1 Wednesday, 5 July 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could you call the
7 case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'd like
9 to greet you all. It's case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus
10 Prlic et al.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar. I'd like
12 to welcome all the people present in the courtroom: Mr. Scott, the
13 Defence counsel, the accused, as well as the witness Mr. Manolic, as well
14 as all those people present in the courtroom.
15 The registrar, before the hearing, told me we had a technical
16 difficulty with the transcript. The technical engineer has been working
17 on it for the last few minutes because we're trying to boost the system.
18 So we will have to nevertheless continue with the hearing, and if you
19 can't read the transcript, just take notes and then you can check it out
20 with the transcript afterwards.
21 Before resuming the cross-examination, which ended off with
22 Mr. Praljak taking the floor yesterday, I would like to say the following:
23 Yesterday, we listened with great attention to the questions that were put
24 to the witness. Personally, I didn't quite understand the meaning of some
25 of your questions, and this morning I read the pre-trial brief of your
1 Defence counsel that had been filed pursuant to the filing of the
2 pre-trial brief of the Prosecution.
3 In this pre-trial brief you clearly spell out what your Defence
4 strategy is, and in its conclusion you indicate that you were innocent and
5 that you hope that a confrontation with witnesses will enable you to
6 render you not guilty. So you clearly stated that you were eagerly
7 awaiting the testimony of the witnesses to clearly assess this. And on
8 reading your submissions, I discovered that you have mentioned a number of
9 interesting items, namely the international armed conflict and the joint
10 criminal enterprise, and to support your arguments you quoted in your
11 submissions a number of examples. I would just like to outline a few of
12 these. This has been recorded, and therefore it has been made public.
13 As far as international conflict is concerned, in paragraph 26 you
14 drew up a list of all the things which Croatia has done. You said that
15 Croatia has supplied the ABiH and the TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina with
16 equipment, has funded the training of a number of military units or police
17 units that included Muslims that went to Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the
18 Republic of Croatia was training helicopter pilots and tolerated military
19 equipment transfers and convoys. So all of this is extremely interesting,
20 and you can put this in the form of a question to the witness to
21 corroborate what you have mentioned in your submissions, because what
22 you've mentioned in your submissions is not supported by anything you say
24 You also say that Croatian hospitals had cared for 12.000
25 Bosnians, which of course could be a useful element to be borne in mind by
1 the Bench and the Defence counsel, and this could be corroborated by the
3 In addition, under exceptional circumstances we had said that you
4 could put questions on -- on -- you could put questions on technical
5 matters. This is why you have been entitled to ask questions of a
6 technical nature.
7 In paragraph 74 of your submissions, and thereafter the title is
8 "Bosnia has attacked the Republic of Croatia," you quote a number of
9 things that are of a military -- quite obviously -- that are quite
10 obviously of a military nature. In paragraph 77 you explain that the
11 Republic of Croatia deployed a new military strategy in the south of the
12 country, and you say that in the spring of 1992 an HV battalion comprising
13 459 soldiers were positioned in Citluk in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the
14 kind of useful question which you can put to the witness. The witness can
15 confirm or deny what you're saying.
16 You also mentioned that the HV was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they
17 never exceeded 500. Perhaps the witness can confirm this, can say this is
18 true or not, and so on and so forth.
19 Mr. Praljak, you -- when you ask a question, that's all very well,
20 but the questions need to be useful questions that serve your interests.
21 So I've just mentioned a number of questions which you can put to the
22 witness, and this is contained in your submissions. The witness can
23 confirm what you are saying or can disagree with you. So you should make
24 the most of it, because I don't know at what point in time you will be
25 able to ask these questions again at a later stage.
1 Yesterday, you had a book with 220 documents, or a bundle with 227
2 documents. I think it would be more useful to put questions on those
3 points you have mentioned in your submissions. I hesitate to interrupt
4 you because I don't know what your strategy is, and I don't know the
5 reasons for which you ask these questions, but the Bench does not want the
6 trial to last for longer than it should, and sometimes you spend a lot of
7 time on questions which could have been put differently. You could have
8 put the questions more specifically.
9 Yesterday, I asked you how much time you needed, and you were
10 unable to tell me how much time you needed. I don't want to find myself
11 in the situation where some Trial Chambers find themselves. In other
12 words, the Bench has to interrupt the accused and say, "This is not
13 relevant and is not of any interest." You are entitled, of course, to a
14 fair trial and you are entitled to put your questions to the witness, but
15 if do so, this should be useful and the question must be relevant and must
16 relate to the indictment and there must be a probative value in your
17 question. If there is no relevance and no probative value, we are all
18 wasting our time.
19 This is something I wanted to call to your attention, Mr. Praljak,
20 to make sure that the questions you put in the future are useful for the
21 Bench and also useful for your own defence. And we don't want to
22 adversely affect the other accused, because their Defence counsel also
23 need time to speak up.
24 I would be very happy to stay here for 25 years and address all of
25 this in great detail. Unfortunately, we have time constraints and we
1 can't do this. Therefore, we all -- we must all focus on what is
2 essential and stick to the time limits. As I've told you already, if you
3 don't have time to ask some questions, when it is time for the Defence to
4 present its case, then you can ask questions which you were unable to ask
5 during the Prosecution case, and at the end of the day, when your Defence
6 counsel -- when the Defence counsel file their submissions, you can also
7 include those questions which have not been addressed at this stage.
8 So I think the position of the Bench is very clear. We want you
9 to put questions, of course, but the questions must be relevant, and we
10 don't want to have the feeling that we're wasting our time. Your
11 submissions are perfectly relevant and relate to important points. And
12 seize this opportunity. You have a witness here in the courtroom, and you
13 should thereby confirm what you would like to confirm through the witness.
14 You have the floor, Mr. Praljak, and you may ask your questions.
15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your
16 Honour. The whole problem with the way that the questions are being put,
17 all of this comes from the fact that it is very difficult to comprehend
18 this concept, joint criminal enterprise. Despite the fact that I talked
19 to the lawyers, despite the fact that in Zagreb a body has been formed
20 comprising law professors, including Professor Damaska, all of whom
21 invested a lot of effort, nobody can give us as precise answer as to where
22 the guilt lies in that concept. I know where I was and what I did, but
23 I'm not here quite certain in where I stand.
24 If Mr. Manolic, who was the second-ranking official in a state, is
25 able to say that Franjo Tudjman went to Karadjordjevo and that that was a
1 criminal act, then that makes me guilty automatically, regardless of
2 whether I was on the ground, was not on the ground, whether I was in Paris
3 or elsewhere. This is the reason why we are having all this difficulty
4 with formulating our questions, Your Honour.
5 Thank you. Now I would like to proceed with the ensuing matters.
6 WITNESS: JOSIP MANOLIC [Resumed]
7 [Witness answered through interpreter]
8 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak: [Continued]
9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Karadjordjevo. That is
10 quite a major topic. They're trying to portray it as one of the problems
11 in the war which resulted in all these criminal activities, and this is
12 where the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina actually started, because
13 allegedly it was discussed by Tudjman and Milosevic precisely in
15 In the Blaskic case, in the judgement in that case, it is stated
16 these aspirations for division were clear in confidential discussions on
17 the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina led by Tudjman and Milosevic on the
18 30th of March, 1991, in Karadjordjevo.
19 Your Honours, this is a judgement of this Honourable Tribunal.
20 They were unable to establish the accurate date. It wasn't on the 30th of
21 March but, rather, on the 25th of March. And we are discussing a very
22 significant crime and can't even establish the date.
23 Q. Mr. Manolic, when did that take place?
24 A. As far as I can remember, it was on the 25th of March, 1991.
25 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Praljak says
2 that in the judgement this was not specified. Mr. Praljak stated that it
3 was on the 25th of March, and you say that it was also on the 25th of
4 March. So everybody agrees on that.
5 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I just want -- I'm just going to start
6 out the day by objecting again and making it clear that we are going to --
7 I ask that Mr. Praljak ask specific questions to the witness. He starts
8 off already by making -- he's made several speeches so far.
9 I also note for the record that the Prosecution used approximately
10 5 hours and 20 minutes. The Chamber has said that in the absence of
11 agreement among counsel each Defence team will get one sixth of the total
12 time. Mr. Praljak so far has used up approximately 42 minutes of his
13 time, so I note that, for the record, this would mean about 55 minutes for
14 each Defence team, so the Praljak Defence now has approximately 13 minutes
15 left, including counsel and Mr. Praljak. So perhaps Mr. Praljak would
16 like to use his very limited time very wisely by asking questions rather
17 than making speeches. Thank you.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So, Mr. Praljak, you
19 have focused on this meeting between Milosevic and Tudjman. You've
20 highlighted this. You said that this took place on the 25th of March,
21 1991. Now, put your question to the witness. What is the question you
22 would like to ask?
23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Was it on the 25th of March, 1991?
25 A. Yes, as far as I can remember.
1 Q. Please, as you can see, I'm short on time. Please just give me
2 yes or no answers, or "I don't remember," or "I don't know."
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Manolic. Did you attend that meeting?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you. Did Mr. Tudjman tell you about what was discussed at
7 the meeting?
8 A. Yes. In principle it was agreed.
9 Q. All right. So in principle some things were agreed upon. All
10 right. Do you know which commission was supposed to implement that
12 A. The commission was established subsequently by President Tudjman.
13 The names of the members are well known because they were announced.
14 Q. Do you believe that the commission failed to reach a solution even
15 though two people had reached an agreement? How do you interpret that?
16 A. I interpret it in such a way that this division in principle was
18 Q. Do you think that Tudjman didn't know that this division was
19 absurd before he proceeded to negotiate?
20 A. I don't think he did, because otherwise he wouldn't have
22 Q. Do you know, in the course of the war, how many times Tudjman and
23 Milosevic met?
24 A. I don't know.
25 Q. I'm going to tender some documentation to the Trial Chamber about
1 48 meetings of different sorts, meetings between Tudjman and Milosevic,
2 where it can be seen what was discussed and how.
3 Immediately after the meeting on the 25th in Karadjordjevic, was
4 there on the 28th a meeting of all presidents in Split?
5 A. I don't remember.
6 Q. After that meeting in Karadjordjevo, were there six meetings of
7 all presidents of all republics?
8 A. I don't remember that either.
9 Q. Do you know that the Defence and National Security Council, of
10 which you were a member yourself, wrote a letter to the UN Security
11 Council, to the presiding of the Council of EC, Mr. Willy Claes, and
12 others, saying the following: We believe, or the Council believes that
13 the pressure and threats advanced against Croatia are unreasonable due to
14 following reasons: Croatia was the first country to recognise the
15 sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia still continues
16 to recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. Croatia
17 supports the principle of territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18 Are you aware of this?
19 A. I've never seen the letter that you mentioned, but the other facts
20 that you are mentioning --
21 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Manolic. You either know about the
22 letter or you don't know about the letter.
23 Do you know that in several interviews Franjo Tudjman said the
24 following: "As for the rest, I repeat once and forever there was never
25 any alleged agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between
1 Tudjman and Milosevic." Are you aware of this?
2 A. I am aware of the interview.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Slobodan Milosevic said --
4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't hear to whom.
5 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
6 Q. -- in the published report Tudjman told me that he wanted an
7 independent Croatia, but we simply couldn't agree. He wanted to destroy
8 the institutions, advisory institutions, and I could not accept that, just
9 as previously I accepted amendments to the constitution that would allow
10 for self-determination. There was some speculation about us agreeing on
11 the division of Yugoslavia. Now I'm telling you, had we decided it at the
12 time, we could have proceeded with implementation immediately.
13 In the same letter to the Security Council, under paragraph (F),
14 it says as follows: "The best confirmation of our viewpoints is contained
15 in the already-advanced proposal of Croatia which we are now voicing
16 again, namely for the UNPROFOR to conduct an efficient border control,
17 both between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as
18 well as between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the entire
19 border, not just the UNPA zones."
20 Are you aware of this letter?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 A. Not the conversation either.
24 Q. Please, Mr. Manolic, you either know, you don't know, you don't
25 remember. Please help me complete my task.
1 Milosevic gave the statement to Laura Silber and Allan Little.
2 The statement by Tudjman and Milosevic in Geneva on the 17th of July,
3 1993. The president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and
4 the president of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, following a
5 meeting held under the auspices of the co-presidents of the International
6 Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen
7 published or, rather, gave the following statement: "The speculations on
8 the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina are completely unfounded, the
9 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia."
10 That was paragraph one. Paragraph two: "The only way to achieve
11 long-term peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies in the affirmation of the
12 interests of all three constituent nations and achievement of agreement on
13 establishment of three republics within a confederation."
14 Are you aware of this?
15 A. I know about the statement, but I don't know about the content of
16 the discussions.
17 Q. How could you know, since you were not there?
18 A. That's correct.
19 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm going to interject on this line of
20 questions. If Mr. Praljak knows the witness wasn't there, then why is he
21 asking him questions about it? Now, if we're going to spend --
22 Mr. Praljak has now used up his allotted time. The Praljak Defence had
23 approximately 55 minutes, we've come to 55 minutes --
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, the question is an
25 interesting one since the witness is being asked if Mr. Tudjman and
1 Mr. Milosevic, in July, 1993, had made a joint statement with respect to
2 the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so this would go in favour of the idea
3 that Croatia did not want to raise the question of the borders of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the witness is asking -- is being asked whether he
5 knew about that joint statement and what he can say about it, his
6 comments. So there we have it. It's an important question. So I don't
7 understand your objection.
8 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I have no problem at all if the witness
9 is asked questions, direct questions which then he can add -- respond to,
10 but all Mr. Praljak has done the last few minutes is read from other
11 documents and then just say, Are you aware of that document? And Mr. --
12 the answers over the last few minutes is Mr. Manolic says, no, I'm not
13 aware of that particular document, or yes, I am, and then he tries to
14 explain something to answer the very -- to give the Court the very
15 information you just indicated, Your Honour, and he goes on to the next
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] He doesn't know the document,
18 but he does know the subject of the joint statement. So --
19 MR. SCOTT: Exactly.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] -- in that case, this is a
21 follow-up question.
22 Mr. Karnavas.
23 MR. SCOTT: And Mr. Praljak is not asking the follow-up question,
24 and then he just goes on to the next document. So let Mr. Manolic give
25 his answer.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's what I said.
2 Mr. Karnavas.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: I just merely wanted to point out that yesterday
4 the gentleman gave all sorts of opinions. Now he's being asked specific
5 questions. It appears that he wasn't there, he doesn't know, he's
6 unaware, so it calls into question his credibility and his veracity.
7 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm sorry to take the time, but I want to
8 be very clear on this because I'm not trying to interfere with the proper
9 questions being put to the witness. I understand that he can ask probing
10 questions of the witness. I understand that fully. But simply to get up
11 and read and refer to documents out of a book and say, Have you heard of
12 this document, have you heard of this document, have you heard of this
13 document? is not proper.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you. Mr. Praljak,
15 the witness has just said that he does not know the object of the meeting,
16 but he heard what you read out, so go ahead and ask him what the
17 consequences were of the joint statement made by Tudjman and Milosevic,
18 even if he is not aware of the paragraphs quoted. And you can ask
19 follow-up questions. Go ahead.
20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
21 Q. On the 17th of July, 1993, what post did you hold?
22 A. I was president of the House of Counties.
23 Q. What do you know -- what happened after that statement? Following
24 that statement, was it a period of fierce conflict between the HDZ and
1 A. Yes. That culminated in the conflict between the HVO and the
2 Bosnian army. And I think that the context -- let me just tell you that
3 why Milosevic sent the letter was a defence from the overall attack
4 launched by the international community on this rumour that was going
5 round that they were in fact partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Q. Well, what could I say to that? Bosnia is divided today with all
7 the pressures that went on, but never mind. What I want to tell the Court
8 here is the following: When -- well, I have to ask the witness whether he
9 knows about this, but when one of the members of the committee was
10 questioned, which Franjo Tudjman appointed to divide that same Bosnia -
11 and the man is Mr. Bilandzic - at the Tribunal in The Hague the Prosecutor
12 asked the following question: "All right, Doctor, you took part in the
13 meeting as a member of the Croatian delegation in order to deal with the
14 question of maps and to determine which portion would go to Serbia and
15 which portion would fall to Croatia. Is that correct?" And the answer
16 was: "No, that is not correct."
17 We don't have enough time, but I'd just like to tender this and
18 say the following: Dr. Jovic, or, rather, Borislav Jovic, member of the
19 Yugoslav state Presidency, in The Hague provided his diaries and signed to
20 say they were authentic, and he addresses the meeting of the -- of the
21 meeting in Karadjordjevo: Franjo Tudjman, Milosevic, Bilandzic, Babic,
22 Jovic, Smilja Avramov; all of them address the issue of Karadjordjevic and
23 all of them say that there was no division, so my question to you is the
24 following: If you were opposed to the division and Franjo Tudjman's
25 policy, why didn't you leave him then and there? Why didn't you establish
1 a new party or join another party? Why did you agree to the criminal
2 enterprise pursued by Mr. Franjo Tudjman?
3 A. You don't leave a policy or a party because you don't agree over
4 one issue. There are a certain -- there are a series of other issues for
5 which I stayed on in the Croatian Democratic Union and in the leadership
6 together with President Tudjman. There you have it.
7 Q. Despite that, or, rather, despite the fact that that kind of
8 policy and politics, according to the International Tribunal was condemned
9 and an indictment raised, and it was stated that it was a criminal
10 enterprise on the part of Franjo Tudjman against another state, that was
11 not something that interested you at the time?
12 A. As to that question --
13 Q. Thank you. Could the witness be shown this next document on the
14 ELMO, on the overhead projector, please, so that he can just confirm what
15 he sees. I'm going to ask him about those documents.
16 Mr. Manolic, when 5.000 Mujahedins entered the territory of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 and 1992, and partially in 1993, you were the
18 Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia or the chief of all the secret
19 intelligence services of the Republic of Croatia; is that true?
20 A. Yes, it is true, but I'd like to specify when I was Prime Minister
21 and when I was the rest. The dates you mention are not correct.
22 Q. Tell me, how long were you Prime Minister of Croatia for; what
24 A. Until August, 1991. From August 1991. Until August, 1991.
25 Q. Up until what date in 1993 were you the head of all the secret and
1 intelligence services of the presidential office for national security,
2 the body that conjoined all the secret services of Croatia?
3 A. For a period of time. I can't establish which period of time.
4 Afterwards I wasn't occupying any positions. If you have a document
5 appointing me, then I'll accept that.
6 Q. Were you in that post or not?
7 A. Yes, at a certain period of time.
8 Q. Which period of time?
9 A. I can't tell you now exactly. I can't specify because I don't
11 Q. You don't know when you were head of the secret services of the
12 Republic of Croatia?
13 A. I don't know the dates, and we're talking about dates now.
14 Q. Do you know the month?
15 A. Well, as to months, yes, I can tell you that. It was round about
16 November, from November onwards.
17 Q. Up until when?
18 A. Until I was elected president of the House of Counties, that is to
19 say March, 1993.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So from November, 1992, to
22 March, 1993, you were in charge of the secret services of Croatia; is that
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was the department or office of
25 the president of the republic for intelligence work.
1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] 1991, not 1992. 1991. From
2 November, 1991, until March, 1993.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So November, 1991, to March,
4 1993, or was it November, 1992, to March, 1993, that you were occupying
5 that function within the presidential office in charge of the secret
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 18th of November. Yes,
8 November, 1991. From that date until March, 1993.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for specifying.
10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
11 Q. At that time, 5.000 Mujahedin passed through Croatia on their way
12 to Bosnia to fight on the side of the BH army. Did you prevent that?
13 A. Not prevented. I didn't even know about that. I didn't know
14 about the figures you're telling us about now.
15 Q. Thank you. Madam, may we have the next document placed on the
16 ELMO, please.
17 I'm afraid you can't see it very well, but those the names of the
18 people, and you're saying you never heard of any of those names or saw any
19 of them. Thank you.
20 May we have the next document, please. This is the attack by the
21 Yugoslav People's Army and Chetniks on Croatia from the territory of the
22 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is this a correct map?
23 A. I don't know the exact borders.
24 Q. Thank you. That will do. Next paper, please. Could you zoom in,
25 please, focus better.
1 Now, on this map -- zoom out.
2 This map shows the bases and places in the Republic of Croatia
3 from which weapons were taken for the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, sent out
4 to them. Do you know anything about that?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you. Next piece of paper, please. That will do,
7 Mr. Manolic.
8 Could you please just give me yes or no answers. Leave the
9 explanations out. I'm not asking for an explanation from you. You gave
10 your explanations when questioned by the Prosecutor. All I wish to
11 establish was that it was either the Prime Minister in whose government we
12 have the minister of the interior or the chief of all the secret and
13 intelligence services, who knows everything, suddenly knows nothing about
14 this attack, about the Mujahedin. So just tell me "yes," "no," or "I
15 don't know."
16 Now, here --
17 A. Mr. President, may I say something? When I started my testimony,
18 I said at the time that I would be testifying about the facts that I am
19 aware of and know about either directly or from certain sessions and
20 meetings that I attended. Everything that you're asking me now and
21 putting to me now are things that were not discussed at any of the
22 meetings that I took part in.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, here in this text we see the establishment of
24 military offices and departments of the Main Staff of the army of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina - that's what it says here on this piece of paper - in
1 the Republic of Croatia in July, 1993.
2 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. Excuse me. I wonder, do we
3 have the English translation of this document? And I don't know if any of
4 the documents have been provided in cross-examination. I think the Court
5 ruled --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, we don't seem to
7 have the English translation, do we?
8 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour, we do have, and it is actually in
9 the e-court under number 3D 120023. And we have the binders here, and
10 also for the Judges, and if we can now distribute it, it will be fine. We
11 were planning to distribute when I would be starting, but is probably a
12 better time now.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So we have the e
14 version in English. May we see it come up on our screens, please,
15 Mr. Registrar. So the document does exist in English.
16 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I'm sorry, I have to make a correction.
17 I was reading the number for the page. Actually the number of this
18 document is 3D 00302.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Please proceed.
20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Manolic, what I want to do is to show quite clearly through my
22 questions that in Croatia, with respect to this document, during the clash
23 between the BH army and the HVO, Franjo Tudjman, who hated Muslims, who
24 divided Bosnia, allowed the formation of these offices or, rather,
25 departments of the Main Staff of the army fighting with part of his people
1 in the HVO. Did you know about this document?
2 A. Yes. Those outposts are always established precisely in the aim
3 of establishing more efficient cooperation between the enemy forces and
4 one's own forces.
5 Q. Well, maybe. I've never heard that in my life before. But the
6 HVO cooperated with Goering, Goebbels, Heitel, or whoever else in the
7 sense of better cooperation with enemy forces, and then supplied them with
8 weapons to attack the French, I don't know about that, but anyway, thank
9 you. Next document, please.
10 This is a similar document. It's also about armed forces of the
11 BH army on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Do you know of this
13 A. No.
14 Q. Next document, please. Thank you.
15 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, this document is also in your folder
16 and it is in e-court 3D 00186.
17 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, excuse me. Two things,
18 important points. I think it was the Trial Chamber's earlier ruling that
19 all the materials for cross-examination should be provided to the
20 Prosecution prior to the beginning, at the end of direct examination.
21 Also -- which I don't think has been done, as far as I can tell.
22 Secondly, I understand that Mr. Praljak is a layperson, but nonetheless if
23 he is going to participate in the process in this way, then he needs to
24 proceed in a proper way and give us exhibit numbers and document numbers.
25 It's the only way we can have a record and know what's being referred to.
1 It could very well be, Your Honour, it would be much more effective for
2 counsel, for Mr. Kovacic to conduct such an examination along the lines
3 that it's legally done, but Mr. Praljak, if he's going to stand up and
4 talk about exhibits and documents, he's going to have to give us exhibit
5 numbers, the English translations are going to have to come up. We have
6 to be able to proceed in a reasonable way.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, as far as possible
8 please give us the numbers of the documents so that the Prosecution can
9 access them and to help the Judges to go straight to the documents.
10 But, Mr. Kovacic has just intervened to tell us the number of the
11 map, has he?
12 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, first of all with
13 respect to the comment made from the opposite side, all the documents were
14 released yesterday through e-court at the end of the examination-in-chief,
15 provided to the Prosecution, a whole set which we might either use or not
16 use, but we provided the whole set. We supplied Your Honours with the
17 same package in the hard copy version, physically in the folders. Since
18 it's difficult to coordinate, I suggest that when Mr. Praljak mentions a
19 document, we shall officially tender it and give you the numbers, but they
20 are accessible to one and all.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. Now,
22 Mr. Scott, apparently you do have the documents that the witness -- that
23 Mr. Praljak is putting to the witness. They were communicated to you
24 yesterday through e-court. No?
