1 Wednesday, 7 May 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours; good afternoon
8 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-74-T,
9 the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al. Thank you, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Today is Wednesday, 7th of May. Good afternoon to the
12 Prosecution, to the Defence counsel, to the accused, and to all the
13 people assisting us in our work.
14 For your information, Mr. Karnavas, you used one hour, 19
15 minutes, so you can add up, and you'll see how much time you have left.
16 Let's have the witness in.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 WITNESS: MOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. We are
21 going to resume the examination-in-chief. You have the floor.
22 You may proceed, Mr. Karnavas.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your
24 Honours and everyone in and around the courtroom.
25 Examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]
1 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul. Welcome back. I trust you had a
2 good evening.
3 Now, yesterday when we left off, I'd asked you a question about
4 the concept of confederation, and it was at that point when you were just
5 about to finish your answer when we had to stop for the day. We will
6 discuss in great detail this concept, but with respect to the concept of
7 confederation, did President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic ever sign
8 any agreements concerning that?
9 A. President Tudjman, President Izetbegovic signed a mutual
10 agreement on the confederation. I believe that was on the 14th of
11 September, 1993. The decision was taken that the agreement would be kept
12 secret in a way. It was never made public. Each of the presidents kept
13 a copy, and there was another one kept at the mission of the Republic of
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. Needless to say, I am well aware of the existence of that
17 agreement because I was involved in preparing it, and I actually
18 physically drafted it myself.
19 Q. All right. Now, we'll discuss that later on towards the end of
20 your testimony here today, but just to round off this topic, are you
21 aware whether President Izetbegovic ever signed any other agreements with
22 others that would impact or had anything to do with the agreement that
23 you've just indicated to us?
24 A. Yes. A mere two days later, President Izetbegovic signed an
25 agreement with Mr. Karadzic. It was a similar agreement, but it wasn't
1 about a confederation. It was about creating republics within the union.
2 The most noteworthy feature of that agreement was this: First of all,
3 Izetbegovic took this step without ever mentioning it to the Croatian
4 side, or at least not to President Tudjman.
5 Secondly, the substance of the agreement itself. What is
6 noteworthy is the fact that President Izetbegovic subscribed to the
7 possibility that after two years the Serbs would be allowed to leave the
8 union. The possibility, in other words, for Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 break up.
10 Q. All right. And we're going to get to that, as well, but I just
11 want to make sure I'm crystal clear here and that the Judges understand
12 this. What you're telling us is this: That the second agreement between
13 Izetbegovic, two days later that is, and the Serbs called for the
14 possibility of an eventual carving up of Bosnia-Herzegovina two years
15 after that agreement; is that correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Now, finally before we get into the documents, and when we do so
18 we'll be going through them rather quickly, but finally were you ever
19 present when Izetbegovic offered any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
20 to anyone else, because it would seem to me that based on this agreement
21 he's offering the Serbs a piece of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did he ever
22 offer any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to anyone else and, if so,
23 to whom?
24 A. I was present in Geneva
25 before this when President Izetbegovic made a direct proposal to
1 President Tudjman for Western Herzegovina to be annexed by Croatia
2 Q. All right.
3 A. This was during a recess in the Geneva negotiations. I was with
4 President Tudjman, and we approached President Izetbegovic. This was
5 something that often happened during recesses in negotiations.
6 At a meeting that had just taken place, there had been very
7 unpleasant conversation where the Bosniak side with President Izetbegovic
8 and the Serbs clashed. I think it was purely human reasons that
9 motivated or pushed Tudjman to approach Izetbegovic during that recess.
10 I can't remember specifically who was with President Izetbegovic. I do
11 believe that Mr. Miles Raguz was also with him at the time.
12 They talked and President Izetbegovic made a proposal in no
13 uncertain terms about what I just said, for Western Herzegovina to secede
14 from Bosnia and Herzegovina and join Croatia
15 the precise extent of the territory on offer. Nonetheless, President
16 Tudjman refused to talk about this.
17 Later on after we'd left, at lunch the president continued to
18 talk about this. My impression at the time was he had been somewhat
19 taken aback by this. He nevertheless believed that regardless of
20 Izetbegovic's motives for that proposal this could never be an
21 appropriate solution for dealing with the crisis in Bosnia and
23 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 Some time later, perhaps a year or more later, I brought this
25 anecdote up with Minister Granic who at the time was Croatia's Foreign
1 Minister. He then shared with me that he, too, once had attended a
2 meeting at which President Izetbegovic tabled a similar proposal. This
3 other proposal that Minister Granic was now telling me about was even
4 more specific in purely territorial terms. There was talk of specific
5 municipalities that would make up this territory. Nonetheless, at least
6 based on what Granic told me at the time, Tudjman yet again refused to
7 discuss any solutions of that nature.
8 Q. Okay.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. Mr. Zuzul, you have said that there
10 were human reasons. That at least is the translation, and I would be
11 grateful if you could elaborate a bit. Do you mean personal reasons
12 or -- or what does it mean? I do not understand.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, during that session, and of
14 course I'm telling you about this based on how I remember things to have
15 happened, I think there was quite a severe verbal attack launched, I
16 think, by Mr. Krajisnik against Mr. Izetbegovic. Mr. Izetbegovic looked
17 hurt, if anything, by this sort of approach that took place as part of a
18 round of negotiations. Other than that, there had been a number of
19 situations in which the Serb negotiators took a harsh or even vulgar
20 approach in how they accosted the other delegations. This was one such
22 As to President Tudjman's humanly understandable motives for
23 approaching Izetbegovic thereafter, to be perfectly clear this is just my
24 own personal interpretation of those events.
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
1 MR. KARNAVAS:
2 Q. Okay. Now -- I'm told that maybe you should say in English what
3 "Lucki" means. Lucki. Well, the English translation obviously was --
4 may be incorrect.
5 A. [In English] I would also say it was human approach based on
7 Q. Empathy. Okay. So in other words, Izetbegovic had been
8 attacked. He's sitting there by himself. Tudjman, being the statesman
9 that he was and a human, went there to comfort another human just to --
10 after that very difficult and vulgar attack by Krajisnik. Is that
11 basically what it was?
12 A. That would be my interpretation.
13 Q. Okay. And it was during that -- that exchange, if you will, when
14 Izetbegovic offered Western Herzegovina and Tudjman rejected it.
15 A. [Interpretation] Yes. But the reaction didn't come immediately.
16 We started talking about a number of different things. At one point, the
17 discussion settled on the need for a solution. It was at this time that
18 President Izetbegovic said as follows -- well, I don't think I can quote
19 him with any degree of accuracy, but he made a proposal for Western
21 Q. All right. And just one -- I guess let's stay with this for one
22 second. Did -- was there any counter-proposal by President Tudjman and
23 say, "Well, I don't need Western Herzegovina. How about just giving me
24 Neum, and I'll give you that water port that you're looking for," you
25 know, that deep port?
1 A. At that time, no proposals were being made by President Tudjman
2 apart from a crystal clear reply to the effect that this was in no way an
3 acceptable solution.
4 Q. All right. Now, we're going to go through some documents. I'm
5 going to ask you to keep your answers rather short, and then I'll direct
6 you if I need more amplification. We have quite a few, so we're going to
7 go at a rather rapid clip, but nonetheless I think the information you've
8 provided thus far lays a good foundation for -- for that process.
9 With you, there should be some binders, unless they took them
10 away. Are they are?
11 A. [In English] Yes, they are here.
12 Q. And if you could to binder number 1, and if you could look at the
13 first document, which is 1D 02039.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: And incidentally, Your Honours, this is the
15 constitution of the Republic of Croatia
16 we saw it with the very first witness. I mention this because this is a
17 document that is well known to everyone around the court in light of our
18 conversation yesterday, that is.
19 Q. Now, let me preface my question by saying we had a witness by the
20 name of Donia that came here. He's an historian who worked for the
21 Prosecution. And in his report -- in his testimony he made references in
22 respect to the Banovina and quoted others or cited others to support his
23 thesis that President Tudjman had aspirations of re-establishing the
24 Banovina Hrvatska boundaries, and both in his report and his testimony he
25 made reference to the constitution. In the preamble, that is.
1 So now I want to go -- I want you to look at this document, 1D
2 02039, page 1, towards the second to last bullet where it says: "In the
3 establishment of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939 by which Croatian state
4 identity was restored in the Kingdom Of Yugoslavia
5 Now, if you could please comment on the preamble recognising
6 that, one, you did not draft the constitution but you have been a member
7 of the government and you are from Croatia. You should be aware of the
8 constitution. Can you comment on that and you knew President Tudjman as
10 A. [Interpretation] Of course I do believe I'm in a position to
11 comment on that. I think I'm sufficiently familiar with Croatia's
12 constitution both as a citizen and as an official.
13 I declare categorically that this interpretation has nothing to
14 do with what is actually contained in the preamble to the Croatian
16 Q. Why is that?
17 A. Anyone who reads this page without necessarily possessing
18 appropriate legal skills and knowledge must understand that what this is
19 about is the continuity of Croatia
21 sovereignty, this would be entirely absurd. In that case, having read
22 the whole thing, Croatia
23 cent of its present territory and perhaps 200 per cent of its present
24 territory. It would probably be spilling over into Austria, Hungary
1 If I may just be allowed to furnish an additional explanation as
2 to the importance of the Banovina of Croatia in determining the historic
3 continuity of the Croats' right to statehood.
4 As is well known from history, and that is something that we see
5 mentioned here again, there is a reference to 1918 and the break-up of
6 the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. After the end of World War I and based on
7 the principle of self-determination as defined by Woodrow Wilson,
8 President of the United States, the Croats -- or, rather, Croatia's
9 representatives at the Versailles Conference opted to unite with the
10 Serbs and the Slovenes, thereby constituting the Kingdom of Serbs
11 Croats, and Slovenes. They did, however, keep their sovereignty and
12 their own parliament. This went on until 1928, when Croat delegates were
13 assassinated in the Yugoslav Assembly.
14 In 1929, the then King of Yugoslavia imposed a constitution on
15 the Croats, defining Yugoslavia
16 abolishing any form of sovereignty of the Croatian people.
17 That is why it is so exceptionally important for the idea of
18 continuity as well as its legal foundations that in 1939 following an
19 agreement between the Croatian and Serbian prime ministers, Cvetkovic and
20 Macek, there was a decision by the King to establish the Banovina of
22 because the Second World War started soon after. This was, however, of
23 the essence to Croatia
24 sovereignty, and then documents followed in 1943, 1945, and this period
25 spanned all the way to the 1974 constitution.
1 It is not my intention to pass myself off as a constitutional
2 legal expert. I am, however, convinced that this is the only correct
3 interpretation of the preamble.
4 Q. All right. Thank you. Well, perhaps you might be able to assist
5 us in -- in more concrete ways given that explanation, of course, but in
6 a different context.
7 We had another witness here, John Kenneth Galbraith's son, the
8 famous economist. His son came in. He happened to be the ambassador to
10 testified that President Tudjman had territorial aspirations and that he
11 believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would not and should not continue as a
12 sovereign independent state and that a substantial part of Bosnian
13 territory should become the territory of the Republic of Croatia
14 indicated that he formed those opinions having met with him on a frequent
15 basis, sometimes even several times a day. He talked about Tudjman being
16 prejudiced against the Muslim people, and he also indicated at one point,
17 he mentioned the fact as further -- as further basis for list supposition
18 that Croatia
19 Croat who wanted it, and of course as compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina in
20 this period, you know, that would have been one other way of establishing
21 his territorial ambitions.
22 And I'm quoting -- or this is part from the testimony, Your
23 Honours, for the record. The gentleman testified in open court on
24 September 12, 2006
25 from pages 6435, 36, 6427-28, and 6453-54.
1 First let me ask you this, sir: Did you know Peter Galbraith?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. And yesterday incidentally, just let me touch on this, you talked
4 about a Contact Group, and as I understand it in the context in which you
5 put it, the Contact Group was established as a result of the failure of
6 the Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg Plans which were UN-EU coordinated
7 efforts; is that correct?
8 A. That was certainly my impression. I think that is correct.
9 Q. You indicated that one of the members of the Contact Groups was
10 the United States, and my first question is Peter Galbraith, being the
11 American ambassador to Croatia
12 States during those negotiations, the Contact Group, to your knowledge?
13 A. No, he was not the representative of the United States in that
14 Contact Group, not the most active representative of the United States.
15 There was one who was specially nominated for that position by
16 President Clinton, and that was Ambassador Charles Redman.
17 Q. All right. And again, how well did you know Peter Galbraith?
18 A. Quite well, I'd say.
19 Q. All right. Now, he indicates that President Tudjman did not want
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina to exist. Is that statement correct in your
22 A. In my opinion, this is an incorrect statement.
23 Q. And what about his statement that he wanted to re-establish the
24 borders more or less based on the Banovina?
