. The soldiers were very scared, because they had never been in combat before and rumours indicated that one of the most terrifying enemy units, the forty-eighth Vietnamese Battalion was going to occupy the village. One of the helicopter pilots reported in radio contact that he saw Vietcong soldiers on the ground and subsequently American soldiers jumped from the helicopter and opened fire.

Apart from fear and some of the previously mentioned emotions, some other phenomena associated with emotions contribute to an increasing submission to social influence. These are reciprocity, techniques such as doors-in-the-face and feet-in-the-door, predicting regret, a sense of loyalty and limited resources.<sup>69</sup> **Reciprocity** refers to the fact that a person loyal to his in-group can in turn expect loyalty from other in-group members when a need arises. This relates to the importance of the **sense of loyalty**. The **door-in-the-face** technique involves compliance to a minor request following noncompliance to a larger request.<sup>70</sup> For example, a person may not do the worst thing that one of his fellow-soldiers asks him to do, but in order to meet the request he will agree to a compromise and will perform a less serious deed. Here it is important to note that some aggressive acts may seem quite acceptable to persons in war because they seemed less serious than what they had seen or heard in the course of war. In comparison, they would consider these same acts as serious deeds in peacetime conditions. The **foot-in-the-door** technique has the opposite effect; after complying with a small request it becomes much more likely that a person will comply with larger requests.<sup>71</sup> Associated with this technique is a phenomenon of **self-justification**:<sup>72</sup> persons begin with acts that are not too aggressive or with passive behavior in situations in which they should help to someone (such as victims of aggression). The next step is to perform something slightly bad (e.g., strike the other person lightly) which is followed by another deed that is worse than the previous one. Consequently people can gradually become more and more aggressive. Justification for this phenomenon is the following: "It is not much worse than what I have now done (for example, kicked someone with my foot) than what I did yesterday (for example, hit someone with my hand)". With self-justification it is important to note that this involves very small shifts and persons in some way "get used to" their increasingly aggressive acts.

If persons **predict that they may later regret** for disagreeing with other in-group members or some important person, they will be more submissive to social influence. For example, a soldier who

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<sup>68</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_pratkanis.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_pratkanis.htm)

<sup>69</sup> Ibid

<sup>70</sup> Aronson E. et al, *Social...*, 1998, p. 313.

<sup>71</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Socijalna...*, 2005, p. 315.

<sup>72</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*, 2005, p. 294

thinks that he will regret not conforming to the rest of his group will more likely decide to participate in it as well.

It is important to emphasize the importance of soldiers' conformity to their group, although this may lead to so-called **conformity to a wrong norm**.<sup>73</sup> For example, such a norm could imply that a crime committed by members of other groups should be avenged by harming any member of this other group. These norms are usually **spontaneously** followed, i.e. people start to behave in accordance with them **without thinking**.

**Scarce resources** as a situation with increased submission to social influence will be mentioned later in the discussion crisis situations.

**Ambiguous situations** increase the tendency of people to use other people as a source of information. People are most open to influence of others when they are not sure about correct answers, appropriate behaviour, or a correct idea. Greater uncertainty is associated with higher dependence on others.<sup>74</sup> In addition, a person that is regarded as a **professional/expert** or well-informed will be worth more as a guide in an ambiguous situation.<sup>75</sup> An "expert" can be considered someone who saw or heard something, thus, they do not have to be a truly professional person. Moreover, there is a possibility that in crisis conditions a person who "knows" something is regarded as an expert without actually verifying that knowledge. In situations when people do not have the possibility of thinking carefully, they often rely on so-called peripheral signs, i.e. they conclude whether a person has adequate expertise to propose and / or lead action on the basis of that person's superficial characteristics.<sup>76</sup>

**Crisis situations** also increase submission to social influence. In these situations people do not have time to stop and think about their behaviour; they need to act at that very moment. In states of fear and panic the only natural reaction is to see how other people react and to do the same.<sup>77</sup> Persons in crisis do not have the full capacity to identify choices and options so they often estimate that something needs to be done quickly. People want something more if they have less time to obtain it. The **Bush administration** used this phenomenon **in initiating war against Iraq**: "Time is flying and, if we do stop Saddam quickly, he will attack us with nuclear weapons".<sup>78</sup> A battle situation is an emotionally charged situation in which critical thinking is less likely. A crisis situation may also occur in unfavourable conditions caused by scarce or limited resources or during hard times when groups will be more likely to characterised by competition, negative attitude and violence towards the other groups. This is called

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<sup>73</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*, 1998,p. 312

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p.289

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, p. 291

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, p. 247-248

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, p. 290.

<sup>78</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-f.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-f.htm)

**theory of realistic conflict.**<sup>79</sup> Figures below shows a relationship between the cotton price and number of lynch cases of African Americans; it can be seen that decline in price of cotton increased the number of lynching in the period from 1882 to 1930. At that time the entire economy depended on cotton production, and the low cotton price meant poverty which raised negative attitudes, discontent and aggression in the white American population.

Figure 4 The relationship between the total number of lynch cases and cotton prices<sup>80</sup>



**Social influence can be also enhanced by context**, which can operate in a very subtle and difficult to detect ways. For example, if an act **is denoted as right** or is **associated with some positive notion** (for example, unnecessary aggression against an enemy soldier is associated with love for own people) a person may consider the act as an expression of patriotism. Context is also **associated with expectations**: if part of a unit expects a soldier to avenge the death of one of his fellow-soldiers, the soldier is likely to conform to these expectations. Also, if soldiers **are not within reach of correct information**, they are more likely to believe rumours or incorrect conclusions.<sup>81</sup>

**Escalation situations** are also among crisis situations. They occur when certain projects or courses of action lead to losses, but there is a possibility of achieving a better outcome by investing

<sup>79</sup> Aronson, E. et al *Social...*, 1998, p. 528- 530

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 529- 530

<sup>81</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_pratkanis.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_pratkanis.htm)

more effort, time or material resources. Persons with a more distinct social identity are more likely to increase their commitment to an action that had a bad start.<sup>82</sup>

Besides believing that other people are right, which is a kind of conformity associated with informational social influence, people are likely to conform and behave like others because they want to be accepted which is referred to as **normative social influence**.<sup>83</sup> A person who does not conform to the in-group risks rejection<sup>84</sup> which might be perilous in a war situation.

**The strength of social influence also depends therefore on social relationships.**<sup>85</sup> Social influence will be stronger when it comes from a person regarded as an **authority figure** who has a **high status**. Milgram<sup>86</sup> in his study revealed that people are sometimes willing to completely defer to a person perceived as an authority figure. In his study, participants were willing to administer electrical shocks to unknown persons only because they were directed to do so by a completely unknown authority figure.

In addition, a strong social influence may come from persons who are **more attractive**, who are perceived as **more like us** and are perceived as **close**.<sup>87</sup> In addition, a person will be under a more powerful social influence **when persuaded by someone who ignores their own interest** and **persuaded by more persons**.<sup>88</sup> **Social reinforcement, social modelling and engaging in the role of another unit co-member**

People also **try to leave an impression that they are in compliance**, i.e., they want to show that their attitudes, thoughts, words and actions comply.<sup>89</sup> Also, in order to be consistent with their previous decisions, people sometimes disregard some information that is relevant to them for making future decisions. Persons will be more loyal to their ideas when they express a decision or an attitude in public and if they, doing this, leave an impression they are truly motivated and free.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, persons will more loyal to those ideas and attitudes that they had to prove with greater effort.<sup>91</sup> Persons may

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<sup>82</sup> Dietz-Uhler, Beth, The escalation of commitment in political decision-making groups: a social identity approach, u časopisu "European Journal of Social Psychology", vol. 26, 1996, p. 612. EBSCOhost Online Research Databases.

<sup>83</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*, 1998, p. 294.

<sup>84</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Socijalna...*, 2005, p. 268

<sup>85</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-e.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-e.htm)

<sup>86</sup> Aronson, E. et al, *Social...*, 1998, p. 317-318

<sup>87</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-d.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-d.htm)

<sup>88</sup> Ibid

<sup>89</sup> Cialdini, Robert, B. *Utjecaj – znanost i praksa*, Zagreb, 1993, p 95.

<sup>90</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-b.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-b.htm)

<sup>91</sup> Cialdini, R. B., *Utjecaj...*p 75

sometimes make decisions that are harmful to them and others in order to show compliance.<sup>92</sup> Loyalty has an influence on a later interpretation of events; people search for reasons to justify their earlier behaviour.<sup>93</sup>

**All these phenomena contribute to understanding that the behaviour of soldiers is often not a consequence of orders given by formal commander, but are often a consequence of the social situation and the strong emotional states in which they find themselves. It is very difficult to control and guide a large group of people in such situations, especially without the support of people with adequate psychological knowledge.**

#### **4. ETHNIC GROUPS AND ETHNOCENTRISM**

Ethnic groups are a particularly important type of group. Members of ethnic groups have cultural, religious, and linguistic commonalities, as well as a shared view on a common origin or a unique heritage acquired by birth.<sup>94</sup> As Rothschild explains, ethnic groups are "collective groups whose membership is largely defined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society".<sup>95</sup> Thus, ethnic groups are considered as more exclusive than inclusive: foreigners cannot join an ethnic group because they do not share a common heritage. For example, persons from Bosnia belonging to the Croatian or Serbian ethnic group could move to Slovenia and work, vote in the national elections, speak Slovenian, become part of the Slovenian nation, but they could never be ethnic Slovenians, because they do not possess a common ancestral heritage with other ethnic Slovenians.

The term **ethnocentrism** that is often mentioned in connection with ethnic groups and ethnic conflicts implies superior viewing of one's own ethnic group and simultaneously a negative attitude towards members of other ethnic groups. In this sense, ethnocentrism should be distinguished from ethnic identity, which implies a commitment to an ethnic group, but not necessarily their beliefs about the superiority and inferior perception of other ethnic groups. The term ethnocentrism was introduced by William Graham Sumner in 1906, describing it as "a view of things in which one's own group is the centre of everything --- and those on the outside are viewed with disgust",<sup>96</sup> and it could be stated that originally the term had a more general meaning -- a positive bias towards one's in- group (in general,

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<sup>92</sup> Zimbardo, Philip & Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, downloaded 21.2.2009. from [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-b.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-b.htm)

<sup>93</sup> Ibid

<sup>94</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 170

<sup>95</sup> Ibid

<sup>96</sup> Ibid



not just ethnic), while expressing a markedly negative attitude to out- groups. Today, ethnocentrism is often equated with ethnic hatred. Together they are considered a source and reason for many irreconcilable conflicts around the world that are responsible for a number of violent acts, including genocide.

#### 4.1. Ethnic conflicts as a form of group conflicts

Within social and political psychology, ethnic groups and ethnicity have become subjects of more intense interest because of the large number of ethnic conflicts that occurred during the twentieth century, and the increased interest of the international community in these types of conflicts which occurred with the cessation of the Cold War period. Ethnic conflicts are often confusing and surprising, because members of an ethnic group are prepared to kill members of other ethnic groups that were previously perceived as neighbours, colleagues, and friends. M. Cottam et al<sup>97</sup> mentioned Bosnia, Guatemala and Nigeria as examples of countries or regions where these types of ethnic conflicts took place.

Before reviewing the socio-psychological explanations of ethnic conflicts, it is necessary to briefly describe conditions and political characteristics of the countries most likely to experience ethnic conflict. These are **multiethnic countries**, meaning that there are at least two ethnic groups, neither of which is capable of assimilating or absorbing the other or of achieving and maintaining independence. People in multiethnic countries are primarily loyal to their ethnic group and then to the broader community.<sup>98</sup>

Ethnic conflicts are the most extreme form of intergroup conflicts, and understanding and explanation of psychological basis of these conflicts and their brutality involves many of the previously described findings on group behaviour. Therefore, let us only briefly repeat the most important of them before dealing with the theory of intergroup conflicts in general and its application to ethnic conflicts.

Situations in which ethnic conflicts occur are those in which there is a more intense **perception of threat to the group** which, in turn, leads to increased **cohesion**; **dehumanisation of other group**; and **deindividuation**, so that people attribute responsibility for their actions to the group and not to themselves as individuals. Besides, there are strong **pressures towards conformity** and unity in threat confrontation as well as the intensification of **strong emotions** associated with an external group that is encouraging the violence. The emotions associated with stereotypes towards an ethnic out-group are often extremely powerful. When conflicts increase in intensity, emotions can change from smouldering

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<sup>97</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, pp. 171- 173; 175- 178

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 171

bitterness and resentment to rage and hatred towards other ethnic groups. At the same time, people experience stronger love and attachment to their own ethnic group. In ethnic conflicts, political leaders actively **manipulate stereotypes and emotions** in order to mobilise ethnic unity against another ethnic group. Using stereotypes and emotions, political leaders instigate intense emotions of hatred and anger towards other ethnic groups. As Kaufman<sup>99</sup> (2001) stated: "If emotional appeals to ethnic topics concurrently appeal to ideas that lead to blaming another group, these appeals may at the same time provoke emotions of anger and aggression that will most probably, motivate people to fight" (p. 9). **Leaders** play an important role in defining threats or opportunities, in shaping perceptions of ethnic identity, and in continuing conflict by obstructing diplomatic solutions. In this process, violence against others in the name of one's own group becomes more likely, even if the victims were once friends. The occurrence of ethnic conflicts does not depend simply on whether times are good or bad. The roots are psychological and so deep that conflicts break out easily when an opportunity appears, or when an ethnic group perceives a threat from the other and when at least one group is mobilised, often by political leaders, to oppose the perceived threat or to exploit the opportunity.

These forms of political activity arise from **stereotyping and prejudice** towards groups of different race or ethnicity. Prejudice usually refers to a relatively consistent negative evaluation of the out-group and its members, which implies a negative reaction towards out-group members based on their group affiliation. Stereotypes are beliefs about personal characteristics of members of a certain group. Stereotypes and prejudices, i.e. negative evaluations of other groups, form a basis for **discrimination**, or unfair behaviour towards members of other groups that may vary from mild avoidance to extreme violence and genocide.

## 4.2. Contemporary theories of ethnic conflict

### 4.2.1. *Realistic conflict theory*

One of the oldest explanations of intergroup conflicts is **realistic conflict theory**.<sup>100</sup> **According to this approach, intergroup conflicts result from competition over scarce resources, such as jobs, political power, etc. Moreover, as competition becomes tougher among those involved the tendency to view out-groups more negatively increases.**<sup>101</sup> One of the earliest studies to verify the

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<sup>99</sup>Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 173

<sup>100</sup> Campbell, Donald T., *Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives*, in D. Levine (ed.) *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, Lincoln, 1965, str. 286- 291, downloaded 21.2. 2009. from [http://www2.uni-jena.de/svw/igc/studies/ss04/campbell\\_1965.pdf](http://www2.uni-jena.de/svw/igc/studies/ss04/campbell_1965.pdf)

<sup>101</sup> Ibid

theory of realistic conflict was conducted by Sheriff, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sheriff (1961).<sup>102</sup> The research was carried out in natural conditions, in a summer camp and included eleven year old boys. It showed that competition for scarce resources can quickly turn into a large-scale conflict.

The possibility for a realistic conflict and competition over scarce resources (power, influence, political autonomy etc.) surely exists among ethnic groups too. Although cooperation is possible in order to achieve common goals in favourable conditions, in unfavourable conditions or during hard times, competition over resources and power may be violent and may be a basis for intense conflicts.

#### **4.2.2. Social identity theory**

**According to the social identity theory, one of the fundamental theories of modern intergroup relationships and conflicts, negative intergroup relationships develop even in the absence of conflicting goals. Competition can occur when the stakes are only psychological and among groups that are artificially formed on the basis of trivial criteria; groups with no real interaction or conflicting goals.**<sup>103</sup>

Social categorization and social identity are partly responsible for the initial process of group differentiation into in-groups and out-groups. Such division influences cognitive processes producing positive in-group bias when individuals tend to perceive their own group (in-group) superior to the out-group. For example, consequences of the differentiation into in-groups and out-groups on social cognition confirm studies demonstrating that people remember negative behaviours far better than their positive behaviours with regard to behaviour or acts of out-group members, while members of their own group members remember positive behaviours better than negative ones.<sup>104</sup>

A key argument of the social identity theory is that social categorization causes a basic motivation for intergroup social comparison. Once social categories are formed, people strive for a positive social identity, which, in turn, creates intergroup competition. This causes biases in perception and discriminatory patterns, because people strive to see their own group in a more positive light than out-groups. **Thus, social identity theory helps us understand general ethnocentrism as a possible base of ethnic conflicts. Namely, ethnocentrism directs our attention to the role of social cues that make salient intergroup distinctions and to the importance of status differentials, that is, the need to see one's own group as superior to others. The theory also emphasizes that groups make social comparisons. When the outcome of comparison is negative, groups are motivated**

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<sup>102</sup> Downloaded 21.2. from <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Sheriff/>

<sup>103</sup> Tajfel, Henry and Turner, John, C., *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, in Tost, John, T., Sidanius, Jim (ed.), *Political Psychology*, New York, 2004, pp. 283 & 284

<sup>104</sup> Fiske, Susan T., *Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination*, in Gilbert, Daniel, T., Fiske, Susan, T. and Lindzey, Gardner (ed.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, New York, 1998, p. 357

to change their status. Possible outcome of social comparison is also a conclusion that out-group has an unjust advantage and that interaction of the groups is unjust. One of the strategies for group status changing is social competition in which the subordinate group directly competes with another group. At the same time, group members will experience threat because the external group is threatening the status of their own group and the competition can turn into a conflict.<sup>105</sup> Thus, from the perspective of social identity theory, continuity of both group and ethnic conflicts may be understood as a result of permanent human need for the creation of in-groups and out-groups, their comparison and the need for positive in-group evaluation.

## 5. NATIONAL GROUPS AND NATIONALISM

Nationalism first emerged in Europe with the development of the modern state, following the French Revolution and has been considered one of the most dangerous sources of political behaviour in the twentieth century. According to Emers (1960), the nation is "a community of people who feel they belong together in the double sense: that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future... The nation is today the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands ... loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society... In this sense, the nation can be called a terminal community with the implication that it is for present purposes the effective end of the road for man as a social animal" (pp. 95-96).<sup>106</sup>

Nationalism is manifested through a marked attachment to one's nation which can be considered to be the political identity of one's group. A **nation-state** exists when an average citizen of a country is primarily attached to the community living within the territorial boundaries of the state. Those who see themselves as part of the Mexican nation would consider the territorial boundaries of Mexico the nation-state. Alternatively, those in Ireland who see themselves as part of the Irish nation would consider the territorial state of Ireland the nation state. Being strongly attached to their nation, nationalists are committed to the unity, independence, dignity, and well-being of the national community and the nation-state. Even when they dislike their government, they love the nation itself. Several characteristic patterns of behaviour appear in nation-states and among nationalists.<sup>107</sup> First, nationalists

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<sup>105</sup> Tajfel, Henry and Turner, John, C., *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, in Tost, John, T., Sidanius, Jim (ed.), *Political Psychology*, New York, 2004, p. 283 & 284

<sup>106</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 191

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, pp. 192- 193

are very sensitive to threats to their nation-state and they tend to use extreme stereotypes in their references to the source of threat. **Nationalists, and particularly nationalist leaders, are very sensitive to opportunities for increasing the influence of their country. It is more likely that they will seriously contemplate the opportunity to expand the influence of their country while being prejudice of others.** In addition, the public of nation-states will be more interested in gathering communities that are outside the borders of the state, which are considered to be part of the national community. **Generally, nationalists want a territorial state for their nation and they want their entire community to live within that state. This is called irredentism - the desire to join together all parts of a national community within a single territorial state.** Those members of the nation who live outside the territory of the state are referred to as a **diaspora**. Irredentism was an important factor in Bismarck's wars for German national unification in the late nineteenth century and, at the beginning of World War II in the German conquest of Poland and Czechoslovakia where millions of ethnic Germans lived.

Besides, nationalists are more concerned with their country's prestige and dignity than non-nationalists and they are more willing to take action to rectify perceived humiliations. It is also more likely that the public of a nation-state will be subject to grandeur interests and will therefore want to strengthen national prestige and status and become recognized globally. Leaders of national states compared to those of non-national states are more effective in their appeals to citizens to make greater sacrifices to enhance the power of the state. In addition, the public is more willing to serve in the military and to have a more intense commitment to the defence of their state. Finally, the citizens of a nation-state are more likely to grant leaders considerable freedom to take risks in defending the interests of the state. However, leaders who fail will be punished by a nationalist community. They will not grant those leaders the freedom to accept defeats or the loss of face.

When speaking about nationalism as a basis of conflict, the type of state should be taken into account since the likelihood of interethnic conflict depends on this factor. In this context, it is essential to distinguish nation-states, multinational states and non-nation states as basic communities. **Multinational states are states in which different groups of people, who think of themselves as separate nations and who actually can establish separate independent states, live together in a single country. These groups do not see their state as their primary identity group but they are primarily attached to their own nation (e.g. the Russians and Ukrainians in the former Soviet Union). In these cases, no nation completely controls its own destiny and no nation has its own independent state. Thus, multinational states contain persistent disintegrative forces, and such countries must invest in continuing efforts to prevent explosion and eruptions of such power. The dynamics of nationalism in such states are likely to be directed towards independence since**

**a characteristic desire is for unity and independence (seen in the examples of Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Russia, Turkey and the Kurds, Cyprus).<sup>108</sup>**

**Core community non-nation state is a type of state which is not**, strictly speaking a nation-state but whose leaders often behave like nationalists. Characteristically, for these countries there is a dominant ethnic or other community that believe that they are the primary nation in the country and in a powerful way identify with the nation. In addition, this community is probably politically dominant and controls the political system. As there are also members of other ethnic groups in the state, who give primary loyalty to their ethnic group it is understandable that they desire autonomy or an independent state but they often do not have sufficient resources to fulfil their desires. M. Cottam et al (2004) as an example of this type of state mentions Russia where, in addition to Russians as the dominant group that tends to be quite nationalistic, there are other ethnic groups.<sup>109</sup> The Serbs in the second Yugoslavia had a similar position to the Russians in Russia. For this type of state, it is characteristic that the dominant group advocates the integration and assimilation of other groups, encouraging minorities to speak the dominant group's language, abandon their customs, identify with the country as a whole and intermarry. If assimilation requires the complete abandonment of group identity and if the existence of the group is threatened, political conflict may occur.

Although nationalism is usually considered to be bad and the initiator of large-scale violence - and indeed throughout history it has caused millions of deaths and great sufferings – the socio-psychological approach stresses that nationalism constitutes normal behaviour in relation to the nation as an in-group. This also means that as long as nations exist as groups in which the social identity of an individual is based, nationalism will exist as well as a basis for relevant political attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups. In other words, **nationalism itself is neither good nor bad but simply a reality that results in certain forms of behaviour. The understanding of nationalism may be exercised on the basis of knowledge in the field of social and political group psychology and social identity.**<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 194

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, pp. 215- 217

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, pp. 220- 221

## 5.1. Modern socio-psychological theories of nationalism

### 5.1.1. *Social identity theory*

The concept of nationalism is similar to the previously explained concept of social identity. Social identity relates to positive emotions of self respect arising from membership in social groups and categories<sup>111</sup> and people have a need not only to belong to groups but also a need to see the groups they belong to (their in-groups) as better than other groups (out-groups). Nations are groups, and for nationalists, the nation is a very important in-group. Application of knowledge on social categorization (classification of people into members of in-groups and out-groups) along with the need for positive social identity has several important psychological consequences in the nation as a group which makes the explanation of nationalist behaviour possible.

**Thus, nationalists are members of groups that are motivated to have a strong positive attachment to their nation. The value of their own nation is determined by comparisons with other nation/groups. Owing to a need for positive social identity, the comparison of their own nation and other relevant out-group results in a positive bias towards one's own nation or ethnic group, i.e. exaggeration of positive characteristics of one's own group (ethnic group or nation) and consequently, their members will perceive themselves better than others.**

**Once nationalist feelings are created people are marked by a strong loyalty to their own nation as a group. By ascribing importance to a strong nation, the sensitivity to identify threats and opportunities for their own nation is increased. At the same time, identification with the nation is a basis for group behaviour, wherein nationalists demonstrate strong cohesion and are very willing to make sacrifices for their nation. In addition, they are more responsive to things such as attacks, frustrations and aggressive behaviour by an out-group.<sup>112</sup>**

Strong attachment to the nation as one's own identity group implies more intense emotional responses when a threat to the nation or opportunities to achieve an important goal is perceived (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). In cases of strong nationalism, very intense positive emotions towards one's own nation are characteristic (e.g., pride for the achievements of their own nation or happiness when opportunities arise for achieving important goals). On the other hand, strong negative emotions

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<sup>111</sup> Tajfel, Henri & Turner, John, C., *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, In: Jost, John, T., Sidanius, Jim (ed.), *Political Psychology*, New York, 2004, pp. 283- 284

<sup>112</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 195

are expressed towards others, along with facilitated, faster and more intensive use of stereotypes and stereotypical images.<sup>113</sup>

**Strong positive emotions towards one's own nation can have additional negative consequences or a lack of critical attitude in relation to the actions of one's own country. Furthermore, if the situation in the country is not as it should be, instead of blaming leaders or politicians of their own nation, they are likely to find others to blame. In addition, group factors, such as group loyalty and obedience begin to conformingly shape in-group attitudes about the out-group. Thus, in strong nationalism people are exposed to intense internal and social pressures to conform.** An individual participates in waving the flag (or becomes a passive observer) or has to face rejection and condemnation by friends, neighbours and community and even families. Kecmanovic (1996) and Searle-White (2001) argue that, in terms of affective properties, nationalist behaviour resembles crowd behaviour.<sup>114</sup> Thus, for nationalistic behaviour as well for behaviour of crowds, low tolerance for differing views, oversimplification, diminished personal responsibility, rejection to consider alternate views, readiness for action, and a sense of being endowed with invincible power, which reduces criticism, intensified emotional reactions and feelings of persecution are typical.

Nationalists' response to other countries depends upon their **image** of other countries or nationalities within a single multinational country. For example, nationalists will use different tactics when confronting enemies, barbarians or imperialists. Nationalists will have especially strong emotions associated with the image because they are so intensely attached to the nation.<sup>115</sup>

### **5.1.2. Image Theory**

**Image theory is an approach developed in political psychology primarily with the aim to provide explanation for policymakers' images of other countries but it can be applied in general: to observe behaviour among groups and intergroup conflicts and to associate these images with certain expected patterns of behaviours**<sup>116</sup>

Images contain information about capabilities, culture, intentions and kinds of groups and about perceptions of threat and opportunity. Capabilities refer to economic characteristics, military strength, political stability within a country and effective policy making and its implementation. Cultural characteristics refer to judgements of cultural sophistication. When decision makers assess a country, they judge whether its capabilities and culture are equal, inferior or superior compared to their country.

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<sup>113</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, pp. 195-196

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 196

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, p. 44, 45, 51, 52



Another assessment is based on their judgement whether the country or group has threatening or defensive (good) intentions or presents an opportunity to achieve important goals. Thus, the way in which policymakers differentiate these types of images are a matter of their perception of capabilities, culture, threats, alternatives of response and event scripts of a country. Each image includes also lessons of history that policymakers associate with a particular type of state, i.e. they use examples from history to help them explain conflicts and predict their outcomes. Policymakers rely upon various policy options, which are measures that they consider appropriate in dealing with a country. Some policy options involve military threat, economic sanctions and incentives, and diplomatic protests. Cottam and Cottam (2001) also stated that certain emotions are directly associated with particular images. The review of images, related emotions and behaviour of certain tactics is shown in *Figure 5*.

*Figure 5 Images, associated emotions and tactics*<sup>117</sup>

<i>IMAGE</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Intentions</i>	<i>Threats</i> <i>opportunities</i>	<i>or Preferred strategy</i>
Enemy	Equal	Equal	Damaging	High threat	Containment
Barbarians	Superior	Inferior	Damaging	High threat	Search for allies, increase in power
Imperialist	Superior	Superior	Damaging	High threat	Submittance/ resistance when possible
Colonial	Inferior	Inferior	Benign	High opportunity	Control, direction, exploit
Rogue	Superior or equal	Weak- willed	Damaging	Moderate/low threat	Destruction
Degenerate	Inferior	Inferior	Damaging	High/moderate opportunity	Challenge, risk
Ally	Equal	Equal	Good	Threat/opportunity (help in both cases)	Negotiate agreement, common strategy

In this review, we will provide a more detailed description only of the images that could be relevant in a situation of conflict in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. **The enemy image** relates to situations when another group (or state) is perceived as relatively equal in capability and culture, which is accompanied with a highly intense perception of threat and strong emotions. In its most extreme form,

<sup>117</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 45 & 52

the enemy is seen as irrevocably aggressive in motivation, monolithic in decisional structure, and highly rational in decision making (to the point of being able to generate and orchestrate multiple complex conspiracies). Citizens who do not share this image, or who merely have a more complex view of the enemy, are often accused of being at best, dupes of the enemy and possibly even traitors.

Some of the emotions associated with the enemy include anger, frustration, envy, jealousy, fear, distrust, and possibly grudging respect. An enemy's successes are considered unfair, and when bad things happen and goals are not met, the enemy is blamed. People tend to be both antagonistic and reactant in responding to an enemy. People compete with the enemy and try to prevent the enemy from gaining anything. The approach to conflict makes sense in light of the cognitive properties of the image. The enemy is as powerful and capable as one's own country, so there is an even chance of losing, if the approach to the conflict is entirely zero sum. Thus, the enemy image makes a strong, aggressive defence the logical choice. The tactics used in responding to such a state are global in focus, competitive and noncompromising, because you cannot trust such a country to keep its word. If such a defence should eliminate the threatener altogether, so much the better. However, a strategy of **containment** may be the only recognized alternative in most political contexts, simply because the odds of defeating an enemy are 50-50 at best. Containing your enemy, preventing them from becoming more powerful or achieving its desired goals, may be all you can do.

The consequences of a stereotypical enemy image can be tragic, when the motivations of the country considered to be an enemy are really misunderstood, that is, when the people and leaders are essentially acting towards that country based upon a stereotype of an enemy. It can produce a *self-fulfilling prophecy*. The people and leaders of enemy countries will conclude that aggression has been committed against them and they will develop an enemy image (or mirror image), because each sees the other as an enemy and will adopt the same tough strategy. The consequence could be an unnecessary and disastrous **security dilemma** that would be extremely difficult to overcome. **Security dilemmas** are situations in which the efforts made by one state to defend itself are simultaneously seen as threatening to its opponents, even if those actions were not intended to be threatening. They easily lead to **spiral conflicts** in which each side matches and one-ups the actions taken by the other side. This can produce arms races and other types of aggression that result from misunderstanding each others' motives. The enemy stereotype virtually cannot be refuted. It can explain any response, including the enemy's withdrawal.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 52, 53

**The barbarian image** occurs when another group - enemy (or state) is viewed as superior in capabilities but inferior in culture, which results in an intense sense of threat; in other words, the barbarians are attributed strong aggressive intentions and therefore seen as frightening. Historical examples of this image can be found in the ancient Greek depiction of the Germanic tribes to the north. The image of the barbarian refers to aggressive people who are monolithic in decisional structure, cunning, and willing to resort to unspeakable brutality including genocide, and who are determined to take full advantage of their superiority. Emotions usually associated with this experience are disgust more often than contempt (because the barbarians are considered superior in capability, even though culturally inferior) anger and fear. Fear is a consequence of barbarians' superior capabilities. People who do not share this image will be accused of cowardice and treason.

As a result of both cognitive and emotional properties, this image does not lead to an aggressive defence posture. Fear produced by capability asymmetries will make people prefer to avoid direct conflict. A more reasonable primary course of action for dealing with a barbarian is a search for allies who can be persuaded of the probability that a failure to deal with this threat will affect, seriously and adversely, their own national interests. In terms of social identity theory, perceivers would probably like to engage in direct competition with this hated and disgusting opponent, in the most violent form of eliminating the threat altogether, but they cannot, because they are too weak. Instead, they must build coalitions to overcome their weakness and improve their ability to at least contain the barbarian.

A good example of this image is the Israeli perception of the Arab world. Although the Arab states are not superior in military capability to Israel, their large populations and resource advantages lead to an Israeli expectation that they have the potential for becoming superior. Despite perceived cultural inferiority, the probabilities are seen as high that superiority in conventional arms is not only attainable but unavoidable. The image theory helps us to understand conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Croatians believed themselves to be culturally superior to the Serbs, but much weaker in capability.<sup>119</sup> In both cases allies were sought: Israel turned to the United States and Europe, and the Croatians turned to Slovenia and other European states for support in their efforts to achieve independence from Yugoslavia.

**The rogue image** is a relatively new image and it denotes the perception of groups that might be powerful and culturally advanced but also weak-willed, undisciplined and lacking the will to follow through on expressive goals and plans of action. During the Cold War, leaders of the West held an image of a dependent enemy, in which a country was viewed as inferior in capability and culture, but controlled and supported by the enemy. This image disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the

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<sup>119</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 53

demise of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, former allies of the Soviet Union, along with some other countries (such as North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Serbia, and Iran), were seen as both inferior and threatening.

Responses to this type of state are driven by a sense of superiority. They are bad children who must be taught a lesson, and that lesson is taught with force. One does not negotiate with bad children, one punishes them. There are many examples. The American reaction to Saddam Hussein's resistance to weapon inspection was an attack with full force of America's military power. President Bush repeatedly stated that there would be no negotiations with Saddam Hussein and that he had to do what he was told to do or be punished.

When Slobodan Milosevic resisted points in the Rambouillet agreement that would have given NATO forces the right to wander unimpeded throughout Yugoslavia, negotiations ceased and Yugoslavia was bombed. When Manuel Noriega interfered with US efforts to promote free elections, Panama was bombed. Often, one individual is assumed to be responsible for the behaviour of the rogue state (e.g. eliminate Noriega, Saddam, or Milosevic, and the problem will be solved).<sup>120</sup>

**The degenerate image** is one associated with the perception of an opportunity to achieve a goal at the expense of a country that is seen as relatively equal or even greater in capabilities and culture. Even though a country seen as a degenerate may be more powerful than the perceiver's country, it is also seen as uncertain and confused in motivation and is characterized by a highly differentiated leadership that lacks a clear sense of direction and that is incapable of constructing an effective strategy. They are believed to be unable to muster the will and determination to make effective use of their power instruments or to mobilize effective public support. Other people who do not share this image are seen as wimps. As in the case of the enemy stereotype, disconfirming evidence is likely to be interpreted as confirming and the image is extremely difficult to falsify.

The emotions associated with the image are disgust, contempt, scorn, and anger all of which may ultimately turn to hatred. This combination leads to a desire to eliminate the offensive group and can lead to a dangerous underestimation of an opponent's abilities.<sup>121</sup> Contempt and abhorrence combine with anger and scorn, and this can lead to dehumanisation and to genocidal violence. Since the motivations of a country seen as a degenerate are assumed to be harmful, the drive to eliminate the problem is likely to be strong.

Leaders of Germany and Japan before World War II made statements about, and committed acts against Great Britain, the United States, and France, that indicated their degenerate image of those

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<sup>120</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 54, 55

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, p. 55 & 56

countries. A more recent example of this stereotypical view was Hussein in the conflict between Iraq and the United States and its allies in 1990. Saddam Hussein evidently believed to the end that the United States and its allies would not have the will to argue with him on the issue of the Kuwait invasion. A more typical example was the operating worldview of Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese military. They at least did possess captivating war capabilities and they all perceived a reality that made the achievement of their aggressive goals seem plausible.<sup>122</sup>

### **5.1.3. Nationalism and wish for unity and independence**

From the previous discussion, there are several features that are characteristic of nationalist ideology, and we will repeat them briefly. First, in situations of pronounced national identity, great importance is ascribed to national independence and unity. There is also an increased sensitivity to perceiving opportunities and chances for the realization of independence and unity. **The growth of nationalism among populations of a state is accompanied with a strengthened belief that they deserve an independent state. In the processes of social comparison with other nations or states, there is an enhanced sense of injustice and of being deprived of what they naturally deserve, that is they are subject to feeling that deprivation of independence and unity is unacceptable and unjust. Such conditions facilitate the role of leaders who can through manipulations with nationalism additionally mobilize people to fight against other ethnic groups in defending their own nation. Generally characteristic for nationalism, there is a strong willingness to make a great sacrifice to realise this goal of independence and unity.** For example, Kaufman<sup>123</sup> states that Milosevic's power resulted from his capacity to use and manipulate nationalist symbols.

The listed socio-psychological political and psychological conceptions about nationalism (which are primarily based on the social identity theory, social categorization theory and the theory of image) have been used to explain many phenomena of intergroup relationships, conflicts or events in the world. Examples of nationalism and its positive effects can also be mentioned. These include the unification of Germany in 1990 or the effect of U.S. nationalism in the United States during World War II, which facilitated mobilization of the U.S. population in order to stop Hitler from achieving his objectives.<sup>124</sup> To this category, nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia in the early nineties which also had a defensive character may be added.

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<sup>122</sup>Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 55 & 56

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, p. 202

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, pp. 210, 211, 213

## 5.2. Strategies of international conflict prevention and resolution

Nationalism will probably continue to be a source of domestic and international conflicts over the following decades. As long as states are common political units, identification with the community residing in their territories will continue, and, when that identity is primary and intense, nationalism will continue too. According to an analysis by Ayers (2000) of 77 intrastate nationalist conflicts from 1945 to 1996, he found 27 on-going as of 1996, 22 ending in defeat, 22 ending in agreements, 4 cease fires, and 2 that simply petered out.<sup>125</sup>

As previously described, **nationalists** are very sensitive to perceptions of threat and opportunities related to values of national unity, independence, grandeur, and generally well-being of the national community and they tend to use extreme stereotypes of others. Thus, strategies of prevention with regard to nationalist motivated conflicts should focus on those perceptions of threat and opportunities that are characteristic for nationalists. **It is therefore extremely important to perceive and react to pronounced nationalism on time as such knowledge enables the prediction of increased sensitivity of the nation in order to identify threats and opportunities as well as a great preparedness to stereotype others.**

**In other words, prevention and resolution of nationalist conflicts greatly depend on an accurate and timely assessment of nationalism. A timely and appropriate reaction to nationalism is important because nationalist conflicts are much easier to stop at the beginning rather than when they flare up. In fact, when a nationalist conflict occurs it is even more difficult to stop it compared to any other type of conflict because the importance that is attached to the nation and readiness to sacrifice make nationalists very strong and determined to fight.**

From what was previously stated it follows that the appropriate strategy to solve the conflict differs depending on whether the foundations of a potential nationalist conflict lies primarily in the perception of threat or primarily in the perception of opportunity. If the perception of threat to one's own nation is responsible for a potential nationalist conflict or preferences of nationalist groups for violence and aggression then measures to mitigate falsely identified perception of threat should be employed. Regrettably, this is difficult because of the powerful influence of images, especially if the existing image had been strongly threat-coloured from the very beginning, even before the conflict increased in strength. In these cases (image of enemy, barbarian, rogue and imperialist) it is hard to overcome the problem of irrefutability. Specifically, images are so strong that almost every action or non-action that

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<sup>125</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 217

can and should refute the image can be rejected as a result of the bad nature of the opponent. However, consistent and clear behaviour which denies the active image and thus reduces the perception of threat is critical for preventing and resolving conflict.

The second situation is when the perception of opportunity lies at the basis of nationalist conflict or groups prone to violence and aggression, because the situation requires a policy of **intimidation and restrictions**. Therefore, strategies to prevent and stop the possible aggression and violence should focus on the opportunity identified by nationalists and the state or the nation must clearly demonstrate that what leaders or the entire group perceive as an opportunity will be a fatal error. Chamberlain failed to do this with Hitler before World War II. Complying with Hitler's demands, Chamberlain provided Hitler with evidence that the rest of Europe complies with his ambitions and that there was no will to stop him; and that the opportunity which Hitler recognized was real and worth the risk.

In this context of conflict, those based on the **desire for independence** also belong here. With this kind of nationalist conflict, an important issue is what the international community can or should do in these situations when faced with the demands of national groups for the separation of a multinational country. To cope with this type of nationalist conflict, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, based on an analysis of numerous conflicts after the Cold War (see Jentleson, 2000; Lund, 1996) suggests basically **four following measures**: early warning and response, preventive diplomacy, economic measures (including sanctions and inducements when necessary) and finally the use of force.<sup>126</sup>

**Early warning and response** require attentive monitoring of indicators that violence is imminent. Such indicators include human rights abuses, brutal political oppressions, acquisition of arms and the use of the media to arouse the public. According to the Carnegie report: "During the early stages of a crisis, policymakers should not only be attentive to how circumstances could worsen, but they should also be alert for opportunities to make constructive use of local issues and processes that could help avoid violence. And they should exercise great care as to whom they support and how that support is offered."<sup>127</sup>

**Preventive diplomacy** goes beyond traditional diplomacy, in that it uses more urgent unilateral and multilateral techniques to "pressure, cajole, arbitrate, mediate or lend 'good offices to encourage dialogue and facilitate a nonviolent resolution of the crisis" (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p. xxii).<sup>128</sup> The Carnegie Commission recommended that governments maintain diplomatic relations with leaders and groups in conflict-prone situations, rather than suspending relations to show disapproval of their actions.

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<sup>126</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 219

<sup>127</sup> Ibid

<sup>128</sup> Ibid

Moderates should be supported and the UN should immediately become involved and should stay abreast of unfolding events, through its own agencies and through other nongovernmental organizations.

**Economic measures, sanctions and inducements** should be employed to provide punishment for violence and rewards for constructive actions. Finally, if **force** becomes necessary, it should only be used as a last resort and should not be the only instrument used. Diplomacy and economic measures should be included as part of an integrated strategy. The use of force involves peacekeeping in the aftermath period. These measures are equally applicable in attempts of resolution of ethnic conflicts.

Although these measures sound sensible, their application frequently does not happen. Namely, this approach requires, first and foremost, an attentive and interested international community able to recognize danger signals (George and Hall, 2000; Lund, 1996). This requires the ability to overcome preexisting images of the participants in a conflict and also requires a fundamental understanding of the causes of nationalist and ethnic conflicts, both to enable identification and recognition of early warning signs and to prevent spill over effects, wherein the action taken in response to one crisis unintentionally affects another crisis.<sup>129</sup>

### **III. HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR**

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#### **1. THE DEFINITION AND CAUSES OF AGGRESSION<sup>130</sup>**

Social psychologists define aggressive behaviour as intentional behaviour aimed at causing physical or psychological harm/pain. According to Berkowitz, two types of human aggressiveness can be distinguished - *hostile aggression* and *instrumental aggression*. **Hostile aggression** is an aggressive act arising from emotions of anger and aims to inflict pain or harm others. In **instrumental aggression** as well as in the hostile aggression there is intent to harm another person, but causing harm is a tool to achieve another goal and not an end in itself (e.g. robbery with violence or murder, or deliberate harm to opponent players in a football match to prevent a goal).

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<sup>129</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 219

<sup>130</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Wilson, Timothy D. and Akert, Robin M., *Social psychology*, New Jersey, 1998 pp. 455-493.



## 1.1. Neural and chemical effects on aggression

Aggressive behaviours in humans as well as in lower animals are associated with the area in the middle part of the brain called amygdala. When amygdaloid nuclei are stimulated, obedient/submissive organisms become violent; similarly, when neural activity in that area is suppressed, violent organisms become obedient. However, there is adaptation, too: the effect of neural mechanisms can be adapted to social factors even in cases of some primates. For example, a monkey in the presence of other, less dominant monkeys will attack them when its amygdaloid nuclei are stimulated. But if amygdaloid nuclei are stimulated when the monkey is in a group of more dominant monkeys, it will not attack them but will run away.

It was demonstrated that certain chemical compounds have an effect on aggression. For example, it seems that **serotonine**, a chemical substance that is naturally excreted in the middle part of the brain, has an inhibiting effect on impulsive aggression. In animals, when serotonin levels were lowered, increased aggressiveness frequently occurred. In humans, it was shown that **violent criminals have a very low naturally produced serotonine level**. Furthermore, in laboratory experiments conducted on normal people, tryptophan depletion (an amino acid responsible for serotonin synthesis in the brain) caused an increase in aggressive behaviour.

Serotonine deficiency may lead to increased aggression; a surplus of testosterone may also have a similar effect. Injection of the male sex hormone **testosterone** increases aggression in animals. The same finding was obtained in humans: James Dabbs and co-workers have shown that a **natural testosterone level is substantially higher among prisoners convicted of violent crimes than among those convicted of non-violent crimes**. In addition, once imprisoned, prisoners with a higher testosterone level violate prison rules more often, especially those pertaining to open conflict. Dabbs and co-workers have also shown that **underage offenders have a higher level of testosterone than students**. Comparison of fraternities in a college showed that **members of those that are usually considered the most rebellious, less socially responsible and "more cruel" have the highest average levels of testosterone**.

Researchers are familiar with the link between alcohol consumption and aggressive behaviour. This relationship exists even among individuals who are not provoked and who usually do not behave aggressively when sober. This may explain why fights often occur in bars and nightclubs and why domestic violence is often associated with alcohol abuse. **Alcohol usually acts as disinhibitor - it reduces our social inhibition, making us less cautious than we normally are**. However, it is more than that. It seems that alcohol interferes with cognitive data processing. This means that **intoxicated**

**people often react to the initial and most obvious aspects of social situations and tend to miss details.** For example, if you are sober and someone steps on your foot, you will recognise that this was not done intentionally. However, if you are drunk, you may miss the details of the situation and react as if the person intentionally stepped on your foot. Accordingly (especially if you are a man), you will probably yell at the person and hit him. This is exactly the kind of ambiguous situation that men can interpret as a threat, especially under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, it is not surprising that crime statistics reveal that **75% of individuals arrested for murder, assaults and other violent crimes were according to the law drunk at the time of arrest.**

## **1.2. Situational causes of aggression**

There are several important situational causes of aggression. Some result from bodily senses, others arise from social events.

**Bodily senses.** Most people experience nervousness when exposed to sharp, unexpected pain (such as when we hit our toe) and then we tend to take it out on the nearest available target. Leonard Berkowitz in a series of experiments demonstrated that students who suffered pain when their hands were immersed into very cold water were more likely to act aggressively towards other students. Following the same logic, it was observed that physical discomforts, such as heat, humidity, air pollution and unpleasant odours can lower the threshold for aggressive behaviour. Systematic research carried out by J. Merrill Carlsmith and Craig Anderson of the unrest that occurred in seventy-nine cities between 1967 and 1971, indicated a **significantly higher probability of rebellion during hot days in comparison to cold days.** Similarly, in major United State cities, from Huston in Texas to Des Moines in Iowa, **if a particular day was warmer, the probability of violent crimes was greater.** It should be noted that a series of laboratory experiments support these correlations. Additional evidence from the natural environment was offered by Craig Anderson, Brad Bushman and Ralph Groom, who showed that **violent crimes are more frequent in warmer than in cooler years.**

**Frustration.** Frustration occurs when a person is prevented from reaching an expected goal or its achievement. Research has shown that the experience of frustration may increase the likelihood of aggressive responses. This tendency is explained by the **frustration aggression theory**, which states that the perception of people that they are prevented from attaining their goals increases the likelihood of an aggressive response. This does not mean that frustration always leads to aggression, but it often does, especially when it is an unpleasant experience. Roger Barker, Tamara Dembi and Kurt Lewin, in their classic experiment brought a group of small children into a room full of attractive toys that were initially inaccessible to them. After a painfully long wait, the children were finally allowed to play with the

toys. In the control group, another group of children were allowed to play with toys immediately, without the frustration of having to wait first. This group of children happily played with the toys. However, the frustrated group was very destructive when they were finally granted access to the toys. They broke the toys, threw them at the wall, walked all over them, etc.

Several factors may increase frustration and, therefore, increase the likelihood of some form of aggression. One such factor is the proximity of a goal or object of one's desire. **The closer the goal, expectations of prevented gratification are higher; the higher the expectations, the likelihood of aggression are more probable.**

It is important to note that frustration is not the same as deprivation. Children who do not have toys are not more aggressive than children who have toys. In the Barker et al experiment with toys, frustration and aggression appeared because the children reasonably expected to play with the toys, and their reasonable expectations were prevented. This prevention caused the children's destructive behaviour. In line with this differentiation, the reverent Jesse Jackson wisely pointed out that the **1967 and 1968 racial rebellions occurred "in the middle of an expectation increase and higher, although inappropriate, social spending."** In short, Jackson held that prevented expectations were largely responsible for frustration and aggression. This is consistent with interpretations of Jerome Frank, a psychiatrist who noted that **the most serious rebellions in that period did not occur in the geographical areas of greatest poverty, but in Watts and Detroit, where the position Afro-Americans was not nearly as bad as in the majority of other large urban areas.** The point is that things were bad in relation to the rebels' perception of white people's standard and in relation to the positive changes that the majority Afro-Americans had rightly expected. So, the cause of aggression is not deprivation, but **relative deprivation: the perception that you (or your group) have less than you deserve, less than what you expect, or less than what people would like you have.**

A similar phenomenon was seen in Eastern Europe in 1991. Serious rebellion against the Soviet monolith occurred only when the chains slightly loosened. In the same way, Primo Levi, a survivor of Auschwitz, claimed that even in concentration camps, rare rebellions were not started by prisoners from the bottom of the camp hierarchy, painful victims of relentless horror, but "prisoners who were privileged in some way."

**Direct provocation and retaliation.** Another unpleasant experience is that of direct provocation. Aggression often arises from a need for a retaliatory response after being provoked by another person's aggressive behaviour. Most people do not follow the Christian principle of 'turning the other cheek', as shown in numerous experiments within and outside the laboratory and other experiments. A typical example of this type of research is Robert Baron's experiment, in which participants were asked to compose an advertisement for a new product that was later assessed and

criticized by the experimenter's assistant. In one situation, the criticism was sharp, but it was addressed in a mild and considerate way: "I think there is enough room for improvement." In the second situation, criticism was addressed in an offensive way: "I think that even if you tried you could not be original." **When given the opportunity for retaliation, the participants who were addressed more severely were more likely to do so than those in the "mild" situation.**

As can be assumed, people do not always retaliate when provoked. One determinant of retaliation is the degree to which a provocation was intentional; if we are convinced that it was not malicious, most people will not retaliate. Similarly, counter-attack will not occur if there are mitigating circumstances. However, in order to be effective in reducing aggressive responses, **mitigating circumstances must be known at the time of provocation.**

**Aggressive signs.** It seems that certain signs encourage action. Is it possible that the mere presence of an **aggressive sign** – objects which are associated with an aggressive response - may increase the likelihood of aggression?

**Presence of weapons.** In a classic experiment carried out by Leonard Berkowitz and Anthony LePage students were provoked to a state of anger. In some of them the anger was provoked in a room in which a weapon was disposed (apparently left from a previous experiment), while the rest of students were provoked in a room where the weapon was replaced by a neutral object (a badminton racquet). Afterwards, participants were given the opportunity to administer electric shocks to another student. The students who were provoked in the room with a weapon administered more intense electric shocks than those who were subject to anger provocation in the room with a racquet. Basic findings were replicated a number of times in the United States and Europe. The findings were challenging and suggested a conclusion contrary to the well-known slogan, often used by opponents to those advocating a need for weapon possession control, saying that "guns do not kill, people do."<sup>131</sup> Weapons kill. As Leonard Berkowitz said: "An angry person can pull the trigger of his gun if he wants to commit violence; but the trigger can also pull the finger or otherwise elicit aggressive reactions from him, if he is ready to be aggressive and does not have strong inhibitions against such behaviour".<sup>132</sup>

Consider Seattle in Washington and Vancouver in British Columbia. They are literally twin cities in many different ways: similar climate, population, economy, general crime rates and rates of physical assaults. They differ in two ways: (1) Vancouver strictly prohibits the possession of weapons, while Seattle does not, and (2) the murder rate in Seattle is almost twice higher than in Vancouver. Is one the cause of another? We can not definitely know. However, the described **laboratory experiments strongly**

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<sup>131</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Willson, Timothy .D. and Akert, Robin M., *Social psychology*, New Jersey, 1998, p. 470

<sup>132</sup> Ibid

**indicate that the universal presence of aggressive signs such as weapons in the United States could be a factor of aggression.**

Archer and collaborators in an extensive study asked teenagers in the United States and in ten other countries, to read the stories about conflicts between people and to provide their own assumptions about the outcome of the conflict. Results show that American teenagers were more inclined to predict the outcome of violent conflict than teenagers from other countries.

Moreover, the likelihood that the violent outcomes they predicted will be "lethal, depending on the weapons and merciless" was higher among American teenagers than teenagers in any other country. Conclusions are undeniable: lethal violence, especially one that involves weapons, is a part of American society - and therefore plays an important role in the expectations and fantasies of American youth.

**Mimicking the aggressive behaviour of others.** One of the main signs for aggressive action is the presence of other people who are behaving aggressively. This is particularly true in the case of children. By mimicking adults and their peers, children often learn to solve conflicts aggressively, especially when they see that aggression is rewarded. In a classic series of experiments, Albert Bandura and his collaborators demonstrated the power of social learning. According to the **social learning theory**, social behaviour (e.g. aggression) is acquired through observation and imitation of others. Bandura's experimental procedure involved adults who hit a plastic "Bobo" doll filled with air (one that returns after falling). Adults hit the doll with their hand, with a hammer, kicked it with their foot and yelled at it. Children were then given a chance to play with the doll. Children in these experiments imitated aggressive models and abused the doll. Children in the control group, who had not seen the aggressive adult behaviour, almost never showed any aggression towards the unhappy doll. Moreover, children who were watched the aggressive adult used the same procedures and the same aggressive words as the adult. In addition, many went further than just mimicking – they performed new forms of aggressive behaviour. This study strongly supports our belief that **aggressive behaviour is often learned by simple observation and the mimicking behaviour of others.**

### **1.3. The impact of aggressive actions on subsequent aggression**

Most people, when they are frustrated or angry reduce their tension by shouting, swearing or even hitting someone. However, does an aggressive act reduce the need for further aggression? Even among professional psychologists, it is widely believed that this is possible. For example, William Menninger, a prominent therapist and co-founder of the Menninger Clinic, states that "competitive games can bring about a needed release from the tensions created by instinctive aggressive impulses".

Unfortunately, no evidence could be found to confirm this assumption. In fact, it seems the other way around. Arthur Patterson measured hostile feelings among college football players by evaluating them one week before and one week after the football season. If it is true that intense competition and aggressive behaviour, which are part of playing football, reduce the tension caused by accumulated aggression, we would expect players to show a decline in hostile feelings during the season. Instead, the results demonstrated a significant increase in hostile feelings. This does not mean that people do not find pleasure in these games. They do find pleasure. However, participation in these games does not diminish participants' aggressive feelings - if anything, it increases them.

So **participation in competitive and aggressive sports does not result in a reduction of aggression, but in its increase, and this also applies to watching sports.** Gordon Russell, a Canadian sports psychologist, tested this assumption by measuring the hostile mood of spectators during a particularly violent hockey game. As the game progressed, spectators became more and more combatant. At the end of the last part, the level of their hostile mood was extremely high and it returned to the level measured before the game only a few hours after the end of the game. Corresponding results were obtained with the spectators of football games and wrestling matches. Thus, participation in an aggressive sport as well as watching it also increases aggressive behaviour.

What about acts of direct aggression towards the source of one's anger? Do they decrease a need for further aggression? Most experiments on this topic have failed to find such effects. In fact, the most frequent finding corresponds to findings obtained in studies on watching violence - **when people perform an aggressive act, this type of act increases the tendency towards future violence.** For example, in the experiment by Russell Geen and associates, each participant in the experiment (male students) was paired with another student, who was actually the experimenter's assistant. First, the assistant made the participant angry; during that time, which included the exchange of opinions on various issues, the participant was given an electric shock whenever his partner (assistant) did not agree with his views. Then, during the false research of "the effects of punishment on learning", a participant behaved as a teacher, and assistant played the role of a student. In the first learning task some participants were asked to give electric shocks to their partner each time he made a mistake; other participants only recorded his errors. In the task that followed all participants were provided with an opportunity to give electric shocks. If a cathartic effect were at work, participants who had previously given electric shocks to their partner would give fewer shocks and less intense shocks next time. This did not happen. In fact, participants who had previously given electric shocks to their partner exhibited even greater aggression when offered an additional opportunity to attack him.

This phenomenon is not limited to the laboratory. **The same tendency has been noted in the events that naturally occur in the real world, where verbal aggressive acts were used to facilitate**

**further attacks.** In one of these "natural experiments" several technicians, who were recently dismissed from their jobs, were given the opportunity to verbally express their hostility to their former boss. When later asked to describe the person, these technicians were much harsher in their descriptions than the technicians who had not previously expressed their feelings.

#### **1.4. Blaming the victim of our aggression**

At first glance it appears that catharsis is to a certain extent a reasonable assumption. That is, when one makes us angry, it seems that expression of our hostility towards the person really releases tension and we consequently feel better. But "feeling better" should not be confused with the reduction of a hostile mood. Aggression in people does not only depend on tension - what one feels - but on what one thinks. More importantly, the main findings of research on this problem has shown that openly expressed aggression towards a person changes the individual's feelings towards the person, reinforcing negative feelings and therefore increasing the likelihood of future aggression towards that person. When one person inflicts harm on another, this initiates cognitive processes aimed at justifying the cruel act. More specifically, a person hurting another person experiences a cognitive dissonance. Dissonance is then being reduced through conviction that offending the person was not indecent, irrational and a bad act. This is achieved by negating the virtues of that person and emphasizing his/her flaws, persuading ourselves that he/she is a terrible human being who deserves to be hurt. In particular, this will be used if the target of aggression is an innocent victim. In the experiments of David Glass, Keith Davis and Ned Jones, participants inflicted, or caused psychological or physical harm to an innocent person, who had not previously done any harm to them. The participants then continued to underestimate their victims, convincing themselves that their victims were not good people and therefore deserved what they got. This certainly reduces the dissonance and leaves room for further aggression, because **once a person has succeeded in underestimating someone, it is easier to inflict further damage to that victim in the future.**

What happens if the victim is not completely innocent? Michael Kahn conducted one of the few experiments verifying this assumption. In Kahn's experiment, a young man, who acted as a medical technician engaged to carry out some physiological measurements on students, made insulting remarks about the students. In one experimental situation participants were allowed to express their hostility towards the technician by expressing their feelings to his employer - an act which seemed like the technician might have serious problems, perhaps even cost him his job. In the second situation, the participants were not given the opportunity to express any aggression towards the person who caused their anger. Those who were allowed to express their aggression later felt greater hostility and enmity

towards the technician than those who were prevented from expressing their aggression. In other words, displaying aggression did not inhibit a tendency towards further aggression. Instead, it increased it, even when the target of aggression was not only an innocent victim.

These results show that people, **often over react when they are angry**. In this case, technicians' potentially lost job had a considerably more damaging effect than the minor offence caused by him. **Excessive reaction produces dissonance in the same way in which dissonance is produced by insulting an innocent person: if there is a large discrepancy between what one person did to another and the strength of their revenge, this discrepancy is justified by putting down the target of anger, that is, the other person.**

## **2. WAR AS AN ACT OF INSTRUMENTAL AGGRESSION**

Aggression as a research topic in social studies, especially in social psychology, was the focus of scientists after World War II when at all global levels and in winners' arrangements between the forces prevailed attitudes and different steps were taken to ensure that no war, and especially not like the two world wars in the twentieth century, would occur ever again. The task of scientists was to investigate the causes of aggressive behaviour of people at individual and group levels, and explain whether there are differences in tendencies towards aggression at the level of various societies and, if there are, what causes them. Social psychology, sociology and anthropology are social sciences that have contributed the most to that knowledge. In the following overview, the main study findings relevant to the fundamental objective of this expertise will be summarized.

### **2.1. Causes of war**

At the individual level, a dilemma whether the causes of aggression are of irrational or a rational nature has been transferred into the social sciences from philosophy. Within philosophy, sayings e.g. Hobbs' are well-known (1981) "Man is a wolf to man" in which he expressed the irrationality of human nature and the state of war as the natural state of man. Unlike him, Malthus (1798) considered that the cause of human afflictions, including war, is the disproportion between food production and population growth. Among the well-known philosophical authors we should mention Machiavelli and his book "The Prince" and Marx, who declared that armed revolution is a legitimate form of "class struggle". The just war theory definitely should not be left out that was developed for centuries (from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and later to Hugo Grotius), which primarily discusses the ethical dimensions of war and which



served as a basis for numerous declarations and conventions on war at the world level. The Geneva Convention was one of them. **However, the most famous historical definition of war did not originate in philosophy, but was given by the Prussian general and historian Carl von Clausewitz (1942). According to this definition, war is the continuation of politics by other means.**

On the basis of empirical insights in the social sciences during the twentieth century, especially from the fifties to the nineties during which most contributions were made by social psychologists and sociologists the prevailing view today about war is what E. Fromm (1973)<sup>133</sup> in the book "Anatomy of human destructiveness," summarized in the following way: The thesis that war is caused by human destructivity is completely absurd to anyone who knows history even most superficially. Babylonians, Greeks, all to the politicians of our time planned the war for, according to their belief, very real reasons and very thoroughly weighed arguments for and against, although naturally, their estimates were often incorrect. Their motives were multiple: the land for cultivation, wealth, slaves, raw materials, markets, territorial expansion and - defence. Under special circumstances, desire for revenge, or, in a small tribe, passion for destruction was among the factors that motivate war. However, such cases are atypical. The opinion that war is caused by human aggression is not only unreal but also harmful. It diverts attention from the real causes and thus weakens the resistance against them.

In terms of sociopsychology Fromm's thesis explains war as the most widespread form of instrumental aggression, that is, almost all forms of violence in war Fromm considered a tool to achieve a basic and rational goal. Achievement of that rational goal is carefully planned activity focused on the maximum gain with minimum losses. Individual manifestations of enemy aggression which have as their sole objective to cause pain or killing, belong to acts of revenge and other situational factors that accompany each war. The exception is genocide that is based on a specific combination of instrumental and hostile aggression.

This view is nowadays prevailing in social studies, not only because it has a rich empirical confirmation, but because its application enables understanding of almost all wars in human history. It should be noted that Clausewitz's definition fits into this approach.

**Anthropological analyses of different societies and cultures have shown that there are differences in the presence and tendencies towards aggression in different societies, which are determined by the dominant system of values and cultural patterns.** On the basis of these anthropological analyses, Fromm (1973)<sup>134</sup> divided social systems according to the criteria of

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<sup>133</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti II, (The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness II)*, Zagreb, 1984, pp. 34- 35

<sup>134</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti I, (The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness I)*, Zagreb, 1984, pp. 182- 191

aggressiveness versus peacefulness and described three different systems: the first system, or system A, was called the "societies that affirm life", system B was called "non-destructive - aggressive" societies, and system C "destructive societies". In the A system, levels of hostility, violence and cruelty among people are minimal, there are no serious penalties, almost no crime, and the institution of war does not exist or has an insignificant role. In the B system, aggression and war, although not of central importance, are normal phenomena. These societies, however, are not pervaded with destructiveness, cruelty or excessive scepticism. The C system is characterized with a lot of violence between individuals, destructiveness, aggression and cruelty between people within the tribe and towards other tribes, satisfaction in war, malice and fraud.

## 2.2. Genocide and ethnic cleansing

According to the United Nations **genocide** is defined as "acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group".<sup>135</sup>

In the twentieth century there were numerous terrible instances of genocidal violence, such as genocide in Turkey, where approximately 1.5 million of Armenians were killed in the period from 1915 to 1917; genocide in Cambodia, where about 2 million people died between 1975 to 1979, genocide during the Holocaust in World War II, or genocide in Rwanda where more than one million people were afflicted over a short period.

**Genocide results from an intense feeling of frustration and threat, caused by a combination of a number of previously described psychological patterns, such as factors of social identity, stereotyping, group loyalty, which operate in the context of serious social, economic and political circumstances.** According to the social psychologist Staub (1989) strong motives for self-protection are generated in difficult social, economic and political circumstances: a motive for defending one's own life and security, motive for defending the concept of self, one's own values and way of life. There is also a need for protection of self-respect, values and traditions. Along with this a weakened concept of our individual self needs be elevated (p. 15). If the enemy as the cause of such circumstances is not easily identified, then one is created: a scapegoat. **Although some claim that certain cultures are prone to that more than others (e.g. Staub, 1989), the potential for violence at such a scale exists in most cultures. The more cohesive a group is -- the potential is more probable, especially when accompanied with a sense of superiority. This is especially evident when there is pronounced nationalism in a country. Strong respect for authority and a**

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<sup>135</sup> Downloaded 21. 2. 2009. from <http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm>

strong tendency for violence, which everyone has to a certain degree, are additional factors that increase the likelihood of mass killings and genocide. These features reduce the likelihood of individual responsibility and increase the likelihood of obedience to a leader.

The very complexity of genocide as a phenomenon and the multiplicity of its sources (economic, political, historical, social, psychological...) certainly diminish the possibility to adequately understand the true nature of genocide. This complexity necessarily requires interdisciplinary approach. We shall describe some conceptions about psychological processes that are essential for the understanding of genocide and for ability to predict genocide as well as extreme group violence in general.

Understanding of the psychological processes that are foundations of genocide and of other forms of group violence is supported by psychological studies in several individual areas a part of which relates to understanding the origin and development of conflict between groups, and part in understanding the execution of violence or processes that reduce the sense of responsibility and facilitate violence. In an attempt to integrate and place that knowledge in a broader context, psychologist, E. Staub made the greatest contribution in his theory of genocide extensively elaborated in the book "The Roots of Evil" (Staub, 1989).

According to Staub the appearance and development of genocide cannot be explained without understanding conditions in society and characteristics of the social situation and culture.<sup>136</sup> In his conception, Staub maintained that basic human needs wherein the possibilities of their fulfilment depend on conditions in society. If conditions do not allow needs to be met, strong motives are activated. One of the possible ways of fulfilling and dealing with such motives is to focus hostility towards a particular group and its members. The extent to which satisfaction of motive and confrontation with the unpleasant consequences of difficult living conditions will manifest negative orientations onto a particular group, to what intensity will hostility reach, which group will be chosen as an object of hostility and ultimately whether or not will genocide occur, according to Staub depends on the culture as well as cultural and social characteristics.

Each of the key elements in Staub's interpretation of the sources and processes of genocide such as **difficult living conditions, characteristics of culture and social organization, motives, psychological and behavioural ways of fulfilling motives**, present general formulations which in a summarizing way point to a large number of individual and varied characteristics and processes. Therefore, we shall first determine these notions and describe what they entail. This will also illustrate

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<sup>136</sup> Staub, Ervin, *Genocide and Mass Killing: Their Roots and Prevention*, in Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. , Winter, D. A. (ed. ) *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, New Jersey, 2001, p 2, downloaded 10-2-2009. from <http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/Staubonrootsofviolence.pdf>.

the way in which Staub interconnected and placed in a broader context the knowledge of psychology on prejudices and stereotypes, conformism, social categorization, deindividuation, dehumanization of victim, obedience to authority etc.

**Difficult living conditions.** It is impossible to accurately determine difficult living conditions by listing all the individual situations that make living conditions difficult. Therefore, it is probably more convenient to say that difficult living conditions refer to the conditions in which people cannot normally achieve and satisfy their basic needs and motives. Seen in this way, difficult living conditions may include a wide range of phenomena, or only some of them such as: poor economic conditions (ranging from great poverty, hunger, through to mass unemployment, inflation, to unrealized expected improvement of material living conditions), intense political changes, marked existence of any criminal or other forms of violence including war, etc. Thus, difficult living conditions alone can vary in type, intensity, duration and accompanying level of disorganization and chaos in society.

In the application of his concept of genocide for the interpretation of actual occurrences of genocide in history, Staub (1989) states that in each of the analysed examples of genocide: the Holocaust, the genocide of Armenians in Turkey, the mass disappearances in Argentina, the genocide of political opponents in Cambodia the political system changed within 10 years before the start of the genocide.

In order to understand the origins of genocide in accordance with E. Staub's concept (1989; 1996) the content or form of difficult living conditions are not of primary importance; the emphasis is on the psychological consequences of these conditions, ways to cope with the consequences and psychological and actual ways of fulfilment of those needs and motives.<sup>137</sup>

**Needs of the individual and society and resulting motives.** Difficult living conditions violated the realization of various needs: needs for safety both physical and psychological, needs for a positive self-concept, for the ability to predict and to have control over things that are happening to us, etc. For example, an extremely bad economic situation or marked violence may endanger life itself or physical safety. As a result of intense political changes, routine the patterns of behaviour, systems of values and world views can be endangered, etc. Long-lasting difficult living conditions also destroy relations between people in society. All people are focused on their own needs, which also strengthen the need to be connected with others. Such experiences of threat and frustration encourage and reinforce different motives.

As a result of difficult living conditions, the following motives are generated: protection of physical well-being of the individual and his/her family, maintaining, preserving psychological self, including image of self and associated values, understanding life problems and social disorganization,

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<sup>137</sup> Staub, Ervin, *Genocide and Mass Killing: Their Roots and Prevention*, in Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. , Winter, D. A. (ed.) *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, New Jersey, 2001, pp. 3- 4, downloaded 10. 2. 2009. from <http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/Staubonrootsofviolence.pdf>.

achieving a new understanding of the world. Since these motives in difficult conditions can hardly be fulfilled through improvement of living conditions, in response to the motives and needs the feelings, thoughts and actions may appear that are not focused on real sources, but facilitate coping with the consequences. In this way *the negative evaluation of other groups, finding sacrificial lambs, joining new groups and acceptance of ideologies* will take place. What motives will appear and how will they be fulfilled depends on the characteristics of the culture and society. Thus, if the society has a history of negative evaluation of some group and discrimination of its members and also an emphasized respect for authorities, it is more likely that the society will turn against some subgroup.