25 MR. SCOTT: [Previous translation continues] ... apparently what
1 happened is the way the e-court system works is that documents can be
2 "released," but that just simply means that there is a bunch of documents
3 in the system. There is no identification that these are the documents
4 that are going to be used tomorrow for the cross-examination of this
5 witness, there's just a universe of documents.
6 So I think -- the Prosecution, Your Honour, has to provide a list
7 of exhibit numbers, a list of exhibits to be used in examining the
8 witness, I think the Defence should be required to do the same thing so
9 that we know what documents are coming up. If they say they're in
10 e-court, there's thousands of documents in e-court. We don't know which
11 documents they're going use.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Kovacic.
13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, up to now it has been
14 the rule, and I think that the problem my learned friend is raising is
15 simply something he has constructed now, because Your Honour said that if
16 in seven hours the Prosecutor finishes his direct, at seven -- after seven
17 hours and one minute, put into the system the documents you will use
18 tomorrow, and this is precisely what we did yesterday. One or two minutes
19 after the end of the direct, we released the documents.
20 I know what the problem is because we have the same problem.
21 There are very many documents in e-court now, so it's very hard for the
22 Prosecutor to monitor this. But there is a way in which he can
23 technically establish which document we released at that time. Whether
24 they know this or not, that's their problem.
25 If the Prosecutor - I'm not sure I understood - is saying that we
1 should also provide a written list, Your Honours, I don't have the
2 resources for that, or the time.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Fine. But when you
4 put the system into the -- into e-court, what stops you to do what the
5 Prosecution does, to make a chart with exhibits for Prosecution witness
6 Josip Manolic? You could follow the same example. [In English]
7 [Previous translation continues] ... cross-examination [Interpretation]
8 Exhibit for Defence, cross-examination, and then you could put Manolic
9 with a list of documents. In that way, the Prosecution, at 7.01 minutes,
10 will know that these are the documents to be used. So it will suffice if
11 your assistants make a recapitulation or summary of the texts, and the
12 Prosecution will know that you might choose to present one of those
13 documents during your cross-examination so that we have a parallel system
14 between the two parties, because when you come to have your own Defence
15 witnesses, you're going to have to have the same list, just like the
16 Prosecutor, because it's out of the question for the Judges to come up
17 with dozens of documents when a witness arrives without having a list
18 beforehand. So it's always good to have a summary list of all the
19 documents. It's not a complicated procedure, and please try and do that,
20 would you.
21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we have such a list for
22 our internal use, and I can provide it right now if it will assist my
23 learned friends. I only wish to remind the Court that because we have a
24 new system, we are all establishing new rules, and Your Honours are
25 providing new rules from time to time, and of course we are willing to
1 adapt to these. But let me just say that the objection raised by the
2 Prosecutor is out of place because up to now we have respected the rules
3 that were in place.
4 Would the usher please hand this to the Prosecutor.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. So we've
6 already seen this map. Please proceed.
7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May I observe, Your Honours,
8 during the direct examination things turn up which simply cannot be
9 foreseen, and I'm unable to communicate with my counsel between the direct
10 examination and what has to be said. That's why these things happen.
11 Q. Mr. Manolic, are you --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment. I apologise for
13 interrupting, but you're telling me something that I hadn't realised up
14 until now. Do you want to say that you were not in contact with your
15 lawyer before the examination-in-chief? I don't know what time your
16 lawyers are here, what time they start in the morning, but if they come in
17 before the sitting begins, you can discussion this with them. The Defence
18 counsel can discuss how the day is going to evolve with their client, how
19 they envisage the day, because I assume that the accused turn up at least
20 half an hour before the morning sitting. So if the counsel arrive half an
21 hour before, they will have ample time to consult their clients, will they
22 not? But anyway, that's a problem that should be addressed and that you
24 Mr. Kovacic.
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we appreciate your
1 interest. We hope that Your Honour will make it possible for us to have
2 regular contact with our clients, and we really respect Your Honour's
3 efforts, especially because of that Friday problem we mentioned. We do
4 have 15 or 20 minutes in the morning before the hearing, and sometimes we
5 even manage to get five or ten minutes after the session, and during
6 breaks in the course of the day. However, very often, yes, this is enough
7 because we only have a few issues to raise. However, when we are
8 discussing matters such as joint criminal enterprise and potentially
9 thousands of documents, there's simply not enough time to discuss that.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. But if we bear that in
11 mind, I thought that Friday was a good day for the accused to meet their
12 lawyers, to look at the debriefing of the previous week and the coming
13 week and to prepare for the cross-examination in the coming week. I know
14 you have to meet with your clients, otherwise there is going to be
16 But anyway, Mr. Praljak, continue.
17 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Manolic, this map shows the training centres in the Republic
19 of Croatia where members of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were trained in
20 1991 and 1992. Do you know anything about this?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Now for the next document, please. Thank
24 On this map we see the units of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 which were established on the territory of the Republic of Croatia in
1 1992. Do you know anything about this and can you comment on it?
2 A. No. I did not enter into the activities of the army, the minister
3 of defence, and the army staff.
4 Q. You mean the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the territory of
6 A. Yes, but with the knowledge and assistance of the Croatian army.
7 Q. Thank you. Next document, please. Are you aware of the training
8 centres in the Republic of Croatia in which pilots of the army of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina were trained in 1991 and 1992?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next document, please. This document
12 contains a list of pilots of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were
13 trained on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Of course, with the
14 knowledge of the minister of the defence, the president, Franjo Tudjman.
15 I had hoped that you would know something about it too. Do you know
16 anything about it?
17 A. No.
18 MR. SCOTT: [Previous translation continues] ... without an
19 exhibit number, we cannot pull it up in e-court, so we renew our request.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, this list of
22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Previously -- excuse me. The two
23 previously mentioned documents are numbers 3D 00313 and 3D 00314. This
24 document, however, is not in the database, and we will tender it
25 separately. For now it's only used for purposes of putting the question.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So it doesn't have a
2 number. Fine.
3 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Next document, please.
5 MR. SCOTT: Could we have the exhibit number, please.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is the number?
7 MR. KOVACIC: I don't think that will be tendered as an exhibit.
8 This is merely a tool to enhance the memory and to ask the question.
9 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, there's no -- then there's absolutely no
10 foundation. We don't even know if this thing is accurate or if this is
11 something Mr. Praljak made up last night. I don't know where it came from
12 or what it's for if it's not offered for the truth of the matter.
13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I propose that the Prosecutor have a
14 little patience and Mr. Praljak will say where this information comes
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just wait for the question.
17 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Do you know that these hospitals shown here took care of wounded
19 soldiers and civilians of Muslim ethnicity in 1992 up until 1995? The
20 hospitals of Split-Firule, Split-Krizine, Split-Toplice, Zagreb, Karlovac,
21 Slavonski Brod, Vinkovci, Metkovic. I wish to mention to Your Honours and
22 Mr. Scott that there are documents about every single patient treated in
23 these hospitals. I just want to ask whether Mr. Manolic knows about these
25 A. I don't know but I think you're putting your questions to the
1 wrong witness. I cannot know anything about this, and you know that the
2 minister of health of Croatia and the people working in the medical corps
3 can certainly confirm this with certainty. So why are you putting this to
4 me when you know in advance I had nothing to do with it?
5 Q. Thank you very much. We will finish with this line of questioning
6 and take this map away.
7 Mr. Manolic, it was my intention to ask you whether you have any
8 explanation for the fact that on the one hand a person who hates Muslims -
9 these are your words - Franjo Tudjman, who colludes with Milosevic to
10 partition Bosnia, is doing all these things we have seen now which you
11 have confirmed in a way.
12 A. Anything is possible in certain conditions. You can be treating
13 imprisoned prisoners of war of the other side, provide humanitarian
14 assistance. All that is correct.
15 Q. Weapons, pilots?
16 A. That's a different matter. That was the dual policy that was
17 pursued by Milosevic and Tudjman. It was a dual policy.
18 Q. Thank you. At the time the referendum was held in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was a precondition for the work of the Badinter
20 Commission for the gaining of independence, Croatia was a recognised state
21 within its AVNOJ borders. Is this correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. At that same time, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina held
24 approximately 70 per cent of the territory; is that correct?
25 A. I don't know that.
1 Q. Thank you. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina - and it was Stjepan
2 Kljuic who told us so before this Court, a politician you hold in high
3 regard - had for centuries aspired to accede to Croatia - these are the
4 words of Mr. Kljuic - and live in the same state. Do you share
5 Mr. Kljuic's opinion that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina desired to live
6 in the same state with the Croats in Croatia?
7 A. Yes. It's quite natural. It's quite natural that they should
8 lean towards their mother country. It's not something recent. For 40
9 years the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Herzegovina, were
10 oriented towards Croatia, including many of your friends who came to
12 Q. And me, too, yes. Franjo Tudjman, as you say, agreed on the
13 partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Milosevic in Karadjordjevo; is that
15 A. No. That's not what I said. I said that they negotiated about
16 the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. At the same time you say that Franjo Tudjman hated the Muslims.
18 A. I don't think I used the verb "to hate." I said he was of an
19 anti-Muslim orientation.
20 Q. Would you agree that had -- that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 obeyed Franjo Tudjman?
22 A. Yes, but not all of them.
23 Q. 99 per cent of the Croats voted at the referendum for the
24 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they disagreed with the
25 question put at the referendum; is that correct?
1 A. Yes, that's correct. But tell me why.
2 Q. Please. Based on the results of the referendum, the international
3 community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Croatia recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was one of the first
6 states to do so.
7 A. That's correct too.
8 Q. Franjo Tudjman appointed Ambassador Sancevic, and Croatia was
9 among the first countries to appoint an ambassador.
10 A. I'm not sure of the date. Could you remind me, please? I think
11 it was a little later on.
12 Q. The Croats didn't want Bosnia and Herzegovina, Franjo Tudjman
13 wanted to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina, he reached an agreement in
14 principle with Milosevic, and then, out of the blue, he tells the Croats
15 in Bosnia-Herzegovina go and vote at the referendum, vote yes, make it
16 possible for Bosnia-Herzegovina to survive. Can you explain this?
17 A. During my testimony, I stated that the question of the referendum
18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina was very significant in the relations between the
19 State of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. You explain to me why this
21 Q. But you said that Franjo Tudjman had authority and that the
22 Croats, who didn't want something, obeyed him anyway. At the same time,
23 we have to accept the fact that he didn't like the Muslims, that he wanted
24 to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that this partition led to crimes
25 through a series of incredible steps for which I'm being held responsible.
1 This is what we are talking about, Mr. Manolic.
2 MR. SCOTT: Again we have just a speech, Your Honour. I'm going
3 to object to that. He can put questions to the witness. There was a fair
4 question a moment ago. He asked Mr. Manolic to explain something and then
5 Mr. Manolic in fact tried to give an explanation. That was a proper
6 question, but now again we're back to speeches.
7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. We haven't concluded with this.
10 Q. No, no, no. We may not continue. We have to press on. Mate
11 Granic was the minister of foreign affairs in the government of the
12 Republic of Croatia?
13 A. Yes, but not in my cabinet.
14 Q. Very well. In his book he stated explicitly that Alija
15 Izetbegovic on two occasions offered to Franjo Tudjman to have the part of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina to the south of Prozor and Rama to be annexed to
17 Croatia. Are you aware of that?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Thank you. You claimed that all Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 should have been taken care of; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. In the Washington Agreement, did the Muslims and Croats jointly
23 receive 51 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What happened with the Croats who lived beyond, outside of this
1 territory, if you were so pleased with the Washington Agreement?
2 A. Following this, a second agreement ensued.
3 Q. Yes. We knew that. After the Washington Agreement, the conflict
4 between the HVO and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased; correct?
5 A. Yes. And that was the greatest achievement.
6 Q. How was it possible, then, in the situation where there was no
7 further conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was no Mate Boban any
8 longer, the international community was pressing for peace, so please
9 explain then to us the continued attacks on Sarajevo, the massacre in
10 Srebrenica and Zepa, and Bihac, which was saved by the HVO and the army of
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 A. You're asking me now about the things that I know of only from the
13 press, just like you do.
14 Q. Thank you. Up until March of 1993, you were chief of all secret
15 services. You were also the speaker of the Upper House of the Croatian
16 parliament. That's a fact.
17 Did you know of the existence of collection centres in Dretelj and
19 A. No.
20 Q. Based on what do you think that President Tudjman knew about these
21 collection centres in Gabela when you yourself, despite your high office,
22 knew nothing about that?
23 A. He had direct contact with the military leadership, and all of
24 this was in the hands of military, so no other government officials had to
25 be involved in this.
1 Q. You continued as member of the Defence and National Security
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You were still a high-ranking member of the HDZ.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You had contact with the HDZ members of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 A. The question that you are putting was never raised at any meetings
8 of Defence and National Security Council. The camps were never discussed.
9 Q. You said that every little person knew about these collection
10 centres, every little person in Croatia knew about that.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And you were not just some little person, and you knew nothing
13 about that.
14 A. Well, one thing is to know, another thing is to participate in
16 Q. We're not talking about participation.
17 A. One can know certain things from the press. You can hear rumours,
18 but that doesn't mean that you're taking any part in decision-making, and
19 that was my situation.
20 Q. Mr. Manolic, nobody says here that you were the decision-maker.
21 You said that every little person or every little policeman in Croatia
22 knew about the existence of these collection centres, whereas you, who
23 were the top-ranking policeman in Croatia, say that you knew nothing of
25 A. Not that I knew nothing of it. In my evidence, I said that the
1 International Red Cross Committee visited these centres and it was then
2 that it was made somewhat known to the public.
3 Q. Did you about this before the visit of the International Red Cross
4 or after?
5 A. No. I think that this took place somewhat later, in 1993. Could
6 you please give me the specific time frame?
7 Q. Your human, professional, and moral, and political duty -- was it
8 your human, professional, moral and political duty, you as member of the
9 Upper House of Croatian parliament, were you duty-bound to bring this up
10 in any of the sessions? Should you have banged your hand on the table and
11 said to Franjo Tudjman, "This may not continue"? Wasn't it your duty to
12 do that?
13 A. No. No, Mr. Praljak. When this was made public, it was only then
14 that it was discussed at a session of Defence and National Security
15 Council and it was then that Minister Granic brought this up, this
16 discussion, but this was towards the end, and the discussion was to
17 disband these camps.
18 Q. Do you know that Minister Granic intervened only when it was
19 announced on television, because one of the people who were accused for
20 creating these camps --
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please go more slowly. The
22 interpreters are finding it -- finding it difficult to catch up with you.
23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Are you aware of that?
25 A. You should put that question to Minister Granic about when he
1 intervened, when he got involved.
2 Q. Thank you very much. When you were Prime Minister of the Republic
3 of Croatia, the Croatian Party of Rights established its own armed forces,
4 Croatian armed forces known as HOS.
5 A. Illegal paramilitary declared to be paramilitary by the Supreme
7 Q. Yes. Correct. All correct. Did these forces seize a building in
8 the centre of Zagreb, a building known as Starcevic Centre, and did they
9 install an anti-aircraft gun in that building?
10 A. Correct. I'm aware of that because I took part in resolving that
12 Q. Did Prime Minister -- or was Prime Minister Josip Manolic
13 duty-bound to act in accordance with the law?
14 A. And he did.
15 Q. How long did they remain there before you intervened and acted in
16 accordance with the law?
17 A. I don't know that. If you know the dates, then please go ahead
18 and give them.
19 Q. Did these armed forces have their military headquarters?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Did they have their generals?
22 A. I'm not sure about the generals because they -- nobody was given
23 that rank until much later.
24 Q. All right. You would then agree that for months you failed to
25 resolve a crisis. This was actually a military coup in the capital city,
1 Mr. Manolic.
2 A. Yes, but we didn't want to resolve it. At the time, Croatian
3 authorities, led by the Prime Minister and president of the state, were
4 not interested in the showdown with a faction that portrayed itself as
5 Greater Croatian force. We found another way which proved to be much more
6 efficient than these military police measures that you seem to propose.
7 Q. Mr. Manolic, you can't know what I am thinking of, what's in my
8 mind. I just asked you about what steps you had taken. We cannot imagine
9 something like this taking place either in London or in Paris. Something
10 like this could have happened only because this was such a young [Realtime
11 transcript read in error "long"] state, so powerless and faced with so
12 many problems that even something as obvious or as blatant as a military
13 putsch in the middle of Zagreb they failed to resolve; isn't that clear?
14 A. That's clear, but I can explain that.
15 Q. Please go ahead then.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please allow me to interrupt.
17 Mr. Praljak said that there was a military coup. Is this something you
18 agree with or which you deny?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I can't confirm that this was a
20 military coup, because it would have had to produce some consequences
21 which would normally entail a change in the ruling structures, and there
22 was nothing of the sort. With time we took some steps against these
23 people who were working to undermine the government of the sovereign
25 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Was General Spegelj accused by federal authorities for the
2 violation of the constitutions of the Socialist Federal Republic of
4 A. Yes, there were such accusations.
5 Q. Did the federal government indict Franjo Tudjman because he had
6 written a letter to the US president, Bush Senior?
7 A. I don't know about that. I don't know about the letter, and I
8 also don't know about any indictment.
9 Q. Was the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
10 a collective body?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Was the president of the Presidency automatically
13 commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the SFRY, Supreme Commander of
14 the JNA?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Did Stipe Mesic become president of the Presidency?
17 A. Please be specific with the date.
18 Q. In June of 1991.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Was Stipe Mesic president of the Presidency of the SFRY during the
21 attack of the JNA on Slovenia?
22 A. Yes, but he was against it.
23 Q. Please. Please let me continue. Was Stipe Mesic president of the
24 Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the
25 attack of the JNA against Croatia and Dubrovnik?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Formally speaking.
3 A. Yes, formally speaking.
4 Q. Are you aware that Stipe Mesic, the commander-in-chief of the JNA
5 at the time, ever wrote an order to the General Staff of the JNA whereby
6 he would order a cessation of the attack against Slovenia and Croatia and
7 order that the military be returned to the barracks?
8 A. I think that you are meanly putting a very unilateral question. I
9 think that it is well known that Stipe Mesic was against the escalation of
10 the situation with the conflict with the JNA and in Slovenia. Everybody
11 knows about the trip that he undertook at the time, and you can clarify
12 with -- this with him further.
13 Q. Do you know about him writing any order?
14 A. No. I wouldn't know about that because that is part of internal
15 communication of the commander-in-chief with people who are his
16 subordinates. Please don't try to draw me into something that I know
17 nothing about just like you don't.
18 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Manolic, does Croatia have more than 4
19 million people living outside of its borders?
20 A. I never counted them, but based on some writings, some writings
21 appearing in various scientific and non-scientific publications, I think
22 that this is the figure that is mentioned there.
23 Q. In the beginning of the independence of Croatia, during the
24 beginning of the aggression against Croatia, did these people assist with
25 the money? Did they provide financial assistance to Croatia?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Or, rather, to Croatian people.
3 A. Well, you're splitting hairs now.
4 Q. In percentages, was the largest number of refugees those who left
5 due to political or economic reasons from Herzegovina?
6 A. Yes, I think so, especially the immigration that started in '45.
7 Q. Yes, after the partisans imposed their laws.
8 A. Well, there was no court, no laws, providing that you were not on
9 the same side.
10 Q. Mr. Manolic, you spoke here yesterday about how costly the funding
11 of the HVO was for Croatia. Once you mentioned a figure of billion
12 dollars, and one of billion Deutschmarks. Which is correct?
13 A. I don't know. I gave an analysis. I said that that was an
14 approximation. I said that it wasn't based on any scientific figures.
15 The only basis was the manpower of the HVO at the time.
16 Q. Did you at any time require from the HVO staff to inform you about
17 how many people they had?
18 A. No, I didn't, because you know that at the time I was already in
19 the opposition, and you know very well that there was no communication
20 between the opposition parties and the army at the time.
21 Q. Mr. Manolic, you didn't join the opposition until 1994.
22 A. This is when I did this analysis. Please try to be specific with
23 the dates, because only then can we be accurate.
24 Q. Yes. And the HVO existed already in 1991, 1992, 1993, and --
25 1993. And I guess the people down there knew how many soldiers there were
1 in the HVO.
2 A. I doubt that.
3 Q. You doubt that?
4 A. Yes, I doubt that.
5 Q. Thank you very much. Can you provide this analysis to the Court?
6 A. Which analysis? This is the analysis I gave in my book, and this
7 is the analysis that I adhere to.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you know how much money poured into Croatia from
9 political and economic emigres from Bosnia and Herzegovina? This money
10 was intended to finance the defence of the Croatian people in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina from any aggressor regardless of who the aggressor was. Do
12 you know about this?
13 A. No, I don't. You don't know about this either. You can only
14 speculate about this, because this -- this inflow of money from abroad,
15 from our emigres, was completely beyond control, and this is why some
16 criminal acts were perpetrated in that field, but that's not what we're
17 discussing here before this Tribunal.
18 Q. Mr. Manolic, do you know that I, just like tens of thousands of
19 others, went to Sunja near Sisak as a volunteer, violating federal laws by
20 doing so. I went there with a rifle in order to defend. Are you aware of
22 A. No, I'm not aware of that detail.
23 Q. Now, please, would you tell the Chamber this: Do you know, be it
24 directly or indirectly, of any piece of information or any fact about me
25 that you could use to testify that I in any way did or failed to do or
1 that I instigated others to do something that can be considered criminal
2 under any laws?
3 A. I can tell you that I have no such information.
4 Q. Thank you very much for your patience. I regret that we found
5 ourselves here facing each other as opponents.
6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you for
7 giving me this time. I would prefer to remain silent if it were
8 possible. I would try to be silent as often as possible unless I'm sure
9 that some things can be clarified only if I put questions to the witness.
10 Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Praljak.
12 It is now 10.30. Mr. Scott, I assume you would like to mention
13 your exhibits.
14 MR. SCOTT: I will do that, Your Honour, whenever the Court would
15 like to do that, now or later. I'm primarily pointing out -- I want to
16 point out a couple of things now in terms of timing and scheduling. First
17 of all, Your Honour, I understand that the Appeals Chamber has affirmed
18 the ruling, the Trial Chamber's ruling about the limits on
19 cross-examination, indicating that it should be the same time as direct
20 examination. The Appeals Chamber has issued its ruling affirming the
21 Trial Chamber.
22 In that regard, Your Honour, I note that, based on that ruling,
23 based on the Trial Chamber's prior announced ruling as affirmed by the
24 Appeals Chamber, each of the Defence teams for this witness should be
25 allowed approximately 55 minutes. Mr. Praljak has now taken an hour and a
1 half, so all of the Praljak Defence time has now been used and Mr. Praljak
2 is now using the time of other Defence teams. So I would assume that
3 other Defence teams want to have some time to question the witness as
4 well. So perhaps they want to take that into account. Thank you.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President. Mr. President, the way I read the
7 initial ruling by the Court, first of all there was some flexibility built
8 in where witnesses come in and mention particular individuals. This
9 gentleman here has mentioned my client, Mr. Praljak, Mr. Stojic, as well
10 as Mr. Petkovic. So in light of that and in light of the Court's ruling,
11 I don't see why on earth we would not be given the necessary time.
12 I also indicated yesterday the way the Prosecution is presenting
13 its case, it's deliberately doing so in a way to obstruct justice.
14 They're doing so because they're afraid of the truth. They don't want the
15 truth --
16 MR. SCOTT: I'm going to object to that, Your Honour. I'm not --
17 that's not --
18 MR. KARNAVAS: -- that's why I'm entitled to make my record. The
19 gentleman, in my opinion, is pursuing in an unethical manner. He's
20 putting in all of these documents one sentence at a time, half a sentence,
21 and then he's asking you, Your Honours, to deny us the opportunity to
22 confront this evidence. Maybe that's what -- that's the way it's done in
23 some fascist state. It shouldn't be done in this International Court.
24 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I state the strongest possible objection.
25 Now look at the record, Your Honour. Look what I -- Mr. Karnavas has just
1 accused me, accused Ken Scott, professional, he's accused me --
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
3 MR. SCOTT: -- of obstructing justice --
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
5 MR. SCOTT: -- and acting unethically.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
7 MR. SCOTT: Those are serious allegations. I would like to know
8 -- I think that's improper. If he has grounds for those serious
9 allegations, he should make them known, but do not come into court and
10 accuse me of obstructing justice and acting unethically. I object.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: How can I possibly confront all of the evidence
12 that he's putting in, at the same time he's saying he's here for the
13 truth? If he's here for the truth, let me get to the truth. What is he
14 afraid of? Why read half of a sentence? That's what I call obstructing
15 of justice. Obstructing -- we're here to get to the truth --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well --
17 MR. KARNAVAS: -- and all I want to do is get to the truth.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, nobody is
19 obstructing justice, because you know full well that the obstruction of
20 justice amounts to contempt of court. So it's in nobody's minds that
21 anybody would like to do such a thing. So please calm down, all of you.