25 A. Again, I think this is another incorrect statement.
1 Q. Now, he talked about this policy. Policy, and I mention that
2 word, and I underscore it because in some ways, in some circles, in some
3 -- under some circumstances it could give sort of a nefarious notion.
4 Let me ask you this being familiar with the Croatian constitution: Are
5 Croats all over the world, wherever they may be born, do they have the
6 possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to have a Croatian
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Also, do the Croats around the world, wherever it may be, do they
10 have the possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to serve on the
11 Croatian parliament? I believe it's called Sabor.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And in fact, if I'm not mistaken, are there some seats that are
14 specifically allocated to those Croats because historically speaking
15 there have been Croatian communities throughout the world that have been
16 organised in order to take care of their particular needs?
17 A. Correct. And if I may add to that, because very often it seems
18 to me that this is misinterpreted. Although there is a number of states
19 across the world that allow their citizens who live abroad and work there
20 to participate in the parliamentary life of their respective states,
22 because when the citizens' will was exercised after the democratic
23 elections and when the free Republic of Croatia
24 was then internationally recognised, one could not and dared not ignore
25 the fact that there was approximately the same number of Croats residing
1 within the territory of Croatia
2 territory of Croatia
3 Why was it that this fact should not have been ignored? A number
4 of them had left for economic reasons, but a large number of those Croats
5 had left for political reasons during the time of Communism, and they
6 could not even spend holidays in Croatia or visit their family members.
7 They were not allowed to do so. In other words, when those Croats were
8 given an opportunity to participate in the political life of Croatia
9 this meant that the injustice was corrected, at least to a certain
10 extent, the injustice that they themselves were not guilty of. They were
11 not to be blamed for that injustice.
12 A provision was introduced that exists in a number of democratic
13 states when this was done.
14 Q. Okay. I think that --
15 A. Likewise -- if I may.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. I believe that this is very important because your question
18 contained one part that was relative to the possibility of holding a
19 Croatian passport. Maybe you would like me to comment on that.
20 Q. Very briefly.
21 A. It is true that a large number or a majority of Croats who reside
22 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina also have Croatian citizenship
23 and hold Croatian passport because this is provided for by the law --
24 laws of both Republic of Croatia
25 based on my knowledge and my information, I believe that I can say that
1 the other state with a number of citizens holding a Croatian passport is
2 the United States of America
3 logic, would that mean that Croatia
4 territory of the United States of America? What I'm saying is this is
5 just an absurd claim. These are two things that have nothing whatsoever
6 to do with each other. The right to a passport cannot be interpreted by
7 saying that one nation has territorial aspirations towards the territory
8 of another nation.
9 Q. All right. Thank you for that. Now, we're going to move on to
10 the next document, 1D 02910, and this is a -- a presidential transcript.
11 We've seen it before.
12 It has a D number, Your Honours, because there were some pages
13 that were added. We translated 12 pages, so that would have been the
14 extent of -- this was P 00037. So the 12 added pages would have been the
15 addition to burdening everyone around the court with additional reading?
16 Now, if I may, Your Honours, read from the -- the Prosecution's
17 exhibit list and their 65 ter description of this particular document.
18 It will be my vehicle for the next series of questions.
19 If you have that, sir. Based on -- this is what the Prosecution
20 says: "This transcript shows that Franjo Tudjman had clear territorial
21 ambitions toward Bosnia
22 between the Serbs and the Croats in Karadjordjevo to divide Bosnia
23 their reference is to page 2, 5 to 8, and 38 to 39.
24 First -- first of all, let me ask you do. You have the document
25 with you?
1 A. Yes, I do. I have it in front of me.
2 Q. Now, this was a presidential transcript that comes from the 7th
3 session of the Supreme State Council, 8 June 1991. First of all, were
4 you present?
5 A. No, I wasn't present because at that moment I was not politically
6 active at all.
7 Q. Have you had an opportunity to -- to go through this presidential
9 A. Yes, I have.
10 Q. Now --
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. Just -- just a --
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Technical.
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Oh, okay. A correction in the transcript. I
14 think it has just disappeared now. The number of the document is not
15 correctly stated. There is an 8 too much, and it might later make it
16 difficult to find it.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. It's 1D 02910.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That's correct. Thank you.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. And this was Prosecution document P
20 00037. The only exception is that we've added or translated, I should
21 say, pages 76 to 83, Your Honours, and pages 96 to 100, and you will be
22 able to notice that quite easily if you look at those pages. They're not
23 numbered, but actually you'll see "Unofficial translation" is at the
24 right top part of the page.
25 Q. In any event, with that, if we could turn to page 2 just very
1 quickly. I want to focus your attention where it says: "About the sixth
2 meeting of the presidents of the republic." Okay? And then you see:
3 "As you can conclude from the release, certain progress has been made in
4 the talks held so far and that Serbia
5 accepted the basic principle of the establishment of an alliance of
6 sovereign republics." And then it goes on. You also see Izetbegovic's
7 name at the bottom of the page.
8 First of all, if you could help us out a little bit in context
9 because I've noted this is June 8, 1991
11 speak a little faster and shorter so we can go through this material.
12 And I apologise to the translators if they're going to have to
13 labour a little bit more.
14 A. At that moment there were almost panic attempts to find a
15 solution to the break-up of Yugoslavia
17 then. The collective Presidency stopped functioning. All the republics
18 had their own governments and their own presidents, and in an attempt to
19 find a solution the presidents met on a regular basis, and this is
20 obviously a meeting that took place after the sixth meeting of the of
22 The international community at that point in time was not showing
23 very much interest in what was happening in Yugoslavia, in -- it did
24 express, however, its position and stated that Yugoslavia should continue
25 existing in one way or another, in one form or another.
1 Two western-most republics of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia
3 and also had managed to develop the most democratic relationships within
4 their respective societies, proposed a model of confederal organisation
5 of Yugoslavia
6 rather, Yugoslavia
7 to the European Commission or Benelux
8 This proposal was drafted by a commission -- a joint commission
9 of Slovenia
10 representatives of Serbia
11 did not even want to talk about it and tabled a completely different
12 proposal for the survival of Yugoslavia
14 the previous constitution of 1974, and it was absolutely clear that it
15 would be dominated by the Republic of Serbia
16 The key issue was the position of the president of Bosnia
18 The two of them found it very hard to reach any conclusions or make any
19 decisions. However, when they finally presented their positions, then
20 their positions were much closer to the position of Belgrade and Serbia
21 Mr. Izetbegovic at one point stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 would be willing and ready to stay with the Rump Yugoslavia. After that
23 and only after that Croatia
24 their dissolution and secession from Yugoslavia. At that moment the --
25 there was something that was very much ignored by the international
1 community but it became very clear already at that point in time that the
2 situation in Yugoslavia
3 ready for an intervention. At the beginning of 1991, which is now very
4 clear, they had already prepared themselves for a military takeover.
5 On the other hand, everybody was clear that Serbia was getting
6 ready for war. The slogan which became a chapter in one of the
7 internationally recognised books which read "If we don't know how to
8 work, at least we know how to fight," became a -- something that was used
9 by a lot of politicians in Serbia
10 then you can see that the predictions of the CIA and other analytical
11 services were that the break-up of Yugoslavia would happen in a war and
12 that this war would be a bloodbath, but at that point in time and -- the
13 international community ignored all that. This, I believe, would give
14 you a general framework within which this discussion took place.
15 Q. All right. Now, during those discussions, were there discussions
16 being held to carve up any particular republic, because there are some
17 references here to Karadjordjevo, and that's part of the Prosecution's
18 thesis, that there was a meeting between Tudjman and -- and Milosevic,
19 and at this meeting they had divided to -- they had decided to divide
21 A. In this document, I did not find any report about any meetings in
22 Karadjordjevo. I may have omitted this reference, but I don't think it's
24 Q. All right. Well, let me just go through one passage, and this
25 would be on page 38. We don't have time to go through this entire
1 document. It would take hours. But just one -- to focus you on this one
2 page, page 38. It says:
3 "The president: All right. Let's wrap up this item. First of
4 all, regarding this proposal, I said there, and the minutes will reflect
5 this, that this proposal by Izetbegovic and Gligorov is actually an
6 attempt to preserve and somewhat bolster the 1974 constitution,
7 basically, that is, Serbia
8 interpretation in regards to the creating of an effective democratic
9 federation, and they are sure not to change their position in this
10 regard. Therefore, the solution lies in what was said there, in the --
11 in the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if -- and if we achieve
12 that, then we can possibly look for a basis for an alliance of sovereign
13 republics and states.
14 "I think we shall achieve it because this is -- this is equally
15 in the interests of Serbia
16 no other exit than to accept the solution, although it will -- it will
17 not be easy to find the solution, but essentially that is it."
18 And then he talks about the next couple -- the next paragraph he
19 talks about the European Community, and then the following paragraph ends
21 "Therefore, the question arises whether such a community is at
22 all possible having in mind the economic and other relations in the
23 eastern part of Yugoslavia
24 Now, if we just looked at this segment in the -- you know, this
25 is just one page out of 163 pages, one might get the impression that what
1 Tudjman is actually suggesting, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be carved
2 up among at least Serbia
3 reading this document?
4 A. My impression was that he was just telling about the conversation
5 that he was reporting about, and the conversation took place among the
6 six presidents, and I don't think that this was about any proposals
7 because it transpires from the entire transcript that no such proposal
8 was ever discussed. There was discussion about completely different
9 things, and the thing that was discussed was whether there should be a
10 confederation of all the republics, meaning the six republics that
11 existed at the moment.
12 Q. All right.
13 A. For example, he is saying, and I have a Croatian version in front
14 of me, on page 9052 of the Croatian text where President Tudjman says
15 explicitly: "We can start from the position that Croatia may find its
16 own interest in preserving a union of sovereign states." And then we
17 come to the guiding thought in my own interpretation of his whole
18 state -- statesman behaviour. He says: "In this way we should achieve a
19 peaceful separation." And he goes on to say: "A peaceful solution of
20 the Croat-Serb issue on the Croatian territory and the whole -- and the
21 territory as a whole," which means that within the context of the
22 situation that prevailed at the time.
23 Q. Okay. Now, in quoting -- and there should be page numbers.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: The first page number, Your Honour, was page 43.
25 I'm just as alarmed as you are because I want to make a clear record, and
1 I know you need to follow.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: We don't have -- it.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Honourable Judge, please.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I think that -- you should have, Your
5 Honour, page 43 of 163.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I have page 9, and the next one is page 38, 39,
7 40. Okay. So 34 does not figure in this document.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: All right.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You have it? Oh, this is a discrimination
10 against my person, I note because my colleague seems to have it. So I
11 will think of the steps that have to be taken. Thank you.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, we apologise. We do massive amounts of
13 copying and printing, and I'll blame it on technology, but --
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Your apology's accepted.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: This was translated by the Prosecution, Your
16 Honour. I'm not suggesting -- I'm not suggesting that the Prosecutor --
17 I'm just merely mentioning this -- that this is part of their --
18 everybody seems --
19 MR. SCOTT: As the Court knows it's always the Prosecution's
21 MR. KARNAVAS: -- everybody seems to be so touchy around here.
22 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
23 MR. KARNAVAS: What I meant to say was this portion was
24 translated by the Prosecutor. We translated other pages. Therefore they
25 should not have been missing but obviously it was our fault in copying
1 it. So the Prosecutor should just relax a little bit.
2 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
3 MR. KARNAVAS:
4 Q. Now, you quoted -- you quoted from another page --
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One second. Mr. Witness, I
6 take this opportunity to ask a question linked to what we're talking
7 about. We have a presidential transcript that relates to the 7th session
8 of the Supreme Council of the state of the Republic of Croatia
9 the 8th of 1991. Several months ago the Defence challenged those
10 presidential transcripts. You seem to be somebody who may have taken
11 part in one of those meetings, so maybe you will be in a position to
12 solve of some of the problems that we've been faced with.