Thus, difficult living conditions, or more precisely unfulfilled needs, goals and motives (as a consequence of difficult living conditions) do not cause genocide per se, but only contain a possibility for the development of genocide, that is, represent a source of motivation for violence. Whether genocide will or will not occur due to difficult living conditions depends on the characteristics of culture and social organizations.

### **2.2.1. Characteristics of culture, society and socio-political institutions**

According to Staub (1989; 1996) there are several characteristics of culture and society that make society more prone to violence. Although each culture or society has at least some of these characteristics, violence and genocide are more probable if there are more of these characteristics.<sup>138</sup>

**Societies differ by their evaluations of aggression and the history of aggression use and violence to resolve conflict. It can be said that the more often aggression was used in the history of a society, the more likely will it appear as a way to respond in a new situation. A rich history of violence of a nation makes violence more accessible and acceptable as a way of solving problems. In some societies or social institutions, aggression and aggressive behaviour have been even set as the ideal. Aggressive characteristics once adopted by culture and society, lead to aggressiveness as a way of life. Aggression in these cases becomes something valuable; it becomes a positive part of the cultural image of oneself.**

Positive evaluation of social aggression, and the place of aggression in the national, cultural image of self are well illustrated by the words of S. Milosevic in 1988, in his speech at Gazimestan (Kosovo): "If we do not know how to work, we do know how to fight" or the statements of D. Cosic: "The Serbian people gain in war and lose in peace."

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<sup>138</sup> Staub, Ervin, *Genocide and Mass Killing: Their Roots and Prevention*, in Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. , Winter, D. A. (ed. ) *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, New Jersey, 2001, pp. 5- 7, downloaded 10-2-2009. from <http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/Staubonrootsofviolence.pdf>.

Thus, any society or culture holds certain beliefs about themselves, a certain image of themselves, a way of approaching the world and values. A frequent component of a national, cultural image of oneself that can often contribute to the occurrence of violence is *the feeling of deprivation usually associated with the belief that a country or a nation deserves more*. If prominent in a society, the general view of the world as a threatening place, a place full of dangers, also contributes to the development of aggression. Components of cultural identity also include the *negative evaluation of other groups*, or more precisely, existing history of negative evaluation of a group. Another feature of society that is important for the development of violence is *the degree of obedience and respect for authorities and strong leaders*.

Although a certain degree of obedience to authority is necessary for normal functioning, especially in some types of social institutions such as the police and army, submission to authority and to rules can become one of the fundamental values that are being integrated into all social institutions and through them, spread further. Such authoritarian societies are generally suitable for the development of violence, and in particular political violence. For if a leader appears who advocates or encourages violence, only a few will oppose.

*A degree of democracy or totalitariness* in society is associated with the authoritarian orientation of society. In democratic societies where there are a greater number of political, religious, national, racial and other groups, free expression of diversity is possible and some initial forms of violence will be probably resisted. In addition, for the emergence of genocide, it is very important whether there are manifested *prejudices and discriminations at the level of institutions* in society. The existence of discrimination at the level of institutions implies discriminatory attitudes towards members of certain groups. This implies that they cannot be employed, or all forms of education are not accessible to them, or within a certain system (e.g. educational or judicial) they are treated differently because of their affiliation to a particular group. If members of a society accept such discrimination at the level of institutions it is more likely that they remain silent even in cases when more pronounced forms of discrimination are introduced.

**An important characteristic of a society that, after all, allows the execution of violence and possibly genocide is the existence of organized groups in society who are able to perform this. This means that the increased probability of genocide along with existing hostility towards a group and motivation to treat it negatively can be identified if there is an organized group capable of committing violence or genocide in the society. The military is often used for execution of violence and genocide considering the degree of its organization, power, practice and trained obedience to authority.**

To summarize, the combination of societal and cultural characteristics makes certain societies prone to respond with hostility and violence towards a subgroup (or another nation or country). In order to begin with violence, not all of these preconditions are naturally necessary. The existence of only some of them is sufficient. However, the absence of some of the features could be favourable for the creation of resistance and counter-reactions that can prevent the strengthening of violence in its initial stage of so-called continuum of destruction.

### **2.2.2. Ways of fulfilling motives and needs**

When considering the relationship between newly created needs, motives and modes of their fulfilment, in accordance with the concept of E. Staub, it should be noted that a motive can be fulfilled in different ways, but also that the same behaviour, psychological process may contribute to the fulfilment of different motives. For example, as has already been mentioned, motives for controlling what happens to us through understanding the world and our place in the world are pronounced in difficult living conditions. In response to these motives one can *join a movement and accept the ideology*, because in this way one achieves a sense of power and control, and the individual self becomes interconnected to form "we". Moreover, by joining a group one fulfils a motive of the need to feel connected to other people.

In addition, in so-called difficult living conditions the image of oneself, self-esteem and a sense of one's own values, as well as individual and social identity are compromised. As a possible response, a *negative evaluation of other groups (out-groups)* may appear and are related to the *uplifting of one's own group (in-group)*. The uplift of an in-group is used because through creation of group identity, the value of the group extends to the value of individual members or in other words, the worthier the group we belong to, the more we value ourselves. This in-group elevation is facilitated by finding and emphasizing the out-group's negative features and mistakes, and by emphasizing the difference between our own and other groups.

**Genocide does not occur as a direct result of all these conditions, but follows a certain progression. Initial harmful behaviours of low intensity cause changes in individuals, perpetrators and observers, and eventually in the entire group, facilitating even more harmful behaviours. This leads to an increasingly negative evaluation of victims, to changing the image of oneself in the eyes of perpetrators who consequently become more willing to commit even greater violence for justified reasons. Finally, there is a commitment to genocide or mass killing or ideological goals that require mass killing or genocide.**

**Such progression is likely in a situation when there are passive observers - members of society who are not directly affected and out-group members, including other nations.** In contrast, the active opposition of observers may re-activate the moral values of perpetrators. Unfortunately observers - members of society who are neither perpetrators nor the victims, or individuals outside a certain group or nation, often remain very indifferent. Apart from a possible fear that may contribute to such an observer's passivity it should be noted that we all tend to accept definitions of reality offered by the government, experts and the entire culture.



**B) APPLICATION OF THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL  
FRAMEWORK TO THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND  
HERZEGOVINA 1991-1995**

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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

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There were two initial difficulties that the author of this expertise encountered concerning the objectivity of the proposed theoretical framework on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1991 - 1995. The first relates to value-neutrality in science, and the other to the social origin and identity of the author. Since these are difficulties that have been debated in science, and especially in the social sciences since early positivism, the author has followed the prevailing attitude in contemporary science. The author therefore offers first a brief overview of the origin and the present scientific standpoint connected with the above-mentioned difficulties.

Max Weber (1864), a sociologist who has been ascribed merits as the founder of modern sociology, presented the standpoint in which a sociologist refers to values according to two meanings. First, because values are part of the sense that actors attach to their activity. Sociology is focused on the understanding of that sense; therefore it necessarily has to include the values that are part of its research areas. Second, a sociologist refers to values because they cannot be avoided – a man is situated in a certain context, and has passions and inclinations. According to Weber (1864) his willingness to research stems from a passionate presence in the world. Therefore, he examines what he considers relevant. Personal preferences, however, lead him to analyse some causative relations in more detail; he sees some phenomena better. But he does not stop there. The objectivity of his work arises from his efforts to be aware of his own preferences and to avoid value judgments on the phenomena under study. This standpoint in science is known as **"Weber's principle of value-neutrality."** It should be noted that this position was quickly accepted in other social sciences, including social psychology. However, the famous physicist Heisenberg believes that natural scientists cannot be completely objective because they are part of the environment they explore. This approach is known as "Heisenberg's effect."

Numerous meta analyses of scientific papers published in the twentieth century have shown that value orientations of the author are present in the social sciences with regard to topic selection, the establishment of hypotheses, selection of methodology and interpretation, that is, in all aspects that provide the basis of scientific research according to which scientific theories are created. However, the standpoint that science is the most objective or at least the least imprecise insight into reality is still prevailing and the indisputable standpoint of all scientists.

We should however turn our attention to another phenomenon associated with value-neutrality in science. This is a relationship between theory and the application of theory or between the so-called

fundamental and applied sciences. The discrepancy between these two scientific perspectives is nowadays a lot smaller than it was during the twentieth century, but in terms of value-neutrality Myrdal (1944)<sup>139</sup> adopted a perspective which is still prevalent in the social sciences. This is that **"applied science is definitely not value-neutral."** Namely, while basic science is primarily oriented to the research process that leads to scientific theory where scientific neutrality is conditioned, applied science is oriented to the problem and its resolution, where a scientist's value-relation is not of primary importance, but it is important that their value-relation does not affect selection and application of theory in practice. For example, it is understandable that the standpoint of every person as well as the scientist's towards violence is value-biased, that is negative, but in the selection of theories and their application in order to reduce violence, it is necessary to follow the principle of value neutrality.

The main reason that the author feels the need to reflect on these commonly known issues in contemporary science and its application in practice is to inform the readers of this presented expertise that he is aware of the possible biases due to his social background and world view, and that he, as a scientist, has tried to minimize their influence.

The general bases within the presented theoretical framework which the author uses to offer a socio-psychological explanation of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B&H) are:

- 1. In the historical context for the explanation of the war, two periods are more important than others. First, this is important for understanding the core of the conflict between the war groups<sup>140</sup>, and refers to the period of the Ottoman conquests and related hierarchy. In the geopolitical and cultural space of the medieval Bosnian state and in the corresponding international environment of that time, ethnic identities of war groups were being shaped, which essentially influenced all subsequent social, political and cultural events in B&H. Second, the first and second Yugoslavia,<sup>141</sup> and especially the dissipation of the second Yugoslavia had a decisive influence on the outbreak of conflicts.**
- 2. At the socio-psychological and sociological level, national and ethnic strategies closely linked with the spatial cultural and ethnic homogenisation, that is, expansion in the process of disintegration and after the collapse of the second Yugoslavia were the**

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<sup>139</sup> Schultz, P. Wesley, Oskamp, Stuart, *Social Psychology: An Applied Perspective*, New Jersey, 2000, pp. 7- 8

<sup>140</sup> The author uses the expression "war" or "ethnic" groups, depending on the context, to denote Bosniaks-Muslims, Croats and Serbs from B&H.

<sup>141</sup> The author uses the phrase the first Yugoslavia for the period between 1918-1941 and the second Yugoslavia for the period between 1945-1991 to simplify matters.

factors that crucially determined the course of the war, war outcome and behaviour of war groups.

3. At the global level, factors that were decisive for the course and outcome of the war were a lack of understanding or biased attitudes of the majority of international political actors involved in resolving conflicts and associated with the historical and cultural background of war as well as disunited attitudes related to the survival or disintegration of Yugoslavia before the outbreak of war. At the level of international law and its application, the UN resolution - GA Res. 3314 (1974) was not observed.<sup>142</sup>

## I. CULTURE, SYSTEM OF VALUE, IDENTITY

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Six important theoretical bases were extensively elaborated in the first chapter of the socio-psychological framework which serve as a basis for the application of scientific achievements in the context of understanding the relationship of the value system, culture and identity of war groups in B&H. **First**, in the framework of history, the human population has developed its diversity through genes, language and culture. **Second**, at the global level, culture is usually placed within the framework of society formed in the framework of national, supranational, regional and ethnic groups. **Third**, social norms based on the value system of a dominant group represent the centre of the process of culture stabilization within the above framework. **Fourth**, from a historical perspective, culture can be understood as the crystallization of history in the mind, heart and hands of the living generations, and it is necessary for understanding the process of stabilization of cultural patterns within the above framework. **Fifth**, culture is in a mutual relationship with the social aspect of an individual's identity; cultural context enables and influences the adoption of the social aspect of individual identity, while social identity regulates those aspects of cultural cognition which are prominent in a particular context. **Sixth**, the system of values is the only invisible and intangible element of culture, while the rituals, heroes and symbols of material culture can be seen inside and outside the group, but their meaning is recognizable only to group members.

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<sup>142</sup> UN Resolution G.A. Res. 3314 8 (1974) in the first Article defines aggression as follows: Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. Explanatory note: In this Definition the term "State": a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a Member of the United Nations; b) Includes the concept of a "group of States" where appropriate.

**In the framework of the proposed theoretical context, the significance of historical perspective for understanding culture, system of values and identity is obvious. A socio-psychological analysis actually provides understanding of the outcome of a historical process during which these social categories developed.** Therefore, the relationship between the historical and socio-psychological perspective (the same applies to the anthropological and sociological) is mutual. Specifically, based on analysis of outcomes offered by social psychology and other relevant social sciences, historians can verify the validity and objectivity of historiographic analyses in an interdisciplinary context. The historical perspective is an important source of hypotheses for the socio-psychological research of the mentioned social categories, and an important base for the explanation of outcomes of the process of their formation. Therefore, modern historians often use socio-psychological, sociological, anthropological, linguistic and other relevant knowledge in their explanation of certain historical events and processes.

In order to reduce any possibility of personal value bias the author of this expertise has used, in addition to the undisputedly expert review of Josip Jurcevic on the same subject available to the author, the historical perspective of Noel Malcolm, especially in areas that were most sensitive with respect to values.

## **1. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE IDENTITY FORMING PROCESS OF WAR GROUPS**

As the adoption of identity in a particular cultural context in a way results from a process of socialization at the individual level it can be analogously claimed that the adoption of ethnic and national identities, that are in terms of socio-psychology a special type of collective identity, in a way results from the historical process in a particular cultural context. It is therefore necessary to understand the level of development of war group ethnic identities - Bosniaks-Muslims, Croats and Serbs, on the threshold of the nineties of the twentieth century and the factors that crucially influenced the process, in order to be able to provide answers to the questions "who are the members of the war groups", "what differentiates them", "how they perceive themselves" and "where are they heading".

## 1.1. Historical circumstances

In the introduction of the book "History of Bosnia" (N. Malcolm, 1994), the author quotes a speech by British Prime Minister, John Major on 23 June 1993 (i.e. more than a year after the outbreak of total war in B&H), before the House of Commons: **"The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that was exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred. There were subsidiary elements, but that collapse was by far the greatest."**<sup>143</sup>

By quoting this statement, the author's principal intention in the context of fundamental standpoints of this expertise is to indicate the importance of perspectives according to which the war in B&H was observed, and the importance of factually-based standpoints of individual actors. Historian Malcolm (1994) commented on this statement in his book and offers to a large extent an acceptable answer based on historical facts.<sup>144</sup>

**Since reference is to the British Prime Minister, who represented a European country that, along with France, Germany, and Russia from a European perspective exerted the greatest influence on the negotiation processes in B&H during the war, it is clear that the historical circumstances that led to conflict were not given greater significance.** However, throughout human history in its entirety it is known that conflicts among national or ethnic groups can last for centuries if a just peace is not established. The first step towards this is certainly the understanding of the historical circumstances that have led to conflict. One needs to believe that the British Prime Minister at the time was familiar with the century long war between France and Great Britain, or the national and ethnic conflicts on the British peninsula, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The bloody conflicts among religious groups in the territory of Western Europe, especially after the church schism in the

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<sup>143</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *The history of Bosnia*, 1995, Zagreb, p. XXII

<sup>144</sup> The "discipline" in which the Soviet Union retained Yugoslavia was abruptly interrupted when Stalin threw Tito out of the Kominform in 1948. Perhaps Mr. Major wanted to hint at the decision of communist leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, to take the sources of nationalism for their own political goals, but the process in Serbia was already at work by the summer of 1989, two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in many respects it was hardly different from the manner in which former political leaders used nationalism in the communist system, for example, Nikolai Causescu. A thought that communism was generally exercised as effective "discipline" in order to keep nationalism in control was doubly wrong. Communist authorities were either just distending nationalism and manipulating it for their own goals, or by suppressing it, they were stirring it up and poisoning, creating a politically frustrated and alienated population, or often made both. This dual effect is clearly visible today in the majority of Eastern European countries, where the parties of the so-called "extreme right" attract ordinary voters, encouraged by the religious and historical symbols of the pre-communist period and politicians who built their former careers in the communist party and state security services. This more or less happened in Serbia too.

Middle Ages are also well-known. **However, today's Europe still offers hope that these conflicts are a matter of the past, that the hatred between the conflicting parties no longer determines their actions and that European integration is primarily based on the principle of justice and equality. Therefore it is essential that the war in B&H is justly evaluated from the standpoint of historical circumstances, choosing a political perspective which rests on facts that are uncontroversial and according to which different standpoints from different political and other levels cannot be taken.**

Thus, for understanding the conflict between war groups in B&H in the socio-psychological sense, first of all, it is necessary to understand the outcomes of historical process in which the **Bosniaks-Muslims, Croats and Serbs shaped their ethnic identities in the modern sense.** It should be noted that from the point of view of a social psychologist, individual historical events or nuances that historians dispute about are not important, nor is any period in history evaluated in this way. In the context of Hofstede's model, it is sufficient to know the dominant environmental factors (see Fig 3, p 8.) and the value system of the dominant group which formed the social norms that guided the structure and functioning of institutions in the periods that greatly influenced and shaped the identity of war groups as they are known today.

**The period of the Ottoman conquest that introduced the Ottoman hierarchy in B&H is undeniably the most important historical period for the analysis of identity outcomes for all three war groups in B&H.** This period lasted from the year 1463 to 1878, which encompassed more than four centuries. Historically, it was between the Middle Age feudalism and post-Napoleonic period in Europe, when modern nations and civil society were born. It is important to point out these facts since that period has not only influenced the political destiny of B&H, but also processes in a large part of Europe, especially in the Mediterranean and Central Europe.

**The main characteristic of this period are permanent wars with minor or major interruptions in which peace reigned, between Ottoman invaders and endangered countries and rebellions in the subdued countries.** In such a context, all processes in B&H were subordinate to the war plans of the Ottoman invaders. Therefore, the territorial and administrative structures were organized on a military principle. The main objectives of the invaders included land tax collection to finance the military<sup>145</sup> and the forcible recruitment of youth for the war<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> According to the *Wikipedia* this is a personal tax that was paid in the Ottoman Empire. Every non-Muslim male paid this as a type of payment from slavery. This tax entitled the taxpayer to a pension. This tax was evidence of loyalty to the Sultan and it was divided into three classes: *evsat, sala i edna*.

<sup>146</sup> According to Noel Malcolm, these recruits were Christian male children that converted to Islam and were trained as the Emperor's servants.

All processes were managed by Muslims, appointed by the Emperor in Istanbul. However, although they dominated as a group, due to the continuing unstable conditions and military orientation they could not, and according to historians that was not even their basic goal, exclusively shape Islamic cultural patterns and stabilize them. Accordingly, not all cultural patterns of the existing groups were destroyed nor did Muslims in B&H strictly follow fundamental Islamic social norms characteristic of the Islamic countries of the invaders' origin. **It can be said that a kind of marginal culture was shaped and for that reason, in the European context, B&H was called the "edge of the West" during the pre-Ottoman period and the "edge of the East" during the Ottoman period.**

**In terms of identity, the most important process which continued throughout the period of Ottoman rule in Bosnia with stronger or weaker degrees of intensity was Islamization of non-Islamic groups. This had an impact on those in Bosnia after the conquest as well as those who came later, mostly following the conquerors, that is, from the East.** According to historians enforced Islamization mainly related to the young recruits and was carried out throughout the Ottoman Empire. In addition, there was also unforced conversion to Islam of individual groups motivated by certain privileges (greater safety, retaining ownership of property, lower taxes).<sup>147</sup> Here, however, it should be noted that in a socio-psychological sense, this so-called unforced or voluntary Islamization can be also considered as enforced, to a lesser or larger degree. This argument can be supported by applying Maslow's hierarchy of needs to this situation (Maslow, 1943.). This shows that a need for safety is second in the order of basic needs, right after the need for physiological need satisfaction.<sup>148</sup> This means that all the people, who changed their religious identity for reasons of safety, did so under indirect coercion because their alternatives were either escape or the threat of suffering. A lesser degree of coercion may be only attributed to those who changed their religious identity for various privileges. A similar process occurred in the twentieth century in communist countries when atheization was practiced through indirect coercion. This should be mentioned for a clearer understanding of the position of individual non-Islamic groups in relation to safety and privileges in the Ottoman B&H and the consequential change of religious identity.

The Berlin Agreement in 1878 ended the Ottoman period in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and jurisdiction over B&H was gained by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The conquered army, and many Muslims that came from Islamic countries withdrew from B&H, and the Austro-Hungarian army subdued military attempts to rescue the independence of B&H. Until 1918, **B&H was therefore included in European integration processes, but significantly lagging behind in social, economic and**

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<sup>147</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *The History of Bosnia*, 1995, Zagreb, p. 86- 88

<sup>148</sup> Maslow, Abraham, H., *Theory of Human Motivation*, in „*Psychological Review*”, 50, pp. 6- 7 downloaded 10-2-2009. at [http://www.advancedhiring.com/docs/theory\\_of\\_human\\_motivation.pdf](http://www.advancedhiring.com/docs/theory_of_human_motivation.pdf)



**cultural development (e.g. 97% were illiterate).** On the other side, the position and relationship between war groups significantly changed. The Austro-Hungarians did not privilege any war group, which particularly relates to not meeting the expectations of the Croats, but based its policy mainly on Austrian interests. Muslims ceased to be the dominant group and had to adapt to an increasingly subdued political and cultural position in relation to the Croats and Serbs. The situation did not significantly change even during Kallay's unitary regime (1882-1903)<sup>149</sup>. By introduction of the name "Bosniak" and the so-called "Bosancica" as an official language and script, an attempt to prevent the birth of Croatian and Serbian national ideologies was made as a reaction to similar processes that occurred in Europe before the Ottoman withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Likewise, the formation of a new supranational group which would be composed of members of all three ethnic groups was attempted. However, Croats and Serbs did not accept such attempts because the majority of them joined the national and cultural processes in their home countries of Croatia and Serbia and the idea failed.

So until the first Yugoslavia, all social, political, economic and cultural processes in B&H were under dominant external influences, primarily the Austro-Hungarian, Croatian and Serbian. An illustrative example of the conflict of interests of the three mentioned groups in B&H is definitely the killing the Austro-Hungarian crown prince Ferdinand, that was the immediate cause of the First World War.

## 1.2. Culture and religion

Social identity at the individual level reflects aspects of the concept of self that are based on affiliation and loyalty to important social groups. As stated in the theoretical part, through membership in different groups, individuals actually adopt a social identity that determines their special place in society. However, Tajfel (1972) warned that belonging to different groups contributes to the development of a positive social identity only if the group to which an individual belongs is favoured in relation to other groups.<sup>150</sup> In the comparison of one's own group with other groups, an individual strives to increase the differences in favour of their own group. **Within the theory of social identity, the most important**

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<sup>149</sup> In a situation in which most Serbs in B&H supported the interests of Serbia, and Croats supported the interests of Croatia, the Austro-Hungarian governor of B&H B. Kallay undertook a series of measures in order to neutralize Serbian and Croatian aspirations. Among other things, he relied on Muslim nobility, and therefore did not solve very important agrarian issues. In public life he attempted to structure a new Bosnian nation and impose a name for the Bosnian language (so-called "Bosancica").

<sup>150</sup> Hogg, Michael A., Social Identity, In: Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, p. 466

components of social identity are considered to be family, homeland, local community (region) in which the individual lives, nationality, citizenship, religion and mother tongue.

Culture and the system of values are stable social categories that develop over a long-term process and they are difficult to change. Against this background, some aspects of social identity are adopted, especially national and ethnic as well as linguistic. Religious identity can also be a major source of the value system and culture in societies with a prominent religious fundamentalism. In relation to national and ethnic identity, it is important to note that the formation of ethnic identity in the historical process provides a template according to which national identities are shaped.<sup>151</sup>

As stated, in the pre-Ottoman period, B&H was culturally considered "the edge of the West", and during the Ottoman period "the edge of the East". Such cultural attribution stems from the geopolitical position of B&H, external influences and threats, and internal cultural and ethnic structure. **Regarding the geopolitical position and historical circumstances, external influences and threats have substantially played a part in the processes of stabilization and destabilization of the cultural patterns in B&H throughout its history. Seen at the global level one kind of influence came from the East and the other from the West.**

In pre-Ottoman period the main influences from the West in the cultural sense came from the Mediterranean and Central European cultural circle. These influences were mainly introduced by Croats into B&H. In the East, the main influences came from the Byzantine Empire, and were chiefly transferred by Serbs and Vlachs. During the Ottoman period, these influences gradually weakened, and strengthened the influence of Islamic culture. Owing to the long-term Ottoman presence in B&H and Islamization of neo-Ottoman groups the influence of Islamic culture gradually increased and became dominant. It was spread by the conquering army and its supporting administrative structures, and later by the Islamized groups.

Concurrently, central European and Mediterranean influences weakened for two reasons. The first reason is because Mediterranean and Central European countries including Croatia were in constant war with the Ottoman Empire. The second reason is because Croats as the main carriers of this influence could not significantly influence any important process inside B&H, including cultural, because of Croatia's inclusion in the enemy block and their exposure to Islamization. On the other hand, Byzantine influence declined as the Ottoman conquerors conquered the whole Byzantine Empire and established the same order as in B&H. In addition, Serbia was also subdued and the influence of Serbs

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<sup>151</sup> Korunić, Petar, *Nacija i nacionalni identitet*, (The nation and national identity) In „*Zgodovinski časopis*”, 57, 2003, pp. 10- 12 downloaded 20-1-2009 from <http://www.filg.uj.edu.pl/~wwip/postjugo/files/273/Etnicki-i-nacionalni-identitet.pdf>

as the main carriers of the Byzantine and Serbian culture gradually weakened, though never to the extent as among Croats. **One reason for this is the constant communication that existed between Serbia as part of the Ottoman Empire and B&H. Namely, groups of Serbs, Vlachs and others came from the East following the conquerors and settled in various areas of B&H, especially in its eastern part. Another reason is that the Serbian Orthodox Church, with its head in the Ottoman Empire was in a more privileged position than the Catholic Church that had its pontiff in Rome and was considered an enemy of the Ottoman Empire.** The conversion of a significant number of Catholics to Orthodoxy illustrates the privileged position of Orthodoxy in relation to the Catholicism and for similar reasons, conversion to Islam while the reverse process did occur.

**In this general context, and with the mentioned differences in view, religion for both Croats and Serbs over time eventually became the only way and means of transferring cultural heritage and ethnic identity from the pre-Ottoman period. The Franciscan order based in the Franciscan province called "Bosna Srebrena", which was the only order that had Sultan's permission for religious activities had a very important role in this process among Croats. The Serbian Orthodox Church had this role among Serbs.** Therefore, the entire cultural heritage from the Ottoman period was mostly collected and guarded within church buildings and the construction of churches was the only construction out of cultural objects that was allowed. Due to above-mentioned reasons, the Orthodox Church was more privileged. During the Ottoman period, many Orthodox churches were built all over B&H territory, while many Catholic churches were destroyed by the conquerors.

**Within the same context Islam had an important impact on cultural processes in the Ottoman period.** Although the Ottoman Empire prevalingly relied on the military and administrative structures, religious factors were more closely associated with the overall activity of Islamic followers due to the nature of Islam as a religion. Thus, religion significantly influenced all cultural processes. This influence was particularly evident in the cities where they mostly lived and completely controlled. Numerous mosques, schools with a religious background and cultural facilities could be found in all B&H cities during the Ottoman period. Among these objects two bridges, the masterpieces of Ottoman architecture, deserve special attention –bridges in Visegrad and Mostar. This is why even today the cities in B&H established in that period have characteristic old cores -- cultural heritage from the Ottoman period (such as Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Travnik, etc.).

**The historical circumstances of B&H in the Ottoman period significantly influenced the social identities of war groups in different ways. Over the whole period, Croats experienced demographic decline, their value system and culture were reduced almost entirely to the religious component, ethnic identity was suppressed under direct and indirect coercion, and**

linguistic identity was impoverished. Throughout the same period, Serbs experienced demographic growth, their value system and culture were enriched by the religious component, which unlike the Croatian case gradually prevailed, and linguistic identities developed parallel to religious identities. Bosniak Muslims also grew demographically; their value system, culture and identity were based exclusively on Islam, but because of the military nature of the Ottoman hierarchy and the process of Islamization of non-Islamic groups, fundamentalism and cultural exclusivity did not prevail during the Ottoman period.<sup>152</sup> In these circumstances, by the end of the Ottoman period all three groups declared their identities solely on the basis of religious affiliation, that is, as Muslims, Catholics and Serbian Orthodox. It should be noted that in some central parts of B&H, the ethnic identity of Croats was suppressed to the extent that they could hardly remember it.

The decline of the Ottoman hierarchy and departure of the conqueror's army and its followers suddenly disrupted all of these processes. In the period of Austro-Hungarian rule over B&H, Muslims had the most preserved cultural and religious heritage, but the link with their native culture was missing. Croats had suffered the greatest loss in every respect, but had a possibility of re-establishing a link with their homeland culture and ethnic roots. Serbs developed as the second largest ethnic and religious group by virtue of their number and strength but with a narrow cultural and ethnic link with their homeland from which they moved during the Ottoman period. **In these circumstances, although the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as mentioned above, tried to preserve existing relations, under the influence of native homeland countries and the broader cultural environment, the cultural, ethnic and religious identities of Croats and Serbs rapidly strengthened, while Muslims were forced to search for their ethnic identity. This remained to be their painful problem throughout the twentieth century.** Namely, Muslims from B&H could not constitute an ethnic group based solely on their religious identity in the European context during the second half of the twentieth century, when the processes of forming nations on foundations of the bourgeois revolution in France and post-Napoleon period in the majority of European countries was already complete. These processes lasted until the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after the First World War, and continued with a variety of strategies and intensities during the period of the first and second Yugoslavia. They were based on the theoretical principle of favouritism of one's own groups on account of real or imagined arguments in which war groups also significantly differed. **This very fact that favouritism of a specific group in the eyes of its members in comparison to other war groups relied on fabricated arguments, along with creation of strategies based on this type of arguments, generated and reinforced social**

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<sup>152</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Povijest Bosne*, (The history of Bosnia) 1995, Zagreb, pp. 87, 88, 294

distance between groups, based on prejudices,<sup>153</sup> stereotypes<sup>154</sup> and myths.<sup>155</sup> These processes were the psychological foundations of the conflict among ethnic groups in B&H throughout the twentieth century which at the end of the century, culminated in war. The Serbian myth of a Greater Serbia was at the centre of this process so that any subsequent stereotypes about Serbs from the Bosnian-Muslim and Croatian perspective could be best understood when observed as a reaction to this central myth.

*The myth of a "Greater Serbia" is based on several separate, but mutually overlapping myths created after the Battle of Kosovo, based on a mixture of rational and irrational structures that were verbally transferred that is typical of myths, but also of lyrics and texts. It should be noted that during the nineteenth and twentieth century, political programmes and plans were built around these myths, known as the Program ("Nacertanije"), "Serbs All and Everywhere" (Srbi svi i svuda) and "Homogeneous Serbia" (Homogena Srbija). In line with all these myths and programmes a "Memorandum" of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts" was composed in 1986. It should be noted that in 2007, Vojislav Seselj, a defendant in The Hague published a book issued by the Serbian Radical Party in which Seselj is President, entitled "The Roman Catholic Criminal Project of an Artificial Croatian Nation" which proves that mythological consciousness is still present in Serbian society. It is not without importance to state that the Serbian Radical Party is supported by the greatest number of voters in Serbia.*

Anzulovic (1999) described three such myths:<sup>156</sup>

*After the battle on the Field of Kosovo in 1389, when Serbs and Turks clashed, texts and folk songs were created about the Serbian Prince Lazar who chose the **heavenly kingdom** over the earthly kingdom. The best known folksong on the Prince's choice of the heavenly kingdom over the earthly kingdom is "The Downfall of the Kingdom of Serbia". This explains how Saint Elias offered Prince Lazar a choice: the heavenly kingdom or the earthly kingdom. According to this song, if Prince Lazar chooses the earthly kingdom, after saddling their horses and preparing soldiers for battle against the Turks, the entire Turkish army would disappear. However, if he chooses the heavenly kingdom, Saint Elias told him to build a church at Kosovo from pure silk and velvet and to let his soldiers take Communion, since the entire army would disappear including himself. According to this myth, Prince Lazar chose the kingdom of heaven, built a tent-church, called the Serbian patriarch and twelve grand*

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<sup>153</sup> A prejudice is a hostile or negative attitude towards members of a recognizable group of people, that is based on exclusively their membership in that group.

<sup>154</sup> A stereotype is a generalization about a group of people to which the same characteristics are ascribed to nearly all its members, independent of the real differences between members.

<sup>155</sup> Stories, orally transmitted beliefs about old nations about the origin of the world, about natural phenomena about gods and legendary heroes. In a transferred sense, myth means a fairytale, a fabricated story an unreliable representation of some event.

<sup>156</sup> Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia*, London, 1999, pp. 11- 13, 30- 31

bishops, and made the army take Communion and make preparations. This song further describes a fierce battle between Serbs and Turks, in which the Serb soldiers together with their prince vanished from the earth.

Another famous folk song about the Kosovo legend is *The Prince's Supper*, which tells about Prince Lazar's supper with his knights on the eve of a battle. The analogy with the Last Supper of Jesus Christ is evident, says Anzulovic (1999). "What is the Kosovo Supper but a repetition of the Last Supper? The Sacrificial Victim presides over both. At the Last Supper it is Christ, God who sacrifices himself; at the Kosovo supper, a ruler and a people sacrifice themselves." In several figurative representations of the Kosovo supper in Serbian churches and monasteries, Lazar is surrounded by twelve apostle warriors. The analogy with the Last Supper is reinforced by the presence of an alleged traitor among the twelve warriors. The original function of the legend about choosing the heavenly kingdom of Prince Lazar was supposed to transform an alleged military defeat into a moral victory. At the end, the legend is expanded to portray people who at every historical turning point strive for the heavenly kingdom adopting a position of moral authority.

**The Kosovo Legend** contains a contradiction. On the one hand, the glory of Prince Lazar, the leader of the Serbian army at Kosovo, because he has chosen the heavenly kingdom, even at the cost of defeat and slavery is celebrated. On the other hand, the most admired hero of the Kosovo cycle - Milos Obilic is guided by a pagan-heroic rather than a Christian ethic. Obilic is celebrated for a single action, which is a combination of trickery and heroic self-sacrifice. According to one version of the legend, Obilic came to see Sultan Murad I during the Battle of Kosovo pretending that he wants to become his vassal. However, when he was granted an audience he pulled out a knife which was hidden in his clothes and slaughtered the Sultan. The cult of Obilic was extended to such a degree that he was sometimes represented as a saint. For example, in Grabovac Monastery, south of Nis, there is a picture at the altar of Prince Lazar and Miloš Obilić beside him. Milos has a traditional halo painted around his head and the inscription reads: Saint Milos Obilic.

**Saint-Savaism** is a common Serbian name for a specific type of church, state and nation that was established by Saint Sava at the beginning of 13th century. Serbian theologians defined it as "Orthodoxy ennobled by a healthy Serbian nationalism." It was formulated as a messianic ideology in the 1930s, when the Serbian Church supported the pan-Serb policy of the Yugoslav government in the newly formed Yugoslav union. Saint-Savaism, published in Belgrade from 1932 to 1940, served as an instrument in spreading the ideology, which was strongly influenced by Slavophil Russian messianism, and which was based on the belief that only Orthodoxy has preserved the purity of original Christianity. Danilo Medan, one of its promoters, wrote that Saint-Savaism was a symbol of the pan-Slavist idea of the union of all Slavs, whose mission is universal: "It must give the world true Christianity in an Orthodox interpretation, whose authentic sources have been obscured by the Roman Catholicism and Protestantism of the West. Saint-Savaism regards the nation as holy because of its identification with the only true faith. This conviction is evident in the words of archimandrite Justin Popovic: "Our national history is clear proof of Christ's resurrection and power." At the same time, the blurred border between the earthly and the transcendent is evident in a speech by Velimirovic on Vid's Day celebration: If somebody asks us what the ideal of our people is, he can be given an answer immediately: holiness. With all their heart the people want a holy church, holy school world, holy culture, holy dynasty, holy authorities, holy state and - holy army.

### 1.3. Nations and ideologies

**In a historical sense, a nation includes territoriality, cultural connections, ethnicity and the existence of a national state.** As stated, forming nations and national states in Europe on the above-mentioned grounds, took place over a historical process that for most countries ended in the second half of the nineteenth century, and for several of them late in the nineteenth century (e.g. Scandinavian countries). Both Croatia and Serbia were countries that formed their nations in this historical context. **However, we should note that Croatia followed the so-called European renaissance matrix in the first half of the nineteenth century, like other countries within the Habsburg Monarchy (Czech national revival, Slovak national revival, Hungarian political and cultural revival), and in Serbia the process was parallel to liberation from Turkish occupation (Serbian rebellions in the early nineteenth century) and its articulation became recognizable at the end of the century within the Kingdom of Serbia, which was established after the Berlin Congress of 1878.** In a new geopolitical context, with Croatian and Serbian cultural and national developed ideas in different circumstances, B&H encountered a situation corresponding to the pre-Ottoman period - on the cultural edge of the West and the East. Due to different strategies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Croatia within its frame interested in the fate of the Croats in B&H and Serbia, B&H failed to form as a nation throughout the entire period of Austro-Hungarian domination despite Kallay's previously mentioned attempts. In the first Yugoslavia, B&H entered with unresolved issues related to national and cultural integration and with strong external influences from both Croatia and Serbia that were using different strategies. The Croatian strategy predominantly referred to cultural integration of Croats from B&H in the Croatian national corpus, while for Serbian to its domination in B&H and territorial expansion in accordance with its developed strategy of a "Greater Serbia" socio-psychologically based on the aforementioned myth. In this context, Bosniaks-Muslims leaned towards either Croats or Serbs in terms of their national identification, and as Muslims they supported the territorial integrity of B&H. **Thus, it can be concluded that B&H integrated in the first Yugoslavia primarily as a territory in which no ethnic group achieved cultural or political domination, nor had a unique strategy for the future of B&H in new circumstances.** In other words, centrifugal tendencies in B&H reinforced by the national-expansionistic strategy of Serbia and cultural influences from Croatia were stronger than unitarian ones that were advocated mainly by Muslims, backed by the Austro-Hungarian politics and interests.

**In the first Yugoslavia, then, B&H entered without essential assumptions to be constituted as a nation which would be the basis for the construction of social and political system. Therefore, during the entire period of the second Yugoslavia, all the more important**

social and political processes in B&H reflected the main political matrix that was based on Serbian efforts for political domination and territorial expansion in accordance with the myth of a Greater Serbia as well as the attempts of Croatia to defend, to gain an equal political position and to prevent the partitioning of Croatian territory. In addition, Croatia was exposed to Italian territorial grabbing for the major part of the Adriatic coast as well as islands and Dalmatia. In this context, Croats from B&H were in a similar situation as in the Ottoman period; they were forced to fight to preserve their identity with the support of Croatia, while Serbs supported the Greater-Serbian expansionist policy and participated in it, and the Bosniak-Muslims, gathered around the Yugoslav Muslim Organization mainly attempting to preserve the acquired goods and property. **Because of these strategies, Bosniak-Muslims have shared a similar fate of threat as Croats and therefore more often expressed their nationality as Croats than as Serbs** (almost all members of the Yugoslav Muslim Organizations declared themselves Croats of Muslim religious orientation).

The end result of the incessant conflicts with these political strategies was the political re-shaping of the Yugoslav territory on several occasions<sup>157</sup>. The last was in 1939 when B&H was territorially reorganized in a way that the king founded the Croatian province (banovina), and B&H lost its territorial frame which it had upon inclusion into Yugoslavia. **The main political objective which the then Yugoslav king, a Serb by nationality, aimed to achieve by this territorial organization was to reduce sources of conflict between Croatia and Serbia in wake of the Second World War.** However, although partition apparently and temporarily reduced political conflicts there are numerous historical traces, which show that with such territorial tailoring, no one was satisfied. Since no one, except the Serbs was satisfied with the political relations as well as the social and cultural processes by which Serbia tried to turn the myth of a Greater Serbia into political, social and cultural reality, the second Yugoslavia dissipated at the very beginning of the Second World War.

**Against the background of political conflicts in the first Yugoslavia, two extreme national ideologies were at work and their main actors were Ustashe in Croatia, who operated illegally and Chetniks in Serbia, Croatia, B&H and Montenegro, who operated legally. Along with them, those illegally operating (Yugoslav communists with their leader, Tito) within the framework of an extreme international ideology with Stalinist foundations can be included. These three ideologies will critically affect all events in the Second World War, determine its outcome and the future of territory until the war called The Kingdom of Yugoslavia.** We should, however, emphasize that all three operated from extreme and opposing positions, noting that in one period of the thirties, the

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<sup>157</sup> Jurcevic, Josip, Expertise for the purpose of MKSJ: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990- 1995, Zagreb, 2008., pp. 21- 25.



communists and Ustashe although they held different political motives shared the same goal of destroying the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Namely, they co-operated in the resistance and conflicts tied to the Greater-Serbian policy of King Petar Karadjordjevic and therefore were persecuted and detained.

**After the disintegration of the first Yugoslavia in Croatia, the Croatian Peasant Party was convincingly the strongest political option. This party was led by Vlatko Macek who withdrew before the war events and thus created a political crisis with unpredictable consequences.** This crisis was favourable for the extreme political group of Ustashe who fled to Italy to escape persecution in the second Yugoslavia. Ustashe formed an Independent State of Croatia (NDH), which consisted of the territory of Croatia, reduced according to so-called Roman Treaty between Italy and the NDH in 1941, most of the islands and most of the Dalmatian mainland and the territory of B&H. They were joined by the majority of Muslim elite who ethnically considered themselves Croats of Muslim religious orientation, similar to members of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, and because of a similar basic reason - feeling of threat from the Serbs. The other extreme political option was provided by Yugoslav communists led by Tito who founded an illegal movement with the fundamental goal to win power in the entire area of the second Yugoslavia and to establish a communist dictatorship. **In Serbia, a political crisis also occurred since the king, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and German occupation in April 1941, fled to London; Kvisling rule by Milan Nedic in Belgrade was established, and the king from London appointed Draza Mihajlovic in 1942 as his deputy for Yugoslavia, which no longer existed.** Draza Mihajlovic, leader of the extremist Chetnik Movement that with some marginal exceptions, fought the whole time on the side of Germans and Italians against Tito's partisans and Ustashe with whom in the fight against partisans from time to time collaborated. **Thus, a paradoxical situation was created where three extreme and opposing groups, none of which came into power democratically, decided the fate of Yugoslavia and of all the people within its space. The winner was Tito. He was admitted by the allies in 1944 as a main ally in the fight against the Germans in the whole area of the second Yugoslavia.** In this way, so-called AVNOJ<sup>158</sup> of Yugoslavia was established and that name was ascribed to it at the session of Partisans in Jajce, a small town in B&H (a territory that then belonged to the NDH) late in 1943. After the end of the war, it was named the Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia, and decisions from the mentioned sessions in Jajce became the basis of its political and territorial organization. It consisted of six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina).

To summarize, Croatia (with attached B&H) and Serbia in the formal sense, like most of Europe and the entire surroundings of Yugoslavia (Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania),

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<sup>158</sup> AVNOJ – Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia

during the Second World War belonged to the Axis Forces and had a 'kvisling' government. In addition, two illegal groups were organized in the territory encompassed by the first Yugoslavia. In the political sense, these were also extreme groups -- Yugoslav communists as organizers of Antifascist Partisan Movement and Serbian Chetniks who represented themselves as the Royal Yugoslav Army. All of these legal and illegal groups were in mutual conflicts, with occasional collaboration when their political strategy overlapped (Ustashe with Chetniks against partisans, Chetniks with partisans against Ustashe). When the Second World War was unveiled in the area of Yugoslavia it was very quickly discovered that the Yugoslav communists were real winners of the conflict between the above-mentioned extreme groups. This was due to their organization of antifascist resistance; they were the only allies to winning forces in Second World War. To restore power, the communists committed mass crimes at the end of the war and several years after the war to avenge their war opponents, and killed all ideological enemies and opponents by establishing a totalitarian order in Yugoslavia. In different ways, in these crimes many antifascist warriors from the partisans who disagreed with Tito's policy or opposed to Tito's deviation from Eastern European communist alliance led by Stalin in 1948<sup>159</sup> suffered.

**Two massive crimes, along with its totalitarian structure, essentially determined the socio-psychological level of observation. The first, committed by totalitarian order of NDH, and second, by the Yugoslav partisans at the end of the war and the Yugoslav communists after the war in revenge of the war enemies and as a way of eliminating the ideological opponents.**

Here is important to note that Serbs in the second Yugoslavia built the myth<sup>160</sup> of genocide against the Serb people and the genocidal character of the Croats<sup>161</sup> based on the crimes committed by the former system of NDH against Serbs. **Based on this myth, the Serbian population in Croatia was homogenized and the absolute domination of Serbs was being accomplished in repressive and other structures in the second Yugoslavia. This will be used also for the homogenization of Serbs in Croatia and in B&H in the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia and for Serbian propaganda abroad which served to blur Serbian aggression on Croatia and B&H where Serbs were represented as victims.** The other crime committed by Yugoslav communists, known as the Bleiburg Tragedy, was best expressed by the highly positioned Party official and Tito's follower, Milovan Djilas: "Croatia has to disappear so that Yugoslavia can survive". Later when Tito separated from Stalin, he was persecuted and jailed, proclaimed dissident and a deserter to the West. **The second Yugoslavia was a communist and totalitarian entity, which by its structure, methods, treatment of opponents and culture followed Stalinist concepts characteristic for all countries of the so-**

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<sup>159</sup> Jurcevic, Josip, *Bleiburg - Yugoslav post-war crimes against Croats*, Zagreb, 2005, p. 332

<sup>160</sup> Jurčević, Josip, *Nastanak jasenovačkog mita (The Creation of the Jasenovac Myth)*, Zagreb, 2005, pp. 149-153

<sup>161</sup> Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia*, London, 1999, p. 7, 106-108

called "Eastern block". Its structure was single-party and centralistic, the main method of ruling was through repression, and the culture of the so-called "mass" with the in-built idea and character of its leader.

However, there were two exceptions, in the eyes of Western civilization that separated Yugoslavia from other totalitarian entities. The first relates to the termination of Soviet Union relations with Yugoslavia in 1948, the second was the attempt to introduce an economic model of "socialist self-management". With regard to geopolitical position during the "Cold War" the position of Yugoslavia overlapped with the interests of Western countries, Yugoslavia was provided with political and financial support during the entire period of its rule. This strengthened the communist government in Yugoslavia and made it possible, as a result of its centralized structure with an ideological background and the cult of Tito, using repression, to develop a model of a supranational Yugoslav culture and identity. In accordance with the earlier presented "Onion Diagram" (Figure 2, p. 6) the system of values are derived from the communist ideology as well as atheistic and anti-theistic (Stepinac's case) spirit of cultural, educational and all other institutions.

**Rituals followed the model of "leader"; mass celebrations and parades marked all events that were important for the formation of the second Yugoslavia, and national, religious holidays were expelled or suppressed to the private sphere. The Model of "hero" promulgation was unique. The first "hero" of this entity was Tito, and he was declared the hero three times during his rule. All the other heroes, whether they came from the military, political, intellectual, artistic and other circles were declared as such primarily based on their loyalty to "the leader", and secondarily on the basis of their merits. If they opposed the leader they were persecuted, detained and killed, and instead of heroes they were stigmatized as traitors. All their merits were subjected to the process of collective silence (example of Goli otok<sup>162</sup>, Djilas<sup>163</sup>, Tujman<sup>164</sup>, Izetbegovic<sup>165</sup>, Hebrang<sup>166</sup> etc).**

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<sup>162</sup> Until the First World War on the island of Goli island there was no settlements. At that time of Austro- Hungarian rule, a camp was set up there for Russian prisoners from the Eastern fronts. After the Second World War, the Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia transformed Goli island in 1949 into a strict prison, where only political prisoners were imprisoned. This prison was in the hands of the Federal Government until 1956, when it was given under the jurisdiction of SR Croatia.

In the period between 1948 and 1963, following the split up of Tito and Stalin, all those who opposed the totalitarian Yugoslav system and later many others were deported to this island. Women were also deported to this island; they were later transferred to Grgur island that is close to Goli island. There many intellectuals, artists and cultural artists from the whole area of the second Yugoslavia among the prisoners. It was a kind of camp where physical and psychic torture was exerted and where many were killed. Following release, many were under the constant surveillance of the Yugoslav secret service and they were not allowed to testify to the torture. The families of wardens did not communicate nor did they know where they were doing service while they worked on Goli island. Precise statistics do not exist as to the exact number of prisoners; estimates are between 30 and 60 thousand.

<sup>163</sup> Djilas was a high official of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia until 1953 when he published a series of articles using a liberalistic approach, the most famous of them being *Anatomy of a moral* in the main party newspaper *Borba* and theoretical journal *Nova misao*. His critical publicist activity experienced unanimous condemnation at the Third Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee (CK SKJ) in January 1954. Djilas was excluded from party membership for enemy propaganda, spreading untruths and confidential information. His medal of National Hero was also taken away as well as his rank of reserve general. He served a jail sentence from 1955 to 1966 and after that he was under constant police surveillance.

**At the level of symbols, Serbo-Croatian as the official language was politically imposed in the entire Yugoslav territory. The languages of other national groups were learned as second languages<sup>167</sup>. Education, arts, literature and speech were impregnated with ideological background, and the cultures of Western countries were not presented neutrally but were valued in relation to the Yugoslav culture.**

In accordance with the proposed theoretical framework, such system of values, rituals, heroes and symbols as elements of the Yugoslav cultural models had meaning, and could be recognized only by the population of Yugoslavia, although they were visible to all. **In the context of Hofstede's model of the stabilization of culture (Figure 3, p. 8), social norms were based on the imposition of**

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<sup>164</sup> Tadjman was a Yugoslav Army general, which he left in 1961 and became the director of a scientific institute. He was among the first in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, to open up the debate on Croatian national issues, among which he considered the following to be the most important: imposition of guilt complex because of NDH, centralization of Yugoslavia, which marginalized and provincialized Croatia, myth of Jasenovac as a centre of the recent Greater-Serbian ideology and the dominant Serbian against Croatian subordinate position in the multinational community. During 1971, Tadjman's views became more radical and more clearly expressed which caused condemnation by the Croatian Communist leadership (Miko Tripalo, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar). This led to his imprisonment in 1972 and staged legal proceedings in which Tadjman served as sacrificial goat being a "hardcore nationalist" who maintained connections with Croatian political emigration. Thanks to the intervention of Miroslav Krleža at Josip Broz Tito, Tadjman avoided a long-year jail sentence and was sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment.

<sup>165</sup> During political process, in 1983, Alija Izetbegović was convicted to 14 years of imprisonment in Sarajevo (along with several like-minded), due to "Muslim nationalism" and "enemy propaganda". It was a typical communist assembled process: Izetbegovic was not even involved in any subversive activities, and did not propagate violence. The only true thing in the verdict was Izetbegovic's characterization, of his pan-Islamic and theocratic world view. After he spent a part of his sentence in prison in Zenica, in a climate of liberalization of dissipating communism, he was officially pardoned in 1988.

<sup>166</sup> Hebrang was a high official in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Minister of the Yugoslav Government. With the cooling of relations with the Soviet Union, Hebrang was suspected of having secret contacts with the Soviet Embassy, and that he was a Stalinist. In May 1948, he was excluded from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and was arrested on charges that he cooperated with Ustashe and Gestapo in captivity, and "sabotaged" economic policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was allegedly known to Russians, but had not revealed it – instead, they blackmailed him to be their agent. On the occasion of Hebrang's arrest, the Soviet Ambassador protested and demanded that their representatives be present during interrogations, but the demands were rejected. Hebrang did not admit to guilt nor renounce Informbiro and ended up in prison where he was allegedly killed. The authorities presented his death as a suicide (in an official report it was stated that was found hung on the radiator in a prison called Glavnjača, while witnesses and documents say that heating in this prison was only on *solid fuel*, so there was no radiator and any attached pipes).

<sup>167</sup> The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in its internationalistic orientation was against many national characteristics, and introduced their, it can be said, communist names or terms. For example, the words for Party, Party secretary and minister, principal secretary, the main or central committee, army, police, mister, music, history, meeting, assembly, school, etc. were mostly replaced by words that were much more common in the Serbian literary language. Croatian was repressed and the Croatian linguistic attitude towards foreign words became blunt which opened the door to anglicisms. However, the Serbian side was not satisfied even with such a condition, but sought ways to bring the Croatian and Serbian literary language closer together with the intention of suppressing Croatian completely. With this intention the Editorial Board of Letopis by Matica Srpska issued a survey on language and orthographic issues, and until September 1954 Letopis published the responses of forty participants. After completion of the survey, a meeting was held at which it was concluded that the language of Croats, Serbs and Montenegrins is one language, and so is the literature that has developed around two centres, Zagreb and Belgrade. They concluded that this is a unique language with two pronunciations: ijekavian and ekavian, that in the name of the language in its official use both components had to be emphasized (both Croatian and Serbian), that both pronunciation are equal (ijekavski and ekavski) as well as both scripts (Latin and Cyrillic), and that it is necessary to create a referent dictionary of the Croato-Serbian / Serbo-Croatian language, terminological dictionaries, and common orthography. On the basis of these conclusions, common orthographic rules were published in 1960 but Matica hrvatska issued an ijekavian orthography written in Latin script entitled Orthography of Croato-Serbian Language, and Matica srpska published an ekavian orthography in Cyrillic script, entitled Orthography of Serbo-Croatian Language. While the common orthography was accepted more or less silently, although in some parts it significantly differed from the previous Broz-Boranic orthography, publication of the Dictionary by Matica hrvatske-Matica Srpska (called "Adok") caused a storm of discontent on the Croatian side. Criticism was directed to deficiencies of the dictionary, of which the most significant was the hidden nature of the particularities of the Croatian and Serbian lexis. The consequence of this dissatisfaction was the "Declaration on the name and position of the Croatian Language" from 1967, which was signed by the majority of Croatian cultural and scientific institutions, and which encountered a strong political criticism. Matica hrvatska disclaimed the Novi Sad Agreement and common orthography, stopped work on a common dictionary (completed only by the Serbian side), and organized the development of a new Croatian orthography.

values by the state structures and institutions that were governed by the Communist Party members, who had this system based on communist ideology, and Marxism and prohibited any form of pluralism. The consequences were that the political system, social stratification, education system and legislation were built according to this system; roles were assigned according to it, and the socialization of young people was promoted even within families. Religion was, in compliance with the Marxist principle declared as "opium for the people", and religious leaders and clergy as enemies, so that many of them, especially Catholics, were persecuted, detained and killed (murdered priests<sup>168</sup> and trial of Stepinac<sup>169</sup>). Even the architecture had its own "socialist recognisability".

In order to give significance and permanence to this model, numerous theories were developed with the same background value, which protect it<sup>170</sup>. **It is especially interesting that in that way the developed theoretical system was successfully promoted internationally, particularly in the left-oriented intellectual circles of Western countries who accepted the theory of Marx as a legitimate social theory and did not distinguish it from Marxism as the basis of communist ideology that was practiced in the second Yugoslavia<sup>171</sup>.** Yugoslav history was created on the basis of such

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<sup>168</sup> At the end of the Second World War, a number of works were produced in the territory of Yugoslavia that could be characterised as regime literature that systematically used the most negative attributes. Namely, this literature criminalized the Church, priests and lay people and completely turned a blind eye to the crimes committed against them, especially those of partisans. On the other hand, the same regime for almost half a century prohibited any mentioning of afflicted priests, nuns, brothers, lay people, theologians and seminarians. It only has been possible to write something about them since 1990. Yugoslav communists killed 534 persons associated with the church during the second Yugoslavia, the most of them immediately after the Second World War.

<sup>169</sup> Stepinac was the Arch Bishop of Zagreb during the Second World War. He opposed fascist and communist totalitarianism. Due to conflict with Tito about the status of the Catholic Church in Croatia, and freedom of religion on 18th September 1946, at half past six in the morning, police officers entered the building of the Zagreb Archdiocese and apprehended Stepinac because of an indictment brought against him. Among other things, he was charged because of the following: he welcomed Ustasha leaders while the Yugoslav army still fought with the German and Italian forces and called on clergy to cooperate with them, that he turned traditional ecclesiastical ceremonies and processions into political events for Pavelic and that he served Mass every 10th April on the anniversary of the establishment of NDH, and that he held a Mass at the opening of Parliament of Ustashe; that he chose for its deputies Vucetic and Cecelja, known as sympathizers of Ustashe; that he received and hid Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs NDH; that he supported the Ustasha resistance after the liberation of the country etc.

Several months prior to this, the Vatican was sent a warning. It stated that Stepinac will be arrested and requested him to be shifted because ... *Yugoslavia cannot tolerate citizens who serve the interests of others* ... The Vatican notified Stepinac asking him to decide himself what to do, but the Vatican would not force him to leave Yugoslavia. Stepinac stayed and the court process was initiated, and the verdict was delivered on 11th October of the same year. He was declared guilty on all counts of the indictment and sentenced to 16 years of harsh imprisonment. Despite the fact that respected people of Serbian nationality insisted on testimony at his trial, which would be in favour of Stepinac, prosecutors did not allow this, in case such information was released in public.

<sup>170</sup> For example, between the period from 1970 to 1990 about 1,200 scientists obtained their doctoral degrees in the social-sciences and the humanities at universities in Croatia. This was a population of intellectual elite that provided intellectual software according to which social, political and cultural modes of thinking were formed, for the Socialist Republic of Croatia before, and today for the Croatian state. Rough analysis of titles and summaries from about eight disciplines of social sciences / humanities -- law, economics, history, political science, sociology, psychology, philosophy and pedagogy show that 60% of doctoral theses relate to the Yugoslav, real-socialist and Marxist paradigm, while 40% are on a topic that is not related to these fields. Out of 40% of these other topics, about half relate to subjects that are entirely theoretically and practically useless in a new democratic environment. Only 20% of topics, according to an approximate assessment have, therefore, theoretical and / or empirical value in circumstances of the establishment of the Croatian state. Theses on Yugoslavia and real-socialism were most numbered among economists, lawyers, sociologists, educators and historians, and Marxist themes among politologists, sociologists and philosophers. All of these doctoral theses fully affirm the Yugoslav totalitarian order and self-management, and Marxism as the ideological basis, that is, they have no any critical approach nor propose alternative solutions.

<sup>171</sup>The term Praxis Philosophy or philosophy of practice denotes a philosophical orientation of the so-called "creative" non-dogmatic Marxism, which was formed in the early sixties of the twentieth century, and was initiated by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and was very influential in the former Yugoslavia. Praxis is the name of a journal that was published in Zagreb. Praxis-philosophers met each year on the island of Korcula, and discussed various topics related to Marxism or topics related to it. Through their public activities, they

developed social norms and consequences, and through that prism the history of individual ethnic groups was revised before the formation of Yugoslavia. All this is visible in the libraries, written works, textbooks and history books from the period of the second Yugoslavia.

To make a fundamental dualism between the interests of leading Western countries to support Yugoslavia and Yugoslav actors who created and managed it even more obvious, it is necessary to look back at the economic system. This is because according to the model presented in relation to the stabilization of national culture many environmental factors such as location, history, demography, hygiene as well as food, economy and technology are important in their effect on this process. Many economic analysts believe that the Yugoslav model of socialist self-management, which is in Western countries often mentioned as the "middle way" between the Western model of market economy and the Soviet model of state socialism, was an economically useless concept from the very beginning.

Namely, economic strategies rested on production regardless of the possibility of selling, and on the other side they could not follow the quality standards that were imposed in Western countries because they could not revive the technology of production. So industry permanently produced losses, and those industries that had a leading role in this were qualified as "losers". However, the model due to ideological reasons, guaranteed jobs and social security to employees, so despite the low pay and constant crisis there were no major workers' rebellions, except for mine-workers in Kosovo in the mid-eighties of the last century. This situation is best illustrated by a popular slogan of that period: "You can never pay me that little to match how little I can work"

**The logical question is how such a system was maintained. An important source of funds for maintaining the system were favourable loans from Western countries and financial institutions that in this way realized their interests related to the preservation of Yugoslavia. In addition, it must be mentioned that internal spill over of funds from more developed into less developed regions was practiced, which actually meant the transfer of funds from the two westernmost republics, in a geographical and cultural sense the most developed - Republics of Croatia and Slovenia into the other four republics. Likewise, a significant source were foreign exchange remittances of immigrants from Yugoslavia, in which Croats accounted for half of the total immigration and employment in developed Western countries. Therefore, Slovenia and Croatia felt exploited.**

**Yugoslavia was, therefore, maintained by balancing between the interests of the West and the internal structure that was only slightly different from the Stalinist structure and**

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intended to promote a social system which was constantly spreading capabilities of individuals to act freely and creatively. They criticized capitalism, that is a "civil" narrowed understanding of human freedom and rights that leads to alienation. They also criticized the introduction of elements of a free market economy into the economic system of self-managing socialism. After the collapse of the second Yugoslav praxis philosophy was ignored and mostly forgotten.

**mentality of other countries of "Eastern bloc" and was trying to create a Yugoslav culture and identity.** After Tito's death, Yugoslavia was managed by a collective presidency consisting of one representative from each socialist republic (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia) and one representative of the autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Every year, one of them according to the agreed order took the chairmanship of the Presidency. However, problems of compliance of interests between nations appeared very quickly. In Kosovo, due to a political rebellion, the army had to intervene, and Serbia began the process of aggressive national homogenization. The first consequence of this was the establishment of domination over the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Thus, the final process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia had begun, although the followers of Tito's cult persistently sang a nostalgic parody that echoed "Comrade Tito, we swear that we shall not turn from your path." In other words, **even without the collapse of communism as a global mega-ideology Yugoslavia did not have greater chances of survival.** Unfortunately, although it was clear at the internal level, the process of disintegration from the perspective of the Western world recognized a very small number of relevant political actors. **Thus, a single-perspective and biased view of leading Western countries in the eighties of the last century blurred the possibility to foresee the collapse and possibility of the outbreak of "war in the territory of former Yugoslavia" despite the multitude of undeniable facts that suggested it.**<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Domazet- Lošo, Davor, *Hrvatska i veliko ratište*, (Croatia and the great battlefield) Zagreb, 2002, pp. 42- 53

## II. GROUPS AND CONFLICTS AMONG GROUPS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ETHNOCENTRISM AND NATIONALISM

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### 1. THE PROCESS OF WAR GROUP FORMATION

Ethnic groups in B&H in the early nineties were formed on two foundations. The first was identity that had its origins mainly in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman period, in the period of the first and second Yugoslavia and the Second World War. The second was geopolitical created by the disintegration of the second Yugoslavia in the context of disintegration of communism as a second mega-ideology of the twentieth century in the frame of which more than 60,000,000 people were killed.<sup>173</sup> In other words, Bosniaks-Muslims, Croats and Serbs, after the collapse of Yugoslavia and its totalitarian order that relied prevalingly on repression, formed special political strategies that followed described historical and cultural circumstances and suppressed national and ethnic aspirations from the periods of the second Yugoslavia.

Already at the end of the eighties, it was obvious, while being fully consistent with theoretical explanations about identity formation in the long-term historical process with recognizable value and cultural background, that all attempts to suppress national and ethnic identity, and affirming supranational Yugoslav, using direct and indirect coercion promoted by the Yugoslav totalitarian system, did not significantly influenced the identity of ethnic groups as they did prior to the period of the second Yugoslavia. Namely, already in the second half of the eighties "brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav peoples and nationalities" was almost completely suppressed from public circulation as the major political formula of Yugoslav unity and a common political future. It was maintained in B&H for the longest, which can be seen today by a monument in the centre of Sarajevo with the Yugoslav coat of arms containing the "eternal flame", which symbolizes that formula.<sup>174</sup> The main reasons for suppression of "brotherhood and unity" were the same as those in which the process of collapse of the

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<sup>173</sup> Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Izvan kontrole- globalna previranja uoči 21. stoljeća*, (Out of control – Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century) Zagreb, 1994, p. 15

<sup>174</sup> The text on the monument says: By courage and the commonly spilled blood of soldiers of Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian brigades of the famous Yugoslav Army, as well as the joint efforts and sacrifices of patriotic Sarajevo Serbs, Muslims and Croats, on 6th April 1945 Sarajevo, the capital of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovine was liberated. Eternal glory and thanks to the heroes fallen for the liberation of Sarajevo and our homeland. On the occasion of the first anniversary of its liberation, grateful Sarajevo.



second Yugoslavia was based. **First**, these were disintegrative processes after the death of Josip Broz Tito, when it became clear that the communist system had not established a value system in which the peoples of Yugoslavia could build a common future. **Second**, immediately after Tito's death in 1981 great political rebellions in Kosovo followed that were stifled by military forces and a large number of Albanians from Kosovo suffered or were later persecuted. Subsequently, the great rebellions of Kosovo miners followed in 1986. **Third**, in the second half of the eighties Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia came to power. He began the process of national homogenization of Serbs in the whole territory of the second Yugoslavia, based on the myth of a Greater Serbia reformulated into the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and published in 1986. The first political consequence of this process was the redefinition of the constitutional status of autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Macedonia after the use of unique political methods of overthrowing the government in those provinces known as the "Yoghurt or the Antibureaucratic Revolution." **Fourth**, at the end of the eighties the process of disintegration of communism in Europe was recognized worldwide and new strategies of power distribution among the major actors who created and instigated this decay were created at a global, regional and national level.

**In the socio-psychological sense, the actual breakup of Yugoslavia has been most directly associated with the disintegration of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in early January 1990 when Milosevic tried to overtake it, but he was prevented by the Slovenian and Croatian delegations that were forced to leave Congress under Milosevic's ultimate requirements.** By this, an ideological constraint from a historical scene of the second Yugoslavia disappeared, and the only group that dominated throughout the territory of Yugoslavia dissipated. In the global context of the collapse of communism, this paved the way for democratic changes in the second Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia were the first to use this opportunity and began preparations for democratic elections. Elections in these republics of the former Yugoslavia were held in the spring of 1990 after which the assemblies of the republics were established with democratically elected representatives. This accelerated the dissolution of the entire central state apparatus of the second Yugoslavia. In such a context Serbia was also forced to organize democratic elections and this was followed by Montenegro, in which Milosevic's followers organized elections and who came into power before the elections by revolution, in a similar way as in the case of Kosovo and Vojvodina before that. When a collective presidency was established after the democratic elections, Serbia controlled half of the eight seats and subsequently could block any decision that was not in its interest. Milosevic put the JNA under control as well. This was in particular manifested in the replacement of Branko Mamula from the post of chief commander and appointment of Veljko Kadijevic who was completely loyal to Milosevic. Because of that, in the second half of 1990, officers and soldiers

massively left the Army (JNA), first in Slovenia and Croatia, and, after the aggression on B&H, members of other national groups other than Serbs and Montenegrins. Consequently, the Army ceased to be Yugoslav and of the people, if this does not assume Serbian and Montenegrin.

**So, while the process of democratization was occurring in all the other republics of Yugoslavia, the process of national homogenization ended in Serbia. Parts of the Serbian and Montenegrin population were armed with weapons of the JNA and the Territorial Defence over the whole territory. Only Slovenia maintained weapons of its Territorial defence under their control. In other words, the armed part of the Serb and Montenegrin population in a situation in which others did not have any weapons, became a threat to all who opposed them. In compliance with the socio-psychological framework, this directly caused national homogenization in Slovenia and Croatia, and later homogenization of Bosniaks-Muslims in B&H based on fear of Serbian threats.**

In such a context, according to the mentioned socio-psychological framework, forming of all war groups, including the ones in B&H under the stated threat, the principles of similarity of their members where national, ethnic and religious identity represented centres around which group cohesion was being formed was taking place.

It is important, in the same context to mention the act of the United Nations which, because of threats from Serbia, speeded up processes of national and ethnic homogenizations in Slovenia, Croatia and B&H, by the Resolution of the Security Council stating embargo on the import of weapons in the territory of all the second Yugoslavia at the end of September 1991. With the increase of fear and accelerated homogenization, in the chaotic situation of disintegration of Yugoslavia, this resolution opened up space for international organized crime that turned many criminal groups into important actors of the war. **It is important to emphasize that this decision in Croatia and B&H, among Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats increased concern that they had been left on their own, and that the international community had openly taken Milosevic's side.**

As was mentioned in the theoretical expertise, high group cohesiveness operates in a way that the goals, successes and failures of the group become personal. The group therefore begins to respond to events in the environment as a whole. Threat and attack on one member of the group is perceived as a threat and attack on the entire group. Therefore, this may lead to so-called collective behaviour, that is, to unpredictable development, quickly created norms and social structures in relatively spontaneous situations that usually occur outside the traditional framework, such as those that need redefining in a given situation and those that need to find a meaning in general confusion.