22 The question that remains is how much time is left. Seemingly the
23 Appeals Chamber has confirmed the ruling on the time limits of the
24 cross-examination. I have not read this yet because it has been recorded
25 this morning. We shall read this. All we know, as far as this witness is
1 concerned, we have spent an hour and a half this morning questioning this
2 witness, and three hours this afternoon, so we have four and a half hours
3 left. And we also have tomorrow. Tomorrow we will have another four
4 hours. If -- I do not include the break time. So four hours, plus three,
5 plus an hour and a half, we still have eight and a half hours. In that
6 time I think a lot can be said by some of you. Mr. Praljak has addressed
7 some of the issues, and unless you feel it is particularly useful, the
8 other Defence counsel don't have to cover the same ground.
9 So you have eight and a half hours left. The Prosecution has only
10 had five hours and 25 minutes, I believe, and since yesterday we have
11 spent or dedicated approximately three hours to the cross-examination, so
12 in eight and a half hours you should be able to conclude the
13 cross-examination if you are sufficiently disciplined. I trust you are
14 able to do this. The Trial Chamber, of course, is prepared to be flexible
15 so that all and everyone is happy and that you don't feel that the certain
16 problems are not being addressed. During cross-examination a lot of
17 points are mentioned, and it is very useful, so make sure you focus on
18 what is important and what is useful to the Chamber.
19 We shall now have a break. It is 35 minutes past 10.00, and we
20 shall resume again at five minutes to 11.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. Two
24 observations to begin with: First of all, I invite the Defence counsel
25 and accused not to make any personal attacks on the representatives of the
1 OTP who are doing their job. If the job is not done properly, then it is
2 up to the Judges to decide. So the Prosecution is putting forward a
3 thesis. You can criticise it, but you can criticise what they're putting
4 forward, not the person putting it forward. So no personal observations.
5 They are misplaced in the courtroom. They don't serve any purpose. We
6 are professional Judges, and are quite able to appreciate arguments put
7 forward from both sides. So there's no point in hurling accusations on
8 the one side or the other because it is up to us to decide and rule on all
9 the things put forward relevant to the indictment. So I'd like to bring
10 that to your attention in order to have the proceedings evolve in the best
11 possible spirit.
12 Now, the second point is since the Appeals Chamber rendered a
13 decision that confirms our previous decisions and that pursuant to Article
14 90(F) it is the Chamber that has the discretionary right as to how much
15 time it is going to allot to the Defence. So the general rule is that the
16 Defence has the same time as the Prosecution and that in certain cases you
17 can share the time, but as the Appeals Chamber has ruled, we invited on
18 several occasions the lawyers to get together amongst themselves so that
19 collectively they can designate one among their member to conduct the
20 cross-examination in a general manner and that the others can step in if
21 the need arises. And as I have said on numerous occasions, there's no
22 point in you all getting up to raise the same points.
23 So you have this collective assignment and job. Although you
24 might not agree amongst yourselves, you should nonetheless decide upon the
25 general points that you agree upon so that the person conducting the
1 cross-examination on behalf of all the rest of you can ask general
2 questions. And when the time comes and one comes to personal
3 responsibility of your individual clients, then if a witness has not named
4 any of the accused, the question doesn't arise. But if the witness does
5 name names, then it is logical for the Defence counsel of that particular
6 accused or accused can intervene on their behalf.
7 So it is up to you to exert discipline on both sides, and it is up
8 to you to see which one of you is going to conduct the cross-examination
9 on the general points and then we come to the individuals where you can
10 speak for your client, if that occasion arises, if a document is discussed
11 which contains the name of your client, of one of the accused. But, if
12 not, then stick to the time division and, as the Appeals Chamber has
13 stated, one must not forget that we always have time constraints and
14 resources and their constraints. So unfortunately, we don't have all the
15 time in the world.
16 I don't think that there will be any problems if you work
17 collectively for the time being, work together in order to determine who
18 is going to conduct the principal cross-examination of the witness. If
19 you can't do that, then we fall back on the rule that the Appeals Chamber
20 has put forward whereas the time is divided by six. But we should like to
21 be more flexible. I don't want you to have the impression that we're
22 cutting you off, but it's up to you to be more disciplined. If you cannot
23 agree amongst yourselves, then tell us, or you cannot agree on certain
24 points, and then you can take the floor individually when it concerns your
25 particular client.
1 Now, as far as this witness is concerned, I have to say that we're
2 going to finish with the witness tomorrow at 1.45. That should be borne
3 in mind. And also, you should bear in mind that we must leave some time
4 for additional questions from the Prosecution, if they need to ask them,
5 which means that you have more than eight hours at your disposal, and
6 eight hours is a long time. A lot can be done in eight hours.
7 Having said that, I'm going to give the floor to the next Defence
8 counsel. I think it was Mr. Kovacic who wanted to speak.
9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'm not
10 going to take too much time about -- in telling you what the Defence has
11 agreed upon, but we're all fully conscious of what we're facing and the
12 situation we have in hand. You have explained it to us, and I think that
13 we'll be able to get through it in the time at our disposal.
14 Before I begin the cross-examination, just a correction: On page
15 36 of the transcript, line 4, it should state the "young state" and what
16 it reads is "long." So "young," not "long." Could that be corrected,
17 please, for the record.
18 And, Your Honour, to draw your attention to another matter, in the
19 viva voce witness table which we received from the OTP with the pre-trial
20 brief, that was compiled partially following your ruling of the 13th of
21 November, it states that witness Josip Manolic was appointed as witness --
22 was designated as Witness M at the time, and that that is related to the
23 accused Slobodan Praljak. I don't see why, personally, but that's what it
24 says on this chart.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Kovacic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Anyway, having said that, let me say good
2 afternoon, to you, Mr. Manolic. My name is Bozidar Kovacic, I am an
3 attorney from the island of Krk, and I'm going to ask you to make pauses
4 between question and answer, because the two of us speak the same language
5 and of course it's natural for us to react to one another's questions and
6 answers straight away, I to your answers, you to my questions, but please
7 bear in mind that everything has to be interpreted which means that
8 there's a little time that has to be left for the interpreters to do their
9 job, so please make pauses between question and answer. Thank you.
10 Mr. Manolic, I'd just like to try and clear up a general matter on
11 the basis of what we have heard here for the past two days from you. I am
12 fully convinced you will agree that this emanates from your statement that
13 the Republic of Croatia, when it became independent and when it was being
14 created in 1990, had the right, in the sense of the right and duty, and
15 the moral duty as well, to bear in mind and take into consideration the
16 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the context of the disintegration of
17 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Would you agree with that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All parties, more or less, and all the political players, if I can
20 use that term, agreed on that point. Would that be correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And can we also agree that at that time, that is to say the
23 disintegration of Yugoslavia and the creation of a new Croatia and new
24 relationships in all the former federal republics, that the intentions of
25 the Republic of Croatia and its political leadership - that is who I mean
1 first of all - were very honest, proper, and morally correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. In a way, from what you have told us in your answers, it would
4 appear that in your judgement and according to your political convictions
5 certain errors were committed in that politics and in those policies waged
6 with the development of events and situation and that the late President
7 Franjo Tudjman, once again, in your opinion, opted for some wrong
8 political solutions or opted for a different approach to the approach you
9 thought was proper. Would that be correct?
10 A. Yes. I think that my whole testimony about all this period shows
11 that quite clearly.
12 Q. Yes. That's right. And moreover, you specified and told us the
13 issues over which you disagreed with him. Would that be right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And one of those issues was a definition of Croatian politics
16 towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, and policies towards Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Would that be right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. At that same time and in that same process and those
20 same developments - and I'm going to try and give you the other side of
21 the medal, if you like, put forward other elements - would you agree with
22 me when I say that it was clear already sometime in 1991, immediately
23 after Serbia's aggression against Croatia, that the same thing would
24 happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina? When I say is it clear, I mean not only to
25 the political leadership but to the people as well.
1 A. We have to differentiate between Serbia's aggression against
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina - that's one question - it's another question the
3 conflict between the Croats and the Muslims.
4 Q. Yes, of course.
5 A. We could not assume the second at that point in time.
6 Q. All right. But I'm sure you'll agree that with the development of
7 events from 1990 to 1991, we already have the aggression against Croatia,
8 that at a certain point in time during that process in that period, and it
9 was a dialectic process, quite obviously, that it became clear to one and
10 all - not only to the politicians but to everybody - that the very next
11 day in the coming period - and that's what indeed happened - the former
12 JNA or, rather, the military force under Serbia's control, would make
13 certain moves and undertake occupation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 A. Yes, but under rather different circumstances. It was aggressive
15 towards Croatia with a help from part of the rebels, whereas in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina the majority of this action and operation was led by a
17 faction, a Karadzic faction, the rebel Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina against
18 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Q. All right. Yes, we can agree there. But regardless of the
20 structure, let's call it the aggressive forces, the fact remains that the
21 war and the aggression and the persecution and all the ugly things that
22 accompany a war happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it could have been
23 foreseen and predicted in advance.
24 A. Only the aggression of the rebel Serbs could have been predicted
25 and foreseen, but at that point in time in 1990 we couldn't have assumed
1 that there would be a conflict between the Croats and the Muslims.
2 Q. Yes. I'm talking about that first conflict, the aggression. And
3 when that aggression on the Serb side, the Serb aggression started in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, very soon after that you received information -- they
5 were more or less public and I assume that you in the top political
6 echelons might have been better informed than the other citizens, but it
7 was common knowledge and generally known that people were suffering, and
8 the Serb aggression that we're talking about specifically caused
9 suffering, victims, refugees of both the other ethnic groups, both the
10 Croats and the Muslims.
11 A. And the Hungarians, all other non-Serbs.
12 Q. Yes, that's right. All the other people living there. But when
13 we're talking about the numbers, then the prime victims were the Muslims
14 and the Croats.
15 A. Once again, with the development of events, that is to say from
16 1991 onwards, the Croats and the Muslims in most areas, or in all areas of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, began to organise themselves in a defence and tried to
18 defend themselves in one way or another from that Serb aggression.
19 A. From the Greater Serb aggression. Now, when I say "Greater Serb,"
20 I don't mean the Serb people but an overall Greater Serbian policy of
22 Q. Yes. I'm glad we agree on that. So the primary victims, and they
23 were the Muslims and the Croats, started to organise themselves and
24 started to defend themselves from that Greater Serbian aggression. We
25 agree on that score, do we?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, at that same time, with the developments of the situation,
3 all the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all the ethnic groups, tried in one
4 way or another to define their own positions for a future
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina when one fine day it manages to defend itself and when
6 war comes to an end - and of course all people think along those lines -
7 they said they want to know why they were going to war. We Croats and we
8 Muslims and the other ethnic groups want to know why we are fighting and
9 what position we can expect or what situation we can expect in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you agree with that?
11 A. Yes, that's quite normal.
12 Q. Right. Thank you. Quite normal. However, the fact is that at
13 that same time, with the Greater Serbian aggression starting, with the war
14 starting, the first victims are visible, they are increasing from one day
15 to the next, and at the same time, simultaneously with all that, the
16 Croats, as the smallest ethnic group of those three large ethnic groups,
17 had no guarantees whatsoever from the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
18 their political leaders and administrative leaders, were given no
19 guarantees whatsoever of what they could expect in future; some sort of
20 Serboslavia, or some dominant Muslim state, or yet again rights of a
21 minority nation or the rights that they had from the 1974 constitution as
22 a constituent peoples. They did not know what to expect, and the Muslim
23 leadership or, rather, the Muslim part of the leadership, through talks
24 and negotiations, did not wish to tell them firmly and to promise them
25 what their situation would be: That is what your position will be if you
1 want to fight for it. Do you agree that the Croats in Bosnia in 1991,
2 1992, and through subsequent talks and negotiations were never given firm
3 assurances and promises from the other side, from their partners, if I can
4 use that term, because they were still defending themselves together,
5 never given those assurances and promises about what their position would
6 be in the Bosnia and Herzegovina of the future?
7 A. I think you are not quite right there, because contacts and
8 communication did take place between the Presidency of the Croatian state
9 and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I attended one such meeting in
10 Sarajevo where these relations were still quite correct and proper. I'm
11 referring to the relations between the Croats and the Muslims. So when we
12 mention these first attempts of ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina to
13 organise, we all welcomed the fact that these ethnic groups were rallying,
14 because we knew that only if they were organised could they fight against
15 the enemy.
16 Q. Yes, I fully agree with that. But the further things developed
17 and the more talks were held, and there were talks between representatives
18 of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, and even the Serb side participated --
19 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter is not sure what side
21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. -- but it's a fact, and I'm telling you this as my assessment
23 which you can either deny or agree with or partly challenge, the fact is
24 that the public impression, the impression that the Croatian people in
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina had was that their political leadership of the
1 time, that is the political leadership of the Bosniaks in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, was not giving them any promises or
3 guarantees as to their status in the future Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe
4 you will agree with me there.
5 A. Yes, but not fully. I attended talks between President Tudjman
6 and Izetbegovic on one occasion, and Izetbegovic, as the representative of
7 the Muslims and the Bosnian state, asked that Mr. Boban, a prominent
8 personage in the Croatian ranks, be the minister of defence of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this is contrary to what the other side -- I mean
10 those holding different opinions than mine, they frequently forget this.
11 But to clarify things, let me tell you what the response was to
13 Q. Just a moment. We haven't arrived at that point in time yet. The
14 talks you mentioned where Izetbegovic generously offered Boban the
15 position of minister of defence, that's already far into 1993.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Far into 1993. So this is already a time when there were attempts
18 at reconciliation after the conflict had already broken out. So these are
19 attempts to remedy the situation. But we're now talking about an earlier
20 stage. I think we will agree, in view of the time we are referring to
21 now, that the Croats were not given any clear guarantees as to their
22 status. To put things simply, as the common people were able to
23 understand it, Izetbegovic was sending the wrong messages. They saw that
24 the state was not functioning, that they were not being given any
25 promises. They see even that Croatia is wavering in its assistance, so
1 objectively --
2 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, yes.
4 MR. SCOTT: We're back to --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Scott, please.
6 MR. SCOTT: Mr. Kovacic is arguing his case. He's making his
7 closing argument today. These are not questions. Look at the transcript
8 and see. It's Mr. Kovacic stating his case, making his arguments, and
9 these are not questions for the witness. They're also overcharacterised.
10 How can this witness say what every Croat living in Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 thought or what their impression was? So I object on both grounds; it's
12 improper form and it also calls for speculation.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Kovacic, you are
14 putting forward a thesis rather than taking it through question form,
15 asking questions, which are interesting for you and the answers to which
16 can be useful to the Judges, because you have already stated your thesis
17 and will be able to do so subsequently and it's not up to the witness to
18 say yes you're right or you're not right.
19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I agree. I just wish
20 to point out to the Court that, in view of the office held by the witness,
21 he was a person with political experience and a person who is
22 well-informed. He is therefore in a position to evaluate whether these
23 theses are grounded in fact or not. That's why I put this question. But
24 as for the technology, I do have the right to put my case to the witness.
25 I will, however, do it in a simpler way.
1 Q. Mr. Manolic, not to weary all other parties, I think we do
2 understand one another. Would you agree that evidently -- we cannot
3 quantify this, but evidently a number of people, Croats in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in that situation understood that they were not being
5 promised any kind of security by anyone in any future system?
6 A. The Muslims couldn't expect security either. This was a creation
7 in those first few months of 1991 where in Bosnia-Herzegovina nobody could
8 be certain about their future. None of these ethnic groups had any
10 Q. Well, I fully agree with you. And we have seen to what this
11 uncertainty led. There was no firm alliance between the Muslims and the
12 Croats against the Greater Serbian aggression. We saw in the period that
13 followed, in late 1992 and in 1993, that both Muslims and Croats had
14 terrible casualties, a lot of victims because they didn't manage to
15 organise in time.
16 A. That's true, but you have skipped over a period in which the
17 Croats and the Muslims did oppose the Serbian aggression at the outset.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. You've skipped over that and moved on.
20 Q. Yes. But not to go into further details, because they no longer
21 trusted each other, because they no longer had any promises about their
22 future, the alliance was not strong enough. That's my case.
23 A. Yes. The very fact that the alliance fell apart goes to confirm
25 Q. Mr. Manolic, would you agree that throughout all these events in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the extent you followed them, and I assume you were
2 better informed than the ordinary citizen, would you agree that the man in
3 the street, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, was not interested
4 in global politics or in political or legal theories about the rights of
5 nations and the changes to borders and so on? Would you agree that the
6 common people, and you did have contacts with ordinary people, were
7 interested in survival? They simply wanted to know how they could survive
8 in this complex wartime situation. Would you agree?
9 A. Yes, I do agree that that's what the man in the street was
10 interested in. But this man in the street also realised that he had to
11 take into account what would happen next, and this prompted them to
12 organise and to rally round their ethnic groups.
13 Q. Yes. We agree fully. That's precisely my thesis. At one point,
14 starting on the 18th of November, 1991, the Croatian Community of
15 Herceg-Bosna was established, and we can see from the transcripts that it
16 emerged as a kind of parallel organisation in parallel to the HDZ party.
17 Is that correct?
18 A. I don't understand your question fully.
19 Q. In view of the fact that formally the Croatian Community of
20 Herceg-Bosna was established on the 18th of November, 1991, and sometime
21 later in 1992 it began to take root and come to life, and you were
22 monitoring the situation at the Defence and National Security Council, you
23 understood, as did some others, that the Croatian Community of
24 Herceg-Bosna was actually becoming a parallel organisation, parallel to
25 the party organisation. So first the Croats had been united, most of them
1 in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the HDZ as a political movement and
2 party, and now they were organising in a different way, in a firmer form,
3 and this was parallel, and you discussed this at the Defence and National
4 Security Council.
5 A. I didn't see it as parallelism. On the contrary. I felt that it
6 was the HDZ that had mobilised and created the Croatian Community of
7 Herceg-Bosna. So it can't be defined as a parallel institution. It can,
8 rather, be defined as a joint action. The organiser was the HDZ, and it
9 was created as a structure which the HDZ, as a political organisation,
10 created with a view to its being transformed into something else, into a
11 state structure.
12 Q. But you will agree, regardless of the putative goal that you
13 mentioned, that this was aimed at strengthening defence precisely because
14 there were no promises or guarantees for the future.
15 A. Well, there was no one who could have given them any promises.
16 You know how the international community was involved in solving these
17 problems, and you saw that there were different combinations, different
18 agreements, different ideas about how a peaceful solution could be reached
19 in that area.
20 Q. Well, that's correct, but without quoting precisely from the
21 record, but you have now given me an idea, President Tudjman more than
22 once, I'm sure I saw it at least on two -- in two places in the
23 transcripts, and I'm paraphrasing now, President Tudjman said that the
24 situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in view of its complexity, will not
25 be solved by either the Muslims or the Croats or the Serbs but by the
1 international community, and that was constantly his position. Would you
2 agree that he said that more than once?
3 A. Well, he said more than once that the influence of the
4 international community could be decisive in the search for a solution in
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's correct.
6 Q. As a politician at that time, would you agree that the
7 international community did not undertake anything that we all expected it
8 to, maybe with too much optimism?
9 A. Well, I wouldn't use the word "nothing." I wouldn't say they
10 didn't do anything. They were actively seeking a solution, but the
11 complexity of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was such that the
12 international factors found it very difficult to resolve.
13 Q. Thank you. I will now move on to a different topic. Maybe just
14 two or three short questions for the sake of the Chamber. I don't believe
15 we disagree here, so could you please keep your answers brief and just say
16 yes or no so we could move on quickly.
17 You told us you were one of the founders of the HDZ in Croatia.
18 That's the transcript of the 3rd of July, the first day of your testimony.
19 You said that you were one of the founders of the party. Is that correct?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Was Praljak among those who participated in founding the party?
22 A. I don't know if it has anything to do with this, but as you are
23 putting the question, Mr. Praljak was in the steering committee. So he
24 was part of the initiative for creating the HDZ. However, we parted ways
25 with him even before the HDZ was founded. I don't want to go into this
1 any further.
2 Q. We would have moved faster if you'd let me, but anyway, he was in
3 the steering committee, and to make the time clear, this was while the
4 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still existed, and these were the
5 first political parties established in the communist regime; is that
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Praljak, however, did not become a member of the party. Can you
9 confirm that he was never a member of the HDZ?
10 A. Well, I can't confirm that - he can tell you that - because I
11 didn't look into the party booklets that were issued. He might have
12 become a member of the party at some time. I'm not denying this.
13 Q. Well, we assert that he was never formally a member of the party.
14 A. I don't know that.
15 Q. Thank you. Very well. You don't know that. I will skip over
16 some things and move on.
17 Mr. Manolic, as far as I can remember now, as a citizen of Croatia
18 at the time that Croatia was being created, one of the first moves, the
19 first major political moves, was the adoption of the new constitution. I
20 think that you were personally involved in that. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is it correct that there was quite a lot of discussion in the
23 parliament and also among those proposing the constitution and experts,
24 that there was a lot of discussion about what the preamble of the
25 constitution should contain?
1 A. Yes. Yes. President Tudjman personally wrote the preamble in his
2 own hand. I was there.
3 Q. And you were close to that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Well, the constitution was adopted by acclamation. There was not
6 a single vote against.
7 A. And there was a boycott.
8 Q. Very well. And in that preamble the first sentence reads as
9 follows -- I could put it on the ELMO if I could find it.
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher assist, please.
11 Your Honour, I don't intend to tender this document into evidence.
12 It's a public document. It's just to make it easier for the witness.
13 Q. Mr. Manolic, you, of course, are familiar with these texts. I
14 only wish to point out the first sentence in the preamble. This is the
15 constitution of the Republic of Croatia. This is the consolidated text,
16 and the first paragraph or the preamble is the origins, the sources.
17 A. Well, I agree with you about the constitution a hundred per cent.
18 Q. Yes, but I'm asking you to assist me in helping the Chamber
19 understand this.
20 In the first sentence, it says: "Expressing the thousand year
21 long national identity and state existence of the Croatian people
22 confirmed through the entire historical events in various forms of
23 statehood and the development of the state building thoughts about the
24 historical right of the historical people to full sovereignty, state
25 sovereignty, as has been evidenced in ..." and there follows a list.
1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note they do not have a proper
2 translation of the constitution into English.
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. I have read this, and what is further listed in the preamble is
5 here, and I'm sure you will agree with me they are here so that everyone
6 will understand. We Croats did not come into existence as a state
7 yesterday. Our state originates from the time the Croatian dukedoms were
8 created in the 7th century. That's in the first bullet point. Then it
9 goes on to talk about the Middle Ages, the Kingdom of the Croats and so
10 on; all the important points in history.
11 And following this chronology, after nine, ten, or 12 bullet
12 points, it is established that the Banovina of Croatia was established in
13 1939, which renewed the Croatian state identity in the Kingdom of
15 And then there follows the next paragraph, going into more recent
16 history, and I believe that you were involved in this because you insisted
17 on this being included, and the ZAVNOH is mentioned here. Maybe you could
18 explain to the Chamber what ZAVNOH is, in a few words, and why did you
19 insist that ZAVNOH be mentioned in this continuity?
20 A. Because ZAVNOH was a political body, a representative body which
21 later was transformed into the Croatian parliament. And all the decisions
22 it made during World War II and after World War II was a continuation of
23 the anti-fascist ZAVNOH policy. So what AVNOJ was for Yugoslavia, ZAVNOH
24 was for Croatia. The country Anti-fascist Council of Croatia.
25 Q. So this is also included in the preamble as part of the historical
1 development of Croatian statehood.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. So both the Banovina of Croatia as the pre-war entity and the
4 principles of ZAVNOH that followed immediately after World War II. And it
5 also mentions all the subsequent Croatian constitutions, including from
6 '63 to '90, the famous constitution of 1974 according to which the
7 Republic of Croatia, like all other republics, gained the right to
8 self-determination and gained guarantees that it was in fact a state
9 freely associated in a federation. Would you agree with me here?
10 A. Yes, fully.
11 Q. Could you then agree with me that mentioning the Banovina in the
12 preamble has no other purpose than to point to the historical continuity
13 of Croatian statehood?
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 Q. Thank you. Can anybody say that mentioning the Banovina implies
16 territorial ambitions? Mentioning the Banovina in the constitution?