13 My first question is as follows: Did you did you personally take
14 part in the Supreme State Council meetings?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, Your Honour. Participate
16 in this meeting. I only read the transcript.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Maybe not this one, but did you
18 take part in other meetings?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I participated in a number of
20 them, but once I was appointed in 1992.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In 1992. When you
22 took part in those meetings with President Tudjman, was there somebody
23 who was charged with recording everything that was said by all the
24 participants to these meetings?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, yes. At meetings of this
1 kind there was somebody.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Who was it, a secretary, an
3 employee, somebody specialised?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These meetings were recorded, and
5 then notes or minutes or transcripts were taken, and as far as I know
6 there were a few professional typists, ladies, who did that.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You have
8 by your answers given authenticity to those transcripts.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Honourable Judge --
10 MR. KARNAVAS: At some point today hopefully we'll get to a
11 transcript where Mr. Zuzul is mentioned. There is an exchange which we
12 will see he did not participate in. So authenticity is one thing,
13 accuracy is another, and we'll get to that at some point.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. But I believe the witness
15 wanted to say something else.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It indeed happened in the way
17 Mr. Karnavas described. As I am reading these transcripts, and this is
18 my first opportunity to read them carefully, I have been able to convince
19 myself that they contain errors, misidentification of person,
20 misinterpretation of their words. And since I know the conditions under
21 which the recordings were made were far, far from ideal, I'm not
22 surprised to see those errors, but it is my personal impression that
23 every transcript has to be checked and re-checked because of those
24 errors, and I'm going to be able to give you my own example to illustrate
25 one of the errors that are contained in one of those transcripts.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Judge Trechsel, did we solve your problem?
3 Okay. Thank you. And we apologise again. And it was no fault of the
4 Prosecution's, so they shouldn't -- I just want to make sure that there's
5 not shifting the blame on anyone.
6 Q. Now, I noticed that earlier that one of your answers, you used
7 the word "unitarian," and -- and I see that on page -- one of the pages
8 that we translated which would have been -- it should be page 46, 47, 48,
9 49 -- I mean, 96, 97, 98, 99, I believe right around there. It says
10 here: "Therefore it is necessary that we cooperate until all
11 possibilities are exhausted and that we create both in principle and
12 personally the best possible relations because that is in our interest,
13 interest of the army and of individuals, but of course we will not be
14 silent about -- we will not be silent about such cases. We will present
15 them as an existence of those elements and dogmatic Communist and
16 unitarian Greater Serbia
17 army but also in all state -- in all strata of the society as well as
18 extremists among us which hinder achieving a political solution."
19 If you could -- I just want to dwell a little bit on this
20 unitarian Greater Serbia. What is meant by that, because we've heard the
21 term "unitary government." Now we have a variation of that word,
22 "unitarian." What was your understanding of that in the context of which
23 we're speaking of, because it might assist us.
24 A. Well, for all of us who group up in Yugoslavia the meaning of the
25 term "unitary" was something that we knew from our everyday lives. It
1 was not something that was learned from constitutional practice, because
2 the more the federal state became unitary or unitaristic the less rights
3 were enjoyed by the republics. Yugoslavia's history is the history of
4 defining unitary versus federal system.
5 In this particular paragraph that you've just quoted, President
6 Tudjman, in my opinion, is referring to something that had already
7 happened in Serbia
8 constitution there was the federal system, but Serbia had two autonomous
9 provinces under this constitution, Vojvodina and Kosovo.
10 At the time when this is being discussed, Serbia had already
11 rescinded the right to the autonomy in both those districts, especially
12 in Kosovo, and from that time until the recent time when Kosovo declared
13 its independence as a state and was recognised as such this was the
14 period when there was the Kosovo crisis, and President Tudjman and all
15 the other participants were quite familiar with this crisis.
16 So he is talking about this unitary Serbia, Serbia
17 rescinding all rights to autonomy and urges the creation of a Yugoslavia
18 that would, it is quite clear, be set up not on the federal principles,
19 not on confederal principles, but on unitary principles. It would be in
21 Q. All right. We're going to move on to this next document because
22 we're running a little bit behind. So if we could go to 1D 00894. This
23 is from "Balkan Odyssey." This is a document that we've seen before. In
24 fact we've seen these pages, again no additional reading for anyone
25 around the court. No surprise. But I want to point out one thing and
1 have you comment on it.
2 On chapter 2 Lord Owen in his book says, bottom of the first --
3 of the second paragraph on the first page: "The Netherlands had the EC
4 Presidency from the outbreak of the war in July until December 1991, and
5 in consequence of my visit to The Hague, I discovered that on 13 July
6 1991, when the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were
7 just eighteen days old, the Dutch government had suggested to the other
8 EC members states that the option of agreed changes to some of the
9 internal borders between the Yugoslavian republic might be explored."
10 Now, I ask you to think about this only because the issue of
11 changing of the borders have come up. From your experiences were you
12 aware of any of the international negotiators exploring possibilities,
13 that is initiating, because I think that's the word, initiating
14 possibilities of changing of borders? And I mention this because of the
15 Prosecution's theory of joint criminal enterprise that Croatia was
16 initiating this process of changing borders?
17 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I'm sorry to intervene. I'm
18 waiting for my microphone. Thank you very much.
19 Your Honour, I'm mindful that the Chamber, or at least some
20 members of the Chamber, do not like many interventions from counsel, and
21 I've been quiet all day for the most part I think with one exception, but
22 I am going to object and continue to object. There is no reason on this
23 basis; that is, there is no reason for Mr. Karnavas to make speeches in
24 connection with his questions and characterise them as this is what the
25 Prosecution says. This is the Prosecution's theory of the case. It is a
1 form of coaching, Your Honour. It's the key words to the witness to say
2 this is what the Prosecution says, so I'm telling you now this is what
3 you, the witness, are supposed to disagree with. Mr. Karnavas can simply
4 ask non-leading questions to the witness. Were you in such a meeting at
5 this day? Tell us what happened. Did you talk to Izetbegovic about this
6 subject? What did he say? Were you at this meeting or not? No, I
7 wasn't. But there is no reason for constant speeches or
8 characterisations of this is what the Prosecution says, so now I'm
9 telling you, Mr. Witness, I want you, I'm expecting you to say the
10 opposite. It's a form of coaching. We object to it.
11 While I'm on my feet, while I'm on my feet, number two, number
12 two, I want to make the record clear, and I'll say why, in terms of the
13 transcripts, in the last transcript, the presidential transcript that we
14 were looking at, and this is not directed at Mr. Karnavas or the Defence
15 at all, but I just want the record to be clear on something because I
16 know statements have been made in the Croatian press, statements have
17 been made in the Croatian media that the Prosecution, for example, used
18 only -- offered bits and pieces or excerpts of the presidential
19 transcripts that the Prosecution tendered into evidence. As the Chamber
20 knows, that's not the case. The Prosecution's position was we tendered
21 the entire transcript, top to bottom, with the exception of a very few
22 where they were long transcripts and it was very clear to any reader that
23 the last 80 pages had absolutely nothing to do with anything at issue in
24 this case, whether to enter into a free trade agreement with China
25 don't think we needed 80 pages on that. With those kind of exceptions,
1 we tendered every single page of every single transcript, and so when the
2 Croatian media writes its article tomorrow about the hearing today that
3 says, well, Mr. Karnavas had to add other excerpts because the
4 Prosecution had not played fairly, I just want it to be clear, the
5 Prosecution offered the entire transcripts, and it was the Chamber that
6 only decided to accept bits and pieces.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, with regard to the media,
8 that's not the Trial Chamber's problem. We're not going to issue our
9 judgement based on some press cuttings. That's one thing. That's your
10 problem, not ours.
11 However, with regard to the objection you've just raised.
12 Mr. Karnavas, I believe that the objection is in part justified.
13 Initially you should have asked the witness whether he had any knowledge
14 of possible changes within the internal borders, and he could have said
15 yes, no, and then you could have asked him to look at what Lord Owen said
16 in his book. Based on that, he would have said, yes, indeed. Then third
17 step, you can say, "The Prosecution in its indictment claims this and
18 that. Do you agree or not?"
19 Otherwise, you should have preempt or you lead the witness.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Mr. President, but I do want to take
21 exception to the Prosecution's characterisation that I'm coaching the
22 witness. First of all, we had a narrative. We had a narrative where we
23 talked about changing of borders or swapping. We had a narrative where
24 it was Izetbegovic that offered part of Herzegovina. We had a narrative
25 where it was Izetbegovic that signed an agreement to allow half of Bosnia
1 to be carved away, so it's not as if I'm coaching the witness, but I
2 take -- I take your observations and I will modify my -- my technique.
3 Q. Concerning this, sir, do you have any knowledge with respect to
4 international negotiators proposing the possibility at least that they
5 should explore the alteration of the borders within Yugoslavia
6 that separated the republics?
7 A. I know that the option of peaceful changing of the borders was
8 mentioned in several international documents. Lord Owen writes about
9 that at several places in his book. This is one of those places.
10 In the first stage of the work of the conference for the former
12 changing of the borders in accordance with the mutual agreement. After
13 all, the case that I described yesterday was initiated by the
14 representatives of the international community, possible territory swaps
15 between Croatia
16 such thinking, and I know that it was mentioned in several international
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now we move to the next document and that
19 would be 1D 00893. I think we've seen this document as well. So without
20 adding too much commentary, I do want to point out that this was a
21 document that is familiar to everyone here.
22 Now, if we can look at this. This is the European Community
23 conference. We have a draft convention. It mentions Lord Carrington,
24 and there's a treaty proposal. I will ask you to first focus on Article
25 1 where it talks about new relations between the republics, and under
1 1(c) common state of equal republics for those republics which wish to
2 remain in a common state. Under (f), recognition of the independence
3 within the existing borders unless otherwise agreed.
4 I then want you to focus on page 16, the section called special
5 status, which says in addition areas in which persons belonging to a
6 national or ethnic group form a majority shall enjoy a special status of
7 autonomy, and it talks about the right to use national emblems,
8 educational system, et cetera.
9 First of all, are you familiar with this document?
10 A. Yes, I am familiar with it.
11 Q. All right. And to your knowledge this is what was being
12 discussed at the time?
13 A. That was the framework for the debate and for the thinking in the
14 period between 1991 and the London
15 because this was, in fact, the only official document produced by the
16 international community.
17 Q. Okay. Now, we see from the very -- the preamble, we see that
18 this is November -- 1 -- we see it was November 1991. What is happening
19 in Croatia
20 A. Immediately before this, on the 8th of October, Croatia made its
21 decision to become independent, and in the international sphere Croatia
22 was trying to achieve international recognition based, among other
23 things, on this document as a state within its borders, and soon after
24 this document was produced Croatia
25 unofficially by Germany
1 mid-January 1992. This was when the European states followed the
4 Internally in Croatia
5 Yugoslav army attacked from several sides, and as I said yesterday, large
6 areas of Croatia
7 purposes cut in two.
8 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the next document, P 00089. It's a
9 Prosecution document. We've seen this before. It's been talked about
10 quite a bit by various witnesses, and it's been referenced, in fact, by
11 some in their works. This is 27 December 1991. You more or less told us
12 politically what is happening and physically what is happening in
14 First let me begin by asking have you read this presidential
16 A. Yes, I have.
17 Q. Were you present --
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, could you --
19 MR. KARNAVAS: P 00089.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The number is clear. In which folder is it? We
21 have five.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, all these documents are in a chronological
23 order, so if you -- the number. So it would be -- you would need to go
24 to the next binder. So number 1, number 2 --
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Number 2.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Yep. We have it that way. If I do go out of
2 order, I'll make sure to give everybody the heads-up. I only have three
3 binders. That's why, so ...
4 Q. Anyway, while we're looking for those, just some preliminary
5 questions. Were you present during this discussion?
6 A. No, I was not.
7 Q. Okay. Now, just to touch on a couple of points. First let me
8 ask you: Given your position and your involvement in the various events,
9 do you feel competent that you might be able to discuss certain contents
10 in this document?
11 A. I think yes. I think I can. I think I can give you some
12 elements regarding the interpretation of this document, and quite by
13 coincidence after I read this document now for the first time, perhaps I
14 can provide some additional information that might shed light on the
15 circumstances, the time when this was going on.
16 Q. All right. Well --
17 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, excuse me again --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
19 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, in light of what was just said, I'm
20 going to object to this kind of just simply tell us your interpretation
21 of the document, the document the witness has no personal knowledge of.
22 He was not present at the meeting. He's told us that. And, you know,
23 this is what Mr. Karnavas -- a word Mr. Karnavas himself likes to use.