All these processes occurred in Croatia during 1991 when, in the mentioned general context Croatia was exposed to powerful Serbian aggression. In a short time, approximately one third of

Croatian territory was occupied and around 700,000 inhabitants of non-Serb origin were exiled, among which approximately 95% were Croats. It should be noted that the system of defence in these circumstances relied on voluntary inclusion and deserters were not sanctioned even when military mobilization was conducted. **Therefore, it was impossible for Croatian political and military leadership to establish control over all the groups that were formed outside institutional frameworks, most of which were established on the principles of self-defence.**

**It would be therefore more reasonable, from the point of socio-psychology, that Croatian political and military leadership from the beginning advocated peaceful and not war options in B&H.**

In B&H, the situation corresponding to that of Croatia occurred in early 1992 when Serbian aggression turned in that direction. **Due to the complete unpreparedness of political leadership of B&H for defence<sup>175</sup> and the different strategies of war groups, in which one was the aggressor, and the other two were threatened without a firm defence alliance between Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats, processes became even more dramatic than in Croatia.** In accordance with the socio-psychological framework of spontaneous group formation in crisis situations, in addition to collective behaviour, processes of deindividuation appeared to a greater extent in which there was a weakening of the usual restrictions in behaviour that opened up possibilities for **uncontrolled crimes**. Precisely such crimes and on these theoretical foundations, in the main occurred in the conflicts of Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats during 1993 and in early 1994. Therefore, in accordance with the provided theoretical framework, is not possible to fully control these processes because, as a rule, they occur spontaneously.

In this context, it is particularly important to emphasize that those subgroups of Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats, due to the above-mentioned spontaneous group formation, had a very heterogeneous composition. They usually did not any significant military training and were organized in a very short time. They were composed of volunteers, of mostly patriotic and not ethnocentric orientation, but they were nevertheless heterogeneous. Besides civilians – volunteers, they included soldiers and officers who had left JNA. In a situation without or with reduced institutional control, extremists of different world views often voluntarily joined them though in small numbers, and not a negligible number of criminals and crime-motivated individuals. Therefore, the distribution of roles in the subgroups also depended on the particular circumstances which differentiated them. And in such circumstances, as was clearly demonstrated by Zimbardo (see below), the behaviour of individuals depends primarily on the

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<sup>175</sup> Jurčević, Josip, *Expertise for the purpose of MKSJ: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990-1995*, Zagreb, 2008, pp.106-109

role distribution of roles, or as shown by Milgram (see below) on submission to situational authority, and not to a world view or identity of individuals. Taking into account, that many subgroups were not under any institutional control and that possibilities of sanctioning any deviation from the law of war were minimal or none, according to the theoretical framework it is obvious that commanders at various levels could hardly, and often not at all, fully control the war situation and behaviour of these subgroups.

**Research by Phillip Zimbardo (1973): Social roles<sup>176</sup>**

*Phillip Zimbardo and associates (1973) believed that social roles can be so strong that they can "overpower" our personal identity, and we become what we are acting. In order to check whether this is true, Zimbardo and his associates conducted an unusual research study. They built a mock prison in the basement of the Department of Psychology at Stanford University and paid students to mock the guards or prisoners (Haney, Banks and Zimbardo, 1973). Students were assigned roles by tossing a coin. "Guards" were given uniforms, which consisted of yellow-brownish trousers and shirts, whistles, police batons and dense glasses, and prisoners had wide overalls with a printed identification number, rubber sandals, a cap made of nylon socks and a chain with a key, attached to their ankle. Researchers planned to observe the students for two weeks, to see whether or not they would start behaving like real prison guards and prisoners. However, it was evident that students very quickly adopted their roles, to the extent that the researchers had to terminate the experiment after only six days. Most guards became quite violent, inventing creative ways of verbally abusing and humiliating the prisoners. Prisoners became passive, helpless and shy. Actually, some of the prisoners became so anxious and depressive that they had to be excluded from the experiment earlier than others. Please remember that everyone knew that they were participating in a psychological experiment, and that it was a mock prison. However, the roles of guards and prisoners were so influential and powerful that this simple fact was often neglected. People were so absorbed in their roles that they lost their own identity and sense of humanity.*

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<sup>176</sup> Aronson E. et al, *Social Psychology*, 2005, pp. 302-303

### **Research by Stanley Milgram, Professor at Yale University (1974): Obedience to authority<sup>177</sup>**

*In this research, participants replied to a newspaper ad that sought participants for research on memory and learning. When participants arrived in the laboratory they met the other participant: a 47-year old, plump man with a rather pleasant appearance. The experimenter explained to the participants that one of them will play the role of a teacher and the other of a learner. Lots were drawn to determine the roles and it turned out that they would be teachers. Their assignment was to teach another participant a list of word pairs (i.e. blue-box, nice-day) and then to examine the learner. The experimenter instructed them to administer the learner an electric shock each time he made a mistake, because the purpose of the experiment was to determine the effects of punishment on learning. They watched the other participant (the learner) sitting in a chair in the adjacent room with the electrodes attached to his arm. They sat in front of the shock generator with thirty switches to set different levels of shock in an increment of 15 V, from 15 to 450V. Each switch had a label, indicating from "slight shock" through to "danger: severe shock" to the fatal "XXX" at the highest level. The experimenter then told them to give the learner the lowest 15 V shock for the first error and then to increase the shock level by an additional 15 V for each error that followed. In order to know what kind of shocks these are, the experimenter administered them a shock of 45V, which is quite painful. They read the list of word pairs to the learner and then the test phase began. After they announced the first word pair, they offered four possible answers, and the learner responded by pressing one of four switches, which resulted in the illuminated light on the box for answers. It all started smoothly, since the learner gave correct answers in the first few tasks. After that the student started to make mistakes, and the participants, in accordance with received instructions, applied a shock. When they reached a level of 75 V, the student, who could be heard over the loudspeaker, pronounced a painful "Oops." The experimenter, even though he noticed their reluctance to continue and the questioning looks of the participants, replied: "Please continue." Since the student continued to give incorrect answers, the participant administered several additional shocks. The learner was upset, and shouted: "Oops, experimenter. That's enough. Let me out of here." The participants at that moment began to look anxiously at the experimenter. He said: "It is absolutely necessary to continue".*

*This is the same as soldiers in the village of My Lai, most of Milgram's participants were subjected to the pressure of an authoritative person. On average, the applied strongest shock was 360 V, and 62.5% of participants continued to the end, giving shocks of 450 V. A total of 80% of participants continued to apply shocks even after the learner, who previously mentioned that he had heart problems, shouted that he had enough and asked them to release him. It is important to know that the learner was in fact the experimenter's co-worker who played this role as learner. He did not really receive any shocks. It is also important to know that the experiment was carried out very convincingly, so that people really believed that they had administered shocks to the learner. Why so*

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<sup>177</sup> Aronson E. et al, *Social Psychology*, 2005, pp. 289-293

*many research participants (ranging from twenty year olds to those in their fifties: workers, officials and experts) conformed to the wishes of experimenter, to the point that they were causing intense pain (at least they thought so) to another human being? All the reasons that explain why people conform dangerously combined causing submission of the participants in the Milgram's study, as did soldiers in the village of My Lai. From further research variations conducted by Milgram, it is evident that in these experiments normative pressures are at work. In this case, there were three teachers, two of which were co-workers of the experimenter. One experimenter was instructed to read a list of word pairs, and another to tell the teacher if the learner's answer was correct. The task of the participants (actual) was to define shock, as in the original experiment by increasing the strength of shock for every following error. At 150 V, when the learner openly protested for the first time, the experimenter's first assistant declined to continue, despite experimenter's command to continue. At 210 V, the other associate refused to continue. The consequence? When a real participant noted that his colleagues were not obeying, it was easier for him to disobey. In this experiment, only 10% of participants applied the most intensive shocks. The results were similar to Asche's findings, that people do not conform that much when one associate blocks the majority and consistently gives the correct answer. So, in the changed situations and with a reduced pressure of authority responses to the pressure of authorities significantly change and people react significantly more rationally, that is in accordance with their moral standards.*

**On the other hand, Serbs had been organized through the JNA or Territorial Defence, which implied the possibility of institutional control and guidance with respect to effective fulfilment of targeted tasks associated with the plan of aggression. The process of their organizing lasted from 1987 when Milosevic came to power in Serbia.**

**In that situation of organized aggression, and of prevailingly spontaneous defence in Croatia and B&H in 1991 and 1992, it was favourable for Serbia and for Serbs in B&H, supported by the army converted from Yugoslav into Serbian, that the plan of creating a Greater Serbia would be to its greater extent fulfilled by mid 1992. With that in view, hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Croatia and B&H were expelled from their homes and many of the mass crimes were committed which fits the UN definition of genocide. The efforts of Serbia to realize its plan provoked, in turn, aggression along with resistance in B&H and led to the partial conflict between Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats.**

## 1.1. Factors that reinforced the social impact of war groups

**In the theoretical part of this expertise it was stated that crisis situations enhance susceptibility to social influence in groups.** In such situations people have no time to think about how they should behave but must act momentarily. Therefore, the behaviour of a person who is a leader or an authority is of great importance in these situations because members of the group are willing to completely submit. **In Croatia and among Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats in B&H where the context of war was imposed, and where, as mentioned previously it was not possible to control all the groups that were formed, situations in which military unit commanders at different levels or situational authority independently decided were very frequent during 1991 and 1992.**

**In B&H, this situation was additionally reinforced by territorial isolation of some Croatian and Bosniaks-Muslim groups.** So conflicts between individual groups of Croats and Muslims occurred even after signing a truce, or in situations when at other locations the same groups fought together against the Serbs (e.g. Bihac, Tuzla and Usora). These war situations, regardless of the commanding hierarchy were generated by isolated contexts that instigated revenge based on incomplete information or incorrect conclusions.

Because of these impact-reinforcing factors in certain isolated groups, regardless of the agreed common strategy, the conflict between Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims once started could not end quickly. In a situation of weak control and unavailability of accurate information decisions related to the conflict often were made at lower levels, and depended on the current situations. **These situations were particularly reproduced after the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats from territory occupied by Serbs, when a relatively tight space that was controlled either by Croats or Bosniaks-Muslims or by both, became uncontrollably crowded. In compliance with the theoretical framework, in crisis situations with scarce and limited resources and when times are difficult, members of the threatened group feel even more threatened by the out-groups and consequently negative attitudes and violence towards them are more likely to occur. Overcrowdiness created by Serbian expulsion of a large number of people and congestion in a small area led to this type of crisis situation that independently of any other factors influenced the conflicts between various subgroups of Bosniaks-Muslim and Croats.**

In the theoretical sense, the mentioned statements confirm the well-known Malthus' theory according to which the discrepancy between food production and population growth causes hunger, disease and wars. At the micro level, this precisely was an important factor which is, among others instigated uncontrolled clashes between Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims during 1993 and the beginning of 1994. When the situation became stable and the exiled population and refugees found refuge in Croatia

and other European countries the conflicts diminished which led to the signing of the Washington Agreement in March 1994. After that the conflicts ceased, and both groups turned to developing a common strategy for the liberation of the occupied territories in Croatia and B&H that was achieved in August 1995.

## **2. THE ETHNOCENTRIC AND NATIONALIST BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN B&H 1991-1995**

Understanding of the ethnic and ethnocentric as well as national and nationalistic background of conflicts requires, as has been previously emphasized, understanding the process of modern nation formation. It is particularly important to note that national groups were created after the nations had emerged during the nineteenth century and that the foundations for nation formation were ethnic communities, that is, peoples. In other words, Croats and Serbs as the dominant ethnic groups in Croatia and Serbia have formed with other sub-ethnic groups in the same territory, the Croatian and the Serbian nation.

**However, as the B&H nation had not been shaped due to a series of historical circumstances and processes, the majority of Croats and Serbs formed ethnic parts of their national corpuses in Croatia and Serbia, and mostly followed their national strategies particularly in the area of culture and system of values. The majority of Serbs have, however, over the entire post-Ottoman period, during the first and second Yugoslavia and in the Second World War, followed a national ideology based on the aforementioned myth of a Greater Serbia as well, while most Croats from B&H, as well as a significant number of Bosniaks-Muslims only followed such an extreme national ideology in the period of the Second World War when Ustashe were in power in Croatia.**

Up to now, Bosniaks-Muslims have not succeeded in forming their ethnic identity in the modern sense because their identity was shaped on an exclusively religious template during the period of Ottoman rule. Consequently, they most often declared themselves as Croats or Serbs until the second Yugoslavia, and also as Muslims but with an ethnic and not a religious meaning, in the second Yugoslavia. After the establishment of B&H, Muslims gradually began by adding the name "Bosniaks" related to their identity in order to separate their ethnic from their religious identity. It was important to mention these facts for a better understanding of the roots of ethnocentrism and nationalism as socio-psychological generators of conflict in B&H.

Out of the various definitions of ethnic groups, Rothschild's previously mentioned definition (1981) is the most adequate for war groups in B&H. According to this definition, ethnic groups are



"collective groups whose membership is largely defined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society."

When emphasizing their ethnic rights in B&H, that is, "their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society", every ethnic group has been building a strategy primarily on stereotypes and with reference to a historical period and cultural background that it favours in relation to other groups. Thus, Bosniaks-Muslims mainly referred to the Ottoman period and related cultural patterns and symbols that have remained part of B&H's permanent heritage, while Croats referred to the pre-Ottoman period of B&H's medieval state, when it was dominated by what at that time represented Western culture, and the Serbs referred to the post-Ottoman period and the period of the first Yugoslavia when they created the myth of a Greater Serbia and actualized it in the territory of B&H. As these strategies do not share the same historical and cultural origin, nor have they strived towards the same goals, in crisis situations they became a source of ethnocentric tendencies. **These ethnocentric tendencies that only contributed to the favouritization of one's own ethnic group in relation to other groups and to the negative evaluation of other groups form the socio-psychological background of the conflicts that were explained in the theoretical part outlined in the realistic conflict theory and social identity theories. However, even here it should be pointed out that ethnocentric tendencies per se were not the cause of conflict; they emerge at the surface in a crisis situation. And the principal cause of the crisis situation in B&H in the period 1991-1995 was dissipation of the second Yugoslavia and Serbian aggression against Croatia and B&H.**

The nationalist background of the war in B&H has no direct sources in B&H itself but is associated with the war in Croatia where aggressive and imperial Serbian nationalism was on the scene, along with Croatian resulting from national homogenization in response to actual external threat. Both nationalisms influenced ethnic homogenization of Croats and Serbs, wherein the Serbs in B&H concentrated their aggressive tendencies towards the other two ethnic groups in B&H, while Croatia concentrated on defence. In accordance with the theory of images, groups in B&H mutually and especially the Croats towards the Serbs, and vice versa, formed their images on the basis of perceived capabilities, culture, intentions and threats. **So the image of renegade was the closest image the Serbs had of Croats, and the barbarian image corresponded to the perception Croats had of Serbs.** Finally, it should be mentioned that the described nationalist tendencies were significantly more present during the war in Croatia than in the war in B&H where the described ethnocentric tendencies dominated.

### III. HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR

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In discussions dealing with the causes of war in philosophy and later in anthropology, sociology and psychology, as noted, a deeply rooted dilemma about the irrationality or rationality of human nature is present. Regarding the consequences that war causes and the manifested cruelty and destructiveness of war actors, many philosophers and social scientists throughout history have been convinced that war cannot be rationally based. In other words, war is an expression of the irrationality of human nature with origins from the early era of human civilization when primitive tribes engaged in war with each other without any rational reason. Therefore, human aggressiveness and war have often been attributed words such as barbarism, primitivism, and savagery, brutality, with clear associations to the primitive human groups, or lineages, and tribes. **Correspondingly, war in the territory of the second Yugoslavia from a Western perspective is often mentioned as "the conflict of the Balkan tribes."**

However, anthropological research (Mead, Benedict) in the twentieth century revealed that primitive tribes were more rarely engaged in war than modern nations and that they were significantly less cruel and destructive than people in modern wars. Sociological analyses have shown that the number of wars increases with the increase of civilized features and development of society<sup>178</sup>. Psychological analyses contributed to the definitive acceptance of the thesis that war is rationally based, that is, it is the most widespread act of instrumental aggression<sup>179</sup>. **In other words, today, war is analysed through research of its rational causes, while irrational causes are seen as a situational manifestation of human behaviour within a war context. These research achievements have been applied to the explanation of the causes of the war in B&H 1991-1995.**

#### 1. THE CAUSES OF WAR IN B&H 1991-1995 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

From the previous analyses of the roots of war, its course and consequences, and with respect to the specified general strongholds on which this socio-psychological expertise is based, it is possible to extract three groups of causes. **The first group** relates to the historical circumstances and cultural and identity background of the conflict. **The second group** refers to the national and ethnic strategies and ideology of war groups. **The third group** refers to the geopolitical circumstances in which the war groups found themselves just before the outbreak of war.

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<sup>178</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti II (The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness II)*, Zagreb, 1984, p. 35

<sup>179</sup>Ibid, p. 34

Analysis of historical circumstances, cultural and religious backgrounds and the factors that had an essential impact on shaping the identity of war groups undoubtedly shows the differences between them that were or might have been the causes of conflict in critical historical situations.

Before the Ottoman conquest, B&H was on the edge of the West and developed a culture and a way of life characteristic of medieval countries from the Mediterranean and central part of Europe. Elite was composed, similar to other surrounding countries, of feudal nobility with the king as the ruler and the main religion was a Roman Catholic tradition. All kings except the one (Ostoja) and the majority of feudal nobility were Croats.<sup>180</sup>

Ottoman conquests completely destroyed this cultural situation; cultural symbols were mostly destroyed, and Croats were reduced to a religious group or Islamized. Muslims became the dominant group, who built their culture and identity solely on the religious model. The Orthodox became a group that were more privileged than Croats. They consisted of a small number of the existing and especially of immigrant Serbs and Vlachs from the territory of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, and in later periods of the Ottoman rule also of Croats who converted to Orthodoxy.

Conflicts, violence, the destruction of existing cultural patterns and identity formation of new groups that after the Ottoman period, determine the fate of B&H were dominant during the entire Ottoman period in B&H. Finally, the Croats, except for their religious identity and cultural patterns based primarily on the religious model, lost nearly everything they inherited from the pre-Ottoman period. Bosniaks-Muslims were the most powerful group in economic terms with identity based solely on the religious model, and Serbs were second in terms of economic strength and first in terms of number. Austro-Hungary, after the establishment of its rule in B&H, preserved the existing situation, by which it actually acknowledged redistribution of resources in the Ottoman period, based on violence and injustice. Such historical circumstances and cultural-identity background directly influenced political and cultural conflicts, and indirectly on the armed conflicts during the twentieth century, including the war in B&H in early nineties.

Parallel with liberation from Ottoman invaders and shaping of the Serbian nation, a national ideology was created in Serbia based on the myth of a Greater Serbia, which was almost from the beginning an aggressive and imperial ideology. The imperial dimension included plans for the territorial expansion of Serbia in the direction of the West, which involved the whole of B&H, and large parts of Croatia. **The cultural and identity model related to the imperial dimension of this myth was the concept that Muslims are Serbs of Islamic religious orientation, and Croats are western Serbs<sup>181</sup>. Up until the period of the second Yugoslavia, many Serbian intellectuals and politicians were**

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<sup>180</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Povijest Bosne (The History of Bosnia)*, 1995, Zagreb, p. 95

<sup>181</sup> Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia*, London, 1999, pp.72- 73

**occupied with this myth and the Serbian Orthodox Church confirmed its credibility from the very start.<sup>182</sup>**

In the period of the first Yugoslavia, the myth was largely a part of the official king's policy and for that reason Croats called the second Yugoslavia a "dungeon for Croatian people", while Muslims sought allies with Croats because of threat from the Serbs.

Under the mantle of communism and the second Yugoslavia, Serbs still continued with the realization of conditions that will in favourable circumstances allow them to achieve the plan based on the myth. This was one of the reasons why Tito was forced remove Aleksandar Rankovic from office, who was the second most powerful politician in Yugoslavia at the time, of Serbian nationality. At the same time, he intensified Muslims' influence in B&H and made them ethnically equal with the Croats and Serbs. **After Tito's death it became obvious that Serbs dominated all structures and institutions of the second Yugoslavia; a plan that was originally rooted in the myth was published by the "Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts" and Milosevic based his invasive strategy on it.** Thus, one of the highest national scientific institutions created a strategic document entitled the Memorandum, which was used as a foundation for plans of aggression, which considering the mission of science in the modern world is a unique example. However, its creators clearly testify to its rational basis with respect to the intentions and goals which **Fromm (1973)** considers to be the main causes of wars in history.<sup>183</sup> **This document, which is a kind of historical integration of all previous programmes based on the myth of a Greater Serbia was created based on the following standpoints:**

- **The borders of Serbia are not in accordance with ethnic composition, and as such they must be changed. The Yugoslav Constitution from 1974 has caused great damage to Serbia because of the creation of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, as well as the creation of artificial administrative boundaries and dilution of the federation.**

- **Threats to the Serbian people from other nations within the second Yugoslavia are based on assimilation, exploitation, expulsion, and the inability to express that marginalization at the political, economic, cultural and scientific level.**

- **Strengthening of anti-Serbian forces within the second Yugoslavia, especially between Croats and Albanians.**

- **The necessity of fast and immediate action to prevent the collapse of Serbia and the Serbian people.**

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<sup>182</sup> Ibid, p. 5, 30-31, 118, 119

<sup>183</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti II* (The Anatomy of Human DestructivenessII), Zagreb, 1984, pp. 34-35

**As was previously stated, Milosevic used the "Memorandum" as a strategy to build his plans of aggression with the goals of creating a Greater Serbia. This implied territorial expansion of Serbia to large parts of Croatia's geopolitical and historical territory, the entire territory of B&H and the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and their full political and territorial integration with Serbia. In the period 1990 - 1995 the plan was implemented with the use of genocide, culturecide, ecocide and urbicide against the non-Serbian population in the territories of Croatia and B&H as well as on their cultural, environmental and architectural heritage.**

**The aggressive strategy based on the "Memorandum" and its objectives, in accordance with this theoretical framework, were the immediate direct and major cause of the Serbian aggression against Croatia and later against B&H.**

**In such a context, the conflict of Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims cannot be observed at the theoretical or practical level separately from the fundamental cause of the so-called "conflict in the former Yugoslavia", which can be summarized as "Serbian aggression on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of taking over territory, expulsions or the cultural assimilation of non-Serbian population as well as the destruction of cultural-identity heritage." In other words, the conflict of Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats does not have its causes in rational plans with an aggressive strategy and goals, although it took place in a historic and cultural context which can be considered as an indirect cause.**

**The conflict in real circumstances was primarily a reaction to the situation created after the Serbian aggression against B&H. This was in fact, symbolically expressed as "the second bottom" of Serbian aggression. Hence, this conflict can be theoretically better explained in view of the above mentioned situational factors of human aggressiveness and group processes and influences, than with theories that are based on rational war plans and goals. Anyone who tries to analyse the conflict at a theoretical level is forced to invent arguments. The myth on Karadjordjevo<sup>184</sup> falls into this category, and the Islamic Declaration<sup>185</sup> though it contains**

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<sup>184</sup> The myth states: At the meeting in the Karadjordjevo estate in the Serbian province of Vojvodina on 25 March 1991, Tadjman and Milosevic "agreed" on the division of spheres of interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, completely disregarding the existence of Muslims (or Bosniak-Muslim people). This laid the practical and political foundations for ethnic cleansing and a common Serbian aggression on Croatia and on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Reality: Tadjman and Milosevic met 48 times during the war in Croatia and B&H, of which only two were bilateral (in Karadjordjevo and Tikves), 35 times at the international level and 11 times at the level of the former Yugoslavia. At all these meetings, including the one at Kardjrdjevo they solely discussed the resolution of the so-called. "crisis in the territory of former Yugoslavia" and made peace agreements. Tadjman at these meetings represented a policy that was known to the entire international public. In Karadjordjevo, he for the first time talked with Milosevic alone, eye to eye, and the content of their conversation was never released except for official notices by information agencies. The myth was built on assumptions or false testimonies from a few political actors of that time.

<sup>185</sup> Izetbegovic demonstrated his political profile at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, when he wrote a political-religious program called the Islamic Declaration (1970), which supports a state structure based on the principles of Sunitic Islam. Essentially, this was a theocratic project that supported not only the

**elements of fundamentalism which encouraged some Muslim groups, mainly gathered in "Patriotic League" and originating from Islamic countries for a "Holy War" and the commitment of crimes on non-Islamic groups, it cannot be considered a strategy that could be used for a planned aggression.**

The proposed theoretical standpoint is very easy to test by a question: Would a conflict between Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims have occurred if the Serbs supported by Montenegrins and the JNA had not committed aggression against B&H in 1992, which included occupying more than half of its territory, and expelling or killing hundreds of thousands of Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims. From the socio-psychological perspective, the myth on Karadjordjevo and the Islamic Declaration when separated from the war context that produced Serbian aggression would not be a strategic basis for the conflict of the Bosniaks-Muslims and the Croats. In addition, the course of the conflict convincingly confirms the stated definition of the conflict.

**First**, the conflict was never a total conflict. **Second**, the truces were constantly agreed, at multiple levels while the conflict lasted<sup>186</sup>. **Third**, while individual sub-groups of Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats engaged in conflicts with each other, other groups fought together against the real aggressor. **Fourth**, the objectives of all subgroups of Bosniaks-Muslims, and of Croats in B&H were not identical. **Fifth** the conflict was relatively short and the war had no winner. **It should be particularly emphasized that, after the Washington Agreement both groups returned to their starting position - a common resistance to Serbian aggression that ended in 1995 by the liberation of a large part of the B&H occupied territory.**<sup>187</sup>

Today, after the Dayton Agreement these two ethnic groups together shape one entity and further struggle for a unified B&H whereas Serbs wants to a separate entity – A Republic of Serbia that they won through aggression and committed crime -- and separated from B&H to join with Serbia, because this was part of their rational plan of aggression from the beginning.

The geopolitical circumstances of B&H after the collapse of Yugoslavia can be clearly seen in a model of concentric circles according to which the central circle represents B&H, the first outer circle represents Croatia and Serbia, the second - former Yugoslavia, and the third - the international

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revitalization of Islamic principles in societies where Muslims live, but also the legal order and political power based on the Sheriat legal system (Bosnia and Herzegovina was not mentioned in the "Islamic Declaration"). This text was visibly pan-Islamic in its worldview: Izetbegovic's utopia was proclamation of a Muslim government and the refusal of totalitarian, communist, and the secular-democratic Western social and political models. Although he was not fundamentally radical in his rhetoric, nor dogmatically orthodox like the movement of extremely anti-western provenance – it was Izetbegovic's political programme along the line of Islamic utopian schemes that have emerged since the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to pressure from the West and to the challenges of modernization.

<sup>186</sup> Jurčević, Josip, Expertise for MKSJ: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990-1995, Zagreb, 2008, pp.142-145

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, p.173,174,180,181

community. Serbian aggression against Slovenia and Croatia began when it was evident that Yugoslavia collapsed. The name SR Yugoslavia Serbia and Montenegro were chosen because of the alliance that they had formed, and they represented themselves as the legal successors of Yugoslavia, while other republics of Yugoslavia were proclaimed as secessionist in international public.

It is especially important to emphasize that by this act they blurred the real goals of aggression to the international community or delayed the moment of their recognition. **Since it was thought among the winners of the Second World War at the end of the eighties that Yugoslavia should survive, intervention of the international community followed too late. The situation was further complicated by the fact that some of the initial decisions of the international community such as the embargo on the import of weapons and the Vance-Owen Plan, were incorrect.** Only Croatia and Serbia stood between B&H and the international community after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and during the most forceful aggression on Croatia in 1991.

Still, Alija Izetbegovic as the President of B&H did not believe that the aggression would be transferred into B&H until it happened to a full extent. He believed that the international community would try and save Yugoslavia, which was for him, because of the position of Muslims in the second Yugoslavia, was a more acceptable political solution than an uncertain future of B&H outside Yugoslavia. He forgot that he was also the President of Croats from B&H who also voted in the referendum for a unified and independent B&H. **After the Serbian aggression on B&H, the last circle which separated B&H from the international community disappeared and the international community was forced to directly become involved in the war in B&H. In this way, failure to implement the mentioned UN Resolution on aggression and Izetbegovic's hesitation in preparing the country for defence, was a direct advantage for Serbia to achieve the objectives of the aggression connected with B&H.**

This theoretical position can also be checked by a question: Would aggression against B&H have occurred if Serbia had managed to defeat Croatia or if B&H simply surrendered? Or another question: Would aggression against B&H have occurred if the international community had predicted on the basis of a number of indicators that aggression would occur if Slovenia, Croatia and other republics of the second Yugoslavia achieve their democratic right and choose their own political future and then intervened the way they did in Kosovo and in Serbia in 1998? Based on the arguments offered in the expertise on the factors that preceded the war, it may be convincingly claimed that it would not. **Therefore reluctance of the international community to initially engage more decisively to prevent war in Croatia and in B&H and the initial wrong decisions may also be included in the immediate and indirect causes of the war in B&H.**

## 2. BASIC DETERMINANTS OF THE WAR IN B&H IN RELATION TO CAUSES, COURSE OF THE WAR AND WAR GROUP GOALS

On the basis of all the proposed analyses and theoretical standpoints, as well as the causes, course of the war and goals of the war groups the first and basic determinant of the war in B&H is aggression. Aggression was initiated by Serbia, which in its implementation included Montenegro, the majority of Serbs in Croatia<sup>188</sup> and in B&H and the JNA from which almost all soldiers and officers from other Yugoslav republics left (except for soldiers and officers from Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbs from B&H).

The manner in which the aggression was conducted fits into the framework defined by the UN Declaration – G.A. Res. 3314 (1974). In order to realize the plan and goals of aggression, in the areas of Croatia and B&H, Serbia committed genocide<sup>189</sup>, ethnic cleansing<sup>190</sup>, culturecide<sup>191</sup>, and uricide<sup>192</sup>. This is the second fundamental determinant of the war in B&H.

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<sup>188</sup>At the turn of 1991, the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar studied the consequences of war on social attitudes on a representative sample. The results of this research showed that the majority of Croatian displaced persons (63.4%) considered that the majority of Serbs from Croatia support the aggression against Croatia while 49.6% of residents from areas that were not afflicted by war held the same attitude.

<sup>189</sup>United Serbian units from Serbia and from the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 11 July 1995 conquered Srebrenica and within three days committed horrifying genocide against an innocent civilian Bosniak population. In a single day, hundreds of civilians were killed and the suffering of tens of thousands of people began; a suffering that was unheard of in the recent history of the world. Ten thousand of them will forever remain without a trace in the forests between Srebrenica and Tuzla, and Srebrenica and Kladanj. There are about ten mass graves and scattered bones of Bosniaks, the skulls strewn about with the traces of the killing, indicating the way in which people were strangled and slaughtered. There are currently 8106 names on the preliminary list of those killed at Srebrenica, and 12,000 people are registered as missing. Unfortunately, new mass graves are excavated every day, and the list of those murdered at Srebrenica frequently becomes longer. A lot of women and children were among the killed as the Serbs around Srebrenica burned pregnant Bosniak women and children alive; this is evident in the pictures of victims from mass graves.

**Ovcara** is the name of a farm 5 km east of the city of Vukovar, known as a Serbian camp that was used during the Homeland War. A concentration camp was organized in one part of Ovcara. Ovcara was opened in early October 1991 and 3000-4000 detainees passed through the camp. Various crimes were committed there, because there are Serbian villages a few kilometres away and all uniformed aggressors went to Ovcara, as well as Velepromet to avenge for their suffering in the aggression on Croatia. Unrestrained, drunk uniformed members of the Territorial Defense (JNA), chetniks, Seselj's men, Arkan's men and others committed horrors by beating up and mutilating victims who were finally led away to be killed. Due to abuse, four prisoners died within the warehouses (Kemo, Damian, Zeljko and Sinisa) and other detainees were in groups of 10 to 20 people taken to a ravine, about 900 metres away from the road Ovcara - Grabovo. On 20th November 1991, there were killed and thrown into a mass grave. The victims were mainly the wounded and medical personnel from the Vukovar hospital. In September and October 1996, 200 bodies were exhumed from the grave (up to July 2006, 192 of the people killed between the ages of 16 to 72 years were identified).

<sup>190</sup> The maximum number of refugees located in Croatia and abroad, was recorded in mid-January 1992 and was approximately 700,000 persons, which was more than 15% of Croatia, according to the 1991 population census. In April 1992, Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina began, and hundreds of thousands of people fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia. Since the beginning of the aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia has given refuge to over 60,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina; this included about 425,000 Muslims, about 170,000 Croats and about 5,000 people of other nationalities.



The third determinant relates to the conflict of the Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats that took place following Serbian aggression against B&H, and during which both sides committed war crimes and when a smaller number of cultural monuments mainly religious in character were destroyed. This conflict, given the unclear causes and objectives and its course of action cannot be defined as the aggression of one ethnic group against another but primarily a conflict caused by the general war context in which B&H found itself after Serbian aggression on its territory. **Thus, the third determinant is the ethnic conflict of Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats caused by Serbian aggression on B&H with a single rational aim - the struggle for limited resources after the expulsions and killings of hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats and the occupation of large parts of the territory of B&H in 1992.**

**The fourth determinant of the war in B&H relates to indecisiveness, inefficiency and wrong decisions of the international community who missed the opportunity to act more resolutely in order to prevent aggression at the outset, despite the evident intentions of Serbia and the JNA to spread aggression from Croatia to the B&H territory.** In this context, let us mention a proposal given along with other measures by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict based on an analysis of a number of conflicts after the Cold War: "Early warning and response require attentive monitoring of indicators that violence is imminent. Such indicators include human rights abuses, brutal political oppressions, acquisition of arms and the use of the media to inflame the public. .... Politicians should exercise great care as to whom they support and how that support is offered."<sup>193</sup> All the indicators were present in B&H in 1991, during aggression against Croatia. Stronger and more accurate

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<sup>191</sup> During the war in Croatia, 380 objects of cultural heritage were completely destroyed, 416 were seriously damaged, and 630 were fairly damaged (total 1426). For B&H, there are no precise figures, but the damage was similar to that in Croatia. As in Croatia, all was carried out by the Serbs, and an incomparably smaller number of devastation, mostly sacral buildings were destroyed by Bosniaks-Muslim and Croats in mutual conflict.

<sup>192</sup> The siege of Sarajevo was almost a four-year blockade during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It began on the night of 4th to 5th of April 1992 and ended on 29th February 1996. Sarajevo's siege lasted 1425 days and is one of the longest in the history of modern warfare. During the siege, 329 shells on average fell on Sarajevo daily. A record of 3777 fired grenades fell on 22 July 1993. During this time, many civilian buildings were attacked. Reports point out that in September 1993, 35,000 buildings in Sarajevo were destroyed and other buildings were more or less damaged. These included the hospital, news agencies, industrial buildings, government buildings, army barracks and the base of the United Nations. Some of the most important buildings such as the buildings of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the City Council, were destroyed on 25 April 1992 along with many other invaluable works of history and culture. The city of Vukovar suffered great damages during the Serbian armed aggression of several month long attacks and siege, and after that a six-year occupation. It was estimated that approximately 1.5 million projectiles over 100 mm, 5 million projectiles under 100 mm, and about 2.5 thousand bombs heavier than 250 kilograms were used in the attack against Vukovar. Consequently, the effect of all of this, over a relatively short period, resulted in the catastrophic destruction of residential buildings and infrastructure, which largely devastated the economic base of the town. All that the inhabitants of the city had built decades and even centuries ago was destroyed. The town was systematically and thoroughly changed literally to dust and ashes.

<sup>193</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Masters, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, p. 218, 219

preventive action by politicians from the international community undoubtedly would have, in addition to aggression prevention, made the conflict between Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats needless, and processes in B&H would have been guided towards political negotiations.

## **IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS**

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Based on the theoretical framework and its application to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina the following conclusions may be proposed:

1. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be understood and explained without considering two groups of factors that caused it. The first group relates to the historical circumstances and cultural factors which influenced the shaping of war group identities. The most important historical period, in this context, was the Ottoman period in B&H, when war groups were formed. Late in the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, using different strategies these war groups influenced all the important events in B&H. Different strategies based on different identities and different levels of their development as well as the cultural background against which these identities were shaped were sources (at the latent or manifest level) of different types of conflicts - political, cultural, and armed throughout the period after the Ottoman withdrawal from B&H to the collapse of the second Yugoslavia. The strategy, which is the core of all armed conflicts that occur in periods of crisis in the wider geopolitical environment was the Serbian national ideology based on a myth and created in the twentieth century. According to this strategy, Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims should have been exterminated or cultural assimilated, and the B&H area annexed to Serbia. The second group of factors relates to the immediate causes of the war that occurred within the second Yugoslavia, during its disintegration, and during the collapse of communism as an ideology of power at the world level. In the framework of the second Yugoslavia, the Serbs managed to achieve complete domination in all ideological and state institutions, especially in repressive instruments and the JNA. This enabled them to prepare the field for the achievement of the mentioned national strategy under the mantle of totalitarian order and communist ideology. Bosniaks-Muslims in the second Yugoslavia, realized a part of their objectives related to ethnic identity. For this reason,

they did not build a critical attitude towards the totalitarian system of the second Yugoslavia and did not predict the aggressive intentions of Serbs. Croats were in a subordinate position, due to Serbian institutional domination as well as real or attributed responsibility for the crimes committed during World War II in the NDH. In comparison, they had a critical attitude towards the totalitarian order, as well as the state organization of the Second Yugoslavia. During the collapse of the second Yugoslavia, similarly as after the departure of Ottoman conquerors and in the first Yugoslavia a new-old Serbian aggressive strategy came to the forefront that the international community did not recognise on time nor predict, which was the immediate cause of the so-called war in the former Yugoslavia.

2. The war in B&H, and especially the conflicts between the Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims cannot be understood independently of the war in Slovenia and Croatia, that preceded it as they were all wars of the same rational plan. As there was no strategy and rational plans on which the conflicting parties could base their goals other than the myth of the Karadjordjeo and incorrect interpretation of the Islamic Declaration that some Muslim subgroups understood as a call to a "Holy War" and acted accordingly, that conflict at the theoretical level and in the context of numerous facts with regard to its progress and completion as well as the behaviour of actors at the end of the conflict to a large extent can be explained by situational factors that cause aggressive behaviour among individuals and groups. In other words, the first level of conflict was the Serbian aggression in B&H that produced a new context in which Croats as well as Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats in which particular subgroups were territorially, command-wise and information-wise separated. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons in a relatively crowded space particularly contributed to this generally chaotic situation. In such a context, all situational factors of human aggressiveness, as well as group behaviour are at work. These in turn produced new contexts in the conflict in which the group strategies in which there are subgroups did not have to any connections. This is because invented information and incorrect attribution of causes to these conflicts at the latent level, according to theory, could cause new conflicts. This leads to the spiral of violence which is no longer rationally connected with rational causes of conflict and that belongs more to the irrational dimension of human nature. Such examples can be found in all wars (e.g. My Lai).

Thus, a context produced in this way, in particular territorial areas that were under the control of Croats as well as Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats, directly affected the outbreak of conflict. Only in such a situation at the surface various statements appeared among individuals and subgroups in conflict that were later used for mutual accusations of aggression of one group against another based on different strategies for the future of B&H. That is in fact, as already mentioned "the second bottom" of the same strategy that was the base of "the war in the former Yugoslavia", and that was Serbian aggression on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina many crimes were committed, which according to theory and international law belong to the categories of genocide, mass killings, ethnic cleansing and destruction of cultural, environmental and architectural heritage. However, on the basis of all of the given facts these crimes cannot be equated because of their numbers, cruelty and objectives. The vast majority of all types of crimes were committed by Serbs using them as an instrument to conquer the territory of B&H in accordance with the plan of aggression, and to a considerably less extent Bosniaks-Muslim and Croats, with unclear and undefined goals largely influenced by the context of the war generated after the aggression on B&H. The scale of crimes committed even today, 15 years after the war are the main obstacles to processes of closer international cooperation between Serbia with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. It is worth mentioning that the processes in B&H, which led to ethnic homogenization caused an increase of social distance between war groups that essentially makes coexistence difficult. Therefore, a just distribution of responsibility for the aggression and punishment for crimes committed is the most important act of prevention so that conflicts do not repeat in the future, and that coexistence based on humane and democratic foundations continues.

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# **RAT U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991. – 1995.**

**Socijalno-psihologijska ekspertiza**

Zagreb, ožujak 2009.



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**A) SOCIOPSIHOLOGIJSKI OKVIR NUŽAN ZA  
RAZUMIJEVANJE RATA U BiH 1991.-1995.**

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# I. KULTURA, SUSTAV VREDNOTA, IDENTITET

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## 1. KULTURA I SUSTAV VREDNOTA

U društvenim znanostima, a posebice psihologiji i sociologiji za objašnjenje načina na koji ljudi funkcioniraju u novije vrijeme često se koristi pojam mentalnog programiranja. U informatičkim terminima mentalno programiranje bi se moglo shvatiti kao „mentalni softver“ pomoću kojeg se ponašamo na sustavan način u različitim situacijama i koji naše ponašanje čini predvidljivim. Budući da je mentalno programiranje nematerijalno i nemjerljivo u društvenim znanostima se tretira kao jedan od konstrukta koji nisu produkt empirijskog uvida već mišljenja, a pomažu nam u razumijevanju složene socijalne realnosti i načina na koji se ljudi u njoj ponašaju. Da bi tu složenu realnost lakše razumjeli znanstvenici koriste modele to jest pojednostavljuju je i omogućuju njeno vizualno predočivanje. **Tako Hofstede (2001) predlaže model mentalnog programiranja u obliku piramide sa tri razine (slika 1.)<sup>1</sup>**



Slika 1. Tri razine mentalnog programiranja

Najmanje posebna, ali najosnovnija razina mentalnog programiranja je univerzalna razina. Dijelimo je, naime, s cijelom ljuskom vrstom. Odnosi se primarno na biološke temelje i funkcioniranje ljudskog organizma, ali i na neka ekspresivna ponašanja kao što je smijeh ili plač te dijelom asocijativna i

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<sup>1</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, str. 3

agresivna ponašanja. Druga je kolektivna razina, a tu razinu dijele ljudi koji pripadaju istim skupinama ili kategorijama i koja ih razlikuje od pripadnika drugih skupina i kategorija. Treća je individualna razina, a odnosi se na posebnost svakog pripadnika ljudske vrste koju ne dijeli ni s kim i koja mu omogućuje različitost u ponašanju unutar iste kolektivne kulture. **Još 1953. antropolog Kluckhohn i socijalni psiholog Murray, anticipirali su ovakav model mentalnog programiranja izrazom da je svaki čovjek istodobno kao svi drugi ljudi, kao neki drugi ljudi i kao niti jedan drugi čovjek.**

Mentalni programi mogu biti naslijeđeni, to jest preneseni genima ili naučeni nakon rođenja. U pravilu što su bliži dnu predočene piramide to su više rezultat naslijeđa, tako da su najmanje naslijeđeni i najviše naučeni mentalni programi na vrhu individualne razine. **Kolektivni programi su oni koji se prenose s generacije na generaciju u određenim skupinama i koji ih čine različitim od drugih skupina. To su prije svega skupine iste kulturne ili nacionalne pozadine.**

**U povijesnom okviru ljudska populacija svoju raznolikost ostvarivala je putem gena jezika i kulture.** Genetska raznolikost, na temelju istraživanja DNA seže od razdoblja između deset i sto tisuća godina, jezična od tisuću do deset tisuća godina, a kulturna od petsto do pet tisuća godina. Valja napomenuti da se znanstvenici slažu da genetska, jezična i kulturna raznolikost iako su često slijedile iste povijesne putove nisu u uzročnoj vezi. Tako npr. Šveđani i Finci iako genetski srodni govore potpuno različitim jezicima. Ili Hrvati i Muslimani iz Bosne i Hercegovine koji govore sličan jezik, a pripadaju različitim kulturama.


**Za razumijevanje identiteta uz poznavanje empirijskih i teorijskih temelja konstrukta koji čine okvir razumijevanja, među kojima su pored mentalnog programiranja, među najvažnijima kultura i sustav vrednota važno je i poznavanje modela njihove međusobne povezanosti i isprepletenosti na univerzalnoj, kolektivnoj i individualnoj razini ljudskog ponašanja i doživljavanja.** „Dijagram luka“ shematski je prikaz modela manifestacije kulture na različitim dubinskim razinama (slika 2) i omogućuje nam uvid u povezanost sustava vrednota, kulture i identiteta. Prije osvrta na model valja ponuditi neke od mnogobrojnih definicija kulture i sustava vrednota. Hofstede kulturu definira kao „kolektivno programiranje uma koje razlikuje pripadnika jedne skupine ili kategorije od drugih“, a vrednote kao „široke tendencije da se jedna stanja stvari preferiraju u odnosu na druge“.<sup>2</sup> Kroeber i Parsons pod konstruktom kultura podrazumijevaju „prenošene i stvorene obrasce vrednota, ideja i drugih sustava simboličkog značenja koji služe kao čimbenici u oblikovanju ljudskog ponašanja i posljedica tog ponašanja.“<sup>3</sup> Antropolog Kluckhohn vrednote definira kao konceptualizacije koje mogu biti eksplicitne i

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<sup>2</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, str. 9

<sup>3</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, str. 9

implicitne, različite među pojedincima ili značajke skupine, o onome što je poželjno te uključuju izbor između mogućih dostupnih načina, sredstava i ciljeva akcije.<sup>4</sup> Na istom tragu s tom definicijom su i poznatije definicije psihologa Rokeach-a, (1973), Feathera, (1996) i Shwartz-a, (1996)<sup>5</sup>, koje vrednote određuju kao poželjne ciljeve i vodeća načela u životu koja se razlikuju po važnosti. Posebno valja napomenuti da su i kultura i vrednote prema općem uvjerenju stabilne socijalne kategorije koje se razvijaju u dugotrajnom procesu i teško se mijenjaju. Također obje socijalne kategorije nastaju i prenose se na razini skupine, a pojedinci ih internaliziraju kao dio svog socijalnog (kolektivnog) identiteta.



Slika 2. „Dijagram luka“: manifestacije kulture na različitim dubinskim razinama<sup>6</sup>

**Prema Kluckhohn-u sustav vrednota sržni je element kulture.** <sup>7</sup> Od četiri elementa na dijagramu vrednote su jedine nevidljive i moguće ih je uočiti tek u ponašanju dok su rituali, heroji i simboli vidljivi elementi kulture unutar i izvan skupine. **Za vidljive elemente karakteristično je da su sadržani u ljudskoj praksi vidljivoj i izvan skupine, ali sa značenjima prepoznatljivim jedino pripadnicima skupine.**

**U svjetskim okvirima kultura se najčešće smješta u okvir društva u nacionalnim, nadnacionalnim, regionalnim i etničkim skupinama,** iako se, prema Hofstede-u (2001), može povezati s bilo kojim ljudskim kolektivitetom ili kategorijom primjerice organizacijom, profesijom, spolnim i dobnim

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
<sup>4</sup> Isto, str. 5

<sup>5</sup> Rohan, Meg, J., *A Rose By Any name: A Value Construct*, u časopisu “Personality and Social psychology Review”, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2000, str. 257

<sup>6</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, str. 11

<sup>7</sup> Isto, str. 10

skupinama, obitelji i sl. Na nacionalnoj razini kulturna homogenost može varirati od vrlo niske koja je karakteristična za nove nacije do vrlo visoke koja karakterizira stabilne nacije koje dugo traju. Budući da je ovaj tip kulturne homogenosti relevantan za ovu ekspertizu na slici 3 nudi se shematski prikaz modela stabiliziranja kulturnih obrazaca na nacionalnoj razini.



Slika 3. Stabiliziranje kulturnih obrazaca na nacionalnoj razini<sup>8</sup>

Prema autoru središte procesa stabiliziranja nacionalne kulture što je vidljivo u gornjoj shemi je sustav društvenih normi temeljenih na sustavu vrednota dominantne skupine. Njihovo ishodište je u ekološkim čimbenicima koji su važni za fizičku i socijalnu okolinu. Društvene norme omogućuju razvoj i održavanje društvenih institucija s različitom strukturom i načinom funkcioniranja (obitelj, obrazovni, politički, zakonodavni sustav itd.). Jednom ustanovljene te institucije pojačavaju

<sup>8</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, str. 12

društvene norme i ekološke uvjete na temelju kojih su nastale čime se krug zatvara. Kada se taj proces stabilizira teško se mijenja pogotovu u zatvorenijim društvima. Naime institucije se mogu mijenjati, ali bez utjecaja na društvene norme koje ostaju nepromijenjene, a sustav vrednota dominantne skupine postupno postaje dominantnim i u novim institucijama te omogućuje uspostavu istih ili sličnih društvenih normi.

U daljnjem obrazlaganju modela **autor naglašava važnost povijesne perspektive ne samo za razumijevanje procesa stabiliziranja kulturnih obrazaca na nacionalnim razinama, nego i radi razumijevanja kulturne raznolikosti na svjetskoj razini. U povijesnom kontekstu kultura se može shvatiti kao kristalizacija povijesti u umu, srcu i rukama živućih generacija. Kako bi se objasnile kulturne razlike među različitim nacionalnim skupinama nužna je, stoga, usporedna analiza povijesti. Na općoj razini povijesna analiza pokazuje da su kroz ovaj sustav neki narodi zadržali svoj identitet tisućama godina iako bili suočeni s gubitkom neovisnosti, deportacijama i gubitkom jezika (primjerice Židovi, Baski, Romi), dok su drugi pod istim uvjetima nestali pod pritiskom vanjskih utjecaja (primjerice Kelti i Rimljani). Drugim riječima da bi se razumio proces stabiliziranja obrazaca kulture na nacionalnim razinama u povijesnom kontekstu nužno je poznavati i snagu samoregulacije procesa stabiliziranja obrazaca kulture kao i snagu vanjskih utjecaja. Važno je napomenuti da je Hofstede navedeni model gradio na temelju empirijske usporedbe pedeset različitih nacionalnih kultura na svjetskoj razini uvažavajući nužnost multidisciplinarnog i interdisciplinarnog pristupa istraživanjima kulture i sustava vrednota. Stoga je ovaj model globalno primjenjiv.**

Temeljni razlog šireg navođenja Hofstede-ova modela proizlazi iz važnosti poznavanja odnosa kulture i sustava vrednota te njihove važnosti za razumijevanje identiteta. **Pri tome je važno napomenuti da kultura, sustav vrednota i identitet nisu identične kategorije, ali su međuovisni. Tako npr. skupine ili narodi različitih identiteta koji imaju srodan sustav vrednota mogu biti u stalnom sukobu (primjer jezičnih identiteta u Belgiji i religijskih u Sjevernoj Irskoj i BiH). Isto tako ista kulturna skupina identitetski se često predstavlja u BiH kao Hercegovci u Europi kao Hrvati, a u SAD-u kao Europljani.**

## **2. IDENTITET**

Prema shvaćanju brojnih socijalnih psihologa identitet je u zadnja tri desetljeća središnja tema u socijalnoj psihologiji. U okviru perspektive simboličkog interakcionizma te sociokulturnih teorija ta tvrdnja vrijedi i za sociologiju dok se unutar antropologija posebna pozornost usmjerava prema proučavanju odnosa kulture i pojedinca to jest aspektu kulturnog identiteta što je jedna od središnjih tema kulturne



antropologije. U povijesnoj perspektivi dominantan je interes ka analizi nacionalnih i etničkih identiteta što je na teorijskoj razini važna tema i u okviru politološke perspektive.

Logično je pitanje zašto je unutar društvenih i humanističkih znanosti razvijen takav interes za proučavanjem identiteta. Čini se da sociopsihološka i sociološka perspektiva nudi na to pitanje najprecizniji odgovor. U socijalnoj psihologiji sedamdestih godina ustanovljena je istraživačka tradicija poznata kao „teorije socijalnog identitea“ (SIT teorije), a u sociologiji na tragu, a dijelom i nasuprot simboličkog interakcionizma razvijene su teorije identiteta temeljenog na ulogama i identitetske teorije. U novije vrijeme neki sociolozi predlažu integriranje sociološkog i psihološkog pristupa identitetu u okviru znanstvene perspektive pod nazivom sociologija socijalne psihologije<sup>9</sup> U obje perspektive temeljno je polazište da je identitet odgovor na pitanja „tko smo“, „kojim skupinama pripadamo“, „što nas čini različitim od drugih“ i „kako sami sebe doživljavamo“. U tim pitanjima skriva se djelomično i odgovor na pitanje zašto toliki interes za proučavanjem identiteta. Naime u modernim društvima, pretežito tržišno orijentiranim pojedincima se nudi mnogo više nego ikada prije prihvatljivih individualnih identiteta temeljenih na socijalnoj interakciji s različitim socijalnim skupinama i ulogama koje ih određuju kao i mogućnosti da ih razviju. Drugim riječima identitet više ne određuju toliko mjesto rođenja, društveni i religijski poredak i roditeljski status. Globalizacija i tržišna ekonomija te snažan utjecaj medija oblikuju socijalnu okolinu u kojoj se individualne razlike i sličnosti često predstavljaju kroz izbor odjeće, stvari, medijskih idola i sl. Web komunikacija proces oblikovanja individualnog identiteta dodatno opterećuje. Stoga je usvajanje identiteta u suvremenim okolnostima među težim i zahtjevnijim životnim izazovima i traje cijeli život.<sup>10</sup>

**Prema navedenim perspektivama dvije su temeljne sastavnice identiteta – socijalna i individualna. Individualna predstavlja psihološki aspekt identiteta koji se odnosi na one odrednice koje pojedinca čini jedinstvenim unutar skupine, a socijalna ili kolektivna predstavlja sociološki aspekt identiteta koji se odnosi na odrednice međusobne sličnosti pripadnika skupine.** Turner (1987)<sup>11</sup> u svojoj teoriji samo-kategorizacije razlikuje tri razine na kojima se pojedinac identitetski definira – nadređenu, među, i podređenu razinu. Na nadređenoj razini svi ljudi pripadaju istoj skupini – ljudskom rodu i uspoređuju se s drugim vrstama i oblicima života. Na među-razini ljudi pripadaju pojedinim

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<sup>9</sup> Stets, Jane, E., Burke, Peter, J., *A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity*, u knjizi Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, str. 133- 134

<sup>10</sup> Ryan, Richard M., Deci, Edward, L., *On Assimilating Identities to the Self: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Internalization and Integrity within Cultures*, u knjizi Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, str. 255.

<sup>11</sup> Stets, Jane, E., Burke, Peter, J., *A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity*, u knjizi Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, str. 145

skupinama (kulturnim, nacionalnim, religijskim, spolnim, dobним, profesionalnim i slično) i uspoređuju se s drugim skupinama unutar ljudskog roda. Na podređenoj razini pojedinci se samo-definiraju kao jedinstvena bića i uspoređuju se s drugim pojedincima unutar skupine kojoj pripadaju. Prema Turneru između istaknutosti pojedinih razina vlada temeljni antagonizam što znači da istaknutost jedne prouzrokuje redukciju ili inhibiciju na druge dvije razine. Tako primjerice ako je istaknuto samo-definiranje pojedinaca unutar iste skupine na međurazini to će izazvati povećanje unutar grupne sličnosti i među grupne različitosti. Prema Tajfelu (1972)<sup>12</sup> socijalni identitet pojedinca povezan je s njegovom spoznajom o pripadanju određenim socijalnim skupinama te emocionalnim i vrijednovanim značenjem koje proizlazi iz pripadnosti tim skupinama. Kroz pripadnost različitim skupinama pojedinac ustvari usvaja socijalni identitet koji određuje njegovo posebno mjesto u društvu. Autor međutim upozoruje da pripadanje pojedinim skupinama doprinosi razvoju pozitivnog socijalnog identiteta samo ako se skupina kojoj pojedinac pripada može favorizirati u odnosu na druge skupine. Uspoređujući svoju s drugim skupinama pojedinac stoga nastoji povećati razlike u korist favoriziranja skupine kojoj pripada.

Prije osvrta na nacionalni identitet čini se korisnim navesti još nekoliko teorijskih uvida u odnos kulture i identiteta. **Noviji pristupi kulturi u okviru sociokulturnih teorija ne promatraju kulturu samo sustav značenja, nego i kao proces trajnog stvaranja i reproduciranja kulturnih obrazaca kroz praksu i aktivnosti pojedinca u određenoj situaciji.**<sup>13</sup> Tako shvaćena kultura, prema nalazi se u uzajamnom odnosu sa socijalnim aspektom identiteta pojedinca. Naime kulturni kontekst omogućuje i utječe na usvajanje socijalnog aspekta identiteta pojedinca dok socijalni identitet regulira one aspekte kulturne spoznaje koji su istaknuti u određenom kontekstu.<sup>14</sup> U terminima individualnih spoznajnih procesa to znači da određeni socijalni identiteti i spoznajni kulturni obrasci mogu predstavljati psihološki set koji se istodobno aktivira u određenoj socijalnoj situaciji utječući na individualnu percepciju socijalne okoline i svijeta. Nadalje, različite prijetnje mogu povećati vjerojatnost da se takva mreža kulturnih spoznaja učvrsti ili oslabi u vremenu i prostoru. Također ove činjenice podržavaju objašnjenje na koji način se pojedinac izražava unutar skupine kojoj pripada. Naime, ovisno o kulturnim spoznajama održavanim od skupine u određenom društvu, socijalni identitet kod pojedinca može potaknuti mišljenja koja odražavaju njegovu individualnu osobitost kao člana skupine. Halloran i Kashima (2006.)<sup>15</sup> zaključuju da upravo noviji pristupi u okviru sociokulturnih teorija i

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<sup>12</sup> Devos, Thierry, Banaji, Mahzarin, B., *Implicit Self and Identity*, u knjizi Leary, Mark, R., Tangney, June, Price, *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, str. 156

<sup>13</sup> Halloran, Michael, J., Kashima, Emiko, S., Culture, *Social Identity and the Individual*, u knjizi Postmes, Tom, Jetten, Jolanda (ed.), *Individuality and the Group*, London, 2006, str. 140

<sup>14</sup> Isto, str. 140- 141

<sup>15</sup> Isto, str. 141- 145

teorija socijalnog identiteta, a posebice Turnerove teorije samo-kategorizacije omogućuju daljnje teorijske i empirijske uvide koji će omogućiti jasnije razumijevanje odnosa između kulture, društva i pojedinca.

### 3. NACIONALNI IDENTITET

Nacionalni identitet suvremeni je konstrukt koji je razvijen u socijalnoj psihologiji i sociologiji u okviru navedenih teorija. U okviru teorija socijalnog identiteta nacionalni identitet se promatra kao važna sastavnica socijalnog aspekta identiteta pojedinca. Ovakav pristup razvijen na temelju brojnih empirijskih uvida, a naročito u zadnjih dvadesetak godina. Međutim interes za raspravama i analiziranjem dominantnih karakteristika pojedinih naroda prisutno je u filozofiji od samih početaka. Tako primjerice arapski filozof kojega neki drže utemeljiteljem sociologije, Ibn Khaldun 50 godina prije Krista u knjizi *Al Muqaddima* analizirao je brojne karakteristike nomadskih i sjedilačkih plemena kao što su mentalitet, obrazovanje, socijalno i političko ponašanje, arhitekturu i slično. Među europskim filozofima, o onome što će se kasnije u okviru antropologije nazvati nacionalnim karakterom, raspravljali su brojni filozofi među kojima su se isticali Hume, Montesquieu i Kant. Iz prve pozitivističke faze svakako treba spomenuti 10-volumnu knjigu utemeljitelja eksperimentalne psihologije Wilhelma Wundta (1911-1920) *Volkerpsychologie* (Psihologija naroda), među-kulturalnu komparativnu psihološku analizu različitih zemalja na temelju jezika, mitova morala, religije, umjetnosti i zakona.

Termin „nacionalni karakter“ razvijen je u antropologiji i bio je središnjom temom antropoloških istraživanja i rasprava u razdoblju između 1930 i 1950. godine. Prema jednoj od brojnih definicija nacionalni karakter predstavljaju „relativno stabilne karakteristike ličnosti i obrasci koji djeluju modalno među odraslom populacijom u društvu“. <sup>16</sup> U takvom kontekstu „*modalna ličnost*“ koristila se kao alternativni izraz za „nacionalni karakter“ jer je takav termin metodološki olakšavao antropološka istraživanja u okviru tadašnje perspektive pod nazivom „kultura i ličnost“. Koliko su ta istraživanja bila razvijena i popularna u navedenom razdoblju najbolje ilustrira primjer Ruth Benedict, autorice poznate knjige *Modeli (obrasci) kulture* (1934/1959). <sup>17</sup> koju su skupa s kolegama američka vlada tijekom i nakon drugog svjetskog rata često pozivali kako bi im pomogli razumjeti psihi tadašnjih neprijatelja Nijemaca, Japanaca i Rusa.

Nacionalni karakter prestaje biti središnjom temom prodorom psiholoških i socioloških istraživanja u okvir antropologije. Temeljni prigovori tradicionalnim antropološkim metodama iz tih perspektiva bili su da nisu u mogućnosti obuhvatiti svu složenost jedne nacije te da su teorije previše pojednostavljene i

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<sup>16</sup> Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, 2001, str. 13

<sup>17</sup> Isto.

historijske što ne dopuštaju uspoređivanje razlika u ponašanju. Takvim je pristupom nacionalni karakter često objašnjavan u kategorijama stereotipa za koje se zna da su u pravilu pogrešna projekcija stvarnosti. Na tim kritikama šezdesetih godina i kasnije ustanovljen je metodološki konsenzus da informacije o određenoj populaciji mogu biti znanstveno valjane samo ako ispunjavaju nekoliko kriterija. Prvo, moraju biti deskriptivne a ne vrijednosne naravi. Drugo, moraju biti provjerljive od više neovisnih izvora. Treće, moraju biti primjenjive najmanje na statističku većinu u istraživanoj populaciji. I na kraju moraju biti diskriminativne, to jest navoditi karakteristike po kojima se pojedine populacije međusobno razlikuju. Na takvom metodološkom tragu razvijene su suvremene teorije socijalnog identiteta i sociokulturne teorije unutar psihologije odnosno sociologije.

**Nacionalni identitet, prema suvremenim pristupima, kako je spomenuto, sastavnicom je socijalnog ili kolektivnog identiteta pojedinca i usvaja se u određenom društvenom i kulturnom kontekstu.** Prema Halloran i Kashima (2006.)<sup>18</sup> kulturna spoznaja jednim dijelom je posredovana socijalnim identitetima pojedinaca i što su istaknutiji posreduju značajniji dio kulturne spoznaje. S druge strane nacionalna privrženost kao emocionalni izraz nacionalnog identiteta osim u okviru nacionalne države, može se oblikovati i izvan (primjerice Kurdi), na regionalnoj razini unutar iste države te na nad-nacionalnoj razini (primjerice Latini u Južnoj ili Latinskoj Americi)<sup>19</sup>

Budući da nacionalni identitet svoje ishodište ima u naciji valja se osvrnuti i na značenje koje se u kontekstu nacionalnog identiteta pridaje konstrukt „nacija“ u suvremenim teorijama identiteta. Važno je zbog toga što postoje brojne definicije „nacije“ iz različitih perspektiva. **Najčešće shvaćanje nacije koje se u suvremenim teorijama smatra tradicionalnim povezano je s kategorijom tzv. „nacionalnog sentimenta „ čiju osnovu čine četiri sastavnice : teritorijalnost, kulturna povezanost, etnicitet i postojanje nacionalne države. Oblikovanje nacije i većine nacionalnih država na tim temeljima dogodilo se u povijesnom procesu koji je završen sredinom 19. stoljeća.**<sup>20</sup> Pri tome valja napomenuti da je pojam „nacija“ u uporabi mnogo duže i u drugim značenjima stariji od onog koje mu se danas pripisuje. Tako na Hebrejskom jeziku prema srednjevjekovnom prijevodu ima dva značenja – prevlast i potomstvo. Također se koristio kao izraz za „prirodna kvaliteta“ odnosno „urođena kvaliteta“. Na srednjevjekovnim sveučilištima izraz se koristio za skupine studenata iz iste regije, a slična uporaba temeljena na pripadnosti skupinama sa zajedničkim podrijetlom korištena je i prije nego je doživjela suvremeno značenje. U eri pozitivizma, nakon razvoja nacionalnih država iz korijena „nacija“ razvili su se

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<sup>18</sup> Halloran, Michael J., Kashima, Emiko S., Culture, *Social Identity and the Individual*, u knjizi Postmes, Tom, Jetten, Jolanda (ed.), *Individuality and the Group*, London, 2006, str. 142

<sup>19</sup> Salazar, Jose Miguel, *Social Identity and National Identity*, u knjizi Worchel, Stephen, Morales, J. Francisco, Paez, Dario, Deschamps, Jean- Claude (ed.) *Social identity- international perspectives*, London, 1998, Str. 116

<sup>20</sup> Korunić, Petar, *Nacija i nacionalni identitet*, u časopisu „Zgodovinski časopis“, 57, 2003, str. 2, preuzeto 20. 1. sa stranice <http://www.filg.uj.edu.pl/~www/wip/postjugo/files/273/Etnicki-i-nacionalni-identitet.pdf>

konstrukti kao što su nacionalna zajednica, nacionalna pripadnost, nacionalizam, nacionalni karakter, nacionalna privrženost, nacionalni sentiment, nacionalni stereotipi, nacionalni identitet i sl. U takvom općem kontekstu Reicher i Hopkins (2001), **sažimljući teorije koje analiziraju odnos nacije i pojedinaca na tragu Anderson-ove teze o naciji kao „zamišljenoj zajednici“ i s obzirom na snagu pojedinih nacionalnih kategorija poput nacionalizma, nacionalnih stereotipa, nacionalne privrženosti, upozoruju da se pojedine kategorije u suvremenom komuniciranju ne bi trebale koristiti na način koji pripadnika bilo koje nacije obezvređuje ili nagrađuje, nego se trebaju promatrati u međuodnosu sa akcijom i njenim posljedicama, to jest komunikaciju temeljiti na argumentima.** <sup>21</sup>Radi ilustracije citiraju Anzulovica<sup>22</sup> koji jednim od uzroka etničkog čišćenja koje su Srbi izveli u agresiji na Hrvatsku 1991. drži uporno ponavljanje teze od strane srpskih političara i intelektualaca o Hrvatima kao „ubojicama i neizlječivo opasnima“.

## **II. GRUPE I SUKOBI MEĐU GRUPAMA S POSEBNIM OSVRTOM NA ETNOCENTRIZAM I NACIONALIZAM**

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### **1. GRUPE I GRUPNI PROCESI**

Grupe su važan dio identiteta jer pomažu ljudima da definiraju tko su. **Grupa se sastoji od dvoje ili više ljudi koji su u međusobnoj interakciji i ovise jedni o drugima.**<sup>23</sup> To znači da oni zbog svojih potreba i ciljeva utječu jedni na druge. Grupe kojima ljudi pripadaju tijekom života dijele se na primarne i sekundarne. **Primarne** grupe su one čiji članovi su međusobno često u interakciji, koje snažno utječu na identitet članova, čiji članovi su snažno i višestruko povezani te koji imaju tendenciju trajno pripadati toj grupi<sup>24</sup>. U njih, primjerice, ubrajamo obitelj i grupe prijatelja. Sekundarne grupe karakterizirane su manje intimnim odnosima među članovima te manjom identifikacijom članova s grupom.<sup>25</sup> Ponašanje pripadnika takvih grupa usmjereno je prema ciljevima koje članovi žele postići, a u grupi najčešće vladaju odnosi podređenosti i nadređenosti. Takve su primjerice političke stranke ili profesionalna društva.

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<sup>21</sup> Reicher, Stephen and Hopkins, Nick, *Self and nation*, Gateshead, 2001, str. 3- 5

<sup>22</sup> Isto, str. 6

<sup>23</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Wilson, Timothy, D., *Social psychology*, New Jersey, 1998, str. 329.

<sup>24</sup> Calhoun, Craig, Light, Donald i Keller, Suzanne, *Sociology*, New York, 1994, str.188.

<sup>25</sup> Isto, str. 189.

Sva društva imaju **norme o tome koja su ponašanja prihvatljiva**, među kojima su neke zajedničke svim članovima društva, a neke se razlikuju od grupe do grupe<sup>26</sup>. Socijalne norme su snažne odrednice ljudskog ponašanja, što je vidljivo ako promatramo što se događa kada ih ljudi učestalo krše: ostali članovi grupe ih izbjegavaju i u krajnjim slučajevima prisiljavaju da napuste grupu.

Pored normi vrlo važan pojam povezan uz grupe su **socijalne uloge**. Dok norme određuju kako bi se trebali ponašati svi članovi grupe, uloge određuju kako bi se trebale ponašati osobe koje zauzimaju određene položaje u grupi. Kao i socijalne norme, uloge mogu biti vrlo korisne, jer ljudi znaju što mogu očekivati jedni od drugih. Kada slijede niz jasno definiranih uloga, članovi grupe obično su zadovoljni i njihov uradak je dobar. No uloge mogu dovesti i do nekih poteškoća. Najveći problem je taj da se ljudi mogu u toj mjeri «uživjeti» u ulogu da izgube vlastiti identitet i osobnost.<sup>27</sup> To je svojim poznatim eksperimentom u simuliranome zatvoru pokazao Philip Zimbardo.<sup>28</sup> Ovaj vrlo cijenjeni socijalni psiholog i danas svjedoči na sudu u različitim slučajevima kako bi objasnio činjenicu da **trenutačna uloga često u cjelosti oblikuje ponašanje osobe** te da se osoba u određenoj ulozi može ponašati posve neusklađeno svojim inače usvojenim moralnim kriterijima.