17 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, how can this witness say what anyone else
18 intended or what purpose anyone else had? According to Mr. -- according
19 to Mr. Kovacic's [sic] testimony, Franjo Tudjman himself wrote the
20 preamble in his own hand. How do we know what Franjo Tudjman meant or
21 intended, and how does this witness know? Of course we can read what
22 Mr. Tudjman says himself in the transcripts about what his intentions were
23 in including that, but how can this witness say what everyone intended and
24 what everyone's purpose was in that being included? It's pure
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Kovacic.
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] If I may reply, Your Honours. I
3 laid the foundation for this question. The witness clearly stated that
4 the preamble was written by Tudjman in his own hand. He confirmed that he
5 had been close to the president, that he was present. So if he wasn't the
6 person who can answer this question as to whether the inclusion of
7 Banovina means a reflection of territorial aspirations or it means
8 precisely what the witness very carefully formulated and what is written
9 in the constitution, then I don't know who would be the better person to
10 ask this.
11 If the Prosecution has no problems about their thesis with
12 Banovina --
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, the Banovina is
14 mentioned in the preamble. Why is that the case?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first one was what Mr. Kovacic
16 said himself: In order to emphasise the state continuity of Croatia
17 throughout all historical events, starting from the 7th century onwards.
18 That's one thing.
19 However, Mr. Kovacic failed to mention that the Banovina had its
20 own territory, and this is what will further emerge through these
21 proceedings. There was a territory which Banovina had. Do you agree with
22 that, that Banovina also was -- there was a territorial delimitation? Do
23 you agree with that?
24 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Yes, I do, Mr. Manolic, but using the same logic, would you agree
1 or did you agree that the inclusion of Banovina in the preamble was a
2 reflection of statehood, not of territorial connotation?
3 A. Yes, I agree, but the territory that was included into Banovina,
4 what was also defined.
5 Q. Mr. Manolic, I don't want to debate this, but then the creation of
6 dukedoms in the 7th century also had some territorial claims or
7 connotations of territorial claims.
8 A. Yes, that's certain. Each of these dukedoms, and later on
9 kingdoms, had to have their territories. Now, whether these territories
10 were firm or not so firm, that's a different question.
11 Q. Yes. Thank you. We don't need to trouble with others with this.
12 We Croats could discuss this endlessly, but I'm not sure that the others
13 share our opinion. But I think that everybody understood now that
14 Banovina was included in the constitution precisely in order to emphasise
15 that we Croats do not exist just from yesterday but we've been in
16 existence for centuries and centuries.
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. I've already asked you this. I don't think we need to go back to
19 Karadjordjevo. It's been discussed -- it was discussed at length today,
20 but let me ask you this: Is it true that in that period of time, in 1991,
21 Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
22 also had bilateral meetings with Tudjman?
23 A. I can't testify about that, I can only suppose that such meetings
24 took place.
25 Q. All right. Thank you. You were a very close associate of Franjo
1 Tudjman for many years. You were not just political associates, you were
2 also good friends.
3 Mr. Manolic, being privy to Tudjman's policy from day one, would
4 you agree with me that one of the principal ideas of his policy, not only
5 in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in general, was to find
6 solutions in conflicts through negotiations, through peaceful resolution,
7 and in principle he was always against the war option in order to achieve
8 any political goals?
9 A. At any rate, that was the goal. Now, as to methods to establish
10 our goal, namely a sovereign State of Croatia, was to use negotiations and
11 avoid any confrontation in the military sense.
12 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to now tender a document which
13 is in e-court 3D 00306.
14 Mr. Manolic, this is a letter of Dr. Franjo Tudjman in April,
15 after the 24th or 25th of April of 1993. This is a letter sent to Alija
16 Izetbegovic and Mate Boban.
17 I will ask the registry to scroll up so that the witness can see
18 -- or, rather, scroll down so the witness can see the contents.
19 Let me know, please, sir, whether you are aware of this letter and
20 whether this is the only letter written by Tudjman to these people.
21 A. I'm not familiar with this letter.
22 Q. Could we please see the signature on page 2. Can we see the
23 signature on page 2, please?
24 A. Yes, this is Tudjman's signature.
25 Q. All right. No need to spend any more time on this. The document
1 is self-explanatory and, precisely along the lines of what we said,
2 Tudjman is trying to achieve peace in Bosnia. The document is
4 Could we now please see the next document, 3D 00295. Just a brief
5 question. You said a while ago that Izetbegovic had meetings with
6 Milosevic -- or, rather, you accepted this as possible, and you must know
7 that there were many bilateral, multi-lateral meetings between the
8 presidents of the Presidencies in republics seeking resolution to the
9 crisis and so on. I think that you said two days ago that Izetbegovic
10 didn't know that Tudjman and Milosevic would meet in Karadjordjevo.
11 Could we please scroll down so that we can see the signature at
12 the bottom.
13 I'm now putting to you a document which is a letter. This is a
14 letter that we have found through our own investigation. Have you ever
15 had occasion to see Alija's handwriting and his signature?
16 A. No. I wasn't really interested in that. I can neither confirm or
18 Q. I'll try to prove that this is indeed Alija's letter. In this
19 first passage, Alija says, "I am convinced," and in parenthesis he says,
20 "and I have certain information in that regard," and then he says, "he,"
21 and "he" is underlined -- you know, this was a message sent by courier, it
22 wasn't encrypted -- "in bilateral discussion offer --" that he would, in
23 bilateral discussion, offer some partial solutions, and then so on and so
24 on, and then he pleads with Tudjman not to accept whatever Milosevic
25 proposes. Would that be consistent with what you know?
1 A. Let's first clarify this "he." I think that this "he" stands for
3 Q. Yes. We fully agree on that. Do you agree that it was possible
4 that Alija was pleading with Tudjman not to agree to what Milosevic was
6 A. That's possible. Let's see the date. Is it the 23rd or the 24th
7 of April?
8 Q. We're not sure because some corrections were made, and I think
9 this was the 23rd March, so on the eve of the meeting, before the meeting.
10 A. And then that would mean that Izetbegovic knew that the meeting
11 would be held, which I question, because I myself didn't know the date of
12 the meeting. And also, the president of the Presidency, Mr. Mesic, was
13 not aware of when the meeting would be held -- or, rather, he knew after
14 the meeting but not prior to the meeting.
15 Q. At any rate --
16 A. This is all speculation anyway.
17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I see my colleague,
18 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I apologise for the interruption.
19 Could we get some information, please, about the alleged source of this
20 document which appears -- allegedly is a letter from the president the
21 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the president of Croatia, written on a
22 Europcar note, which -- I'd like to know more about this document and
23 where it came from.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, could you tell us whether
25 it's a Europcar who provided you with this document, or otherwise how did
1 you obtain a copy of this document?
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] It was uncovered by my
3 investigators. Later on, I will provide more information.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Did you -- was this found in a
5 dustbin? Where was this found?
6 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I can't tell you that with any
7 precision now. All I know is that my investigators brought it after
8 several visits. This was uncovered by our investigators. I know that
9 this document wasn't shown to anyone else. I would like to show you the
10 paper on which it was written denoting that it comes from a hotel. I
11 think my client might be better informed to tell you about this. He might
12 know the details.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Praljak.
14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Yes. This document came
15 from a man who was in Izetbegovic's inner circle, and it came to us via
16 the former advisor to President Tudjman.
17 As to the origins of this document, this document was published in
18 a book about President Tudjman, and we can establish through a
19 graphologist that the date is authentic. This was before the meeting in
20 Karadjordjevo, and Alija Izetbegovic received this information from the
21 president of Macedonia, Gligorov, and supposedly he had received that
22 information in Belgrade.
23 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I thank my client for the
24 assistance. During the Defence case, we will be able to provide more
25 information about the origins of this document.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you please clarify? Is it the
2 23rd of April or what is the date? It is very important so that we can
3 fully understand the meaning of this letter.
4 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Yes, Mr. Manolic, we fully agree. You and I can see that
6 something was corrected here. It is our position that this was in March,
7 but this is our assumption. You said that this is possible, this is
8 likely, but you couldn't be fully sure about that. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The letter explicitly states
10 that he, in bilateral discussions, would do so-and-so, and the bilateral
11 discussions between Tudjman and Milosevic never took place after the 24th
12 of April. So this letter could only have been written on the 24th of
13 March, because the bilateral meeting took place on the 25th in
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that you are categorically
16 claiming something that is not fully true, namely that no meetings were
17 held after that day. I cannot claim that, assert that with full
18 certainty. I can say neither yes or no.
19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I'm skipping over some topics. I'm trying to be as focused as
22 Mr. Manolic, is it true that the primary issue and the primary
23 interest of the Republic of Croatia in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina
24 in the early stage in 1991 and 1992, was it Croatia's primary interest to
25 ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina remain as an independent state and that
1 it doesn't join some creation that at the time was referred to as
2 Serboslavia? Was it the strategic interest of Croatia?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And this was in the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia;
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. When asked by the Presiding Judge during the first day of your
8 testimony, on page 98, line 2, you confirm that it was Tudjman's position
9 that the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to organise themselves for
10 the purpose of their defence. I'm asking this now for the sake of the
11 transcript. I think that it wasn't clearly stated. I think that it was
12 hinted at that this organising meant them preparing their defence against
13 the aggression of Greater Serbia. Would you agree with that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. At the time there was no mention of any defence against Muslims.
16 A. Yes. We always have to be very specific with the dates, yes, but
17 this is what this pertained to.
18 Q. Mr. Manolic, since we're running out of time, I'm not quite sure
19 how to do this, but my client touched upon some topics today --
20 A. I'm not pressed for time.
21 Q. You're not. You're definitely not. This morning my client showed
22 you some documents. Namely, he wanted to illustrate that there were
23 numerous examples of the conduct of Croatia both before the conflict with
24 the Muslims and during the conflict, showing that there was no plan in
25 Croatia to seize some territory of the neighbouring state.
1 Let me now withdraw that question.
2 You told us clearly in your evidence so far that Franjo Tudjman
3 and Croatia appealed to the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to come to
4 the referendum where the vote was taken on the independence of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina and its secession from Yugoslavia.
6 A. Yes. But you failed to mention that an atmosphere was created in
7 the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that establishment of Croats in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina not to join the Muslims in going to vote at the
9 referendum. And it was very late that the decision was made that, after
10 all, the Croats should take part in that referendum.
11 Q. And I thank you for that information. So regardless of how this
12 came about, it is clear that the voters had different viewpoints, and
13 precisely because of these differences, the political leadership and
14 Franjo Tudjman appealed to the Croats. They urged them to go out to the
15 referendum and to vote, to save that state. Is that the idea?
16 A. Yes, but you're forgetting --
17 Q. Please answer my question.
18 A. You're forgetting that a bloody crime was perpetrated by the
19 Yugoslav army or, rather, by rebel Serbs who were under the influence of
20 Milosevic's policy, which was the crime in Vukovar, and this crime left
21 such a huge impact on Croats that at that point in time they were
22 unwilling to join the Serbs.
23 Q. Yes, Mr. Manolic, I agree with all that, but the fact is that due
24 to one circumstance or another, and perhaps for other things too, the fact
25 remains that ultimately Tudjman - this is simplified, of course - was
1 saying to the people who wanted to listen to him, go to the elections,
2 ensure a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. We agree with that, don't we?
3 A. Yes, we agree. There is no disputing the matter there.
4 Q. Now, further on in time Croatia helps Bosnia-Herzegovina on
5 different levels. Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot survive without Croatia. You
6 and I know that. Humanitarian aid, military aid, refugees, hospitals,
7 helping sport life. I can go on and on and show you many, many documents
8 to bear it out. So why is Croatia doing that if it had a plan to divide
9 up the territory in the future? Just tell me that.
10 A. But you'd have to tell me then why an armed conflict took place in
11 the first place. Who started it and why, what the reason was. What
12 you're saying now, we agree. We agree up to that point, and I can be -- I
13 could be a Defence witness, I can be your witness up until that particular
14 point. But then you will have to answer why. First of all, why were the
15 Croats indoctrinated nonetheless to vote against? And ultimately that's
16 what happened, because none of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in the
17 Croatian leadership had the moral force to go together with the Serbs
18 after the Vukovar tragedy. So that's why I'm saying Vukovar was a
19 catalyst in those relationships, and it was at that point in time that
20 relations grew cold between Milosevic and Tudjman. That was the turning
22 Q. Yes, well, that's precisely it. Even if they had reached some
23 kind of agreement, and those were the rumours going round in Croatia but
24 nobody can confirm that, had they agreed upon something, it wouldn't have
25 happened. There wouldn't have been the bloody attack on Vukovar and this
1 would not have triggered off what happened in Bosnia later on.
2 A. Yes, but in politics and in military actions you never have any
3 consistency, or very rarely. So who started, who led the action? Was it
4 Milosevic's action and operation, or was it the forces who were
5 extremists, extreme nationalist forces who launched the action and
6 bypassed him? I don't think we'll ever be able to clear that up, you and
8 Q. I don't think so either.
9 JUDGE PRANDLER: Please kindly slow down. [Microphone not
10 activated] Thank you.
11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, Your Honour. Yes,
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I also apologise, but sometimes in
14 the heat of the moment one forgets that one is in a courtroom.
15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Manolic, you say that some things can't be foreseen in
17 politics. I don't want to prolong that discussion, but let me just ask
18 you this: You said yourself that in your opinion the attack that took
19 place during those days, the Greater Serbian aggressor against Vukovar,
20 and you used the word --
21 A. I beg your pardon. Not "attack." "Attack" is too mild a word.
22 It was the bloody crimes took place, and it is common knowledge which
23 those bloody crimes were; that thousands of people were killed, that
24 patients from hospital were taken to the execution site, and so on.
25 Q. Yes. We agree with that. Everybody more or less knows what
1 happened in Vukovar, you described the event, but the fact is that you
2 said it was a catalyst, the event was a catalyst and triggered other
3 things. So you must have known about this, that there were some physical
4 laws that existed and all that was needed was this catalyst to trigger off
5 the whole chemical reaction. So there were other catalysts too. Do we
6 agree with that? The situation was highly complex, was it not? We agree
8 A. Yes, we do, certainly.
9 Q. Thank you. So it wasn't easy to find your way in that forest of
10 trees and say that this was the cause and this was the effect. That would
11 be quantum mechanics, or physics, as my client would say. We don't know
12 when what particle is going to hit what electron. We know it will in due
13 course, but we don't know the exact moment when fusion will take place,
14 and that is the reality of those times and the politics of those times.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, following the
16 question that has just been put to you, and I myself have the same
17 question: You told us that from November, 1991, until March, 1993, as
18 head of the Presidency you were head of the intelligence services. So you
19 were informed about a number of events.
20 The Defence counsel of General Praljak has indicated that during
21 the time of the conflict between the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
22 Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia supplied arms. What kind of logic
23 was applied here? You supply arms to the -- to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
24 is in a conflict with the Croats. What was the political necessity here
25 that prevailed?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The times we're talking about now,
2 at that period there still was no conflict between the Croats and the
3 Muslims. We're still talking about the Greater Serbian aggression against
4 the Croatian territory and against the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as
5 well. And so possibly -- I did not take part in it, but quite possibly
6 Croatia at that point in time in one way or another, to what extent I
7 don't know, did send weapons or sold weapons to the army of
9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was my intention to
10 ask those questions with documents provided, but I can't -- I haven't got
11 the time to do that, so I would like to suggest that these eight documents
12 -- they needn't -- they're self-explanatory; whose sending them, who the
13 addressees are, what they're about, it's all self-explanatory, and with
14 your permission, I'd like to tender them straight away. You have them in
15 your binders, I will make a list of them, and the witness has confirmed --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you introduce one of them,
17 at least?
18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher then put 3D 00006 on
19 the ELMO or the screen first, please. I know that's already been admitted
20 into evidence, I do apologise. Put another one; 007, for example. Four
21 0s: 00007. 3D 00007.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a minute. I think there's
23 one that looks appropriate. That's 3D 00009.
24 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] At any rate, while we're waiting for
25 the document, I'd like to mention that the dates are in 1992 and 1993, and
1 that's quite obvious and can be seen from the documents. Then e-court --
2 there's another document in e-court that I'd like to ask some questions
3 about that. It's a similar document but not quite the same, not
5 Q. Mr. Manolic, on the screen --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's please stick to the
7 document you have before you, 26th of March, 1993. We have a document
8 here that seems to prove that there has been -- that arms have been sent
9 to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 At the beginning of 1993, were there any problems between
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there were. There were
13 problems and conflicts.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So there were armed conflicts,
15 weren't there? There were armed conflicts, and we have before us a
16 document which indicates that Croatia is sending to the ABiH army 75
17 RPG-7s, 7.000 mines, and so on and so forth. What is the reason for this?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is no logic in trade
19 transactions that might have taken place, with or without the knowledge of
20 certain people, certain leaders in the state structure.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic.
22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may we have the
23 document 3D 00186 placed on the screen, please. And to facilitate things
24 for the usher, 3D 00002 should be prepared, the next document. So may we
25 have those documents displayed, please.
1 Q. From the documents that were on our screens for just the briefest
2 moment, we were able to see that the embassy of the Republic of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina working in Zagreb since Bosnia-Herzegovina was
4 recognised, in July, 1993, is asking the Ministry of External Affairs,
5 Foreign Affairs of Croatia, to allow them to establish in Zagreb a
6 military economic representative office; and secondly, a logistics -- [In
7 English] I would like to have on the monitor document 3D [Interpretation]
8 [No interpretation].
9 [Interpretation] So the Croatian authorities allowed the Republic
10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 - July, 1993 - and we can see that from the
11 document, that the embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is informing the
12 government which individuals would be in their bodies - this excerpt in
13 the middle - the Ministry of the Defence of the Republic of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina has appointed certain individuals to work in the
15 military economic representative offices in Zagreb in the logistics
16 department of the Supreme Command of the armed forces in Zagreb. So this
17 is official communication between the embassy and the Foreign Ministry.
18 So do you agree that from this excerpt the past tense was used?
19 The ministry appointed, which means that it had already functioned for a
20 certain amount of time. It's something that's already happened.
21 And now let's look at the second page. On the second page we can
22 see that mention is made of the people to man the logistics department in
23 Split. And in the military economic office in Zagreb, we have six
24 individuals appointed. In the logistics department in Zagreb, there are
25 21 names, and in Split two individuals. So official representatives of
1 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to whom Croatia has given the
2 instruments to work with on the basis of the Vienna consulary conventions
3 because they all had consular passports and they had been recorded, so
4 this isn't the trading on the part of certain individuals. It's the
5 Croatian Foreign Affairs Ministry granting permission for that. And the
6 Bosnian embassy is writing to the ministry.
7 A. I would like the Court and the Trial Chamber to differentiate
8 between what is official policy what is trafficking with weapons. You all
9 know that there was a black market and there was an embargo on the
10 purchase of weapons where the Croatian state was concerned. So it wasn't
11 the normal functioning of the state. It was clandestine trading. And we
12 have a saying which says where the mind stops, the dollar allows you to
14 Q. Let's divide that up, Mr. Manolic. It is one thing to look at
15 relations between the official organs of the Republic of Croatia and the
16 Republic of BH, which we can conclude on the basis of this document,
17 because you have the embassy of one country writing an official note to
18 the Foreign Affairs Ministry of another country, so that is that kind of
19 document; it is the formal legal communication between two legal subjects.
20 Now, what you're talking about, I don't want to enter into that.
21 It's irrelevant for this purpose.
22 A. But I just want you to differentiate between the two.
23 Q. Yes, we'll agree. The other topic that you've mentioned, that's
24 something different again. That's a different topic, how individuals
25 procured, purchased weapons and so on. But this is the formal legal
1 relationship between the two countries, between the two states, and it was
2 legally transferred from Croatia to BH for the purposes of the BH army.
3 Let's forget about black marketeering and trafficking in weapons and so on
4 and so forth.
5 A. Yes, but you as a legal person must understand that there is a
6 difference between legal formulation of a particular relationship and
7 reality, and you'll have to get to reality willy-nilly.
8 Q. All right. But may I have the next document 3D 000 -- 0002.
9 MR. SCOTT: I just wanted the record -- I think there is a
10 confusion, or the suggestion that what is in document 3D 00186, which
11 appears to be simply the fact that certain diplomatic personnel were being
12 located in Croatia, they maintained diplomatic relations during the war,
13 apparently, don't think anyone would dispute that, but there's no
14 indication that that document has anything to do with the document showing
15 the transfer of arms. Those are two separate items but there seems to be
16 some suggestion that somehow they're connected. Unless Mr. Kovacic can
17 show us what that connection is.
18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I don't think we understood each
19 other. I'm claiming on the basis of this document - and we saw similar
20 documents earlier on - and this clearly emerges from this particular
21 document that the Republic of Croatia at that point in time was an
22 internationally recognised independent state and that it gave permission
23 and enabled the neighbouring republic, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
24 again an international, independent subject with which the Republic of
25 Croatia is already at war, a war which in the -- in paragraph 232 of the
1 indictment states, in an international armed conflict. So we're now
2 saying -- and this is something I'm asking the witness, I'm asking him --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but the witness must be
4 allowed to answer.
5 The Defence has just shown you a document, Mr. Manolic, about the
6 fact that in Split there are people from Bosnia-Herzegovina with a
7 diplomatic passport. Now, as Mr. Kovacic is claiming, is it true that
8 there were diplomatic relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia,
9 which would signify -- which would mean that Croatia recognised the
10 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with all its attributes, in all its facets?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I think that would be correct.
12 That is correct, yes. In formal legal terms, that holds water. That is
13 true. I don't know about these representative offices and the names of
14 the people that were the staff there, but I assume that the document is
15 authentic and correct.
16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. You've got
17 round this problem in a better way than I.
18 But 3D 00032 would be the next document I'd like to have up on our
19 screens. Mr. Usher, or Mr. Registrar, please. 000302 [as interpreted].
20 No, we don't need this document.
21 This morning, while Mr. Praljak was speaking, we saw the document
22 for a moment. Here it is. Here it is.
23 Q. Mr. Manolic, would you please just glance at this document.
24 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Defence, strictly
25 confidential, Sarajevo, 12th of July, 1993.
1 If we were sitting around the table, not looking at e-court, we
2 would see this is a decision issued by the Ministry of Defence with a view
3 to carrying out the tasks and assignments falling within the purview of
4 the Supreme Command Staff of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia,
5 and so on and so forth, and there are three groups here, and they
6 correspond fully to the persons we saw in the previous note sent by the
8 So what kind of trafficking is this? Bosnia is a state. Their
9 government, their mechanism, appoints certain people to certain positions.
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, same state, has an embassy in Zagreb. They inform the
11 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia in Zagreb these people are
12 going to work for us, let them do the work they're doing.
13 A. I used the word "trafficking." You know that that is always
14 something illegal, trafficking. What this is about is that some legal
15 bodies were involved in the trafficking. That's the only way I can
16 explain this. Show me any document issued by the cabinet or the president
17 of the republic, or anybody who will confirm that this trafficking I'm
18 talking about did not take place.
19 Q. Mr. Manolic, I think there's no point in our discussing this any
20 further, but it is a fact that between two states this was something that
21 was going on legally. That's a fact you cannot deny.
22 A. Yes, but if you read all the transcripts, consequently you will
23 see that the minister of defence of the Republic of Croatia identifies
24 himself with the issue of Herceg-Bosna. This runs through the entire
25 material. How can you explain that?
1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Kovacic.
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I will now show you two documents signed -- signed by Susak,
4 Minister Susak, on the 26th of April, 1993, in connection to what you said
5 yesterday about funding through various channels. We haven't had time to
6 put it into e-court, so I would like to ask the usher to put this on the
8 Could you please look at this document. It's dated the 14th of
9 September. There is an almost identical one with a later date in
10 September, and there are also others. From the text, if you have managed
11 to read it --
12 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there is a translation
13 of this document, albeit done at the last moment.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you read out the first two
15 paragraphs, please.
16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Of course. It's a very brief
17 document. It's dated the 14th of September, 1993. It has the heading of
18 the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and contains a number
19 and so on. It is addressed to the administration for finance. That's
20 within the ministry. It's signed by Minister Gojko Susak. The title is
21 "Order," and under 1, he says: "I order the execution of a loan to the
22 Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,
23 Department of Defence in Mostar," and the amount is 5.965.000 Croatian
24 dinars - I have to tell the Chamber that there was a rampant inflation at
25 the time so I cannot say exactly how much it is worth, but it was worth
1 something - from the funds of Ministry of Defence of the Republic of
2 Croatia, and the remittance is to be made immediately to the transfer
3 account of Privredna Banka Zagreb, and the same amount, and so on and so
5 A. Can you just tell me when this money was paid back?
6 Q. Let me ask you this first of all: Would you agree that this is a
7 loan, that this document creates a loan? The Ministry of Defence is
8 lending money to the HVO, in this case in Mostar.