24 This is just spin. I've got a witness here from the Tudjman government,
25 and I'm going to ask him to give his spin on this material, and that's
1 all it is. I have no objection if -- if he asks about a specific
2 question about something that may have a technical meaning, something --
3 a moment ago he said something, what would "unitary" mean. I didn't
4 object to that. I think probably that's something the witness might be
5 able to assist us with. But to simply take a presidential transcript of
6 a meeting where the witness was not involved, he wasn't even in
7 government at that time to my knowledge - this is December 1991 - and
8 just simply put it before the witness, "Witness, what do you think about
9 this? What's your spin on this?" And that's all this is. That's all it
10 is. Objection, Your Honour.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. I've heard the objection loud and clear,
12 and may I respond. I'll be measured.
13 The Prosecutor brought in Donia, someone who got a degree in the
14 United States on 19th century intellectual Muslims in Sarajevo
15 career in banking -- or in financing. Twenty-some years later, writes a
16 book with very few footnotes and then becomes a "Prosecution expert,"
17 reads this, cites it. Ribicic, Constitutional Judge in Slovenia
18 a book supposedly analysing the laws, the basis of Herceg-Bosna, does a
19 constitutional analysis, and if you look at the portions and you look at
20 the transcript, and by the way I did look at it before coming here today,
21 but if you look at it - I'm afraid I didn't bring it in because of time -
22 you will see that I referenced the part where he gets to say, "Once I
23 read this particular transcript, I changed my opinion." And then if you
24 recall, there was a heated exchange where even you, Judge Trechsel,
25 intervene at one point because I said, well, what about all these other
1 transcripts. You know, and he said, well, he didn't read them, and of
2 course my position at that point was that his report should be stricken
3 from the record because obviously that report was written when he only
4 looked at one particular transcript and not the others, at which point as
5 I recall, Judge Trechsel, you indicated well, you know, he could spend
6 his lifetime reading all this stuff or that could be supplemented, but be
7 that as it may, be that as it may, the point that I'm trying to make is
8 this: When the Prosecution wants to have somebody who wasn't present and
9 take one sliver out of a presidential transcript, and I dare say he
10 wasn't quite correct when he said earlier that he's tendered everything.
11 He's only translated portions, translated portions, so tendering is one
12 thing. Translating is another, so if you only have two or three passages
13 of 160 pages or whatever, he has it.
14 But be that as it may, he brings in outsiders, not participants,
15 to comment, to opine, and then he uses that as the foundation in
16 establishing the joint criminal enterprise, and the first time I bring in
17 someone who is aware of the events, and had Mr. Scott listened because he
18 got a little excited there and was ready for his objection, but he didn't
19 listen to the end of Mr. Zuzul's answer, which was having read that, he's
20 able to comment on certain things. So he got a little excited, didn't
21 listen to the whole answer, and now here we are wasting valuable time.
22 But I want to point that out.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We are right. We are
24 losing and wasting time. You're both right.
25 You know, Mr. Karnavas, you should, in order to avoid this
1 objection because you are an experienced professional and you know how to
2 do it, initially you should have told the witness: "During the proofing
3 session, we both looked at this document, P 89, 160 pages long, and we
4 mentioned this and that page. Expert Donia in his report said this and
5 that. Could you, Witness, enlighten the Trial Chamber on specific
6 points," because then the Prosecutor would not have anything to object
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may add a point. It strikes me that you
10 are comparing witnesses, your witness here --
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Right.
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: -- to experts brought by the Prosecution, and I
13 don't think that is really quite equitable. An expert is asked to give
14 opinions on matters. A witness is asked to speak about facts that he has
15 witnessed, and the question you put to your witness, in my view, is
16 totally a question for an expert. Now, your witness has not been
17 presented as an expert. We do not have any credentials like we have for
18 an expert, and I think there's a little problem here.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, let me respond to that because I beg to
20 differ with you significantly. Ribicic read law. That's what he did.
21 Now, what makes him an expert to take a presidential transcript and to
22 say based on this he's making a constitutional analysis? And just
23 because we call somebody an expert doesn't make him an expert. Donia
24 worked for the Prosecution, and I dare say in my 25 years of working in
25 this business, I'm entitled to ask a layperson to provide expert
1 testimony if they're capable of doing that. So I've asked -- that was --
2 that was a foundational question. Having read it, is he able to comment
3 on it? He is an expert in a sense even though a fact witness in some
4 ways because he spent time over there. He was with President Tudjman.
5 He knew the events. He represented the government. You're shaking your
6 head, but that's the fact.
7 Now, what I would do -- what I would ask -- what I would ask,
8 Judge Trechsel, is that -- that you begin registering your objections on
9 the record because it seems to me that at this point, at this point, it
10 is curtailing my defence. Not only am I limited in time, now I'm being
11 limited in scope, as well, and I don't think I agree with your analysis,
12 but if that's the case I would like a clear record exactly, and give
13 me -- give me the scope. Tell me how you want me to do it, so maybe I
14 make submissions for an interlocutory appeal, but at this point I must
15 say, with your interpretation I wholly disagree, especially when we say
16 that we're practising before professional Judges, especially because of
17 that, and we can't have it both ways, but I dare say that the gentleman
18 can comment because he was there and he knows the circumstances, and if I
19 was allowed to ask those questions that I wanted to ask, you would see.
20 Now, how much weight you give to that, that's a different story,
21 but I think I have -- I was laying the predicate that would allow me to
22 ask those questions because I wasn't asking him for an expert opinion.
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, you have challenged me, and I will give
24 you an answer.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm not making an objection. I'm just recalling
2 that we have witnesses, according to the Rules of Procedure, and we have
3 experts, and it is news to me that -- that they are the same and that you
4 can switch and take the expert as a witness and the witness as an expert
5 if it pleases you.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour --
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: But maybe I'm wrong on this.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, let me just -- I don't want to have a
9 philosophical or legal debate, but let's just say hypothetically
10 speaking, hypothetically speaking I brought in as a fact witness a
11 general. Now, by virtue of his position, by virtue of his knowledge, by
12 virtue of his experience, is not that general able, capable, willing, if
13 I asked the question, to answer technical questions regarding military
14 matters that are outside what he has observed? Of course. Do I need to
15 qualify him as an expert? Of course not. If it's relevant I should be
16 able to ask that question.
17 Now, it shouldn't be -- I shouldn't be trying to sabotage the
18 Prosecution, but I could certainly ask him technical questions. It comes
19 within that.
20 Let's just say that I have a regular witness, and I'm asking him
21 if he can identify somebody's voice like you have these recordings. If I
22 can lay the foundation that that individual does recognise the person's
23 voice because he's heard it a hundred times on the telephone, in a sense
24 that person is giving expert testimony because he's capable of
25 identifying the voice. So that's how you can.
1 I'm not bringing this gentleman in as an expert nor was my
2 questioning eliciting expert testimony. I was asking him to opine on
3 what he was able to glean from reading this, and had -- had we been
4 allowed, he would have been able -- he's indicated that after reading
5 this he has some personal experience of which he can discuss certain
6 matters. That's not an expert.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break, yes,
8 Mr. Scott.
9 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. I've been patient and
10 hopefully this will give Mr. Karnavas a chance to take a breath.
11 I fully agree with what Judge Trechsel said and that was in my
12 notes, and Judge Trechsel you beat me to it and good for you for that.
13 This is now -- this is now -- the witness is now being tendered
14 as an expert. That's the difference between the witnesses -- the
15 Prosecution witnesses that Mr. Karnavas cites and this witness. And I
16 might add in light of the issues that were raised yesterday, we can add
17 now to the deficiencies the lack of an expert report. We don't have a
18 statement. We don't have an adequate summary. We don't have notice of
19 an expert. We don't have an expert report. So we just got a
20 free-ranging witness here, a member of the Tudjman government, who can
21 just come in and give his views about anything that Mr. Karnavas wants to
22 ask him about.
23 Now, that is not appropriate. You cannot simply, with all due
24 respect to this Chamber, all of whom I have great respect for, you cannot
25 appeal every time to say it's professional Judges as if that means there
1 are no rules. Yes, you are professional Judges. There are still Rules
2 of Procedure and rules of evidence that should be followed and just to
3 say it's professional Judges, no holds barred, everything is fair, you
4 can do whatever you want, is not correct. These are -- further these are
5 not technical matters.
6 I added a moment ago -- I asked a moment -- I made the comment a
7 moment ago: If someone says it was a term of art and a witness could
8 say, "Well, I'm a general and I happen to know that when that term is
9 used this is what it means." These are not technical matters. These are
10 clearly political matters, political matters of the most direct kind.
11 I'm going to give you my political interpretation on these events, and
12 I've never -- I wasn't at the meeting, I've never seen this before, but
13 now that I've read it I'm going to give you my political interpretation
14 of events and that's all we're getting, Your Honour, and I we do object
15 and I'm going to continue to object to this kind of testimony.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Well Your Honour -- Your Honour --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. Let me give my own
18 opinion. First of all, I do not agree with what Mr. Scott has just said.
19 We are here with a witness who was a Minister of Foreign Affairs in
21 negotiations, who also participated in the work related to the Vance-Owen
23 The Defence counsel is examining the witness on issues related to
24 borders, to meetings between Tudjman and other individuals with regard to
25 these geopolitical problems. Without the witness being an expert but in
1 his field of foreign affairs, he's no doubt an expert because if you have
2 a minister of foreign affairs who would not be able to address issues of
3 foreign affairs, where are the experts, then? And I do remind you that
4 the Trial Chamber is made up of two former ambassadors among the Judges,
5 and I believe that the Defence are entitled to ask questions of the
7 The only residual issue that may remain is to make sure that the
8 questions as they are asked are not leading because we're dealing here
9 with a common law procedure. So as the chief examiner, he should not put
10 leading questions. So that would be a cause for objections by the
11 Prosecution. But, I mean, if he asked questions that could challenge the
12 case of the Prosecutor, that's another matter. There should not be
13 automatically objections if the Prosecution's case is being challenged.
14 We have just spent about half an hour on procedural matters
15 whereas I and I believe my colleagues, too, are interested in the
16 substance of the case.
17 We are going to break for 20 minutes, and we shall resume
19 --- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.
22 Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.
24 Q. Mr. Zuzul, if you could turn to page 27 of this particular
25 document. We're still on P 00089, 27 December 1991, and I'm going to
1 read a portion here, and I'm going ask you if you're able to comment on
3 It says here "the president," so that would be President Tudjman.
4 I'm going to go to the bottom of the page first. It says, "There are
5 numerous indicators that, you see, that America would gladly accept
7 establishment of a Muslim state in Europe."
8 Now, throughout those years that you were involved in the various
9 positions that you held, was that ever a concern, that is, that they
10 might be -- that the US
11 reluctant to see the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe
12 would be, of course, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13 A. That was certainly what President Tudjman had in mind. He
14 believed there was concern both in America
15 countries about the possibility to establish a pure Muslim state in
17 Q. Okay. At this point in time, 27 December 1991, had Croatia
18 recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence? This is December 27,
19 1991. Or I should put -- I should rephrase it. Had Bosnia and
21 A. I believe they were preparing for independence, but no
22 international recognition had been granted by this time. I'm certain
23 about that.
24 Q. Now, further down -- in the next page, page 28, I'm just going to
25 hit this rather quickly, certain passages, it says, "Izetbegovic, even
1 Stipe may recall," and I suspect that he's talking about Stipe Mesic,
2 "once openly said that he would favour a solution whereby Slovenia
3 go. Croatia
4 associated with Serbia
5 border crossings between Croatia
7 there? Shall we set up customs office? Shall we set up customs? Shall
8 we make it so that one has to, as the government has already issued and
9 rightly so, an order that petrol may be sold and so on? Shall we --
10 shall we a currency in the end," as written, "all this together? These
11 are the problems that arise in everyday administrative and legislative
12 sense, which establish new relationships which would be unbearable among
13 according to this view, not only for Croatia in view of the shape of its
14 borders but also for the Croatian part of the Herzegovina and Bosnian
16 "In addition, if Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain whole,
17 what are Croatia
18 If we go down to the -- to the next paragraph. "During the talks
19 under these circumstances, we supported the position of preserving a
20 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina precisely because the Greater Serbia
21 policy raised the issue of Serbian areas in Croatia.
22 "Therefore, in such circumstances, it would have been
23 politically unwise for us to raise the issue of demarcation of borders in
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina otherwise. However, if you recall as early as
25 1989, we said in our delegation the historic HDZ declaration" I'm sorry,
1 "the historic HDZ declaration that we were for a sovereign Bosnia
3 in view of the interests of the Croatian people, we have to raise the
4 issue of Croatian borders."