Svaki član skupine ima svoju ulogu te su sve uloge međusobno povezane. Uz svaku ulogu vezan je i određeni položaj, koji je određen s važnošću te uloge u grupi. **Neke uloge u grupi su službeno određene, dok druge može prihvatiti bilo koji član.**<sup>29</sup>

Različiti pripadnici grupe ulaze u grupu s različitim karakteristikama te se mogu priključiti grupi zbog vrlo različitih razloga. U Strakerovom straživanju nasilja (1992)<sup>30</sup> na mladim pripadnicima nasilnih skupina opisani su sljedeći tipovi: **vođe** (uravnoteženi, idealistični, posvećeni grupi, vješti i popularni), **sljedbenici** (labilni, žele postati heroji, mogu biti nerazboriti, postoji mogućnost da postanu vođe), **provoditelji** (nedostaje im osjećaj sebe, koriste grupu da bi definirali sebe, mogu voditi, ali na način da ne mijenjaju smjer grupe), **konformisti** (motivirani socijalnim konformizmom više nego idealima, traže da ih grupa prihvati, no nisu strastveni pripadnici), **psihološki oštećeni** (antisocijalni, čine agresiju zbog vlastitih antisocijalnih poriva, grupa ih ne prihvaća). Ovdje je primjetno kako grupu čine vrlo različiti tipovi te je vrlo teško kontrolirati svakoga od njih. Budući da je, primjerice, konformistima najvažnije da ih grupa prihvati, oni se vjerojatno neće imati hrabrosti pobuniti protiv pogrešnih djela nekog pripadnika svoje grupe. Sljedbenici su, primjerice, skloni riziku i slijeđenju ponašanja drugih, no navedeno je da

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<sup>26</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...* str. 340.

<sup>27</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, str. 340

<sup>28</sup> Isto, str. 340- 341

<sup>29</sup> Rijavec, Majda (2000). *Vojna postrojba kao skupina*, u Pavlina, Želimir i Komar, Zoran (Ur.) *Vojna psihologija-knjiga prva*, Zagreb, 2000, str.202.

<sup>30</sup> Hinde, Robert i Pulkinnen, Lea, *Human aggressiveness and war*, u publikaciji Boutwell, Jeffrey (Ur.) *Eliminating the causes of war*, Pugwash occasional papers, 2(3), 2001., str. 17, preuzeto sa 12.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers\\_2-3.pdf#page=7](http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers_2-3.pdf#page=7)

postoji mogućnost da ih se počne doživljavati kao vođe. Provoditelji su također osobe koji nemaju osjećaj sebe, a time ni vlastite odgovornosti.

Iako se grupa sastoji od različitih tipova te od nositelja različitih uloga, članovi grupe pokazuju s vremenom sklonost **postajati međusobno sličniji** po svojim idejama, stavovima i ponašanjima, a to se naziva grupnom kohezijom. **Grupna kohezija** može se opisati kao obilježja grupe koja povezuju članove i potiču međusobno sviđanje<sup>31</sup>. Što je grupa kohezivnija, veća je vjerojatnost da će članovi ostati u grupi (ako imaju izbora), sudjelovati u grupnim aktivnostima i pokušati privući nove članove koji su njihovi istomišljenici. U istu grupu obično se uključuju ljudi koji su po nekoj važnoj karakteristici ili karakteristikama bili slični i prije nego što su se priključili grupi, no, kao što je ranije navedeno, grupe obično djeluju na takav način da potiču sličnost među članovima.<sup>32</sup> Grupa nepovezanih pojedinaca postaje visokokohezivna grupa kada su njeni članovi **uključeni u česte interakcije**, dakle kada su svakodnevno u međusobnom kontaktu.

Visoka kohezivnost grupe djeluje tako da ciljevi, uspjesi i neuspjesi grupe postaju osobni.<sup>33</sup> Grupa stoga počinje djelovati na događaje iz okoline kao cjelina. **Prijetnja i napad na jednog člana grupe doživljava se kao prijetnja i napad na čitavu grupu.**<sup>34</sup> Zbog toga može doći do takozvanog kolektivnog ponašanja. **Kolektivno ponašanje** se može opisati kao razvoj nepredviđenih, brzo stvorenih normi i socijalne strukture u relativno spontanim situacijama.<sup>35</sup> Ono se najčešće pojavljuje u situacijama koje su **izvan okvira uobičajenih situacija**, poput onih u kojima je potrebno „redefiniranje situacije i pronalaženje nekog smisla u općoj konfuziji“<sup>36</sup>. Grupe omogućavaju razvoj nekih oblika kolektivnog ponašanja, a kolektivna ponašanja olakšavaju daljnje zблиžavanje grupe.<sup>37</sup> Ona se značajno češće pojavljuju u grupama u kojima vladaju prijateljski odnosi. Kolektivna ponašanja najčešće su usmjerena na neku drugu skupinu te **ponašanja te druge skupine utječu na kolektivna ponašanja.**<sup>38</sup> Za pozitivan socijalni identitet, tj. za pozitivno vrednovanje sebe kao pripadnika svoje grupe važno je i to da se grupa kojoj pojedinac pripada može favorizirati u odnosu na druge grupe<sup>39</sup>, tj. da može doživjeti

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<sup>31</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Willson, Timothy D. i Akert, Robin M., *Socijalna psihologija*, Zagreb, 2005., str. 304.

<sup>32</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Willson, Timothy D. i Akert, Robin M., *Socijalna psihologija*, Zagreb, 2005., str. 302

<sup>33</sup> Rijavec, M. (2000). *Vojna...*, str. 203.

<sup>34</sup> Rijavec, M. (2000). *Vojna...*, str. 203.

<sup>35</sup> Neal, David M., *A further examination of anonymity, contagion, and deindividuation in crowd and collective behavior*, u časopisu "Sociological focus", vol. 36, br. 2, 1993, str. 100. [EBSCOhost Online Research databases](#).

<sup>36</sup> Reicher, Stephen, *The psychology of crowd dynamics*, u knjizi Hogg, Michael A. i Tindale, R. Scott. (Ur.) *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes*, Oxford, 2001, str. 192.

<sup>37</sup> Neal, David, M. *A further...*, str. 105

<sup>38</sup> Reicher, Stephen, *The psychology...* 2001, str. 200

<sup>39</sup> Turner, John, C., *Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories*, u knjizi Ellemers, Naomi, Spears, Russell i Doosje, Bertjan (Ur.), *Social identity*, Oxford, 1999, str. 8.

svoju skupinu kao bolju i snažniju. Stoga, ako druga skupina značajno ugrozi pozitivan identitet vlastite skupine, pripadnici skupine često su skloni kolektivno se ponašati.

Boravak u grupi može dovesti i do **deindividuacije**, a to je pojava do koje može doći kada se osoba nalazi u mnoštvu, a radi se o **slabljenju normalnih ograničenja u ponašanju**. Gubljenje u mnoštvu može dovesti do počinjenja teških djela, koja osoba nikada ne bi pomislila učiniti da je sama.<sup>40</sup>

Tijekom povijesti javljali su se brojni primjeri grupa ljudi koji su počinili užasavajuća djela. Jedan takav primjer je užasavajući incident počinjen u selu **My Lai** za vrijeme Vijetnamskog rata, kada je grupa američkih vojnika sustavno poubijala stotine nezaštićenih žena, djece i starijih muškaraca. U Europi se skupine nogometnih navijača ponekad međusobno napadaju i premlaćuju. U Sjedinjenim Državama histerični obožavatelji na rock koncertima izgazili su jedni druge do smrti. Sjedinjene Države u svojoj povijesti imaju sramotne primjere bijelaca, često ogrnutih u anonimnost bijelih ogrtača, koji su linčovali Afroamerikance.

### **Masakr u selu My Lai**

Godine 1968. Sjeverna je Koreja zarobila USS Pueblo, brod US mornarice špijunskoga predznaka, u Vijetnamu Viet Cong je pokrenuo Tet ofenzivu, ubijen je Robert Kennedy a po cijelim su se Sjedinjenim Državama održavale demonstracije protiv rata u Vijetnamu. Ta, 1968. godina, uz sve ovo, ostat će zapamćena i po **My Lai masakru**. Quang Ngai provincija smjestila se na zapadu Vijetnama, i mješavina je planina, džungle, rižinih polja i plaža. Svjedoci kažu kako se američki vojnici nisu mogli pomaknuti ni pola milje dnevno od bujne džungle. Seoce Chu Lai smjestilo se u ovoj provinciji u blizini jedine nacionalne ceste Južnog Vijetnama Q1. Jedanaesta je brigada izgradila kamp u južnom dijelu provincije, u gradu Duc Pho. Do 1967. godine ovim je dijelom dominirao Viet Cong, a tamošnje je stanovništvo naprosto obožavalo Ho Ši Mina kao i njegov sveti cilj. Jedini način da se izbaci Viet Cong iz ovoga područja, bio je izbrisati sela sa lica zemlje. Kada je 11ta brigada stigla u Duc Pho, 70 % sela je već bilo izbrisano. Najviše je dakako patilo civilno stanovništvo, kojima je noću vladao Viet Cong a danju Amerikanci, koji unatoč stalnim bombardiranjima nisu uspjeli dobiti prevlast nad ovim dijelom. Vijetnamci su ih dobivali ponajviše smrtonosnim zamkama, koje su postavljali po džungli. U veljači i ožujku 1969. Charlie grupa iz 1. bataljona, 11 te brigade pretrpila je zbog ovakvih zamki i znatne gubitke. Patrolirajući u blizini Son Mya, naletjeli su na gusto minsko polje. Kada su eksplozije počele, umjesto da se povuku krenuli su naprijed, što je rezultiralo petnaesticom mrtvih, a kasnije je Charlie grupa izgubila još ljudi, što je dovelo do konačne brojke od 28 mrtvih. Vođa Charlie grupe, William Calley, je bio sasvim običan mladić, tipičan Amerikanac. Prije negoli će otići u vojsku, radio je i nekolicinu poslova: u osiguravajućem društvu kao istražitelj, u autopraonici, kondukter u tramvaju... Nakon završene škole za časnike prebačen je na Havaje, gdje je trenirao za spomenutom Charlie grupom. Stigavši u Vijetnam, grupa je postala dio 23. pješadijske divizije; no Calleya njegov vod nije poštovao i mnogi su se pitali kako je uopće prošao u školi za časnike. 15. ožujka Charlie grupa se sa zapovjednicima skupila oko 'kuće' "Mad Dog" Madine, koji je bio Calleyev nadređeni, kako bi održali komemoraciju za poginulog Charljevca George Cox-a. Tu je Madina održao i kratki briefing o napadu na My Lai. Iako to nikada nije potvrđeno, jedan od svjedoka je rekao kako je "Mad Dog" ovdje izdao zapovijed da se puca i na civile; drugi svjedoci iz Charlie grupe ovo su opovrgli.

U rano jutro 16. ožujka Charlie grupa je krenula u akciju. Na My Lai vozili su ih Huey helikoperi 174te helikopterske napadačke grupe. Osim Charljevca, u jedan od helikoptera ukrcao se i Ron Haeberte, fotograf vojske, koji je radio za "Stars and Stripes," magazin američke vojske. Oko 07. 45 h stigli su u blizinu My Laia, a tada su i njegovi žitelji postali svjesni napada. Sakrili su se u podzemne prostorije izgrađene još dok su Francuzi bili u ovim krajevima. Calley je sa 1. vodom, sa jugoistoka, stigao do My Lai među prvima, a prvi je nastradao

<sup>40</sup> Aronson i suradnici, *Social...*, str. 337.



starac koji se zatekao u polju u blizini sela. Prvi je vod otvorio vatru na devet vijetnamskih farmera ubivši ih na mjestu, a, kako su svjedoci utvrdili, pucalo su nasumce, odnosno na sve što se kreće. Neki od ranjenih stanovnika sela dolazili su po pomoć Amerima, ali i njih su na licu mjesta ubijali. "Žena je izašla iz 'rupe' sa djetetom u rukama; Widmar je pucao na nju iz M-16 puške i ona je pala na pod. Iako je beba još uvijek bila živa, Widmar je pucao i u nju," pričao je jedan od svjedoka. Varnado Simpson, jedan od vojnika također je ubio ženu s djetetom a kasnije je priznao kako je bio odgovoran za smrt barem 25 ljudi. Prvi je vod nastavio ulaziti dublje u selo. Iako nije bilo neprijateljske vatre, pucali su na 'rupe' i ljude u njima, bacajući i granate. Mlade djevojke koje nisu ubili Amerikanci su silovali, ponekad prisiljavajući cijelu obitelj da gleda. Pilot Brian Livingston, napisao je u pismu kući kako nikada nije vidio toliko mrtvih na jednom mjestu i kako su većina njih bili - žene i djeca. Ostale preživjele Calley je ubio. Dok je pokolj trajao na tlu, jednim je od helikoptera upravljao Hugh Thompson. Malo dalje od sela ugledao je ranjenu ženu u polju. Kada se približio vidio je jednog od vojnika kako udara ženu i puca joj u glavu. Nakon što je bio svjedokom još nekolicine zločina spustio je helikopter između civila i Calleyevih ljudi. Svojim je ljudima naredio da pucaju na Calleya ako nešto pokuša napraviti. Nakon toga mali broj preživjelih prebacio je u Quang Ngai. Prvi je vod nastavio prema istoku sela. U blizini mosta, tamo je bilo još četrdesetak žene i djece. Među njima se našao i jedan budistički svećenik. Dok je Calley ispitivao svećenika o oružju u selu, iz gomile je prema svojoj majci istrčalo dijete. Calley ga je ubio, a nakon toga pucao je i na svećenika. Nakon toga i ostatak je voda počeo pucati po preživjelim. Nakon 1. voda, u akciju čišćenja krenuo je 3. vod. Sve što je preživjelo masakr oni su dokrajčili, bilo da je riječ o ljudima ili životinjama. No, nitko se ne sjeća da ijedan metak ispaljen na 1. vod, koji je vodio Calley.

Već i sama činjenica da je osoba **uniformirana** može umanjiti osjećaj odgovornosti za vlastite postupke i povećati agresivnost. Taj fenomen u sportu su zabilježili Rehm, Steinleitner i Lilli (1987)<sup>41</sup> – djeca koja su u timske sportu nosila svoju svakodnevnu odjeću bila su manje agresivna od one koja su nosila uniforme. Jedan od razloga zbog kojih deindividucija smanjuje osjećaj odgovornosti za vlastite postupke jest taj da **umanjuje vjerojatnost da će bilo koji pojedinac biti izdvojen i okrivljen**.<sup>42</sup> Ona će se vjerojatnije pojaviti ako su pripadnici skupine anonimni u odnosu na one koji kontroliraju ili bi trebali kontrolirati njihovo ponašanje.<sup>43</sup>

Istraživanje Tanisa i Postmesa<sup>44</sup> pokazalo je da u situaciji kada je nemoguće prepoznavanje svake osobe pojedinačno, povjerenje prema nekoj osobi temelji se isključivo na činjenici pripada li ta osoba vlastitoj ili vanjskoj grupi. Ovime dolazimo do spoznaje da deindividucija **povećava istaknutost socijalnog, odnosno kolektivnog identiteta**, a time i **poštivanje normi grupe** kojoj pojedinac trenutno pripada. Istaknutost socijalnog identiteta znači da pojedinac sebe doživljava kao pripadnika grupe, a ne kao pojedinca. Pripadnici grupe takvim ponašanjima naglašavaju svoj **kolektivni identitet**. Deindividualizirani članove skupine doživljavaju se međusobno vrlo sličnima te se time povećava

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<sup>41</sup> Rehm, Jurgen, Steinleitner, Michael i Lilli, Waldemar, *Wearing uniform and aggression – A field experiment*, u časopisu "European journal of social psychology", 1987, vol. 17, str. 358. [EBSCOhost Online Research Databases](#).

<sup>42</sup> Aronson i sur., *Social...*, 1998, str. 338.

<sup>43</sup> Neal, David M., *A further...*, str. 104.

<sup>44</sup> Tanis, Martin i Postmes, Tom, Short Communication A social identity approach to trust: Interpersonal perception, group membership and trusting behaviour, u časopisu "European Journal of Social Psychology", Vol. 35, 2005, str.421. [EBSCOhost Online Research Databases](#).

njihovo međusobno sviđanje.<sup>45</sup> Tipični članovi skupine voljeni su više od netipičnih. Kada je pripadnost grupi jako izražena, sviđanje se temelji na tome tko je, a tko nije član grupe. Ova tvrdnja potvrđena je u **laboratorijskim i terenskim istraživanjima te u sportskim grupama i organizacijama.**<sup>46</sup> Postmes i Spears<sup>47</sup> analizirali su šezdeset istraživanja o deindividuaciji te su potvrdili da deindividuacija povećava stupanj u kojem se pojedinci pridržavaju grupnih normi. Ponekad su norme specifične grupe čiji je osoba član u sukobu s normama ostalih grupa ili društva u cjelini. Kada su članovi grupe zajedno, i kada su deindividualizirani, **veća je vjerojatnost da će se ponašati sukladno grupnim normama nego sukladno ostalim normama.**

Dakle, deindividuacija s jedne strane smanjuje vjerojatnost da će jedna osoba biti izdvojena i okrivljena, dok s druge strane povećava pristajanje uz specifične grupne norme. Ovo drugo objašnjenje je posebno primjenjivo za situacije rata u kojima osoba često nije u mogućnosti držati se općeprihvaćenih društvenih normi jer u tome slučaju ne bi preživjela te bi također ugrozila živote drugih pripadnika svoje postrojbe. Postoje primjeri u kojima je vojnicima rečeno da zaborave na prijašnje norme ako se žele boriti i preživjeti.

Deindividuacija stvara svoj **vlastiti moral**: taj moral može značiti isključivu ljubav prema vlastitoj grupi i malo ljubavi za ostatak čovječanstva. **Izloženost ratu ima snažan negativan učinak na moralno rezoniranje.**

Deindividuacija kao fenomen može pojačati i pozitivna ponašanja, najčešće prema pripadnicima vlastite grupe. Dakle, deindividuacija ne dovodi uvijek do agresivnog ili antisocijalnog ponašanja. To ovisi o tome kakve su grupne norme, no grupne norme u ratu su nužno značajno različite od mirnodopskih. Ako je grupa ljuta i norme upućuju na nasilno ponašanje, deindividuacija će kod ljudi u grupi izazvati agresivno ponašanje.<sup>48</sup> U situaciji rata, vojnici su pripravnici da se brane od agresije te da ju čine, stoga norma te grupe postaje ponašati se agresivno prema svakome tko je doživljen kao neprijatelj.

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<sup>45</sup> Hogg, Michael, A. Social categorization, depersonalization, and group behavior, u knjizi Hogg, Michael A. i Tindale, R. Scott. (Ur.) *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes*, Oxford, 2001, str. 66.

<sup>46</sup> Isto.

<sup>47</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Socijalna....*, 2005., str.313.

<sup>48</sup> Aronson E. i suradnici, *Socijalna....*, 2005. str. 314.

## 2. VOJNA POSTROJBA KAO GRUPA

### 2.1 Grupni procesi u vojnoj postrojbi

Iako vojna postrojba nastaje zbog postizanja određenog cilja i karakterizirana je odnosima nadređenosti i podređenosti, ona s vremenom postaje primarna grupa<sup>49</sup>, što znači da su **veze među pojedincima snažne** te da postoji **jak osjećaj međusobnog pripadanja**.

U vojnoj postrojbi vrlo je važno da se zadatak postrojbe dobro obavi te je stoga vrlo važno da se zna što je čija uloga te u njoj moraju biti zastupljene i dobro izvođene sve potrebne uloge<sup>50</sup>. To su **rukovođenje**, odnosno njegovi formalni vidovi. Njih obavljaju zapovjednik i dozapovjednik, a njihov zadatak jest nadzor, opskrba i veza s drugim postrojbama. Ulogu **određivanja uloga i definiranja prihvatljivog ponašanja** mogu obavljati zapovjednik ili dozapovjednik, ali i ostali iskusniji članovi postrojbe. Osoba koja preuzme tu ulogu mora jasno svakome reći što se od njega očekuje. U ratu upravo može doći do problema vezanih uz ovu ulogu; nju u nekoj kriznoj situaciji može preuzeti osoba koja nije dovoljno kompetentna, već koja je vođena emocijama ili krivim saznanjima. U mirnodopskim uvjetima, ta osoba ima ulogu da potiče vojnike da govore o svojim potrebama ili željama te da se dužnosti, koliko je moguće, usklade s time, no u ratnim uvjetima to baš nije moguće. Ulogu **uzora** najčešće imaju iskusniji članovi nižeg ranga, no također ju u različitim situacijama mogu preuzeti i drugi. Ulogu **poučavatelja** zauzima onaj tko brine da članovi postrojbe koji nemaju dostatna znanja steknu ta znanja. Također je bitna i uloga **pružatelja čuvstvene potpore** – ta osoba mora biti dobar slušač i pomagati vojnicima u prilagodbi.<sup>51</sup> Budući da se u ratu mora djelovati brzo, emocionalna potpora više se iskazuje kroz, primjerice, zajedničku akciju, tj. rijetko kada postoji vrijeme za dulje slušanje osobe koja je u teškom emocionalnom stanju.

Vojnici u postrojbi su u **svakodnevnome kontaktu** što potiče **kohezivnost postrojbe**<sup>52</sup>. Oni se vrlo brzo upoznaju te upoznaju jake i slabe strane svakog člana svoje skupine. U početku javna izloženost svakog vojnika njegovoj postrojbi i svakodnevna interakcija mogu biti uzrokom sukoba, no s kohezijom jača i tolerancija. **Vojnici imaju zajedničke ciljeve i ideale**<sup>53</sup>. Kada ljudi prepoznaju da dijele ciljeve i ideale s drugom osobom, to dovodi do toga da zanemaruju razlike među sobom, a naglašavaju

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<sup>49</sup> Rijavec, M. (2000). *Vojna...*, str. 203.

<sup>50</sup> Isto, str. 202.

<sup>51</sup> Isto, str. 202.

<sup>52</sup> Isto, str. 201.

<sup>53</sup> Isto, str. 201.

sličnosti. Ovdje je potrebno navesti specifičnost vojne postrojbe u ratu u odnosu na mirnodopske skupine: pripadnici vojne postrojbe nemaju izbora da napuste skupinu ako im ona ne odgovara te imaju veću vjerojatnost preživljavanja ako su dobro povezani s ostalima te ako su im dragi, stoga je **snažna kohezivnost vojne postrojbe gotovo nužna**. U formalnim skupinama (u kojima je smanjena mogućnost izbora, a u koje ubrajamo i vojne postrojbe) psihosocijalna klima ima veće značenje nego u neformalnim skupinama. Psihosocijalna klima u vojnoj postrojbi može ovisiti o uključenosti, zajedništvu, časničkoj potpori, osobnome statusu, redu i organizaciji, jasnoći i časničkom nadzoru.<sup>54</sup> Ovdje ponovno treba naglasiti važnost zajedništva i osobne uključenosti vojnika, no i važnost jasnoće. Kada dođe do kaotičnih situacija, vojnicima nije jasno što se od njih formalno očekuje te koje će biti posljedice ako ne ostvare ta očekivanja. Stoga oni nastoje sami sebi i jedni drugima povećati jasnoću kako bi se osjećali sigurnije u svojoj postrojbi.

U ratu je potrebna snažna usmjerenost na zadatak budući da situacija zahtjeva visoku kontrolu. Uloga vođe u vojnoj postrojbi je ključna u svim stupnjevima. Djelovanje časnika u vojsci može se razvrstati u šest područja: nadzor nad osobljem, planiranje, pokretanje i usmjeravanje djelovanja, upravljanje administracijom, preuzimanje osobne odgovornosti, iskazivanje pripadnosti i odanosti postrojbi i vojsci kao cjelini te provedba neposrednih poslova.<sup>55</sup> Glavne značajke dužnosti visokog zapovjednika su zamršenost dužnosti, trajanje zadaća, međunarodni pogled, uvid u vojni sustav, postizanje suglasja, predviđanje i ostalo.<sup>56</sup> Moramo primjetiti da je važno imati na umu zamršenost dužnosti u kaotičnoj situaciji rata u kojoj je vrlo teško predvidjeti akcije druge strane te reakcije vlastitih vojnika. Previđanje i zaustavljanje negativnih reakcija vlastitih vojnika bilo bi u većoj mjeri moguće kada bi zapovjednik ili njegovi suborci imali širok raspon psiholoških znanja. Također je potrebno primjetiti da, kada grupe postanu prevelike, interakcija sa svim članovima nije moguća.<sup>57</sup> Stoga zapovjednik, već zbog veličine postrojbe kojom zapovijeda, nema mogućnost interakcije, a stoga ni kontrole, nad postupcima svih vojnika.

Također je potrebno **navesti razliku između vođe i zapovjednika**: vođa je osoba koju pripadnici skupine dragovoljno prihvaćaju, dok zapovjednika imenuje zapovjednik više razine zapovijedanja.<sup>58</sup> Ono što se može dogoditi u situaciji rata jest to da neformalni vođa neke manje skupine postane netko tko nije formalni zapovjednik postrojbe. Vođe ponekad mogu biti odabrani zbog toga što

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<sup>54</sup> Hudina, Boris. (2000). *Psihosocijalna klima u vojnim skupinama*, u Pavlina, Želimir i Komar, Zoran (Ur.) *Vojna psihologija-knjiga prva*, Zagreb, 2000, str.257.

<sup>55</sup> Jeličić, Z. i suradnici, *Psihologijske...*, str. 269.

<sup>56</sup> Jeličić, Z. i suradnici, *Psihologijske...*, str. 291

<sup>57</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str.340.

<sup>58</sup> Jeličić, Z. i suradnici, *Psihologijske...*, str. 272.

predstavljaju grupne vrijednosti ili pak oni mogu oblikovati vrijednosti grupe.<sup>59</sup> Vođe mogu potaknuti agresiju te ograničiti perspektivu svojih sljedbenika. Oni mogu imati kritičnu ulogu u legitimiziranju nasilja te nasilje izjednačavati s lojalnošću te jačati sliku unutrašnje grupe kao „vojnika oslobođenja“ te vanjske kao „opasnosti za grupu ili društvo“. Uz to, vođe mogu pojačati neprijateljske osjećaje prema vanjskoj grupi s ciljem da ojačaju integritet grupe, da stabiliziraju vlastitu poziciju te da dobiju potrebna sredstva<sup>60</sup>

## 2.2 Vojna postrojba u sukobu

Priroda sukoba i način njegova razrješenja bili su teme velikog broja socijalno-psihologijskih istraživanja. Brojni su pristupi objašnjenju načina na koje ljudi reagiraju na dileme do kojih dolazi u sukobu, uključujući sociološka istraživanja socijalnih pokreta te povijesne, ekonomske i političke analize međunarodnih odnosa. **Socijalno-psihologijski pristup je jedinstven, jer svojim metodama nastoji jasno objasniti uzroke i posljedice.**<sup>61</sup> Dvije strane u oružanoj bitci mogu smatrati da si ne mogu priuštiti predaju oružja, zbog straha da će druga strana iskoristiti slabljenje njihovog položaja.<sup>62</sup> U ovom konkretnom slučaju se radi o tzv. dilemi zatvorenika: osoba treba odabrati neko ponašanje, no pri tome ne zna koje će ponašanje odabrati druga strana. Situacija rata je upravo snažno povezana s dilemom zatvorenika; budući da u ratu zaraćene strane jedna od druge kriju svoje kapacitete i strategije te svaka od strana treba biti pripravna da druga strana neće ispoštovati svoj dio dogovora, npr. primirja. U ratu je naglašeno nepovjerenje među zaraćenim stranama.

Sukob je jednostavnije rješi na razini pojedinaca, a ne na razini grupa. Istraživanje koje su proveli John Schopler i Chet Insko (1999)<sup>63</sup> prema Aronson i sur., (2005) pokazalo je da je veća vjerojatnost da će surađivati dva pojedinca pred koje je postavljena dilema zatvorenika, nego dvije grupe koje trebaju donijeti svoju odluku u toj situaciji. Razlog tome je veća vjerojatnost da će ljudi pretpostaviti da je drugi pojedinac spremniji na suradnju nego grupa. U ratu dolazi do snažne kategorizacije, tj. pripadnici i vlastite i vanjske skupine se doživljavaju isključivo kao pripadnici grupe, a ne kao pojedinci. Pojava da se svi pripadnici vanjske grupe smatraju međusobno sličnima naziva se

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<sup>59</sup> Hinde, Robert i Pulkinnen, Lea, *Human aggressiveness and war*, u publikaciji Boutwell, Jeffrey (Ur.) *Eliminating the causes of war*, Pugwash occasional papers, 2(3), 2001., str. 16, preuzeto sa 12.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers\\_2-3.pdf#page=7](http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Papers_2-3.pdf#page=7)

<sup>60</sup> Isto.

<sup>61</sup> Aronson i suradnici, *Social...*, str.359.

<sup>62</sup> Isto, str. 361.

<sup>63</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Socijalna...*,2005, str. 328.

**homogenost vanjske grupe.**<sup>64</sup> To dovodi do toga da se ne vjeruje nikome „od njih“. U ratu je važno je prepoznati neprijatelja te pripadnost neprijateljskoj skupini se doživljava kao jedina relevantna značajka.

**Pregovaranje** se definira kao oblik komunikacije među suprotstavljenim stranama u sukobu kod kojeg se daju i primaju ponude, a rješenje se javlja tek kada se obje strane slože. Ograničenje uspješnog pregovaranja je to da ljudi često pretpostavljaju da su zarobljeni u sukobu iz kojeg samo jedna strana može izići kao pobjednik. Ovakav kompromis naziva se integrativno rješenje, koje se definira kao rješenje sukoba kod kojeg obje strane razmjenjuju ustupke prema svojim različitim interesima, pri čemu svaka strana radi najveće ustupke u područjima koja njoj nisu važna, ali su važna drugoj strani. Do manje spremnosti za pregovaranje doći će ako postoji loše iskustvo u pregovorima s drugom stranom, tj. ako postoji iskustvo da se druga strana često nije držala dogovora. Time dolazi i do snažnog nepovjerenja prema pripadnicima druge strane, a time i do veće spremnosti na agresivno reagiranje.

### **3. ČIMBENICI KOJI POJAČAVAJU PODLOŽNOST SOCIJALNOM UTJECAJU U GRUPAMA**

Komunikacija među pripadnicima grupe dovodi do stvaranja tzv. djeljene realnosti, tj. komunikacija s drugima utječe na to da pojedinčev doživljaj realnosti postaje gotovo identičan onome koji imaju ostali članovi grupe.<sup>65</sup> Ljudi imaju dvije temeljne potrebe za čije zadovoljenje su im nužni drugi ljudi: da imaju točne informacije o događajima koji su im nejasni te da budu prihvaćeni u svojoj grupi. U situaciji rata, obje ove potrebe su izrazito naglašene stoga što o njihovom zadovoljenju ovisi preživljavanje. Stoga su ljudi u toj situaciji i podložniji socijalnom utjecaju, odnosno manje su kritični prema informacijama i zahtjevima koje pred njih postavljaju drugi članovi njihove skupine.

Prisutnost nekih osjećaja u velikoj mjeri povećava vjerojatnost podložnosti socijalnom utjecaju.<sup>66</sup> Emocije djeluju duboko, trenutačno te ih često nije moguće umanjiti. Gustav Le Bon<sup>67</sup> bio je prvi istraživač koji je zabilježio kako se emocije i ponašanja mogu brzo proširiti kroz masu – učinak koji je nazvao **socijalna zaraza**.

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<sup>64</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 510.

<sup>65</sup> Thompson, Leigh i Fine, Gary Alan, *Socially shared cognition, affect and behavior: a review and integration*, u časopisu “Personality and social psychology review”, vol.3, br.4., 1999, str. 288. [EBSCOhost Online Research Databases](#).

<sup>66</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_pratkanis.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_pratkanis.htm)

<sup>67</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 288.

Kao emocije koje se često javljaju u kriznim situacijama, a koje povećavaju podložnost socijalnom utjecaju, možemo navesti **strah, krivnju, osramoćenost, prijetnju da će osoba doživjeti uvredu te empatiju**.<sup>68</sup> Ubojstvo 450 do 500 vijetnamskih civila u selu My Lai u najvećoj se mjeri može objasniti upravo strahom. Vojnici su bili vrlo preplašeni zato što nikada prije nisu bili u borbi i postojale su glasine da će jedna od najstrašnijih neprijateljskih jedinica, četrdeset i osmi vijetnamski bataljun, okupirati to selo. Jedan od pilota helikoptera radiovezom je javio da je pred sobom vidio vojnike Vijetkonga, tako da su američki vojnici iskočili iz helikoptera otvorivši vatru.

Osim straha i još nekih ranije navedenih emocija, još neki fenomeni povezani s emocijama doprinose povećanju podložnosti socijalnom utjecaju. To su reciprocitet, tehnike vratima u lice i noge u vratima, predviđanje žaljenja, osjećaj odanosti te ograničenost resursa.<sup>69</sup> **Reciprocitet** se odnosi na činjenicu da osoba koja je odana svojoj skupini može očekivati da će drugi pripadnici skupine biti odani njoj u situaciji kada će joj to biti potrebno. S time je povezana i važnost **osjećaja odanosti**. **Tehnika vratima u lice** odnosi se na pristajanje na manji zahtjev, nakon što je osoba odbila učiniti veći.<sup>70</sup> Primjerice, osoba možda neće učiniti najgoru stvar koju netko od njezinih suboraca traži od nje, no kako bi udovoljila zahtjevu pristat će na svojevrsni kompromis te učiniti neko manje teško djelo. Ovdje je važno napomenuti da se osobi u ratu neka agresivna djela, koja bi u mirnodopskim uvjetima smatrala vrlo teškima, mogu činiti posve prihvatljivima, jer su manje teška od nekih djela koja je vidjela ili o kojima je čula da su se dogodila za vrijeme rata. Tehnika noge u vratima, djeluju suprotno; ona se odnosi na prvo pristajanje na mali zahtjev, a nakon toga na pristajanje na veći zahtjev.<sup>71</sup> S njome je povezan i fenomen **samoopravdanja**.<sup>72</sup> Radi se o tome da osoba započne s činjenjem djela koja nisu previše agresivna ili s pasivnim ponašanjem u situacijama u kojima bi trebala pomoći nekome (npr. žrtvi agresije). Sljedeći korak jest činjenje malo lošijeg djela (npr. laganog udaranja druge osobe) nakon kojeg slijedi činjenje još malo lošijeg djela te na taj način osoba može postupno postajati sve agresivnija. Razmišljanje u pozadini ovog fenomena jest sljedeće: „Nije puno lošije učiniti to što sam sada učinio (npr. nekoga udario nogom) od onoga što sam učinio jučer (npr. nekoga udario rukom)“. Kod samoopravdanja je bitno primjetiti da se radi o vrlo malim pomacima te se osoba na neki način „navikava“ na svoja sve agresivnija djela.

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<sup>68</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_pratkanis.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_pratkanis.htm)

<sup>69</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_pratkanis.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_pratkanis.htm)

<sup>70</sup> Aronson E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 313.

<sup>71</sup> Isto, str. 315.

<sup>72</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Socijalna...*, 2005, str. 294.

Ako osoba **predviđa da će kasnije žaliti** zbog toga što se nije složila sa drugim pripadnicima svoje skupine ili nekom važnom osobom, ona će biti podložnija socijalnom utjecaju. Primjerice, ako vojnik smatra da će poslije žaliti što se nije priklonio manjoj grupi svojih suboraca u počinjenju nekog djela, vjerojatnije će odlučiti da i on sudjelovati u počinjenju tog djela.

Ovdje je važno ponoviti i koliko je vojnicima važno da se slože sa svojom skupinom, a zbog toga može doći i do tzv. **konformiranja pogrešnoj normi**.<sup>73</sup> To, primjerice, može značiti normu da se za počinjeni zločin od strane pripadnika druge skupine treba osvetiti bilo kojem pripadniku njegove skupine. Ovakve norme najčešće se slijede **spontano**, tj. osobe se počnu ponašati u skladu s njima **bez razmišljanja**.

O **ograničenosti resursa** kao situaciji u kojoj je povećana podložnost socijalnom utjecaju navest ćemo nešto u nastavku, kada ćemo govoriti o kriznim situacijama.

**Nejasnoća situacije** povećava sklonost ljudi da druge ljude koriste kao izvor informacija. Za utjecaj drugih ljudi su najotvoreniji kada su nesigurni u pogledu točnog odgovora, prikladnog ponašanja ili točne ideje. Veća nesigurnost povezana je s većim oslanjanjem na druge.<sup>74</sup>

Također, što je osoba procijenjena **stručnijom** ili informiranijom, u nejasnoj će situaciji više vrijediti kao vodič.<sup>75</sup> „Stručnjakom“ se može smatrati netko tko je nešto vidio ili čuo, dakle, ne mora se raditi o stvarno stručnoj osobi. Također, postoji mogućnost da se stručnom osobom u krizi procijeni neka osoba koja nešto „zna“ bez da se njezino znanje stvarno provjerava. U situacijama kada osobe nemaju mogućnost pomnijeg razmišljanja, često se oslanjaju na takozvane periferne znakove, tj. na površne karakteristike osobe na temelju koje zaključuju da je ta osoba dovoljno stručna da može predložiti i/ili voditi akciju.<sup>76</sup>

**Krizne situacije** također povećavaju podložnost socijalnom utjecaju. U takvim situacijama ljudi nemaju vremena zastati i razmisliti kako bi se trebali ponašati, već moraju djelovati trenutno. U stanjima straha i panike jedina prirodna reakcija je pogledati kako drugi ljudi reagiraju i učiniti isto što i oni.<sup>77</sup> Osoba u krizi nema puni kapacitet prepoznavanja izbora i mogućnosti, a procijenjuje da nešto treba brzo učiniti. Ljudi više žele nešto ako imaju manje vremena da to dobiju. **Busheva administracija** koristila je ovaj fenomen **u pokretanju rata protiv Iraka**: „Vrijeme juri i, ako brzo ne zaustavimo Sadama, on će nas napasti nuklearnim oružjem“.<sup>78</sup> Situacija borbe je emocionalno nabijena situacija

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<sup>73</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 312.

<sup>74</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 289.

<sup>75</sup> Isto, str. 291.

<sup>76</sup> Isto, str. 247- 248

<sup>77</sup> Isto, str. 290.

<sup>78</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-f.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-f.htm)



koja kritičko razmišljanje čini manje vjerojatnim. Krizna situacija je i ona u kojoj postoje nedostatni tj. ograničeni resursi: kada su vremena teška, članovi grupe osjećati jaču prijetnju od članova vanjske grupe te će biti skloniji negativnom stavu i nasilju prema njima. Ovo objašnjenje naziva se **teorijom realnog sukoba**.<sup>79</sup> Niže prikazan grafikon pokazuje odnos između cijene pamuka i broja linčovanja Afroamerikanaca na Jugu SAD-a. Autori su utvrdili da je, u razdoblju od 1882. godine do 1930. godine, padanje cijene pamuka značilo i povećavanje broja linčovanja. Pamuk je u to vrijeme bio roba o kojoj je ovisila čitava ekonomija te je niska cijena pamuka značila i siromaštvo za veći broj ljudi te su se nezadovoljstvo i agresija bjelačke populacije usmjerili na Afroamerikance – pripadnike vanjske skupine koja je u to vrijeme bila „pogodna“ da se smatra krivom za sve.

Slika 4. Odnos između ukupnog broja linčovanja i cijene pamuka<sup>80</sup>



**Socijalni utjecaj može biti pojačan i kontekstom** koji može djelovati na vrlo suptilne i teško prepoznatljive načine. Primjerice, ako se neki postupak **označi kao ispravan** ili ako ga se **poveže s nekim pozitivnim pojmom** (primjerice, ako se nepotrebna agresija nad neprijateljskim vojnikom poveže s ljubavlju prema svome narodu) osoba može takav čin smatrati izrazom domoljublja. Kontekst je također **povezan i s očekivanjima**: ako dio postrojbe od vojnika očekuje da se on osveti za smrt nekog od svojih suboraca, vojnik će se vjerojatno ponašati u skladu s tim očekivanjima. Također, ako do vojnika **ne dopiru prave informacije**, oni su podložniji vjerovati poluinformacijama ili netočnim zaključcima.<sup>81</sup>

Među krizne situacije možemo ubrojiti i **situacije eskalacije**, a to su one u kojima neki projekti ili smjerovi akcije vode ka gubitcima, ali u kojima je moguće postići bolji ishod ako se uloži više truda,

<sup>79</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 528- 530

<sup>80</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 529- 530

<sup>81</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_pratkanis.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_pratkanis.htm)

vremena ili materijalnih sredstava. Osobe koje imaju jače izražen socijalni identitet sklonije su povećati svoju odanost akciji koja je loše krenula.<sup>82</sup>

Osim vjerovanja da su drugi ljudi u pravu, što je povezano s informacijskim socijalnim utjecajem, ljudi su skloni ponašati se slično drugima i zbog toga što žele biti prihvaćeni, što se naziva **normativnim socijalnim utjecajem**.<sup>83</sup> Osoba koja se ne bi složila sa svojom grupom riskirala bi odbačenost<sup>84</sup> što bi u situaciji rata moglo biti pogubno.

**Snaga socijalnog utjecaja ovisi dakle i o socijalnim odnosima.**<sup>85</sup> Socijalni utjecaj bit će snažniji ako dolazi od osobe koja je smatrana **autoritetom** te koja ima **visok status**. Milgram (1963, 1974, 1976)<sup>86</sup> je u svojim istraživanjima pokazao da su ljudi ponekad spremni u potpunosti pokoriti se osobi koju dožive kao autoritet. U njegovom su istraživanju sudionici bili spremni zadavati elektrošokove drugim nepoznatim ljudima, samo zbog činjenica što im je posve nepoznata osoba od autoriteta naređivala da tako čine.

No, također, snažan socijalni utjecaj imaju i osobe koje su **privlačnije**, koje osoba doživljava kao **sličnije sebi** te koje doživljava kao **bliske**.<sup>87</sup> Također, osoba će biti pod jačim socijalnim utjecajem **ako ju uvjerava netko tko zanemaruje vlastiti interes** te ako ju uvjerava **veći broj osoba**.<sup>88</sup> **Socijalno pojačavanje, socijalno modeliranje te uživanje u ulogu drugog člana svoje postrojbe.**

Ljudi također **nastoje ostavljati dojam da su usklađeni**, tj. žele pokazati da su njihovi stavovi, razmišljanja, riječi i djela usklađeni.<sup>89</sup> Također, da bi bili konzistentni svojim prethodnim odlukama, ljudi ponekad zanemare neke informacije koje su im relevantne za donošenje budućih odluka. Osoba će biti više odana svojim idejama kada neku odluku ili neki stav iskaže javno te ako pri tome djeluje kao da je motivirana iznutra te slobodna.<sup>90</sup> Također, osoba će biti odanija onim idejama ili stavovima koje je morala dokazati uz veći trud.<sup>91</sup> Osoba ponekad može donijeti odluke koje su štetne za nju i za druge

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<sup>82</sup> Dietz-Uhler, Beth, *The escalation of commitment in political decision-making groups: a social identity approach*, u časopisu "European Journal of Social Psychology", vol. 26, 1996, str. 612. [EBSCOhost Online Research Databases](#).

<sup>83</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 294.

<sup>84</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Socijalna...*, 2005, str. 268.

<sup>85</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-e.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-e.htm)

<sup>86</sup> Aronson, E. i suradnici, *Social...*, 1998, str. 317-318

<sup>87</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-d.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-d.htm)

<sup>88</sup> Isto

<sup>89</sup> Cialdini, Robert, B. *Utjecaj – znanost i praksa*, Zagreb, 1993, str 95.

<sup>90</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-b.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-b.htm)

<sup>91</sup> Cialdini, R. B., *Utjecaj...* str 75.

kako bi se pokazala usklađenom.<sup>92</sup> Odanost utječe i na kasniju interpretaciju događaja; ljudi traže razloge da bi opravdali svoje ranije ponašanje.<sup>93</sup>

Svi ovi fenomeni doprinose razumijevanju toga da ponašanja vojnika često nisu posljedica njihovog izvršavanja naredjenja od strane formalnih zapovjednika, već su često posljedica socijalne situacije i snažnih emocionalnih stanja u kojima se oni nađu. Veliku skupinu ljudi u takvim situacijama je vrlo teško kontrolirati i voditi, posebice bez potpore osoba s adekvatnim psihološkim znanjima.

## 4. ETNIČKE SKUPINE I ETNOCENTRIZAM

Posebno važan tip skupina su etničke skupine. Pripadnike etničke skupine obilježava zajednička kultura, religija, jezik kao i shvaćanje o zajedničkom porijeklu ili jedinstvenom nasljeđu koje se stiče rođenjem<sup>94</sup>. Prema Rothschildu etničke su skupine "kolektivne grupe u kojima je pripadnost velikim dijelom određena stvarnim ili navodno naslijeđenim vezama predaka, pri čemu se te veze opažaju kao one koje sustavno utječu na mjesto i sudbinu u političkim i socioekonomskim strukturama države i društva"<sup>95</sup>. Dakle, etničke se grupe smatraju više isključujućima nego uključujućima: stranci se ne mogu priključiti etničkoj grupi s kojom ne dijele zajedničko nasljeđe. Primjerice, osoba hrvatske ili srpske etničke pripadnosti iz Bosne može se preseliti u Sloveniju, glasati na nacionalnim izborima, govoriti slovenski, postavši dio slovenske nacije, ali ne može biti etnički Slovenac, zato jer nema nasljeđe zajedničkih predaka s drugim etničkim Slovencima.

Uz etničke skupine pa i etničke sukobe često se spominje i izraz **etnocentrizam**, pri čemu se pod etnocentrizmom podrazumijeva superiorno gledanje vlastite etničke grupe uz istovremeni negativni odnos prema pripadnicima drugih etničkih grupa. U tom smislu etnocentrizam treba razlikovati od etničkog identiteta koji podrazumijeva privrženost etničkoj grupi, ali ne i nužno vjerovanja o njenoj superiornosti i inferiorno doživljavanje drugih etničkih grupa. Izraz etnocentrizam uveo je William Graham Sumner 1906. godine, opisujući ga kao "stajalište prema kojem je vlastita grupa centar svega -- i s gađenjem gleda na one izvan"<sup>96</sup>, te se može reći da je u originalu taj izraz imao općenitije značenje pozitivne pristranosti prema vlastitoj grupi (općenito, ne samo etničkoj), uz istovremeni izraziti negativan

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<sup>92</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-b.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-b.htm)

<sup>93</sup> Zimbardo, Philip i Wang, Cindy X. *Resisting influence*, preuzeto 21.2.2009. sa stranice [http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide\\_cialdini-b.htm](http://www.lucifereffect.com/guide_cialdini-b.htm)

<sup>94</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 170

<sup>95</sup> Isto.

<sup>96</sup> Isto.

odnosa prema vanjskim grupama. Danas, se etnocentrizam često izjednačuje s etničkom mržnjom, i zajedno se smatraju izvorom i razlogom mnogih nepomirljivih sukoba širom svijeta koji su odgovorni za brojna djela nasilja, uključujući i genocid.

#### 4.1 Etnički sukobi kao oblik grupnih sukoba

U socijalnoj i političkoj psihologiji etničke grupe i etnička pripadnost postali su intenzivniji predmet interesa upravo zbog velikog broja etničkih sukoba tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća, a i pojačana interesa međunarodne zajednice za ovaj tip sukoba do kojeg je došlo s prestankom razdoblja Hladnog rata. Etnički sukobi su često zbujujući i iznenađujući, budući da u njima pripadnici jedne etničke grupe postaju spremni ubiti pripadnike druge etničke grupe, koje su ranije doživljavali kao susjede, kolege, pa i prijatelje. Kao primjeri zemalja ili regija u kojima su se odvijali etnički sukobi M. Cottam i sur.<sup>97</sup> navode Bosnu, Gvatemalu i Nigeriju.

Prije samog pregleda sociopsiholoških objašnjenja etničkih sukoba potrebno je ukratko opisati uvjete, odnosno politička obilježja zemalja, u kojima je najvjerojatnija pojava etničkih sukoba. Radi se o **višeetničkim državama**, dakle državama s najmanje dvije etničke grupe od kojih nijedna ne može asimilirati ili apsorbirati drugu ili postići i održati nezavisnost. Uobičajeno ljudi u takvim državama primarno su odani svojoj etničkoj skupini, a tek potom široj zajednici<sup>98</sup> Budući se kod etničkih sukoba radi o krajnjem obliku međugrupnih sukoba, za razumijevanje i objašnjenje psihološke osnove takvih sukoba i njihove brutalnosti nužne su mnoge od već opisanih spoznaja o grupnom ponašanju, stoga će se samo ukratko ponovo napomenuti najvažnije te se onda osvrnuti na teorije međugrupnih sukoba općenito i njihovu primjenu na etničke sukobe.

Situacije u kojima dolazi do etničkih sukoba su one u kojima postoji intenzivna **percepcija prijetnje grupi**, što, s druge strane, dovodi do povećane **kohezivnosti**; **dehumanizacije druge grupe**; **deindividualizacije**, tako da ljudi odgovornost za događaje pripisuju grupi, a ne sebi kao pojedincima. Osim toga djeluju snažni **pritisci ka konformiranju** i jedinstvenosti u suočavanju s prijetnjom te jačaju **snažne emocije** povezane s vanjskom grupom koje pridonose nasilju. Emocije povezane sa stereotipima prema vanjskoj etničkoj grupi često su krajnje moćne. Kada se sukobi intenziviraju emocije se mogu promijeniti iz tinjajuće gorčine i zamjeranja u bijes i mržnju prema drugim etničkim skupinama. Istovremeno, ljudi osjećaju snažniju ljubav i privrženost prema vlastitoj etničkoj grupi. Osim toga, u etničkim sukobima politički vođe aktivno **manipuliraju stereotipima i emocijama**, kako bi mobilizirali

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<sup>97</sup>Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 171- 173; 175- 178

<sup>98</sup> Isto, str. 171

etničko zajedništvo protiv druge etničke grupe. Za pobuđivanje intenzivnih osjećaja mržnje i ljutnje prema drugim etničkim grupama vođe koriste stereotipe i emocije. Tako M. Cottam i sur. citiraju Kaufmana<sup>99</sup> "Ako se s emocionalnim apelima na etničke teme istovremeno apelira na ideje koje vode okrivljavanju druge grupe, ti apeli mogu istovremeno izazvati osjećaje ljutnje i agresije koji će najvjerojatnije motivirati ljude da se žele boriti." **Vođe** imaju važnu ulogu u određivanju prijetnje ili mogućnosti, u oblikovanju percepcije etničkog identiteta i nastavljanju sukoba onemogućujući diplomatska rješenja. U tom procesu nasilje nad drugima u ime vlastite grupe postaje vjerojatnije čak i ako su žrtve nekad bile prijatelji. Pritom, pojava etničkih sukoba ne ovisi jednostavno o tome jesu li vremena dobra ili loša. Korijeni su psihološki i tako duboki da sukobi lako izbiju kada postoji prilika ili kada jedna etnička grupa percipira prijetnju od druge te kada je najmanje jedna grupa mobilizirana, često od strane političkih vođa, da se suprotstavi percipiranoj prijetnji ili iskoristi priliku.

Ovi obrasci političke aktivnosti proizlaze iz **stereotipiziranja i predrasuda** prema grupama različite rase ili etniciteta. Pod predrasadama se uobičajeno podrazumijeva relativno dosljedno negativno vrednovanje vanjske grupe i njenih članova, dakle negativna reakcija prema članovima vanjske grupe, koja se zasniva na njihovoj pripadnosti grupi, dok stereotipi predstavljaju vjerovanja o osobnim obilježjima pripadnika određene grupe. Stereotipi i predrasude, dakle, negativna vrednovanja druge grupe, čine osnovu za **diskriminaciju**, odnosno nepravedno ponašanje prema članovima druge grupe koje može varirati od blagog izbjegavanja pa do krajnjeg nasilja i genocida.

## 4.2 Suvremene teorije etničkih sukoba

### 4.2.1 Teorija realnog sukoba

Jedno od najstarijih objašnjenja međugrupnih sukoba općenito je **teorija realnog sukoba**<sup>100</sup>. **Prema ovom pristupu do međugrupnih sukoba dolazi zbog natjecanja za oskudne resurse, kao što su radna mjesta, politička moć i sl. Ujedno, s povećanjem ozbiljnosti natjecanja kod uključenih se povećava i sklonost negativnijem gledanju vanjskih grupa**<sup>101</sup>. Jedno od najranijih istraživanja u okviru provjere teorije realnog sukoba proveli su Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood i Sherif

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<sup>99</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 173

<sup>100</sup> Campbell, Donald T., *Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives*, in D. Levine (ed.) *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, Lincoln, 1965, str. 286- 291, preuzeto 21.2. 2009. sa [http://www2.uni-jena.de/svw/igc/studies/ss04/campbell\\_1965.pdf](http://www2.uni-jena.de/svw/igc/studies/ss04/campbell_1965.pdf)

<sup>101</sup> Isto.

1961. godine<sup>102</sup>. Radilo se o istraživanju u prirodnim uvjetima, u ljetnom kampu a u njemu su sudjelovali jedanaestogodišnji dječaci, pri čemu je istraživanjem pokazano kako natjecanje za oskudnim resursima može brzo prerasti u sukob velikog razmjera. Mogućnost za realni sukob i natjecanje za oskudne resurse (moć, utjecaj, političku autonomiju I sl.) naravno postoji i među etničkih skupinama. Iako je u povoljnim okolnostima moguća suradnja u svrhu ostvarenja zajedničkih ciljeva, u nepovoljnim okolnostima ili teškim vremenima natjecanje za resurse i moć može biti žestoko I može biti u osnovu intenzivnih sukoba.

#### **4.2.2 Teorija socijalnog identiteta**

Prema teoriji socijalnog identiteta kao jednoj od temeljnih suvremenih teorija međugrupnih odnosa i sukoba negativni međugrupni odnosi javljaju se čak i u odsustvu suprotstavljenih ciljeva. Natjecanje se može javiti čak i kada su ulozi samo psihički, odnosno kada se radi o umjetno stvorenim grupama na temelju trivijalnih kriterija, grupa bez stvarne interakcije ili suprotstavljenih ciljeva<sup>103</sup>.

Socijalna kategorizacija i socijalni identitet djelomično su odgovorni za početni proces podjele grupa na vlastite i vanjske grupe. Ovakva podjela na vlastitu i vanjske grupe djeluje i na spoznajne procese, odnosno dolazi do pojave pozitivne pristranosti prema vlastitoj grupi kada se vlastita grupa percipira superiornom vanjskoj grupi. Primjerice posljedice podjele na vlastitu i vanjske grupe na socijalnu spoznaju potvrđuju nalazi istraživanja koji su pokazali da se od ponašanja ili postupaka članova vanjske grupe znatno bolje pamte negativna ponašanja nego pozitivna, dok se za pripadnike vlastite grupe bolje pamte pozitivna ponašanja nego negativna<sup>104</sup>.

Ključni argument teorije socijalnog identiteta je da socijalna kategorizacija izaziva temeljnu motivaciju za međugrupnu socijalnu usporedbu. Jednom kada su socijalne kategorije formirane, ljudi teže pozitivnom socijalnom identitetu, što izaziva međugrupno natjecanje. To uzrokuje pristranosti u percepciji i obrasce diskriminacije, jer ljudi teže pozitivnijem doživljaju vlastite grupe u usporedbi s vanjskim grupama. **Dakle, teorija socijalnog identiteta pomaže u razumijevanju općeg etnocentrizma kao moguće osnove etničkih sukoba. Naime etnocentrizam usmjerava našu pažnju na znakove u društvu koji ističu međugrupne razlike, te na važnost statusnog razlikovanja vlastite od vanjskih grupa odnosno na potrebu da se vlastita grupa vidi**

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<sup>102</sup> Preuzeto 21. 2. sa stranice <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Sherif/>

<sup>103</sup> Tajfel, Henry and Turner, John, C., *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, in Tost, John, T., Sidanius, Jim (ed.), *Political Psychology*, New York, 2004, str. 283 i 284

<sup>104</sup> Fiske, Susan T., *Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination*, u knjizi Gilbert, Daniel, T., Fiske, Susan, T. and Lindzey, Gardner (ur.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, New York, 1998, str. 357

superiornom drugim grupama. Ujedno teorija naglašava da grupe čine socijalne usporedbe. Kada je ishod te usporedbe negativan, grupe su motivirane na promjenu svoga statusa. Mogući ishod socijalne usporedbe jest i zaključak da je da vanjska grupa ima nepravednu prednost te da je odnos između grupa nepravedan. Jedna strategija za mijenjanje statusa grupe je socijalno natjecanje kojim se podređena grupa izravno natječe s drugom grupom. Ujedno pripadnici grupa doživljavati će prijetnju zato što vanjska grupa ugrožava status vlastite grupe, te natjecanje može prerasti u sukob.<sup>105</sup> Dakle, iz perspektive teorije socijalnog identiteta trajnost grupnih pa i etničkih sukoba možemo shvatiti kao rezultat trajne ljudske potrebe za stvaranjem vlastitih i vanjskih grupa, usporedbom vlastite grupe s drugim grupama i potrebe za pozitivnim vrednovanjem vlastite grupe.

## 5. NACIONALNE SKUPINE I NACIONALIZAM

Nacionalizam se prvi puta javlja u Europi s razvojem moderne države nakon Francuske revolucije i smatra se jednim od najopasnijih izvora političkog ponašanja u dvadesetom stoljeću. M. Cottam i sur. Navode Emersonovo određenje nacije prema kojem je nacija „zajednica ljudi koji osjećaju međusobnu pripadnost u dvostrukom smislu: u smislu dijeljenja vrlo značajnih elementa zajedničkog nasljeđa i u smislu zajedničke buduće sudbine. Danas je nacija najveća zajednica koja, u kritičnom trenutku, djelotvorno upravlja ... odanošću, nadvladavajući zahtjeve i manjih zajednica unutar sebe i onih koji joj se isprije ili ju potencijalno obuhvaćaju unutar još većeg društva... U tom smislu naciju se može zvati završnom zajednicom, podrazumijevajući da je ona za sadašnje svrhe djelotvoran kraj čovjekova puta kao društvene životinje“.<sup>106</sup> Kod izraženog nacionalizma najizraženija je privrženost vlastitoj naciji, koja se može smatrati političkim identitetom vlastite grupe. **Nacionalna država** postoji kada je prosječni građani primarno vezan uz zajednicu koja živi unutar teritorijalnih granica države. Primjerice, oni koji se smatraju dijelom meksičke nacije će teritorijalne granice Meksika smatrati nacionalnom državom. Alternativno, oni u Irskoj koji se smatraju dijelom irske nacije smatrat će teritorijalnu državu Irsku nacionalnom državom. Dakle, nacionalisti su snažno privrženi naciji, posvećeni jedinstvu, nezavisnosti i dobrobiti nacionalne zajednice i nacionalne države. Čak i kada im se ne sviđa vlada, vole samu naciju. U nacionalnim državama i kod nacionalista javlja se nekoliko karakterističnih

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<sup>105</sup> Tajfel, Henry and Turner, John, C., *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, in Tost, John, T., Sidanius, Jim (ed.), *Political Psychology*, New York, 2004, str. 283 i 284

<sup>106</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 191

obrazaca ponašanja.<sup>107</sup> Kao prvo, nacionalisti su pojačano osjetljiviji na prijetnje nacionalnoj državi i skloniji su krajnjim predodžbama izvora prijetnje. **Za nacionaliste, posebice nacionalističke vođe karakteristično je da su vrlo osjetljivi na prilike za povećanjem utjecaja svoje zemlje i vjerojatnije će ozbiljno razmatrati mogućnost proširenja utjecaja svoje države na uštrb drugih. Osim toga, javnost nacionalnih država bit će sklonija većoj zainteresiranosti za cilj okupljanja zajednica koje su izvan granica države, a koje se smatraju dijelom nacionalne zajednice. Općenito, nacionalisti za svoj narod žele teritorijalnu državu i žele da čitava zajednica živi u toj državi. To se naziva iredentizam – želja da se svi dijelovi nacionalne zajednice okupe zajedno, unutar jedne teritorijalne države.** Oni pripadnici nacije koji žive izvan teritorija države nazivaju se **dijaspora**. Iredentizam je bio važan čimbenik u Bismarkovim ratovima za njemačko nacionalno ujedinjenje u kasnom devetnaestom stoljeću, te na početku 2. svjetskog rata u njemačkom osvajanju Poljske i Čehoslovačke u kojima su živjeli milijuni etničkih Nijemaca.

Osim toga, nacionalisti su zainteresiraniji za prestiž i ugled zemlje nego nenacionalisti i spremniji su djelovati da bi ispravili percipirana poniženja. Ujedno, vjerojatnije je da će javnost nacionalne države biti podložna megalomanskim interesima, željeti ojačati nacionalni prestiž i status te biti globalno priznata. Vođe nacionalnih država su, u usporedbi s vođama nenacionalnih država, djelotvorniji u pozivanju građana na veće žrtvovanje kako bi se ojačala moć zemlje. Osim toga javnost je spremnija služiti vojsku i biti predanija obrani države. Konačno, građani nacionalne države skloniji su vođama dati znatnu slobodu preuzimanja rizika u obrani državnih interesa. Međutim, nacionalistička zajednica će kazniti vođe koji ne uspiju. Tim vođama neće dopustiti slobodu prihvaćanja poraza ili gubitka ugleda.

Kod govora o nacionalizmu kao osnovi sukoba treba voditi i računa o tipu države budući da o tome ovisi i vjerojatnost javljanja međunacionalnih sukoba. U tom kontekstu uz nacionalne države bitno je razlikovati i višenacionalne države te nenacionalna država osnovne zajednice. **Višenacionalne države su one u kojima različite grupe ljudi, koje se smatraju odvojenim nacijama i koje u stvari mogu uspostaviti zasebne nezavisne države, žive zajedno u jednoj zemlji. Te grupe ne doživljavaju državu kao svoju primarnu identitetsku grupu, nego su primarno vezani uz vlastitu naciju (primjerice Rusi i Ukrajinci u bivšem Sovjetskom Savezu). U tim slučajevima niti jedna nacija ne kontrolira u potpunosti vlastitu sudbinu i niti jedna nacija nema svoju nezavisnu državu. Samim time višenacionalne države sadrže trajne dezintegrirajuće snage, te se s razine takvih država moraju ulagati stalni naponi kako bi se sprejčilo buktanje i eksplozija takvih snaga. Dinamika nacionalizma u takvim državama vjerojatno će biti usmjerena težnji prema**

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<sup>107</sup> Isto, str. 192- 193



nezavisnosti, budući da je za izraženi nacionalizam karakteristična želja za jedinstvom i nezavisnošću (vidljivo na primjerima Sjeverna Irska, Jugoslavija, Kosovo, Rusije, Turska i Kurdi, Ciper).<sup>108</sup>

**Nenacionalna države osnovne zajednice je tip države koji nije** striktno govoreći nacionalna država, ali čiji se vođe često ponašaju kao nacionalisti. Za takve je zemlje karakteristično postojanje dominantne etničke ili druge zajednice koja vjeruje da je ona primarna nacija u zemlji i koja se naj snažnije identificira s nacijom. Osim toga, ta je zajednica vjerojatno politički dominantna i kontrolira politički sustav. Budući da u državi postoje i pripadnici drugih etničkih grupa koji su vjerojatno primarno odani svojoj etničkoj grupi, razumljivo je da i one žele autonomnu ili nezavisnu državu, pri čemu najčešće nemaju dovoljno resursa za ostvarenje takvih težnji. M. Cottam i sur. (2004) kao primjer takve države ističu Rusiju u kojoj osim Rusa kao dominantna grupa kod koje je izražen nacionalizam postoje i druge etničke skupine.<sup>109</sup> Sličan položaj Rusima u Rusiji imali su Srbi u drugoj Jugoslaviji. Za ovaj tip države karakteristično je da dominantna skupina zastupa integraciju i asimilaciju drugih, ohrabrujući pripadnike manjina na korištenje jezika dominantne skupine, napuštanje običaja, identificiranje sa zemljom kao cjelinom, pa i na međusobno sklapanje brakova. Ako asimilacija zahtjeva potpuno odbacivanje grupnog identiteta i ako je ugroženo samo postojanje skupine, to može rezultirati javljanjem političkog sukoba.

Iako se nacionalizam obično smatra lošim i pokretačem velikog nasilja i doista je u povijesti je bio uzrokom milijuna smrti i užasnih patnji, sociopsihološki pristup naglašava da je i nacionalizma normalno ponašanje vezano uz naciju kao vlastitu grupu. To ujedno znači da će i sve dok postoje nacije kao grupe na kojima se djelomično temelji socijalni identitet pojedinca postojati će i nacionalizam kao osnova za političke relevantne stavove i ponašanja i pojedinaca i grupa. Drugim riječima **nacionalizam sam po sebi nije ni dobar ni loš nego jednostavno realnost koja rezultira određenim obrascima ponašanja. Razumijevanje nacionalizma moguće je ostvariti na temelju spoznaja iz područja socijalne i političke psihologije grupa i socijalnog identiteta.**<sup>110</sup>

## 5.1 Suvremene sociopsihološke teorije nacionalizma

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<sup>108</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 194

<sup>109</sup> Isto, str. 215- 217

<sup>110</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 220- 221

### 5.1.1 Teorija socijalnog identiteta

Pojam nacionalizma sličan je već objašnjenom pojmu socijalnog identiteta. Naime socijalni identitet se odnosi na pozitivni osjećaj samopoštovanja koji proizlazi iz članstva u socijalnim grupama i kategorijama<sup>111</sup>, te ljudi ne samo da imaju potrebu pripadnosti grupama nego i potrebu da grupu/e kojoj i sami pripadaju (vlastite grupe) vide boljima od drugih grupa kojima oni ne pripadaju (vanjske grupe). Nacije su grupe, i za nacionaliste je nacija jako važna vlastita grupa. Primjena spoznaja o socijalnoj kategorizaciji (podjela ljudi na članove vlastite i vanjske grupe) zajedno s potrebom za pozitivnim socijalnim identitetom na naciju kao grupu ima nekoliko važnih psiholoških posljedica koje nam omogućuju objašnjenje ponašanja nacionalista.