9 MR. SCOTT: [Previous translation continues] ... the question,
10 does the document on its face say it's a loan or does this witness know
11 whether in fact it was a loan? The witness just said he doesn't know if
12 it was ever paid back or not. He can ask the question, Does the document
13 -- Does this document say it was a loan? and I can agree that the
14 document says it was a loan, but we don't know whether it was or not.
15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave. My
16 learned friend is a lawyer, just like me. The repayment is discussed
17 after a debt is created. That's normal in law. First the legal
18 transaction has to be characterised and then we can talk about a
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, I'll ask the question so
21 that we can proceed faster.
22 Mr. Manolic, there's a document here which seems to establish the
23 fact that the Defence Ministry through its minister is giving instructions
24 for a loan to be granted to the HVO in Mostar.
25 Now, this type of document, as far as you're concerned, is it a
1 surprise to you? Does it come as a surprise, or are you telling us that
2 that is part of the job of the Ministry of Defence, to give loans to
3 external entities, external parties?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that through the legal budget
5 of the Republic of Croatia there was no such item in the budget. The
6 minister of defence concealed this within his own ministry and gave this
7 loan from the ministry funds. So in formal terms, yes, it looks like any
8 other document in good order, but my personal opinion is that this money
9 was never paid back and that it hasn't been paid back to date. However,
10 this can be investigated.
11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Manolic, can you ascertain -- can you assert with certainty
13 that this money loaned to the HVO was never paid back to the Ministry of
14 Defence of Croatia or that no compensation was ever made in any way? Can
15 you say that with certainty?
16 A. No, I can't. I don't even know about these loans that were made.
17 Q. Thank you. So it is your opinion, you think that this might have
18 happened; right?
19 A. No. You're simplifying things. It's not what I think.
20 Q. Very well. Let me ask you the following, then: Under the law in
21 Croatia, there is a state auditing service. I think it was adopted while
22 you were a Member of Parliament.
23 And under this law, Your Honours, there is a certain state
24 institution, the state auditing service, which is duty-bound, which must -
25 and you will correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Manolic - must look into the
1 business books, investigate anything suspicious or out of the ordinary,
2 and say whether each ministry used the funds from the budget in the proper
3 way or not. This was recorded in the books of the Ministry of Defence.
4 Nobody knows whether anyone gave some money under the table.
5 A. If you want to convince the Court of that, you would have to
6 provide the Court with the audit of the Ministry of Defence, but I don't
7 think you have it because it doesn't suit your purposes.
8 Q. Mr. Manolic --
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a question or, rather, we
10 have a question.
11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, I want to ask for some
12 clarification to see if what I have understood is correct. You've said
13 that you were head of the service in -- intelligence service from 1991 to
14 1993, and at the same time you said that it was President Tudjman's policy
15 not to remain inert with respect to the position of the Croats in Bosnia,
16 which means he had the moral obligation to see to the fate and destiny of
17 the Croats in Bosnia.
18 Now, with respect to what Mr. Kovacic has said and the documents
19 we have, it would appear that there was an order of the 25th of March,
20 1993, about supplying the BH army with weapons. At the same time, we have
21 a document which speaks about the loan of money from the Ministry of
22 Defence of Croatia which is being sent to the HVO.
23 Now, my question to you is as follows: Of course, you, as an
24 individual who was in charge of the intelligence service, were you
25 informed about all that, and did you know about it, and did you know or
1 was there any trafficking with profit involved and are these two orders
2 linked, or does it all come within the frameworks of the policy to protect
3 and care for the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My position as president of this
5 office for intelligence was not in charge of monitoring the ministries and
6 the cabinet of the Republic of Croatia. Each ministry was autonomous, and
7 it was not my duty to monitor them. What was done by the minister of
8 defence was done autonomously within the sphere of his competence.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Manolic, but you're not
10 exactly answering the question posed by my colleague, which was a very
11 specific one. The documents that we've just seen, there could be two
12 explanations for them. The first is we are trafficking and the
13 authorities, Mr. Tudjman, yourself, or others, were not aware of this. Or
14 the second explanation is that these two documents illustrate the aid
15 provided by Croatia in logistic terms to the Croats of Bosnia. So what
16 explanation would you give? Was it one or other of these hypotheses, or a
17 third or fourth possibility perhaps? Which?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With respect to formal things, and
19 this is a formal document signed by the person who was in charge of this,
20 there is no doubt. There is doubt, however, as to whether this was
21 carried out legally or illegally.
22 If it was done legally, then the budget of the Croatian Republic
23 should contain an item, "Assistance to Herceg-Bosna." This, however, was
24 not there. And let the gentleman be more precise.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And what is the conclusion as
1 far as you're concerned? In your opinion, what is the conclusion?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my view, the conclusion is that
3 there was communication between the Ministry of Defence, but if you look
4 at the function or the actions of the minister throughout this period, you
5 will see that at the same time he was also a minister of the Croatian
6 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina although he was not that in formal
7 terms. And I believe it will be hard for Your Honours to understand this
8 because of the complexity of the relations that existed.
9 When you look at the documents in formal terms, then everything
10 seems to be in good order according to the legislation and the
11 constitution, but when you look into the practice, then you will see that
12 this is missing. How can we explain Croatia sending weapons to the army
13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina when it was itself under an arms embargo and unable
14 to obtain weapons? So it could not provide weapons to anyone legally.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to stop there
16 because we've overstepped the time. We'll reconvene at approximately
18 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.38 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 2.06 p.m.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing has resumed.
21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, you have me all
22 confused now. I'm not sure -- yes. I see that my colleague here is
23 indicating something.
24 MR. SAHOTA: Mr. President, may I make an oral application. As
25 the Tribunal will be aware, the deadline for the Defence to submit a
1 response to two recent Prosecution motions for judicial notice of
2 adjudicated facts expires tomorrow. This is an oral application for
3 permission to exceed the word count. The word count limit, as the
4 Tribunal will be aware, is 3.000 words or 10 pages, whichever is greater,
5 and that is pursuant to the practice direction of the 19th of January,
6 paragraph (C) 5.
7 I would like to advise the Tribunal that a joint response is being
8 prepared by all of the Defence teams, and further that the Defence is
9 replying to two Prosecution motions in one document. The issues raised
10 are complex, and we would therefore request leave from the Tribunal to
11 exceed the 3.000 word count limit.
12 I can indicate now that the joint response from the Defence is
13 unlikely to exceed 6.000 words.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Trial Chamber,
16 by its oral decision, grants the request of the Defence who can file its
17 submission in such a way that it does not exceed 3.000 words -- 6.000
19 Mr. Kovacic.
20 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. In order
21 for everybody else to be able to plan their time, let me indicate that I
22 will use ten minutes at the most. I have just two brief topics to cover,
23 and hopefully that will leave sufficient time for other Defence counsel.
24 Q. Mr. Manolic, I hope you were able to rest during our lunch break.
25 As you have heard, I have only two more questions for you. I hope we can
1 cover that quickly.
2 In view of your assessment of the role and importance of the
3 minister of defence, Gojko Susak - you have mentioned him many times
4 during these two days - I wish to put a document to you and then we will
5 proceed to the question.
6 Could the registry please put on the screen document P 00312.
7 This is a report from a business trip conducted between the 4th until the
8 12th of July, 1992. The trip was to Zagreb, Celju, Ljubljana, and Split.
9 Yesterday the Prosecution spent almost the whole morning dealing with this
11 Do you remember what this was all about, Mr. Manolic? We spoke
12 about this at length yesterday. Thank you. Will you now please turn to
13 page 9. Pagination can be seen at the bottom of the pages. It's
14 somewhere towards the middle of the page. Could we see that portion,
15 please. No, that's not it. Scroll up a little bit. I need item 2, The
16 role of the HDZ. No, I apologise. Scroll down, please. Yes.
17 Mr. Manolic, you can see there under this chapter, "The role of
18 the HDZ." You can see that this subject was discussed. Somewhere in the
19 middle of that paragraph there is a sentence that begins: "Mr. J. Manolic
20 proposes individual persons to take part in discussions with the
21 representatives of BH and that those people should be Mr. Susak and
23 So these were the problems that they were supposed to discuss, and
24 you proposed specific people who would be taking part in those
25 negotiations with the representatives of BH, namely Mr. Susak and Juric.
1 In view of your beliefs and your position on the activity of the
2 late Susak, it is a fact, isn't it, that it was you who nominated him, and
3 it was adopted. You nominated him to discuss with the other side on
4 behalf of the Zagreb leadership, to discuss with the other side and to try
5 to seek a peaceful resolution.
6 Can I, on the basis of that, conclude that you nevertheless agreed
7 with Susak's viewpoints?
8 A. No.
9 Q. So why did you then nominate him? I can't say that you nominated
10 him as a plenipotentiary, but at any rate he was the person who discussed
11 with the opposite side.
12 A. Given the complexity of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I
13 know that Gojko Susak had the greatest deal of influence among those
14 people, but -- that's why I nominated him. But I also nominated Juric,
15 who had a different opinion or, rather, he shared my opinion in relation
16 to the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina that needed to be solved.
17 Q. But let me remind you, this was in July of 1992.
18 A. But that changes nothing.
19 Q. All right.
20 A. Perica Juric maintained constant contact, especially with Bosnian
21 Posavina and those municipalities there. So he was well-informed about
22 the situation on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also hails from
23 Livno or Duvno.
24 Q. Yes. Juric is mentioned frequently in these minutes. It seems
25 that he was quite active in contacts with Bosnia.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. But I don't think I fully understood your answer. So you proposed
3 Susak. You nominated him because there was a certain value in his
4 nomination due to his contacts.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Does this mean -- please tell me yes or no.
7 A. That means that I was interested in finding the solution, finding
8 the best solution. This is why I nominated Juric and Susak.
9 Q. All right. It's fully clear to me now, thank you.
10 Now that we have this document on the screen, could we please see
11 page 10, the first passage at the very top of the page.
12 Now that we have this document, it won't take more than a minute.
13 We see Mr. Susak speaking at the top of the page, and before Mr. Boban
14 starts speaking, Susak says explicitly, "We have to seek a joint solution
15 with the Muslims, because we're not interested in increasing tensions in
16 our relations." Is that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you very much. Another issue, please. We dealt extensively
19 with all of the minutes kept at the meetings in the office of President
20 Tudjman, and I would now like to see document P 2302. This is minutes of
21 the meeting held on the 11th of May, 1993, the meeting of the Defence and
22 National Security Council. This is a document that we dealt with
23 yesterday. Could we please see it on the screen? So it's P 2302, 11th of
24 May, 1993. That's correct. Could we see ERN number 01866904.
25 I will be reading slowly. I'm sure that you will recall this.
1 This is where you said something following the president. "I think we
2 have to be aware that this is the fiercest attack of the West, of
3 Igelberg, in relation to the war in Slovenia. It has to do with our
4 positions as regards Bosnia."
5 So once again let me remind you, this is the 11th of May, 1993.
6 And then you go, say: "Listen here. The Germans will come. These people
7 will come, too, and what we will have to tell them is what is our
8 relationship or, rather, what is our attitude with respect to the central
9 government in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
10 And then another two or three issues that are not overly important
11 to us here, and then you proceed to conclude your discussion, and you say
12 as follows -- I should tell the registry that they need the ERN -- all
13 right. It's here. Great. Could you please scroll down a little bit.
14 Two more lines down. Yes. Yes, that's precisely what I read out.
15 So look at this passage, please: "I think it would be good --"
16 and this is the continuation of your statement. Do you see it on the
17 screen, Mr. Manolic? This is the passage: "I think it would be good,"
18 and so on. And then in the next paragraph you basically conclude. You
19 say: "Gentlemen, Bosnia may not continue existing in its current form.
20 The only solution is to partition it so that there is a small Bosnia with
22 A. No. This is not my opinion. What I stated there was related to
23 the entire discussion, that namely all of the participants had to voice
24 their opinion as to whether they supported the partition of Bosnia and
25 should there be just a small Bosnia in existence from then on. So this is
1 the context of my discussion. I think that there is a word missing there,
2 because as it stands now, it seems, or it looks as though I was the one
3 advocating the partition -- the partitioning of Bosnia. However, based on
4 all my previous statements, you can see that I was the firmest supporter
5 of Bosnia remaining integral.
6 Q. All right. And then further on, in the next passage, you say: "I
7 think that it will unfold in this direction. If that doesn't happen, then
8 we will see it happen in the next stage, because they constantly want to
9 put us in this same basket with Serbia, with Milosevic, so that they could
10 treat us in the same way. This is what this attack against us is all
11 about. So now we should have Croatia -- so now we should pressure Croatia
12 so that we can reduce the pressure on Serbia, or better said, make the
13 current position of Serbia easier."
14 So as you have just explained to us, all the options were still
15 open. You are now here referring to the international influence or
16 international circumstances; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. So whether this is your statement or not --
19 A. It is my statement, but what I was talking about is that the
20 leadership of Croatia in that moment had to state whether it supported the
21 partitioning or not so that they wouldn't come in this situation that I
22 was speaking about, so that they wouldn't be placed in the same basket as
23 Serbia, so that Croatia would not be accused, just like Serbia was, for
24 aggression. That was the essence of what I was saying.
25 Q. All right. I fully understand that. Based on that I conclude,
1 and you can correct me if my conclusion is wrong, that it wasn't until
2 May, 1993, in your view as you just told me, that the situation came to a
3 point where a decision was needed; is that correct?
4 A. Yes, that's correct. But this is not the beginning and the end.
5 This discussion continued.
6 Q. Yes, naturally. We agreed initially this morning that this was a
7 chaotic situation, and you will definitely agree with that.
8 A. We would say a complex situation.
9 Q. All right. So "complex" is perhaps a better word. Thank you for
10 helping me with this.
11 So it was a situation where circumstances changed on a daily
12 basis; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And now we get to what the late president said, and I think that
15 you confirmed that that was your opinion as well, that the solution in
16 Bosnia would not be defined either by Croats, Serbs, or Muslims but by the
17 international community first and foremost; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Manolic. I would have many more
20 questions for you because you are an inexhaustible source of information,
21 but thank you for your time. I have to conclude now.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Next Defence counsel, please.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours.
24 Mr. Kovacic just took one topic off my list, so that will shorten my
25 cross-examination somewhat. I hope that I can conclude within this
1 session or slightly a little bit over the next session.
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:
3 Q. Mr. Manolic, yesterday you pointed to all of the accused, and you
4 in essence indicated that they're all guilty of being involved in a joint
5 criminal enterprise. Do you recall that, when you said that they were all
6 together trying to carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 A. I did not say that, so please don't put words into my mouth,
8 because I didn't mention a single person, except Prlic, perhaps, in a
9 different context. Not the one you're referring to.
10 Q. Okay. So it's your position here today, and you would like the
11 Trial Chamber to accept -- hold on --
12 A. Not position. Those were my words. Please. Show me the text
13 where I accused all six. Go on, then, with their names.
14 Q. Mr. Manolic, you're a trained lawyer? You are a trained lawyer?
15 A. Just as you are. We agree.
16 Q. Now, so it's your position here today that none of them were
17 involved in a joint criminal enterprise?
18 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, that's not at all what he said.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm asking him to clarify his position.
20 MR. SCOTT: That's beyond the scope, Your Honour. This witness is
21 going to express a view on that, the ultimate issue in this case? I mean
22 on this --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I don't remember,
24 Mr. Karnavas, that the witness said that the accused were part of this
25 joint criminal enterprise, unless you -- you have a page number and line
1 number which we could refer to, but I don't recollect him saying anything
2 of this kind.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour. As I recall, he did point
4 and said the third or second tier, including the accused, but we'll look
5 it up on the transcript.
6 Q. Be that as it may, Mr. Manolic, you did bring up my client's name
7 yesterday, Mr. Prlic, and you'd indicated, at least based on -- with
8 respect to the Washington agreement, that he was rather constructive; is
9 that correct?
10 A. Yes, that's correct. The most constructive document thus far.
11 Q. And because of time limitations, as I understand it, because
12 you've reviewed all these documents, we could find that the six points
13 with respect to the implementation of the Washington Agreement on -- in
14 the document -- Prosecution's document P 08012. That's where he lays out
15 the six points. Is that what you were referring to, sir?
16 A. Yes. I think that that was Prlic's proposal at that point in
17 time. You have it in the transcripts, and what I said, that he was
18 constructive, I can say that he approached a document professionally, and
19 it was one that we had to implement.
20 Q. Thank you. And for the record, and keeping with the time
21 limitations and trying to be as creative as I can in using my time, this
22 can be found, as I noted, in P 08012. This is the March 4, 1994,
23 transcript where Mr. Manolic was present, and the six points can be found
24 on pages 49 to 51. You'll see them, Mr. President, Your Honours. It's
25 right there. So since we can all read them, we won't -- I'll move on to
1 the next subject.
2 Now, my client's name also came -- came up at least in one of the
3 transcripts, the very last one that was introduced by the Prosecution.
4 That's D 0 -- P 01325. That was a transcript from the 27th of January,
5 1993. If you recall, in that particular session of the Defence and
6 National Security, Dr. Prlic had submitted a letter. Do you recall that?
7 A. I don't know what we're talking about now. Are we referring to
8 the proposal made by Mr. Prlic at that particular session, the six-point
9 proposal, or are you referring to another letter? As to another letter, I
10 know nothing about that. All I know about is the six points put forward
11 by Mr. Prlic at that session.
12 Q. Okay. Very well. All right. If we could -- yesterday, at the
13 close of the Prosecution's direct examination, they introduced a document
14 of P 01325. This was a session of Defence and National Security Council
15 held on 27 January, 1993. Though your name does not appear here, as I
16 believe -- I believe you testified yesterday nonetheless you recall
17 attending that particular session. And in that session, if we look at
18 page 3 of the document, or actually page 2, there's a letter that was
19 submitted by Dr. Prlic, and I believe on page 3 that letter is being read.
20 Do you recall that, sir? And if you don't, we'll move on.
21 A. I don't remember, but I think the question is why I wasn't
22 introduced there, because I can see that I'm not there at that session.
23 So I'd like to adhere to the transcript and say that I did not attend that
24 meeting. Perhaps they got this mixed up with other sessions, but I'm
25 going to stick to what it says in the transcript, that I didn't take part
1 at that particular meeting.
2 Q. Okay. And therefore, I take it it would be appropriate for us not
3 to go into that particular transcript since you weren't there to comment
4 one way or the other with respect to Dr. Prlic's letter and the
5 conversation, the discussion that took place thereafter.
6 That was a question. So there's no need for us to go into that
7 document, sir, correct? We need to make a record. It's either yes or no.
8 I'll move on.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: By the way, Your Honour, earlier, as I indicated,
10 the remarks that were made by Mr. Manolic were concerning all of the
11 accused, as I understand it, can be found on page 9, lines 18 -- 17 to 18,
12 4 July, 2006, transcript, and I'll leave it up to the Trial Chamber what
13 if anything -- what weight to give to that comment.
14 Q. Briefly I want to talk to you about your book next. I'm not going
15 to go into it at any length because I believe one of my colleagues will do
16 so in great detail --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You could perhaps read outlines
18 17 and 18 on page 9, like -- that there will be nothing more ambiguous.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: "In Bosnia-Herzegovina the main implementers of
20 this policy were Boban, Kordic --"
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: "-- including the accused here."
23 If I could read it again. I'm told the microphone didn't pick it
24 up. It says here: "In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the main implementers of this
25 policy were Boban, Kordic, and the third echelon, including the accused
1 here," and as I recall, Your Honour, Mr. Manolic made a gesture pointing
2 to accused, pointing to the box, and since "accused" is both singular and
3 plural, I can only assume that he meant every single one of them. And
4 being a lawyer, I'm sure he chooses his words rather carefully. But I
5 will move on, Your Honour.
6 Q. If I could go on to the next subject, sir, and this is in regards
7 to your book. When I look at this, when I flip it open, it appears that
8 you have the copyrights to this particular book that was published in
9 1995. Is that correct, sir?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And that being so, sir, it would appear that -- while it says here
12 that a Mr. Hlad was sort of the, I guess, commentator, editor, whatever
13 you want to call him, it would appear that, in essence, this is your text,
14 both commentary and the articles themselves, because obviously you're the
15 proprietor of this book and you were going to sign off on anything and
16 everything that was included in this text; correct?
17 A. Well, to answer, the book was published completely legally, in
18 conformity with all the rules and regulations, and as far as my interviews
19 are concerned, you can rest assured that all my interviews were signed.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, that wasn't the answer to my question, though,
21 was it? I mean, lawyer to lawyer. So --
22 A. And what's the answer, then? Go on, you tell me.
23 Q. Well, what I'm suggesting is what I suggested in my previous
24 question, is in fact we don't have a commentator, an editor, doing a
25 one-on-one interview but, rather, it's Manolic on Manolic with somebody
1 actually just, you know, doing the typing, or maybe brushing up on the
2 language, but in fact this is you. This is Manolic on Manolic; right?
3 And that's nothing wrong with that, but let's call it for what it is.
4 Would you agree with me?
5 A. What you are doubting -- well, as the Defence, you can call any of
6 these people who can either deny or support your line of thinking. All I
7 can tell you is that I signed all those interviews which you have there
8 placed and contained in the book, that I am the author. Do you doubt
9 that? Do you doubt that I'm the author? No, you don't?
10 Q. Sir, I'm not here to answer your questions, but I have no doubt
11 that you made certain public statements. Now, whether they're all true,
12 accurate and complete - and complete - that's something for other counsel,
13 perhaps they may want to raise, but the point that I'm making -- the point
14 that I'm making and the point that I wish to establish is that this is not
15 some commentary by some -- someone objective but, rather, it's Manolic -
16 that's you - on Manolic - that's you again. In other words, this is your
17 text and you're commenting on yourself. And the reason I'm making this
18 assertion is because this in fact is political propaganda that was
19 designed to assist you with the following elections that were coming up.
21 A. I don't think you're abreast of the situation and developments. I
22 think you're improvising with your questions, which don't hold water. All
23 I can do is to confirm that it is my interview, they are my interviews.
24 The commentators can be different people. You know that full well
25 yourself. So the commentators are responsible for the comments they make,
1 if we're here to establish the truth.
2 Q. Now, on the first part, if we talk about, just to help us out here
3 a little bit, and again, I don't want to go too much into the book, the
4 first part is called "Who is Josip Manolic?" And if we're looking at the
5 first paragraph - I don't want to take up too much time - but the
6 commentator goes on talking about all of your great achievements -- it
7 would be page 7 in B/C/S, in your actual book.
8 Now, "Who is Josip Manolic?" Is that something that you wrote,
9 was written with your approval, or was written objectively and
10 independently? Which of the three?
11 A. I think that the comments were made independent of me, but the man
12 probably used my own comments.
13 Q. Again, and just to make sure I understand this correctly, if you
14 have your book open, if you open it up, it says over here in the very
15 first page, it says "Josip Manolic," and we can see the little C in a
16 circle, which means copyright. So it means that you own -- you're the
17 proprietor and you own everything that's in this book, right, including
18 the portion on "Who is Josip Manolic?"
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Okay. Now, in looking here, we have -- in this section you have a
21 short biography of yourself, and on page 3 in the English translation you
22 indicate, you know, among other things, that -- I believe it was in 1944,
23 at a rather young age, that's when you got involved in the security
24 service business, in the UDBA business. UDBA -- this was the precursor to
25 UDBA, and UDBA is the security services; right? That would be page 9,
1 although I'm sure you know your text rather well.
2 A. Well, I don't know what is contentious there. Everything it says
3 is correct.
4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
5 A. My biography and all the rest of it.
6 Q. And then in 1946, apparently you went for three years to the -- to
7 Belgrade to the Military Political Academy. Now, was that a university or
8 was this some sort of finishing school for young Communist cadres that
9 were within Tito's --
10 A. I think you're distorting reality once again --
11 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
12 A. -- both in terms of time and correctness. Please, it says quite
13 clearly that in 1947 -- 1946, 1947, I was in the Military Political
14 Academy in Belgrade. That's what it says there. Now, whether it's three
15 years or five years, it doesn't matter. Don't do things like that. It's
16 not proper.
17 Q. And then in 1948, and you would be at that point in time about 28
18 years old, you were appointed to be the head of the department of the
19 executive of the penalty sanctions in the MUP of Croatia, and you were
20 there for 12 years. Does that sound like you were the head of the prison
21 system in Croatia? Is that what it is?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. In addition to the judiciary and all the other participants in the
25 penal system. In the system, I was one of the people at the head of the
1 penal or penitentiary systems of Croatia, and all the good and all the
2 evil within that department can be ascribed to me during that period of
4 Q. Right. And there's quite a bit of evil during that period, as I
5 understand it, while folks in the former Yugoslavia and the various
6 republics were trying to exercise their right to self-determination, the
7 national identity, those folks were being persecuted in one way or
8 another. Some were put in prison for being dissidents; right?