5 First of all, let me ask you this: By this point this time were
6 you a member of -- of HDZ? We're talking December.
7 A. I became a member in October that year, but I was just an
8 ordinary member.
9 Q. And how much, if any, of Croatia
10 was under attack at that point in time?
11 A. At that point in time virtually a third of Croatia's territory
12 had been occupied already. Vukovar had fallen. Eastern Slavonia was
13 under occupation, and on the 10th of September the siege of Dubrovnik and
14 attacks on the town began. Dubrovnik
15 time was being subjected to heavy gunfire.
16 Q. In light of your background, experience, and knowledge, are you
17 able to decipher, if you would, where on page 28 President Tudjman says:
18 "Izetbegovic, even Stipe may recall, once openly said that he would
19 favour a solution whereby Slovenia
20 more and Bosnia
21 A. Yes, indeed. That's what I was talking about earlier on. There
22 were clear indicia as far as a solution for the former Yugoslavia was
23 concerned. The Muslim leadership had certain inclinations in favour of
25 as much even when the attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina were first being
1 launched. Even prior to this there were villages in Dubrovnik's
2 hinterland, in Eastern Herzegovina that had already been attacked by the
3 JNA already and had been destroyed in their entirety.
4 Q. What kind of army did Croatia
5 A. Croatia
6 established defence lines and put a stop to any further advances by the
7 JNA. However, at the time it was still unable to defend its territory in
8 its entirety. I think I did spend a great deal of time discussing that
9 yesterday. Now, however, just before the turn of the year in 1992, the
10 greatest danger was the Dubrovnik
12 around Dubrovnik
13 Q. All right. Let me -- let me just walk you step by step on this
14 now. At this point in time, is the -- are the JNA forces in Bosnia
16 A. There is no doubt that they were there. I don't think anybody
17 had asked them by this time to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina officially.
18 I think didn't that happened until sometime later, but it's quite certain
19 that there were JNA units in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is quite certain
20 that they were launching attacks on the republic of Croatia
21 I mentioned several times the area around Dubrovnik and the forces that
22 were arriving from Herzegovina
23 attacking Dubrovnik
24 Posavina area, as well, and just north of Knin. There were several areas
25 in which the JNA were carrying out attacks from Bosnian territory.
1 Q. All right. And yesterday you told us that you had joined the
2 army. At that point in time, where -- were you in the army or working
3 for the department of defence?
4 A. I was partly in the Croatian army at the time.
5 Q. Okay. And were you stationed in anyplace in particular?
6 A. We were stationed in Zagreb
7 time that I and my colleagues travelled south to Dubrovnik, our intention
8 being to reach Dubrovnik
9 Perhaps a month and a half before this, I had been to the Opuzen
10 area. I said that I might have some additional explanations that might
11 shed light on the background of this meeting.
12 Q. Let me -- let me just lead you step by step because before we get
13 there, I just want to make sure that I'm crystal clear. It's December
14 1991. Croatia
15 the JNA. The JNA is staging attacks using Bosnian -- from the Bosnia
16 Herzegovinian territory, and as I understand yesterday from your
17 testimony, Bosnia and Herzegovina did nothing to stop it. Perhaps it
18 could not do anything. Let me ask you this question based on this
19 background: What -- let me make sure I phrase it in a way that it can be
20 answered in a non-leading fashion.
21 Were there discussions with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 viability as a state and, if so, can you please tell us? And we're
23 talking about historically that period in time because we know that
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet declared its independence, but at that
1 A. There probably were, but in the context of defending Croatia
2 there was no one to raise this with in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
3 serious issue.
4 Q. All right.
5 A. I will try to be more specific. I'm talking about the leaders of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 Q. All right. Okay. And did -- as far as you know, and I'm asking
8 you -- maybe you didn't know back at the time, that is back in December,
9 but thereafter did you ever learn, given your experience and the
10 positions that you held, what Izetbegovic's position was at that point in
11 time? Did you ever come out and expressly say, "We are for independence.
12 We are against Yugoslavia
13 sort of a public expression which we could look at and identifiably know
14 exactly where that man, given his position and his responsibility, stood
15 at at the time?
16 A. His position as to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not
17 entirely clear. He said he had a preference for Belgrade's solution. As
18 far as war was concerned, his position unfortunately was clear. He said
19 this wasn't their war and that he had no desire to interfere. If we try
20 to interpret this, and we look at transcript one, the Croatian
21 representatives, he talks about his own meeting with General Kadijevic,
22 Mr. Kljuic's specifically. His conviction is not only that the army
23 would not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina but, rather, that the army would
24 be allowing political parties to take control in Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 We know now that this was quite gullible as a line of reasoning
1 since the war had already begun, a war true and proper.
2 Q. Okay. Now, to make sure that we fully understand, who is
3 Mr. Kadijevic?
4 A. Mr. Kadijevic was at the time the defence minister of a
5 disintegrating Yugoslavia
6 Q. All right. And when you say "army," which army are we talking
8 A. [In English] Yugoslav People's Army, JNA.
9 Q. All right. Just to make sure I'm crystal clear, because I'm just
10 a little confused here, at this period of time we see an exchange between
11 Tudjman and Kljuic. Of course we all knew because Kljuic was here that
12 at the time he was president of the HDZ. And what exactly is Kljuic
13 saying to Tudjman so we are -- and be as precise as you can so we can
14 understand that.
15 A. [Interpretation] The transcript is quite long. We see Kljuic as
16 president of Bosnia and Herzegovina's HDZ, and we realise that he had
17 just talked to General Kadijevic. Tudjman asked him an explicit
18 question; namely, whether he had talked to Izetbegovic and Karadzic, who
19 were then the political leaders of the other two ethnicities in Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina
21 much like Izetbegovic, still believed, at least that's how it comes
22 across to me, that the JNA could be part of a solution and not one of the
23 sources of crisis. Apart from Kljuic, there was a large delegation of
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina's Croats attending this meeting.
25 Q. I just want to make sure. I don't want to get into the whole
1 debate, but this issue here is very important. Kljuic is under
2 discussion with Kadijevic, and -- because you said that they were
3 somewhat naive or gullible, gullible, I believe the word was, I think
4 that's the part that we want to be crystal clear, because we know in
5 context that Croatia
6 now we have the highest Croat representative, and he's saying words, at
7 least if I understand you, that they think that they can do business with
8 the JNA, that is, Sarajevo
9 is it that is being said in that, because you understand the events
10 better than we do.
11 A. That is precisely what I was about to point out. On the one
12 hand, we have Mr. Kljuic; and on the other, Mr. Kljuic who is saying just
13 what I've been telling you about. That's my impression, and I think
14 you've just summed it up. That was his conviction. He said he still
15 believed that an agreement could be reached, even an agreement with the
16 Yugoslav Army. On the other hand, there were a group of Croats from
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina on their way to see President Tudjman, the
18 president of Croatia
19 fact, that were strikingly different from what Kljuic was suggesting at
20 the time.
21 Q. All right. Now, in this transcript we see the name of Mate
22 Boban. At that point in time, did you know him?
23 A. Yes, I did. I had known him for quite some time before the war
24 erupted. I can't say I knew him well. He was older than me. I grew up
25 in a small town call Imotski, however, and Mr. Boban worked there. He
1 was the manager of one of the major companies based in the area. It was
2 called Napredak. That was when I made his acquaintance. During the war,
3 however, just before the developments that I have now been discussing, I
4 had been directly in touch with Mr. Boban.
5 Q. All right. Now, I believe you wanted to say something earlier,
6 and I cut you off of a little bit --
7 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes, Mr. Karnavas. I apologise for interrupting
8 you, but since we have been dealing with the document here, with the
9 minutes of this meeting under the chairmanship of the President Franjo
10 Tudjman, I would like to take this opportunity, not tomorrow when the
11 Judges are supposed to ask questions, to ask the witness about a
12 particular point since we are here at the document and you have
13 already -- I mean, Mr. Karnavas, you have already asked several questions
14 about the document, pages 28, I believe, and others. And now I would
15 like to address myself to the -- to page 31, 31, of this very document,
16 that is the document 00089, I believe. And 31, you -- concerning the
17 future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are interesting remarks. Let me
18 quote or -- it's a long quotation.
19 President Tudjman said: "In other words, the sovereignty of
21 that not only do we not have to advocate it, we must not even raise the
22 issue openly. However, why not accept this offer of demarcation -- " the
23 demarcation which would have demarcated into three parts Bosnia and
25 it this morning, and I continue now with the quotation. "However, why
1 not accept this offer of demarcation when it is in the interest of the
2 Croatian people, the Croatian people here in this republic, and the
3 Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because I do not see a single
4 reason, a single serious reason, against it. Moreover, in the talks I --
5 that I personally conducted with Izetbegovic and Milosevic, in addition
6 one of our people in Bosnia
7 the Croatian areas and those that you have included in this community of
8 Herceg-Bosna and in the community of Croatian Posavina, in the event of
9 demarcation, Croatia
10 would not only get those two communities but also for geopolitical
11 reasons Cazinska and Bihacka Krajina, which would satisfy almost ideally
12 the Croatian national interests, not only present but also for the future
13 and then from the remaining areas." End of the quotation.
14 And now my question is to Mr. Zuzul. If -- how would you in a
15 way view this excerpt of the transcript as far as the position, of course
16 it was in late 1991, position of President Tudjman concerning the future
17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I thank you, Your
19 Honour. May I say this isn't just because I was part of Tudjman's
20 cabinet, which I was. It is because I wished to tell the truth, the
21 truth that I saw and the way I saw it. I want to tell you how I think
22 about this when I think about it.
23 I think one thing that this transcript shows is one of the
24 principles -- or, rather, all of the principles that Tudjman was applying
25 whenever he thought about the future. The first thing being protecting
2 Croatian people -- the rights of the Croatian people in Bosnia
4 When he discusses this, what he actually means is a division
5 within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this is what I was trying to point out
6 having read the transcript: Tudjman is facing a proposal made by a
7 delegation of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The proposal was
8 formulated as a set of 19 issues or items. If you look at item 27 -- or,
9 rather, page 27, that Tudjman was not familiar with those conclusions.
10 He did, however, show respect to this group of Croats who came to see
11 him, and I can comment why, if you like. And he responds as to why he
12 believed that the only solution acceptable, and this is earlier on before
13 the negotiations, was a demarcation within the borders of Bosnia
15 Regardless of the fact that President Tudjman at the time knew
16 that such a response was not likely to satisfy everyone since there were
17 people around who really believed that some parts of Bosnia and
19 sincerely believed at the time that this was the only direction that this
20 moment in history could possibly take, nevertheless we have those
21 opinions on the one hand and President Tudjman's opinions in his capacity
22 as president on the other, and I think the distinction between the two is
23 perfectly clear.
24 If I may just add something based on my own knowledge of the
25 situation and something specific about Mr. Boban. It is due to a sheer
1 coincidence that I know about the following: Not long before this
2 President Tudjman had first been in touch with Mr. Boban in a way that
3 illustrated the totality of what was going on at the time. I can testify
4 to this based on my own direct experience.
5 I was part of the Croatian army, as I have pointed out already,
6 and we were headed for Dubrovnik
7 colleagues, university lecturers. We were trying to contribute to the
8 defence effort. We reached Opuzen and realised that the situation was
9 bordering on sheer panic. The Croatian army, which was only in the
10 process of being organised, was simply unable to defend the area. They
11 were short on manpower and equipment. We spoke to the command there, and
12 someone raised the following issue: What about the Croats from
14 to the Croatian army in order to defend Croatia.
15 Among our group, representatives of the Croatian army from
17 due to the fact that he is the father of probably the most famous
18 Croatian football player ever, Zvonimir Boban. A little indiscretion, if
19 I may. I was travelling with Marinko Boban in a car that his son had
20 received as a gift from his own football club, FC Milan. That's what the
21 times were like. There is nothing else I can say. We were trying to set
22 up some sort of defence.
23 At one point in time, someone at the table had raised the
24 following issue: Maybe Boban would be able to help. Maybe he could make
25 available some volunteers. He might give us a hand. The person they
1 meant was Mato Boban, who had by this time had been appointed to lead the
2 Croats in Herzegovina
3 We made a call to President Tudjman. Following our conversation, I
4 understood that he knew about Mate Boban but that they had never met.