**Dakle, nacionalisti su članovi grupe koji su motivirani imati snažnu pozitivnu privrženost svojoj naciji. O vrijednosti vlastite nacije zaključuje se na temelju usporedbe s drugom/im nacijama grupom, a kako postoji potreba za pozitivnom socijalnom identitetom, pri usporedbi vlastite nacije s relevantnom drugom vanjskom grupom dolazi do pozitivne pristranosti prema vlastitoj naciji ili etničkoj skupini odnosno preuveličavanja pozitivnih obilježja vlastite grupe (etničke slupine ili nacije) te će se pripadnici vlastita nacija ili država grupu doživljavati boljom od drugih.**

Kada su jednom nacionalistički osjećaji izazvani ljude obilježava snažna odanost vlastitoj naciji kao grupi te pridavanje važnosti snažnoj nacije, zbog čega je povećana osjetljivost na uočavanje prijetnji i prilika za vlastitu naciju. Ujedno identifikacija s nacijom predstavlja osnovu za grupno ponašanje, pri čemu su nacionalisti jako kohezivni i vrlo spremni žrtvovanju za naciju. Također, osjetljiviji su na stvari kao što su napadi, frustracije i agresivno ponašanje vanjske grupe.<sup>112</sup> Jaka privrženost naciji kao identitetskoj grupi, podrazumijeva da će se na doživljene prijetnje nacionalnom ili uočene prilike nacionalisti reagirati snažnijim emocionalnim reakcijama. Pritom su za situacije izraženog nacionalizma karakteristične vrlo intenzivne pozitivne emocije prema vlastitoj naciji (npr. ponos zbog postignuća vlastite nacije ili sreća kada se ukaže prilika za ostvarenje važnog cilja), a ujedno i snažne negativne emocije prema drugima zajedno s olakašanim, bržim i intenzivnijim korištenjem stereotipa i stereotipnih predodžbi.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Tajfel, Henri i Turner, John, C., *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, u knjizi Jost, John, T., Sidanius, Jim (ed.), *Political Psychology*, New York, 2004, str. 283- 284

<sup>112</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 195

<sup>113</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 195 i 196

**Snažne pozitivne emocije prema vlastitoj naciji mogu imati dodatnu negativnu posljedicu odnosno nesposobnost kritičkog odnosa prema postupcima vlastite zemlje, pri čemu se onda ako u samoj državi nije sve kako bi trebalo biti, umjesto okrivljavanje vođa ili političara vlastite nacije, vjerojatnije pronalaze drugi koji se okrivljuju za lošu situaciju. Osim toga, grupni čimbenici, kao što su odanost grupi i poslušnost počinju djelovati u smjeru konformiranja stajalištu vlastite grupe o vanjskoj grupi. Dakle, kod izraženog nacionalizam ljudi su izloženi snažnim unutarnjim i socijalnim pritiscima ka konformiranju. Pojedinaac ili sudjeluje u mahanju zastavom (ili postaje pasivan promatrač) ili se pak suočava s odbacivanjem i osuđivanjem od strane prijatelja, susjeda i zajednice, pa čak i obitelji. Stoga, neki autori (npr. Kecmanovic, 1966; Searle-White, 2001) tvrde da nacionalističko ponašanje, u smislu osjećajne sklonosti, odgovara ponašanju gomile.<sup>114</sup> Tako su za nacionalističko ponašanje, kao i ponašanje gomile, karakteristični niska tolerancije za različita gledišta, preveliko pojednostavljivanje, umanjena osobna odgovornost, odbijanje razmatranja drugačijih gledišta, spremnosti na djelovanje, osjećaj obdarenosti nepobjedivom moći koji smanjuje kritičnost, intenzivirane emocionalne reakcije i osjećaji proganjanja.**

Kako će nacionalisti reagirati na druge zemlje ovisi o njihovim **predodžbama** drugih zemalja ili nacionalnosti unutar jedne višenacionalne države. Primjerice, nacionalisti će primijeniti različite taktike prema neprijateljima barbarima ili imperijalistima. Kod nacionalista će biti naročito izražene emocije povezane s predodžbom zato jer su nacionalisti tako intenzivno privrženi naciji.<sup>115</sup>

### **5.1.2 Teorija predodžbi**

**Teorija predodžbi je pristup u razvijen u političkoj psihologiji prvenstveno namijenjen za objašnjenje predodžaba političara o drugim državama, međutim može se primijeniti općenito na opažanje međugrupama i međugrupne sukobe te same predodžbe o drugim grupama povezuje s određenim očekivanim obrascima ponašanja<sup>116</sup>**

Predodžbe sadrže informacije o sposobnostima, kulturi, namjerama i vrstama grupa, te percepciji prijatnji i mogućnosti. Sposobnosti se odnose na ekonomska obilježja, vojnu snagu, unutarnjopolitičku stabilnost te djelotvorno osmišljavanje i provođenje politike. Kulturalna obilježja odnose se na prosudbe o kulturalnoj profinjenosti. Kada procjenjuju državu, osobe koje odlučuju prosuđuju jesu li njezine sposobnosti i kultura jednake, slabije ili bolje u odnosu na njihovu državu. Druga procjena temelji se na tome ima li država ili grupa prijeteće ili obrambene (dobre) namjere ili predstavlja mogućnost postizanja

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<sup>114</sup> Isto, str. 196

<sup>115</sup> Isto, str. 196

<sup>116</sup> Isto, str. 44, 45, 51, 52

važnih ciljeva. Dakle, način na koji političari razlikuju ove vrste predodžbi stvar je njihove percepcije sposobnosti, kulture, prijjetnji, mogućnosti reagiranja i skriptova događaja država. U svaku predodžbu uključene su i povijesne lekcije koje političari povezuju s određenim tipom države, odnosno koriste se i primjeri iz povijesti koji pomažu objasniti sukobe i predvidjeti njihove ishode. Političari se oslanjaju i na različite političke opcije, odnosno mjere koje smatraju prikladnima u odnosu s državom. Neke političke opcije uključuju vojne prijjetnje, ekonomske sankcije i poticaje te diplomatske proteste. Alexander, Brewer i Herrmann potvrđuju i povezanost određenih predodžbi s određenim emocijama. U nastavku slijedi pregled predodžbi, povezanih emocija i određenih taktika ponašanja *slika 3.1.*

*Slika 5. Predodžbe, prateće emocije i taktike*<sup>117</sup>

<i>PREODODŽBA</i>	<i>Sposobnosti</i>	<i>Kultura</i>	<i>Namjere</i>	<i>Prijetnje mogućnosti</i>	<i>ili</i> <b>Preferirana strategija</b>
Neprijatelja	Jednake	Jednaka	Štetne	Visoka prijjetnja	Zadržavanje
Barbara	Superiorne	Inferiorna	Štetne	Visoka prijjetnja	Traženje saveznika, povećanje moći
Imperijalista	Superiorne	Superiorna	Štetne	Visoka prijjetnja	Pokoravanje/otpor kada je moguće
Kolonijalna ili klijentistička	Inferiorne	Inferiorna	Dobronamjerne	Visoka mogućnost	Kontrola, usmjeravanje, iskorištavanje
Nitkova	Superiorne ili jednake	Slabe volje	Štetne	Umjerena/niska prijjetnja	Uništenje
Odmetnika	Inferiorne	Inferiorna	Štetne	Visoka/umjerena mogućnost	Izazov, riskiranje
Saveznika	Jednake	Jednaka	Dobre	Prijetnja/mogućnost (pomaganje u oba slučaja)	Pregovaranje oko dogovora, zajednička strategija

<sup>117</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 45 i 52

U ovom pregledu samo ćemo se zadržati na nešto detaljnijem opisu predodžbi koje mogu biti relevantne u situaciji sukoba na prostoru BiH. **Predodžba neprijatelja** označava situacije kada se drugu grupu (državu) ili neprijatelja percipira kao razmjerno ravnopravan u sposobnostima i kulturi, što je praćeno vrlo snažnim percepcijom prijetnje i snažnim emocijama. U krajnjim slučajevima, smatra se da je neprijatelj trajno agresivno motiviran da ima monolitnu strukturu odlučivanja te da je vrlo razuman u donošenju odluka (do točke u kojoj je sposoban osmisliti i provesti brojne složene urote). Članove grupe koji ne dijele ovaj doživljaj, ili koji jednostavno složenije doživljavaju neprijatelja, često se optužuje da su u najmanju ruku zavedeni od strane neprijatelja, ili čak izdajice.

Neke od emocija povezanih s neprijateljem uključuju ljutnju, frustraciju, zavist, ljubomoru, strah, nepovjerenje, a moguće je i zavidno poštovanje. Neprijateljev uspjeh smatra se nepravednim, a kada se dogode loše stvari i kada ciljevi nisu ostvareni, optužuje se neprijatelj. Kada reagiraju na neprijatelja, ljudi mogu biti i suparnički i suradnički nastrojeni. Ljudi se natječu s neprijateljem i pokušavaju ga spriječiti da bilo što ostvari. Pristup sukobu ima smisla u svjetlu spoznajnih svojstava predodžbe. Neprijatelj je jednako moćan i sposoban kao i vlastita država, tako da postoji i mogućnost poraza, ako je pristup sukobu jednak nuli. Stoga predodžba neprijatelja čini snažnu i agresivnu obranu logičnim izborom. Taktike koje upotrebjavamo u odgovoru na ovakvu državu su globalno usmjerene, natjecateljske i nekompromisne, jer takvoj državi ne možemo vjerovati da će održati riječ. Ako ovakva obrana posve ukloni prijetnju, tim bolje. Međutim, u većini slučajeva u politici, jedina mogućnost koja se prepoznaje može biti strategija **zadržavanja**, jednostavno stoga je jer je vjerojatnost poražavanja neprijatelja u najboljem slučaju 50-50. Zadržavanje neprijatelja, tako da ga sprečavamo da postane moćniji i ostvari željene ciljeve, može biti jedina stvar koju možemo napraviti.

Kada zapravo krivo shvatimo motive države koju smatramo neprijateljem, odnosno kada se ljudi i vođe ponašaju prema ovoj državi na temelju stereotipa o neprijatelju, posljedice stereotipne predodžbe neprijatelja mogu biti tragične. Ovo može dovesti do *samoispunjavajućeg proročanstva*. Ljudi i vođe neprijateljskih država smatrat će da je protiv njih izvršena agresija i razvit će predodžbu neprijatelja (ili zrcalnu predodžbu), jer će svaka od njih doživjeti drugu kao neprijatelja i razvit će istu strogu strategiju. Posljedica toga može biti nepotrebna i pogubna **dilema sigurnosti**, koju je iznimno teško prevladati. **Dileme sigurnosti** su situacije u kojima protivnici jedne grupe (etničke grupe ili države) njezine pokušaje da se obrani istovremeno doživljavaju kao prijetnju, čak i ako nije namjeravano da ovi postupci budu prijeteći. One lako dovode do **spiralnih sukoba**, u kojima svaka strana pokriva i nadmašuje postupke druge strane. Ovo može izazvati utrke oko oružja i druge vrste agresije koji se javljaju zbog

nerazumijevanja motiva drugih. Stereotip neprijatelja doslovno je nemoguće opovrgnuti. Njime se može objasniti svaka reakcija, uključujući i neprijateljevo povlačenje. <sup>118</sup>

**Predodžba barbara** javlja se kada se percipira da se druga grupa neprijatelj (ili država) doživljava superiornom u sposobnostima, ali inferiornom u kulturi, što rezultirala snažnim doživljajem prijetnje, odnosno barbarima se pripisuju snažne agresivne namjere, zbog čega ih se doživljava zastrašujućima. Povijesni primjeri ovog doživljaja mogu se pronaći u starogrčkim opisima germanskih plemena sa sjevera. Predodžba barbara odnosi se na agresivne ljude koji imaju monolitnu strukturu odlučivanja, prepredeni su i spremni podleći neopisivoj okrutnosti koja uključuje i genocid te koji su odlučni u tome da potpuno iskoriste svoju superiornost. Emocije koje su obično povezane s ovim doživljajem su češće gađenje nego prezir (jer se barbare smatra nadmoćnijima u sposobnostima, iako su inferiorni u kulturi) ljutnju i strah. Strah je posljedica superiornih sposobnosti barbara. Ljude koji ne dijele ovu predodžbu optužuje se za kukavičluk i izdaju.

I zbog spoznajnih i zbog emocionalnih svojstava, ova predodžba ne dovodi do agresivnog obrambenog stava. Zbog straha izazvanog neravnotežom u sposobnostima ljudi su skloniji izbjegavati izravni sukob. Razumniji način postupanja s barbarima je traženje saveznika koje je moguće uvjeriti u mogućnost da će neuspjeh suočavanja s ovom prijetnjom ozbiljno i nepovoljno utjecati na njihove nacionalne interese. U pojmovima teorije socijalnog identiteta, opažajući bi se vjerojatno željeli uključiti u izravno natjecanje s ovim protivnikom kojeg mrze i koji im se gadi, posve uklanjajući prijetnju na najnasilniji način, ali ne mogu, jer su preslabi. Umjesto toga, moraju izgrađivati koalicije kako bi prevladali svoje slabosti i poboljšali svoju mogućnost da barem zadrže barbara.

Dobar primjeri ove predodžbe je izraelska percepciju arapskog svijeta. Iako arapske države prema vojnoj sposobnosti nisu superiorne Izraelu, njihova mnogobrojna populacija i prednosti u resursima kod Izraelaca izazivaju očekivanje da one imaju potencijal postati superiorne. Neovisno o percipiranoj kulturalnoj inferiornosti, smatra se da postoji visoka vjerojatnost da superiornost u konvencionalnom naoružanju nije samo ostvariva, nego i neizbježna. Ujedno teorija predodžbi nam pomaže i u razumijevanju sukoba na području bivše Jugoslavije. Naime Hrvati su sebe smatrali kulturalno superiornima u odnosu na Srbe, ali mnogo slabijih sposobnosti. <sup>119</sup> U oba slučaja, traženi su saveznici: Izrael se usmjerio na Sjedinjene Države i Europu, a Hrvati su se usmjerili na Slovence i druge europske države radi podrške u svojim pokušajima ostvarenja neovisnosti od Jugoslavije.

**Predodžba nitkova** razmjerno je nova označava percepciju grupa koje mogu biti moćni i kulturalno napredni, ali i slabe volje, nedisciplinirani te bez volje da slijede postavljene ciljeve i planove

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<sup>118</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 52, 53

<sup>119</sup> Isto, str. 53

djelovanja. Tijekom Hladnog rata, vođe Zapada imale su zavisnu predodžbu neprijatelja, u kojoj je država smatrana inferiornom u sposobnostima i kulturi, ali ju je neprijatelj kontrolirao i podržavao. Ova je predodžba nestala završetkom Hladnog rata i raspadom Sovjetskog Saveza. Neovisno o tome, bivši saveznici Sovjetskog Saveza, zajedno s nekim drugim državama (poput Sjeverne Koreje, Kube, Iraka, Libije, Srbije i Irana), smatran su i inferiornima i prijetećima.

Reakcije na ovaj tip država vođene su osjećajem superiornosti. One su zločesta djeca koja moraju naučiti svoju lekciju, a ta se lekcija podučava silom. Sa zločestom djecom se ne pregovara, njih se kažnjava. Postoje brojni primjeri. Američka reakcija na otpor Sadama Huseina prema inspekciji oružja bila je napad svom silom američke vojne moći. Predsjednik Bush ponavljano je izjavljivaio da sa Sadamom Huseinom neće biti pregovaranja te da on mora učiniti što mu je rečeno, ili će biti kažnjen. Kada se Slobodan Milošević usprotivio točkama sporazuma u Rambouilletu koje bi NATO-ovim snagama dale pravo da se neometano kreću Jugoslavijom, pregovori su prekinuti i Jugoslavija je bombardirana. Kada se Manuel Noriega upleo u pokušaje SAD-a da potaknu slobodne izbore, Panama je bombardirana. Često se pretpostavlja da je jedan pojedinac odgovoran za ponašanje države nitkova (npr. uklonite Noriegu, Sadama ili Miloševića i problem će biti riješen).<sup>120</sup>

**Predodžba odmetnika** povezana je s percepcijom mogućnosti ostvarenja cilja na uštrb grupe (države) koju se smatra razmjerno jednakom ili čak boljom u sposobnostima i kulturi. Čak i ako je grupa koju se doživljava kao odmetnika moćnija nego vlastita grupa, ipak se smatra da je u motivaciji nesigurna i zbunjena te da je obilježena vrlo diferenciranim vodstvom kojem nedostaje jasan smjer i koje je nesposobno osmisлити djelotvornu strategiju. Smatra se da su nesposobne skupiti volju i odlučnost za djelotvornu uporabu svojih oruđa moći kako bi mobilizirale djelotvornu javnu podršku. Druge ljude koji ne dijele ovu predodžbu smatra se mekušcima. Kao i u slučaju stereotipa o neprijatelju, opovrgavajući dokazi vjerojatno će biti protumačeni kao potvrđujući te je ovu predodžbu vrlo teško pobiti.

Emocije povezane s ovom predodžbom su gađenje, prezir, poruga i ljutnja, od kojih se sve naposljetku mogu pretvoriti u mržnju. Ova kombinacija dovodi do želje da se uništi druga grupa te može doći do opasnog podcjenjivanja sposobnosti protivnika.<sup>121</sup> Prezir i gađenje kombiniraju se s ljutnjom i porugom, što dovodi do dehumanizacije i genocidnog nasilja. Budući da se pretpostavlja da je motivacija vanjske grupe koju se doživljava kao odmetnika štetna, poriv da se problem ukloni vjerojatno je snažan.

Vođe Njemačke i Japana su prije 2. svjetskog rata davali izjave i djelovali protiv Velike Britanije, Sjedinjenih Država i Francuske, na način koji je ukazivao na to da doživljavaju ove države kao

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<sup>120</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 54, 55

<sup>121</sup> Isto, str. 55, 56

odmetnike. Noviji primjer ovog stereotipnog doživljaja je Huseinov u sukobu Iraka i Sjedinjenih Država i saveznika 1990. godine. Sadam Husein je očito do kraja vjerovao da Sjedinjene Države i njihovi saveznici neće imati volje sukobiti se s njim oko pitanja napada na Kuvajt. Još tipičniji primjer je operativni pogled na svijet Hitlera, Musolinija i japanske vojske. Oni su barem posjedovali zadivljujuće vojne sposobnosti i svi su uvidjeli stvarnost koja je ostvarenje njihovih agresivnih ciljeva činila izglednim.<sup>122</sup>

### **5.1.3 Nacionalizam i želja za jedinstvom i nezavisnošću**

Iz dosadašnje rasprave slijedi nekoliko obilježja koja su karakteristične za nacionalističke ideologije, pa ćemo im ukratko ponoviti. Kao prvo u situacijama izraženog nacionalnog identiteta pridaje se velika važnost nacionalnom nezavisnosti i jedinstvu. Ujedno dolazi do povećane osjetljivosti na percipiranje prilika i šansi za ostvarenje nezavisnosti i jedinstva. **Porast nacionalizma među stanovništvom neke države praćen je jačanjem uvjerenja da se zaslužuje samostalna država. Osim toga u procesima socijalne usporedbe s drugim narodima ili državama naglašen je doživljaj nepravde i zakirutosti nečega što se prirodno zaslužuje, odnosno izražena je podložnost osjećaju da je uskraćivanje nezavisnosti i jedinstva neprihvatljivo i nepravedno. Takvi uvjeti olakšavaju ulogu vođa koji manipulirajući nacionalizmom mogu dodatno mobilizirati ljude na borbu protiv drugih nacionalnih grupa pri obrani svoje vlastite nacije, pri čemu je općenito za nacionalizam karakteristična i snažna spremnost na velike žrtve kako bi se ti ciljevi nezavisnosti i jedinstva ostvarili.** Primjerice Kaufman<sup>123</sup> navodi da je Miloševićeva moć proizašla iz njegove sposobnosti da iskoristi i manipulira nacionalističkim simbolima

Navedene sociopsihološke i političko psihološke spoznaje o nacionalizmu (koje se prevenstveno temelje na teoriji socijalnog identiteta, teoriji socijalne kategorizacije i teoriji predodžbi) primjenjuju se za objašnjenje mnogih pojava međugrupnih odnosa sukoba ili manifestacija u svijetu. Kao pozitivne primjere djelovanja nacionalizma mogu se navesti primjer ujedinjenja Njemačke 1990. godine, ili djelovanje američkog nacionalizma u SAD-u tijekom drugog svjetskog rata koji je omogućio je mobiliziranje američkog stanovništva kako bi se Hitler zaustavio u ostvarenju svojih ciljeva.<sup>124</sup> U tu kategoriju može se ubrojiti i nacionalizam u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj početkom devedesetih koji je također imao obrambeni karakter.

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<sup>122</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 55, 56

<sup>123</sup> Isto, str. 202

<sup>124</sup> Isto, str. 210, 211, 213



## 5.2 Strategije sprječavanja i rješavanja međunacionalnih sukoba

Nacionalizam će vjerojatno i u sljedećim desetljećima biti izvor unutarnjih i međunarodnih sukoba. Sve dok su države uobičajene političke jedinice postojati će identifikacija sa zajednicom koja obitava na svom teritoriju, i nacionalizam kada je taj identitet primaran i intenzivan. Prema analizi Ayersa (2000) od 77 međudržavnih nacionalističkih sukoba u razdoblju od 1945. do 1996. godine, 1996. godine trajala su još 22 sukoba, 22 su završila porazom, 22 sporazumom, 4 primirjem, a 2 su jednostavno prestala.<sup>125</sup>

Kao što je navedeno **nacionalisti** su jako osjetljivi na percepcije prijetnje i mogućnosti ili prilike u vezi vrijednosti nacionalnog jedinstva, nezavisnosti, veličine i općenito dobrobiti nacionalne zajednice, te su skloni snažnom stereotipiziranju drugih. Dakle, i strategije sprečavanja nacionalistički motiviranih sukoba trebaju biti usmjerene na takve percepcije prijetnje i prilike koje su karakteristične za nacionaliste. **Stoga je izuzetno važno na vrijeme uočiti i reagirati na izraženost nacionalizma budući da takva spoznaja omogućuje i predviđanje povećane osjetljivosti toga naroda za uočavanje prijetnji i prilika te veliku spremnost na krajnje stereotipiziranje drugih.**

Drugim riječima, sprečavanje i rješavanje nacionalističkih sukoba uvelike o točnoj i pravovremenoj procjeni nacionalizma. Pravovremena i primjerena reakcija na nacionalizam važna je jer je nacionalističke sukobe puno lakše zaustaviti na početku nego kada su se jednom razbuknuli. Naime, kada već dođe do nacionalističkog sukoba, zaustavljanje takvog sukoba je čak i teže nego kod drugih tipova sukoba budući važnost koja se pridaje naciji i veličina žrtve na koju su nacionalisti spremni, nacionalisti čine vrlo snažnom spremnost i odlučnost na borbu.

Na temelju rečenog slijedi da se primjerena strategija rješavanja sukoba razlikuje ovisno o tome je li u osnovi mogućeg nacionalističkog sukoba primarno percepcija prijetnje ili primarno percepcija prilike. Ako je u osnovu nacionalističkog sukoba, ili sklonosti nacionalnista grupnom nasilju i agresiji, primarna percepcija prijetnje po vlastitu naciju tada primarno treba koristiti mjere za ublažavanje krivo prepoznate percepcije prijetnje. Nažalost, to je teško zbog snage djelujućih predodžbi, osobito ako je postojeća predodžba od početka, dakle, prije nego što se sukob osnažio, snažno obojena prijetnjom. U tim je slučajevima (predodžba neprijatelja, barbara, nitkova, i imperijalista) teško nadvladati problem neoborivosti. Naime, predodžbe su toliko čvrste da se praktički svako djelovanje ili nedjelovanje, koja može i treba opovrgnuti predodžbu, može odbaciti kao posljedica loše prirode protivnika. Neovisno o

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<sup>125</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 217

tome, dosljedno i jasno ponašanje koje pobija djelujuću predodžbu i time smanjuje percepciju prijatne ključno je za sprečavanje i rješavanje sukoba.

Druga je situacija, ako je u osnovi nacionalističkog sukoba ili sklonosti grupnom nasilju i agresiju percepcija prilike, budući da takva situacija zahtjeva politiku **zastrašivanja i ograničavanja**. Dakle, strategija za sprečavanje i zaustavljanje moguće agresivnosti i nasilja treba biti usmjerena na prepoznatu priliku nacionalista te se državi ili naciji mora nedvosmisleno pokazati da će to što vođe ili čitava grupa percipira kao priliku postati kobna pogreška. To je Chamberlain propustio učiniti s Hitlerom prije 2. svjetskog rata. Uovoljavajući Hitlerovim zahtjevima, Chamberlain je Hitleru pružio dokaze da ostatak Europe pristaje na njegove ambicije, da ga nemaju volje zaustaviti, i da je prilika koju je Hitler prepoznao stvarna i vrijedna rizika da bi se ostvarila.

U ovaj kontekst sukoba spadaju i oni u osnovi kojih se nalazi **želja za nezavisnošću**. Ujedno kod ovog tipa nacionalističkih sukoba važno pitanje jest i što međunarodna zajednica može ili treba učiniti u ovim situacijama kada je suočena sa zahtjevima nacionalne grupe za odvajanjem od višenacionalne zemlje. Za suočavanje s ovim tipom nacionalističkim sukoba Carnegi povjerenstvo za sprečavanje kobnih sukoba (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict) na temelju analize brojnih sukoba nakon Hladnog rata predlaže u osnovi **četiri sljedeće mjere**: rano upozorenje i reakcija, preventivna diplomacija, ekonomske mjere (uključujući sankcije i poticaje kada je nužno) i konačno upotreba sile.<sup>126</sup>

**Rano upozorenje i reakcija** zahtjeva pažljivo motrenje pokazatelja koji ukazuju na neizbježnost javljanja nasilja. Takvi pokazatelji su primjerice kršenja ljudskih prava, brutalna politička suprotstavljanja, nabava oružja, i korištenje medija za razjarivanje javnosti. Prema Carnegie izvješću: „Tijekom ranih faza krize, političari trebaju biti osjetljivi ne samo na to kako se okolnosti mogu pogoršati, nego trebaju biti i na oprezu za prilike za konstruktivno korištenje lokalnih pitanja i procesa koji mogu pomoći u izbjegavanju nasilja. Veliku pažnju trebaju poklanjati tome koga podržavaju i kako se ta podrška nudi“.<sup>127</sup>

**Preventivna diplomacija** ide iza tradicionalne diplomacije u smislu da koristi hitnije unilateralne i multilateralne tehnike za „pritisak, obmanjivanje, arbitražu, medijaciju ili posuđivanje „dobrih službenika, za ohrabrivanje dijaloga i poticanje nenasilnog rješenja krize“. <sup>128</sup> Carnegie povjerenstvo preporuča da vlade održavaju diplomatske odnose s vođama i grupama u situacijama vjerojatnog sukoba, umjesto da prekinu odnose kako bi pokazali neodobravanje njihovih akcija. Umjerene treba

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<sup>126</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 219

<sup>127</sup> Isto.

<sup>128</sup> Isto.

podržavati i treba odmah uključiti UN koja treba ostati u toku s razvojem događaja kroz svoje agencije i druge nevladine organizacije.

**Ekonomske mjere, sankcije i poticaje** treba primijeniti kao kaznu za nasilje i nagradu za konstruktivne akcije. Konačno, ako **sil**a postane nužna, treba se koristiti samo kao posljednji pokušaj i ne treba biti jedini instrument. Diplomaciju i ekonomske mjere treba uključiti kao dio integrirane strategije. Korištenje sile uključuje snage održavanja mira nakon prestanka nasilja. Ujedno ove su mjere jednako primjenjive i pri pokušajima rješavanja etničkih sukoba

Iako navedene mjere zvuče razumno, do njihove primjene često ne dolazi. Naime, ovakav pristup sprečavanja sukoba kao prvo zahtjeva pozornu i zainteresiranu međunarodnu zajednicu koja može prepoznati opasne znakove. To zahtjeva sposobnost nadvladavanja postojećih predodžbi sudionika u sukobu i također temeljno razumijevanje uzroka nacionalističkih i etničkih sukoba, što pridonosi prepoznavanju i priznavanju ranih upozoravajućih znakova i sprečavanju učinka prelijevanja, kada akcija poduzeta kao odgovor na jednu krizu neplanirano utječe na drugu krizu.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 219

### III. LJUDSKA AGRESIVNOST I RAT

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#### 1. DEFINICIJA I UZROCI AGRESIJE<sup>130</sup>

Socijalni psiholozi definiraju **agresivno ponašanje** kao namjerno ponašanje kojem je cilj nanošenje fizičke ili psihičke boli. Prema Berkowitzu dva su tipa ljudske agresivnosti - *neprijateljska agresiju* i *instrumentalna agresija*. **Neprijateljska agresija** je agresivni postupak koji proizlazi iz osjećaja ljutnje i usmjeren je na nanošenje boli ili ozljede drugima. Kod **instrumentalne agresije** kao i kod neprijateljske postoji namjera da se povrijedi druga osoba, ali povređivanje nije samo sebi svrhom nego služi kao sredstvo ostvarenja nekog drugog cilja (npr. pljačka uz nasilje ili ubojstvo, ili namjerno povređivanje protivničkog igrača na nogometnoj utakmici radi sprječavanja gola).

##### 1.1 Neuralni i kemijski utjecaji na agresiju

Agresivna su ponašanja kod ljudskih bića, kao i kod nižih životinja, povezana s područjem u središnjem dijelu mozga nazvanim **amigdala**. Kada su amigdaloidne jezgre podražene, pokorni organizmi postaju nasilni; slično tome, kada je neuralna aktivnost u tom području zaustavljena, nasilni organizmi postaju pokorni. Međutim, i ovdje postoji prilagodljivost: utjecaj neuralnih mehanizama može se prilagoditi socijalnim čimbenicima, čak i kod nekih primata. Primjerice, ako je majmun u prisustvu drugih, manje dominantnih majmuna, on će ih napasti kada su amigdaloidne jezgre podražene. Međutim, ako su amigdaloidne jezgre podražene kada je majmun u prisustvu dominantnijih majmuna, neće ih napasti, nego će bježati.

Pokazalo se da određeni kemijski spojevi utječu na agresiju. Primjerice, čini se da **serotonin**, kemijska tvar koja se prirodno izlučuje u srednjem mozgu, ima inhibirajući učinak na impulzivnu agresiju. Kada se kod životinja prekine protok serotonina, često nastupa porast agresivnog ponašanja. Kod ljudi je pokazano da **nasilni kriminalci imaju vrlo nisku razinu prirodno stvorenog serotonina**. Nadalje, u laboratorijskim eksperimentima na normalnim ljudima, pražnjenje triptofana (aminokiseline iz koje se sintetizira serotonin u mozgu) izaziva porast agresivnog ponašanja.

Manjak serotonina može dovesti do povećanja agresije; sličan učinak može imati i višak testosterona. Ubrizgavanje muškog spolnog hormona **testosterona** povećava agresiju životinja. Isti je nalaz dobiven

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<sup>130</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Wilson, Timothy D. and Akert, Robin M., *Social psychology*, New Jersey, 1998, str. 455-493.

i kod ljudi: James Dabbs i suradnici pokazali su da je **prirodna razina testosterona znatno viša među zatvorenicima osuđenim za nasilne zločine nego među onima osuđenim za nenasilne zločine**. Također, kada su jednom zatvoreni, zatvorenici s višom razinom testosterona krše više zatvorskih pravila, osobito onih koja se odnose na otvorene sukobe. Dabbs i suradnici pokazali su i da **maloljetni prijestupnici imaju višu razinu testosterona nego studenti**. Usporedba bratstava unutar jednog koledža pokazala je da **članovi onih koje se obično smatra najbuntovnijima, manje socijalno odgovornima i «okrutnijima» imaju najviše prosječne razine testosterona**.

Među istraživačima je dobro poznata povezanost između konzumiranja alkoholnih pića i agresivnog ponašanja. Ova povezanost postoji čak i kod pojedinaca koji nisu ničim izazvani i koji se trijezni obično ne ponašaju agresivno. Ovime se može objasniti zašto tučnjave često izbijaju u barovima i noćnim klubovima i zašto je obiteljsko nasilje često povezano sa zlouporabom alkohola. **Alkohol obično djeluje kao disinhibitor – on smanjuje naše socijalne inhibicije, čineći nas manje opreznima nego što smo obično**. Međutim, on je i više od toga. Čini se da alkohol **omete kognitivnu obradu podataka**. To znači da **intoksicirani ljudi često reagiraju na početne i najočitije aspekte socijalne situacije i obično propuštaju detalje**. Primjerice, ako ste trijezni i netko vam nagazi na nogu, primijetit ćete da osoba to nije učinila namjerno. Ali ako ste pijani, možete propustiti detalje situacije i reagirati kao da vam je nagazila na nogu potpuno namjerno. Sukladno tome (osobito ako ste muškarac), vjerojatno ćete viknuti na nju i udariti je. Upravo je ovo vrsta dvosmislene situacije koju muškarci mogu protumačiti kao prijetnju, osobito pod utjecajem alkohola. Stoga nije iznenađujuće da statistike kriminala otkrivaju kako je **75% pojedinaca uhićenih zbog ubojstva, napada i drugih nasilnih zločina bilo prema zakonskim kriterijima pijano u vrijeme uhićenja**.

## 1.2 Situacijski uzroci agresije

Nekoliko je važnih situacijskih uzroka agresije. Neki proizlaze iz tjelesnih osjeta, drugi nastaju iz socijalnih događaja.

**Tjelesni osjeti.** Većina ljudi doživjela je uzrujanost kod izloženosti oštroj, neočekivanoj boli (npr. kada se udarimo u nožni prst) i tada smo skloni iskaliti se na najbližem dostupnom cilju. Leonard Berkowitz je u nizu eksperimenata pokazao da su studenti koji su pretrpjeli bol zbog uranjanja ruke u vrlo hladnu vodu pokazali nagli porast vjerojatnosti da će se ponašati agresivno prema drugim studentima. Istom logikom, došlo se do spoznaje da tjelesne nelagode, poput vrućine, vlage, zagađenog zraka i neugodnih mirisa mogu smanjiti prag za agresivno ponašanje. Sustavnom analizom nemira koji su se javili u sedamdeset devet gradova između 1967. i 1971. godine, J. Merrill Carlsmith i

Craig Anderson su pokazali da je **znatno veća vjerojatnost da će se pobune javiti za vrućih dana nego za hladnih dana**. Slično tome, u većim američkim gradovima, od Hustona u Teksasu do Des Moinesa u Iowa, **što je određenog dana bilo toplije, to je vjerojatnost da će se javiti nasilni zločini bila veća**. Valja napomenuti da niz laboratorijskih eksperimenata podupire navedene odnose. Dodatne dokaze iz prirodne okoline nude Craig Anderson, Brad Bushman i Ralph Groom koji su pokazali da **su nasilni zločini učestaliji za toplijih godina nego za hladnijih godina**.

**Frustracija.** Frustracija se javlja kada je osoba spriječena na putu prema očekivanom cilju ili njegovom zadovoljenju. Istraživanja su pokazala da doživljaj frustracije može povećati vjerojatnost agresivnog reagiranja. Ovu tendenciju objašnjava **frustracijska teorija agresije**, prema kojoj percepcija ljudi da su spriječeni u ostvarenju cilja povećava vjerojatnost agresivnog reagiranja. To ne znači da frustracija uvijek dovodi do agresije, ali često dovodi, osobito kada je frustracija nesumnjivo neugodno iskustvo. U klasičnom eksperimentu Rogera Barkera, Tamare Dembo i Kurta Lewina, mala su djeca uvedena u prostoriju punu privlačnih igračaka koje su im bile nedostupne zbog jednosmjernog stakla. Nakon bolno dugog čekanja, djeci je napokon dopušteno igranje igračkama. U kontrolnoj je situaciji drugoj skupini djece odmah dopušteno igranje igračkama, bez da ih se prvo frustrira. Ova se skupina djece radosno igrala igračkama. Međutim, frustrirana je skupina, kada im je napokon odobren pristup igračkama, bila iznimno destruktivna. Oni su razbijali igračke, bacali ih o zid, gazili po njima i slično.

Nekoliko čimbenika može pojačati frustraciju te, shodno tome, povećati vjerojatnost pojave nekog oblika agresije. Jedan takav čimbenik je blizina cilja ili predmeta vaše želje. **Što je cilj bliže, to je očekivanje zadovoljenja koje je spriječeno veće; što je očekivanje veće, to je agresija vjerojatnija**.

Važno je napomenuti da frustracija nije isto što i deprivacija. Djeca koja nemaju igračke nisu agresivnija od djece koja imaju igračke. U eksperimentu s igračkama Barkera i suradnika, frustracija i agresija su se javile jer su djeca opravdano očekivala da će se igrati igračkama, a njihova su razumna očekivanja spriječena. Ovo sprječavanje je prouzročilo destruktivno ponašanje djece. U skladu s ovim razlikovanjem, vlč. Jesse Jackson je vrlo mudro istaknuo da su se **rasne pobune 1967. i 1968. godine javile «usred porasta očekivanja i povišene, iako neprimjerene, društvene potrošnje»**. Ukratko, Jackson je smatrao da su spriječena očekivanja bila uvelike odgovorna za frustraciju i agresiju. Ovo je sukladno shvaćanjima psihijatra Jeromea Franka, koji je napomenuo da se **najozbiljnije pobune u tom razdoblju nisu javile u geografskim područjima najvećeg siromaštva, nego u Wattsu i Detroitu, gdje položaj Afroamerikanaca nije bio niti približno toliko loš kao u većini drugih velikih urbanih središta**. Stvar je u tome da su stvari bile loše u odnosu na percepciju pobunjenika o

tome kako je bijelcima i u odnosu na pozitivne promjene koje je većina Afroamerikanaca s pravom očekivala. Dakle, ono što uzrokuje agresiju nije deprivacija, nego **relativna deprivacija: percepcija da vi (ili vaša grupa) imate manje nego što zaslužujete, manje od onoga što očekujete, ili manje od onoga što imaju ljudi slični vama.**

Slična se pojava javila u istočnoj Europi 1991. godine. Ozbiljna pobuna protiv Sovjetskog monolita javila se tek kad su lanci malo popustili. Na isti način, Primo Levi, preživjeli iz Auschwitzta, tvrdi da čak i u koncentracijskim logorima, rijetke pobune nisu započinjali zatvorenici sa samog dna hijerarhije logora, bolne žrtve neumoljivog užasa, nego «zatvorenici koji su na neki način bili povlašteni».

**Izravna provokacija i uzvratanje.** Drugo je neugodno iskustvo izravna provokacija. Agresija često proizlazi iz potrebe za uzvratanjem nakon što nas druga osoba svojim agresivnim ponašanjem isprovocira. Kršćansko načelo «okreni drugi obraz» većina ljudi ne slijedi, što je pokazano u brojnim eksperimentima u laboratoriju i izvan njega. Tipičan predstavnik ove vrste istraživanja je eksperiment Roberta Barona, u kojem su sudionici smišljali oglas za novi proizvod, a pomoćnik eksperimentatora je potom procjenjivao i kritizirao njihov oglas. U jednoj je situaciji kritika bila oštra, ali je upućena na blag i pažljiv način: «Smatram da ima dosta mjesta za poboljšanje». U drugoj je situaciji kritika upućena na uvredljiv način: «Mislim da ni kad biste pokušali ne biste mogli biti originalni». **Kada im je pružena prilika za uzvratanje, sudionici prema kojima je postupano strože bili su skloniji to učiniti nego oni u «blagoj» situaciji.**

Kao što se može pretpostaviti, ljudi ne uzvrataju uvijek kada su isprovocirani. Jedna je odrednica uzvratanja stupanj u kojem je provokacija bila namjerna; ako smo uvjereni da nije bila namjerna, većina ljudi neće uzvratiti. Slično tome, protunapad se neće javiti ako postoje olakotne okolnosti. Međutim, da bi bile učinkovite u smanjenju agresivne reakcije, **olakotne okolnosti moraju biti poznate u trenutku provokacije.**

**Agresivni znakovi.** Čini se da nas određeni znakovi potiču na djelovanje. Je li moguće da puka prisutnost **agresivnog znaka** – predmeta koji je povezan s agresivnom reakcijom – može povećati vjerojatnost javljanja agresije?

**Prisutnost oružja.** U klasičnom eksperimentu Leonarda Berkowitza i Anthonyja LaPagea, u studentima je izazvana ljutnja. Kod dijela njih ljutnja je izazvana u prostoriji u kojoj je bilo odloženo oružje (prividno iz prethodnog eksperimenta), a kod ostatka je ljutnja izazvana u prostoriji u kojoj je oružje zamijenjeno neutralnim predmetom (reketom za badminton). Sudionicima je potom pružena prilika da zadaju elektrošokove drugom studentu. Pojedinci kod kojih je ljutnja izazvana u prisutnosti oružja zadavali su snažnije elektrošokove od onih kod kojih je ljutnja izazvana u prisustvu reketa.

Temeljni nalazi višestruko su replicirani u Sjedinjenim Državama i Europi. Ovi su nalazi izazovni i ukazuju na zaključak suprotan poznatoj krilatici, koju često koriste protivnici kontrole oružja da «ne ubija oružje, nego ljudi»<sup>131</sup>. Oružje ubija. Kao što navodi Leonard Berkowitz, «Ljutita osoba može povući okidač na svom oružju ako želi počiniti nasilje; ali okidač također može povući prst ili na drugi način izazvati agresivnu reakciju, ako je osoba spremna na agresiju i nema snažne inhibicije protiv takvog ponašanja.»<sup>132</sup>

Razmotrite Seattle u Washingtonu i Vancouver u Britanskoj Kolumbiji. Oni su doslovno gradovi blizanci na brojne načine: imaju sličnu klimu, stanovništvo, gospodarstvo, opće stope zločina i stope fizičkih napada. Razlikuju se na dva načina: (1) Vancouver strogo zabranjuje posjedovanje oružja, dok Seattle ne zabranjuje i (2) stopa ubojstava u Seattleu gotovo je dvostruko viša od one u Vancouveru. Je li jedno uzrok drugome? Ne možemo biti sigurni. Međutim, upravo opisani **laboratorijski eksperimenti snažno upućuju na to da u Sjedinjenim Državama sveopća prisutnost agresivnih znakova poput oružja može biti čimbenik agresije.**

U opsežnom naknadnom istraživanju, Archer i suradnici tražili su od tinejdžera iz Sjedinjenih Država i deset drugih zemalja da čitaju priče o sukobu među ljudima te da navedu vlastite pretpostavke o ishodu sukoba. Rezultati pokazuju da su američki tinejdžeri bili skloniji predvidjeti nasilni ishod sukoba nego tinejdžeri iz ostalih država.

Štoviše, vjerojatnost da će nasilni ishodi koje su predvidjeli biti «smrtonosni, ovisni o oružju i nemilosrdni» bila je veća kod američkih tinejdžera nego kod tinejdžera iz bilo koje druge zemlje. Zaključci su neosporivi: smrtonosno nasilje, osobito ono koje uključuje oružje, sastavni je dio američkog društva – te stoga igra značajnu ulogu u očekivanjima i maštanjima američke mladeži.

**Oponašanje agresivnog ponašanja drugih ljudi.** Jedan od glavnih znakova za agresivno djelovanje je prisustvo drugih ljudi koji se ponašaju agresivno. Ovo je osobito slučaj kod djece. Djeca oponašanjem odraslih i svojih vršnjaka često uče rješavati sukobe agresivno, osobito kada vide da je agresija nagrađena. U klasičnom nizu eksperimenata, Albert Bandura i suradnici demonstrirali su snagu socijalnog učenja. Prema **teoriji socijalnog učenja**, socijalno ponašanje (npr. agresiju) usvajamo opažanjem i oponašanjem drugih. Temeljni postupak u Bandurininim eksperimentima sastojalo se u tome da odrasla osoba udara plastičnu «Bobo» lutku napunjenu zrakom (onu koja se vraća nakon što je oborena). Odrasla je osoba udarala lutku dlanom ruke, mlatila je čekićem, udarala nogom i vikala na nju. Djeci je potom dopušteno igranje lutkom. Djeca su u ovim eksperimentima oponašala agresivne modele i zlostavljala lutku. Djeca u kontrolnoj situaciji, koja nisu vidjela agresivnu odraslu

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<sup>131</sup> Aronson, Elliot, Willson, Timothy .D. and Akert, Robin M., *Social psychology*, New Jersey, 1998, str. 470

<sup>132</sup> Isto.



osobu na djelu, gotovo nikada nisu pokazala nikakvu agresiju prema nesretnoj lutki. Štoviše, djeca koja su promatrala agresivnu odraslu osobu koristila su iste postupke i iste agresivne riječi kao i odrasla osoba. Pored toga, mnoga su išla dalje od pukog oponašanja – izvodila su i nove oblike agresivnog ponašanja. Ovo istraživanje pruža snažnu podršku našem vjerovanju da je **agresivno ponašanje često naučeno jednostavnim procesom opažanja i oponašanja ponašanja drugih.**

### 1.3 Utjecaj agresivnih postupaka na kasniju agresiju

Većina ljudi, kada su frustrirani ili ljuti vikanjem, psovanjem ili čak udaranjem nekoga smanje napetost. Međutim, smanjuje li agresivni postupak potrebu za daljnjom agresijom? Čak i među profesionalnim psiholozima rašireno je vjerovanje da je to moguće. Primjerice, William Menninger, istaknuti terapeut i suosnivač Klinike Menninger, govori nam da natjecateljske igre predstavljaju zadovoljavajući ventil za instinktivni agresivni poriv. Nažalost, ne može se pronaći dokaze koji bi potvrdili ovu pretpostavku. Zapravo, čini se da je obrnuto. Arthur Patterson je mjerio neprijateljske osjećaje srednjoškolskih igrača nogometa, procjenjujući ih jedan tjedan prije i jedan tjedan nakon nogometne sezone. Ako je istina da intenzivno natjecanje i agresivno ponašanje, koji su dio igranja nogometa, smanjuju napetost uzrokovanu nakupljenom agresijom, očekivali bismo da će igrači pokazati opadanje neprijateljskih osjećaja tijekom sezone. Umjesto toga, rezultati su pokazali značajan porast neprijateljskih osjećaja. To ne znači da ljudi ne pronalaze zadovoljstvo u ovim igrama. Oni ga pronalaze. Međutim, sudjelovanje u ovakvim igrama ne umanjuje agresivne osjećanje sudionika – ako išta, onda ih povećava.

Dakle **sudjelovanje u natjecateljskim i agresivnim sportovima ne rezultira smanjenjem agresije, nego je povećava, a to se odnosi i na gledanje.** Gordon Russell, kanadski sportski psiholog, provjeravao je ovu pretpostavku mjerenjem neprijateljskog raspoloženja gledatelja za vrijeme osobito nasilne hokejaške utakmice. Kako je igra napredovala, gledatelji su postajali sve ratoborniji. Na kraju zadnjeg dijela, njihova razina neprijateljskog raspoloženja bila je krajnje visoka i vratila se na razinu prije igre tek nekoliko sati nakon završetka igre. Slični su rezultati dobiveni i s gledateljima nogometnih utakmica i hrvačkih mečeva. Dakle, kao i sudjelovanje u agresivnom sportu, i gledanje povećava agresivno ponašanje.

Što je s postupcima izravne agresije prema izvoru vaše ljutnje? Smanjuju li takvi postupci potrebu za daljnjom agresijom? Većina eksperimenata na ovu temu nije uspjela pronaći takve učinke. Zapravo, daleko najučestaliji nalaz nalikuje istraživanjima gledanja nasilja – **kada ljudi izvrše agresivni postupak, takav postupak povećava sklonost prema budućoj agresiji.** Primjerice, u

eksperimentu Russella Geena i suradnika, svaki od sudionika u eksperimentu (muški studenti) uparen je s drugim studentom, koji je zapravo bio suradnik eksperimentatora. Prvo, suradnik je razljutio sudionika; tijekom ovog razdoblja, koje je uključivalo razmjenu mišljenja o različitim pitanjima, sudioniku su zadani električni šokovi kada se njegov partner nije složio s njegovim mišljenjem. Zatim, tijekom lažnog istraživanja «učinaka kazne na učenje», sudionik se ponašao kao učitelj, dok je pomoćnik služio kao učenik. U prvom zadatku učenja, od nekih je sudionika zatraženo da zadaju električne šokove suradniku svaki put kada bi pogriješio; drugi su sudionici samo snimali njegove pogreške. Na sljedećem je zadatku svim sudionicima pružena prilika da zadaju šokove. Ako je djelovao katarzični učinak, očekivali bismo da će sudionici, koji su prethodno zadali šokove suradniku, drugi put zadavati manje šokova i manje intenzivne šokove. To se nije dogodilo. Zapravo, sudionici koji su prethodno zadali šokove suradniku iskazivali su još snažniju agresiju kada im je pružena naknadna prilika da ga napadnu.

Ova pojava nije ograničena na laboratorij. **Ista je sklonost zapažena u događajima koji se prirodno javljaju u stvarnom svijetu, gdje su verbalni agresivni postupci služili za olakšavanje daljnjih napada.** U jednom takvom «prirodnom eksperimentu», nekolicini je tehničara, koji su nedavno otpušteni, pružena prilika da verbaliziraju svoje neprijateljstvo prema svom bivšem šefu. Kada su kasnije zamoljeni da opišu tu osobu, ovi su tehničari bili mnogo stroži u svojim opisima od tehničara koji nisu prethodno iskazali svoje osjećaje.

## 1.4 Okrivljavanje žrtve agresije

Na prvi pogled se čini da je katarza donekle razumna pretpostavka. To jest, kada nas netko naljuti, čini se da oslobađanje našeg neprijateljstva prema toj osobi uistinu oslobađa napetost i dovodi do toga da se osjećamo bolje. Ali «osjećati se bolje» ne smije se miješati sa smanjenjem neprijateljskog raspoloženja. Kod ljudi agresija ne ovisi samo o napetosti – onome što osoba osjeća – nego i o onome što osoba misli. Nadalje, još važnije, glavni nalazi istraživanja ovog problema pokazuju da iskazivanje otvorene agresije prema osobi mijenja osjećaje pojedinca prema toj osobi, jačajući negativne osjećaje i stoga povećavajući vjerojatnost buduće agresije prema toj osobi. Kada jedna osoba nanese štetu drugoj, to pokreće spoznajne procese usmjerene na opravdavanje okrutnog čina. Preciznije, kada jedna osoba povrijedi drugu osobu, ona doživljava kognitivnu disonancu. Disonancu zatim smanjujem uvjeravajući se da vrijeđanje te osobe nije bio nepristojan, nerazuman i loš postupak. To se postiže zatvaranjem očiju pred vrlinama te osobe i naglašavanjem njezinih mana, uvjeravajući

se da je on/ona užasno ljudsko biće, koje zaslužuje da ga se povrijedi. Ovo će se osobito održati ako je cilj agresije nedužna žrtva. U eksperimentima Davida Glassa te Keitha Davisa i Neda Jonesa, sudionici su nanijeli ili psihološku ili fizičku štetu nevinoj osobi, koja im prethodno nije učinila ništa nažao. Sudionici su zatim nastavili podcjenjivati svoje žrtve, uvjeravajući se da one nisu dobri ljudi i da stoga zaslužuju ono što su dobili. To svakako smanjuje disonancu te ostavlja prostora za daljnju agresiju, jer **jednom kada je osoba uspjela nekoga podcijeniti, lakše joj je nanijeti daljnju štetu žrtvi u budućnosti.**

Što se događa ako žrtva nije posve nevina? Michael Kahn je proveo jedan od nekoliko eksperimenata kojima je provjeravana ova pretpostavka. U Kahnovu je eksperimentu mladić, koji je glumio medicinskog tehničara koji vrši neka fiziološka mjerenja na studentima, iznio uvredljivu opasku o studentima. U jednoj je eksperimentalnoj situaciji sudionicima dozvoljeno da iskažu svoje neprijateljstvo prema tehničaru izražavanjem svojih osjećaja njegovom poslodavcu – postupak koji je djelovao kao da će uvaliti tehničara u ozbiljne probleme, možda ga čak stajati posla. U drugoj situaciji sudionicima nije pružena prilika da iskažu bilo kakvu agresiju prema osobi koja je izazvala njihovu ljutnju. Oni kojima je dozvoljeno da izraze svoju agresiju naknadno su osjećali veću odbojnost i neprijateljstvo prema tehničaru od onih koji su spriječeni u iskazivanju agresije. Drugim riječima, iskazivanje agresije nije inhibiralo sklonost prema daljnjoj agresiji. Umjesto toga, povećalo ju je, čak i kada cilj agresije nije bila samo nevina žrtva.

Ovi rezultati pokazuju da **ljudi, kada ih se razljuti, često pretjerano reaguju.** U ovom je slučaju uzrokovanje gubitka posla tehničara znatno razornije od manje uvrede koju je tehničar izazvao. **Pretjerano reagiranje proizvodi disonancu na isti način na koji disonancu proizvodi vrijeđanje nevine osobe: ako postoji velika nepodudarnost između onoga što je jedna osoba učinila drugoj i jačine njene osvete, ta nepodudarnost opravdava se omalovažavanjem objekta bijesa, to jest druge osobe.**

## **2. RAT KAO ČIN INSTRUMENTALNE AGRESIJE**

Agresija kao istraživačka tema u društvenim znanostima, a posebice u socijalnoj psihologiji, našla se u fokusu znanstvenika poslije drugog svjetskog rata kada su na svim globalnim razinama i u dogovorima velesila pobjednica prevladavali stavovi i poduzimali se različiti koraci da se bilo koji ratovi, a pogotovu takvi kao što su bila dva svjetska rata u dvadesetom stoljeću nikada više ne ponove. Zadatak znanstvenika bio je istražiti uzroke agresivnog ponašanja ljudi na individualnim i skupnim razinama te objasniti postoje li razlike u sklonosti agresiji na razini različitih društava i, ako postoje, što ih uvjetuje.

Socijalna psihologija, sociologija i antropologija su društvene znanosti koje su tim spoznajama najviše doprinijele. Sažeto će se osvrnuti na glavne istraživačke nalaze relevantne za temeljni cilj ove ekspertize.

## 2.1.Uzroci rata

Na individualnoj razini dilema jesu li uzroci agresije iracionalne ili racionalne naravi u okvir društvenih znanosti prenesena je iz filozofije. Unutar filozofije poznate su npr. Hobbes-ova izreka „čovjek je čovjeku vuk“ kojom je on izrazio iracionalnost ljudske prirode i stanje rata proglasio prirodnim stanjem čovjeka. Za razliku od njega, Malthus smatra da je uzrok ljudskim nevoljama pa tako i ratu nesrazmjer između proizvodnje hrane i rasta populacije. Među poznatim filozofskim autorima svakako treba spomenuti Machiavelli-a i njegovo djelo „Vladar“ te Marxa koji je oružanu revoluciju proglasio legitimnim oblikom „klasne borbe“. Dakako ne smije se izostaviti ni teorija o pravednom ratu koja je razvijana stoljećima (od Augustina do Tome Akvinskog te dalje Huga Grociosa) koja raspravlja prvenstveno etičke dimenzije ratnih sukoba na temelju koje su donesene brojne deklaracije i konvencije o ratu na svjetskoj razini, među njima i Ženevska konvencija. **Međutim najpoznatija povijesna definicija rata ne potječe iz filozofije, nego ju je postavio pruski general i povjesničar Carl von Clausewitz. Prema toj definiciji rat je nastavak politike drugim sredstvima.**

Na temelju empirijskih uvida u društvenim znanostima tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća, a posebice u od pedesetih do devedesetih godina u kojima su najviše doprinijela istraživanja socijalnih psihologa i sociologa danas prevladava mišljenje o ratu koje je E. Fromm (1973)<sup>133</sup> u knjizi „Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti“ sažeo na slijedeći način: Teza da je rat uzrokovan ljudskom destruktivnošću potpuno je apsurdna svakome tko i najpovršnije poznaje povijest. Babilonci, Grci, svi do državnika našeg vremena planirali su rat zbog, po njihovom uvjerenju, vrlo stvarnih razloga i vrlo su temeljito vagali argumente za i protiv, čak, iako su prirodno, njihovi proračuni često bili pogrešni. Motivi su bili mnogostruki: zemlja za obrađivanje, bogatstva, robovi, sirovine, tržišta, teritorijalna ekspanzija i – obrana. Pod posebnim okolnostima želja za osvetom ili, u malom plemenu, strast za destrukcijom bili su među faktorima koji su motivirali rat. No, takvi su slučajevi atipični. Mišljenje da je rat uzrokovan čovjekovom agresijom nije samo nestvarno već i štetno. Ono odvlači pažnju od stvarnih uzroka i tako slabi otpor protiv njih.

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<sup>133</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti II*, Zagreb, 1984, str. 34- 35

**U sociopsihologijskom smislu Fromm-ova teza rat objašnjava kao najprošireniji oblik instrumentalne agresije, to jest gotovo sve oblike nasilja u ratu smatra sredstvima za ostvarenje temeljnog i racionalnog cilja. Ostvarenje toga racionalnog cilja pažljivo je planirana djelatnost usmjerena na maksimalni dobitak uz minimalne gubitke. Pojedine manifestacije neprijateljske agresije kojima je isključivi cilj nanošenje boli ili ubijanje činovi su osvete i drugih situacijskih čimbenika koji su popratne pojave svih ratova. Iznimka je genocid koji se temelji na svojevrsnom sklopu instrumentalne i neprijateljske agresije.**

Ovo shvaćanje je danas u društvenim znanostima prevladavajuće ne samo zbog toga što ima bogatu empirijski potvrdu, nego što njegova primjena omogućuje razumijevanje gotovo svih ratova u ljudskoj povijesti. Valja napomenuti da se i Clausewitzova definicija uklapa u ovo shvaćanje.

**Antropološke analize različitih društava i kultura pokazuju da postoje razlike u prisutnosti i sklonosti agresiji u različitim društvima koje su uvjetovane dominantnim sustavom vrednota i kulturnim obrascima.** Na temelju tih antropoloških analiza, Fromm (1973)<sup>134</sup> dijeli društvene sustave prema kriteriju agresivnost nasuprot miroljubljivost i opisuje tri različita sustava: Prvi sustav, ili sustav A, naziva „društva koja afirmiraju život“, sustav B naziva „nedestruktivno – agresivna“ društva, a sustav C „destruktivna društva“. U sustavu A razina neprijateljstva, nasilja i okrutnosti među ljudima minimalna je, ne postoje teške kazne, zločina gotovo nema, a institucija rata ne postoji ili igra neznatnu ulogu. U sustavu B, agresivnost i rat, iako nisu od središnje važnosti, normalne su pojave. Ta društva, međutim, ne prožima destruktivnost, okrutnost ili pretjerana sumnjičavost. Za sustav C karakteristično je mnogo nasilja između pojedinaca, destruktivnosti, agresije i okrutnosti među ljudima unutar plemena i prema drugim plemenima, zadovoljstva u ratovanju, zlobe i prijevara.

## **2.2. Genocid i etničko čišćenje**

Prema međunarodnoj Konvenciji o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1948. Entry into force: 12 January 1951.) **genocid** su “djela počinjena s namjerom djelomičnog ili potpunog uništenja nacionalne, etničke, rasne ili religiozne grupe”.

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U dvadesetom stoljeću postojali su brojni užasni slučajevi genocidalnog nasilja, primjerice genocid u Turskoj u kojem je u razdoblju od 1915. Do 1917. približno 1.5 miliona Armenaca izgubilo

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<sup>134</sup> Fromm, Erich, Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti I, Zagreb, 1984, str. 182- 191

<sup>135</sup> Preuzeto 21. 2. 2009. sa stranice <http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm>

život; genocid u Kambodži gdje je u razdoblju od 1975. do 1979. godine umrlo 2 miliona ljudi, genocid tijekom Holokausta u II svjetskom ratu, ili genocid u Ruandi u kojem je u kratkom razdoblju stradalo preko jedan milion ljudi.

**Genocid je rezultat intenzivnog osjećaja frustracije i prijetnje, kojeg izaziva kombinacija brojnih već opisanih psiholoških obrazaca, kao što su čimbenici socijalnog identiteta, stereotipiziranje, odanosti grupi, koji djeluju u kontekstu teških društvenih, ekonomskih i političkih okolnosti.** Prema socijalnom psihologu Staubu, u teškim društvenih, ekonomskih i političkim okolnostima javljaju se snažni motivi za samozaštitom: motiv za obranom vlastitog života i sigurnosti, motiv za obranom pojma o sebi, vlastitih vrijednosti i načina života. Postoji i potreba za zaštitom samopoštovanja, vrijednosti i tradicija. Također, postoji i potreba za uzdizanjem oslabljenog pojma o sebi. Ako neprijatelj kao uzrok takvih okolnosti nije lako prepoznat: jedan je stvoren: žrtveni jarac. **Iako neki tvrde da su određene kulture tome sklonije nego druge potencijal za nasilje takvog opsega postoji u većini kultura. Što je grupa kohezivnija, takav je potencijal vjerojatniji, osobito kada je praćen osjećajem nadmoći. To je naročito vidljivo kada je u zemlji izražen nacionalizam. Snažno poštivanje autoriteta i snažna sklonost nasilju, koju svatko ima u određenom stupnju, su dodatni čimbenici koji povećavaju vjerojatnost masovnih ubojstava i genocida. Ta obilježja smanjuju vjerojatnost osobne odgovornosti a povećavaju vjerojatnost poslušnosti vodi.** (International Law, 1987)

**Sama složenost genocida kao pojave i mnogostrukost njegovih izvora (ekonomski, politički, povijesni, socijalni, psihološki..) svakako doprinose smanjenom razumijevanju genocida. Ovakva složenost nužno zahtjeva interdisciplinarni pristup. Ovdje ćemo opisati neka saznanja o psihološkim procesa koji su bitni za razumijevanje i mogućnost predviđanja genocida odnosno ekstremnog grupnog nasilja općenito.**

Razumijevanju psiholoških procesa koji se nalaze u osnovi genocida i drugih oblika skupnog nasilja prinose saznanja psihologije iz više pojedinačnih područja od koji se dio odnosi na razumijevanje nastanka i razvijanja sukoba među skupinama, a dio na razumijevanje izvođenja nasilja odnosno procesa koji smanjuju osjećaj odgovornosti i olakšavaju nasilje. U pokušaju integracije i smještanja tih znanja u širi kontekst najdalje je otišao psiholog E. Staub u svojoj teoriji genocida opširno izloženoj u knjizi Korijeni zla ("Roots of Evil", Staub 1989).

Prema Staubu pojava i razvoj genocida ne može se objasniti bez razumijevanja uvjeta u društvu te obilježja društvene situacije i kulture.<sup>136</sup> U svojoj koncepciji Staub polazi od postavke o postojanju osnovnih ljudskih potreba pri čemu mogućnosti njihova zadovoljenja ovise o uvjetima u društvu. Ako su uvjeti u društvu takvi da ne omogućuju zadovoljenje potreba nastaju jaki motivi. Jedan od mogućih načina zadovoljavanja i suočavanja s takvim motivima je usmjeravanje neprijateljstva prema određenoj skupini odnosno njenim članovima. U kojoj mjeri će se zadovoljavanje motiva i suočavanje s neugodnim posljedicama teških životnih uvjeta ostvarivati negativnim usmjeravanjem na neku skupinu, do kojeg intenziteta će to neprijateljstvo ići, koja će se skupina izabrati kao objekt neprijateljstva i u krajnjoj liniji hoće li doći do genocida, prema Staubu ovisi o kulturi odnosno kulturno-društvenim obilježjima.

Svaki od ključnih elemenata u Staubovom tumačenju izvora i procesa genocida kao što su **teški životni uvjeti, obilježja kulture i društvenih organizacija, motivi, psihološki i ponašajni načini njihova zadovoljavanja** predstavljaju općenite formulacije kojima se skraćeno ukazuje na veliki broj pojedinačnih i raznovrsnih obilježja odnosno procesa. Stoga ćemo prvo detaljnije odrediti te pojmove odnosno opisati na što se sve oni odnose. Time će ujedno biti i vidljivo na koji način Staub znanja psihologije o predrasudama i stereotipima, konformizmu, društvenoj kategorizaciji, deindividualizaciji, dehumanizaciji žrtve, pokornosti autoritetu i sl. međusobno povezuje i smješta u širi kontekst.

**Teški životni uvjeti.** Teške životne uvjete nemoguće je točno odrediti eventualnim nabrojanjem koje su to sve pojedinačne situacije koje čini uvjete života teškima. Stoga je možda na pitanje o teškim životnim uvjetima, jednostavnije odgovoriti da su to takvi uvjeti u kojima ljudi ne mogu normalno ostvarivati i zadovoljavati svoje osnovne potrebe i motive. Tako gledano teški životni uvjeti mogu uključivati široki raspon pojava ili samo neke od njih kao što su: loši ekonomski uvjeti (u rasponu od velikog siromaštva, gladi, preko velike nezaposlenosti, inflacije, pa do neostvarivanja očekivanog poboljšanja materijalnih uvjeta života), intenzivne političke promjene, izraženo postojanje bilo kriminalnog ili nekog drugog oblika nasilja uključujući i rat i sl. Znači sami teški uvjeti života mogu varirati u vrsti, intenzitetu, trajnosti i pratećem stupnju disorganizacije i kaosa u društvu.

U primjeni svoje koncepcije genocida za tumačenje stvarnih slučajeva genocida iz povijesti Staub (1989) navodi da je u svakom od analiziranih primjera genocida: Holokaust, genocid Armena u Turskoj, masovni nestanci u Argentini, genocid političkih neprijatelja u Kambodži prethodila promjena političkog sustava unutar 10 godina prije početka genocida.

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<sup>136</sup> Staub, Ervin, *Genocide and Mass Killing: Their Roots and Prevention*, in Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., Winter, D. A. (ed.) *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, New Jersey, 2001, str. 2, preuzeto 10. 2. 2009. sa <http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/Staubonrootsofviolence.pdf>.

Za razumijevanje nastanka genocida sukladno koncepciji E. Stauba nije toliko važan sam sadržaj ili oblik teških životnih uvjeta, nego je naglasak na psihološkim posljedicama takvih životnih uvjeta, načinima nošenja s tim posljedicama odnosno psihološkim i stvarnim načinima zadovoljavanja izraženih potreba i motiva.<sup>137</sup>

**Potrebe pojedinca i društva i rezultirajući motivi.** U teškim životnim uvjetima narušeno je ostavarivanje različitih potreba: potrebe za sigurnošću kako tjelesnom tako i psihičkom, potrebe za pozitivnim gledanjem na sebe, potrebe za mogućnošću predviđanja i ostvarivanja kontrole nad onime što nam se događa i sl. Primjerice uslijed izuzetno loše gospodarstvene situacije ili izraženog nasilja može biti ugrožen sam život odnosno tjelesna sigurnost, uslijed intenzivnih političkih promjena mogu biti ugroženi ustaljeni obrasci ponašanja, sustavi vrednota i načini gledanja na svijet i sl. Trajniji teški životni uvjeti narušavaju i odnose među ljudima u društvu. Svatko se usmjeruje na vlastite potrebe, pa ujedno i jača potreba za povezanošću s drugima. Ovakvi doživljaji prijetnje i frustriranosti potiču i jačaju različite motive.

Kao rezultat teških uvjeta života, izraženi su motivi: zaštita fizičke dobrobiti pojedinca i njegove obitelji, održavanje, očuvanje psihološkog ja, uključujući sliku o sebi i vrednote, razumijevanje životnih problema i društvene dezorganizacije, postizanje novog razumijevanja svijeta. Budući da je te motive u takvim uvjetima teško zadovoljiti poboljšavajući uvjete života, kao odgovor na te motive i potrebe mogu se javiti osjećaji, misli i akcije koji nisu usmjereni na stvarne izvore, nego omogućuju lakše suočavanje s posljedicama. Na taj način se javlja *negativno vrednovanje drugih skupina, pronalaženje žrtvenih janjadi, pridruživanje novim skupinama i prihvaćanje ideologija*. Koji motivi će se javiti i na koji način će se oni zadovoljavati ovisi o karakteristikama same kulture i društva. Tako, ako društvo ima povijest negativnog vrednovanja neke skupine i diskriminacije njenih članova i ujedno izraženije poštivanje autoriteta vjerojatnije je da će se okrenuti protiv neke podskupine.

Znači teški životni točnije nezadovoljene potrebe, ciljevi i motivi (kao posljedica takvih teških životnih uvjeta) ne izazivaju genocid sami po sebi, već samo sadrže mogućnost za razvoj genocida odnosno predstavljaju izvor motivacije za nasiljem. Hoće li uslijed postojanja teških životnih uvjeta stvarno doći do genocida ili ne ovisi o obilježjima kulture i društvenim organizacijama.

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<sup>137</sup> Staub, Ervin, *Genocide and Mass Killing: Their Roots and Prevention*, in Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. , Winter, D. A. (ed. ) *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, New Jersey, 2001, str. 3- 4, preuzeto 10. 2. 2009. sa <http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/Staubonrootsofviolence.pdf>.



## 2.2.1 Obilježja kulture, društva i društveno-političkih institucija

Prema Staubu nekoliko je obilježja kulture odnosno društva koje to društvo čine sklonom nasilju. Iako svaka kultura ili društva ima barem neka od tih obilježja, vjerojatnost da će doći do nasilja i genocida veća je što je takvih obilježja više.<sup>138</sup>

**Društva se razlikuju po vrednovanju agresije i povijesti korištenja agresije i nasilja za rješavanje sukoba. Može se reći da što je u povijesti nekog društva agresija češće korištena to će se ona vjerojatnije pojaviti kao način reagiranja u novoj situaciji. Bogata nasilnička povijest nekog naroda čini nasilje dostupnijim i prihvatljivijim kao način rješavanja problema. U nekim društvima ili društvenim institucijama agresija i agresivno ponašanje čak se postavlja kao ideal, a kada jednom kultura i društvo usvoji agresivna obilježja, agresivnost postaje način života. Agresija u tim slučajevima postaje nešto vrijedno, postaje pozitivan dio kulturalne slike o sebi.**

**Pozitivno društveno vrednovanje agresije i mjesto agresije u nacionalnoj, kulturalnoj slici o sebi dobro oslikavaju riječi S. Miloševića iz 1988. godine pri govoru na Gazimestanu (Kosovo): "Ako ne umemo da radimo, umemo da se bijemo" ili izjava D. Čosića "Srpski narod dobiva u ratu, a gubi u miru".**

Znači svako društvo ili kultura posjeduje određena vjerovanja o sebi samima, određenu sliku o sebi, način gledanja na svijet i vrednote. Česta sastavnica nacionalne, kulturalne slike o sebi koja može doprinijeti pojavi nasilja je *osjećaj zakinutosti najčešće povezan s vjerovanjem da zemlja ili nacija zaslužuje više*. Ako je u nekom društvu istaknuto općenito gledanje na svijet kao mjesto prijetnji, mjesto puno opasnosti, to također doprinosi javljanju agresije. Sastavnice kulturalnog identiteta su i postojanje *negativnog vrednovanja drugih skupina*, točnije postoji li povijest negativnog vrednovanja neke skupine. Također, bitno obilježje društva za razvoj nasilja je i *stupanj pokornosti odnosno poštivanja autoriteta i jakih vođa*.

Iako je određeni stupanj poslušnosti autoritetu nužan za normalno funkcioniranje pogotovo u nekim tipovima društvenih institucija kao što su policija i vojska, pokoravanje autoritetu i pravilima može postati jedna od osnovnih vrednota koja se ugrađuje u sve društvene institucije i putem njih prenosi dalje. Takva autoritarna društva pogodna su za javljanje nasilja općenito, a posebno političkog nasilja. Jer ako se pojavi vođa koji zagovara ili potiče nasilje, malo tko će mu se usprotiviti.