9 A. Yes. All those who came in conflict with the law had to answer,
10 just as they would in any other state with the rule of law. Regardless of
11 their position, regardless of their thoughts, what they thought
12 themselves, but they came into conflict with the law, the courts tried
13 them, they came to a penitentiary system where there was a regime that was
14 enforced, and I was one of the leading people there. I'm not trying to
15 avoid that, but I don't see what this -- what purpose it serves you.
16 Q. We're going to get there slowly, sir, step-by-step. And -- now,
17 in your -- in your -- in your book over here, under this whole section who
18 you are, you indicate that -- that you introduced some sort of moderate
19 penal methods and that you improved sort of the conditions in the prison
20 system. Is that correct, or am I overstating the situation in your
22 A. That is correct. But it says in what respect? In respect of the
23 training of cadres who were in direct contact with people who were serving
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please. Microphone.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And here we come to the open-type
2 penitentiaries as the first of that kind in the socialist bloc. That's
3 quite clear, is it?
4 Q. And just to conclude this chapter of your life, it was during this
5 period of time when you were head of the prison system in Croatia when a
6 very prominent cardinal, Cardinal Stepinac, was not only arrested but was
7 under your care, and it is claimed that while he was under your care he
8 died because of poison. Now, I'm not suggesting that you were the one who
9 poisoned him, but that's what's being alleged. Would that be correct?
10 A. Once again, in a very insolent manner the lawyer is insinuating
11 things about me and about some poisoning. The commission that
12 investigated the acts of Cardinal Stepinac in prison did not take this
13 possibility of poisoning. I was investigated by the commission. They
14 heard me, I gave them my opinion. They heard me out. They heard out
15 hundreds of people about that same problem.
16 Q. But he was under your care and supervision, was he not, while you
17 were in charge of the prison system, and as I understand it, you were
18 specifically instructed to watch over and care for this -- this rather
19 esteemed cardinal, Catholic cardinal, who was beatified later on by none
20 other than the Pope?
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I don't see how this question is
22 relevant and ties up with the indictment, but Mr. Manolic, what did the
23 cardinal die of?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that the cardinal died nine
25 years after he left the penitentiary. I think he died of leukaemia, but I
1 can't say for sure. There are endless reports on the subject, because he
2 was treated throughout those nine years after he left the prison. So this
3 could not be linked to any poisoning that took place in the penitentiary
4 and link that up to why and how he died.
5 MR. KARNAVAS:
6 Q. Now, after leaving that -- that job, I believe it was in 1960,
7 then you became the head of the Secretariat of the Internal Affairs of the
8 city of Zagreb; is that correct?
9 A. Correct. To make things quite clear, the chief of police of the
10 city of Zagreb.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. And the broader region as well.
13 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, I want to go into -- I want to start
14 off with where we started yesterday. Prior to coming in here today, prior
15 to beginning your testimony, Judge Antonetti posed some questions to you
16 before you were put under oath, and he asked you to -- and I quote, and
17 this is on page 42, that would have been on July -- July 3, line -- line
18 8, Judge Antonetti asked you: "Could you tell me what your functions were
19 in 1991, 1992, and 1993." And then you indicate: "In 1992 I held the
20 office of head of the office of the president of the republic until 1993
21 in March when I was elected the Speaker of the Chamber of Counties of the
22 Upper House of parliament." Then Judge Antonetti asks you to be placed
23 under oath.
24 Now, before we go to what you said after you were placed under
25 oath, when you were asked very specifically from Judge Antonetti about
1 your positions, how is it - how is it - that you omitted to say that you
2 were head of the security services at that period of time? Was that a
3 lapse of memory, or were you conveniently trying to avoid being totally
4 truthful with -- with the Court? Which of the two?
5 A. Neither, nor did I have a lapse of memory, nor did I wish to avoid
6 the issue, because my entire biography is public knowledge and now it is
7 something that the Tribunal knows about through this short biography. I
8 could, of course, write a whole book about my biography, but this was a
9 summary that was provided. There is no reason to hide even a minute or
10 hour of that biography and to hide what positions I held. There is
11 absolutely no reason for me to do that.
12 Q. Well, I think the record will reflect that the fact that you were
13 the head of the security services came out through the Defence and not
14 through you. But be that as it may, let's see what else -- what happens
15 thereafter. You're placed under oath, and the oath that you read is: "I
16 solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
17 but the truth." That can be found on page 42, again on July 3, lines 8
18 and 9. And then it was Mr. Scott there, the representative from the
19 Office of the Prosecution, that led you through your biography, and he
20 begins on page 45, line 21, with: "Good afternoon, Mr. Manolic, sir, I
21 want to run through some of your background fairly quickly." And of
22 course Mr. Scott doesn't mention anything about you being in the security
23 services. Perhaps because he wasn't aware of that, or perhaps he forgot,
24 but nonetheless, again if you go to page 46, there's -- and on to page 47
25 when you do answer, there's nothing there of you being a member of the
1 security -- the head of the security services.
2 Now, under oath, sir, you were asked to tell the whole truth. Can
3 you please explain, why is it that again you omitted to tell us the whole
4 truth about your background? And it will be rather relevant when we get
5 to it.
6 A. First of all, I'd like to ask you to stick to the terminology that
7 existed. I was appointed representative of the office of the president of
8 the republic for state security.
9 Q. Okay. Now, let me stop you right there. Did you know that that
10 was the office that you had -- excuse me, sir.
11 A. I did not go from date to date here, but we cleared that matter up
12 during the discussion.
13 Q. Well, we cleared it up, but I want to know, why is it that you
14 omitted to tell us that -- you know, that little, you know, insignificant,
15 I guess, detail.
16 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. If I might. I think the
17 transcript will show at that particular point, as the Court will have seen
18 me do with other witnesses, I was leading the witness through his
19 background. I think these were all leading questions. I think the
20 mistake was frankly mine, and I take responsibility for not asking that
21 question, but the only further point I'll make is if Mr. Manolic was
22 trying to conceal that information from the Court, I don't know why he
23 would have said it earlier because, Your Honour when Mr. President, when
24 yourself asked the questions, he did disclose that information.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour --
1 MR. SCOTT: And I take the responsibility for not, when I led him
2 through it, that I did not include that again after he had told you the
3 same information, but that was my error, for which I apologise.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, we're going to get to that section that the
5 Prosecutor helped us out here on, because today you were asked a question
6 by Mr. -- Mr. Praljak regarding the Mujahedin, and you called into
7 question what period he was referring to when you were the head of the
8 security services, and then there was an exchange -- and this can all be
9 found on pages 16 to 18, but primarily on page 16, of today's transcript
10 -- and you claimed not to know the dates, and then, miraculously, you
11 were able to recall the exact date, with precision in fact. Right? That
12 was 18 November, 1991. Again, it calls into question your veracity, sir.
13 How is it that you claim not to -- not to know what date you were the head
14 of the security services, and after a one -- one-page exchange, all of
15 sudden it's cleared up and you're able to recall the exact date. Can you
16 help us out here?
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I took note of that
18 myself. Why did you say the 18th of November, 1991? What reminded you
19 that you actually took up your post on that particular day, the 18th of
20 November, 1991? Did that -- did you happen to remember it, or was there
21 something that triggered this off to remind you that it was the 18th of
22 November, 1991?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I was asked to determine
24 when I took over that post in the intelligence service, because it was the
25 time when I was relieved of my duties of Prime Minister. There was a
1 vacuum, an interim period where I had no -- held no post in the state
2 structures, or any other structures, for that matter, apart from political
3 life. And then the question -- I was asked when that actually was. Then
4 I said approximately the 18th of November, but don't hold me by that
5 particular date, because if you -- we look at the documents, we'll be able
6 to see exactly when I was appointed. I think, to the best of my
7 recollection, that was on the 18th of November, 1991, as I said.
8 MR. KARNAVAS:
9 Q. And for the record, on page -- on line 10 of this particular page,
10 page 16, when he's asked from Mr. Praljak which period of time, the
11 response on line 10 is: "I can't tell you exactly. I can't specify
12 because I don't know." Question: "You don't know when you were head of
13 the secret services of the Republic of Croatia?" Answer: "I don't know
14 the dates and you're talking about dates now." Question: "Do you know
15 the month?" And then it goes on and on, but we'll leave that again for
16 the Trial Chamber.
17 Now, this exchange came over with respect to your knowledge of
18 Mujahedin being in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as I understand it, as I
19 recall, the figure was approximately 5.000 that was mentioned by
20 Mr. Praljak, again on page 17, line 12, and at which point you said you
21 didn't know anything about it.
22 First of all, before we get to the issue of the Mujahedin, could
23 you please tell us, how many different services were there at that period
24 of time in the Republic of Croatia gathering information? Because as I
25 recall yesterday, you described your function as a bureaucrat receiving
1 information and passing it on to the president. Rather a nice way of
2 putting your title, as a mere bureaucrat, but tell us, how many different
3 services were there in that period of in time in the Republic of Croatia?
4 And if it would help you to --
5 A. Well, none the services came under my department. In Croatia, to
6 be quite precise, there was the service for the protection of the
7 constitutional order, which was located in the Ministry of the Interior,
8 which was responsible to the minister, via the minister to the government.
9 And I just had those authorisations which the president had given me for a
10 period of time. More as coordinator for all this information that was
11 being gathered and funneled into the department but which were also
12 funneled to other services.
13 Q. Okay. My question was how many services were there in the
14 Republic of Croatia at that point in time?
15 A. At that time, there was the internal affairs service, the service
16 in the internal affairs, there was some sort of informative service within
17 the army, information service in the army, and there was some sort of
18 service, I believe, informative or information service, within the Foreign
20 All those people -- all those people who were in charge of these
21 different sectors were responsible directly and formally to their
23 Q. How were you gathering your information? You were a one-person
24 office? Didn't you have agents? Didn't you have folks gathering
25 information or passing it on? Are you sitting here today -- I just want
1 to make sure: Are you sitting here today claiming that no information was
2 coming to you from all these other services?
3 A. No, I didn't claim that. You're distorting things again.
4 Q. All right. That's why I'm trying to get you --
5 A. That it could have sent. It didn't but it could have sent. Now,
6 as far as the service of the apparatus was concerned, there were only five
7 of us in that service, so you can weigh how -- what the scope of that
8 intelligence work was.
9 Q. Sir, you were the number two man in Croatia at the time, power
10 speaking. You were at the right hand of President Tudjman.
11 A. Again you're distorting things. Where did you find this number
12 two? Please adhere to the proper legal terminology because you're a
13 lawyer. In the Croatian constitution there is only the office of
14 president. No vice-presidents or anything else. The second-ranking man
15 is the Speaker of parliament, according to the constitution, and I was not
16 that except in the Upper House, and that was in 1993.
17 Q. So you're saying de jure you were not the number two, but you're
18 not claiming here today that de facto you weren't. I mean, there's a
19 reason why President Tudjman put you in that position. Most likely
20 because of your previous experience in -- as -- in the security services.
21 A. That's right. Certainly he appreciated that.
22 Q. Of course. And I take it in all those years during the Tito era,
23 you had honed and fine-tuned your skills in gathering information; right?
24 That's why he wanted you there?
25 A. Again you're distorting things.
1 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Karnavas --
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Around this period I was a
3 politician, a man dealing in politics.
4 JUDGE PRANDLER: Let me interrupt the witness too and
5 Mr. Karnavas. I would like only to say, as it was mentioned before, that
6 we are actually -- we would like to listen to the witness mainly about
7 that trial which is going on and about the accused or in general terms,
8 but frankly speaking, I do not see too much reason how Cardinal Stepinac
9 would come into the picture, and also those work of the witness which
10 happened in the '40s and '50s. So that is why I would like to ask you,
11 Mr. Karnavas, to concentrate, if possible, to the -- to those issues which
12 are really before us and which are very important as far as the indictment
13 is concerned. Thank you very much.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour. As you recall, I -- he
15 just acknowledged that he was hand-picked by Tudjman because of his skills
16 and experience in working as UDBA and the secret services during those
17 years. That is relevant because today he was claiming that he didn't have
18 any information and no information was coming to him, while yesterday he
19 seemed to have all the answers while being questioned by the Prosecution.
20 So I do think that there is some relevance to this.
21 Q. Now, you indicated to -- to General Praljak that you didn't know
22 anything about the Mujahedin because you said that it was never discussed
23 at any of those meetings. Do you recall saying that?
24 A. Yes, I remember, but I could also ask whether the number of 5.000
25 presented by Mr. Praljak is correct. Was it 501? That's why I can't
1 answer questions like that.
2 Q. Sir --
3 A. But again you're playing tricks on me. It's not that I personally
4 knew nothing. I knew a lot, but it's not relevant for these proceedings.
5 Q. Well, that's where -- sir --
6 A. Everything that's relevant, I will tell you.
7 Q. Sir, you were asked a question about Mujahedin. You had to be
8 informed, or we had to point it out to you that you were the head of the
9 secret service. You begrudgingly told us when. Now you're telling us
10 that you had all those skills and that's why you were picked. Now, when
11 you were asked the question about the Mujahedin, you said, "Everything
12 that you're asking me now and putting to me are things that were not
13 discussed at any meeting that I -- that I took part in," and that was the
14 reason for you saying that you didn't know anything about the Mujahedin.
15 Yes or no. And it's on page 16. It can be found on the transcript. You
16 stand by your answer?
17 A. You don't have a single document about this transport of Mujahedin
18 through Croatia. No document whatsoever. You're speaking off the top of
19 your head, whether they went through Croatia or by some other route, but
20 all of that is irrelevant for this Court.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, we're not going to
22 spend hours on this question of the Mujahedin. You said that you were in
23 charge of coordinating the intelligence services. You said that there was
24 a service under the Defence Ministry, there was another under the Ministry
25 of the Interior, and one within the Foreign Affairs Ministry. So you
1 coordinated this activity. Now, when one coordinates, it means that you
2 meet the head people of the individual services, and you must have had
3 meetings with them. Now, after these meetings or when you had these
4 meetings, did one of the services at one point in time speak about the
5 fact that there were foreigners coming from Arab countries, transiting
6 through Croatia, and going to Bosnia-Herzegovina? Was that subject
7 mentioned at some point in time in front of you when you were the
8 coordinator of the intelligence services - in the plural - the
9 intelligence services of Croatia?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with full
11 responsibility, I can tell you we did not have the information presented
12 here concerning the Mujahedin and their transit through Croatia. There
13 are people still alive, if you want to establish this fact, who were at
14 the head of these services, and they can tell you whether they ever told
15 me anything about such information or not.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1992, 1993, for example, was
17 the word "Mujahedin" uttered in Croatia? Could you hear the word being
18 used in Croatia?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. To the best of my recollection,
20 no. The term "volunteers from various Arabic countries," was used.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, and I do -- I do
22 appreciate -- I do appreciate that question.
23 Q. If we could look at the Prosecution's evidence, P 03517. This
24 would be a National Security Council meeting 17 July, 1993. On page 17
25 it's the president, the president speaking, and he begins by saying, and I
1 quote: "Gentlemen, it's very interesting what Milosevic said, that there
2 are 5 to 6.000 of Mujahedin in Bosnia," and then it goes on to have this
3 discussion about Mujahedin.
4 Now, interestingly enough, Your Honour, and Mr. Manolic, if we go
5 to page 33 of the very same meeting of the National Security Council on 17
6 July, 1993, of which you were a member, your name pops up. So obviously
7 from that we can conclude that you were present at that very same meeting
8 where the issue of Mujahedin were being discussed. Again, it's on page 33
9 in the English transcript. We see your name. The discussion has
10 something -- is about something else, but nonetheless you were present.
11 You were informed, and there is the president talking about the Mujahedin,
12 and I put to you, sir - I put to you - that that is a total fabrication
13 that you did not know anything about Mujahedin when answering to General
14 Praljak's question, or that it was never discussed, as it's indicated here
15 on the transcript earlier today.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Karnavas, would you kindly slow down for the
18 MR. KARNAVAS: I will.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The president probably used the
20 term, but in our communication that term was not common. It was not
21 usually used in that period of time.
22 MR. KARNAVAS:
23 Q. All right. Now, you said he probably. Are you saying that you're
24 not sure that this transcript is correct and that maybe the word
25 "Mujahedin" just creeped in by its own, or is it that he indeed used it?
1 Because it's used more than once.
2 A. I don't deny that he used it, but I don't recall that. I don't
3 remember him using that term. Now when I look at the transcript and when
4 you read it out to me, I do believe he used it.
5 Q. All right.
6 A. All the more so as there's something else I know about the matter,
7 and that is that Milosevic --
8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
9 A. -- tried to intimidate Tudjman and the rest of us --
10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Your Honour, this is
11 non-responsive. I'm not asking you about Milosevic. I'm asking you, sir,
12 and we just caught you lying on the record, under oath, okay? That's what
13 this is about.
14 MR. SCOTT: Objection.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: It's not objection --
16 MR. SCOTT: That's an overstatement, Your Honour.
17 There may have been an inconsistency, there's nothing about lying
18 under oath and that's a completely different allegation.
19 MR. KARNAVAS:
20 Q. Now, I want to talk to you about another issue, the issue of the
21 Livno question. Do you know anything about that, sir? The question
22 regarding -- that was discussed in Livno. Are you aware of that incident,
23 sir? You know what I'm talking about?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Okay. Now, yesterday and today there has been some discussion
1 with respect to the referendum in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you recall that
2 conversation that took place yesterday and today here?
3 A. I recall that the referendum was held. I recall what the forces
4 were and how they were distributed in that referendum.
5 Q. All right. Now, are you aware of a meeting that took place in
6 Livno where the whole issue was with respect to the question on the
7 referendum and what the concerns were of the Croats from
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Are you aware of that?
9 A. No, I'm not aware of that. I am not aware that the meeting was
10 held or who attended it.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. I didn't participate in that.
13 Q. All right. And I take it as you sit here today you have no
14 recollection that this -- that -- of a meeting by HDZ in BiH holding a
15 meeting with respect to the referendum, particularly on the language of
16 the referendum because the folks, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were
17 concerned that the question as posed - as posed - did not fully protect
18 their sovereign rights, you know, as a constitutive nation in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. If you don't know, don't recall, I'll move on.
20 A. I don't remember.
21 Q. Okay. And so I take it you're -- you're unaware of any other
22 meetings that took place with respect to this particular question?
23 A. Don't say "other meetings." Tell me what meetings specifically.
24 I'm telling you I don't know about this particular meeting. What are the
25 other meetings?
1 Q. Do you recall that the -- do you recall whether the Croats in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina had a particular problem with the way the question was
3 posed? Yes or no. If you don't recall, that's fine.
4 A. I don't remember their comments, but I do remember how the
5 question was put, and it was about this question that they expressed
6 themselves at the referendum. Whether everyone agreed or not on the way
7 the question was formulated, I don't think that's important. What's
8 important is what the question was and what the vote was.
9 Q. Well, that may be relevant or important to you, sir, but I put to
10 you that there was a whole discussion and there were a lot of concerns
11 within HDZ BiH concerning the language in the referendum, and in fact, as
12 a result of that, there were meetings with the European Union to see
13 whether the language itself guaranteed the sovereign principles of the
14 Croatian people within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you recall any of that or
15 do you know any of that happening?
16 A. I know that preparations were held for the referendum and what the
17 standpoint of the HDZ in Croatia and the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 would be. So both the HDZ of Croatia and the state institutions of
19 Croatia and the institutions of Herceg-Bosna had their standpoints.
20 Q. Yes, sir, but I -- as I recall your testimony yesterday, you
21 seemed to think that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not want to vote
22 for the referendum and therefore had to be sort of pressured by President
23 Tudjman. Now, maybe I'm oversimplifying your testimony. Is that your
25 A. That's your position in this case. It's quite correct that
1 President Tudjman exerted a certain political pressure, saying now is the
2 time for us to declare ourselves to be together with the Muslims and
3 against the Serbs.
4 Q. All right. And I take it it would be pointless for me to show you
5 a statement of principles of 18 March, 1992, regarding the constitutional
6 arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. I mean, given your answers, it seems
7 to me that you're without a clue as to meetings that took place with the
8 European Union concerning this particular question as a result of certain
9 anxieties expressed by Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina primarily within the
10 HDZ, matters that would -- which were discussed in Livno, a meeting of
11 which you know nothing about.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter did not hear the reply.
13 MR. KARNAVAS:
14 Q. You need to reply again. They didn't hear you.
15 A. Yes, I think that's correct.
16 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, if we could go to the Graz issue, because
17 this is somewhat interesting. It is your testimony, as I understand it,
18 that -- or your belief that some sort of a deal was made in Graz between
19 Boban and Karadzic. Or do I have it wrong?
20 A. No agreement was reached at that time, because the elements needed
21 for an agreement were not in place. I stated clearly who asked for the
22 meeting, who participated in it, and what the result was.
23 Q. All right.
24 A. And we have all that.
25 Q. And as I understand it, you had a meeting in Graz too at one
1 point, did you not, or am I wrong on that?
2 A. That's what I was referring to, my meeting, not Boban's.
3 Q. Your meeting. And what period are we talking about?
4 A. We're talking about the 26th of March, 1992.
5 Q. All right.
6 A. Sorry. Not the 26th of March but the 26th of February.
7 Q. All right. And is that the same meeting that supposedly Karadzic
8 and Boban reached this agreement, or is this -- was that a separate
10 A. These two meetings have no connection. This meeting was a
11 definite response to Karadzic and the Serbs in Bosnia that the Croats
12 would participate in the referendum.
13 Q. Okay. As far as another meeting in Graz, do you have any
14 information that might have taken place between Mr. Boban and Karadzic?
15 If you don't know, then I'll move on. If you do know, then I have
16 something to show you.
17 A. I don't know. I was not informed about the meeting between Boban
18 and Karadzic.
19 Q. And as you sit here today you're not suggesting that there was any
20 agreement, are you, sir? Since you don't know, we want to make sure that
21 the Trial Chamber is clear that as far as you know - as far as you know -
22 especially in light of the positions that you held and the information
23 that you were gathering, you are unaware of any agreement that was reached
24 between Karadzic and Boban in a place called Graz.
25 A. What was known about that meeting was that some of these elements
1 were mentioned at the session of the Defence and National Security Council
2 chaired by President Tudjman. Something was also published in the media,
3 but I did not know that the meeting was being held.
4 Q. Did you by any chance have a chance to look at the letter that was
5 sent by Mate Boban on the 17th of May, 1992? It was sort of a letter to
6 the diaspora. It was a public statement regarding this. Did you get a
7 chance to look at it?
8 A. No, I don't remember that letter, Boban's letter addressed to I
9 don't know who, the public or -- I don't know who.
10 Q. Okay. All right. Well, just -- just to be on the safe side, if
11 we could pull up 1D 00428. 00428, if we could just look at it.
12 And while this is being pulled up, if I could just ask a couple of
13 other questions. During that period of time, it seems to me that
14 everybody is quoting everybody in the sense that everybody is looking to
15 partner up. The Serbs are talking to the Muslims, the Serbs are talking
16 to the Croats, the Croats are talking to -- to the Serbs. It seems to me
17 everybody's trying to find a way out of the situation that everyone found
18 themselves in as a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Would that be
20 A. That's correct, yes. It's correct that everybody was looking for
21 a way out with the least losses and the least casualties and victims, to
22 resolve the overall crisis both in Bosnia and in Yugoslavia as a whole.
23 Q. Right. And at the Yugoslav level -- in fact, you know, you had
24 all sorts of meetings between the various presidents of the republics.
25 Sometimes it was two, sometimes it was three at a time, and they were
1 rotating from place to place, trying to -- to find a way out of this
2 solution -- out of this situation that was created with the break-up of
3 Yugoslavia or the breaking up of Yugoslavia.
4 A. I think we've answered that question.
5 Q. Okay. All right. Now, you've told us about your high political
6 positions that you've held. Can I ask you whether you participated in --
7 I mean, you told us that you did participate in Graz in a meeting, and
8 just to finish that, may I ask who organised that? Who sent you to that
10 A. President Tudjman received a request from Karadzic saying that he
11 would like to meet him. Him, let me stress. President Tudjman didn't
12 want to go to that meeting because he had other obligations, so he tasked
13 me and Professor Zvonko - help me, please, the last name escapes me -
14 Lerotic, that's right. Mr. Lerotic, as his advisor, to go to that
15 meeting. The meeting was held in Graz at the airport. On the Serb side
16 there was Mr. Koljevic --
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. -- and Mr. Karadzic.