5 Just to be specific about the time line, I'm talking about late
6 October, possibly early November. So this is just under two months
7 before the Zagreb
8 Mr. Marinko Boban should travel to Herzegovina, of which he, too, was a
9 native, and that he should talk to his relative Mate Boban and ask him if
10 he could help with defending Dubrovnik
11 Marinko Boban returned the same night late - it was well past
13 entire battalion of volunteers who would be prepared to defend and attack
14 the JNA in Herzegovina
15 Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Marinko Boban later told me and
16 President Tudjman that this really occurred, that this materialised.
17 Several days later, a group of Croat volunteers from Herzegovina
18 crossed to Eastern Herzegovina, Dubrovnik's hinterland, and this was
19 possibly one of the key factors in the defence of Dubrovnik and the
20 eventual success in defending the city.
21 I'm talking about telling the truth as I saw it. Why did I deem
22 it important to point out this very fact and to address this particular
23 meeting? President Tudjman knows that he not only enjoys the political
24 support of the Croats from Herzegovina
25 in order to do something that constituted one of the most important
1 strategic goals at the time, which was to defend Dubrovnik. He pays his
2 respect to them at that meeting. He values their presence. It wasn't a
3 matter of agreeing or disagreeing with what they were actually saying.
4 He knew that they were the only ones at the time capable of carrying this
5 extra burden of defence.
6 I don't know whether between the episode that I've just described
7 and the meeting there was any actual communication between President
8 Tudjman and Mr. Boban. I simply don't know. I do, however, believe,
9 Your Honours, that if we place this against that sort of a background
10 then reading the entire transcript is cast in an entirely different
11 light. These proposals are being made but not by President Tudjman.
12 He's discussing these proposals. He's discussing these proposals with
13 people that he respects, with people who are members of the same
14 political party. They respected him in political terms. That was one of
15 the reasons. But if you ask me, I'll say this quite openly, he realised
16 at the time how important these people were and how crucial they were to
17 his ability to obtain his own political goals and in terms of helping
19 I'm sorry if I'm trailing off here into some sort of
20 interpretation rather than telling you what you expected me to say, but I
21 do believe that this is something that casts a truly different light on
22 the transcript itself.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You provide very long answers.
24 They should be shorter.
25 I use the opportunity from my colleague's question, and this
1 will not be taken out of your time, Mr. Karnavas, rest assured.
2 I use this opportunity to raise an issue that seems to me
3 extremely relevant, and your very words raised -- focused my attention on
4 this issue.
5 I see that there was this meeting between Tudjman and the
6 delegation of Herceg-Bosna, and under item 1 it is stated that: "The
7 Community of Herceg-Bosna is going to give its full support to the
8 recognition and the final establishment of the Republic of Croatia
9 That's item 1.
10 But based on this, since you were very close to President
11 Tudjman, you held very high functions indeed, I'd like to know the
12 following: Why did the Republic of Croatia
13 at one point in time the Republic of Herceg-Bosna
14 issue based on the recent model where you had various countries that
15 recognised Kosovo. Why is it that back then Croatia did not want to or
16 was not able to officially recognise the Republic of Herceg-Bosna? Could
17 you answer this question?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you meant the
19 Republic of Herceg-Bosna
20 organisation of Croats, as far as I know Croatia never seriously thought
21 about recognising this as an independent republic.
22 As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the Republic of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, Croatia
24 if I'm not mistaken, that recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina at the moment
25 when Bosnia and Herzegovina sought the recognition. I'm again speaking
1 off the cuff. At that moment Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet sought
2 recognition either from Croatia
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are telling us that at
4 no point in time did Croatia
5 Herceg-Bosna, that it was never a concern of the then leaders of Croatia
6 and that you never heard this possibility being mentioned.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard a reference being made to a
8 possibility of the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina and separation of
9 different parts of Bosnia
10 various international negotiations because reference was made to that,
11 but the unilateral recognition by Croatia of the organisation of Croats
12 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that appeared under different
13 names, one of them being Herceg-Bosna, I never attended any such meeting
14 that a reference was made to that, and I don't know that such a
15 possibility was ever seriously considered by the Croatian leadership.
16 As for the paragraph that the Honourable Judge pointed to, one
17 can see hear that he makes a clear distinction between the
18 internationally recognised Croatia
19 certain degree, if you allow me my own interpretation, a degree of pride
20 because he knew that very soon after that Croatia would be recognised.
21 He speaks in one way about the international borders, and he speaks in
22 another way which doesn't lend itself to an easy interpretation about the
23 Croatian territory or the Croatian interest, territory, or the territory
24 where Croats lived, and he primarily implies 30 -- or the 28
1 It seems to me that one can see the difference very clearly,
2 especially within the context of the previous question. He does consider
3 certain possibilities and options, but he leaves room for future
4 decisions and reactions. And there are also areas where he's very firm
5 and categorical, one of them being the borders of Croatia.
6 I think that Tudjman could not be as categorical and as proud at
7 the moment about the recognition, the upcoming recognition of Croatia
8 he had thought at the time that the international borders of Croatia
9 would change. Tudjman was not naive. That's at least what we thought of
10 him. And if he had thought in that way he would have appeared naive.
11 On the one hand he speaks about the recognised borders and the
12 recognition of Croatia
13 ways to solve the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the different
14 options for that.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Karnavas.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Any other questions? Otherwise, we'll go on to
17 the next document. And I think from now on where we -- where there's a
18 need I think it's perfectly acceptable, and in fact the best thing is for
19 the Trial Chamber to ask their questions as we go through this.
20 Q. The next one is P 00130. This is another so-called presidential
21 transcript. And just to save a little time we can see this is 3 March
22 1992, and we can see from the very first page that your name is on -- is
23 on as one of the -- somebody that was present at the meeting. P 00130.
24 Do you have it?
25 A. [In English] Yeah.
1 Q. All right. Now, because I don't want to lose too much time on
2 this one, have you had an opportunity to read this -- this particular
4 A. [Interpretation] Yes.
5 Q. And the one part that I want to focus on just very briefly before
6 I ask you for any other things that you may wish to point out, on page
7 65, at the second paragraph, it says: "I think that this is a big
8 problem that should be resolved urgently, namely the problem of
9 communication. The Croatian War Navy, the Sixth Operational Zone, and
10 especially in the context of the problem of Herzegovina."
11 Now, this is several months after the previous transcript that we
12 saw. Can you tell us how the situation had changed if at all in Croatia
13 vis-a-vis the JNA and the aggression that we spoke about yesterday?
14 A. At that moment the overall situation had changed to a certain
15 extent. Croatia
16 been established in certain parts of Croatia or their establishment was
17 under way, so there was no military danger in Croatia. The situation was
18 frozen, in military terms, at that point. However, there was still a
19 direct threat in the area around Dubrovnik
20 of Croatia
22 We're talking about, me and others, which was the main purpose of
23 this meeting, was in relation to the general problems of the army. I and
24 the others who were with me had all just come back from a visit to the
25 territory around Dubrovnik
1 defence there, one of the problems being communication between the
2 different branches the Croatian army, more concretely between the navy
3 and land army, and the impossibility of formal communication with the
4 units. I better say -- I don't know whether I can call them units in
5 formal terms, but with the volunteers in Herceg-Bosna from the territory
6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those that I referred to a while ago. And
7 this is what this particular sentence refers to as well as the rest of my
9 I would like to add to that the group that I was with was dealing
10 with the psychological and information activities; i.e., problems in
11 communication with the different parts of the military were an integral
12 part of our everyday work.
13 Q. You're going to have to slow down a little bit now. Now we might
14 be going a little bit too fast, but is there anything else on this
15 transcript? Otherwise we'll move on to the next document. I only
16 mention that because you were present.
17 A. As for the context in which this happened, I believe that a lot
18 has already been said about that.
19 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the next document, 1 -- it's P
20 00131, and the Prosecution says that this particular document is relevant
21 because this transcript records discussions by the senior Croatian
22 military command and shows Croatian logistical assistance of both arms
23 and military units to the Bosnian Croats. And there's a reference to
24 page 27, and we can see that on that particular page there are references
25 to sector Dubrovnik
1 Now, before we get into the specifics of this, if we just look at
2 the very first page we'll see that you were present at this meeting.
3 This is the following day from the previous transcript, 4 March 1992, and
4 all sorts of other individuals are present, as well, including an
5 individual by the name of Daidza, and perhaps you could begin by telling
6 us did you know this person, who was and what position he held? Just
7 very briefly.
8 A. I met Mr. Daidza during one of my visits to the southern front.
9 I don't know whether this was immediately prior to this event. At the
10 moment when I met him, he was the commander of a unit which mostly
11 consisted of Muslim volunteers. At the moment when we met them, they
12 were in training in Croatia
13 near Makarska. Maybe in Backa Polje, but I'm not a hundred percent sure.
14 But I know for a fact that he was the commander of that unit of Muslim
15 volunteers who fought together with the Croatian volunteers against the
16 J -- the Yugoslav Army.
17 Q. Okay. I'm going to have to ask you to slow down a little bit,
18 but you say Muslim volunteers. Would they be Muslim volunteers from
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or are they Muslim volunteers from Croatia?
20 A. From Bosnia and Herzegovina. From Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 Q. Now, you also mentioned the word "training." I take it that you
22 meant military training.
23 A. Yes. I believe that this was primarily military training.
24 Q. All right. And just prior to that you had pointed to what has
25 been previously marked as 3D 03171. That's the map itself. And you had
1 pointed towards the area of Dubrovnik
2 your attention, and perhaps you might be able to comment. On page 25 of
3 this transcript where you say -- when Daidza says: "I was assigned a
4 task to arrange the valley of the Neretva River
5 commanders because it was our very last defence line. I would like to
6 give a brief statement." And then he gives a statement, and then on page
7 27, at the very last sentence there is a reference from a Luka --
8 A. Djanko.
9 Q. -- Djanko, thank you, where he talks about the zone of
10 responsibility of Dubrovnik
11 territory of the municipalities of Dubrovnik, Metkovic, Ploce -- I always
12 have problems with this one.
13 A. Vrgorac.
14 Q. Vrgorac in Western Herzegovina
15 specific about of few elements, Neum and Herzegovina cut it off and it is
16 shallow for the Defence. The Dubrovnik
17 facing subjective problems in commanding, and I will say a few words.
18 "There are actions in Herzegovina without written orders issued
19 by the staff, and I'm already there with two of my brigades. Croatian
20 people of Herzegovina
21 Popovo Polje, and I think that they have approximately 22.000 barrels of
22 artillery which is enough. I'm going to say a few words," and then
23 there's a further discussion.
24 Now just so I'm clear, do these reflect what you were saying
25 yesterday with respect to Neum and the difficulties of covering the
1 entire Croatian -- southern Croatian territory?
2 A. Yes. This is a very specific illustration of my own words. I
3 can provide you an example and give you an episode. The first time I met
4 Mr. Djanko down there he was the commander of the Croatian army in the
5 area but not of the navy. According to some information, Yugoslav tanks
6 were moving towards Opuzen -- or, rather, towards the line on the Neretva
7 River. At the moment when we arrived, he was considering the possibility
8 of blowing up a bridge on the river Bistrina in the area. However, when
9 we looked at a map we could see that this would not make any strategic
10 sense, because if he blew up that bridge, he would have prevented their
11 passage through the narrow territory of Croatia
12 and went on moving to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13 What I'm trying say is this: It was absolutely clear that it was
14 absolutely impossible to defend that territory unless the defence of the
15 part of the territory in Herzegovina
16 defence, because it was from that particular area that all the attacks
17 came from.
18 Q. All right. Okay. Thank you. We're going to move on to the next
19 three documents. I will try to cover them in succession, so I'll just
20 point out some relevant passages and then ask you to comment on them if
21 that's okay with the Trial Chamber just to save some time, because they
22 relate more or less to the same matter.
23 So we'll be looking first at P 00205. This is from the Security
24 Council. It's 15 May 1992
25 Before we go to the document, is Croatia at this point in time
1 sending troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina to attack the Sarajevo
3 A. Of course not.
4 Q. Have they sent in troops at this point in time to attack the
5 Muslim people?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Okay. And you just told us just previously that in fact there
8 were Muslim volunteers who were being trained in Croatia, assisting
10 the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina onto Croatia
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Right. Now, if we look at this Security Council Resolution, and
13 if we go to the second page under item number 2, it says: "Welcomes the
14 effort -- the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the
15 framework -- framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements
16 for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the auspices of the conference of
18 the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate actively
19 and constructively in these discussions." And it goes on and on?
20 First question is: Were you aware of -- of these activities?
21 There was -- there were undergoing discussions concerning the
22 constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 A. I was aware of that.