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<sup>138</sup> Staub, Ervin, *Genocide and Mass Killing: Their Roots and Prevention*, in Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., Winter, D. A. (ed.) *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, New Jersey, 2001, str. 5-7, preuzeto 10. 2. 2009. sa <http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/Staubonrootsofviolence.pdf>.

Povezano s autoritarnom orijentacijom u društvu je i *stupanj demokratičnosti odnosno totalitarnosti* u društvu. U demokratskim društvima u kojima postoji veći broj političkih, religijskih, nacionalnih, rasnih i drugih skupina omogućeno je slobodno izražavanje različitosti te će se na neke početne oblike nasilja vjerojatnije javiti otpori. Također, za nastanak genocida vrlo je važno postoje li u društvu izražene *predrasude i diskriminacije na razini institucija*. Postojanje diskriminacija na razini institucija podrazumijeva diskriminirajući odnos prema pripadnicima nekih skupina na taj način da se oni ne mogu zaposliti, da im nisu dostupni svi oblici obrazovanja ili se u samom sustavu (npr. obrazovnom ili pravosudnom), prema njima drugačije postupa upravo zbog njihove pripadnosti određenoj skupini. Ako su članovi društva prihvatili postojanje takvih diskriminacija na razini institucija vjerojatnije je da će ostati tihi i u slučajevima uvođenja izraženijih stupnjeva diskriminacije.

**Važno obilježje društva koje, u krajnoj liniji omogućuje izvršenje nasilja, pa i genocida je postojanje organiziranih skupina u društvu koje su to u stanju izvesti. Znači vjerojatnost pojave genocida uz postojanje neprijateljstva prema nekoj skupini i motivacije da se prema njoj djeluje negativno, povećana je ako u društvu postoji organizirana skupina sposobna za izvršenje nasilja odnosno genocida. Upravo se zbog stupnja svoje organiziranosti, moći, uvježbanosti ali i zbog tretninga na poslušnost autoritetu za takvo izvršavanje nasilja i genocida često koristi vojska.**

Sažeto govoreći sklop obilježja društva i kulture čini da je određeno društvo sklono na nezadovoljene potrebe reagirati neprijateljstvom i nasiljem prema nekoj podskupini (ili drugoj naciji odnosno zemlji). Da bi se započelo s nasiljem nisu naravno potrebni svi ovi preduvjeti. Dovoljno je postojanje samo nekih od njih. Međutim, odsustvo nekih od obilježja pogoduje da se na eventualne početne korake nasilja na tzv. kontinuumu destrukcije javi otpori i protureakcije koje mogu zaustaviti jačanje nasilja.

### **2.2.2 Načini zadovoljavanja motiva i potreba**

Pri razmatranju odnosa novonastalih potreba, motiva i načina na koji se oni zadovoljavaju sukladno koncepciji E. Stauba valja uočiti da se jedan motiv može zadovoljavati na različite načine, ali i da isto ponašanje, psihološki proces prinosi zadovoljavanju različitih motiva. Primjerice, kao što je već rečeno u teškim životnim uvjetima izraženi su motivi za kontroliranjem onoga što nam se događa razumijevanjem svijeta i svoga mjesta u svijetu. Kao odgovor na te motive može se javiti *pridruživanje nekom pokretu i, prihvatanje ideologije* jer se na taj način postiže osjećaj snage i kontrole, a vlastito ja postaje umreženo i postaje mi. Ujedno pridruživanjem skupini zadovoljava se i motiv potreba za osjećajem povezanosti s drugim ljudima.

Također u tzv. teškim životnim uvjetima ugrožena je i slika o sebi, samopoštovanje i osjećaj vrijednosti, vlastiti i društveni identitet. Kao moguća odgovor javlja se *negativno vrednovanje druge skupine* i s time povezano *uzdizanje vlastite skupine*. Uzdizanje vlastite skupine se koristi jer se preko stvaranja skupnog identiteta vrijednost skupine proteže i na vrijednost pojedinačnih članova ili drugačije rečeno što više vrijedi skupina kojoj pripadamo, vredniji smo mi sami. Takvo uzdizanje vlastite skupine olakšano je pronalaženjem i isticanjem negativnosti i pogrešaka drugih skupina, i naglašavanjem razlika između svoje i te druge skupine.

**Kao rezultat svih ovih uvjeta genocid ne nastaje izravno, već slijedi jednu progresiju. Početna štetna ponašanja nižeg intenziteta izazivaju promjene u pojedincima; počiniteljima i promatračima te u čitavoj skupini, pri čemu još štetnija ponašanja postaju moguća. To dovodi do još negativnijeg vrednovanja žrtve, mijenja se slika o sebi kod počinitelja koji time postaju spremniji na još veća nasilja radi pravednih razloga. Konačno javlja se predanost genocidu ili masovnom ubijanju odnosno ideološkim ciljevima koji zahtjevaju masovna ubijanja ili genocid.**

**Takva progresija vjerojatnija je u situaciji kada postoji pasivnost promatrača - članova društva koji nisu izravno pogođeni i vanjskih skupina, uključujući i druge nacije.** Suprotno tome, aktivno suprotstavljanje promatrača može ponovo aktivirati moralne vrednote počinitelja. Nažalost promatrači - članovi društva koji nisu niti počinitelji niti žrtve odnosno pojedinci izvan određene skupine ili nacije, vrlo često su indiferentni. Osim eventualnog straha koji može doprinijeti takvoj pasivnosti promatrača treba istaći da svi mi imamo tendenciju prihvaćati određenja stvarnosti koje nudi vlada, stručnjaci odnosno čitava kultura.

## **B) PRIMJENA SOCIOPSIHOLOGIJSKOG OKVIRA NA RAT U BiH 1991.-1995.**

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## UVODNA NAPOMENA

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Dvije su startne tegobe autora ove ekspertize u pogledu objektivnosti primjene ponuđenog teorijskog okvira na rat u BiH 1991.- 1995. godine. Prva se odnosi na vrijednosnu neutralnost u znanosti, a druga na socijalno podrijetlo autora. Budući da su to tegobe koje su tema rasprava u znanosti, a posebice društvenim znanostima od početaka pozitivizma autor će slijediti prevladavajuće stajalište u suvremenoj znanosti. Stoga će se kratko osvrnuti na podrijetlo i današnje stajalište u znanosti povezano sa spomenutim tegobama.

Sociolog kojem se pripisuju i zasluge utemeljitelja moderne sociologije, Max Weber izrekao je stajalište prema kojemu se sociolog poziva na vrijednosti u dva značenja. Prvo, zato što su vrijednosti dio smisla što ga akteri pridaju svome djelovanju. Kako je sociologija usmjerena na razumijevanje toga smisla, ona nužno mora zahvatiti i vrijednosti koje su dio njezinog istraživačkog područja. Drugo sociolog se poziva na vrijednosti jer ih ne može zaobići – čovjek je smješten u određeni kontekst, ima strasti i sklonosti. Prema Weberu, njegova volja za istraživanjem proizlazi iz te strastvene prisutnosti u svijetu. Stoga on proučava ono što misli da je relevantno. Osobne ga sklonosti, međutim, navode da neke uzročne veze analizira više, neke fenomene vidi bolje. Ali ne staje na tome. Objektivnost njegova rada slijedi iz njegova nastojanja da bude svjestan vlastitih sklonosti te da izbjegava vrijednosne sudove o fenomenima koje proučava. Ovo stajalište u znanosti je poznato kao „**Weberovo načelo vrijednosne neutralnosti**“.

Valja napomenuti da je ovo stajalište vrlo brzo prihvaćeno u drugim društvenim znanostima pa tako i u Socijalnoj psihologiji. Međutim, poznati fizičar Heisenberg smatra da ni prirodni znanstvenici ne mogu biti potpuno objektivni jer su dio okoline koju istražuju. To stajalište je poznato kao „Heinseberg-ov efekt“.

Brojne meta analize znanstvenih radova objavljenih u dvadesetom stoljeću pokazale su da su vrijednosne orijentacije autora bile prisutne u društvenim znanostima na razini odabira tema, postavljanja hipoteza, odabira metodologije te načina interpretacije, to jest u svim aspektima na kojima se temelje znanstvena istraživanja, a na temelju kojih se kreiraju znanstvene teorije. Međutim stav da je znanost najobjektivniji ili barem najmanje neprecizan uvid u realnost i dalje je prevladavajuće i nesporno stajalište svih znanstvenika.

Valja međutim upozoriti na još jedan fenomen povezan s vrijednosnom neutralnošću u znanosti. Radi se o odnosu između teorije i primjene teorije ili između tzv. fundamentalne i primjenjene znanosti. Mada je diskrepancija između te dvije znanstvene perspektive danas mnogo manja nego što

je bila tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća u pogledu vrijednosne neutralnosti Myrdal (1944.)<sup>139</sup> zauzima stajalište, koje je i danas prevladavajuće u društvenim znanostima, da „**primijenjena znanost definitivno nije vrijednosno neutralna**“. Naime dok je fundamentalna znanost primarno orijentirana na znanstveni proces koji vodi do znanstvene teorije pri čemu je znanstvena neutralnost uvjet, primijenjena znanost orijentirana je na problem i njegovo rješavanje, pri čemu nije primaran vrijednosni odnos znanstvenika, nego je važno da njegov vrijednosni odnos ne utječe na odabir i primjenu teorije u praksi. Na primjer, razumljivo je da je odnos svakog čovjeka pa tako i znanstvenika prema nasilju vrijednosno pristran to jest negativan, ali u odabiru teorija i njihove primjene, kako bi se nasilje smanjilo, nužno je slijediti načelo vrijednosne neutralnosti.

Glavni razlog koji je je autora ponukao da se osvrne na ova općepoznata mjesta u suvremenoj znanosti i njenoj primjeni u praksi jest skrenuti pozornost korisnicima podastrte ekspertize da je svjestan mogućih pristranosti s obzirom na svoje socijalno podrijetlo, te da ih je kao znanstvenik nastojao učiniti što minimalnijim.

Opća su uporišta u okviru ponuđenog teorijskog okvira na kojima autor nudi sociopsihologijsko objašnjenje rata u Bosni i Hercegovini u daljnjem tekstu (BiH) :

- 1. U povijesnom kontekstu za objašnjenje rata dva su razdoblja važnija od drugih. Prvo, koje je važno za razumijevanje korjena sukoba ratnih skupina<sup>140</sup> odnosi se na razdoblje otomanskog osvajanja i poretka kada su se na, zatečenom geopolitičkom i kulturnom prostoru srednjevjekovne bosanske države te u tadašnjem međunarodnom okruženju, oblikovali etnički identiteti ratnih skupina koji su bitno utjecali na sva kasnija društvena, politička i kulturna događanja u BiH. Drugo, koje je presudno utjecalo na izbijanje sukoba odnosi se na prvu i drugu Jugoslaviju<sup>141</sup>, a posebice na raspad druge Jugoslavije.**
- 2. Na sociopsihologijskoj i sociološkoj razini promatranja čimbenici koji su bitno odredili tijek, ratni ishod i ponašanje ratnih skupina, su nacionalne i etničke strategije usko povezane s prostornom kulturnom i etničkom homogenizacijom odnosno ekspanzijom u procesu raspada i nakon raspada druge Jugoslavije.**
- 3. Na globalnoj razini čimbenici koji su bitno određivali tijek i ratni ishod su nerazumijevanje ili pristrani stavovi većeg broja međunarodnih političkih aktera uključenih u rješavanje sukoba povezani s povijesnom i kulturnom pozadinom rata te**

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<sup>139</sup> Schultz, P. Wesley, Oskamp, Stuart, *Social Psychology: An Applied Perspective*, New Jersey, 2000, str. 7- 8

<sup>140</sup> Autor koristi izraz ratne ili etničke skupine, ovisno o kontekstu, za Bošnjake-Muslimane, Hrvate i Srbe iz BiH. Kod zajedničkog navođenja poredak je abecedni.

<sup>141</sup> Autor zbog pojednostavljenja koristi izraz prva Jugoslavija za razdoblje 1918-1941. a druga za razdoblje 1945.-1991.

nejedinstveni stavovi povezani s opstankom odnosno raspadom druge Jugoslavije prije izbijanja rata. Na razini međunarodnog prava i njegove primjene nije se uvažavala rezolucija UN – G.A. Res. 3314 (1974.).<sup>142</sup>

## I. KULTURA, SUSTAV VREDNOTA, IDENTITET

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Šest je važnih teorijskih uporišta šire elaboriranih u prvom poglavlju sociopsihologijskoga okvira na kojima se temelji primjena znanstvenih postignuća u kontekstu razumjevanja odnosa sustava vrednota, kulture i identiteta ratnih skupina u BiH. **Prvo**, u povijesnom okviru ljudska populacija svoju raznolikost ostvarivala je putem gena, jezika i kulture. **Drugo**, kultura se na svjetskoj razini, najčešće smješta u okvir društva oblikovanih u okvirima nacionalnih, nadnacionalnih, regionalnih i etničkih skupina. **Treće**, društvene norme temeljene na sustavu vrednota dominantne skupine središte su procesa stabiliziranja kulture oblikovane u navedenim okvirima. **Četvrto**, povijesna perspektiva u okviru koje se kultura shvaća kao kristalizacija povijesti u umu srcu i rukama živućih generacija, nužna je za razumijevanje procesa stabiliziranja kulturnih obrazaca u gore navedenim okvirima. **Peto**, kultura se nalazi u uzajamnom odnosu sa socijalnim aspektom identiteta pojedinca pri čemu kulturni kontekst omogućuje i utječe na usvajanje socijalnog aspekta identiteta pojedinca, a socijalni identitet regulira one aspekte kulturne spoznaje koji su istaknuti u određenom kontekstu. **Šesto**, sustav vrednota je nevidljivi i jedini nematerijalni element kulture, dok su rituali, heroji i simboli materijalni elementi kulture vidljivi unutar i izvan skupine, ali sa značenjem prepoznatljivim jedino pripadnicima skupine.

**U okviru ponuđenog teorijskog konteksta razvidan je značaj povijesne perspektive za razumijevanje kulture, sustava vrednota i identiteta. Sociopsihologijska analiza zapravo nudi razumijevanje ishoda povijesnog procesa u kojemu su se te socijalne kategorije razvile.** Zato je odnos povijesne i sociopsihologijske perspektive (isto vrijedi za antropologijsku i sociologijsku) uzajaman. Naime, na temelju analize ishoda koji nudi socijalna psihologija i druge relevantne društvene znanosti povjesničari mogu provjeravati valjanost i objektivnost historiografskih analiza u interdisciplinarnom kontekstu, a povijesna perspektiva važan je izvor hipoteza za sociopsihologijska istraživanja navedenih socijalnih kategorija te važno uporište za objašnjenje ishoda procesa njihovog

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<sup>142</sup> Rezolucija UN-G.A. Res. 3314 8 (1974) u prvom članu definira agresiju na slijedeći način: Agresija je uporaba vojne sile jedne države protiv suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i političke nezavisnosti druge države, ili na bilo koji drugi način suprotan Povelji Ujedinjenih Naroda, koji nije spomenut u ovoj definiciji. Nota objašnjenja: U ovoj definiciji pojam država: a) koristi se bez obzira je li država priznata ili je član Ujedinjenih Naroda; b) uključuje pojam „grupa država“ gdje je primjereno.

oblikovanja. Stoga suvremeni povjesničari često koriste sociopsihologijske, sociologijske, antropologijske, lingvističke i druge relevantne spoznaje kod objašnjavanja pojedinih povijesnih događaja i procesa.

Kako bi maksimalno smanjio mogućnost vrijednosne pristranosti autor ekspertize će se koristiti povijesnom perspektivom iz knjige Noela Malcolma, na mjestima koja su vrijednosno najosjetljivija.

## 1. ČIMBENICI KOJI SU UTJECALI NA PROCES OBLIKOVANJA IDENTITETA RATNIH SKUPINA

Kao što je usvajanje identiteta u određenom kulturnom kontekstu svojevrsni ishod socijalizacijskog procesa na individualnoj razini, analogno se može tvrditi da je usvajanje etničkog i nacionalnog identiteta koji su u sociopsihologijskom smislu poseban tip skupnih identiteta, svojevrsni ishod povijesnog procesa u određenom kulturnom kontekstu. Stoga je razumijevanje stupnja razvoja etničkih identiteta ratnih skupina – Bošnjaka-Muslimana, Hrvata i Srba, na pragu devedesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća i čimbenika koji su na to bitno utjecali nužno za odgovor na pitanja „tko su pripadnici ratnih skupina“, „po čemu su različiti“, „kako sami sebe doživljavaju“ te „kamo idu“.

### 1.1 Povijesne okolnosti

U Uvodu knjige „Povijest Bosne“, autor Noel Malcolm citira britanskog premijera Johna Majora koji je pred Donjim domom 23. lipnja 1993.,( dakle više od godinu dana nakon izbijanja totalnog rata u BiH) koji je izjavio: „**Najvažniji pojedinačni element koji stoji iza onoga što se dogodilo u Bosni jest raspad Sovjetskog Saveza i stege u kojoj je on držao vjekovne mržnje u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Kad je jednom te stege nestalo, vjekovne su se mržnje opet pojavile, a njihove smo posljedice vidjeli kada su započele borbe. Bilo je tu i nekih drugih elemenata, ali je taj raspad bio kudikamo najvažniji**“.<sup>143</sup>

Navodeći ovu izjavu prvenstvena je namjera autora u kontekstu temeljnih uporišta ekspertize upozoriti na važnost perspektiva iz kojih se rat u BiH promatrao, te važnost činjenične utemeljenosti stavova pojedinih aktera. Povjesničar Malcolm (1994.) tu izjavu komentirao je u knjizi i nudi u većem dijelu prihvatljiv odgovor, temeljen na povijesnim činjenicama<sup>144</sup>.

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<sup>143</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Povijest Bosne*, 1995, Zagreb, str. XXII

<sup>144</sup> “Stega” u kojoj je sovjetski Savez držao Jugoslaviju naglo je prekinuta 1948. godine nakon što je Staljin izbacio Tita iz Kominforma. Možda je g. Major želio aludirati na odluku komunističkih rukovodilaca kao što je



**Budući da se radi o britanskom premijeru koji predstavlja europsku zemlju koja je uz Francusku, Njemačku, i Rusiju iz europske perspektive najviše utjecala na procese pregovaranja u BiH tijekom rata razvidno je da povijesnim okolnostima koje su dovele do sukoba nije pridavan veći značaj. Međutim iz cjelokupne ljudske povijesti poznato je da sukobi među nacionalnim ili etničkim skupinama mogu trajati stoljećima ako se ne uspostavi pravedan mir. A, prvi korak k tome svakako je razumijevanje povijesnih okolnosti koje su do sukoba dovele. Treba vjerovati da je tadašnjem britanskom premijeru poznat stogodišnji rat između Francuske i Velike Britanije ili nacionalni i etnički sukobi na Britanskom poluotoku tijekom devetnaestog i dvadesetog stoljeća. Dakako nisu nepoznati ni krvavi sukobi među religijskim skupinama na tlu Zapadne Europe, naročito nakon crkvenog raskola u srednjem vijeku. Pa ipak današnja Europa pruža nadu da su ti sukobi stvar prošlosti, da mržnja među sukobljenim stranama više ne određuje njihove postupke te da europske integracije počivaju primarno na načelu pravednosti i ravnopravnosti. Zato je nužno i rat u BiH pravedno vrednovati iz pozicije povijesnih okolnosti birajući političku perspektivu koja počiva na činjenicama koje su neprijeporne i o kojima se ne mogu zauzimati različiti stavovi na različitim političkim i inim razinama.**

**Dakle, za razumijevanje sukoba među ratnim skupinama u BiH, u sociopsihologijskom smislu, nužno je, prije svega, razumijevanje ishoda povijesnog procesa u kojima su Bošnjaci- Muslimani, Hrvati i Srbi oblikovali etničke identitete u suvremenom smislu. Valja pri tome napomenuti da za socijalnog psihologa nisu važni pojedinačni povijesni događaji ili nijanse oko kojih se povjesničari spore, niti se svako povijesno razdoblje jednako vrednuje u tom smislu. U kontekstu ponuđenog Hofstedovog modela dovoljno je poznavanje dominantnih ekoloških čimbenika (vidi sliku 3., str. 4) te sustav vrednota dominantne skupine na kojem su oblikovane društvene norme koje su određivale strukturu i funkcioniranje institucija u razdobljima koja su poglavito utjecala na oblikovanje identiteta ratnih skupina kakve danas poznajemo.**

**Najvažnije povijesno razdoblje za analizu identitetskog ishoda za sve tri ratne skupine u BiH neprijeporno je razdoblje otomanskih osvajanja kada je u BiH vladao otomanski poredak. To**

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slobodan Milošević u Srbiji da iskoriste izvore nacionalizma za svoje političke ciljeve; ali taj je proces u Srbiji bio na djelu već u ljeto 1989. godine, dvije godine prije raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, a umnogome se jedva razlikovao od načina na koji su nacionalizam koristile prijašnje političke vođe u komunističkom sistemu kao, primjerice, Nicolae Ceaușescu. Misao da je komunizam općenito provodio djelotvornu „stegu“ kako bi držao nacionalizme na uzdi dvojako je pogrešna. Komunističke su vlasti ili samo raspirivale nacionalizam i manipulirale njime za svoje vlastite ciljeve, ili su ga gušenjem još više razbuktavale i trovale stvarajući politički frustrirano i otuđeno pučanstvo, ili su često radile i jedno i drugo. Taj je dvostruki učinak danas jasno vidljiv u većini istočnoeuropskih zemalja, u kojima stranke takozvane „krajnje desnice“ privlače obične glasače, jer ih potiču vjerski i historijski simboli iz pretkomunističkog doba i političari koji su svoje ranije karijere gradili u komunističkoj partiji i službi državne sigurnosti. To se manje- više dogodilo i u Srbiji.

razdoblje trajalo je od 1463. do 1878., dakle više od četiri stoljeća a povijesno je locirano između feudalnog srednjovjekovlja i postnapoleonskog razdoblja u Europi, kada se rađaju moderne nacije i građansko društvo. Važno je to naglasiti budući da to razdoblje nije samo utjecalo na političku sudbinu BiH, već i na procese u velikom dijelu Europe, a posebice Mediterana i Srednje Europe.

**Glavna karakteristika tog razdoblja su neprestani ratovi s manjim ili većim prekidima u kojima je vladao mir, između otomanskih osvajača i ugroženih zemalja te pobune u pokorenim zemljama.** U takvom kontekstu svi procesi u BiH bili su podređeni ratnim planovima otomanskih osvajača. Stoga je i teritorijalno i upravno ustrojstvo bilo organizirano na vojnom načelu. Glavni ciljevi osvajača bili su ubiranje poreza za financiranje vojske i osiguravanje ljudstva za ratovanje (harač<sup>145</sup> i devširma<sup>146</sup>).

Svim procesima upravljali su muslimani, a postavljeni su voljom cara u Istanbulu. Međutim, iako su kao skupina dominirali, zbog trajno nestabilnih prilika i vojne orijentacije nisu mogli, a prema povjesničarima nije im bio ni temeljni cilj oblikovati isključivo islamske kulturne obrasce i stabilizirati ih. Na taj način nisu svi zatečeni kulturni obrasci zatečenih skupina uništeni niti su Muslimani u BiH strogo slijedili fundamentalne islamske društvene norme karakteristične za islamske zemlje podrijetla osvajača. **Može se reći da se oblikovala neka vrst rubne kulture zbog čega je BiH u europskom kontekstu predotomansko vrijeme nazivana „rubom Zapada” , a u otomanskom razdoblju „rubom Istoka”.**

**U identitetskom smislu, najvažniji proces koji je s jačim ili slabijim intezitetom trajao cijelo razdoblje otomanske vladavine u Bosni, bila je islamizacija neislamskih skupina, zatečenih u Bosni nakon osvajanja te onih koji su dolazili kasnije, poglavito za osvajačima, to jest s Istoka.** Prema povjesničarima, prisilna islamizacija odnosila se poglavito na devširmu koja je provedena u cijelom otomanskom carstvu te neprisiljena islamizacija pojedinih skupina motivirana određenim privilegijama (većom sigurnošću, zadržavanjem vlasništva nad posjedima, manjim porezima).<sup>147</sup> **Ovdje međutim valja napomenuti da u sociopsihologijskom smislu i tzv. neprisiljena ili dragovoljna islamizacija može se smatrati u manjem ili većem stupnju prisilnom.** Radi potpore toj tvrdnji može se na navedenu situaciju primjeniti Maslow-ljeva hijerarhija potreba (Maslow, 1943.) prema kojoj je potreba za sigurnošću druga temeljna potreba, odmah nakon potrebe za zadovoljenje fizioloških

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<sup>145</sup> Prema *Wikipedi-i* harač je osobni porez, tzv. glavarina u Osmanskom carstvu. Naplaćivao se od svake muške nemuslimanske glave, kao vrsta otkupa od ropstva. Davao je pravo na osobnu i imovinsku sigurnost. Harač je bio dokaz vjernosti sultanu, pa su često počinjale bune uskraćivanjem harača. Harač se dijelio po visini na tri klase: *evsat, sala i edna*.

<sup>146</sup> Prema Noelu Malcolmu devširma je danak u dječacima, skupljanje kršćanske muške djece koja su se preobraćala na islam i obučavala za janjičare i carske službenike.

<sup>147</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Povijest Bosne*, 1995, Zagreb, str. 86- 88

potreba.<sup>148</sup> To znači da su svi koji su pristajali na promjenu religijskog identiteta zbog sigurnosti radili to pod neizravnom prisilom jer su kao alternative imali bijeg ili prijetnju stradavanja. Manji stupanj prisile može se pripisati samo onima koji su to radili radi različitih privilegija. Sličan proces događao se u dvadesetom stoljeću u komunističkom bloku zemalja kada je ateizacija provođena neizravnom prisilom. Ovo je važno napomenuti radi jasnijeg razumijevanja položaja pojedinih neislamskih skupina u odnosu na sigurnost i privilegije u otomanskoj BiH te posljedičnu promjenu religijskog identiteta.

Berlinskim sporazumom 1878. završeno je otomansko razdoblje u BiH, a jurisdikciju na BiH dobila je Austro Ugarska. Osvajačka vojska i mnogi doseljeni Muslimani iz islamskih zemalja povukla se iz BiH, a Austro Ugarska vojska pokorila je vojne pokušaje spašavanja neovisnosti BiH. Do 1918. **BiH je tako priključena europskim procesima, s velikoim zaostatkom u društvenom, gospodarskom i kulturnom razvitku (npr. nepismenih je bilo 97%)** S druge strane položaj i odnos među ratnim skupinama bitno se promijenio. Iako Austro Ugarska nije privilegirala nijednu ratnu skupinu čime posebno nije ispunila očekivanja Hrvata, nego je politiku temeljila poglavito na austrijskim interesima, muslimani su, prestali biti dominantnom skupinom i morali su se prilagođavati na sve podređeniji politički i kulturni položaj u odnosu na Hrvate i Srbe. Tome nije bitno pripomogao ni Kallayev unitaristički režim (1882.-1903.)<sup>149</sup> koji je uvođenjem naziva „Bošnjak” te tzv. „bosančice” kao službenog jezika i pisma pokušao spriječiti rađanje hrvatskih i srpskih nacionalnih ideologija kao reakcije na slične procese koji su se u Europi dogodili prije otomanskog povlačenja iz BiH te oblikovati novu nadnacionalnu skupinu koja bi identitetski bila sastavljena od pripadnika sve tri etničke skupine. Međutim Hrvati i Srbi takve pokušaje nisu prihvaćali već su se većinom priključivali nacionalnim i kulturnim procesima u matičnim zemljama Hrvatskoj i Srbiji pa se ta ideja raspala.

Tako su sve do prve Jugoslavije svi društveni, politički, gospodarski i kulturni procesi u BiH bili pod dominantnim vanjskim utjecajima, prvenstveno austrougarskim, hrvatskim i srpskim. Zoran primjer sukoba različitih interesa navedenih strana u BiH svakako je ubojstvo austrougarskog prijestolonasljednika Ferdinanda, koji je bio povodom prvom svjetskom ratu.

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<sup>148</sup> Maslow, Abraham, H., *Theory of Human Motivation*, u časopisu „*Psychological Review*”, 50, str. 6- 7 preuzeto 10.2. 2009. sa [http://www.advancedhiring.com/docs/theory\\_of\\_human\\_motivation.pdf](http://www.advancedhiring.com/docs/theory_of_human_motivation.pdf)

<sup>149</sup> U situaciji u kojoj su uglavnom Srbi u BiH bili potpora interesima Srbije, a Hrvati potpora interesima Hrvatske, austrougarski upravitelj BiH B. Kallay je poduzimao niz mjera s kojima je nastojao neutralizirati srbijanske i hrvatske težnje. Između ostalog, oslanjao se na muslimansko plemstvo, te stoga nije riješio iznimno važno agrarno pitanje, a u javnom životu je nastojao ustrojiti novu, bosansku naciju i nametnuti bosansko ime za jezik (tzv. „bosančica“).

## 1.2 Kultura i religija

Socijalni identitet na pojedinačnoj razini odražava aspekte pojma o sebi koji se zasnivaju na pripadnosti i privrženosti važnim društvenim skupinama. Kao što je u teorijskom dijelu navedeno kroz pripadnost različitim skupinama pojedinac ustvari usvaja socijalni identitet koji određuje njegovo posebno mjesto u društvu. Tajfel (1972), međutim upozoruje da pripadanje pojedinim skupinama doprinosi razvoju pozitivnog socijalnog identiteta samo ako se skupina kojoj pojedinac pripada može favorizirati u odnosu na druge skupine.<sup>150</sup> Uspoređujući svoju s drugim skupinama pojedinac stoga nastoji povećati razlike korist favoriziranja skupine kojoj pripada. **U okviru teorija socijalnog identiteta najvažnijim sastavnicama socijalnog identiteta smatraju se obitelj, zavičaj, lokalna zajednica (regija) u kojoj pojedinac živi, nacionalna pripadnost, državljanstvo, vjeroispovijest i materinji jezik.**

**Kultura i sustav vrednota su stabilne socijalne kategorije koje se razvijaju u dugotrajnom procesu i teško se mijenjaju. Na toj pozadini usvajaju se pojedini aspekti socijalnog identiteta, a posebice nacionalni i etnički te jezični, dok religijski mogu biti i glavno ishodište sustava vrednota i kulture u društvima s istaknutim religijskim fundamentalizmom.** U odnosu na nacionalni i etnički identitet važno je napomenuti da je oblikovanje etničkih identiteta u povijesnom procesu predložak na kojemu se oblikuju nacionalni identiteti<sup>151</sup>

Kao što je navedeno predotomanska BiH u kulturnom pogledu smatrala se „rubom Zapada“, a u otomanskom „rubom Istoka“. Takva kulturna atribucija proizlazila je iz geopolitičkog položaja BiH, vanjskih utjecaja i prijetnji te unutarnje kulturne i etničke strukture. **S obzirom na geopolitički položaj i povijesne okolnosti vanjski utjecaji i prijetnje kroz cijelu povijest BiH bitno su sudjelovali u procesima stabiliziranja odnosno destabiliziranja kulturnih obrazaca u BiH.** Promatrajući s globalne razine jedni su dolazili s Istoka a drugi s Zapada.

**U predotomanskom razdoblju glavni utjecaji sa Zapada u kulturnom smislu dolazili su iz mediteranskog i srednjeeuropskog kulturnog kruga, a glavni prenositelji tog utjecaja u BiH bili su Hrvati. S Istoka glavni utjecaji dolazili su iz Bizantskog carstva, a glavni prenositelji bili su Srbi i Vlasi. U otomanskom razdoblju ti utjecaji su postupno slabili, a jačao je utjecaj islamske kulture koji je zbog dugotrajnog otomanskog prisustva u BiH i islamizacije neotomanskih**

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<sup>150</sup> Hogg, Michael A., Social Identity, u knjizi Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (ed.), *Handbook of Self and Identity*, New York, 2005, str. 466

<sup>151</sup> Korunić, Petar, *Nacija i nacionalni identitet*, u časopisu „*Zgodovinski časopis*“, 57, 2003, str. 10- 12 preuzeto 20. 1. sa stranice <http://www.filg.uj.edu.pl/~wwwip/postjugo/files/273/Etnicki-i-nacionalni-identitet.pdf>

**skupina postupno jačao i postao dominantnim. Glavni prenositelji su bili osvajačka vojska i prateća činovnička struktura, a kasnije i islamizirane skupine.**

U istom razdoblju srednjeeuropski i mediteranski utjecaji su slabili zbog dva razloga. Prvi je što su mediteranske i srednjeeuropske zemlje među kojima i Hrvatska bile u neprestanom ratu s otomanskim carstvom, a drugi je što Hrvati kao glavni prenositelji tog utjecaja zbog uključenosti Hrvatske u neprijateljski blok i procesa islamizacije kojima su bili izloženi nisu bitno mogli utjecati ni na jedan važan proces koji se u BiH događao pa tako ni kulturni. Za razliku od toga bizantski utjecaj je padao budući da su otomanski osvajači pokorili cijelo Bizantsko carstvo i u njemu uspostavili isti poredak kao u BiH. Osim toga pokorena je i Srbija te je time i utjecaj Srba kao glavnih prenositelja bizantske i srpske kulture postupno slabio, iako nikada u tolikoj mjeri kao Hrvati. **Jedan razlog je što je između Srbije kao dijela otomanskog carstva i BiH postojala stalna komunikacija, pa su za osvajačima s Istoka dolazile skupine Srba, Vlaha i drugih te naseljavale razna područja u BiH, a naročito u njenom istočnom dijelu. Drugi je razlog što je srpska pravoslavna crkva koja je poglavara imala u okviru otomanskog carstva bila u povlaštenijem položaju od katoličke čiji je poglavar bio u Rimu i smatrao se neprijateljem otomanskog carstva.** Jedan indikator povlaštenijeg položaja pravoslavlja u odnosu na katoličanstvo je prelazak značajnog broja katolika na pravoslavlje zbog sličnih razloga prelasku na islam dok se obrnuti proces nije događao.

**U takvom općem kontekstu i uz spomenute razlike, religija je za Hrvate i Srbe s vremenom postajala uz očuvnje vjerskog identiteta, i gotovo jedini čuvar i prijenosnik kulturnog nasljeđa i etničkog identiteta iz predotomanskog razdoblja. Među Hrvatima najvažniju ulogu u tom procesu imao je franjevački red koji je jedini imao sultanovo dopuštenje vjerskog djelovanja, okupljen u franjevačkoj provinciji „Bosna Srebrena”, a među Srbima srpska pravoslavna crkva.** Zato je i cjelokupna kulturna baština iz otomanskog razdoblja poglavito skupljana i čuvana u okviru crkvenih objekata, a gradnja crkava bila je jedina dopuštena gradnja među objektima kulture. I tu je pravoslavna crkva, zbog navedenih razloga, bila povlaštenija pa su pravoslavne crkve tek u otomanskom razdoblju sagrađene na cjelokupnom teritoriju BiH, dok su mnoge zatečene katoličke crkve srušene od strane osvajača.

**U istom kontekstu Islam je bitno utjecao na kulturne procese u otomanskom razdoblju.** Mada je otomansko carstvo poglavito počivalo na vojnim i činovničkim strukturama zbog naravi Islama kao religije vjerski čimbenici uže su povezani sa sustavom vrednota i cjelokupnom djelatnošću islamskih vjernika pa je tako religija bitno utjecala na sve kulturne procese. Naročito se taj utjecaj širio u gradovima u kojima su osvajači poglavito i živjeli i koje su potpuno kontrolirali. Mnogobrojne džamije, škole s vjerskom pozadinom te kulturni objekti preplavili su u otomanskom razdoblju BiH gradove. Među te objekte svakako treba ubrojiti i dva mosta – u Višegradu i Mostaru, remek djela otomanskog

graditeljstva. Stoga i danas gradovi u BiH iz tog razdoblja imaju karakteristične stare jezgre kao kulturnu baštinu iz otomanskog razdoblja (npr. Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Travnik itd.).

**Povijesne okolnosti u kojima se BiH našla, u otomanskom razdoblju bitno su utjecale na zatečene socijalne identitete ratnih skupina na različite načine. 1. Bošnjaci Muslimani su demografski stalno rasli, a sustav vrednota, kulturu i identitet temeljili su isključivo na Islamu, mada zbog vojničke naravi otomanskog poretka i procesa islamizacije neislamckih skupina kod BiH muslimana u otomanskom razdoblju nije prevladavao fundamentalizam i kulturna isključivost.<sup>152</sup> 2. Hrvati su u cijelom razdoblju demografski opadali, sustav vrednota i kulturu reducirali su gotovo u cijelosti na religijsku komponentu, etnički identitet su potiskivali pod izravnom i neizravnom prisilom, a jezični identitet osiromašili. 3. Srbi su, također cijelo razdoblje demografski rasli, sustav vrednota i kulturu crpili su iz religijske komponente koja je za razliku od one kod Hrvata s postupno jačala, a jezični identitet razvijali paralelno s religijskim i u njegovom okviru.** U takvim okolnostima sve tri skupine do kraja otomanskog razdoblja identitetski su se deklarirale isključivo na temelju religijske pripadnosti to jest kao muslimani, katolici i pravoslavci pri čemu valja napomenuti da je etnički identitet kod Hrvata u nekim središnjim dijelovima BiH bio toliko potisnut da su ga se jedva sjećali.

Pad otomanskog poretka i odlazak osvajačke vojske i njenih sljedbenika naglo je prekinuo sve navedene procese. U razdoblje austrougarske vladavine nad BiH muslimani su ušli s najsačuvanijom kulturnom i religijskom baštinom, ali s izgubljenom poveznicom s matičnom kulturom, Hrvati su najviše stradali u svakom pogledu, ali s mogućnošću ponovnog povezivanja s matičnom kulturom i etničkim korjenima, a Srbi razvijeni do razine druge po snazi etničke i religijske skupine i uskom kulturnom i etničkom povezanošću s matičnom zemljom iz koje su poglavito doselili za vrijeme otomanskog razdoblja. **U takvom kontekstu, iako je austrougarska monarhija, kako je spomenuto, nastojala zadržati zatečene odnose, kulturni obrasci te etnički i religijski identiteti Hrvata i Srba pod utjecajem matičnih zemalja i šireg kulturnog okruženja naglo su jačali, dok su muslimani bili prisiljeni na potragu za etničkim identitetom što će biti njihova tegoba i kroz cijelo dvadeseto stoljeće.** Naime, u europskom kontekstu u drugoj polovici dvadesetog stoljeća kada su procesi oblikovanja nacija na temeljima građanske revolucije u Francuskoj i postnapoleonskog razdoblja u velikoj većini europskih zemalja bili završeni muslimani iz BiH nisu se mogli konstituirati kao etnička skupina na temelju isključivo religijskog identiteta. Ovi procesi trajali su do rapada austrougarske monarhije nakon prvog svjetskog rata, a nastavili su se s različitim strategijama i intezitetima i tijekom razdoblja prve i druge Jugoslavije. Temeljili su se na teorijskom načelu favoriziranja vlastite skupine

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<sup>152</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Povijest Bosne*, 1995, Zagreb, str. 87, 88, 294

pomoću stvarnih ili izmišljenih argumenata u čemu su se ratne skupine također međusobno razlikovale. **A upravo izmišljanje argumenata koji su pojedinu skupinu favorizirale u očima pripadnika i u usporedbi s drugim ratnim skupinama te kreiranje strategija na tom tipu argumenata stvarale su i pojačavale socijalnu distancu među skupinama, temeljenu na predrasudama<sup>153</sup>, stereotipima<sup>154</sup> i mitovima<sup>155</sup>. Ti procesi su psihološki temelji sukoba među etničkim skupinama u BiH kroz cijelo dvadeseto stoljeće koji su pred kraj stoljeća kulminirali do rata. Srpski mit o „Velikoj Srbiji“ nalazio se u središtu tih procesa tako da je sve kasnije stereotipe o Srbima iz Bošnjačko-Muslimanske i hrvatske perspektive najlakše razumjeti ako se promatraju kao reakcije na taj središnji mit.**

*Mit o „Velikoj Srbiji“ temelji se na nekoliko zasebnih, ali međusobno isprepletenih mitova nastalih nakon Kosovske bitke, a temeljenih na mješavini racionalnih i transcendentnih konstrukcija koje su se prenosile usmenim predanjem što je tipično za mitove, ali i u pjesmama i tekstovima. Valja napomenuti da su tijekom devetnaestog i dvadesetog stoljeća na tim mitovima građeni politički programi i planovi poznati pod nazivima „Načertanije“, „Srbi svi i svuda“ te „Homogena Srbija“. Na tragu svih tih mitova i programa izrađen je i „Memorandum“ Srpske Akademije Nauka i Umetnosti“ 1986. godine. Valja napomenuti da je Haški optuženik Vojislav Šešelj, u istom kontekstu, 2007. godine objavio knjigu u izdanju Srpske radikalne stranke, kojoj je predsjednik, pod naslovom „Rimokatolički zločinački projekat veštačke hrvatske nacije“ što dokazuje da je mitološka svijest još uvijek prisutna u dijelu srpskog društva. Nije nevažno kao potporu toj tvrdnji spomenuti da Srpska radikalna stranka i danas ima najbrojniju podršku birača u Srbiji.*

Anzulovic (1999) opsuje tri takva mita:<sup>156</sup>

*Nakon Kosovske bitke 1389., kad su se sukobili Srbi i Turci, počeli su se javljati tekstovi, pjesme o tome kako je knez Lazar izabrao **nebesko kraljevstvo** nad zemaljskim. Najpoznatija pjesma o kneževom izboru nebeskog kraljevstva nad zemaljskim je ona „Pad srpskog kraljevstva“, koja govori o tome kako je sveti Ilija knezu Lazaru ponudio izbor: nebesko kraljevstvo ili zemaljsko kraljevstvo. Prema toj pjesmi, ukoliko knez Lazar odabere zemaljsko kraljevstvo, nakon što osedla svoje konje i pripremi vojnike za bitku protiv Turaka, cijela turska vojska će nestati. No, ukoliko odabere nebesko kraljevstvo, Lazaru je sveti Ilija rekao da sagradi crkvu na Kosovu od čiste svile i baršuna, neka se vojnici pričeste, jer će cijela njegova vojska nestati kao i on sam. Prema ovom mitu, princ Lazar je odabrao nebesko kraljevstvo, sagradio crkvu- šator, pozvao srpskog patrijarha i dvanaest biskupa te su vojnici pričješćeni i pripremljeni. Ta pjesma nadalje opisuje neustrašivu bitku Srba i Turaka, u kojoj su srpski vojnici zajedno sa svojim princom nastali sa zemlje.*

*Druga poznata narodna pjesma o Kosovskoj legendi je Kneževa večera, koja govori o večeri kneza Lazara sa svojim vitezovima večer uoči bitke. Analogija Posljednje večere Isusa krista je očita, navodi Anzulovic (1999). Što je Kosovka večera nego Posljednja večera? Nakon obje slijedi žrtveni prinos. Na Posljednjoj večeri se Krist žrtvovao; na Kosovskoj večeri, vladar i narod su se žrtvovali. U više figurativnih prikaza Kosovske večere u srpskim crkvama i manastirima, Lazar se prikazuje kako sjedi okružen s dvanaest ratnika apostola. Analogija Posljednje večere je pojačana i prisutnošću navodnog izdajice među dvanesticom ratnika. Originalna funkcija legende o odabiru nebeskog kraljevstva princa Lazara je transformirati navodni vojni poraz u moralnu pobjedu. Na kraju je legenda proširena kako bi se prikazali ljudi koji na svakoj svojoj povijesnoj prekretnici teže nebeskom kraljevstvu usvajajući poziciju moralnog autoriteta.*

<sup>153</sup> Predrasuda je neprijateljski ili negativan stav prema pripadnicima prepoznatljive grupe ljudi, koji se zasniva isključivo na njihovu članstvu u toj grupi.

<sup>154</sup> Stereotip je generalizacija o grupi ljudi, kojom se istovjetne osobine pripisuju gotovo svim članovima te grupe, neovisno o stvarnim varijacijama između članova.

<sup>155</sup> Priča, predajno vjerovanje starih naroda o podrijetlu svijeta, o prirodnim pojavama, o bogovima i legendarnim herojima. U prenesenom značenju mit znači bajka, priča izmišljotina, nevjerodostojan prikaz nekih događaja.

<sup>156</sup> Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia*, London, 1999, str. 11- 13, 30- 31

**Legenda o Kosovu** sadrži kontradikciju. S jedne strane, slavi kneza Lazara, vođu srpske vojske na Kosovu, zato što je izabrao nebesko kraljevstvo, čak i pod cijenu poraza i ropstva. S druge strane, najslavniji heroj Kosovskog ciklusa- Miloš Obilić- je vođen prije pogansko- herojskom nego kršćanskom etikom. Obilića se slavi zbog jedne svoje akcije, koja je kombinacija lukavstva i herojskog samožrtvovanja. Prema jednoj verziji ove legende, Obilić je došao Sultanu Muradu i tijekom Kosovske bitke pretvarajući se da hoće postati njegov podanik. No, kada je pridobio pažnju, izvukao je nož kojeg je sakrio u odjeću i ubio sultana. Proširenje kulta Obilića dolazi do te mjere da je on nekad prikazivan kao svetac. Primjerice, u manastiru u Grabovcu, na jugu Niša, na oltaru postoji slika kneza Lazara i Miloša Obilića pored njega. Oko Miloševe glave je naslikana tradicionalna aureola i natpis: Sveti Miloš Obilić.

**Svetoslavlje** je uobičajen srpski termin za specifičnu vrstu crkve, države i nacije koje je ustanovljeno od strane Svetog Save na početku 13. stoljeća. Srpski teolozi je definiraju kao „Pravoslavno oplemenjivanje zdravim srpskim nacionalizmom“. Formulirana je kao mesijanska ideologija 1930- ih , kada je srpska crkva pružila potporu svesrpskoj politici jugoslavenske vlade u novoj jugoslavenskoj uniji. Svetoslavlje, objavljeno u Beogradu od 1932 do 1940, je bio instrument u širenju ideologije, na koju je snažno utjecao ruski slavenofilski mesijanizam i koji je utemeljen na uvjerenju da samo pravoslavlje očuvalo čistoću originalnog kršćanstva. Danilo Medan, jedan od njegovih promicatelja, je napisao da je Svetoslavlje simbol panslavističke ideje jedinstva svih Slavena, čija je misija univerzalna: mora svijetu podariti istinsko kršćanstvo u interpretaciji pravoslavlja, čiji su autentični izvori prikriveni od strane rimskog katolicizma i protestantizma sa zapada. Svetoslavlje naciju promatra kao svetu zbog njene identifikacije s jednom jedinom, pravom vjerom. Ovo uvjerenje je očito u riječima arhimandrita Justina Popovića: „Naša nacionalna povijest je jasan dokaz Kristovog uskrsnuća i moći“. Ujedno, nejasna granica između zemaljskog i transcendentnog je očito i u Velimirovićevu govoru na dan slavlja Vidovdan: Ako nas netko upita što je ideal našeg naroda, može dobiti odgovor odmah: svetost. Sa svim svojim srcem, ljudi žele svetu crkvu, svetu školu, svetu kulturu, svetu dinastiju, svetu vlast, svetu državu i – svetu vojsku.

### 1.3 Nacija i ideologija

U povijesnom smislu naciju čine teritorijalnost, kulturna povezanost, etnicitet i postojanje nacionalne države. Kao što je navedeno oblikovanje nacija i nacionalnih država u Europi, na spomenutim temeljima, dogodilo se u povijesnom procesu koji je za većinu zemalja završen polovicom, a za manji broj krajem devetnaestog stoljeća (npr. skandinavske zemlje). Među zemljama koje su u tom povijesnom kontekstu oblikovale naciju bile su i Hrvatska i Srbija. **Valja međutim napomenuti da je Hrvatska, slijedila tzv. preporodnu europsku matricu u prvoj polovici devetnaestog stoljeća slično drugim zemljama u okviru Habsburške monarhije (češki narodni preporod, slovački narodni preporod, mađarski politički i kulturni preporod), a u Srbiji je taj proces tekao paralelno s oslobađanjem od Turske okupacije (srpski ustanci početkom devetnaestog stoljeća ) te se njegova artikulacija prepoznavala krajem stoljeća u okviru Kraljevine Srbije koja je ustanovljena nakon Berlinskog kongresa 1978.**

U novom geopolitičkom okruženju sa razvijenim hrvatskom i srpskom kulturnom i nacionalnom idejom u različitim okolnostima BiH se našla u sličnoj situaciji kakva je bila u predotomansko vrijeme – na kulturnom rubu Zapada i Istoka. Zbog različitih strategija Austro Ugarske i iz njenog okvira Hrvatske



kao zainteresirane za sudbinu Hrvata u BiH te Srbije, BiH se i pored navedenog Kallay-eva pokušaja, cijelo razdoblje austrougarske dominacije, nije uspjela oblikovati kao nacija. U prvu Jugoslaviju BiH je, dakle, ušla s neriješenim pitanjima nacionalne i kulturne integracije, te s jakim vanjskim utjecajima iz Hrvatske i Srbije s različitim strategijama. Hrvatska strategija dominantno se odnosila na kulturnu integraciju Hrvata iz BiH u hrvatski nacionalni korpus, a srpska na dominaciju u BiH i teritorijalnu ekspanziju sukladno razvijenoj strategiji „Velike Srbije” sociopsihologijski utemeljene na spomenutom mitu. U takvom kontekstu Bošnjaci-Muslimani priklanjali su se Hrvatima ili Srbima u pogledu nacionalne identifikacije, a kao muslimani zauzimali za teritorijalnu cjelovitost BiH. **Stoga se može zaključiti da je BiH u prvu Jugoslaviju integrirana prvenstveno kao teritorij na kojem nijedna etnička skupina nije ostvarila kulturnu odnosno političku dominaciju niti su imali jedinstvenu strategiju budućnosti BiH u novim okolnostima.** Drugim riječima centrifugalne tendencije u BiH pojačane nacionalno-ekspanzionističkom strategijom Srbije i kulturnim utjecajima iz Hrvatske bile su jače od unitarističkih za koje su se zalagali poglavito muslimani, potpomognuti austrougarskom politikom i interesima.

**U prvu Jugoslaviju, dakle, BiH je ušla bez bitnih pretpostavki da se konstituira kao nacija što bi bio temelj za izgradnju društvenog i političkog sustava. Stoga su cijelo razdoblje druge Jugoslavije svi važniji društveni i politički procesi u BiH samo odražavali glavnu političku matricu koja se temeljila na srpskim nastojanjima za političkom dominacijom i teritorijalnom ekspanzijom u skladu s mitom o Velikoj Srbiji te nastojanjima Hrvatske da se od toga obrani, izbori za ravnopravan politički položaj i spriječi komadanje hrvatskog teritorija.** Uz to Hrvatska je bila izložena i talijanskim teritorijalnim posezanjima za većinom obale Jadranskog mora i otoka te Dalmacije. U takvom kontekstu Hrvati iz BiH bili su u sličnoj situaciji kao u otomanskom razdoblju to jest prisiljeni boriti se za očuvanje identiteta s osloncem na Hrvatsku, Srbi su podržavali velikosrpsku ekspanzionističku politiku i sudjelovali u njoj, a Bošnjaci-Muslimani, okupljeni oko Jugoslavenske Muslimanske Organizacije nastojali poglavito sačuvati stečena dobra i vlasništvo. **Zbog takvih strategija Bošnjaci-Muslimani su dijelili sličnu sudbinu ugroženosti s Hrvatima te su se zbog toga češće nacionalno izjašnjavali Hrvatima nego Srbima** (gotovo svi članovi Jugoslavenske Muslimanske organizacije izjašnjavali su se Hrvatima muslimanske vjeroispovijesti).

Krajnji rezultat neprestanih sukoba s takvim političkim strategijama bilo je političko prekrajanje jugoslavenskog teritorija u više navrata.<sup>157</sup> Zadnji je uslijedio 1939. godine kada je BiH teritorijalno reorganizirana na način da je kralj osnovao hrvatsku banovinu, a BiH izgubila teritorijalni okvir s kojim je

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<sup>157</sup> Jurčević, Josip, *Ekspertiza za potrebe MKSJ: Bosna i Hercegovina 1990.- 1995. godine*, Zagreb, 2008., str. 21- 25

ušla u Jugoslaviju. **Glavni politički cilj koji je tadašnji jugoslavenski kralj, po nacionalnosti Srbin, htio postići tom teritorijalnom organizacijom bio je smanjiti izvore sukoba između Hrvatske i Srbije uoči drugog svjetskog rata.** Međutim, iako je tom podjelom postignut prividno i privremeno smirivanje političkih sukoba brojni su povijesni tragovi koji pokazuju da s takvim teritorijalnim prekrajanjem nitko nije bio zadovoljan. Budući da nitko, osim Srba nije bio zadovoljan političkim odnosima te društvenim i kulturnim procesima kojima je Srbija nastojala mit o Velikoj Srbiji pretvotiti u političku, društvenu i kulturnu stvarnost, druga Jugoslavija se raspala na samom početku drugog svjetskog rata.

**U pozadini političkih sukoba u prvoj Jugoslaviji djelovale su dvije ekstremne nacionalne ideologije čiji su glavni akteri bili Ustaše u Hrvatskoj koji su djelovali ilegalno i Četnici u Srbiji, Hrvatskoj, BiH i Crnoj Gori koji su djelovali legalno. Pored njih ilegalno su, u okviru ekstremne internacionalne ideologije sa staljinističkim temeljima djelovali jugoslavenski komunisti s vođom Titom. Te tri ideologije presudno će utjecati na sva zbivanja u Drugom svjetskom ratu, odrediti njegov ishod te budućnost prostora koji se do rata nazivao Kraljevina Jugoslavija.** Valja, međutim, naglasiti da su sve tri nastupale s ekstremnih i suprostavljenih pozicija, uz napomenu da su u jednom razdoblju tridesetih godina komunisti i Ustaše s različitim političkim motivima, ali istim ciljem rušenja Kraljevine Jugoslavije surađivale u otporu i sukobima s velikosrpskom politikom kralja Petra Karađorđevića te zbog toga bili progonjeni i zatvarani.

**Nakon raspada prve Jugoslavije u Hrvatskoj je uvjerljivo najjača politička opcija bila Hrvatska seljačka stranka s liderom Vlatkom Mačekom koji se pred ratnim događanjima povukao i tako stvorio političku krizu s neizvjesnim posljedicama.** Ta kriza je pogodovala dolasku na vlast ekstremne političke skupine Ustaša koji su pred progonima u drugoj Jugoslaviji boravili u Italiji i bili pod njezinom zaštitom. Ustaše su formirali Nezavisnu Državu Hrvatsku (NDH) koja se sastojala od teritorija Hrvatske, umanjenog temeljem tzv Rimskih ugovora između Italije i NDH 1941. za veći broj otoka i većinu dalmatinskog kopna te teritorija BiH. Njima se pridružila većina muslimanske elite koja se etnički izjašnjavala kao Hrvati muslimanske vjeroispovjesti, dakle slično članovima Jugoslavenske muslimanske organizacije i iz sličnog temeljnog razloga – osjećaja ugroženosti od Srba. Kao druga ekstremna politička opcija na scenu su stupili jugoslavenski komunisti predvođeni Titom koji su osnovali ilegalni pokret kojemu je temeljni cilj bilo osvojiti vlast na cijelom prostoru druge Jugoslavije i uspostaviti komunističku diktaturu. **U Srbiji je također nastupila politička kriza jer je kralj nakon raspada Jugoslavije i Njemačke okupacije u travnju 1941. pobjegao u London, u Beogradu je uspostavljena kvinsliška vlast Milana Nedića, a kralj je iz Londona 1942. imenovao Dražu Mihajlovića kao svog namjesnika za Jugoslaviju koja više nije postojala.** Draža Mihajlović, vođa ekstremnog četničkog pokreta koji se uz neke marginalne iznimke cijelo vrijeme borio na strani Njemaca

i Talijana protiv Titovih partizana i Ustaša s kojima je u borbi protiv partizana povremeno i surađivao? **Tako se dogodila paradoksalna situacija da su tri ekstremne i suprotstavljene skupine, od kojih nijedna na vlast nije došla demokratskim putem odlučivali o sudbini Jugoslavije i svih naroda s njenog prostora. Pobijedio je Tito kojeg su saveznici 1944. godine priznali za glavnog saveznika u borbi protiv Njemaca na cijelom prostoru druge Jugoslavije.** Na taj način ustrojena je i tzv. AVNOJ<sup>158</sup>-evska Jugoslavija tako nazvana na zasjedanju partizana u malom gradu u BiH (tada teritorija NDH) Jajcu krajem 1943. godine. Nakon završetka rata nazvana je Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija, a odluke sa spomenutog zasjedanja u Jajcu postale su temeljem njenog političkog i teritorijalnog ustroja. Sastojala se od šest republika (Bosna i Hercegovina, Crna Gora, Hrvatska, Makedonija, Slovenija, Srbija) i dvije autonomne pokrajine (Kosovo i Vojvodina).

Sažeto i Hrvatska (s priključenom BiH) i Srbija u formalnom smislu, slično većini Europe i cijelom jugoslavenskom okruženju ( Austriji; Mađarskoj, Rumunjskoj, Bugarskoj, Grčkoj, Albaniji), tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata pripadale su silama osovine i imale kvinsliške vlade. Osim toga na teritoriju koji je obuhvaćala prva Jugoslavija bile su organizirane dvije ilegalne, u političkom smislu, također ekstremne skupine-jugoslavenski komunisti kao organizatori antifašističkog partizanskog pokreta te srpski četnici koji su se predstavljali kao kraljevska jugoslavenska vojska. Sve navedene legalne i ilegalne skupine bile su u međusobnim sukobima, s povremenim udruživanjima kada su im se političke strategije preklapale (Ustaše s Četnicima protiv partizana, Četnici s partizanima protiv Ustaša). Kada je podignut plašt drugog svjetskog rata s prostora Jugoslavije vrlo brzo se otkrilo da su stvarni pobjednici sukoba među navedenim ekstremnim skupinama jugoslavenski komunisti koji su zbog organiziranja antifašističkog otpora bili jedini saveznici silama pobjednicama Drugog svjetskog rata. Kako bi uspostavili vlast komunisti su počinili masovni zločin na kraju rata i nekoliko godina poslije rata kojim su se osvetili protivnicima u ratu te pobili sve ideološke neprijatelje i protivnike uspostave totalitarnog poretka u Jugoslaviji. Na različite načine u tim zločinima stradali su i mnogi antifašistički borci iz partizanskih redova koji se s takvom Titovom politikom nisu slagali ili su se suprotstavili Titovom odstupanju od istočnoeuropskog komunističkog saveza predvođenog Staljinom 1948. godine.<sup>159</sup>

**Dva su masovna zločina, pored njenog totalitarnog ustroja, bitno odredila odnose na sociopsihologijskoj razini promatranja. Prvi, koji je počinio totalitarni poredak NDH i drugi, koje su počinili jugoslavenski partizani krajem rata te jugoslavenski komunisti poslije rata osvećujući se ratnim neprijateljima i uklanjajući ideološke protivnike.**

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<sup>158</sup> Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije

<sup>159</sup> Jurčević, Josip, *Bleiburg- Jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima*, Zagreb, 2005, str. 332

Ovdje je važno napomenuti da su Srbi, u drugoj Jugoslaviji na zločinima koje je počinio tadašnji poredak NDH prema Srbima gradili mit <sup>160</sup> o genocidu nad srpskim narodom i genocidnom karakteru Hrvata.<sup>161</sup> **Na tom mitu, u drugoj Jugoslaviji, homogenizirano je srpsko pučanstvo u Hrvatskoj, a ostvarivana je i apsolutna dominacija Srba u represivnoj i drugim strukturama To će se iskoristiti i za homogenizaciju Srba u Hrvatskoj i BiH u procesu raspada Jugoslavije te za srpsku propagandu u inozemstvu kojom se zamagljivala srbijanska agresija na Hrvatsku i BiH, a Srbi prikazivani žrtvom.** Drugi zločin koji su počinili jugoslavenski komunisti, poznat pod nazivom Blajburška tragedija, najbolje je objasnio visoki partijski dužnosnik i Titov sljedbenik, a kasnije kada se Tito rastao od Staljina progonjeni i zatvarani disident i prebjeg na Zapad Milovan Đilas: „Da bi Jugoslavija opstala Hrvatska mora nestati”.

**Druga Jugoslavija bila je komunistička i totalitarna tvorevina, koja je po ustroju, metodama, postupanju prema oponentima i kulturi slijedila staljinističke koncepte karakteristične za sve države tzv „istočnog bloka“. Ustroj joj je bio jednopartijski i centralistički, glavna metoda vladanja je bila represija, a kultura tzv „masovna“ s ugrađenom idejom i likom vođe.**

Međutim dva su izuzetka, u očima zapadne civilizacije, razdvajala Jugoslaviju od drugih totalitarističkih tvorevina. Prvi se odnosi na raskid odnosa Sovjetskog Saveza s Jugoslavijom 1948.godine, a drugi na pokušaj uvođenja gospodarskog modela „socijalističkog samoupravljanja“. Kako se s obzirom na geopolitički položaj u razdoblju „hladnog rata“ takva pozicija Jugoslavije preklapala s interesima zapadnih zemalja, Jugoslavija je dobivala političku i financijsku podršku tijekom cijelog razdoblja svoje vladavine. To je učvršćivalo komunističku vlast u Jugoslaviji i omogućavalo da, s obzirom na centralizirani ustroj s ideološkom pozadinom i Tita kao kult osobu, služeći se represijom pokuša razviti model nadnacionalne jugoslavenske kulture i identiteta. Sukladno predočenom „dijagramu luka“ ( slika 2.,str. 3) sustav vrednota proizlazio je iz komunističke ideologije te ateističkog i antiteističkog (slučaj Stepinac) duha kulturnih,obrazovnih i svih ostalih institucija.

**Ritualima se slijedio model „vođe“, masovnim proslavama i paradama obilježavani su svi događaji koji su bili važni za nastanak druge Jugoslavije, a nacionalni vjerski praznici istiskivani su ili potiskivani u privatnost. Model proglašavanja „heroja“ bio je jedinstven. Prvi „heroj“ te tvorevine bio je Tito, a za heroja je proglašen tri puta tijekom svoje vladavine. Svi ostali heroji, bilo da su dolazili iz vojnih, političkih, intelektualnih, umjetničkih i drugih krugova proglašavani su takvima prvenstveno na temelju odanosti „vođi“, a sekundarno na temelju zasluga. Ukoliko bi se**

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<sup>160</sup> Jurčević, Josip, *Nastanak jasenovačkog mita*, Zagreb, 1998, str. 149- 153

<sup>161</sup> Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia*, London, 1999, str. 7, 106- 108

suprotstavili vođi bili su proganjani, zatvarani i ubijani, a umjesto heroja bili su stigmatizirani kao izdajnici. Sve njihove zasluge bile su podvrgnute procesu kolektivnog zaborava. (primjer Golog Otoka<sup>162</sup>, Đilasa<sup>163</sup>, Tuđmana<sup>164</sup>, Izetbegovića<sup>165</sup>, Hebranga<sup>166</sup> i slično).

**Na razini simbola politički je nametnut srpskohrvatski jezik kao službeni na cijelom jugoslavenskom prostoru, jezici ostalih nacionalnih skupina učili su se kao drugi jezici (primjer deklaracije o jeziku<sup>167</sup>).** Obrazovanje, umjetnost, književnost te govor bili su prožeti ideološkom

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<sup>162</sup> Sve do Prvog svjetskog rata na Golom otoku nije bilo naselja, kada je Austro Ugarska tu napravila logor za ruske zarobljenike s istočnog bojišta. Poslije drugog svjetskog rata federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija pretvorila je 1949. Goli otok u strogi zatvor (robiju), gdje isključivo bili zatvarani politički zatvorenici. Ovaj zatvor je bio u rukama federalne vlade sve do 1956., kada prelazi u nadležnost SR Hrvatske.

U razdoblju između 1948. i 1963. nakon razlaza Tita i Staljina, na Goli otok su deportirani svi koji su se tome suprotstavili, a kasnije i mnogi drugi koji su se suprotstavljali totalitarnom jugoslavenskom poretku. Na Goli Otok deportirane su i žene koje su kasnije premještene na otok Grgur u blizini Golog otoka. Među njima su bili brojni intelektualci, umjetnici i kulturni djelatnici sa cijelog prostora druge Jugoslavije. To je bio svojevrsni logor u koji se dolazilo nakon presude prijekog suda. Nad zatočenicima vršene su tjelesne i psihičke torture, a mnogi su ubijeni. Nakon otpuštanja bili su pod trajnim nadzorom jugoslavenskih tajnih službi, a o torturama nisu smjeli svjedočiti. Obitelji čuvara nisu komunicirale niti su znale gdje su dok su obnašali službu na Golom Otoku. Ne postoje precizne statistike koliko je bilo zatočenika, a procjene se kreću između 30 i 60 tisuća.

<sup>163</sup> Đilas je bio je visoki dužnosnik Komunističke partije Jugoslavije do 1953. kada je u glavnom partijskom glasilu *Borbi* i teorijskom časopisu *Nova misao* objavio niz članaka s liberalističkih pozicija, od kojih je najpoznatiji *Anatomija jednoga morala*. Ta je njegova kritička publicistička djelatnost doživjela jednoglasnu osudu Trećeg plenuma CK SKJ u siječnju 1954. Đilas biva isključen iz partijskog članstva, radi neprijateljske propagande, širenja neistina i povjerljivih podataka. Oduzet mu je Orden narodnog heroja i čin rezervnoga generala. Služio je je zatvorsku kaznu od 1955. do 1966 a nakon nje je bio pod stalnim policijskom prisмотрom.

<sup>164</sup> Tuđman je bio general JNA, koju je napustio 1961 te postao ravnatelj znanstvenog Instituta. Među prvima u Socijalističkoj Republici Hrvatskoj otvorio je raspravu o hrvatskim nacionalnim temama, među kojima su prema njemu najvažnije bile nametanje kompleksa krivnje zbog postojanja NDH, centralizacija Jugoslavije koja je marginalizirala i provincijalizirala Hrvatsku, Jasenovački mit kao stožer novovjeke velikosrpske ideologije, te srpski dominantni i hrvatski podređeni položaj u višenacionalnoj zajednici. Tijekom 1971., Tuđman je radikalizirao i još jasnije izrazio svoje stavove, što je uzrokovalo i osudu od strane hrvatskoga komunističkoga vodstva (Miko Tripalo, Savka Dabčević-Kučar). To je 1972. dovelo do njegova zatvaranja i insceniranog sudskog procesa u kojemu je Tuđman trebao poslužiti žrtvenim jarcem kao "tvrdokorni nacionalist" koji održava veze s hrvatskom političkom emigracijom. Zahvaljujući intervenciji Miroslava Krleža kod Josipa Broza Tita izbjegao je višegodišnju robiju i osuđen je na 2 godine zatvora.

<sup>165</sup> Na političkom procesu u Sarajevu 1983. Alija Izetbegović je osuđen (zajedno s još nekolicinom istomišljenika) zbog «muslimanskog nacionalizma» i «neprijateljske propagande» na 14 godina zatvora. Radilo se o tipično komunističkom montiranom procesu zbog delikta mišljenja: Izetbegović nije bio upleten ni u kakve subverzivne djelatnosti, niti je propagirao nasilje. Jedino točno u presudi je sama implicitna karakterizacija Izetbegovićeve svjetonazora kao panislamističkoga i teokratskoga. Nakon izdržanoga dijela kazne u zatvoru u Zenici, 1988. je, u klimi liberalizacije raspadajućega komunizma, amnestiran.

<sup>166</sup> Hebrang je bio visoki dužnosnik Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije i Ministar u jugoslavenskoj vladi. Zahlađenjem odnosa sa Sovjetskim Savezom Hebrang je osumnjičen da održava tajne kontakte sa sovjetskom ambasadom, odnosno da je staljinist. U svibnju 1948. je isključen iz KPJ i uhićen pod optužbom da je surađivao s ustašama i Gestapom u zarobljeništvu te "sabotirao" gospodarsku politiku FNRJ; i Rusi su za to navodno znali, ali ga nisu izdali nego ucijenili da bude njihov agent. Povodom uhićenja sovjetski veleposlanik je prosvjedovao i tražio da njihovi predstavnici budu nazočni prilikom ispitivanja, no zahtjevi su odbijeni. Hebrang nije priznao krivicu niti se odrekao Informbiroa te je završio u zatvoru gdje je navodno ubijen, a vlasti su smrt prikazale kao samoubojstvo (u službenom izvješću je navedeno da je nađen obješen o radijator u zatvoru Glavnjači, dok svjedoci i dokumenti govore da je u tom zatvoru grijanje bilo samo na *kruto gorivo*, dakle radijatora i pripadajućih cijevi nije bilo).