19 Q. Now --
20 A. On our side, as I said, there was myself and Mr. Zvonko.
21 Q. Now, the purpose of that particular --
22 A. Their request was that we should tell them whether the Croats in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina would vote at the referendum or whether they would
24 express solidarity with the Serbs, who were going to boycott the
1 Q. All right. Now, as understand it, and we've heard testimony here,
2 and maybe you -- you would agree or disagree with it, the Croats in -- in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina were not interested in remaining within Yugoslavia. Is
4 that correct?
5 A. I don't think this is about Yugoslavia. I think we were
6 discussing an issue limited in time, and that was the issue of the
7 referendum. There's no point involving Yugoslavia in all this.
8 Q. Well, we know at some point the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their
9 position, their stated position at the time was that they didn't -- they
10 did not wish to have Bosnia-Herzegovina become independent; correct?
11 A. Judging by their moves, yes, they aimed at breaking up
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina very violently, very cruelly, with armed forces that
13 perpetrated horrendous crimes.
14 Q. Very well.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We shall have a
17 20-minute break and resume at ten minutes to 4.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 3.30 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 3.52 p.m.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
22 MR. KARNAVAS:
23 Q. Mr. Manolic, now, in your position of head of the security
24 services, surely you would have kept track of -- of all the folks that
25 were working in the -- in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian embassy located in
1 Zagreb; would that be correct?
2 A. No, I didn't.
3 Q. Would it surprise you that virtually a hundred per cent of those
4 folks were Muslim, representing Bosnia and Herzegovina? No Serbs and
5 certainly no Croats working there? Would that surprise you?
6 A. It doesn't surprise me because I don't know that, so it can't
7 surprise me.
8 Q. Okay. Well, do you know to what extent that particular embassy
9 was involved in, sort of, on the various issues concerning, say,
10 humanitarian aid, refugees, and so on and so forth? Do you know anything
11 about that in light of the various positions that you held during the
12 critical period of the indictment; 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994?
13 A. In Croatia there was a Ministry for Humanitarian Aid which handled
14 all of those issues. I personally didn't take part in it.
15 Q. I understand. But normally, in most embassies, usually you have
16 members of the other services working there, if you get my drift, you
17 know. So were you keeping abreast of who was coming and going and what
18 was happening within Croatia from that -- from that particular embassy
19 vis-a-vis Bosnia and Herzegovina?
20 A. Yes, but this is done similarly to things that are done in all
21 other services. So I don't see how this relates to what we're discussing
22 here and to your question. I don't see whether you're trying to
23 disqualify me or something else.
24 Q. I'm trying to figure out to what extent you were keeping abreast
25 of the events that were taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because
1 there were -- there was a line of questioning today where you seemed to
2 indicate that you really didn't know what was happening in Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina. And you being in that particular position, being informed,
4 and as you well know, all sorts of services working in and around Zagreb,
5 especially from Western countries, providing you with information and
6 exchanging information, and I'm wondering how is it that today you say you
7 didn't know a whole lot of what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
8 light of your position?
9 A. I think that you have an overactive imagination when you're
10 implying that there were all these services during this intelligence work.
11 There is no need for me to enter into --
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. -- this issue.
14 Q. Now, if we look at the transcripts - and we're not going to go
15 through them because I do need, Mr. President, two or three days to do
16 that, but in light of the time limitations we won't - but if we did go to
17 the transcripts, one could see that there are some geopolitical
18 discussions taking place. Would that be correct?
19 A. I can testify about all these sessions which I attended, and I can
20 tell you about what was discussed there. I had nothing to do with any
21 other material, any other events outside of these events and outside of
22 the interviews that I gave throughout that time.
23 Q. I understand, sir, but let me go back. If you go through the
24 transcripts, the presidential transcripts, and yesterday you told us that
25 you were unaware - unaware - that you were being tape recorded at the
1 time, at various points at time in history during that period there are
2 discussions about what the Americans want or think, what the British, the
3 French, contacts with Turkey, Iran, and so on and so forth, and what I'm
4 saying is there are a lot of geopolitical discussions taking place in
5 light of the circumstances. Would that be correct? Would I find that in
6 there, or is it in my overactive imagination?
7 A. I think that that's true, because you are now referring to the
8 other transcripts, not the ones from sessions which I attended. Your
9 imagination seems to be neglecting this.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, the counsel has
11 just asked you a question. During those meetings, were there any
12 discussions of a geopolitical nature? You may say either yes or no. This
13 is nothing to do with anyone's imagination. The question was very
15 Did the security council members address any geopolitical issues?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the transcripts
17 clearly reflect when each session was held and who attended it. I will
18 gladly answer any question pertaining to these transcripts, these sessions
19 which I attended.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but without talking about
21 the transcripts, from what you remember, as you were one of the
22 high-ranking members that was attending these meetings, do you recollect
23 whether you, President Tudjman, or anybody else addressed geopolitical
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I think that one can see that
1 in certain transcripts. Not in all of them, but you can see where
2 President Tudjman expressed his thoughts on the issue.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Karnavas, please
4 proceed as the answer is yes.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Now, before coming here today, you spent, at least by our
7 knowledge, a couple of sessions with the Prosecutor in going over these
8 transcripts. Could you please tell us about how many hours in total did
9 you spend with the Prosecution in going over the transcripts, because we
10 don't have a statement that you gave or -- other than -- we do have a
11 summary but no formal statement. So do you know how many hours,
12 approximately, you spent with the Prosecutor on these documents?
13 A. I didn't spend time with the Prosecutor. I had seen the
14 transcripts earlier, so there was no need for me to spend time with them
15 going over this. But the Prosecutor would be better placed to tell you
16 how many hours we discussed -- we spent discussing things.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but here again you're not
18 answering the question. It's not the Prosecutor who is the witness. You
19 are the witness in the witness stand. The Defence counsel is asking you
20 this question: Did you spend any time together with the Prosecutor to
21 read through these transcripts? So you can say either "We didn't discuss
22 them," or "We did discuss them"; and if you did discuss them, tell us how
23 much time you spent on reviewing these transcripts.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Given that I had these transcripts
25 available to me back in Zagreb, there was no need for me to discuss them
1 with the Prosecutor.
2 MR. KARNAVAS:
3 Q. Okay. Now, you say you had them with you. Is that your personal
4 archive or is that what the Prosecution provided you? In other words, did
5 they provide you a number of copies for you to look at or did you have
6 your own private archives? Because I understand in that part of the world
7 everybody has their own personal archive.
8 A. Yes. You're quite right. Everyone has their own personal archive
9 compiled in different ways and means, and it is quite a hotly debated
10 issue in Croatia, these transcripts.
11 Q. All right. By the way, did you share your archive with the
12 Prosecution? Were they curious in looking at it?
13 A. They didn't ask for my archive, nor did they ask for my notes.
14 What I gave them is this book, the book of my interviews, where you can
15 see my viewpoints throughout the period up until 1995.
16 Q. Okay. Now, we're going to get to your book in a second. I have
17 just a couple of questions on that. But would it be fair to say that, in
18 light of the period that has passed by, you're not testifying from your
19 independent memory of the events that took place in these particular
20 meetings but, rather, you're looking at the transcripts and it's based on
21 the transcripts that you're now testifying. Would that be correct?
22 A. Yes, that's correct. I gave my comments to the transcripts, and I
23 gave my explanations. If something was contained there, then to the best
24 of my recollection I would provide an explanation as to what was meant by
25 a certain statement.
1 Q. Right. And so in other words, the Prosecution, as they did
2 yesterday or the day before, would show you the transcript, and it's based
3 on reading the transcript that you're testifying as opposed to testifying
4 from an independent memory of the events.
5 A. Yes. I don't remember some transcripts, but now, after seeing
6 them on the screen, I remembered them. And it wasn't so difficult for me
7 to remember them because, after all, I was actively participating in these
9 Q. All right. Now, in your position do you have -- given your
10 position, the information that was coming your way, did you gather -- do
11 you recall any information regarding the Third World Relief Agency, which
12 as I understand it sort of a humanitarian agency designed -- part of their
13 function was to get money to finance, you know, part of the army of BiH
14 and maybe the Mujahedin? Do you recall that at all, any of that
15 information coming your way?
16 A. I did not have such information, but back when I was Prime
17 Minister, I did know that the Croatian government appealed to all Croatian
18 emigres to provide assistance following the aggression against Croatia.
19 Q. Yes, but this --
20 A. And to be fully precise, except for what was stated at the session
21 of the council or a session of the party leadership, about the events
22 involving Bosnia.
23 Q. All right. But the Third World Relief Agency is tied into Islamic
24 fundamentalists. They may not have necessarily been interested in having
25 the situation calm in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, they may have
1 been influencing radical elements.
2 A. There were such -- there was such information. It was discussed
3 both at the sessions of the Defence and National Security Council and at
4 various party meetings. Thus I was informed. I was informed that this
5 was assistance going through Turkey and Iran towards Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina. And they asked for cooperation with Croatian authorities in
7 this regard in order to enable this humanitarian aid to reach them. Now,
8 as to whether there was something else in addition to this humanitarian
9 aid, I don't know.
10 Q. Now, I recall reading at one point in time that Ambassador
11 Galbraith, who was the ambassador of the United States in Croatia, at one
12 point in time had approached President Tudjman to inform him that -- or
13 President Tudjman contacted Ambassador Galbraith - the other way round,
14 that is - informing him that shipments of arms were coming in or wanted to
15 be brought in from Iran to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he was asking for
16 clearance. These events took place -- this matter came out in the open,
17 as I understand it, before the US Congress.
18 Now, we do know that Iran was trying to be a player in this --
19 during this period of time. Do you know for a fact whether that sort of
20 information was coming through, that Iran was trying to get their foot in
21 and were trying to funnel weapons to the Muslims, especially the radical
22 Islamists, the Mujahedin, during that period of time? Do you have any
24 A. Yes. I did come across such information. I am aware of that. It
25 was discussed at the session of our council. The Prime Minister at the
1 time, Nikica Valentic, informed that he had met with the ambassador of
2 Iran, or some other envoy, who asked for certain things, namely that the
3 humanitarian aid be supplied. I don't think that the weapons were
4 discussed, only the humanitarian aid was that was supposed to be sent to
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina via Croatia.
6 Q. And as I understand it also, the US was promoting Turkey in a
7 sense that, you know, perhaps Croatia should be looking towards Turkey in
8 a way to influence Alija Izetbegovic, Turkey being a Muslim country, very
9 secular, and somewhat democratic. Is that -- am I correct in that?
10 A. Yes, you are correct. Those contacts were quite intense, and
11 there was also some substantial material substance to it between Croatia
12 and Turkey. And now that you've mentioned Galbraith, I can tell you that
13 these contacts were quite frequent, the contacts with President Tudjman,
14 especially as the situation deteriorated in certain areas. I can tell you
15 that during those times those contacts were almost daily.
16 Q. Now, as I understand it historically - historically - the Serbs
17 and the Croats have had their share of problems. They seem to not get
18 along at times. Would that be correct?
19 A. That's correct, and that continues to this day.
20 Q. Okay. Hopefully things will improve, but Bosnia-Herzegovina is
21 sort of sandwiched in between Serbia and Croatia; correct?
22 A. That's correct. And it couldn't receive any assistance without
23 the involvement of Croatia, and perhaps even Serbia, depending on the
24 situation as it existed at the time where convoys had to reach Bosnia and
1 Q. And as I understand it --
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, at the time wasn't
3 there an embargo on the supply of weapons?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that there was an embargo.
5 This is why I think, now that the gentleman has mentioned Galbraith and
6 President Tudjman, I don't think that they could have discussed this,
7 because the embargo was in place and it was supposed to be very firm.
8 That was the position of the international community. So anything that
9 sidestepped the embargo was considered to be smuggling, and no country
10 wanted to be part of that, at least not publicly.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. As I understand it, the policy, especially advocated by the US and
14 some other countries, was that there should be embargo, but I also
15 understand that there were other ways that the big powers were looking the
16 other way as they would allow arms to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
17 primarily, especially to help the Muslims. Isn't that a fact? I'm not
18 talking about some official policy. And this is what I'm talking about,
19 geopolitical issues.
20 A. All I could say to that question would amount to speculation, and
21 I told you that I don't want to do that. I just want to testify about
22 facts concerning which I'm fully certain.
23 I told you that there were frequent contacts and talks between
24 Galbraith, as the US president -- as US ambassador, and President Tudjman,
25 and that was true throughout the period.
1 Q. Okay. And getting back to Bosnia-Herzegovina being in the middle
2 of Serbia and Croatia, as I understand in reading all of these transcripts
3 and reading about President Tudjman, my take - and correct me if I'm wrong
4 - that President Tudjman's main concern when it came to
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina was having Serbia gobbling up Bosnia and Herzegovina
6 and then having the Serbian border right at the existing Croatian border.
7 And I'm oversimplifying it, but isn't that one of his major concerns?
8 A. There was a risk of that, that's true, but that wasn't the only
9 concern. This is why our policy and that of President Tudjman was to
10 preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina in a sense as a buffer zone, especially in
11 relation to Serbia.
12 Q. Exactly. And then within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 President Tudjman was rather firm in light of his understanding of history
14 and culture and the position that he -- the historic position that he
15 found himself that within Bosnia-Herzegovina the Croatian nation would
16 retain its national identity, and any formula reached within
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina would ensure the vital national interests of the
18 Croatian nation within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Am I not correct on that?
19 A. Not entirely correct. President Tudjman was dissatisfied with
20 this crescent border area or crescent border towards Croatia, but as you
21 know, he didn't change the borders. The borders remained intact, and he
22 opted for an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina the minute he went to vote at the
23 referendum. So therefore there was no gap there, at least not in the
24 formal legal sense, because the results of that referendum were complied
25 with. Quite another issue is the implementation of a certain policy at a
1 certain period in time.
2 Q. All right. Now, you say he was dissatisfied. Wouldn't it be fair
3 to say that if you look at any Balkan country, including Greece, because
4 we consider ourselves part of the Balkans, all of us have our own idea
5 where the historical borders of our country should be, and all of us are
6 dissatisfied with where they currently are. Isn't that a fact of life?
7 A. I think that your comment is quite correct. I have nothing to
8 take issue with.
9 Q. All right. Now, because we're dissatisfied that doesn't
10 necessarily mean that we wage war in order to push the borders, and isn't
11 that a fact that's what President Tudjman's position was, that he wasn't
12 waging war against Bosnia-Herzegovina and wasn't trying to necessarily
13 disturb the borders as they existed back then, though nonetheless he was
14 concerned about the Serbs pushing their way towards Croatia?
15 I beg your pardon?
16 A. Yes. I think that the statement that there is quite a big
17 difference between dissatisfaction and achievement of your goals, and
18 there's quite a big gap there, and it was never closed, and this is why
19 the borders towards Bosnia and Herzegovina are now what they used to be
21 Q. All right. Now, did you, sir, by any chance, participate in any
22 of the international conferences that took place during that period from,
23 say, 1992 -- or starting with March 18, 1992, the Cutileiro Plan, all the
24 way, say, to the Washington Agreement, which would have been around 30th
25 of March, 1994? Did you participate personally in any of those
2 A. I don't want you to accuse me of stating things falsely. That's
3 why I'm trying to remember all those events. I don't think I took part in
4 any of those international conferences unless they are the conferences
5 with the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, unless we take into account
6 contacts with Serbia at certain points in time. I think that would be my
7 answer to your question.
8 Q. Okay. Now, would it be fair to say that throughout this period,
9 though, from 1992 to 1994, one the main issues with respect to
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina that all three sides are having - Serbs, Croats,
11 Muslims - is how within this -- the geographical borders of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina they're going to find their own space in the sense of
13 preserving their vital national interest? Isn't that what's happening
14 throughout this period with all these negotiations, trying to find the
15 proper formula?
16 A. Yes, certainly a formula was being sought to satisfy those
17 interests. But we're not only talking about 1992. We're talking about
18 the time when the question of the disintegration of Yugoslavia cropped up
19 in the first place. Are we going to retain the borders of the autonomous
20 republics, which the Badinter Commission would ultimately confirm as state
21 borders. So that's when those problems arose in respect to
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then of course it touched upon all the
23 neighbouring states and the problem arose there too.
24 Q. Right. But with the break-up of Yugoslavia, if we just focus on
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, you have three constituent nations that are guaranteed
1 by the 1974 constitution. Correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, even though the Croats were 17.4 or 17.5 per cent of the
4 population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were not considered a minority but,
5 rather, a nation; correct?
6 A. It was considered to be the constituent element of that state
7 which was Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 Q. And there's a vast difference between being a constitutive element
9 and being a minority.
10 A. Yes, certainly there was a difference, and that was defined by the
11 constitution, whether you were a constituent element, which means on a
12 footing of equality with all the other elements, or were you a national
13 minority. And in the constitutions of all those republics, that is
14 repeated today too.
15 Q. Exactly. And -- and because of this -- this element, this aspect
16 within the constitution of 1974, with the break-up of Yugoslavia, now
17 within Bosnia-Herzegovina these three different nations are trying to
18 figure out how they're going to co-exist, sharing the same -- within this
19 geographical space called Bosnia-Herzegovina as it existed as a republic
20 within -- you know, prior to the break-up.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And you would agree with me, sir --
23 A. And also, because of that, all those who had the thesis of an
24 integral Bosnia-Herzegovina meant that set-up. Not a one-party set-up but
25 the internal set-up with equality of all those elements. And then
1 constitutionally to resolve the question of management in an
2 administration in certain areas, whether it would be proportionate to the
3 Muslims, Croats, Serbs population, and then their part in the government.
4 Q. All right. Now, you've told us that you didn't -- you don't
5 recall, at least, participating in any of these conferences. I take it
6 that would also go for the -- did you, by any chance, look at the
7 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, you know, in detail to see what exactly that plan
8 called for in Bosnia-Herzegovina? I'm sure you heard of it, but did you
9 at the time study it to see what exactly was the nature of the plan
11 A. Yes. Stoltenberg took part for a long period of time in seeking a
12 solution not only to Bosnia-Herzegovina but also a solution between Serbia
13 proper and Croatia. I don't remember his exact plan for
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment, but I do know that it existed, and I
15 also know that it was intensively put forward as a possible solution, one
16 possible solution for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. Yes. And if we look at the dates, because this one -- I believe
18 if we look at the dates and the events as they unfold, it seems to me -
19 and maybe I'm wrong, and perhaps you can correct me if you know - that the
20 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was the precursor -- the precursor to the Washington
21 Agreement that ultimately led to the formation of the federation within
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would that be correct?
23 A. I think that would be correct, yes.
24 Q. And yesterday you did bring up the issue of the Croatian Republic
25 of Bosnia-Herzegovina as opposed to the Croatian Community of -- it should
1 be Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and then you -- as opposed to the
2 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. Did you by any chance during that
3 period of time study or review any of the statutory decisions which
4 brought -- which created the community or the republic to see how they
5 were formulated, on what grounds, what basis?
6 A. For as long as a community of Herceg-Bosna existed as an
7 organisation which was there to resist the Serb aggression, there was
8 nothing contested in Croatian policy and amongst us. However, when it was
9 reformulated to create Herceg-Bosna as a state, that's when the
10 misunderstandings arose. I personally felt that you could not have a
11 state within a state, and Herceg-Bosna had all the elements of statehood,
12 and that is what led to the conflict with the Muslims or, rather, the
13 central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 Q. Okay. Now, you say a state within a state. And my question now
15 is did you at the time review the decisions, the legislation, the
16 jurisprudence, decisions, decrees, and what have you, and was it based on
17 your analysis that you came -- your own independent analysis as lawyer,
18 was it your independent conclusion that this was a state within a state,
19 or was this something that you opined later or you learned later or was
20 told to you later?
21 A. I did not read those decisions directly. I didn't study them.
22 But what you must understand politically is the elements that were exposed
23 towards the other side, that is to say the state, that Herceg-Bosna
24 pinpointed as being state elements.
25 Q. All right. Now, yesterday you indicated you us that you spent
1 very little time in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this critical period. Did I
2 hear you correctly?
3 A. Nothing except for a session in Sarajevo.
4 Q. What year --
5 A. In other situations I wasn't in Bosnia-Herzegovina or, rather,
7 Q. Well, we're going to talk about the country Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 When you were in Sarajevo, when was this? What period? Do you remember,
9 about what year?
10 A. That was still 1990, perhaps the beginning of 1991, when those
11 relationships, politically speaking, were very good or fairly good between
12 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic specifically, and the
13 Presidency of Croatia with President Tudjman at its head. So that was
14 that period.
15 Q. All right. Now, I'm sure you were aware back then, as you are
16 today, that at some point Sarajevo came under siege.
17 A. Yes, but I wasn't in Sarajevo then when it was under siege.
18 Q. Right. But we could all see it on CNN. So I mean, that's not a
20 A. Well, nobody's denying that.
21 Q. Right.
22 A. So there is no dilemma, you're quite right.
23 Q. We're going step-by-step. Now, we -- we had another witness here,
24 Mr. Kljuic, and we questioned him a little bit about this period of time,
25 and he was able to tell us that in essence Sarajevo, where the government
1 was, was unable to provide for the rest of the country because it was
2 under siege and, therefore, the communities outside of Sarajevo had to
3 fend for themselves. Would you have any -- would you disagree with that?
4 MR. SCOTT: I'm going to object, Your Honour. I don't think it's
5 proper to talk to the witness about what some other witness has testified.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Based on what grounds, Your Honour? Can I have a
8 MR. SCOTT: I think it is generally not proper to ask this witness
9 to talk -- comment on what another witness has said. He can ask the
10 question, What did you think the state of affairs was, whether --
11 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll rephrase, Your Honour. I'll rephrase. I'll
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, that question was
14 already asked on several occasions, because it has to do with Defence
15 strategy and, as such, the Defence considers that it should ask the
16 question, whether they're right or wrong. Now, if the witness responds to
17 a question about Sarajevo under siege without referring to Mr. Kljuic, the
18 Defence can say, to the best of his knowledge, does the witness know that
19 Sarajevo was under siege? He can say yes or no, and what were the
20 consequences of that situation.
21 So this is a politician par excellence, and he had important
22 responsibilities, and I'm sure he heard about Sarajevo.
23 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, just let me be clear. Just let me be
24 clear on my position. I'm not saying he can't be asked about Sarajevo but
25 I don't think it should be proper to be couched in terms of what some
1 other witness said. Just ask Mr. Manolic directly.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm willing to rephrase, Your Honour, but I don't
3 want to concede the point because I am entitled to either get a yes or no.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Restate your question,
7 Mr. Karnavas.
8 MR. KARNAVAS:
9 Q. Now, sir, you told us you were in Sarajevo once around the period
10 of 1990. Can you tell us whether the central bank was working within
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Say 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, do you know whether the
12 central bank was working? Yes or no.
13 A. Well, I can't tell you that, because my presence in Sarajevo was
14 at a meeting. We went there and went back. That's all I did. I didn't
15 -- I wasn't involved in the functioning of the system in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But you expanded your question to include 1995 now,
17 is that what you did?
18 Q. No, I didn't say 1995.
19 A. Anyway, the first question you asked, the first question you asked
20 me, whether I knew that Sarajevo was under siege, yes, I do know that, or
21 I did know that.
22 Q. Okay. We're going to go step-by-step because of the objection
23 raised by the Prosecutor. You're telling us, at least as I understand it,
24 because you weren't in Sarajevo, that you don't know whether the central
25 bank was functioning in 1992, 1993, 1994.
1 A. I can't really testify about that. I didn't enter into any of
3 Q. Can you testify what services -- can you testify what services the
4 government, the state government of BiH, was able to provide to all of its
5 citizens, everywhere that is, within Bosnia-Herzegovina during the period
6 of 1992, 1993, 1994?
7 A. I can't answer that either.
8 Q. Very well.
9 A. If you're asking me about 1990 and 1991, about -- until the
10 aggression, those services functioned, because we communicated with them
11 on a regular basis.
12 Q. I understand. But I'm -- I'm interested in 1992, 1993, 1994,
13 especially 1994, because you've indicated there was a state within a
14 state, and now I'm trying to get you to tell us to what extent you knew
15 what this state within a state was doing, how it operated, and so first I
16 want to start with the state itself, BiH, and if you could tell us what
17 services it was able to deliver to its citizens, be there having a
18 currency, being able to pay the pensions, and so on and so forth.
19 Providing security, ensuring that they have a national defence against any
20 aggressors. So can you tell us with any degree of certainty that you know
21 for a fact whether the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina was able to provide to
22 all of its citizens in all of its communities the services that a normal
23 state under normal circumstances would be able to provide?