24 Q. Okay. And at any point in time -- this is a foundational
25 question for future questions. At any point in time, were you involved
1 in any sorts of activities, negotiations, discussions, drafting of -- of
2 agreements or what have you, that were based in part -- were due to
3 the -- the discussions on the constitutional arrangements of Bosnia
5 A. Most certainly over the entire period of time, on several
6 occasions. At this point in time, I was in a certain way involved in
7 negotiations and talks.
8 Q. All right. Now let's look at point number 3. It demands that
9 all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including
10 the units of the Yugoslav People's Army, JNA, as well as elements of the
11 Croatian army cease immediately and that Bosnia and Herzegovina
12 neighbours take swift action to end such an interference and respect the
13 territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
14 First question, to your knowledge were there elements of the
15 Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, if so, where
16 would they have been located at that point in time in light of the
17 circumstances and the activities that you've already discussed thus far?
18 A. I don't have any concrete information about that, but I believe
19 that there were elements of the Croatian army on the territories of
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I don't have any reason to doubt this report,
21 but it is also absolutely clear from the overall situation that at that
22 moment they were fighting exclusively against the JNA, which was at the
23 time in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also confirmed
24 by this particular Resolution.
25 Q. All right. Now, we're going to get other Resolutions, but if you
1 could just help us out a little bit because yesterday we talked about the
2 UN and their lack of effort to send combat troops to defend the
3 territorial integrity and the lives of Croatians as a result of the
4 aggressive actions taken by the JNA.
5 Assuming, assuming, and you told us that you were in that area
6 and you know it very well, so we have the foundation for that. You were
7 in the military, so we have the foundation for that, as well, so let's
8 assume that those elements of the Croatian army had withdrawn from that
9 area around Dubrovnik
10 assume for the sake of our hypothetical, but we will see later on that in
11 fact that was the case, that the JNA did not withdraw from that
12 territory, what would have happened to the southern part of Croatia
13 A. Yesterday I said that at that time there already was enough
14 compelling information to the effect that it was the plan of the Serbian
15 army, because the Yugoslav army at that time was completely controlled by
16 the Serbian leadership, to establish the border along the Neretva River
17 It is my impression that had it not been for the volunteers from
19 side by side with them, again I have to say this is my personal
20 impression, and the assistance they received from the Croatian army, and
21 the elements of the Croatian army, that they would not have been able to
22 achieve this goal militarily.
23 Now, as for the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as for the course
24 that the peace talks would take, this is something that we can only guess
25 and speculate, but it is a fact that all the peace talks about Bosnia
2 in control of certain territory, and at times they side-stepped the issue
3 as to how Serbs actually got to hold this territory.
4 Q. All right. Let me just move on for the sake of -- there's a
5 point number 4. We've seen this before where it talks about -- it says:
6 "Demands that those units of the Yugoslavia People's army and elements of
7 the Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be withdrawn
8 or be subject to the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina or
9 be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective
10 international monitoring, and request the Secretary-General to consider
11 without delay to what international assistance could be provided in this
13 First, let me ask you this starting with the latter part of this
14 segment. What if any assistance, what international assistance, was
15 provided at this point in time in that particular area?
16 A. Primarily monitoring it seems to me.
17 Q. Okay. Were the monitors in a position to fight back the JNA
18 should they continue with their attacks on Croatia?
19 A. I think that they did not have this kind of mandate at that time.
20 I'm sure that they didn't have it at that time. They didn't have the
21 forces to do it either. And we know, I think from the judgements
22 rendered by this Tribunal, that even when they had the forces they were
23 not in a position to intervene and to prevent some major humanitarian
25 Q. Now, the next two documents are dated --
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A follow-up question if I may
2 on the document we've just been reviewing. It is document 205 if I'm not
3 mistaken. Is this the right document, Mr. Karnavas?
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Correct, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the Resolution, on page 2 in
6 the English version, item 4, it is demanded that the Croatian army units
7 in Bosnia
8 dozens, maybe hundreds of hours.
9 To your knowledge, sir, were there units of the Croatian army in
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that at that time there
12 were elements of the Croatian army in some areas of Bosnia and
14 different issue, but they all fought side by side with all those who were
15 trying to defend themselves against the Yugoslav army and the Serbian
16 aggression as I have already said. We in the Republic of Croatia
17 instance, welcomed this resolution. At that time, I was in the Foreign
19 Why did we welcome it? Because this resolution offers two
20 options. One, for the Yugoslav army to withdraw from Bosnia and
22 international institutions, and some hoped that this could actually come
23 to pass. In that case, the question of any elements of Croatian army
24 remaining there would become immaterial. They would have nothing to do.
25 But if that did not happen, the Resolution goes on in paragraph 4 as it
1 continues offering another option for those forces to be placed under the
2 authority of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 Your Honour, I can vouch that at that time we were already in
4 contact with Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of operationalising the
5 conclusions stemming from this Resolution.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I was only referring to the
7 month of May 1992. For the rest, we'll see later. Thank you very much.
8 Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. Now, the next two documents are May 1992, and again, they sort of
11 touch upon the same issues that we've discussed, and if we look on
12 page -- page 2 of P 00232, sort of in the middle of the page it says:
13 "Deeply concern also at the developments in Croatia, including persistent
14 cease-fire violations and the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians
15 and at the obstruction of and lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR in other
16 parts of Croatia
17 If you could assist us a little bit. What are they talking about
18 when they say the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians? Are we
19 talking about in Croatia
20 A. They're talking about the events in so-called UNPROFOR zones.
21 Those were parts of Croatia
22 so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina had been set up. The international
23 forces arrived in the areas, yet despite that, the expulsion of non-Serbs
24 continued in that zone and in other zones, and when they're talking about
25 the lack of cooperation, it is obvious that at that time what happened
1 was that the self-proclaimed authorities in those occupied forces were
2 refusing to cooperate with UNPROFOR.
3 Q. Well, were those self-proclaimed authorities being assisted by
4 any particular armed force, or were they just capable on their own to
5 conduct those expulsions?
6 A. Right from the beginning, they received direct support and
7 assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army. They received weapons from
8 them. The command structure was for the most part taken over from the
9 Yugoslav army. One of the commanders in the area in -- in the Knin area
10 was Ratko Mladic before he moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina, so it is no
11 secret that it was a mix of self-proclaimed leaders who advocated the
12 idea of Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav army, which in the meantime had
13 dropped every pretense of the effort to save Yugoslavia. They merely
14 occupied Croatia
16 Q. And again before I -- before I ask my next question concerning
17 this particular document, can you tell us at this point in time how much
18 of the -- of Croatian territory is occupied? It might be relevant
19 because sometimes in this courtroom we tend to forget the percentage of
20 the country and the devastation that Croatia underwent.
21 A. Well, I don't want to pretend to be an expert. From what I've
22 read and from the documents that I received in my diplomatic career, the
23 international documents, the percentage of the territory was between 25
24 at the lower end, but the figure that was quoted most often was 30 per
25 cent of the Croatian territory. That would be one-third of the overall
1 territory of Croatia
2 Q. Okay. And we see now in this -- in paragraph 2 -- I mean on page
3 3, item 2, I'm sorry, page 3 item 2 it says: "Demands that any elements
4 of the Croatian army still present in Bosnia-Herzegovina act in
5 accordance with paragraph 4 of Resolution 752 very quickly." Had the
6 situation say, just in the southern part of Croatia, where we talked
7 about earlier, had that changed in the 15 days between the document that
8 we saw earlier, that is P 0025 and this one P 00232, had the situation
9 changed on the ground at all?
10 A. No. The situation did not change, but in the meantime the
11 diplomatic activities between Croatia
12 stepped up, and they would soon result in the signing of the agreement
13 that would fully meet the demands of the UN Security Council.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm told that there's a wrong number in the
15 transcript. It should be P 00205.
16 THE WITNESS: This is P 00232.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. For the record, for the transcript, I
18 probably misspoke and that's why it was written down. I was referring to
20 Q. Okay. Now when we get to this document P 00233, which is the
21 last document in this series, it's dated the same date, and you told us
22 that the JNA has not left at least the areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina
23 where they're attacking Croatia
24 Now, if we look at -- I just wanted to point a couple of things
25 out again. So we can take a reality check over here, or do a reality
1 check. In paragraph 10: "As regards the withdrawal of elements of
2 Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, information currently
3 available in New York
4 UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian army personnel in
5 uniforms operating within and as part of military formations in
7 The Croatian authorities have consistently taken the position
8 that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina have left the Croatian
9 army and are not subject to its authority. International observers do
10 not, however, doubt that the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina are under the
11 control of the Croatian military --"
12 A. [In English] to the portion.
13 Q. To the portion -- I'm sorry, the portion I can't read. "The
14 portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Croatian
15 military and it's whether -- whether belonging to the local territorial
16 defence, to paramilitary groups, or to the Croatian army. It is unclear
17 in the circumstances how their withdrawal or disbandment as required by
18 the council can be achieved." We spoke of Mr. Daidza. Was Daidza under
19 the -- to your knowledge, that is - if you can answer the question; if
20 not, we won't bother - but was he under the control of the Croatian
21 military or the Croatian authorities or the Croatian army?
22 A. I couldn't give you an answer to that question. I think it was
23 quite clear to me who Daidza and his volunteers were fighting, but as to
24 under whose control he was, I couldn't really venture an opinion.
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. But Mr. Daidza was from Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is a
2 notorious fact. Everybody knew that, myself included. He was from some
3 place in Central Bosnia, if I'm not mistaken.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A general question, Witness.
5 At the time you no doubt read the Resolutions of the Security Council, I
6 suppose. Your department within the ministry kept close scrutiny of
7 anything that was written at the time.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Surely. At that time, I was
9 at the Foreign Ministry at the time. We were familiar with those
10 Resolutions, and we were trying to take steps in accordance with those
11 Resolutions. Now I'm talking about the Foreign Ministry.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you know, those Resolutions
13 result from different information coming from the international forces
14 present on the ground, from other sources, and so on and so forth. In
15 your position, in your capacity, did you observe at any time major
16 mistakes in the Resolutions when certain facts were mentioned? Do you
17 have specific cases in mind where you could say that what was written
18 down was obviously wrong, inaccurate, based on unreliable information?
19 Do you have in mind one or two examples that you could give us from the
20 top of your head?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, I can't now
22 think of any Resolutions or reports of the UN Secretary-General such as
23 this one where I spotted some major errors. If there were any such
24 cases, we reacted while the Resolutions were in the process of being
25 drafted. At times, it appeared that the idea behind the Resolutions was
1 to establish some kind of a balanced approach towards -- where all sides
2 would be treated in the same way, and to us who knew what the situation
3 was like on the ground, they did not seem an accurate reflection of that.
4 I can tell you that because I had direct relations, good
5 relations, with a number of international representatives. I would
6 sometimes bring that up. At times, I would officially put -- make an
7 official protest, but most often I would receive the following reply:
8 They were there to establish facts and not to judge what is going on, who
9 is to blame and who is not.
10 It seemed to us that this approach was not always productive, but
11 that may have been just our impression because, after all, I was there to
12 represent the Republic of Croatia
13 subjective in my approach. But I couldn't really say that I noticed any
14 major glaring errors in those documents.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break --
16 MR. KARNAVAS: If I could, just one last point on this document,
17 and we'll take our break.
18 Q. Sticking with the same document, because this is 233, because you
19 mentioned Mladic, and I think it might be relevant here. If we look at
20 paragraph number 5 on page 2, it says: "The bulk of JNA personnel who
21 were deployed in Bosnia
22 and were not, therefore, covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision of
23 4 May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of them appeared to
24 have joined the army of the so-called Serbian Republic of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia
1 and Herzegovina
2 which is under the political control of the Presidency of that republic.
3 Others may have joined various irregular forces operating there."
4 Now, you said earlier -- you talked earlier about General Mladic,
5 who was in Croatia
6 little bit about what is being said in paragraph 5, why it might be
7 significant about the JNA personnel?
8 A. In an effort to report objectively, I was talking about it a
9 moment ago, it is my interpretation that the Secretary-General in this
10 report as it is worded, that the members of the Yugoslav army from Bosnia
11 and Herzegovina
12 nothing changed. Those were the same troops. They retained their
13 equipment; I think the equipment is actually mentioned somewhere in this
14 report by the UN Secretary-General, and they had the same command
15 structure. And unfortunately time would tell. I think this is the first
16 time that General Mladic is actually referred to in a document
17 originating from the United Nations, but as time went by we went on to
18 see under whose command he operated and what he actually did. So this
19 was just pretense. The same troops remained there under the same
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. That's it, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll take a
23 20-minute break.