<sup>167</sup> Komunistička partija Jugoslavije u svome internacionalističkome usmjerenju bila je protiv mnogih nacionalnih obilježja i uvodila svoje, može se reći komunističke nazive. Tada je npr. Stranka preokrenuta u partija, tajnik i ministar u sekretar, glavni tajnik u generalni sekretar, glavni ili središnji odbor u centralni komitet, vojska u armija, redarstvo i oružništvo u milicija, gospodin u drug, glazba u muzika, povijest u historija, skup, zbor u miting, škola u centar i druge. Većinom su to

pozadinom i porukom, a kulture zapadnih zemalja nisu predstavljane neutralno već su vrednovane u odnosu na „jugoslavensku“ kulturu.

Sukladno predloženom teorijskom okviru takav sustav vrednota, rituali, heroji i simboli kao elementi jugoslavenskog kulturnog modela imali su značenje i prepoznatljivost samo stanovništvu Jugoslavije iako su svima bili vidljivi. **U kontekstu Hofstede-ova modela stabiliziranja kulture (slika 3., str. 4), društvene norme temeljile su se na nametanju sustava vrednota putem državne strukture i institucija kojima su upravljali članovi komunističke partije, koji su taj sustav temeljili na komunističkoj ideologiji i marksizmu i zabranjivali svaki oblik pluralizma.** Posljedice su bile da je na tom sustavu izgrađivan politički sustav, socijalna stratifikacija, obrazovni sustav, zakonodavstvo, vršena je podjela uloga, a poticala se i socijalizacija mladih čak i unutar obitelji. Religija je sukladno marksističkom načelu proglašavana „opijumom za narod“, a religijske vođe i kler neprijateljima te su mnogi od njih, a posebno katolici, proganjani, zatvarani i ubijani (ubijeni svećenici<sup>168</sup> i suđenje Stepincu<sup>169</sup>). Čak je i arhitektura imala „socijalističku prepoznatljivost“.

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bile tuđice, mnogo uobičajenije u srpskome književnom jeziku, a u njihovim olakim i nekritičnim preuzimanjem, što se također podudaralo s osobinama srpskoga književnoga jezika, hrvatski je bio potiskivan, a hrvatski jezični osjećaj prema tuđicama otupljen pa su tada vrata širom otvorena anglicizmima. No srpska strana nije bila zadovoljna ni takvim stanjem, nego je nastojala da hrvatski i srpski književni jezik što više zbliže i da u tome hrvatski bude potpuno potisnut. S tom je namjerom uredništvo Letopisa Matice srpske raspisalo anketu o jezičnim i pravopisnim pitanjima i do rujna 1954. Letopisi je objavio odgovore četrdesetak sudionika. Poslije završene ankete održan je sastanak na kojem je zaključeno da je jezik Hrvata, Srba i Crnogoraca jedan jezik, pa je i književni koji se razvio oko dva središta, Zagreba i Beograda, jedinstven s dva izgovora: ijekavskim i ekavskim, da je u nazivu jezika u službenoj upotrebi nužno istaknuti oba njegova dijela (i hrvatski i srpski), da su ravnopravna oba izgovora (ijekavski i ekavski) i oba pismna (latinica i ćirilica), da je potrebno izraditi pritučni rječnik hrvatskosrpskog/srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika, terminološke rječnike i zajednički pravopis. Na temelju tih zaključaka izrađen je zajednički pravopis koji je 1960. Matica hrvatska izdala ijekavski i latinicom pod naslovom Pravopis hrvatskosrpskoga književnog jezika, a Matica srpska ekavski i ćirilicom pod naslovom Pravopis srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika. Dok je zajednički pravopis primljen više- manje prešutno, premda se u nekim svojim dijelovima znatno razlikovao od dotadašnjeg Broz- Boranićeva Pravopisa, izlazak Rječnika Matice hrvatske- Matice srpske (prozvanoga „Adok“) izazvao je na hrvatskoj strani buru nezadovoljstva. Uočavaju se i u kritici ističu nedostaci Rječnika, od kojih je najbitnije unifikatorsko prikrivanje posebnosti hrvatskoga i srpskoga leksika. Posljedica tog nezadovoljstva jest „Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika“ iz 1967. godine, koju je potpisala većina hrvatskih kulturnih i znanstvenih ustanova i koja je naišla na snažnu političku osudu. Matica hrvatska odriče se Novosadskoga dogovora i zajedničkoga pravopisa, prekida rad na zajedničkom rječniku (koji dovršava samo srpska strana), te organizira izradu novog pravopisa.

<sup>168</sup> Nakon završetka Drugog svjetskog rata na području Jugoslavije nastala je brojna režimska literatura koja je sustavno najcrnjim atributima kriminalizirala Crkvu, svećenike i angažirane laike a posvema prešućivala zločine nad njima, prije svega one partizanske. S druge strane, isti režim krot skoro pola stoljeća najstrože je zabranjivao i progonio svaki drukčiji govor o nastradalim svećenicima, ačsnim sestrama, braći laicima, bogoslovima i sjemeništarcima o kojima se u domovini može objektivno pisati tek nakon 1990. godine pa su se u međuvremenu pojavile opsežne studije o njima. Jugoslavenski komunisti ubili su za vrijeme druge Jugoslavije 534 crkvene osobe, najviše neposredno nakon Drugog svjetskog rata.

<sup>169</sup> Stepinac je bio zagrebački metropolit tijekom cijelog Drugog svjetskog rata. Suprostavljaio se i fašističkom i komunističkom totalitarizmu. Zbog sukoba s Titom oko statusa katoličke crkve u Hrvatskoj i slobode vjeroispovjesti 18. rujna 1946. u pola šest ujutro policajci su ušli u zgradu zagrebačke nadbiskupije i priveli Stepinca jer je protiv njega podignuta optužnica. Između ostalog optužen je, da je pozdravio ustaške vođe dok se jugoslavenska vojska još borila s njemačkim i talijanskim snagama i pozvao svećenstvo da s njima surađuje; da je pretvorio tradicionalne crkvene svečanosti i procesije u političke manifestacije za Pavelića i služio misu svakog 10. travnja, na godišnjicu osnivanja NDH, a održao je i misu prilikom otvaranja ustaškog Sabora; da je izabrao za svoje zamjenike Vučetića i Celclju, poznate ustaške simpatizere; da je prihvatio i sakrio arhiv ministarstva vanjskih poslova NDH; da je podržavao ustaški otpor nakon oslobođenja zemlje itd. Nekoliko mjeseci prije Vatikanu je upućeno upozorenje, da će Stepinac biti uhićen, sa zahtjevom da ga smjene, jer *...Jugoslavija ne može tolerirati građane koji su služili interesima drugih..* Vatikan je o tome obavijestio Stepinca rekavši mu neka sam odluči o tome što će učiniti, ali ga Vatikan neće prisiljavati da napusti Jugoslaviju. Stepinac je ostao, sudski proces je pokrenut, a presuda je donesena 11. listopada iste godine. Proglašen je krivim po svim točkama optužnice i osuđen na 16

Kako bi takav model dobio na značenju i trajnosti razvijene su i brojne teorije s istom vrijednosnom pozadinom koje su ga štitele<sup>170</sup> **Posebno je zanimljivo da je tako razvijani teorijski sustav uspješno međunarodno promican, naročito u lijevim intelektualnim krugovima zapadnoeuropskih zemalja koji su Marxovu teoriju prihvaćali kao legitimnu društvenu teoriju te je nisu razlikovali od marksizma kao temelja komunističke ideologije koja se prakticirala u drugoj Jugoslaviji.** (primjer Praxisa)<sup>171</sup>. Na tako razvijenim društvenim normama i posljedicama kreirala se jugoslavenska povijest, a kroz tu prizmu vršila se i revizija povijesti pojedinih nacionalnih skupina prije nastanka Jugoslavije. Sve je to vidljivo u bibliotekama napisanih uradaka, udžbenika i povjesnica iz razdoblja druge Jugoslavije.

Kako bi temeljni dualizam između interesa vodećih zapadnih zemalja da podržavaju Jugoslaviju i jugoslavenskih aktera koji su je kreirali i njome upravljali postao još razvidnijim nužno je osvrnuti se i na gospodarski sustav, budući da su prema predočenom modelu stabiliziranja nacionalnih kultura (slika..) među ekološkim čimbenicima o kojima taj proces ovisi osim položaja, povijesti, demografije i higijene važni i prehrana, ekonomija i tehnologija. Mnogi ekonomski analitičari drže da je jugoslavenski model socijalističkog samoupravljanja koji u zapadnim zemljama često spominjan kao „srednji put“ između zapadnog modela tržišne ekonomije i sovjetskog modela državnog socijalizma bio gospodarski promašen koncept od samog početka.

Naime, ekonomska strategija počivala je na proizvodnji bez obzira na mogućnost prodaje, a s druge strane nisu se mogli slijediti standardi kvalitete koje su nametale zapadne zemlje jer se nije mogla

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godina strogog zatvora. Unatoč inzistiranjima poznatih osoba srpske nacionalnosti za svjedočenje na suđenju, koja bi bila Stepinu u korist, tužitelji nisu dopustili, da takvi podaci izađu u javnost.

<sup>170</sup> Na primjer, u društveno- humanističkom znanstvenom području na sveučilištima U Hrvatskoj, u razdoblju od 1970. do 1990. doktoriralo je oko tisuću i dvjesto znanstvenika. To je populacija iz koje se regrutirala intelektualna elita, koja je Socijalističkoj Republici Hrvatskoj priskrblivala intelektualni softver prema kojem su se formirali društveni, politički i kulturni obrasci. Gruba analiza naslova i sažetaka oko iz osam društveno humanističkih disciplina - prava, ekonomije, povijesti, politologije, sociologije, psihologije, filozofije i pedagogije pokazala je da se 60% doktorskih tema odnosi na jugoslavensku, realsocijalističku i marksističku paradigmu, a 40% na neku temu izvan toga. Među 40% ostalih tema otprilike polovica se odnosi na teme koje su potpuno teorijski i praktično neuporabljive u novom demokratskom okruženju te koje se zbog toga više neće istraživati Tek 20% tema, prema gruboj procjeni, imaju, dakle, teorijsku i/ili empirijsku vrijednost i u okolnostima nakon uspostave hrvatske države. Doktorske teme o Jugoslaviji i realsocijalizmu najbrojnije su među ekonomistima, pravnicima, sociolozima, pedagozima i povjesničarima, a marksističke su teme najbrojnije među politolozima, sociolozima i filozofima. Svi ti doktorati u potpunosti afirmiraju jugoslavenski totalitarni poredak i samoupravljanje te marksizam kao ideološki temelj to jest nemaju nikakvog kritičnog odstupa niti predlažu alternativna rješenja.

<sup>171</sup> Pojam Praxis filozofija ili Filozofija prakse označava filozofski pravac tzv. „stvaralačkog“ nedogmatskog marksizma koji se oblikovao početkom šezdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća, a pokrenut je od strane Komunističke partije Jugoslavije te bio vrlo utjecajan u tadašnjoj Jugoslaviji. Ime Praxis nosio je časopis koji je izlazio u Zagrebu. Praxis-filozofi su se sastajali svake godine na Korčuli i raspravljali o različitim temama povezanim s marxizmom ili u odnosu na marxizam. Nastojali su svojim javnim djelovanjem promovirati društveni sustav u kojem se stalno šire mogućnosti pojedinca da slobodno i stvaralački djeluju. Kritizirali su kapitalizam, to jest „građansko“ suženo razumijevanje ljudskih sloboda i prava koje dovodi do otuđenja. Kritizirali su uvođenje elemenata slobodnog tržišta u privredni sustav samoupravnog socijalizma. Nakon raspada druge Jugoslavije praxis filozofija je zanemarena i uglavnom zaboravljena.

obnavljati tehnologija proizvodnje. Tako je industrija trajno proizvodila gubitke, a one industrije koje su u tom prednjačile imale su i pridjevak „gubitaši“. Međutim model je zbog ideoloških razloga jamčio radna mjesta i socijalnu sigurnost zaposlenima tako da i pored niskih plaća i stalnih kriza nije bilo većih radničkih pobuna osim rudarskih na Kosovu sredinom osamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća. Tu situaciju najbolje ilustrira popularna radnička krilatica iz tih vremena „nikad me ne možeš tako malo platiti koliko ja mogu malo raditi“.

**Logično je pitanje kako se takav sustav održavao. Važan izvor sredstava za održavanje sustava bili su povoljni krediti zapadnih zemalja i financijskih institucija koji su na taj način ostvarivali svoje interese povezane s očuvanjem Jugoslavije. Osim toga valja spomenuti unutrašnje prelijevanje sredstava iz razvijenijih u nerazvijenije regije što se zapravo svodilo na odljevanje sredstava iz dvije najzapadnije u geografskom i kulturnom smislu te najrazvijenije republike Hrvatske i Slovenije u druge četiri republike. Isto tako Također značajan izvor bile su devizne doznake iseljenih iz Jugoslavije u kojoj su Hrvati činili polovicu ukupnog iseljavanja i zapošljavanja u razvijenim zapadnim zemljama. Stoga su se Slovenija i Hrvatska osjećale eksploatiranima.**

**Jugoslavija se održavala, dakle, balansirajući između interesa Zapada i unutarnjeg ustroja koji se tek u nijansama razlikovao od staljinističkog ustroja i mentaliteta drugih zemalja „Istočnog bloka“ te pokušavala kreirati jugoslavensku kulturu i identitet. Nakon Titove Jugoslavijom je upravljalo kolektivno predsjedništvo koje je činio po jedan predstavnik svake socijalističke republike (BiH, Crna Gora, Hrvatska, Makedonija, Slovenija, Srbija) i po jedan predstavnik autonomnih pokrajina (Kosovo, Vojvodina). Svake godine jedan od njih prema dogovorenom redosljedu preuzimao je funkciju predsjednika predsjedništva. Međutim vrlo brzo su se pojavili problemi međunacionalnih usuglašavanja interesa, na Kosovu je zbog političke pobune morala intervenirati vojska, a Srbija je započela proces agresivne nacionalne homogenizacije čija je prva posljedica bilo uspostavljanje dominacije nad autonomnim pokrajinama Kosovom i Vojvodinom. Tako je započeo završni proces raspada Jugoslavije iako su sljedbenici Titova kulta uporno pjevali nostalgijačku parodiju „Druže Tito mi ti se kunemo da sa tvoga puta ne skrenemo“. Drugim riječima, **i bez raspada komunizma kao svjetske mega ideologije Jugoslavija nije imala veće izgleda za opstanak.** Nažalost, iako je to bilo razvidno na unutarnjem planu, proces raspada iz perspektive zapadnog svijeta prepoznavao je vrlo mali broj relevantnih političkih aktera. **Tako je jednoperspektivan i pristran pogled vodećim zapadnim zemljama osamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća zamaglio mogućnost****



da predvide raspad i mogućnost izbijanja „rata na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije“ i pored mnoštva neporecivih činjenica koje su na to upućivale.<sup>172</sup>

## **II. SKUPINE I SUKOB I MEĐU SKUPINAMA S POSEBNIM OSVRTOM NA ETNOCENTRIZAM I NACIONALIZAM**

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### **1. PROCES OBLIKOVANJA RATNIH SKUPINA**

Etničke skupine u BiH početkom devedesetih oblikovale su se na dva temelja. Prvi je identitetski koji je svoja ishodišta poglavito ima u otomanskom i postotomanskom razdoblju, razdoblju prve i druge Jugoslavije i razdoblju drugog svjetskog rata. Drugi je geopolitički nastao raspadom druge Jugoslavije u kontekstu raspada komunizma kao druge mega ideologije dvadesetog stoljeća u okviru koje je, svijetu ubijeno više od 60 000 000 ljudi.<sup>173</sup> Drugim riječima Bošnjaci – Muslimani, Hrvati i Srbi, nakon raspada Jugoslavije njenog totalitarnog poretka koji je počivao poglavito na represiji, oblikovali su posebne političke strategije koje su slijedile opisane povijesne i kulturne okolnosti te potisnute nacionalne i etničke težnje iz razdoblja druge Jugoslavije.

Već krajem osamdesetih godina bilo je razvidno, a što je potpuno u skladu s teorijskim objašnjenjima o oblikovanju identiteta u dugotrajnom povijesnom procesu sa prepoznatljivom vrijednosnom i kulturnom pozadinom, da svi pokušaji potiskivanja nacionalnih i etničkih identiteta te afirmiranje nadnacionalnog, jugoslavenskog, uz korištenje izravne i neizravne prisile što je promicao jugoslavenski totalitarni poredak, nisu bitnije utjecali na identitet etničkih skupina kakav je postojao prije razdoblja druge Jugoslavije. Naime već polovicom osamdesetih „bratstvo i jedinstvo jugoslavenskih naroda inarodnosti“ bilo je gotovo potpuno potisnuto iz javnog optičaja kao glavna politička formula jugoslavenskog zajedništva te zajedničke političke budućnosti. Najduže se zadržala u BiH o čemu svjedoči i danas spomenik u središtu Sarajeva s jugoslavenskim grbom u kojemu je „vječni plamen“, koji simbolizira tu formulu<sup>174</sup>. Glavi razlozi potiskivanja „bratstva i jedinstva“ bili su isti na kojima se

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<sup>172</sup> Domazet- Lošo, Davor, *Hrvatska i veliko ratište*, Zagreb, 2002, str. 42- 53

<sup>173</sup> Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Izvan kontrole- globalna previranja uoči 21. stoljeća*, Zagreb, 1994, str. 15

<sup>174</sup> Na spomeniku piše: Hrabrošću i zajednički prolivenom krvlju boraca bosansko- hercegovačkih, hrvatskih, crnogorskih i srpskih brigada slavne Jugoslavenske Armije, zajedničkim naporima i žrtvama sarajevskih rodoljuba Srba, Muslimana i Hrvata 6. aprila 1945. oslobođeno je Sarajevo, glavni grad Narodne Republike Bosne i Hercegovine. Vječna slava i hvala palim junacima za oslobođenje Sarajeva i naše otadžbine o prvoj godišnjici svoga oslobođenja zahvalno Sarajevo.

temeljio i proces raspada druge Jugoslavije. **Prvo**, to su bili dezintegrativni procesi nakon smrti Josipa Broza Tita kada je postalo razvidno da komunistički poredak nije uspostavio vrijednosni sustav na kojem na kojem bi narodi Jugoslavije gradili zajedničku budućnost. **Drugo**, odmah poslije Titove smrti, 1981. uslijedile su velike političke pobune na Kosovu koje su ugušene uz uporabu vojne sile pri čemu je veliki broj Albanaca s Kosova stradao ili bio kasnije proganjan. Potom su slijedile velike pobune kosovskih rudara 1986. godine. **Treće** u drugoj polovici osamdesetih u Srbiji dolazi na vlast Slobodan Miloševića koji započinje proces nacionalne homogenizacije Srba na cijelom teritoriju druge Jugoslavije temeljen na mitu o Velikoj Srbiji uobličenom u Memorandumu „Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti” objavljenom 1986. godine. Prva politička posljedica tog procesa bilo je ustavno redefiniranje statusa autonomnim pokrajinama Kosovu i Makedoniji nakon uporabe jedinstvene političke metode svrgavanja vlasti u tim pokrajinama poznate kao „jogurt ili antibirokratska revolucija”. **Četvrto**, krajem osamdesetih proces raspada komunizma u Europi prepoznao se u cijelom svijetu te su se na globalnoj, regionalnim i nacionalnim razinama stvarale nove strategije raspodjele moći među glavnim akterima koji su taj raspad kreirali i poticali.

**U sociopsihologijskom smislu stvarni raspad Jugoslavije najizravnije je povezan sa raspadom Centralnog Komiteta Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije početkom siječnja 1990. godine, kada je Milošević pokušao njime ovladati, ali su ga u tome spriječile slovenska hrvatska delegacija koje su bile prisiljene napustiti kongres pod Miloševićevim ultimativnim zahtjevima.** Time je s povjesne scene druge Jugoslavije nestalo ideološko ograničenje, a jedina skupina koja je dominirala na cijelom prostoru Jugoslavije se raspala. U globalnom kontekstu raspada komunizma to je otvorilo put demokratskim promjenama u drugoj Jugoslaviji. Tu šansu su prve ostvarile Slovenija i Hrvatska te započele pripreme za demokratske izbore. Izbori u tim republikama bivše jugoslavije održani su u proljeće 1990. godine nakon čega su uspostavljene republičke skupštine s demokratski izabranim poslanicima. To je ubrzalo raspad cjelokupnog središnjeg državnog aparata druge Jugoslavije. U takvom kontekstu Srbija je također bila prisiljena organizirati demokratske izbore, a slijedila ju je Crna Gora u kojoj su izbore organizirali i pobijedili Miloševićevi sljedbenici koji su na vlast prije izbora došli pučem, na sličan način kao u slučaju Kosova i Vojvodine prije toga. Kada je poslije demokratskih izbora uspostavljeno kolektivno predsjedništvo Srbija je od osam mjesta kontrolirala polovicu, to jest mogla je blokirati sve odluke koje joj nisu bile u interesu Budući da je Milošević stavio pod kontrolu i JNA što se naročito očitovalo u smjeni Branka Mamule kao glavnog zapovjednika i postavljanja Veljka Kadijevića koji je bio potpuno lojalan Miloševiću, u drugoj polovici 1990. počeli su je masovno napuštati časnici i vojnici, najprije iz Slovenije i Hrvatske, a nakon agresije na BiH i pripadnici ostalih nacionalnih skupina osim Srba i Crnogoraca. Time je ona prestala biti jugoslavenskom i narodnom ako se pod narodnom ne misli srpskom i crnogorskom.

Dakle, dok su u svim republikama druge Jugoslavije tekli procesi demokratizacije u Srbiji je završen proces nacionalne homogenizacije, a dijelovi srpskog i crnogorskog naroda na cijelom teritoriju naoružani su oružjem JNA i Teritorijalne obrane. Jedino je Slovenija zadržala oružje Teritorijalne obrane pod svojom kontrolom. Drugim riječima naoružani dio srpskog i crnogorskog naroda u situaciji kad drugi nisu imali nikakvo naoružanje postao je prijetnja svima koji im se suprostave. To je, sukladno sociopsihologijskom okviru izravno izazvalo nacionalnu homogenizaciju u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj, a kasnije i homogenizaciju Bošnjaka Muslimana u BiH temeljenu na strahu od srpskih prijetnji.

U takvom kontekstu prema navedenom sociopsihologijskom okviru, oblikovanje svih ratnih skupina, pa tako i onih u BiH pod navedenom prijetnjom događalo se po načelima sličnosti njihovih članova u čemu su nacionalni, etnički i vjerski identitet zauzimali središta oko kojih su se gradile grupne kohezije.

Važno je, u istom kontekstu spomenuti i čin Ujedinjenih Naroda koji je, uz navedene prijetnje iz Srbije, ubrzao procese nacionalnih i etničkih homogenizacija u Sloveniji Hrvatskoj i BiH, a to je Rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti o embargu na uvoz oružja na prostor cijele druge Jugoslavije donesena krajem rujna 1991. godine. Uz pojačavanje straha i ubrzanje procesa homogenizacije ova je rezolucija u kaotičnoj situaciji raspada Jugoslavije otvorila prostor međunarodnom organiziranom kriminalu što je mnoge kriminalne skupine pretvorila u važne aktere rata. **Posebno je važno naglasiti da je ta odluka u Hrvatskoj i BiH među Bošnjacima - Muslimanima i Hrvatima pojačala strepnju da su prepušteni sami sebi, a da se međunarodna zajednica time otvoreno stavlja na stranu Miloševića.**

Kao što je spomenuto u teorijskom dijelu ekspertize visoka kohezivnost skupine djeluje tako da ciljevi, uspjesi i neuspjesi skupine postaju osobni. Skupina stoga počinje djelovati na događaje iz okoline kao cjelina. Prijetnja i napad na jednog člana skupine doživljava se kao prijetnja i napad na čitavu skupinu. Zbog toga može doći do tzv. kolektivnog ponašanja to jest razvoja nepredviđenih, brzo stvorenih normi i socijalne strukture u relativno spontanijama situacijama koje se najčešće pojavljuju izvan uobičajenog okvira poput onih u kojima je potrebno redefiniranje situacije i pronalaženje nekog smisla u općoj konfuziji.

Svi ovi procesi događali su se u Hrvatskoj tijekom 1991. kada je, u navedenom općem kontekstu bila izložena snažnoj srpskoj agresiji. U kratkom vremenu okupirana je približno trećina hrvatskog teritorija s kojeg je protjerano oko 700 000 stanovnika nesrpskog podrijetla među kojima su je oko 95% bilo Hrvata. Valja napomenuti da je sustav obrane u Hrvatskoj u tim okolnostima počivao na dragovoljnom uključivanju, a dezerterstvo se nije sankcioniralo ni kada je provedena mobilizacija. **Stoga je hrvatskom političkom i vojnom vrhu bilo nemoguće uspostavljati kontrolu nad svim skupinama koje su se formirale izvan institucionalnog okvira, od kojih se većina formirala na načelima samoobrane.**

**Stoga je sociopsihologijski logičnije da se hrvatski politički i vojni vrh zalagao otpočetak za mirnu a ne ratnu opciju u BiH.**

Situacija kao u Hrvatskoj pojavljuje se u BiH početkom 1992. kad se srpska agresija usmjerava u tom pravcu. **Zbog potpune nepripremljenosti političkog vodstva BiH za obranu<sup>175</sup> te različitih strategija ratnih skupina prema kojima je jedna agresor, a druge dvije ugrožene te bez čvstog obrambenog saveza Bošnjaka-Muslimana i Hrvata, procesi postaju još dramatičnijim nego u Hrvatskoj, te sukladno sociopsihologijskom okviru spontanog oblikovanja skupina u kriznim situacijama, osim kolektivnog ponašanja pojavljuju se u većoj mjeri i procesi deindividucije to jest slabljenja uobičajenih ograničenja u ponašanju čime se otvaraju mogućnosti nekontroliranih zločina.** Upravo takvi zločini i na tim teorijskim temeljima većinom su se događali u sukobima Bošnjaka – Muslimana i Hrvata tijekom 1993. i početkom 1994. godine. Prema tome, sukladno teorijskom okviru takve procese nije moguće potpuno nadzirati jer se, u pravilu, događaju spontano.

**U ovom kontekstu posebno je važno naglasiti da su podskupine Bošnjaka – Muslimana i Hrvata bile, zbog navedenog spontanog oblikovanja, imale vrlo heterogen sastav najčešće bez značajnije vojne obuke, te da su se organizirale u vrlo kratkom vremenu. Činili su ih dragovoljci, među kojima je većina bila domoljubno, a ne etnocentrično orjentirana, ali koja je također bila heterogena. Osim civila - dragovoljaca bila je sastavljena od vojnika i časnika koji su napuslili JNA. U situaciji bez ili sa smanjenom institucijskom kontrolom njima su se često, makar u manjem broju dragovoljno priključivali ekstremisti, različitih svjetonazora, a nije zanemariv broj bio i kriminalaca ili kriminalno motiviranih pojedinaca. Stoga raspodjela uloga u podskupinama također je ovisila o pojedinoj situaciji koje su se razlikovale. A u takvim okolnostima, kako je to zorno pokazao Zimbardo (vidi dolje) ponašanje pojedinaca ovisi primarno o raspodjeli uloga, ili kako je pokazao Milgram (vidi dolje) o pokoravanju situacijskom autoritetu, a ne svjetonazoru ili identitetu pojedinaca. Kada se tome pridoda da mnoge podskupine nisu bile pod nikakvom institucionalnom kontrolom te da su mogućnosti sankcioniranja odstupanja od ratnog prava bile minimalne ili nikakve, prema teorijskom okviru je razvidno da su zapovjednici na različitim razinama teško, a nerijetko nikako, mogli potpuno nadzirati ratnu situaciju i ponašanje tih podskupina.**

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<sup>175</sup> Jurčević, Josip, Ekspertiza za potrebe MKSJ: Bosna i Hercegovina 1990.- 1995. godine, Zagreb, 2008, str.106- 109

### **Istraživanje Phillipa Zimbarda (1973): Socijalne uloge<sup>176</sup>**

**Phillip Zimbardo i suradnici (1973)** su smatrali da socijalne uloge mogu biti toliko snažne da «nadvladaju naš osobni identitet te mi postajemo ono što glumimo. Kako bi provjerili je li ovo istina, Zimbardo i suradnici proveli su neobično istraživanje. Izgradili su lažni zatvor u podrumu odjela za psihologiju Sveučilišta u Stanfordu i platili studentima da glume čuvere ili zatvorenike (Haney, Banks i Zimbardo, 1973). Studentima su uloge dodjeljivane bacanjem novčića. »Čuvari su dobili uniformu, koja se sastojala od žutosmeđih hlača i košulje, zviždaljku, policijsku palicu i neprozirne naočale, a zatvorenici široko radno odijelo s otisnutim identifikacijskim brojem, gumene sandale, kapu izrađenu od najlonske čarape i lanac s ključem, privezan za gležanj jedne noge. Istraživači su namjeravali opažati studente dva tjedna, kako bi vidjeli hoće li se početi ponašati kao pravi zatvorski čuvari i zatvorenici. Međutim, pokazalo se da su studenti vrlo brzo usvojili ove uloge, do te mjere da su istraživači morali prekinuti eksperiment nakon samo šest dana. Većina čuvara postala je prilično nasilna, smišljajući kreativne načine verbalnog zlostavljanja i ponižavanja zatvorenika. Zatvorenici su postali pasivni, bespomoćni i povučeni. Zapravo, neki su zatvorenici postali toliko anksiozni i depresivni da su morali biti isključeni iz istraživanja ranije od ostalih. Prisjetite se da su svi znali da sudjeluju u psihologijskom eksperimentu i da je zatvor lažan. Međutim, uloge čuvara i zatvorenika bile su toliko utjecajne i snažne da je ova jednostavna činjenica često zanemarivana. Ljudi su se toliko uživali u svoje uloge da su izgubili vlastiti identitet i osjećaj čovječnosti.

### **Istraživanje Stanleya Milgrama (1974): Pokoravanje autoritetu<sup>177</sup>**

**Istraživanje Stanleya Milgrama, profesora na Sveučilištu Yale,** je započelo time da su se sudionici javljali na oglas u novinama kojim se traže sudionici za istraživanje o pamćenju i učenju. Kada su stigli u laboratorij sreli su drugog sudionika: 47-godišnjeg, debeljuškastog gospodina ugodnog izgleda. Eksperimentator je sudionicima objasnio da će jedan od njih igrati ulogu učitelja, a drugi učenika. Izvlačili su papirić iz šešira i saznali da će oni biti učitelji. Ispostavilo se da je njihov zadatak drugog sudionika naučiti listu parova riječi (tj. plava-kutija, lijep-dan) i zatim ga ispitati. Eksperimentator ih je zatim uputio da učeniku svaki put kada pogriješi zadaju elektrošok zato što je svrha istraživanja utvrditi učinke kažnjavanja na učenje. Gledali su kako je drugi sudionik (učenik) privezan u stolici u susjednoj sobi i kako su mu elektrode priključene na ruku. Sjeli su ispred generatora šokova na kojem je trideset prekidača kojima se zadaju različite razine šoka u povećanjima od po 15 volti, od 15 do 450 volti. Uz svaki prekidač nalazila se oznaka, od «blagi šok» preko «opasnost: ozbiljan šok» do kobnog «XXX» uz najvišu razinu (pogledajte fotografiju na sljedećoj stranici). Eksperimentator im je zatim rekao da učeniku za prvu pogrešku trebaju zadati najslabiji šok od 15 volti i zatim da za svaku sljedeću pogrešku trebaju povećati intenzitet za dodatnih 15 volti. Kako bi znali o kakvim se šokovima radi, eksperimentator im je zadao šok od 45 volti, koji je prilično bolan. Učeniku su čitali listu parova riječi i zatim je počela faza testiranja. Nakon najave prve riječi u paru, ponudili su četiri moguća odgovora, a učenik je odgovarao pritiskajući jedan od četiri prekidača, što je rezultiralo paljenjem svjetla na kutiji za odgovore. Sve počinje glatko, budući da učenik u nekoliko prvih zadataka odgovara točno. Nakon toga je učenik pogriješio, a sudionici, sukladno primljenoj uputi, zadaju šok. Kada dođu do razine od 75 volti, učenik, kojeg se moglo čuti preko zvučnika, izgovara bolan «Joj». Eksperimentator na zastajkivanje i upitne poglede sudionika odgovara: «Molim nastavite». Budući da učenik nastavlja griješiti, sudionik zadaje još nekoliko šokova. Učenik se buni, uzvikujući: «Joj, eksperimentatoru. Dosta je. Pustite me van odavde.» Sudionici su u tom trenutku počeli zabrinuto gledati u eksperimentatora. On im kaže: «Apsolutno je nužno da nastavite».

<sup>176</sup> Aronson E. i suradnici, *Socijalna...*, 2005, str. 302- 303

<sup>177</sup> Aronson E. i suradnici, *Socijalna...*, 2005, str. 289- 293

*Kao i vojnici u selu My Lai, većina Milgramovih sudionika potpala je pod pritisak osobe s autoritetom. Prosječni najjači zadani šok bio je 360 volti, i 62.5% sudionika je išlo do kraja, zadajući šokove od 450 volti. Punih 80% sudionika nastavilo je zadavati šokove čak i nakon što je učenik, koji je ranije spomenuo da ima problema sa srcem, zavikao da mu je dosta i da ga puste. Važno je znati da je učenik u stvari bio suradnik eksperimentatora koji je igrao svoju ulogu. Nije primao nikakve stvarne šokove. Jednako je tako važno znati da je istraživanje provedeno vrlo uvjerljivo, tako da su ljudi vjerovali da stvarno zadaju šokove učeniku. Zašto se toliko mnogo sudionika istraživanja (u rasponu od dvadesetogodišnjaka do pedesetogodišnjaka: radnika, službenika i stručnjaka) konformiralo željama eksperimentatora, sve do točke u kojoj su zadavali jaku bol (barem su tako mislili) drugom ljudskom biću? Svi razlozi koji objašnjavaju zašto se ljudi konformiraju opasno su se kombinirali uzrokujući pokoravanje sudionika u Milgramovu istraživanju, kao što su to učinili vojnici u selu My Lai. Iz daljnjih je varijacija istraživanja koje je proveo Milgram očita činjenica da su u navedenim eksperimentima djelovali normativni pritisci. U ovom slučaju postojala su tri učitelja, od kojih su dva bila suradnici eksperimentatora. Jedan eksperimentator je bio instruiran da čita listu parova riječi, drugi da učitelju kaže je li odgovor učenika ispravan. Zadatak sudionika (stvarnog) bio je zadati šok, kao i u originalnom eksperimentu povećavajući jačinu šoka pri svakoj sljedećoj pogrešci. Na 150 volti, kada je učenik prvi put otvoreno protestirao, prvi suradnik eksperimentatora je odbio nastaviti, usprkos naredbi eksperimentatora da nastavi. Na 210 volti, drugi je suradnik eksperimentatora odbio nastaviti. Posljedica? To što je pravi sudionik vidio kako se njegovi kolege ne pokoravaju i njemu samom je olakšalo nepokoravanje. U ovom je eksperimentu samo 10% sudionika zadalo najintenzivnije šokove. Rezultat je sličan Aschevim nalazima, da se ljudi ni približno toliko ne konformiraju kada jedan suradnik blokira većinu i dosljedno daje točan odgovor. Dakle, u promijenjenim situacijama i uz smanjeni pritisak autoriteta reakcije na pritisak autoriteta bitno se mijenjaju i ljudi reagiraju bitno racionalnije, to jest u skladu sa svojim moralnim standardima.*

**S druge strane Srbi su bili organizirani kroz JNA ili Teritorijalnu obranu što znači da ih se moglo institucionalno kontrolirati i usmjeravati na efikasno ispunjavanje ciljnih zadataka povezanih s planom agresije. Naime, proces njihovog organiziranja trajao je od 1987. godine kada Milošević dolazi na vlast u Srbiji.**

**U takvoj situaciji organizirane agresije i poglavito spontane obrane u Hrvatskoj i BiH 1991. i 1992. godine bitno je pogodovalo Srbiji potpomognutoj armijom koja je od jugoslavenske pretvorena u srpsku i Srbima iz BiH da do polovice 1992. većim dijelom ispune plan stvaranja Velike Srbije protjerujući stotine tisuća stanovnika Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine iz njihovih domova te čineći mnoge masovne zločine koji se uklapaju u UN ovu definiciju genocida, a s druge strane dovelo uz otpor agresiji u BiH i do djelomičnog sukoba Bošnjaka – Muslimana i Hrvata.**

## **1.1 Čimbenici koji su pojačavali socijalni utjecaj u ratnim skupinama**

**U teorijskom dijelu ekspertize navedeno je da krizne situacije povećavaju podložnost socijalnom utjecaju u skupinama. U takvim situacijama ljudi nemaju vremena razmišljati kako bi se trebali ponašati već moraju djelovati trenutno. Stoga je vrlo važno ponašanje osobe koja je vođa ili autoritet u takvoj situaciji jer su joj se članovi skupine spremni potpuno pokoriti. U Hrvatskoj i među Bošnjacima – Muslimanima i Hrvatima u BiH kojima je nametnut ratni kontekst i u kojima, kao**

što je spomenuto nije bilo moguće kontrolirati sve skupine koje su se formirale, situacije u kojima su tijekom 1991. i 1992. neovisno odlučivali zapovjednici vojnih postrojbi na različitim razinama ili situacijski autoriteti bile su vrlo česte.

U BiH ovu situaciju je pojačavala i teritorijalna izoliranost pojedinih hrvatskih i bošnjačko-muslimanskih skupina. Tako se događalo da su se sukobi između pojedinih skupina Hrvata i Bošnjaka-Muslimana događali i nakon potpisanih primirja ili u situacijama kada su se na drugim mjestima iste skupine zajedno borile protiv Srba (primjer, Bihaća, Usore i Tuzle). Takve ratne situacije neovisno o zapovjednoj hijerarhiji proizodile su izolirane kontekste koji su poticali osвете temeljene na poluinformacijama ili netočnim zaključcima.

Zbog takvih čimbenika koji su pojačavali utjecaj u pojedinim izoliranim skupinama, neovisno o zajedničkoj dogovorenoj strategiji kada je sukob Hrvata i Bošnjaka-Muslimana započeo on se nije mogao brzo završiti jer su se u situaciji slabe kontrole i neprotočnosti točnih informacija odluke o sukobu često donosile se na nižim razinama i ovisile su o trenutnim situacijama. **Te situacije su se naročito umnožavale nakon protjerivanja stotine tisuća Bošnjaka-Muslimana i Hrvata sa područja koja su Srbi okupirali, kada je na relativno skućenom prostoru koji su Hrvati i Bošnjaci-Muslimani zajedno ili odvojeno kontrolirali nastala nekontrolirana prenapućenost. Naime, sukladno teorijskom okviru, krizna situacija u kojoj postoje nedostatni i ograničeni resursi te kada su vremena teška članovi ugrožene skupine osjećaju još jaču prijetnju prema vanjskim skupinama te su skloniji negativnom stavu i nasilju prema njima. A prenapućenost stvorena srpskim protjerivanjem velikog broja ljudi i njihovo gomilanje na skućenom prostoru izazvalo je takvu kriznu situaciju koja je utjecala na sukobe među različitim podskupinama Bošnjaka – Muslimana i Hrvata neovisno o bilo kojem drugom čimbeniku.**

U teorijskom smislu narečene tvrdnje potvrđuje i poznata Malthus-ova teorija prema kojoj nerazmjernost između proizvodnje hrane i rasta populacije izaziva glad, bolesti i ratove. Na mikro razini upravo je, kao što je navedeno, to bio važan čimbenik koji je, među ostalima poticao nekontrolirane sukobe između Hrvata i Bošnjaka-Muslimana tijekom 1993. i početkom 1994. godine. Kad se situacija stabilizirala, a iprognanici i izbjeglice smješteni u Hrvatskoj i ostalim europskim zemljama, smirivali su se i sukobi što je dovelo do potpisivanja Washingtonskog sporazuma u ožujku 1994. godine poslije kojega su sukobi prestali, a obje ratne skupine okrenule se stvaranju zajedničke strategije za oslobođenje okupiranih teritorija u Hrvatskoj i BiH do čega je i došlo u kolovozu 1995.

## 2. ETNOCENTRIČKA I NACIONALISTIČKA POZADINA SUKOBA U BiH 1991.-1995.

Za razumijevanje etničke odnosno etnocentrističke i nacionalne odnosno nacionalističke pozadine sukoba prethodno je naglašena važnost razumijevanja procesa oblikovanja modernih nacija. Posebno je važno napomenuti da su nacionalne skupine nastale nakon oblikovanja nacija tijekom devetnaestog stoljeća, a temelj oblikovanju nacija bili su etničke zajednice to jest narodi. Drugim riječima Hrvati i Srbi kao dominantne etničke skupine u Hrvatskoj odnosno Srbiji oblikovale su s drugim subetničkim skupinama na istom prostoru hrvatsku odnosno srpsku naciju.

**Međutim, kako se BiH zbog niza navedenih povijesnih okolnosti i procesa nije oblikovala BiH - nacija većina Hrvata i Srba činili su zapravo etničke dijelove svojih nacionalnih korpusa u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji te su većinom slijedili nacionalne strategije poglavito u području kulture i sustava vrednota. Većina Srba su međutim, u cijelom postotomanskom razdoblju te u razdoblju prve i druge Jugoslavije te Drugog svjetskog rata slijedili i nacionalnu ideologiju temeljenu na spomenutom mitu o Velikoj Srbiji dok su veći dio Hrvata iz BiH kao i značajan dio Bošnjaka-Muslimana slijedili takvu ekstermnju nacionalnu ideologiju samo u razdoblju Drugog svjetskog rata kada su u Hrvatskoj na vlasti bile Ustaše.**

Bošnjaci-Muslimani zbog isključivo religijskog predloška na kojem su u otomanskom razdoblju oblikovali identitet nisu uspjeli oblikovati etnički identitet u modernom smislu do danas. Zbog toga su se najčešće izjašnjavali Hrvatima odnosno Srbima do druge Jugoslavije, a u drugoj Jugoslaviji i kao Muslimani s etničkim, a ne religijskim predznakom. Nakon uspostave BiH Muslimani su postupno svome identitetu dodavali naziv Bošnjaci čime su razdvajali etnički od religijskog identiteta. Ove činjenice bilo je važno navesti kako bi se razumjeli korjeni etnocentrizma odnosno nacionalizma kao sociopsihološki generatori sukoba u BiH.

Među brojnim definicijama etničkih skupina najprikladnijom se za primjenu na ratne skupine u BiH čini spomenuta Rothchildova (1981) prema kojoj su etničke skupine „kolektivne skupine u kojima je pripadnost velikim dijelom određenim stvarnim ili navodno naslijeđenim vezama predaka, pri čemu se te veze opažaju kao one koje sustavno utječu na mjesto i sudbinu u političkim i socioekonomskim strukturama države i društva”.

Prigodom isticanja svojih etničkih prava u BiH to jest „mjesta i sudbine u političkim i socioekonomskim strukturama države i društva” svaka etnička skupina gradila je strategiju poglavito na stereotipima pozivajući se na povijesno razdoblje i kulturnu pozadinu koja jje favorizira u odnosu na druge skupine. Tako su se Bošnjaci-Muslimani poglavito pozivali na otomansko razdoblje i kulturne



obrasce i simbole koji su poslije ostali trajna baština BiH, Hrvati na predotomansko razdoblje srednjevjekovne države BiH, kada su njome dominirali i izgrađivali ono što se u to vrijeme podrazumijevalo zapadnom kulturom, a Srbi na postotomansko razdoblje i razdoblje prve Jugoslavije kada su izgradili mit o Velikoj Srbiji i provodili ga u djelo na teritoriju BiH. Budući da te strategije nemaju isto povijesno i kulturno ishodište niti su težile istim ciljevima, a srpska ni održanju BiH kao posebne političke cjeline, te naglašavaju samo dio koji ide u prilog pojedinoj etničkoj skupini u kriznim su situacijama bile ishodište etnocentričkih tendencija. **Te etnocentrične tendencije koje doprinose favoriziranju vlastite etničke skupine u odnosu na druge i negativnom vrednovanju drugih skupina sociopsihologijska su pozadina sukoba što je u teorijskom dijelu objašnjeno teorijama realnog sukoba i teorijama socijalnog identiteta. Međutim i ovdje je važno napomenuti da etnocentrične tendencije nisu same po sebi uzrokom sukoba, nego se pojavljuju na površini u kriznim situacijama. A glavni uzrok krizne situacije u BiH 1991. – 1995. godine, bio je raspad druge Jugoslavije i srpska agresija na Hrvatsku i BiH.**

Nacionalistička pozadina rata u BiH nema izravna ishodišta u BiH već se povezuje s ratom u Hrvatskoj u kojem je na sceni bio agresivni i imperijalni srpski nacionalizam i hrvatski koji je posljedica nacionalne homogenizacije kao odgovora na stvarnu vanjsku prijetnju. Jedan i drugi nacionalizam utjecali su na etničko homogeniziranje Hrvata odnosno Srba pri čemu su Srbi u BiH agresivne tendencije usmjerili na druge dvije etničke skupine u BiH, a Hrvati na obranu. Sukladno teoriji predodžbi i skupine u BiH međusobno, a posebice Hrvati prema Srbima, i obrnuto oblikovale su predodžbe na temelju percipirane sposobnosti, kulture, namjere i prijetnje. **Tako je predodžba odmetnika najbliža percipiranju Hrvata od strane Srba, a predodžba barbara percipiranju Srba od strane Hrvata.** Valja na kraju napomenuti da su ovako opisane nacionalističke tendencije bile značajno prisutnije u ratu u Hrvatskoj nego u ratu u BiH gdje su dominirale navedene etnocentrične tendencije.

### III. LJUDSKA AGRESIVNOST I RAT

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U raspravama o uzrocima rata u filozofiji, a kasnije u antropologiji, sociologiji i psihologiji, kao što je navedeno, prisutna je i duboko ukorijenjena dilema o iracionalnosti odnosno racionalnosti ljudske prirode. S obzirom na posljedice koje rat izaziva te iskazivanu okrutnost i destruktivnost aktera rata mnogi filozofi i društveni znanstvenici kroz povijest bili su uvjereni da rat ne može biti racionalno utemeljen to jest da je izraz iracionalnosti ljudske prirode koja svoje podrijetlo vuče iz ranog doba ljudske civilizacije kada su primitivna plemena međusobno ratovala bez ikakva racionalnog povoda.

Zbog toga se ljudskoj agresivnosti i ratu često atribuiraju nazivi barbarizam, primitivizam, divljaštvo, zvjerstvo, s jasnim asocijacijama na primitivne ljudske skupine, odnosno rodove i plemena. **Tako je i rat na prostoru druge Jugoslavije iz zapadne perspektive često spominjan kao „sukob balkanskih plemena”.**

Međutim antropološka istraživanja (Mead, Benedict) u dvadesetom stoljeću otkrila su da su primitivna plemena međusobno mnogo rijeđe ratovala nego moderne nacije te da su bili mnogo manje okrutni i destruktivni od ljudi u suvremenim ratovima. Sociološke analize pokazuju da je s porastom civiliziranosti i razvojem društva broj ratova rastao.<sup>178</sup> Psiholgijske analize su doprinjele definitivnom prihvaćanju teze da je rat racionalno utemeljen to jest da je najrasprostranjeniji čin instrumentalne agresije.<sup>179</sup> **Drugim riječima rat se danas analizira istraživanjem njegovih racionalnih uzroka, a iracionalne se promatra kao situacijske manifestacije u ljudskom ponašanju unutar ratnog konteksta. Ta istraživačka postignuća primjenjena su na objašnjenje uzroka rata u BiH 1991.-1995.**

## **1. UZROCI RATA U BiH 1991.-1995. U KONTEKSTU PONUĐENOG TEORIJSKOG OKVIRA**

Iz prethodnih analiza korijena rata, njegovog tijeka i posljedica te s obzirom na navedena opća uporišta na kojima se temelji ova sociopsihologijska ekspertiza moguće je izlučiti tri skupine uzroka. **Prva skupina** odnosi se na povijesne okolnosti i kulturno-identitetsku pozadinu sukoba. **Druga skupina** odnosi se na nacionalne i etničke strategije i ideologije ratnih skupina. **Treća skupina** odnosi se na geopolitičke okolnosti u kojima su se ratne skupine našle neposredno pred izbijanje rata. Analiza povijesnih okolnosti, kulturne i religijske pozadine te čimbenika koji su bitno utjecali na oblikovanje identiteta ratnih skupina nedvojbeno pokazuje razlike među njima koje su u kriznim povijesnim situacijama bile ili mogu biti uzrocima sukoba.

Prije otomanskih osvajanja BiH se nalazila na rubu Zapada te razvijala kulturu i slijedila način života srednjevjekovnih zemalja iz mediteranskog i srednjeeuropskog dijela Europe. Elitu su, slično drugim okolnim zemljama činili feudalci s kraljem kao vladarom, a glavna religija bila je katoličanstvo. Svi kraljevi osim jednog (Ostoja) i velika većina feudalnog plemstva bili su Hrvati.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti II*, Zagreb, 1984, str. 35

<sup>179</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti II*, Zagreb, 1984, str. 34

<sup>180</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Povijest Bosne*, 1995, Zagreb, str. 95

Otomanskim osvajanjima potpuno je destruiran zatečeni kulturni sklop, kulturni simboli su većinom uništeni, a Hrvati reducirani na religijsku skupinu ili islamizirani. Dominantna skupina postali su muslimani koji su kulturu i identitet gradili isključivo na religijskom predlošku, a privilegiranija skupina od Hrvata postali su i pravoslavci koji su se sastojali od manjeg broja zatečenih i poglavito doseljenih Srba i Vlaha s područja Srbije, Crne Gore i Albanije te u kasnijim razdobljima otomanske vladavine i Hrvata koji su prešli na pravoslavlje.

Tijekom cijelog otomanskog razdoblja u BiH, dakle, dominirali su sukobi, nasilje, destrukcija zatečenih kulturnih obrazaca i oblikovanje novih identiteta skupina koje će nakon otomanskog razdoblja određivati sudbinu BiH. Na kraju, Hrvati su, osim religijskog identiteta i kulturnih obrazaca temeljenih poglavito na religijskom predlošku, izgubili gotovo sve drugo što su baštinili iz predotomanskog razdoblja, Bošnjaci-Muslimani su u gospodarskom pogledu bili najsnažnija skupina s identitetom temeljenim isključivo na religijskom predlošku, a Srbi su izrasli u drugu po gospodarskoj snazi i prvu po brojnosti. Austrougarska je, nakon uspostave vladavine u BiH takav zatečeni sklop sačuvala, čime je zapravo priznala redistribuciju resursa u otomanskom razdoblju temeljenom na nasilju i nepravdi. Takve povijesne okolnosti i kulturno-identitetska pozadina izravno su utjecale na političke i kulturne sukobe, a neizravno na oružane tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća pa tako i u ratu u BiH početkom devedesetih godina.

Paralelno s oslobođenjem od otomanskih osvajača i oblikovanjem srpske nacije, u Srbiji se kreirala i nacionalna ideologija temeljena na mitu o „Velikoj Srbiji” koja je u svojoj biti otpočeta bila agresivna i imperijalna ideologija. Imperijalnu dimenziju činili su planovi teritorijalnog proširivanja Srbije u smjeru Zapada, a to se odnosilo na cijelu BiH i velike dijelove Hrvatske. **Kulturni i identitetski predložak imperijalne dimenzije toga mita bio je da su muslimani Srbi muslimanske vjeroispovjesti, a Hrvati zapadni Srbi.**<sup>181</sup> Oko tog mita do razdoblja druge Jugoslavije okupljali su se mnogi srpski intelektualci i političari, a vjerodostojnost mu je otpočeta potvrđivala srpska pravoslavna crkva.<sup>182</sup> U razdoblju prve Jugoslavije mit je većim dijelom bio dio službene kraljeve politike zbog čega su Hrvati drugu Jugoslaviju nazivali „tamnicom hrvatskog naroda”, a muslimani u Hrvatima tražili saveznike zbog ugroženosti od Srba.

Pod plaštom komunizma i druge Jugoslavije Srbi su i dalje nastavili s ostvarivanjem uvjeta koji će u povoljnim okolnostima omogućiti im da plan temeljen na mitu ostvare. To je bio jedan od razloga zbog kojeg je Tito bio prisiljen smjeniti Aleksandra Rankovića, tada drugog najmoćnijeg političara u Jugoslaviji, po nacionalnosti Srbina. Istodobno muslimanima je pojačao utjecaj u BiH i etnički ih izjednačio s Hrvatima i Srbima. **Nakon njegove smrti postalo je razvidno da Srbi dominiraju svim**

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<sup>181</sup> Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia*, London, 1999, str.72- 73

<sup>182</sup> Anzulovic, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia*, London, 1999, str. 5, 30- 31, 118, 119

strukturama i institucijama u drugoj Jugoslaviji, plan koji je prvotno počivao na mitu objavljen je kao uradak „Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti”, a Milošević je na njemu temeljio svoju **osvajačku strategiju**. Tako je jedna najviša nacionalna znanstvena institucija oblikovala strateški dokument pod nazivom Memorandum, koji je korišten kao temelj za planove agresije, što je s obzirom na misiju znanosti u suvremenom svijetu, jedinstven primjer. Međutim, njegovi kreatori zorno svjedoče o njegovoj racionalnoj utemeljenosti s obzirom na namjere i ciljeve što **Fromm (1973)** smatra glavnim uzrocima ratova u povijesti.<sup>183</sup> **Taj dokument koji je svojevrsna povijesna integracija svih prethodnih programa temeljenih na mitu o Velikoj Srbiji izrađen je na slijedećim uporištima:**

- **granice Srbije nisu u skladu s etničkim sastavom i kao takve one moraju mijenjati. Jugoslavenski Ustav iz 1974. nanio je veliku štetu Srbiji zbog stvaranja autonomnih pokrajina Kosova i Vojvodine te stvaranja umjetnih administrativnih granica i razvodnjavanja federacije.**

- **ugroženost srpskog naroda od drugih naroda unutar druge Jugoslavije temelji se na asimilaciji, iskorištavanju, istjerivanju, nemogućnosti izražavanja te marginalizacije na političkoj ekonomskoj, kulturnoj i znanstvenoj razini.**

- **jačanje protusrpskih snaga unutar druge Jugoslavije posebice među Hrvatima i Albancima.**

- **nužnost brze i skore akcije radi sprječavanja propadanja Srbije i srpskog naroda.** Milošević je, kao što je spomenuto, „Memorandum” koristio kao strategiju na kojoj je gradio planove agresije s ciljevima stvaranje Velike Srbije. To je podrazumjevalo teritorijalno širenje Srbije na velike dijelove hrvatskog geopolitičkog i povijesnog teritorija cijelu BiH te ukidanje autonomije Kosovu i Vojvodini i njihovo potpuno političko i teritorijalno integriranje sa Srbijom. Plan je, u razdoblju 1990. – 1995. provoden uz uporabu genocida, kulturocida, ekocida i urbicida nad nesrpskim pučanstvom na teritorijima Hrvatske i BiH te kulturnom, ekološkom i arhitektonskom baštinom.

**Agresivna strategija temeljena na „Memorandumu” i njeni ciljevi, sukladno ponuđenom teorijskom okviru, izravni su neposredni i glavni uzrok srpske agresije na Hrvatsku i nakon toga BiH.**

**U takvom kontekstu sukob Hrvata i Bošnjaka-Muslimana ne može se na teorijskoj ni praktičnoj razini odvojeno promatrati od temeljnog uzroka tzv. "sukoba na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije”, koji se može sažeto izreći kao „srpska agresija na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu s ciljem osvajanja teritorija protjerivanja ili kulturnog asimiliranja zatečenog nesrpskog pučanstva te uništavanja zatečene kulturno-identitetske baštine.”** Drugim riječima sukob

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<sup>183</sup> Fromm, Erich, *Anatomija ljudske destruktivnosti II*, Zagreb, 1984, str. 34- 35

Bošnjaka-Muslimana i Hrvata nema svoje uzroke u racionalnim planovima s agresivnom strategijom i ciljevima, mada se dogodio na povjesnoj i kulturnoj pozadini koja se može smatrati neizravnim uzrokom.

**Taj sukob u realnim okolnostima bio je prvenstveno reakcija na situaciju stvorenu nakon srpske agresije na BiH. To je zapravo, simbolički iskazano „drugo dno” srpske agresije. Zato se taj sukob teorijski može bolje objasniti navedenim situacijskim čimbenicima ljudske agresivnosti te grupnim procesima i utjecajima nego teorijama koje počivaju na racionalnim ratnim planovima i ciljevima. Svatko tko pokušava taj sukob promatrati na toj teorijskoj razini prisiljen je izmišljati argumente. Mit o Karadorđevu<sup>184</sup> spada u tu kategoriju, a Islamska deklaracija<sup>185</sup> mada sadrži fundamentalističke elemente koje su neke muslimanske skupine poglavito okupljene u „Patriotskoj ligi” te došle iz islamskih zemalja, ohrabrine za „Sveti rat” i činjnje zločina na neislamskim skupinama ne može se smatrati strategijom na kojoj bi se mogla planirati agresija.**

Ponuđeno teorijsko stajalište vrlo je jednostavno testirati jednim upitom: Bi li se dogodio sukob Hrvata i Bošnjaka-Muslimana da Srbi potpomognuti crnogorcima i JNA nisu izvršili agresiju na BiH 1992, okupirali više od polovice njenog teritorija i protjerali ili pobili stotine tisuća Hrvata i Bošnjaka-Muslimana. Iz sociopsihologijske perspektive „mit o Karadorđevu” i Islamska deklaracija izdvojeni iz ratnog konteksta koji je proizvela srpska agresija ne bi bili strateški temelji na kojima bi se mogao temeljiti sukob Bošnjaka-Muslimana i Hrvata. Osim toga sam tijek sukoba uvjerljivo potvrđuje navedenu definiciju sukoba.

**Prvo**, on ni u jednom trenutku nije bio totalni sukob. **Drugo**, primirja su neprestano, na više razina dogovarana dok je sukob trajao.<sup>186</sup> **Treće**, dok su se pojedine podskupine Bošnjaka-Muslimana i Hrvata međusobno sukobljavale druge su se skupa borile protiv stvarnog agresora. **Četvrto**, ciljevi svih podskupina Bošnjaka-Muslimana, a tako i Hrvata u BiH nisu bili identični. **Peto**, sukob je relativno kratko trajao a ratnog pobjednika nije bilo. **Posebno valja istaknuti činjenicu da su se, nakon**

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<sup>184</sup> Mit glasi: Na sastanku na vojvodanskome imanju Karadorđevo 25.03. 1991., Tuđman i Milošević su „dogovorili” podjelu interesnih sfera u Bosni i Hercegovini, ne obazirući se uopće na postojanje Muslimana (ili muslimansko-bošnjačkoga naroda). Time su položeni praktičko-politički temelji za etničko čišćenje i zajedničku agresiju Srbije i Hrvatske na Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Stvarnost: Tuđman i Milošević sastali su se 48 puta tijekom rata u Hrvatskoj i BiH, od kojih su samo 2 bila bilateralna (u Karadorđevu i Tikvešu) 35 na međunarodnoj razini te 11 na razini bivše Jugoslavije. Na svim sastancima pa tako i Kardorđevu raspravljalo se isključivo o razrješenju tzv. „krize na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije” te sklapali mirovni sporazumi. Tuđman je na tim sastancima zastupao politiku koja je bila poznata cijeloj međunarodnoj javnosti. U Karadorđevu je jedini put s Miloševićem razgovarao u četiri oka, a sadržaj razgovora nikada nije objavljen osim službenih obavijesti informativnih agencija. Mit je izgrađen na pretpostavkama ili lažnim svjedočenjima nekoliko tadašnjih političkih aktera.

<sup>185</sup> Izetbegović se politički do kraja profilirao koncem 60-ih i početkom 70-ih, kada je napisao političko-vjerski program Islamska deklaracija (1970.), u kojem se zalaže za državni ustroj temeljen na principima sunitskog islama. Esencijalno, radilo se o teokratskom projektu koji se zalaže ne samo za revitalizaciju islamskih načela u društvima u kojima žive muslimani, nego i za pravni poredak i političku vlast baziranu na šerijatskom pravnom sustavu (sama Bosna i Hercegovina nije spomenuta u "Islamskoj deklaraciji"). Taj je tekst vidljivo panislamistički po svomu vidozoru: Izetbegovićeva je utopija proklamacija muslimanske vlasti i odbijanje kako totalitarno komunističkoga, tako i sekularno-demokratskog zapadnoga društvenog i političkog modela. Iako nije fundamentalistički radikaln u svojoj retorici, niti dogmatski ortodoksan kao vehabijski pokret krajnje protuzapadne provenijencije-razvidno je da je Izetbegovićev spis politički program na crti islamskih utopijskih nacrti koji su nastajali od druge polovice 19. stoljeća kao reakcija na pritisak zapada i izazove modernizacije.

<sup>186</sup> Jurčević, Josip, Ekspertiza za potrebe MKSJ: Bosna i Hercegovina 1990.- 1995. godine, Zagreb, 2008, str.142- 145

**Washingtonskog sporazuma obje skupine vratile su se na početnu poziciju - zajedničkom otporu srpskoj agresiji koji je završio 1995 oslobođenjem velikog dijela okupiranih teritorija BiH.** <sup>187</sup>

Danas, nakon Daytonskog sporazuma ove dvije etničke skupine zajedno oblikuju jedan entitet i bore se i dalje za cjelovitu BiH dok Srbi hoće posebni entitet – Republiku Srpsku, koji su osvojili agresijom i počinjenim zločinima odvojiti od BiH i priključiti Srbiji jer je to bio dio njihovog racionalnog plana agresije otpočeka.

Geopolitičke okolnosti u kojima se BiH našla nakon raspada Jugoslavije zorno se mogu predočiti modelom koncentričnih krugova prema kojemu središnji krug predstavlja BiH, prvi vanjski krug predstavljaju Hrvatska i Srbija, drugi bivša Jugoslavija, a treći međunarodna zajednica. Srpska agresija na Sloveniju i Hrvatsku započela je kada je bilo razvidno da se Jugoslavija raspala. Naziv SR Jugoslavija Srbija i Crna gora izabrale su zbog saveza koji su sklopili, te su se prikazivale kao pravni slijednici Jugoslavije, a druge republike druge Jugoslavije u međunarodnoj javnosti proglašavali secesionističkim.

Posebno je važno naglasiti da su tim činom zamagljivali prave ciljeve agresije pred međunarodnom zajednicom odnosno odgađale trenutak njihovog prepoznavanja. **Budući da je među zemljama pobjednicama drugog svjetskog rata krajem osamdesetih prevladavala pomisao da bi Jugoslavija trebala opstati, intervencija međunarodne zajednice uslijedila je kasno. Situaciju je dodatno kompliciralo što su neke početne odluke međunarodne zajednice poput embarga na uvoz oružja i Wens – Ovenova plana bile i pogrešne.** Dakle, nakon rapada Jugoslavije i za vrijeme najžešće agresije na Hrvatsku 1991. između BiH i međunarodne zajednice bila je samo Hrvatska i Srbija.

Pa ipak Alija Izetbegović kao predsjednik predsjedništva BiH nije vjerovao da će se agresija premjestiti u BiH dok se to u punoj mjeri nije stvarno dogodilo. Bio je vođen mišlju da će zbog narečenih razloga međunarodna zajednica pokušati ipak spasiti Jugoslaviju, što je za njega, zbog položaja Muslimana u drugoj Jugoslaviji, bilo prihvatljivije političko rješenje od neizvjesne budućnosti BiH izvan Jugoslavije. Zaboravio je pritom da je bio i predsjednik Hrvata iz BiH koji su na referendumu također glasovali za cjelovitu i samostalnu BiH. **Nakon agresije Srbije na BiH nestao je i zadnji krug koji je dijelio BiH i međunarodnu zajednicu te je međunarodna zajednica bila prisiljena izravno se uključiti u rat u BiH. Na taj način ne primjenjivanje navedene Rezolucije UN o agresiji te oklijevanje Izetbegovića da pripremi zemlju za obranu izravno je koristilo Srbiji za ostvarivanje ciljeva agresije povezane s BiH.**

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<sup>187</sup> Jurčević, Josip, Ekspertiza za potrebe MKSJ: Bosna i Hercegovina 1990.- 1995. godine, Zagreb, 2008, str.173,174,180,181

I ovo teorijsko stajalište može se provjeriti upitom: Bi li došlo do agresije na BiH da je Srbija uspjela pokoriti Hrvatsku ili bi se BiH naprosto predala. Ili drugi upit: Bi li došlo do agresije na BiH da je međunarodna zajednica predvidjela na temelju brojnih pokazatelja da će se agresija dogoditi ako Slovenija, Hrvatska i druge republike druge Jugoslavije ostvare demokratsko pravo izbora vlastite političke budućnosti te intervenirala na način na koji je to učinila na Kosovu i u Srbiji 1998. godine? Na temelju ponuđenih argumenata u ekspertizi o čimenicima koji su prethodili ratu, može se dovoljno uvjerljivo tvrditi da ne bi. **Stoga se oklijevanje međunarodne zajednice da se na početku odlučnije angažira na sprječavanju rata u Hrvatskoj i BiH i početne pogrešne odluke mogu također ubrojiti u neposredne i neizravne uzroke rata u BiH.**

## **2. TEMELJNE ODREDNICE RATA U BiH S OBZIROM NA UZROKE, TIJEK RATA I CILJEVE RATNIH SKUPINA**

**Na temelju svih ponuđenih analiza i teorijskih stajališta, a s obzirom na uzroke tijek rata i ciljeve ratnih skupina prva i temeljna odrednica rata u BiH je agresija.** Agresiju je započela Srbija, koja je u njenu provedbu uključila Crnu Goru, veliku većinu Srba u Hrvatskoj<sup>188</sup> i BiH te JNA koju su napustili gotovo svi vojnici i časnici iz svih republika druge Jugoslavije (osim vojnika i časnika iz Srbije Crne Gore te Srba iz BiH).

**Način na koji je agresija provedena uklapa se u okvir koji je definiran Deklaracijom UN – G.A. Res. 3314 (1974). Radi ostvarenja plana i ciljeva agresije Srbija je na područjima Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine počinila genocid<sup>189</sup>, etničko čišćenje<sup>190</sup>, kulturocid<sup>191</sup>, urbicid<sup>192</sup>. To je druga temeljna odrednica rata u BiH.**

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<sup>188</sup> Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar je na prijelazu iz 1991. u 1992. godinu na reprezentativnom uzorku ispitivao posljedice rata unutar socijalnih stavova. Između ostalog, rezultati istraživanja su pokazali da je većina hrvatskih prognanika (63,4%) smatrala da većina Srba iz Hrvatske podržava agresiju na Republiku Hrvatsku te da je 49,6% stanovnika mirnih područja isto to smatrala.

<sup>189</sup> Udružene srpske jedinice iz Srbije i s područja Bosne i Hercegovine, 11. srpnja 1995. osvajaju **Srebrenicu** i u roku od tri dana čine stravičan genocid nad nevinim bošnjačkim civilnim stanovništvom. Istog dana ubijeno je na stotine civila i započela u novijoj povijesti svijeta nezapamćena patnja desetine tisuća ljudi. Deset tisuća njih zauvijek će ostati bez traga u šumama između Srebrenice i Tuzle, odnosno Srebrenice i Kladnja. Tamo su desetine masovnih grobnica i razbacane bošnjačke kosti, posebno razasute lubanje na kojima se vide tragovi ubojstva, kako su ljudi davljeni i klani. Na preliminarnom spisku ubijenih Srebreničana trenutno se nalazi 8.106 imena, a 12.000 ljudi se vodi kao nestalo. Nažalost, svakodnevno se iskopavaju nove masovne grobnice, pa spisak sa ubijenim srebreničanima svakodnevno raste. Među ubijenim je bilo dosta žena i djece, a Srbi oko Srebrenice su prakticirali da pale trudne bošnjačke žene i djecu žive, što svjedoče i slike žrtava iz masovnih grobnica.