24 MR. SCOTT: Hasn't the witness said several times no?
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Am I allowed --
1 MR. SCOTT: Hasn't he answered the question several times now?
2 MR. KARNAVAS: It goes to the issue, Your Honour. It goes to the
3 issue. Why is the Prosecutor afraid of the truth?
4 MR. SCOTT: I'm not afraid of the truth, but when we talk about
5 limited time -- when we talk about limited time, Mr. President --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you are objecting and
7 we're wasting time. On line 16, the witness said as follows, that from
8 1990 to 1991 the services functioned up until the aggression.
9 MR. SCOTT: And --
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So it would appear that after
11 1991 they no longer functioned. So the question that should now be asked,
12 Mr. Manolic, is this: You said -- I'm going to ask it. You said that on
13 the basis of your knowledge 1990, 1991 everything was functioning
14 properly. There were relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, after 1991, were there
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After 1991, problems started
19 arising. But I'd like to link up --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which problems?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'd like to answer the question
22 asked by the Defence, and that is about the siege of Sarajevo. I think
23 that I can agree with what you quoted Kljuic as having said, that it was
24 due to that siege by Belgrade that the system could not have functioned,
25 the system in Bosnia-Herzegovina could not have functioned due to that.
1 So Kljuic provided an answer, the one you quoted. Otherwise, I wouldn't
2 know. But I completely agree with what was said by him, the answer you
3 quoted as being Kljuic's.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
5 MR. SCOTT: That was --
6 MR. KARNAVAS: May I --
7 MR. SCOTT: No, wait a minute.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: First I want --
9 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
11 MR. SCOTT: That was exactly my objection earlier, and the witness
12 just put it extremely well: He didn't have independent knowledge, but
13 he's saying, If you say Mr. Kljuic said that, I'll agree with that. And
14 that's exactly the reason I objected ten minutes ago in putting a question
15 to the witness about what some other witness said, and now we've seen the
16 fruit -- we've seen the fruit of --
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, fine, right. But the
19 question that should now follow is this: What allows him to say what he's
20 just said.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There we have it.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So, Mr. Scott, you keep getting
25 up, but allow the Defence counsel to do his job professionally. He is
1 straight away going to follow on from that because, like you, he's a
2 professional and he knows what he's just said is not sufficient. He can't
3 rely on what Mr. Kljuic said. The witness is here to testify, so we're
4 going to have follow-up questions, because we're among professionals after
6 Mr. Ibrisimovic.
7 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
8 should just like to respond to Mr. Scott. Your instructions allow us to
9 present the testimony of other witnesses to -- other people testifying to
10 witnesses in court.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: I want to thank my colleague. It's gone off the
12 page, but at some point I believe Mr. Manolic said the siege of Belgrade.
13 It should be corrected to siege of Sarajevo. All right.
14 THE INTERPRETER: By Belgrade, the witness said, interpreter's
16 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. I'll move on.
17 Q. You've just agreed with what Mr. Kljuic told us. Of course, prior
18 to that you told us you hadn't been to Sarajevo, weren't aware. So my
19 next follow-up question is: What leads you to that conclusion or how are
20 you able to validate what Mr. Kljuic is telling us, told us under oath?
21 Is that based on personal knowledge?
22 A. That is based on overall knowledge and information that existed.
23 First of all, that Sarajevo was under siege, facing a blockade, and second
24 that it couldn't function as a state ruled by law.
25 Q. And I take it you, having grown up in the former Yugoslavia,
1 obviously must have been aware that at least the central government, many
2 of the ministries are in Sarajevo as opposed to, say, Tuzla, Banja Luka,
3 Brcko, Doboj, Mostar, and so on and so forth; right?
4 A. I think that that would be right, yes, that they were in Sarajevo.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. Whether all of them, I can't claim.
7 Q. All right. Do you know, by any chance, what -- we talked about it
8 before, about the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. Do you know exactly what that
9 called for? The constitutional agreement.
10 A. I couldn't give you the details of it now. The text does exist
11 somewhere, and please, if you have the text, show it to me and I'll give
12 you my comments on it.
13 Q. Okay. And that might be -- that might be a good idea to do that
14 at this point in time. I have to apologise for not having a translation,
15 I'm told, but the number -- and I'll just read it for you. We'll read it
16 slowly. The number is 1D 00526. And I understand that you understand a
17 little bit of English, and you can read English; right?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Okay. You're going to go that route. All right. You seem to be
20 answering some of my questions before you get the translation. That's why
21 I'm suggesting that perhaps you know a little bit of English.
22 A. I learnt four foreign languages, but unfortunately, I can't really
23 use any of them.
24 Q. If we could -- I'm just going to look, and if we could move -- go
25 on to the following page, please, on 286. I just want to look at just a
1 couple of points. Go to 1D 27-
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm sorry. 1D 270012 at the bottom of the page.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, we're going to
5 have to work with the ELMO because the registrar has just informed me that
6 there's a problem with e-court.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: I prefer the ELMO myself anyway, Your Honour. And
8 I'll have one more to look at. Hold on to this for a second.
9 Q. Okay. We're just -- if we look at the bottom of the page, sir, it
10 says the undersigned are A. Izetbegovic, R. Karadzic, M. Boban,
11 M. Bulatovic, S. Milosevic, and F. Tudjman, and as witnesses
12 T. Stoltenberg and D. Owen. That's at the bottom. I'm sure there's not a
13 name there that you are unfamiliar with. And by the way, this document,
14 as I understand it, was generated on 20 September, 1993.
15 The first part it says, and I'll go slowly because the translators
16 need to help us out here: "The Constitutional Agreement of the Union of
17 Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina is set out in Appendix 1 hereto. The
18 three parties agree that it shall enter into force one week of the
19 Security Council has taken into accounts the present Agreement, has
20 confirmed that the Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue
21 as a member of the United Nations as specified in the Security Council
22 Resolution 859 (1993) and has authorised United Nations support for the
23 implementation of the present Agreement."
24 Now, if we go on to the next page that I have given Madam Usher,
25 and this would be -- it looks like Appendix 1, it's on page 290 of this
1 particular document. I'm sorry, I hope I've -- just bear with me, sir,
2 and I apologise for not having this translated.
3 Page 290. Okay. It says here -- it's titled "Constitutional
4 Agreement of the Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
5 "Article 1: The Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
6 composed of three constituent republics and encompasses three constituent
7 peoples: the Muslims, Serbs and Croats, as well as a group of other
8 peoples. The Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a
9 member state of the United Nations, and as a member state it shall apply
10 for membership of other organisations of the United Nations system."
11 Now, this was the constitutional agreement that appears to have
12 been agreed upon at the -- as part of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. You
13 would agree with me, sir, that at least the constitutional agreement that
14 is an appendix to this plan calls for -- for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be
15 composed of three constituent republics, does it not?
16 A. Well, that's what I was advocating throughout this period. I know
17 about it from the political talks that this proposal was on the table,
18 their proposal that that's how Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised.
19 Q. Right. And the fact that the -- that the Stoltenberg -- the
20 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan called for three republics within
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is not calling for having a state within a state.
22 There's a big difference between a state within a state and having
23 republics as it's called for in this particular agreement. Would you not
24 agree with me there?
25 A. That's not the way I understood it, that there would be three
1 states. There would be three constituent elements making up
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and based on those constituent elements, the
3 government should be organised, both the central government at the level
4 of Sarajevo and the government in individual parts of the Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina that was to be organised, but not three states. That's not
6 how I understood it.
7 Q. Right. Exactly. And when you say the three different parts,
8 that's what we're talking about, the three different republics, because it
9 says here, and I repeat again: "The Union of Republics of Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina is composed of three constituent republics and encompasses
11 three constituent peoples ..."
12 So you would have the state, and then within the state you would
13 have these three republics --
14 A. I think there's a mistake in the translation. It's not three
15 constituent states but three constituent elements.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. The elements refer to the ethnic groups on the territory of
19 Q. All right. And I don't know if there is a mistake in the
20 translation, but it's not calling for states, it's calling for republics,
21 three constituent republics within Bosnia and Herzegovina. And you would
22 agree with me that what ultimately evolves, based on the Washington
23 Agreement, is a Bosnia-Herzegovina with two different republics that are
24 called entities.
25 A. I never heard that the Stoltenberg agreement advocated three
1 republics on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have to understand
2 what the constituent elements are. They are ethnic groups. And it's not
3 easy to put them within borders so as to draw the three, the borders of
4 that state.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, would you take a
6 look at page 291, Article 2 of that page. Could we have that page placed
7 on the screen, on the ELMO. There we have it. Madam Usher, could you see
8 to that, please.
9 And take a look at Article 2 of page 291. I'm afraid I can't see
10 it on my screen.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see it but it's a little
12 faint. Article 2, yes. It's in English again.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, there we have it. And
14 Article 2 states as follows: "Each of the constituent republics shall
15 adopt its own constitution ..."
16 How do you interpret that article?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if it says "republics," then I
18 don't think that would be correct, because we never accepted republics.
19 You can have it translated, you can have the original of the agreement,
20 and then I can comment, but I can't comment on the basis of this.
21 MR. KARNAVAS:
22 Q. Okay. Now, sir, what if I were to tell you that this is a correct
23 translation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan? Is it possible that simply you
24 were not aware of the details of the plan? Is that not possible?
25 A. I said at the outset that I was not familiar with the text of the
1 agreement. I said that. But in political discussions, there was no
2 mention of creating states on that territory. All that was spoken about
3 were the constituent elements on the basis of which Bosnia and Herzegovina
4 could be built up. So this is the only source of confusion, whether the
5 constituent elements are states or not.
6 Q. All right. Let's --
7 A. I accept the agreement entirely provided that these are
8 constituent elements and not states.
9 Q. If we can -- let me clear up one thing. There is a difference
10 between a state and a republic. So -- I mean, there's a difference, and
11 that's where perhaps we have this misunderstanding, because if we go back
12 to -- if we go back to page 290 -- if we go back to page 290 and we look
13 at Article 1 in the constitution, and I'll read it again, and I'll read it
14 very slowly, it says: "The Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 is composed of three constituent republics and encompasses three
16 constituent peoples ..."
17 A. No. If the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina is mentioned, then this
18 presupposes a central government, and these republics would then be
19 parts --
20 Q. Absolutely.
21 A. -- of that unitary state.
22 Q. I don't want to use the term "unitary state," but I think you got
23 it right. We're talking about a state. Within the state there are three
24 different republics. And as His Honour correctly pointed out, all three
25 republics are to have their own constitution, which obviously would be
1 subordinate to the state constitution.
2 Now, from this exchange that we're having, it appears to me, sir,
3 and I might be wrong, that you were not familiar back then, or even today,
4 with the contents, the actual agreement that was reached, or the plan of
5 the -- the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. Would I be correct on that?
6 A. I think you are correct that there was a plan, but as for the
7 contents of the plan, I don't think you're right, because even if the Serb
8 side were to accept it, and perhaps the Croatian side as well, I doubt
9 that the Bosnian side, with Izetbegovic at its head, accepted it. I doubt
10 that. That's why I think it was never fully adopted. It could not be
11 implemented. It was not viable, and you will correct me if I'm wrong.
12 Q. Let's take it step-by-step. First of all, you're not disputing
13 that there was a plan; correct? That is not in dispute?
14 A. Correct. No one disputes that Stoltenberg's plan existed.
15 Q. Now, you know and I know that Izetbegovic would say one thing in
16 the morning and in the afternoon would turn around and 180 degrees say
17 something else.
18 MR. SCOTT: Objection, Your Honour.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm asking the question, Your Honour.
20 MR. SCOTT: We don't know that, but he says, "I know and you
22 MR. KARNAVAS: I do know. I do know from reading all the
23 documents. It's very clear. It's very clear from the statements.
24 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, it's not for Mr. Karnavas to testify and
25 provide evidence in this case.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll rephrase the question. I'll rephrase the
3 MR. SCOTT: Further, Your Honour, while I'm on my feet, and I'm
4 sorry, because perhaps I've on my feet too much this afternoon, and I'm
5 sorry if the Court feels that way, but this witness said 20 minutes ago he
6 didn't know the details of this agreement and Mr. Karnavas just continues
7 to argue him into a position when the witness said 20 minutes ago, half an
8 hour ago, I don't know about this agreement; yes, I know there was a plan;
9 I don't know the terms of it. And it's made very clear that he doesn't,
10 so why do we keep putting these questions to this witness?
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, it's important --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: -- to his testimony that there was a state within a
14 state. The gentleman indicated that he did not have a problem with the
15 Community of Herceg-Bosna. Then he characterised that there was a state
16 within a state. Here I'm showing the precursor to the Washington
17 Agreement is a plan that calls for three republics, and obviously it
18 appears that the gentleman, who was busy with other affairs, wasn't aware
19 of certain details.
20 MR. SCOTT: Precisely.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Which -- which then leads -- which then goes to the
22 credibility of his testimony that there was a state within a state.
23 That's my whole point. He's commenting based on speculation.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We have already
25 spent 20 minutes talking about this. The witness has told us that he had
1 heard of a Stoltenberg-Owen Plan, and he discovers that plans had been
2 established to create three constituent republics. This is what -- where
3 we stand at the moment. Please proceed.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Q. Sir, you brought up Izetbegovic, and I just want to ask you, based
6 on the discussions that took place while you were present, and we have the
7 presidential transcripts, and correct me if I'm wrong, there appears to be
8 instances where there are complaints by various people, including
9 President Tudjman, that Izetbegovic would agree to one thing and then
10 later on would change his mind. And I'm not saying there's anything wrong
11 with that, but that was the nature of the way he did business during those
12 days, because obviously difficult decisions had to be made.
13 A. I don't think you are right.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. Because you're entering into what President Izetbegovic's mind
16 processes were. I don't think this is proper, and I think it will be hard
17 to arrive at a solution in this way. But please don't see me as the only
18 witness to this subject matter. You will probably have other witnesses,
19 and you need not clarify everything through me. I may be able to clarify
20 up to a point, but I cannot clarify further --
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. -- as for this particular agreement.
23 Q. All right. But just to be clear on this point, on this agreement,
24 today it would appear that you're -- that you're hearing the terms of the
25 agreement for the very first time.
1 A. The provisions, yes. But I know in political discourse that there
2 was a plan under consideration by various international representatives
3 seeking for a solution, but as far as I know, it was not adopted. It was
4 not actually adopted. It remained hanging in the air, and it was buried
5 with the Washington Agreement.
6 Q. All right. Because when the Washington Agreement came in, they
7 agreed to two republics within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We can
8 call them entities, but in essence it called for two republics, and we see
9 that -- we see that with -- the Washington Agreement calls for the
10 creation of the federation, and then at Dayton we have Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, a state within two republics. Three constitutions, plus a
12 district that later on gets resolved as a result of final award, and I'm
13 talking about Brcko.
14 A. But you are a lawyer and you understand that these are not three
15 republics but two republics now. But this again is not the solution
16 because, after that, the Dayton Accords followed, and they set things up a
17 little bit differently than the Washington Agreement did. But this
18 problem actually still exists. It's still awaiting its solution on the
19 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 Q. We're not going to resolve that issue but I think we've both
21 established the points that we wanted to.
22 A word was introduced earlier, "catalyst," and if I can pick up on
23 that word a little bit. It seems to me when this book was written, which
24 was 1995, by that point you and President Tudjman had parted company.
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. By that point --
3 A. At that time we had already parted company politically.
4 Q. Exactly. In fact, you were with Mr. Mesic. You and Mesic went
5 one way; correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. And in fact, as I understand it, and there's some -- it's unclear,
8 but at some point when you moved -- when you left the security services
9 and you went over as, I believe, the head of -- the president of the Upper
10 Chamber, that was considered as -- let me finish the question, sir. Sir,
11 let me finish the question.
12 A. You are --
13 Q. Sir, let me finish the question. Let me finish the --
14 A. You're forgetting that after that I was the Speaker of the House
15 of Counties in the parliament.
16 Q. Sir, sir, you just told us that you don't speak English. You --
17 now, you obviously were not telling us the truth before because you're
18 understanding me without the translation. So "cekaj," step-by-step.
19 We're going to get there.
20 Now, some have considered that when you went to become the
21 president of the Upper House, that was considered a demotion, that you
22 were demoted.
23 A. But that's just gossip. That's various opinions.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
25 A. To leave the office of chief of a presidential office and become
1 the Speaker of a legislative body, the House of Counties, that's something
2 different. So make up your mind. Don't repeat the gossip of the streets
3 whether this was a demotion for me or not.
4 Q. All right. And it was while you were holding that position that
5 the rift between you and Tudjman grew bigger and bigger. Isn't that
7 A. What office? What duty? Please be precise.
8 Q. Sir, one of the main problems that you had with President Tudjman
9 was the fact that he preferred or he claimed that one of his best
10 ministers was Susak and not Manolic, and isn't it a fact that that caused
11 you a great deal of anger and jealousy?
12 A. I think this is gossip again.
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. This is something that people gossiped about on the street. Give
15 me one document about this.
16 Q. And in fact -- and in fact, Susak had been considered someone from
17 the diaspora who was perhaps tied in with an Ustasha background, versus
18 you, someone who had fought with the partisans, did your time through
19 Tito, worked your way through the ranks, and perhaps that was one of the
20 reasons why there was this --
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, what is the
22 relevance of the question here?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that has nothing to do with
24 this trial and these proceedings. My relations with Susak involved
25 misunderstandings in the political arena.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: The whole -- my whole line of questioning, Your
2 Honour - and this is the end of it - the relevance is that obviously he
3 has some political scores to settle. There is clear indication that he
4 and Susak did not get along, for a variety of reasons, including the fact
5 that he had been pushed aside, being one of the founding fathers of the
6 HDZ. And I think this is why the gentleman perhaps may be embellishing in
7 some of his testimony. So that was the relevance of the question, Your
8 Honour. It goes to his credibility and motive to fabricate.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, it seems that at
10 some point in time you were working in the office and in charge of
11 intelligence matters. You left this position to become the president of
12 the Upper House. According to you, was this a promotion? Were you being
13 demoted, or were you being pushed aside, or was it a standard political
14 course to follow?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I was promoted to a higher
16 office in the state structure seen as a whole. When I spoke about it to
17 President Tudjman, whether I would accept this office or not, I said to
18 him, "I'm holding this office now, chief of your office. I am now your
19 clerk." When I become the president of a legislative house, I will become
20 a political personage whose survival depends on elections and on being
21 elected by the deputies in the parliament. My position therefore becomes
22 politically freer and more stable, unlike the administrative office I had
23 held before as chief of the president's office.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Does this mean that when you
25 were president, the president of the Upper House, you had been elected by
1 the members of the Upper House to become president?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was elected. But I also have
3 to say for the sake of objectivity that it was not against President
4 Tudjman's will, and that's very important to mention.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, we have five
6 minutes left, because it's time.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
8 One minute left, interpreter's correction.
9 MR. KARNAVAS:
10 Q. Sir, in your book - and I'm not going to cover it - I believe my
11 colleague may --
12 A. We can read it.
13 Q. Well --
14 A. Or you can take it home over the holidays and read it.
15 Q. Yes. But in your book, and there is one section - perhaps my
16 colleague will deal with it tomorrow - there's one section where you
17 indicate, early on, at least, when you and President Tudjman are still in
18 a very friendly relationship and very close to him, you're talking about
19 criticism that is being lodged against the HDZ, and you're sort of
20 defending the policies of the HDZ, particularly President Tudjman in his
21 -- in his approach. Would that be correct? We will find -- that we will
22 find interviews that you give to that --
23 A. That's quite correct, yes.
24 Q. All right.
25 A. Even today I defend President Tudjman from various forms of libel.
1 I do not permit things to be said against a man who has political merit,
2 but I'm also critical when I see reason to be, and the consequences of
3 that can be seen here today, the things that I'm critical of.
4 Q. And of course you became extremely critical of Mr. Tudjman after
5 you were tossed out of the party, you and Mesic. You were dismissed from
6 the HDZ, were you not?
7 A. You misunderstand things again. President Mesic was not expelled;
8 I was expelled.
9 Q. We're talking about you.
10 A. Because of things I said to journalists and because of standpoints
11 that I voiced which were not in accordance with the standpoints of the
12 president. And you can get the materials from the disciplinary court
13 which decided to expel me from the HDZ.
14 Q. And lastly, I mean, it's obvious -- it's obvious that one of the
15 reasons that you were expelled, because you are a man of principle and you
16 speak your mind, and you're not afraid to speak in public, if necessary,
17 and even be critical to the president, and that's one of the reasons you
18 had this friction with Tudjman; correct?
19 A. You are now bringing me not into a political dilemma but a moral
20 dilemma. I have to tell you that even after my expulsion I was on good
21 terms with the president, and even when I established a new party our
22 human relations were good. Now you're trying to ascribe to me personal
23 reasons for a conflict with Mr. Susak, and that is not correct either. I
24 visited Mr. Susak in Canada when he was there so that our interpersonal
25 relations remained quite correct, but politically we were [Realtime
1 transcript read in error "were not"] in a conflict.
2 Q. Sir, I'm not talking about Susak, I'm talking about Tudjman, and
3 what I'm trying to suggest is you being a -- "cekaj." You being a man of
4 principle, are not afraid of speaking your mind. Would that be a correct
6 A. I think you have described me well.
7 Q. Exactly. Exactly. Exactly.
8 A. In that part, anyway.
9 Q. And so -- and so if we went through the transcripts, which I
10 didn't have time, for two or three days, to go through with you, we would
11 be able to find in the transcripts exactly what you're telling us, that
12 you're standing -- what President Tudjman is doing, what Susak is doing,
13 and you standing up voicing your principal concerns. We would be able to
14 find that in the transcripts that the Prosecution went over with you and
15 they're about to --
16 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Karnavas. Mr. Karnavas, I simply would like
17 to say there is a small -- small mistake in one of the sentences. I
18 believe anyway it is important. When the witness actually answered to
19 your question about his relationship with Mr. Susak, then - I believe it
20 is page 161 and line 2 - the translation went on that "Our interpersonal
21 relations remained quite correct but politically we were not in a
22 conflict." I believe that, of course, the intention was that -- that
23 sentence, the second half of the sentence should be interpreted that
24 "politically we were in a conflict."
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. But what -- I guess the point I'm trying to make is you're such a
2 man of principle that --
3 A. Yes. I think that's correct, that this was a political conflict,
4 not an interpersonal one, which is what you're implying.
5 Q. Okay. I'm just trying to get out of here as quickly as possible,
6 and what I'm implying is you speak your mind no matter where you are, and
7 you were in -- you were in those meetings, not knowing that you were being
8 tape recorded, and obviously you were speaking your mind at the time that
9 we see here in these transcripts, in the presidential transcripts;
10 correct? You weren't holding back, in other words.
11 A. Yes. Sometimes I would keep quiet, just like people do in many
12 sessions. They keep quiet. I didn't present in each and every session my
14 Q. But -- but when it came to the division of Bosnia, as you have
15 claimed, that Tudjman was saying that he wanted to annex parts of Bosnia
16 or carve it up and what have you, I suspect that if President Tudjman had
17 made and voiced such -- such concerns or such policies you, with your
18 conscience, you being the principled man that you are, not knowing that
19 you were being tape recorded, you would have spoken up and we would have
20 seen this in the transcripts; right?
21 A. You haven't seen this anywhere, did you, namely that President
22 Tudjman wanted to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina. You didn't find this
23 formulated anywhere, did you? Because if you do, I'll thank you for that.
24 President Tudjman was quite reasonable in the political sense. He
25 was an historian. He had broad views of social problems. So he never
1 made such mistakes. But he had some pragmatic mistakes, and if due to
2 such pragmatic -- and it is due to such pragmatic mistakes and their
3 consequences that we find ourselves here today.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: I have no further questions. I have no further
6 cross-examination, and I thank you very much, Mr. Manolic. I hope I
7 didn't disturb you too much with my questioning. Obviously you're a
8 formidable individual to cross-examine. Thank you.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But you were quite unpleasant.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Praljak, it is already
11 -- what would you like to say?
12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The witness said that the
13 pragmatic policy of President Tudjman is what led to us sitting here
14 today. Once again, he is pointing to a direct link between the pragmatic
15 policy and the guilt of the six people who are accused here. Which policy
16 is it? Which events are these? We haven't heard that even though the
17 gentleman, the witness, accused us once again, all six of us.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't accuse you, Praljak.
19 Therefore, do not put words into my mouth. You know very well how the
20 situation unfolded in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You know
21 that I was opposed to that. And I'm sure that you will be able to clarify
22 further this question with other witnesses.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Tomorrow, according
24 to my calculation, there are four Defence counsel who wish to take the
25 floor tomorrow. We have four hours left tomorrow. So you can share the
1 time between you. We shall reconvene tomorrow morning at 9.00.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.25 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 6th day of July,
4 2006, at 9.00 a.m.