**Ovčara** je ime farme 5 km istočno od grada Vukovara, danas poznate po srpskom logoru u vrijeme Domovinskog rata. U tom dijelu Ovčara napravljen je koncentracijski logor. Ovčara je otvorena početkom listopada 1991. godine i kroz logor je prošlo 3000-4000 zatočenika. Tu su počinjeni razni zločini, jer su na par kilometara u blizini srpska sela i svi uniformirani agresori su došli na Ovčaru, kao i Velepromet da se namire za svoja stradanja u agresiji na RH. Razulareni, pijani uniformirani pripadnici Teritorijalne obrana, JNA), četnici, šešeljevci, arkanovci i dr. činili su strahote, premlaćujući, masakrirajući i sl. i na kraju odvođenjem na strijeljanja. Zlostavljanju su podlegla četiri zatvorenika u samim skladištima (Kemo, Damjan, Željko i Siniša), a ostali zatočenici su u skupinama 10 do 20 osoba odvoženi do jaruge,

Treća odrednica odnosi se na sukob Bošnjaka-Muslimana i Hrvata koji je uslijedio nakon srpske agresije na BiH, tijekom kojeg su počinjeni ratni zločini na jednoj i drugoj strani te u manjem broju porušeni kulturni spomenici poglavito religijskog karaktera. Ovaj sukob, s obzirom na nejasne uzroke i ciljeve te tijekom sukoba ne može se imenovati agresijom jedne etničke skupine na drugu već primarno izazvanim općim ratnim kontekstom u kojemu se BiH našla nakon srpske agresije na njen teritorij. **Dakle treća odrednica je etnički sukob Bošnjaka – Muslimana i Hrvata izazvan srpskom agresijom na BiH s jedinim racionalnim ciljem – borbom za ograničene resurse nakon protjerivanja i ubijanja stotine tisuća Bošnjaka – Muslimana i Hrvata te okupacije velikog dijela teritorija BiH 1992. godine.**

Četvrta odrednica rata u BiH odnosi se na oklijevanje, neučinkovitost i pogrešne odluke međunarodne zajednice koja je propustila šansu, nakon evidentnih namjera Srbije i JNA da agresiju iz Hrvatske proširi na BiH postupi odlučnije i agresiju spriječi u začetku. U tom kontekstu podsjetimo što je Canegie Commision on Preventing Deadly Conflict) na temelju analize brojnih sukoba nakon razdoblja Hladnog rata pored ostalih mjera predložila: „Rano upozorenje i reakcija zahtijeva pažljivo motrenje pokazatelja koji ukazuju na neizbježnost javljanja nasilja. Takvi pokazatelji su primjerice kršenje ljudskih prava, brutalna politička suprostavljanja, nabava oružja i korištenje medija za razjarivanje javnosti....Političari veliku pažnju moraju poklanjati tome koga podržavaju i kako se ta podrška nudi.”<sup>193</sup> Svi pokazatelji bili su prisutni u BiH tijekom 1991., za vrijeme trajanja agresije na Hrvatsku. Snažnije i točnije preventivno djelovanje političara iz međunarodne zajednice zacijelo bi

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udaljene otprilike oko 900 metara od puta Ovčara - Grabovo. Tu su 20. studenoga 1991. ubijeni i bačeni u masovnu grobnicu. Žrtve su bile uglavnom ranjenici i medicinsko osoblje iz vukovarske bolnice. U rujnu i listopadu 1996. iz grobnice je ekshumirano 200 tijela (do srpnja 2006. identificirane su 192 osobe, ubijene u dobi od 16 do 72 godine).

<sup>190</sup> Najveći broj prognanika smještenih u Hrvatskoj i inozemstvu zabilježen je sredinom siječnja 1992. godine i bio je oko 700.000 osoba, što je bilo više od 15 % stanovnika Hrvatske, prema popisu pučanstva iz 1991. godine. U travnju 1992. godine počinje srpska agresija na BiH, te stotine tisuća osoba bježi iz BiH u Hrvatsku. Od početka agresije na BiH Hrvatska je smjestila preko 600.000 izbjeglica iz BiH, među kojima oko 425.000 Muslimana, oko 170.000 Hrvata te oko 5.000 osoba ostalih narodnosti.

<sup>191</sup> U Hrvatskoj je u ratu uništeno u potpunosti 380 objekata kulturne baštine, 416 ih je ozbiljno oštećeno, a 630 je poprilično oštećeno (ukupno 1426). Za BiH ne postoje precizne brojke ali je šteta bila sličan onoj u Hrvatskoj. Sve su kao i u Hrvatskoj počinili Srbi, a neusporedivo manji broj rušenja, pretežito sakralnih objekata izvršili su Bošnjaci –Muslimani i Hrvati u međusobnom sukobu.

<sup>192</sup> Opsada grada **Sarajeva** je bila skoro četverogodišnja blokada Sarajeva za vrijeme rata u Bosni i Hercegovini. Opsada je počela u noći sa 4. na 5. travnja 1992. godine a završila se 29. veljače 1996. godine. Sarajevska je opsada trajala 1.425 dana i jedna je od najdužih u povijesti modernog ratovanja. Za vrijeme opsade prosječno je palo 329 granata dnevno na Sarajevo. Rekord od 3.777 ispaljenih granata uknjižen je 22. srpnja 1993. godine. U ovom su vremenu bile napadnute mnoge civilne zgrade. Izvještaji ističu da je u rujnu 1993. godine 35.000 zgrada u Sarajevu bilo srušeno i sve ostale zgrade bile su manje ili više oštećene. Tome pripadaju bolnice, novinske agencije, industrijske zgrade, zgrade vlasti, vojarne i baze Ujedinjenih nacija. Među važnijim objektima se nalaze zgrada Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i Vijećnica, koja je 25. travnja 1992. godine izgorjela zajedno s mnoštvom nenadoknadivih djela povijesti i kulture. Grad **Vukovar** je uslijed srbijanske oružane agresije, tijekom višemjesečnih napada i opsade, a potom i šestogodišnje okupacije, pretrpio vrlo velika ratna stradanja. Procjenjuje se da je na Vukovar ispaljeno približno 1,5 milijuna projektila iznad 100 mm, 5 milijuna projektila ispod 100 mm te bačeno oko 2,5 tisuće bombi težih od 250 kilograma. Sve je to u relativno kratkom vremenu rezultiralo katastrofalnim razaranjima stambenih objekata i svekolike infrastrukture, koja su uvelike devastirala gospodarsku osnovicu grada, razorno uništavajući sve što su stanovnici toga grada marljivo izgrađivali desetljećima, pa i stoljećima prije. Grad je sustavno i temeljito pretvaran doslovce u "prah i pepeo".

<sup>193</sup> Cottam, Martha, Dietz- Uhler, Beth, Mastors, Elena, Preston, Thomas, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Mahwah, 2004, str. 218, 219



pored spriječavanja agresije i sukob Bošnjaka –Muslimana i Hrvata učinilo izlišnim, a procese u BiH usmjerilo prema političkom pregovaranju.

## **IV. OPĆI ZAKLJUČCI**

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Na temelju teorijskog okvira i njegove primjene na rat u BiH mogu se ponuditi slijedeći zaključci:

1. **Rat u BiH nije moguće razumjeti i na temelju toga objasniti ako se ne uvažavaju dvije skupine čimbenika koje su ga prouzročile. Prva skupina odnosi se na povijesne okolnosti te kulturne čimbenike koji su utjecali na oblikovanje identiteta ratnih skupina. Najvažnije povijesno razdoblje, u tom kontekstu je otomansko razdoblje u BiH tijekom kojeg su oblikovane ratne skupine koje su krajem devetnaestog stoljeća i cijelo dvadeseto stoljeće s različitim strategijama utjecale na sva bitna događanja u BiH. Različite strategije temeljene na različitim identitetima i stupnjevima njihove izgrađenosti te kulturnim pozadinama na kojoj su ti identiteti oblikovani, u cijelom razdoblju nakon otomanskog povlačenja iz BiH do raspada druge Jugoslavije, bile su na latentnoj ili manifestnoj razini izvori različitog tipa sukoba – političkih, kulturnih, oružanih. Strategija koja je u osnovi svih oružanih sukoba koji su se događali u kriznim razdobljima u širem geopolitičkom okruženju je srbijanska nacionalna ideologija temeljena na mitu, a kreirana u dvadesetom stoljeću. Prema toj strategiji Hrvati i Bošnjaci-Muslimani trebali su biti iskorijenjeni ili kulturno asimilirani, a prostor BiH pripojen Srbiji. Druga skupina čimbenika odnosi se na neposredne uzroke rata koji su se dogodili u okviru druge Jugoslavije, tijekom njenog raspada i tijekom raspada komunizma kao mega ideologije na svjetskoj razini. U okviru druge Jugoslavije Srbi su uspjeli ostvariti potpunu dominaciju u svim ideološkim i državnim institucijama, a naročito u represivnom aparatu i JNA. To im je omogućilo da pod plaštom totalitarnog poretka i komunističke ideologije pripreme teren za ostvarenje navedene nacionalne strategije. Bošnjaci – muslimani u drugoj Jugoslaviji ostvarili su dio svojih ciljeva povezanih s etničkim identitetom te tako nisu izgradili kritičan odnos prema totalitarnom poretku druge Jugoslavije niti su predvidjeli agresivne namjere Srba. Hrvati su bili u podređenom položaju zbog srpske**

institucijske dominacije te stvarne ili pripisane odgovornosti za zločine koji su počinjeni u drugom svjetskom ratu u NDH, ali su imali kritičan odnos prema totalitarnom poretku kao i prema državnom ustroju druge Jugoslavije. Tijekom raspada druge Jugoslavije, slično kao i nakon odlaska otomanskih osvajača te u prvoj Jugoslaviji na scenu je u novom prilagođenom obliku stupila nova-stara srpska agresivna strategija koju međunarodna zajednica nije na vrijeme prepoznala niti predvidjela, a što je bio glavni neposredni uzrok tzv. rata na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije”.

2. Rat u BiH, a posebice sukobe između Hrvata i Bošnjaka – Muslimana nije moguće razumjeti neovisno o ratu u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj koji mu je prethodio budući da su svi ti ratovi dio istog racionalnog plana. Kako nisu postojale strategije i racionalni planovi na kojima su sukobljene strane temeljile svoje ciljeve osim izmišljenog mita o Karadorđevu i pogrešnih interpretacija Islamske deklaracije, koje su neke muslimanske podskupine tumačile kao poziv na „sveti rat”i sukladno se tome ponašale, taj sukob se na teorijskoj razini i u kontekstu brojnih činjenica o njegovom tijeku i završetku te ponašanju aktera nakon završetka sukoba u velikoj mjeri može objasniti situacijskim čimbenicima koji kod pojedinaca i skupina uzrokuju agresivno ponašanje. Drugim riječima, prva razina sukoba je srpska agresija na BiH koja je proizvela novi kontekst u kojemu su se našli Hrvati i Bošnjaci-Muslimani i Hrvati u kojem su pojedine podskupine i jednih i drugih bile teritorijalno, zapovjedno, a često i informacijski razdvojene. Toj općoj kaotičnoj situaciji posebno je doprinjelo stotine tisuća izbjeglica i prognanika na relativno skučenom prostoru. U takvom kontekstu, djeluju svi navedeni situacijski čimbenici ljudske agresivnosti, kao i grupna ponašanja što proizvodi nove kontekste koje s strategijama skupina kojima pripadaju podskupine u sukobu ne moraju imati nikakve poveznice. No zato izmišljanje i pripisivanje netočnih uzroka tim sukobima na latentnoj razini, prema teoriji može izazvati nove sukobe. Tako nastaje spirala nasilja koja nije više povezana s racionalnim uzrocima sukoba i koja više pripada iracionalnoj dimenziji ljudske prirode. Takvih primjera ima u svim ratovima (npr. My Lai).

Dakle tako proizvedeni kontekst, na pojedinim područjima teritorija koji su kontrolirali Bošnjaci-Muslimani i Hrvati, izravno je utjecao na izbijanje sukoba. Tek u takvoj situaciji na površini su se pojavile kod pojedinaca i podskupina u sukobu i različite izjave koje su kasnije korištene za međusobna optuživanja za agresiju jedne skupine na drugu temeljene na različitim strategijama o budućnosti BiH. To je zapravo, kao što je već navedeno „drugo dno” iste strategije koja je u temelju „rata na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije” , a to je srpska agresija na Sloveniju, Hrvatsku i BiH.

3. U ratu u BiH počinjeni su mnogi zločini koje prema teoriji i međunarodnom pravu pripadaju kategorijama genocida, masovnih ubojstava, etničkog čišćenja te uništavanja kulturne, ekološke i arhitektonske baštine. Međutim, na temelju svih predočenih činjenica ne može se postaviti znak jednakosti među tim zločinima s obzirom na njihovu brojnost, okrutnost i ciljeve koji su se htjeli postići. Veliku većinu svih vrsta zločina počinili su Srbi koristeći ih kao instrument za osvajanje BiH teritorija sukladno planu agresije, a u mnogo manjoj mjeri Bošnjaci-Muslimani i Hrvati s nejasnim i nedefiniranim ciljevima u velikoj mjeri pod utjecajem ratnog konteksta nastalog nakon agresije na BiH. Razmjeri počinjenih zločina i danas, 15 godina poslije rata glavna su prepreka procesima uže međudržavne suradnje Srbije sa BiH i Hrvatskom. Posebno valja napomenuti da su procesi u BiH koji su doveli do etničke homogenizacije prouzročili porast socijalne distance među ratnim skupinama koja bitno otežava zajednički suživot. Zbog toga je i pravedna raspodjela odgovornosti za agresiju i kazni za počinjene zločine najvažniji čin prevencije da se sukobi ne ponove u budućnosti, a suživot nastavi na humanim i demokratskim temeljima.

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# **ANNEX B**

## ***CURRICULUM VITAE* OF DR. VLADO ŠAKIĆ**

Dr. Sci. Vlado Šakić  
*Curriculum vitae*



**EUROPEAN  
CURRICULUM VITAE  
FORMAT**



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**WORK EXPERIENCE**

• Dates (from – to)	1992 -
Name and address of employer	Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar
Type of business or sector	Scientific institution
Occupation or position held	Research Advisor (2005- ) Senior research associate (1997-2005) Research associate (1993-1997)
Main activities and responsibilities	Director of the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Principal investigator on the project: "Social deviations and antisocial behaviour – interactive approach " Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, Republic of Croatia

• Dates (from – to)	1991-1992.
Name and address of employer	Ministry of justice
Type of business or sector	
Occupation or position held	Assistant minister
Main activities and responsibilities	Social Sciences

• Dates (from – to)	1984 -1991.
Name and address of employer	Ministry of justice
Type of business or sector	
Occupation or position held	Head of department for offenders' treatment
Main activities and responsibilities	Social Sciences

• Dates (from – to)	1979-1984.
Name and address of employer	Institute for migration, University of Zagreb
Type of business or sector	
Occupation or position held	Assistant researcher
Main activities and responsibilities	Social Sciences

**EDUCATION**

Date	1991
Place of education	Zagreb
Name and type of organisation	Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb

providing education	
Title or qualification awarded	Ph.D. in Psychology
Date	1982
Place of education	Zagreb
Name and type of organisation providing education	Medical School, University of Zagreb
Title or qualification awarded	M.Sc.
Date	1979.
Place of education	Zagreb
Name and type of organisation providing education	Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb
Title or qualification awarded	B.Sc. in Psychology and Sociology

### TRAINING

Year	N/A
Place of training	N/A
Name and type of organisation providing training	N/A
Principal subjects/Occupational skills covered	N/A

### PERSONAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES

Mother tongue(s)	Croatian
Other language(s)	
Language Speaking	English
Writing	Yes
Understanding (listening and reading)	Yes

### SOCIAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES

1998 - lecturer of the "Social Psychology" course at the Department of Sociology at the Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb; and lecturer of the "Introduction to Psychology", "Social Psychology II" and "Applied Social Psychology" at the Department of Psychology at the Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb.

The author of the new model of penological system in the Republic of Croatia.  
 Recognized expert of the UN in the area of crime prevention and penal treatment.  
 The author of model of National bureau for family, mother and youth.  
 1992. invited by State Department (USIA – USA) to participate in the development of expert program *Drugs and legal regulation of the drug addiction*.  
 He is a member of two national and two international scientific associations.  
 Ex-president of the Croatian penological association and vice president of the Croatian psychological association.

### ORGANISATIONAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES

Principal investigator at the numerous domestic and international scientific projects. Member of Constitutional and Organizational Committees of Croatian Studies and Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar.

Member of the Organization and Program Committees for numerous domestic and international conferences.

Founder and moderator of *Aktualni četvrtak* and *Znanstveni četvrtak* at the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar.

Founder of Center for psycho-social diagnostics at the Bureau for execution of penal sanctions.

Representative of the Republic of Croatia in Technical Committee COST for social sciences.  
 Member of Management committee of COST A18 project *Comparing the Dynamics of Violence*

within European Countries.

1989. invited as an expert by the Helsinki Institute of UN for Prevention of Criminal Behavior and Offender Treatment into visiting Helsinki Institute and to attend the organizational meeting for 8th UN Congress for prevention of criminal behavior and offender treatment.

**TECHNICAL SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES**

Editor of the two scientific journals: *Psihologia Croatica* and *Croatian Journal for criminology and penology* which was also founded by him.

**ARTISTIC SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES**

N/A

**OTHER SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES**

N/A

**DRIVING LICENCE(S)**

B category

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

He has received numerous awards and acknowledgements for his scientific and research work: in 2003. and he received Annual Award *Ramiro Bujas* from Croatian Psychological Association for the promotion of the field of psychology; he was also awarded by Croatian penological association for scientific and expert work, and by Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia for scientific contribution to the country defense. He also received medal and award for the foundation of Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar and Croatian Studies.  
Awarded with Certificate of participation in the Homeland War.

**ANNEXES**

N/A

SIGNATURE

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Dr. Sci. Vlado Šakić  
List of scientific activities and achievements

## A ZNANSTVENA DJELATNOST

### 1 ZNANSTVENI RADOVI

#### 1.1 Knjiga

- 1.1.1 Franc, R., Šakić, V. (2006.), Javno mnijenje: *Stavovi javnosti o nevladinim organizacijama*. Zagreb: Academy of Educational Development.
- 1.1.2 Franc, R., Šakić, V., Šalaj, B., Lailić, D., Kunac, S. (2006.). Udruge u očima javnosti: istraživanje javnog mnijenja s osvrtima. Zagreb: Academy of Educational Development.
- 1.1.3 Čizmić, I., Sopta, M., Šakić, V. (2005.); *Iseljena Hrvatska, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga*, Zagreb.
- 1.1.4 Šakić, V. (1997.): *Načelo Vukovar: bilješka za imaginarnu povijest vukovarske Hrvatske*, Otvoreno sveučilište, (monografija), Zagreb
- 1.1.5 Rogić, I; Kovačević-Lamza, V; Šakić, V; Knezović, Z; Esterajher, J. (1995): *Psihosocijalni i razvojni aspekti reintegracije prognanina i izbjeglica u Hrvatskoj*, Sys Print, Zagreb.
- 1.1.6 Knezović, Z; Kulenović, A; Šakić, V; Zarevski, P; Žužul, M; (1989) *Psihološke karakteristike osuđenih osoba*, Znanstvena edicija časopisa "Penološke teme", Zagreb.

#### 1.2 Poglavlje u knjizi

- 1.2.1 Šakić, V. Franc, R. Ivičić, I. (2006.). *Psihosocijalna analiza nekih sastavnica socijalnog identiteta građana Istre*. Manin, M., Dobrovšak, Lj., Črpić, G., Blagoni, R. (Ur.) *Identitet Istre – ishodišta i perspektive*, str. 503-521. Biblioteka *Zbornici*. Zagreb, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar
- 1.2.2 Milas, G., Šakić, V. (2004.): *What are Detainees of Serbian Concentration Camps Testifying on?*. Jurčević, J., Živić, D., Esih, B. (Ur.): *Vukovar '91. – International Echoes and Significance*, str. 250 Biblioteka *Zbornici*, Zagreb, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar
- 1.2.3 Rogić, I., Šakić, V., Mišetić, A., Miletić, G., M. (2002.): *Kutinčani o svom gradu*, tr. 521-541; Pasarić, D. (ur.): *Kutina – povijesno-kulturni pregled s identitetom današnjice*; Matica Hrvatska, Kutina.
- 1.2.4 Šakić, V. (2004.): *Overview on Contemporary Migration Processes*. Šakić, V., Duncan, H., Sopta, M. (Ur.): *Immigrants and Homeland*, str. 262., Biblioteka *Zbornici*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.2.5 Šakić, V., Ivičić, I., Franc, R. (2003.): *Self-Reported Substance Use and Delinquent among Croatian Youth*; Dunkel, F., Drenkhahn, K. (Ur.): *Youth Violence New Patterns and Local Responses – Experiences in East and West*, str. 419-442, Monchengladbach, Forum Verlag Godesberg.
- 1.2.6 Šakić, V. (2002.): *Uvid u djelo Borba za vrijednost svojeg „ja“ ili u „Pilarovu psihologiju“*, Lipovčan, S., Matijević, Z. (Ur.): *Godišnjak Pilar*, str. 41-64, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.

- 1.2.7 **Šakić, V.** (2002.): *Sociopsihološka rasprava o socijalnom identitetu mladih*, Jelenić, J. (ur.): Mladi u postmodernoj. Kamo idu mladi naraštaji?, str. 11-30, Filozofsko-teološki institut Družbe Isusove, Zagreb.
- 1.2.8 **Šakić, V.** (2001.): *Ima li Hrvatska modernu elitu – sociopsihologijski pogled*. Čengić, D, Rogić, I. (ur.): Upravljačke elite i modernizacija, Biblioteka *Zbornici*, str. 95-116., Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.2.9 **Šakić, V.**, Franc, R. (2000): *O genocidu i drugim oblicima skupnog nasilja*, Pavlina, Ž., Komar, Z. (Ur.): *Vojna psihologija*, knjiga 1, str. 319-335. Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb.
- 1.2.10 **Šakić, V.** (1999.): *Socijalna pravednost i privatizacija u Hrvatskoj: sociopsihološki pogled*. Čengić, D., Rogić, I.: Privatizacija i javnost, str. 175-213, Biblioteka *Zbornici*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.2.11 **Šakić, V.**, (1984.): *Karakteristike migracijskog procesa*, Špicer, G., Rebić, M. (Ur.): Migranti i vjesnikova izdanja, Sveučilišna naklada Liber, Zagreb.
- 1.3 Znanstveni rad objavljen u časopisu citiranom u tercijarnim publikacijama (uključujući pregledni rad)**
- 1.3.1 Franc, R., **Šakić, V.**, Maričić, J. (2007.): *Građanski aktivizam u Hrvatskoj*, „Društvena istraživanja“ 87-88, str. 111-132.
- 1.3.2 Kaliterna Lipovčan, Lj., Brkljačić, T., **Šakić, V.** (2007.): Monthly income and subjective well-being in Croatian citizens, *Croatian Medical Journal*, str. 727-733
- 1.3.3 **Šakić, V.**, Kaliterna, Lj., Franc, R. (2003); *Kvaliteta življenja i stavovi prema doseljenicima u dvije hrvatske regije*, «Društvena istraživanja», Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar.
- 1.3.4 Franc, R., **Šakić, V.**, Ivičić I., (2002), *Vrednote i vrijednosne orijentacije adolescenata: hijerarhija i povezanost sa stavovima i ponašanjima*. "Društvena istraživanja", 11, 2-3 (58-59), 265-290.
- 1.3.5 Mlačić, B., **Šakić, V.**, Franc, R. (2002), *Mladi i izloženost ratnim događajima*. "Društvena istraživanja" 11, 2-3 (58-59), 379-393.
- 1.3.6 **Šakić, V.**, Franc, R., Mlačić B., (2002), *Samoskazana sklonost adolescenata socijalnim devijacijama i antisocijalnom ponašanju*. "Društvena istraživanja", 11, 2-3 (58-59), 265-290).
- 1.3.7 Kaliterna-Lipovčan, Lj., Prizmić-Larsen, Z., **Šakić, V.** (2002): *Subjektivna dob, životno zadovoljstvo i zdravlje*, «Društvena istraživanja», 62, 897-908.
- 1.3.8 Rogić, I., **Šakić, V.**, (1997), *Views and Opinions of the Displaced from the Croatian Danube Basin towards the Serbian population Living in the area*, "Društvena istraživanja", 28-29, 513-537.
- 1.3.9 Sakoman, S., Kuzman M., **Šakić, V.**, (1997), *Pušačke navike zagrebačkih srednjoškolaca*, "Društvena istraživanja", 30-31, 513-537.
- 1.3.10 **Šakić, V.**, Rogić, I., Sakoman, S., (1997), *Attitudes and Opinions of the Croatian displaced Persons Considering Peaceful Reintegration of the Croatian Danube Basin*, "Društvena istraživanja", 28-29, 235-259.
- 1.3.11 **Šakić, V.**, Sedlar, S., Tojčić, A. (1993): *Ratni zločin i zločin genocida u agresiji Srbije na Republiku Hrvatsku 1991.*, «Društvena istraživanja2, 4-5, 407-455.
- 1.3.12 **Šakić, V.**; Raboteg-Šarić, Z.; Brajša-Žganec, A. (1993): *Uzroci progona i obilježja hrvatskih prognanika u kontekstu izbjegličkog problema u svijetu*, "Društvena istraživanja", 4-5, 383-407.
- 1.3.13 **Šakić, V.**, Fulgosi-Masnjak, R. (1983): *Analiza nekih crta ličnosti djece koja su određeno vrijeme živjela u stranoj zemlji*, *Revija za psihologiju*, 1-2, 71-79.

#### 1.4 Znanstveni rad objavljen u časopisu citiranom u sekundarnim publikacijama

- 1.4.1 Šakić, V., Franc, R. Ivičić, I., Maričić, J. (2007.): Tie – an Accessory Fashion Detail or a Symbol?, *Croatian Medical Journal*. 48, str. 419-430.
- 1.4.2 Šakić, V. (1994): *Neke relacije između socioekonomskog statussa i kriminalnog ponašanja*, "Hrvatski časopis za kriminologiju i penologiju", 1-2, 37-59.
- 1.4.3 Šakić, V. (1994): *Prijedlog novog modela zatvorskog sustava Republike Hrvatske, temeljen na tretmanskome pristupu i međunarodnim standardima ljudskih prava zatvorenika*, "Hrvatski časopis za kriminologiju i penologiju", 1-2, 1-37.
- 1.4.4 Šakić, V. (1991): *Pregled važnijih teorija kriminalnog ponašanja*, "Penološke teme", 1-4, 1-47.
- 1.4.5 Žužul, M., Knezović, Z., Šakić, V. (1989): *Da li je agresivnost patološka osobina ličnosti*, "Penološke teme", 4, 3-4, 201-207.
- 1.4.6 Šakić, V., Knezović, Z., Žužul, M. (1987): *Provjera Eysenckove EPQ-C skale sklonosti kriminalitetu na osobama osuđenim za krivična djela "napada na ljude"*, "Penološke teme", 2, 3-4, 255-261.
- 1.4.7 Šakić, V. (1988): *Ostvarivanje principa individualizacije u izvršenju krivičnih sankcija*, «Penološke teme», 3-4, 143-151.
- 1.4.8 Šakić, V., (1987): *Provjera nekih predikcija iz Eysenckove teorije kriminaliteta s obzirom na vrstu krivičnog djela i prethodnu institucionaliziranost počinitelja*, "Penološke teme", 2, 1-2, 57-63.
- 1.4.9 Šakić, V. (1986): *Neke karakteristike "sociometrijskih" i "opaženih" vođa kod populacije osuđenih*, "Penološke teme", 1, 3-4, 199-205.
- 1.4.10 Šakić, V. (1982): *O psihosocijalnim problemima naših migranata pri pokušaju adaptacije na strane društvene sisteme*, *Primijenjena psihologija*, 3, 1-4.
- 1.4.11 Šakić, V. (1980): *Psihički poremećaji migranata i sindrom raseljavanja*, *Rasprave o migracijama*, 63, 27-36.
- 1.4.12 Šakić, V. (1980): *Psihologija i istraživanje migracija*, *Rasprave o migracijama*, 63, 71-78.
- 1.4.13 Šakić, V. (1980): *Alkoholizam kod migranata*, *Rasprave o migracijama*, 63, 61-68.

#### 1.5 Znanstveni rad recenziran, objavljen u zborniku radova s međunarodnog znanstvenog skupa

- 1.5.1 Šakić, V., Ivičić, I., Franc, R., (2003), *Self-Reported Substance Use and Delinquent Behaviour among Croatian Youth*; Dünkel, F., Drenkhahn, K. (Ed.): *Youth violence: new patterns and local responses – Experiences in East and West*; Conference of the International Association for Research into Juvenile Criminology, Forum Verlag Godesberg.
- 1.5.2 Šakić, V. (2001.), *Theories of conflict and the New European order*, *European integration for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, *Proceedings*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.

#### 1.6 Znanstveni rad, recenziran, objavljen u zborniku radova s domaćeg znanstvenog skupa

- 1.6.1 Franc, R. Ivičić, I., Šakić, V. (2007.): *Kriminal i nasilje kao društveni problemi – percepcija javnosti*. str. 103-116. *Zbornik radova znanstveno-stručnog skupa Psihologija nasilja i zlostavljanja*, Osijek, 2006. Kolesarić, V. (ur.): *Psihologija i nasilje u suvremenom društvu*, Sveučilište Josipa Jurja Strossmayera, Osijek, Filozofski fakultet
- 1.6.2 Šakić, V. (2003): *Psihosocijalni aspekti vladanja u suvremenom svijetu – rasprava iz teorijske perspektive*, str. 155-176; Jelenić, J. (Ur.): *Politika mogući izazov*, Filozofsko teološki institut Družbe Isusove, Zagreb.



- 1.6.3 **Šakić, V.** (2003): *Hrvatska javnost devedesetih i «detuđmanizacija» Hrvatske, Dr. Franjo Tuđman – neoprostena pobjeda*; Rasprave sa simpozija uz treću obljetnicu smrti prvoga hrvatskoga predsjednika, (str. 253-281), Zagreb.
- 1.6.4 **Šakić, V.** Franc, R., Ivičić, I. (2003): *Mediji i nasilje mladih – sociopsihološki pogled*. (str. 76-86); Anali Studentskog centra u Zagrebu, Mladi i nasilje.
- 1.6.5 **Šakić, V.** (2002): *Uvid u djelo Borba za vrijednost svojeg "ja" ili uvod u "Pilarovu psihologiju"*, S. Lipovčan i Z. Matijević (Ur.) *Godišnjak Pilar 2002 – Prinosi za proučavanje života i djela dra Ive Pilara*, svezak drugi, (str. 41-64), Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb 2002.
- 1.6.6 **Šakić, V.** (2002): *Sociopsihološka rasprava o socijalnom identitetu mladih*, U J. Jelenić (ur.) *Mladi u postmodernoj. Kamo idu mladi naraštaji?* (str. 11-30). Zagreb: Filozofsko-teološki institut Družbe Isusove.
- 1.6.7 **Šakić, V.**, Marinić, D., Perković, M. (2002 u tisku): *Neki aspekti socijalnog identiteta Slavonaca i Baranjaca*. U "Razvojne perspektive Slavonije i Baranje". *Zbornik*; Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar.
- 1.6.8 **Šakić, V.** (2001.), *Privatizacija pred očima hrvatske javnosti (Analiza socijalno-etičkih učinaka)*, Baloban, S. (Ur.): *Gospodarsko-socijalni izazovi u tranzicijskim zemljama*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.6.9 **Šakić, V.** (1999.), *Socijalna pravednost i privatizacija u Hrvatskoj – sociopsihološki pogled*, Rogić, I., Čengić, D. (Ur.): *Privatizacija i javnost*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.6.10 Žužul, M., Knezović, Z; **Šakić, V.** (1987): *Latentna i manifestna agresivnost kod različitih skupina kriminalaca*, *Zbornik, Dani psihologije*, Zadar, 109-113.



## 1.7 Urednik znanstvenog zbornika/knjige

- 1.7.1 Šakić, V., Kaliterna Lipovčan, Lj., (ur.) (2004.): *Hrvatsko društvo danas: psihosocijalni procesi*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zbornik, Zagreb
- 1.7.2 Šakić, V., Duncan, H., Sopta, M. (2003.): *Immigrants and Homeland*, Proceedings, Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb
- 1.7.3 Bilokapić, F., Bilić, S., Bilić, Z., Bilić Prčić, M., Jurčević, J., Maras, M., Subašić, S., Šakić, V., Tišljarić, Z., Udiljak, S., (ur.), (2003.): *Moji Studenci*, Župni ured Stuenici (monografija), Zagreb
- 1.7.4 Šakić, V. (2002.), (Ur.) Kačić, H.: *Serving my Country: Croatia Rediviva, Studies*, Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb
- 1.7.5 Šakić, V., (2001.), Lj. Kaliterna (Ur.), *European Integration for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Proceedings*, Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.7.6 Šakić, V. (2001.), (Ur.) Sakoman, S.: *Društvo bez droge? Hrvatska nacionalna strategija, Studija*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.7.7 Šakić, V., (2000), (Ur.) s. Valentina Blaženka Mandarić: *Religiozni identitet zagrebačkih adolescenata, Studija*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.
- 1.7.8 Rehak, D., Šakić, V., Jurčević, J., Rogić, I., Mažar, I., Rantuša, Z., (ur.) (2000.): *Putovima pakla u 21. stoljeće...*, Hrvatsko društvo srpskih koncentracijskih logora (monografija)
- 1.7.9 Šakić, V., Jurčević, J., Sopta, M. (1998) (Ur.): *Budućnost iseljene Hrvatske*, Zbornik, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb.

## 1.8 Znanstveni popularizacijski članak

- 1.8.1 Šakić, V. (2002.): *Socijalna psihologija i društveni razvitak*. U Kaliterna, Lj., Šakić, V. (Ured.) *Zbornik Annales Pilar*. Zagreb, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar

## 1.9 Ostali radovi

- 1.9.1 Šakić, V. (2006.) *Je li moguć hrvatski nacionalni i društveni konsenzus (rasprava iz sociopsihološke perspektive): Društveni konsenzus u Hrvatskoj / Balaban, Stjepan (Ur.), Črpić, Gordana; Zagreb; Centar za promicanje socijalnog nauka Crkve, kršćanska sadašnjost; 27-52.*
- 1.9.2 Kaliterna, Lipovčan, Lj., Rimac, I., Milas, G., Raboteg-Šarić, Z., Nestić, D., Šućur, Z., Šakić, V., Njavro, Đ. (2003). (elaborat): *Strengthening Poverty Monitoring Capacity.*
- 1.9.3 Kaliterna, Lipovčan, Lj., Rimac, I., Milas, G., Raboteg-Šarić, Z., Nestić, D., Šućur, Z., Šakić, V., Njavro, Đ., (2003). (elaborat): *Povećanje sposobnosti praćenja siromaštva.*
- 1.9.4 Šakić, V., Mlačić, B., Pokos, N. (2000): *Analiza hrvatskog tiska u razdoblju 1995-1999.* (elaborat).
- 1.9.5 Šakić, V., Ivanda-Serdar, K., Jurčević, J., Mišetić, A., Mlačić, B., Pokos, N. (1997). *Sociodemografski, migracijski, povratničko-motivacijski i psihosocijalni status hrvatskih povratnika iz iseljništva* (elaborat).
- 1.9.6 Šakić, V., Mišetić, A., (1999). *Socioekonomski uvjeti života i razvojna perspektiva područja republike Hrvatske od posebne državne skrbi* (elaborat)
- 1.9.7 Šakić, V., Pokos, N., Živić, D. (1999): *Sociodemografska analiza područja Republike Hrvatske od posebne državne skrbi* (elaborat).

## 1.10 Citiranost prema SCI

- 1.10.1 Šakić, V., Franc, R, Mlačić, B. (2002.): *Self-expressed tendency of adolescents towards social deviations and antisocial behaviour*, «Društvena istraživanja» 11 (2-3): 265-289 Mar-Jun.
- 1.10.2 Ivkovic SK (2001): *Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia*. Stanford J INT Law 37 (2): 255-346 SUM
- 1.10.3 Cengić, D. (2000): *The rulling elite and the delefitimation of the privatization project*, «Društvena istraživanja» 9 (4-5); 497-525.
- 1.10.4 Jurčević, J. (1997): *The basic of Vuk Karadzic's war*, «Društvena istraživanja» 6 (4-5): 637-639.
- 1.10.5 Šundalić, A. (1997): *A model of peaceful reintegration and the possibility to live together*, «Društvena istraživanja» 6 (2-3): 217-233.
- 1.10.6 Šakić, V., Rogić, I., Sakoman, S. (1997.): *Attitudes and opinions of the Croatian displaced persons considering peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube basin*, «Društvena istraživanja» 6 (2-3): 235-258.
- 1.10.7 Rogić, I., Šakić, V. (1997.): *Views and opinions of the displaced from the Croatian Danube basin towards the Serbian population living in the area*, «Društvena istraživanja» 6 (2-3): 259-280.
- 1.10.8 Sekulić Majurec, A. (1996): *Interculturalism in education as a methodological challenge*, «Društvena istraživanja» 5 (5-6): 875-894.

## 2 PROJEKTI

### 2.1 Voditelj međunarodnog projekta

- 2.1.1. COST A18 – *Comparing the dynamics of Violence within European countries* – voditelj: Šakić, V.

### 2.2 Voditelj domaćeg projekta

- 2.2.1 *Hrvatski iseljenički leksikon* (tržišni projekt, 2007. - ), voditelj: Šakić, V.
- 2.2.2 *Hrvatska vojska – hrvatsko društvo* (tržišni projekt, 2007. - ), voditelj: Šakić, V.
- 2.2.3 *Program vrednovanja eksperimentalne provedbe elemenata Hrvatskog nacionalnog obrazovnog standarda (HNOS-a)*; (tržišni projekt, 2005.-2006.), voditelj: Šakić, V.
- 2.2.4 *Odrednice rizičnih ponašanja u nacionalnom i globalnom kontekstu (MZOŠ – 194-194558-1520)*: voditelj projekta: Šakić, V. (2007. – 2010.)
- 2.2.5 *Učestalost nošenja kravate odnosno poslovne marame u Hrvatskoj i javna percepcija nekih osobina njihovih nositelja – EKSPERTNO IZVJEŠĆE - ožujak 2006.*
- 2.2.6 *Javno mnijenje Hrvatske o institucijama kaznenopravnog sustava i politici kažnjavanja: Opravdanost uključivanja u hrvatsko kazneno pravo – Stavovi javnosti i predstavnika pravosuđa* (tržišni projekt, 2005.), voditelj: Šakić, V.
- 2.2.7 *Socijalne devijacije i antisocijalna ponašanja: Interakcijski pristup*, (MZT – 0194103); voditelj projekta: Šakić, V. (2002. – 2006.)
- 2.2.8 *Integracije domovinske i iseljene Hrvatske* (MZT – 01940104), voditelj teme: Šakić, V. (1996-2002.)
- 2.2.9 *Znanstveno-stručna analiza posljedica boravka zatočenika u srpskim koncentracijskim logorima s prijedlogom modela pomoći*, (tržišni projekt, 2000-2001.), voditelj: Šakić, V.
- 2.2.10 *Demografska slika područja RH od posebne državne skrbi*, (tržišni projekt, 1998-2000.), voditelj: Šakić, V.
- 2.2.11 *Socio-ekonomski uvjeti života i razvojna perspektiva područja RH od posebne državne skrbi*, (tržišni projekt, 1998-1999.), voditelj: Šakić, V.

- 2.2.12 *Sociodemografski, migracijski, povratničko-motivacijski i psihosocialni status hrvatskih povratnika iz iseljništva* (tržišni projekt 1997.); voditelj: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.2.13 *Rat protiv Hrvatske: Akteri, ratni zločini, ratno izbjeglištvo i žrtve* voditelj: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.2.14 *Psihosocijalne determinante kriminalnog ponašanja i tretman prijestupnika*, (MZT), voditelji: Kulenović, A., **Šakić, V.**
- 2.2.15 *Psihosocijalne determinante integracije domovinske i iseljene Hrvatske*, (Ministarstvo povratka i iseljništva), voditelj: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.2.16 *AIDS i penalni sustav*, (Ministarstvo pravosuđa); voditelj: **Šakić, V.**

### **2.3. Aktivno sudjelovanje u realizaciji znanstvenih projekata**

- 2.3.1. *ENERGETSKA SIGURNOST, KRITIČNA INFRASTRUKTURA I LOKALNE ZAJEDNICE U RH- Sociološka analiza uloge energetskih kritičnih infrastruktura u nacionalnom energetskom sutavu i odabranim lokalnim zajednicama*, voditeljica: Poljanec Borić, S., konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.2. *Pilarov barometar hrvatskog društva: stavovi i mišljenja građana o društvenim odnosima i procesima*, Hrvatski sabor (2008. - ... ), voditeljica; Kaliterna, Lj., Konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.3. *Studija ostvarivosti*, Hrvatski sabor, voditeljica: dr. sc. Kaliterna, Lj.; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**, srpanj 2008.
- 2.3.4. *Eksperimentalno vanjsko vrednovanje obrazovnih postignuća u osnovnim školama Republike Hrvatske* (2007.-2008.); voditelj: Josip Burušić; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.5. *Modeli obveznog srednjoškolskog obrazovanja* (2006.); voditelj: Goran Milas; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.6. *Hrvatska vojska – hrvatsko društvo – Studija ostvarivosti* (2006.); voditelj: Ivan Rogić; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.7. *Stavovi javnosti o nevladinim organizacija 2006.* (2006.); voditeljica: Renata Franc; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.8. *Stavovi zagrebačke javnosti spram prometa* (2006.); voditeljica: Anka Mišetić; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.9. *Povećanje sposobnosti praćenja siromaštva* (2003.); voditelji: Mark Foley i Ljiljana Kaliterna Lipovčan; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.10. *Analiza sadržaja hrvatskog tiska 1995. – 1999.* (2000.); voditelj: Boris Mlačić; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.11. *Izbori za Zastupnički dom Sabora RH – ispitivanje raspoloženja birača prve, pete i desete izborne jedinice* (1999.), voditeljica: Zora Raboteg Šarić; konzultant: **Šakić, V.**
- 2.3.12. *Evaluacija tretmana osuđenih osoba* (MZT), (voditelj: M. Mejovšek)
- 2.3.13. *Psihosocijalna klima u penalnim ustanovama u Hrvatskoj* (Ministarstvo pravosuđa), (voditelj: D. Ajduković)
- 2.3.14. *Interakcijski pristup strukturi patoloških fenomena* (MZT – 01940112) (voditelj: S. Sakoman)

## **3. POZVANA PREDAVANJA (PLENARNA, SEKCIJSKA)**

### **3.1 Pozvana predavanja na međunarodnom skupu**

- 3.1.1 Institut za svjetsku politiku u Washingtonu (2004.), **Šakić, V.**, S. Poljanec-Borić: *Croatian Society on the Eve of European Integration*
- 3.1.2 COST Conference «Violence, Terrorism and War – New Research Challenges after September 11», (2002.), Copenhagen; **Šakić, V.**: *War Conflicts and the Future of European Integration.*

- 3.1.3 Metropolis, «Dijaspora i domovina». (2002.), Dubrovnik, **Šakić, V.:** *Current Migration Processes – a sociological and psychological review* (plenarno predavanje)
- 3.1.4 Konferencija «The Role of Intermediate Organizations for Social Stability and Democracy», (1999.), Italija, **Šakić, V.:** *Theories of Conflict and the New European order.*

## 3.2 Pozvana predavanja na domaćem skupu

- 3.2.1 **Šakić, V.,** Poljanec Borić, S.: *Sociološki aspekti energetske sigurnosti i zaštite kritične infrastrukture*, Okrugli stol: *Energetska sigurnost i kritična infrastruktura*; Fakultet političkih znanosti, Institut za istraživanje i razvoj obrambenih sustava MORH-a, Zagreb, 27. veljače 2008.
- 3.2.2 Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova i europskih integracija – Diplomatska akademija, **Šakić, V.:** *Hrvatski domovinski rat (opći okvir)*, 2007., Zagreb
- 3.2.3 Okrugli stol: Hrvatsko iseljeničtvo i manjine u Hrvatskoj u procesu europskih integracija, **Šakić, V.:** *Identitet i budućnost hrvatskih iseljenika*, (2007.), Centar za kulturu i informacije, Zagreb
- 3.2.4 Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova i europskih integracija – Diplomatska akademija, **Šakić, V.:** *Identitet i budućnost hrvatskih iseljenika*, (2006.), Zagreb.
- 3.2.5 Sveučilište u Zadru, Filozofski fakultet u Zadru, **Šakić, V.:** *Identitet i budućnost hrvatskih iseljenika*, (2006.), Zadar.
- 3.2.6 Tematski skup: Globalizacija u Hrvatskoj, *Hrvatska u globalizaciji* (2003.), Zagreb.
- 3.2.7 Znanstvena srijeda: **Šakić, V.,** Raboteg-Šarić, Z.: *Tko su mladi Hrvatske*; Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb.
- 3.2.2 *10. godišnja konferencija hrvatskih psihologa, Plitvička jezera*; (2002.), (Raboteg-Šarić, Z.; **Šakić, V.** – moderator, Kaliterna Lipovčan, Lj, Sakoman, S.)

## 4 SUDJELOVANJE NA ZNANSTVENIM SKUPOVIMA

### 4.1 Sudjelovanje na međunarodnim skupovima

- 4.1.1 15th General Meeting of the European Association for Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP); Ivičić, I., Franc, R., **Šakić, V.** (2008.): *Social identity and in-group stereotypes in different types of groups*, Opatija, Croatia, June 10-14, 2008.
- 4.1.2 XXIX International Congress of Psychology; Maričić, J., Franc, R., **Šakić, V.:** *Cross-cultural approaches in psychology: Dimensionality and correlates of the social dominance orientation scale on Croatian sample*;  
Ivičić, I., Franc, R., **Šakić, V.:** *Psychology and Law: Determinants of public opinion on sentences and their preference for different types of sentences*; Berlin, 20.-24. srpanj 2008.
- 4.1.3 *Third European Security Research Conference – SRC '08*, Paris, 28. – 30. rujna 2008., **Šakić, V.**
- 4.1.4 XXIX International Congress of Psychology; Maričić, J., Franc, R., **Šakić, V.:** *Cross-cultural approaches in psychology: Dimensionality and correlates of the social dominance orientation scale on Croatian sample*;  
Ivičić, I., Franc, R., **Šakić, V.:** *Psychology and Law: Determinants of public opinion on sentences and their preference for different types of sentences*; Berlin, 20.-24. srpanj 2008.
- 4.1.5 *Annales Pilar 2007.* – Međunarodna europska konferencija: Značenje Europske unije za Hrvatsku – značenje Hrvatske za Europsku uniju (2007.); S. Poljanec Borić, **V. Šakić:** *Socioekonomski identitet Hrvatske u EU-kontekstu*, Vukovar



- 4.1.6 Međunarodna znanstvena konferencija Siromaštvo i solidarnost: Hrvatska u proširenoj Europi, 2005., **Šakić, V.:** *Kada i zašto pomažemo drugima? – sociopsihološki aspekti prosocijalnog ponašanja*, Zagreb.
- 4.1.7 *Annales Pilar 2004. – Interdisciplinarni skup s međunarodnim sudjelovanjem: Quo Vadis Hrvatska? – Identitet-Modernizacija-Europska obzorja*, **Šakić, V.**, Franc, R., Ivičić, I.: *Psiho-socijalni aspekti identiteta Hrvatske*, Zagreb.
- 4.1.8 Šesti međunarodni znanstveno-stručni skup: Vukovar '91. – dvanaest godina poslije. Hrvatsko dragovoljstvo u međunarodnom kontekstu (2003.); **Šakić, V.:** *Socijalno-identitetska obilježja hrvatskog dragovoljstva*, Zagreb.
- 4.1.9 Peti međunarodni znanstveno-stručni skup: Vukovar '91 – jedanaest godina poslije – Logori i ljudska prava u Europi na pragu 21. stoljeća, (2002.), **Šakić, V.**, Milas, G.: *O čemu svjedoče zatočenici srbijanskih logora*, Vukovar.
- 4.1.10 Metropolis, International Conference „Diaspora and Homeland“ (2002.), **Šakić, V.:** *Current Migration Processes – a sociological and psychological review*, Dubrovnik. (plenarno predavanje)
- 4.1.11 Međunarodni kolokvij: *Stigmatizacija i identitet marginalnih grupa u procesu globalizacije kulture*, 2002., **Šakić, V.:** *Stigmatizacija i moć – psihosocijalni proces stigmatizacije*, Rijeka-Opatija.
- 4.1.12 Međunarodni znanstveno-stručni skup: *XIII. Dani psihologije*, Zadar, 2002., **Šakić, V.:** *Socijalna psihologija i društveni razvitak*.
- 4.1.13 *The European Congress of Psychology*, 2001., London, Kaliterna Lj, **Šakić V.**, Brkljačić T: Age differences in perceived age norms. VII th European Congress of Psychology.
- 4.1.14 Conference *Youth violence: New Patterns and Local Responses Experiences in East and West*, Greifswald (Njemačka), 2001., Franc, R., Ivičić, I., **Šakić, V.:** *Self-reported Substance Use and Delinquent Behaviour among Croatian Youth*.
- 4.1.15 Međunarodni znanstveni simpozij: *Europske integracije za 21. stoljeće*, Dubrovnik, 1999.; Izlaganje, **Šakić, V.:** *Teorije sukoba i novi europski poredak*
- 4.1.16 Conference „The Role of Intermediate Organizations for Social Stability and Democracy“, (1999.), **Šakić, V.;** *Theories of Conflict and the New European Order*, Italija-Napulj.
- 4.1.17 Sedma europska konferencija o ličnosti, 1994. (poster: *Personality and types of criminal behaviour*), Madrid.
- 4.1.18 Osmi kongres Ujedinjenih naroda za prevenciju kriminaliteta i postupanje s prijestupnicima, Havana, 1990. (službeni predstavnik Republike Hrvatske, izlaganje o stanju kriminaliteta i postupanju s prijestupnicima te preventivnim programima u Republici Hrvatskoj)
- 4.1.19 Prvi europski kongres psihologije, Amsterdam, 1989, (poster: Zarevski, P., **Šakić, V.:** *Relation of cognitive status of convicted individuals to some criminological, penological and socialization variables*)
- 4.1.20 Deseti svjetski kongres za kriminologiju, Hamburg, 1988. (2 izlaganja)

## 4.2 Sudjelovanje na domaćim skupovima

- 4.2.1 Okrugli stol *Vrijednosne orijentacije mladih i nasilje*; organizatori: Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i športa, Povjerenstvo Vlade RH za obilježavanje 60-te obljetnice opće Deklaracije o ljudskim pravima, Moderator: **Šakić, V.;** Zagreb, 2008.
- 4.2.2 Rogić, I. **Šakić, V.:** *Stavovi stanovništva Vukovarsko-srijemske županije prema mirmoj reintegraciji hrvatskog Podunavlja*, 11. znanstveno-stručni skup VUKOVAR '91. – sedamnaest godina poslije: Mirma reintegracija hrvatskog Podunavlja: očekivanja, učinci, perspektive (2008.), organizator: Institut Pilar Zagreb i Područni centar Instituta Pilar Vukovar, Vukovar

- 4.2.3 Teološko-pastoralni tjedan, Katoličko-bogoslovni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Teologija u Rijeci (2007.), **Šakić, V.:** *Kultura rastave: socijalni, psihološki i drugi uzroci rastave braka danas u Hrvatskoj*, Rijeka
- 4.2.4 Teološko-pastoralni seminar za svećenike đakovačke i srijemske biskupije, (2007.), **Šakić, V.:** *Sociopsihološki pogled na uzroke i posljedice sukoba u obitelji i rastava braka*, Đakovo
- 4.2.5 Znanstveni skup „Identitet Like: korijeni i razvitak (2007.)”, **Šakić, V.:** *Suvremeni pristupi identiteta*; **Šakić, V.**, Franc, R., Ivičić, I., Maričić, J.: *Važnost sastavnica socijalnog identiteta: sličnosti i razlike građana Like i Pokuplja s građanima drugih hrvatskih regija*, Gospić
- 4.2.6 *Simpozij IVAN PAVAO II. – poslanje i djelovanje*, (2005.) **Šakić, V.:** *Papa i suvremeni identitet kršćana u društvenim znanostima*, Zagreb.
- 4.2.7 *Konferencija „Siromaštvo i solidarnost: Hrvatska u proširenoj Europi“*, (2005.), **Šakić, V.:** *Kada i zašto pomažemo drugima? – sociopsihološki aspekti prosocijalnog ponašanja*, Zagreb.
- 4.2.8 Teološko-pastoralni tjedan – Crkva i mediji (2005.), **Šakić, V.:** *Odražava li se objektivno i nepristrano Crkva i njeno poslanje u hrvatskim medijima?*, Rijeka.
- 4.2.9 *Znanstveni skup: Identitet Istre: ishodišta i perspektive, 2004.*; **Šakić, V.**, Franc, R., Ivičić, I.: *Psiho-socijalni aspekti identiteta Istre*, Pula.
- 4.2.10 Znanstveni skup: *Razvojne perspektive Slavonije i Baranje, 2002.*, **Šakić, V.**, Marinić, d., Perković, M.: *Biti Slavonac ili Baranjac . sociopsihološka rasprava o identitetu*, Osijek.
- 4.2.11 *Savjetovanje: Mladi i nasilje, 2001.*, **Šakić, V.**, Franc, R., Ivičić, I.; *Nasilje mladih – sklonosti, pojavnosti, posljedice*, Zagreb.
- 4.2.12 *Annales Pilar 2001.*; *Psihologijski susreti: Hrvatsko društvo danas: psihosocijalni procesi*; **Šakić, V.:** *Zašto i kako istraživati psihosocijalne procese i socijalni identitet*, Zagreb.
- 4.2.13 Znanstveni skup: *Hrvatska u djelu Ive Pilara, 1999.*, **Šakić, V.:** *Domovinski rat i predviđanja Ive Pilara*, Zagreb.
- 4.2.14 *Drugi znanstveno-stručni skup: Vukovar-Hrvatska-Svijet: Vukovar '91 – osam godina poslije, 1999.*; Jurčević, J, Knezović, Z., **Šakić, V.** *Vukovarski legitimitet – Vukovarska načela*, Zagreb, Vukovar.
- 4.2.15 *Prvi stručno-znanstveni skup: Vukovar '91 – sedam godina poslije, 1998.*, **Šakić, V.:** *Načelo Vukovar '91.*, Zagreb
- 4.2.16 Znanstveni skup: *Ostvarivanje principa individualizacije u izvršenju kaznenih sankcija*, Crikvenica, 1988.; **Šakić, V.:** *Ostvarivanje principa individualizacije u izvršenju kaznenih sankcija*
- 4.2.17 Dani Ramira Bujasa, Zagreb, 1987., **Šakić, V.:** *Mjeri li Eysenckova C skala kriminalitet?*
- 4.2.18 Kongres psihologa bivše Jugoslavije, Herceg Novi, 1984. **Šakić, V.:** *Analiza nekih crta ličnosti djece koja su neko vrijeme živjela u stranoj zemlji*
- 4.2.19 Dani psihologije, Zadar (1988-2000.); Radovi: *Da li je agresivnost patološka karakteristika ličnosti; Neke psihološke karakteristike osuđenih osoba; Neke psihološke karakteristike psihometrijskih i opaženih vođa kod populacije osuđenih*
- 4.2.20 Znanstveni skup: *Institucionalni tretman osoba društveno neprihvatljivog ponašanja*, Opatija, 1984.; **Šakić, V.:** *Neki problemi institucionalizacije osoba društveno neprihvatljivog ponašanja*

## 5 ZNANSTVENA DRUŠTVA

- a) Član dvije međunarodne i dvije hrvatske strukovne udruge (bio je predsjednik Hrvatskog penološkog društva i zamjenik predsjednika hrvatskog psihološkog društva)
- b) Predstavnik Republike Hrvatske u Tehničkom komitetu COST za društvene znanosti

- c) Član Upravnog odbora projekta COST 18 Comparing the Dynamics violence within European Countries

## 6 UREDNIK ZNANSTVENOG ČASOPISA

- a) Urednik Društvenih istraživanja Mladi Hrvatske – socijalizacija, vrednote, devijacije (58-59), 2002.
- b) Uređivao tri znanstvena časopisa: *Psihologija Croatica*, *Penološke teme* i *Hrvatski časopis za kriminologiju i penologiju* (ujedno i osnivač navedenih časopisa)
- c) Urednik tematskog broja Društvenih istraživanja Rat protiv Hrvatske (4-5) 1993.

## 7 ČLAN UREDNIČKOG ODBORA ZNANSTVENOG ČASOPISA

- Pilar – časopis za društvene i humanističke studije 2006.-
- *Primijenjena psihologija* 1989 – 1993.
- *Društvena istraživanja* 1992 – 1994.

## 8 ČLAN PROGRAMSKOG ODBORA ZNANSTVENOG SKUPA

- 8.1 Znanstveni skup Biskup Marko Kalogjera, *Blato*, 05. i 06. prosinac 2008., (član Organizacijskog odbora **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.2 Znanstveni skup *Fra Didak Buntić – čovjek i djelo* (član: **Šakić, V.**), Mostar, 02. i 03. listopada 2008.
- 8.3 Znanstveni skup *Lika u drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću*, *Gospić*, 11. – 12. rujna 2008.,; organizatori: *Institut Pilar – Područni centar Gospić*, *Hrvatski institut za povijest Zagreb*, *Državni arhiv u Gospiću*; (član Programsko-organizacijskog odbora: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.4 *Annales Pilar* 2007. (15.-17. studenoga); *Značenje Europske unije za Hrvatsku i značenje Hrvatske za Europsku uniju* (član: **Šakić, V.**); međunarodna europska konferencija, Vukovar,
- 8.5 Znanstveni skup: *Identitet Like: korijeni i razvitak* (26.-29. rujna 2007.), *Gospić* (član: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.6 *Annales Pilar* 2004.: *Quo Vadis Hrvatska?-identitet-modernizacija-europska obzorja* (član: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.7 Znanstveni skup: *Razvojne perspektive Slavonije i Baranje*, 2002., Osijek; (predsjednik: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.8 *Annales Pilar* 2001.; *Psihologijski susreti: Hrvatsko društvo danas: psihosocijalni procesi*, Zagreb; (predsjednik: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.9 Četvrti znanstveno stručni skup: *Vukovar – 10 godina poslije: Međunarodni odjeci Vukovar '91.*, 2001., (predsjednik: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.10 Znanstveni skup: *Hrvatska u djelu Ive Pilara*, 1999., Zagreb; (predsjednik: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.11 Drugi znanstveno-stručni skup: *Vukovar-Hrvatska-Svijet: Vukovar '91 – osam godina poslije*; 1999.; (član).
- 8.12 Prvi stručno-znanstveni skup: *Vukovar '91 – sedam godina poslije*, 1998., **Šakić, V.**, Zagreb. (član)
- 8.13 Sedma europska konferencija o ličnosti, Madrid, 1994.
- 8.14 Prvi europski kongres psihologije, Amsterdam, 1989. (predsjednik: **Šakić, V.**)
- 8.15 Znanstveni skup: *Ostvarivanje principa individualizacije u izvršenju kaznenih sankcija*, *Crikvenica*, 1988.; (predsjednik **Šakić, V.**).

## 9 ZNANSTVENA NAGRADA/PRIZNANJE

- Dobitnik Državne nagrade za znanost za 2005. godinu – u području humanističkih znanosti – knjiga *Iseljena Hrvatska* (koautor)
- 2003. dobitnik Godišnje nagrade hrvatskih psihologa na 11. kongresu hrvatskih psihologa u Zadru
- Dobitnik nagrade Hrvatskog psihološkog društva Ramiro Bujas (za afirmaciju psihologije)
- Dobitnik nagrade Hrvatskog penološkog društva za znanstveni i stručni rad
- Dobitnik nagrade Ministarstva obrane i Ministarstva znanosti i tehnologije Republike Hrvatske za znanstveni doprinos unapređenju obrane Republike Hrvatske
- Dobitnik utemeljiteljskih medalja i povelja Instituta Pilar i Hrvatskih studija Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
- Dobitnik spomenice Domovinskog rata

## 10. GOSTUJUĆI ZNANSTVENIK

- USIA – SAD; u programu *Droga i zakonsko reguliranje droge*, 1991.
- HEUNI (Helsinški institut Ujedinjenih naroda), 1989.



## **B NASTAVNA DJELATNOST**

### **1 Program i uvođenje novih predmeta**

- dodiplomska nastava (*Uvod u psihologiju, Socijalna psihologija, Socijalna patologija, Primijenjena socijalna psihologija*), Hrvatski studiji Sveučilišta u Zagrebu)
- poslijediplomska nastava (*Psihologija nasilja*), Visoka policijska škola u Zagrebu.

### **2 Autorstvo i suautorstvo udžbenika (knjige...)**

- *Vojna psihologija*, sveučilišni udžbenik (suautor i urednik poglavlja); MORH, Zagreb, 2001.

### **3 Autorstvo internih skripata**

- *Socijalna psihologija 1 i 2*; Hrvatski studiji Sveučilišta u Zagrebu

### **4 Mentorstvo i podizanje znanstvenog podmlatka, posebno:**

- diplomskog rada - Hrvatski studiji : 27
  - - Fakultet za defektologiju: 5
- magistarskog rada - Visoka policijska škola,  
Poslijediplomski studij «Nasilni kriminalitet» : 2

### **5 Poslijediplomska nastava (predavanja, vježbe, seminari...)**

- Nositelj kolegija *Psihologija nasilja* na poslijediplomskom studiju na Visokoj policijskoj školi u Zagrebu

### **6 Dodiplomska nastava (predavanja, vježbe, seminaril**

- Nositelj kolegija na katedri za Penološku psihologiju na Fakultetu za defektologiju Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
- Nositelj kolegija *Uzroci i posljedice rata protiv Hrvatske* na Hrvatskim studijima Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
- Nositelj kolegija *Socijalna psihologija* na Visokoj policijskoj školi u Zagrebu
- Nositelj kolegija *Socijalna psihologija i Socijalna patologija* na Studiju sociologije, Hrvatski studiji Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
- Pročelnik *Studija psihologije* na Hrvatskim studijima Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (do 2004.)
- nositelj kolegija *Uvod u psihologiju, Socijalna psihologija i Primijenjena socijalna psihologija*

### **7 Osnivanje i operacionalizacija novih studija**

- Član *Povjerenstva Katoličkog sveučilišta u Zagrebu*
- Utemeljitelj *Hrvatskih studija* Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
- Utemeljitelj *Studija psihologije* na Hrvatskim studijima Sveučilišta u Zagrebu

## 8 Osnivanje i operacionalizacija novih odjela, centara, škola...

- Utemeljitelj Instituta društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar
- Utemeljitelj Centra za psihosocijalnu dijagnostiku pri Upravi za izvršenje kaznenih sankcija

## 9 Osnivanje i operacionalizacija ljetnih škola, tečajeva

- Osnovao tečaj za obuku na PC kompjutorima u Ministarstvu pravosuđa 1988. (voditelji: Boras, D., Žužul, M.)

## 10 Gostujući nastavnik

- University Notre Damme, Chicago, 1999.; predavanje: *Psihosocijalne posljedice rata protiv Hrvatske*

## 11 Ostale nastavne aktivnosti

- Poslovna škola *Eksperta*, Zagreb: Predavanja iz socijalne i političke psihoogije
- *Zagrebačka škola ekonomije i menadžmenta*: Predavanja iz Socijalne psihologije

# C STRUČNA DJELATNOST

## 1. Knjiga, poglavlje u knjizi

- **Šakić, V.** (1998): *Haag u odrazu Nürnberga*, Zbornik «Hrvatski žrtvoslov», Zagreb, 75/87.
- **Šakić, V.** (1998): *Integracijski procesi domovinske i iseljene Hrvatske*, Zbornik «Budućnost iseljene Hrvatske», 13-23.
- **Šakić, V.** (1997): *Načelo Vukovar*, Naklada «Slap», Zagreb, 1997.

## 2. Stručni rad objavljen u međunarodnom časopisu

- 2.1 **Šakić, V.** (1993): *Opći okvir proučavanja srpske agresije na hrvatsku 1991.*, Društvena istraživanja, 4-5, 217-247.

## 3. Stručni rad objavljen u domaćem časopisu

- 3.1 **Šakić, V.** (1986): *Društvo i prijestupnik na razmeđu*, Penološke teme, 1, 1-2, 23-29.
- 3.2 **Šakić, V.** (1983): *Pokušaj analize odnosa vanjskih migracija i prijestupništva maloljetnika na primjeru općine Imotski*, Migracije, 3, 90- 94.
- 3.3 **Šakić, V.** (1980): *Psihički poremećaji mgranata i sindrom raseljavanja*, Rasprave o migracijama, 63, 27-36.

#### 4. Stručni rad objavljen u zborniku radova s domaćeg stručnog skupa

- 4.1 **Šakić, V.**, (2000).: *Što je načelo Vukovar (znanstvena bilješka – 17.11.1998)*; Zbornik, Vukovar '91: značenje, vrednote, identitet ( Jurčević, J. (ur.), Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, 21-26. (pregledni rad).
- 4.2 **Šakić, V.** (1984).: *Neki problemi institucionalizacije osoba društveno neprihvatljivog ponašanja*, Zbornik, Republički zavod za socijalni rad, Zagreb, 161-169.

#### 5. Sudjelovanje na međunarodnom stručnom skupu

- 5.1
- 5.2 Ministarska konferencija COST-a, Beč, 1992.
- 5.3 Pripremna konferencija za VIII Kongres UN-a za prevenciju kriminaliteta i postupanje s prijestupnicima, Helsinki, Finska, 1989.
- 5.4 Europska konferencija za unapređenje penitencijarnih sustava u Europi, Messina, Italija, 1989.

#### 6. Sudjelovanje na domaćem stručnom skupu

- 6.1 *Budućnost visokog obrazovanja u RH*, Zagreb, 2002.
- 6.2 Okrugli stol: *U ime naroda*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 1999.
- 6.3 *Hrvatska u djelu Ive Pilara*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 1999.

#### 7. Rad na popularizaciji struke

- Osnivač i voditelj tribina *Aktualni četvrtak* i *Znanstveni četvrtak* u Institutu društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar

#### 8. Istraživačka i razvojna postignuća

- Autor novog modela penitencijarnog sustava Republike Hrvatske
- Autor modela Državnog zavoda za obitelj, majku i mladež prema narudžbi Vlade RH

#### 9. Stručna društva, radne grupe

- član Odbora za pravosuđe Hrvatskog Sabora iz reda znanstvenih javnih djelatnika (1996-2000.)
- član brojnih radnih grupa za izradu zakona iz područja pravosuđa u razdoblju 1986-1992.

Dr. Sci. Vlado Šakić  
Outline for the report to be prepared

# ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1991-1994

## *A sociopsychological explanation*

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### 1. CONTEMPORARY SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES AND EXPLANATIONS OF NATIONALISM, ETHNOCENTRISM AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM

#### 1.1. Human aggression as the foundation of conflict at the individual and group level

##### 1.1.1. *The definition of aggressive behaviour*

1.1.1.1. The causes of aggressive behaviour (neurological and chemical influences, situational sources))

1.1.1.2. The reduction of aggression

1.1.1.3. Human aggression and war

*Application to the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

#### 1.2. Groups and group processes

##### 1.2.1. *The definition of groups*

1.2.1.1. Central features of groups

1.2.1.2. The emergence and development of groups

1.2.1.3. Influence in groups (conformism, situational conformism)

1.2.1.4. Group decision-making (group think, group polarisation, increased commitment)

1.2.1.5. Conflict in groups

1.2.1.6. The dissolution of conflict

*Application to the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

#### 1.3. Ethnocentrism, nationalism and political extremism as forms of group behaviour

*1.3.1. The definition of ethnocentrism*

1.3.1.1. Ethnic conflicts as a form of group conflicts

1.3.1.2. Contemporary theories of ethnic conflict (conflict theory, social identity theory)

1.3.1.3. The resolution of conflicts (integration strategy, divided sovereignty, utilitarian strategy)

*Application to the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

*1.3.2. The definition of nationalism*

1.3.2.1. Contemporary sociopsychological theories of nationalism (social identity theory, image theory)

1.3.2.2. Nationalism and aspiration for uniqueness and independence.

*1.3.2.3. The prevention and resolution of conflicts*

*Application to the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

*1.3.3. The definition of political extremism*

1.3.3.1. Political extremists and their social identities (extreme groups, terrorists, state terror, paramilitary)

1.3.3.2. Genocide and ethnic cleansing

1.3.3.3. Passive observers

*1.3.3.4. Reconciliation*

*Application to the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

**2. A SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1991-1994**

Dr. Sci. Vlado Šakić

Short list of literature to be primarily used  
as a source or reference in the report.

## Basic Literature for the Report

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1. Aronson, E., Wilson, T.D., Akert, R.M.: *Socijalna psihologija*, Zagreb: Mate, 2005.
2. Cottam, M., Dietz-Uhler, B., Mastors, M., E., Preston, T.: *Introduction to Political Psychology*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, London, 2004.
3. Pavlina, Ž., Komar, Z. (Ur.): *Vojna psihologija – priručnik za hrvatske časnike* (knjiga druga), Ministarstvo obrane Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb, 2003.

## Additional Literature

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1. Ellemers, N., Spears, R., Doosje, B.: *Social Identity*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1999.
2. Cipek, T., Vrandečić, J.: *Nacija i nacionalizam u hrvatskoj povijesnoj tradiciji*, Alineja, Zagreb, 2007.
3. Hofstede, G.: *Cultures Consequences – Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations* (Second Edition), Sage Publications, London, 2001.
4. Jurčević, J.: *Bosna i Hercegovina 1990.-1995. – Ekspertiza za potrebe MKSJ*, prosinac 2008.
5. Kurtines, M., W.: *The Role of Values in Psychology and Human Development*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., USA, 1992.
6. Myers, G., D.: *Social Psychology*, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993.
7. Postmes, T., Jetten, J.: *Individuality and the Group*, Sage Publications, 2006.
8. Reicher, S., Hopkins, N.: *Self and Nation: Categorization, Contestation and Mobilization*, Sage Publications, 2001.
9. Tuđman, M.: *Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini*, Slovo M, Zagreb, 2005.
10. Worchel, S., Morales, J., F., Paez, Deschamps, J. C.: *Social Identity – international perspectives*, Sage Publications, 1998.



# **ANNEX C**

## **REFERENCE MATERIAL**