24 --- Recess taken at 5.40 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you may proceed.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. Okay.
4 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas, to stop you, but before
5 we break I didn't want to take your time. I only would like to have a
6 question from Mr. Zuzul, and it is about a clarification.
7 During the very last minutes of -- of the witness, you spoke and
8 he spoke about some of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security
9 Council, and I believe it was page 74, lines 1 and 2, that -- that
10 Mr. Zuzul you mentioned that, and I quote: "I was there to represent
12 following: According to -- to your -- I mean the summary of what we have
13 received, there is not very much clearly stated, if you will, also posted
14 in New York
15 you mentioned that you were posted in Geneva as the permanent
16 representative of Croatia
17 statement that -- that if you were also in New York as representing
19 et cetera. So my question is to clarify if you were permanently in
21 New York
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. When the
23 Resolutions were passed, I was with the foreign ministry. I was, in
24 actual fact, assistant minister. I had started dealing with the
25 negotiations already. I had not yet been appointed ambassador. Soon
1 after this, I became deputy foreign minister.
You talked about the position of ambassador to the UN in Geneva
3 I was appointed on the 1st of February, 1993, to that particular
4 position. However, even while working as assistant and deputy foreign
5 minister in Geneva
7 and I took part in discussing all the Resolutions on the Croatian side,
8 needless to say.
9 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you very much.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Judge Prandler.
11 Q. And I wanted to point out something on page 74, line 24, because
12 it was translated as -- in an effort for those folks to be objective, and
13 I believe my colleague tells me that you used the word "Pokusaj," if I'm
14 pronouncing that correctly. Could you please tell us whether that means
15 "effort" or "attempt," because it may be a slight variation. It may be
16 slightly nuance, but just to have a more accurate -- what did you exactly
17 mean when you were asked the question about the reports? Were they
18 making an effort, or were they attempting? I don't want to put words in
19 your mouth, but I'm told that you actually used the word. We don't have
20 a Croatian transcript. So if you could think back?
21 A. [In English] I would say that they were making efforts.
22 Q. Okay. All right. Now, if we could go to the next document, and
23 we're probably going to move through the next couple of documents rather
24 quickly so we can get some more substantive areas. The next one is a P
25 document for Prosecution, P 00263. This is a presidential transcript.
1 Now, this is dated 15 June 1992
2 exhibit list indicated that the relevant pages for them are 66 to 67 and
3 that this transcript shows army of Republic of Croatia
4 into Bosnia
5 Now, if I could direct you to that page, page 67, it also shows,
6 by the way, that you were present. I don't know if you recall being
7 present, but in any event, the first page shows that you were present.
8 Page 67, as I understand it, you had an opportunity to read not just the
9 English version but also to make some comparisons with the Croatian
10 version, and it might be of some significance, I don't know, we'll leave
11 it up to the Trial Chamber, but could you look at that, the very last
12 paragraph where it starts: "The numbers of theft and larceny cases has
13 also increased." Did you notice anything missing, any words missing in
15 A. That's true, I was at this meeting. Naturally having read the
16 transcripts it came back to me. It has been 16 years since, after all.
17 However, when I read both English and the Croatian versions, I noticed
18 that the English is missing a word which in this case might change the
19 overall meaning. In the English it's page 67. In the Croatian -- I
20 don't know exactly how the pages were marked, but I think it's 714.
21 Anyway, the word "return" is missing. Therefore, if we try to translate
22 this paragraph over here there is a word missing, the word "return,"
23 which can be translated into English -- well, I am certainly no expert,
24 but to the extent that I can tell, it could be translated in two ways
25 perhaps, "withdrawal," which is I think the word that most people would
1 have used in this case, or "return," which is another possibility.
2 If you add that word to the paragraph, no matter if you actually
3 opt for the word "withdrawal" or the word "return," I think this changes
4 the meaning entirely, and the paragraph shows that those elements of the
5 Croatian army that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina were now returning home
6 and while withdrawing were perpetrating certain crimes.
7 Q. Okay. And with respect to the -- to the issue of check-points --
8 well, perhaps you could read the paragraph itself, which is only a few
10 A. [In English] Excuse me, the same paragraph.
11 Q. Yeah. And you can read it in Croatian. It can be translated or
12 you can read it in English, however you feel more comfortable. Croatian
13 is the original language of the transcript, so ...
14 A. Maybe I'll read it in Croatian so maybe we'll get new translation
16 Q. All right.
17 A. [Interpretation] "Cases of theft and larceny have been on the
18 increase. The movable property, too, has been stolen, and in the last
19 cases at local check-points machines and equipment has been moved over
20 from Herceg-Bosna where units and individuals who were involved over
21 there along various front lines while returning to Croatia have been
22 hauling in as war booty tractors, and all other kinds of agricultural
23 machinery, et cetera.
24 "However," and that's the next paragraph, "However, we have set
25 up very effective check-points here, and I can now say that we have been
1 particularly effective at putting a stop to this kind of practice."
2 Q. Okay. All right. Can you, being there, and now that we have the
3 context and having read it and spotted the error, can you tell us when
4 they say "we have set up check-points here," what are they talking about?
5 What kind of check-points, and what does "here" mean in this context?
6 A. I can't tell you exactly where the check-points were. I simply
7 don't know. However, looking at the overall context, I think these are
8 check-points in Croatia
9 Q. Okay. All right. Let's go on --
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just for the record, Mr. Karnavas, wouldn't it
11 be good to mention that it is Mate Lausic who is speaking here? It's not
12 Boban. It's not the witness.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Right. Right. I should apologise. I should have
14 done that. I'm just getting a little tired but --
15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Of course. We all are.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: -- you're absolutely correct.
17 Q. All right. And now just for the record, who is that individual
18 so we know?
19 A. I think at this time he was the commander of the military police
20 of the Croatian army.
21 Q. Okay. All right. Now, if we go on to the next -- next document,
22 P 00336. This is a presidential transcript dated 21 July 19 --
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: We have to change the folders.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Sorry.
25 Q. 21 July 1992
1 is happening in Croatia
2 stopped, or is it -- and has the territory up to 30 per cent, as you've
3 indicated, does Croatia
4 internationally recognised borders?
5 A. There were no considerable changes in Croatia at this time.
6 Large tracts of Croatian territory were still under occupation. There
7 was nothing much going on in terms of warfare, as far as I know, since
8 all of those were by now UNPROFOR-controlled areas. However, there
9 wasn't anything in particular moving in a good, positive direction
10 either. Nevertheless, relations were changing between Croatia
11 and Herzegovina
12 internationally recognised. It had been recognised by Croatia as well.
13 In the context of this story, one thing that strikes me as worth
14 mentioning is that at a referendum before Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 established, there were only Bosniaks and Croats participating. The
16 Serbs refused to be involved. President Tudjman issued a public call on
17 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to go to that referendum and to vote in
18 favour of an independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Soon after the proclamation, Croatia recognised Bosnia
21 document is in relation to the first major meeting following the
22 recognition. However, in the context of the Resolutions that I have been
23 talking about, there is one thing that I would like to note. Sometime in
24 mid-June President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic issued a joint
25 statement. I was with President Tudjman when we prepared the statement.
1 Among other things, the statement also dealt with issues
2 mentioned in the Secretary-General's letter as well as in the Resolutions
3 of the Security Council. Croatia
4 immediately. So this gives you the general background. There was a lot
5 of diplomatic activity going on. This meeting was agreed and eventually
6 held between the leaders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
7 the leaders of the Republic of Croatia
8 Q. Okay. Now -- thank you. Let me walk you step by step, but I'm
9 happy that you put that into context because let me use this to segue
10 into my next question. The Prosecution in the 62 ter description in
11 describing this particular presidential transcript, and I'll use a word
12 that they attribute to me that is "spin", this is what the Prosecution
13 says: That this transcript --
14 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, as I objected earlier this afternoon,
15 I'm also going to object again to this now.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well.
17 MR. SCOTT: There's no point in putting these preparatory
18 comments and criticisms. He can ask the question. If he can point him
19 to the page and say -- if -- assuming it's otherwise a fair question,
20 there's no reason for these other preparatory remarks.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: I am entitled -- I am entitled -- this is the
22 Defence, Mr. President. I am defending allegations. The allegation --
23 the spin by the Prosecutor who wasn't there at the time is suggesting
24 that -- that Tudjman is -- presses the Bosnian president. The gentleman
25 is particularly familiar. That's their spin. He's going to comment.
1 MR. SCOTT: This is further coaching of the witness, Your Honour.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: How is it coaching of the witness?
3 MR. SCOTT: Because I'm now telling you what the Prosecution
4 position is, so you can be sure to disagree with that. That's your queue
5 to disagree.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours.
7 MR. SCOTT: This is objectionable.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours.
9 MR. SCOTT: Just ask the question.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, let's take a reality check. I met
11 with the witness. I went through the documents. If I wanted to coach
12 him, I would have coached him back then.
13 MR. SCOTT: Maybe you did.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: This is absolutely ridiculous, and this Prosecutor
15 has met with every single witness, gone through the documents, and we've
16 seen them testify. So I'm -- they allege a joint criminal enterprise.
17 They allege that Tudjman is pressing the Bosnian president, entering into
18 a particular agreement, which is the very next document. That's their
19 spin. I'm entitled to -- I'm entitled to point that out because the
20 gentleman can comment. To suggest that I'm suggesting is utterly and
21 patently ridiculous, and I'm being generous at this point.
22 MR. SCOTT: Well, I do suggest it, and also, Your Honour, I ask
23 the Chamber and not just Judge Antonetti. I ask all the Chamber in
24 fairness. Remember back during the Prosecution case and when the
25 Prosecution put on its witnesses. I didn't say, and I'm telling you,
1 Mr. Witness, what the Prosecution case is, and this is the answer I want
2 you to give, and if you look at paragraph so-and-so of our indictment,
3 this is the Prosecution's theory. I didn't preface my questions, and the
4 Prosecution counsel didn't in that way. You ask a witness to come in.
5 You put questions to the witness. You don't argue your case. You don't
6 say, I'm telling -- I'm putting your spin on it. You ask questions.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: It's called burden of proof, Your Honour, burden
8 of proof. They are alleging. They have the power. They draft that
9 indictment the way they want it. They decided to put the spin on this
10 particular presidential transcript in order to get it in. That's their
11 interpretation. I'm not inventing anything. That's their invention.
12 They got to proof that. I'm attacking. I'm defending. That's -- so if
13 he thinks that's the case --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, the Judges are
15 thinking about how to speed up trials, and the both of you have just
16 illustrated the need for Judges to intervene at times.
17 Mr. Karnavas, you want to highlight one point. Very well. In
18 order to do so, you tell the witness, "Look at this transcript. There is
19 this particular sentence." He can say yes. He can say no. He can say,
20 "I don't know." Thereafter, afterwards you say, "well, it appears in the
21 indictment that this is being alleged," and then we can move forward.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Mr. President, but it's not in the
23 indictment. It's in their description of the evidence, but very well.
24 And I understand that the description is not evidence, and you'll see a
25 motion that I filed where I objected to these characterisations. That's
1 parted of this -- my whole attack on the Prosecution case, that in trying
2 to get in evidence they've had to put certain descriptions as to what
3 they believe the evidence shows. So that's part and parcel. And then
4 when I objected to that, they came back and they said, "No. Our -- our
5 characterisations are part of the evidence." But I take your point. Let
6 me move on. Let's go straight to the document.
7 Okay. Let's everyone calm down a little bit.
8 Q. 21st of July, 1992, there's a discussion, and I just want to
9 focus you very briefly because we're going to go on to the next document.
10 On page 59, we have Dr. Franjo Tudjman, who is the president, and there
11 he's -- he says, and I quote: "Mr. President Izetbegovic, our time is
12 limited, so can we finish with this part of the discussion as the base --
13 as the presumption for further interstate conversations, that both
14 delegations agree that the status of the Croatian people in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised on the basis of three constitutive
16 units of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and second, that the defence forces of
17 the Croatian Defence Council are considered to be an integral part of the
18 defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they are to be
19 represented in the command, the Joint Command of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
20 Now, can you tell us given the position that you held and your
21 involvement, can you tell us exactly why is President Izetbegovic
22 pursuing this sort of policy, if you will, with President Izetbegovic at
23 the time -- I mean, President Tudjman, why is he pursuing this with
24 President Izetbegovic?
25 A. I attended this meeting. I think it was a very important
1 meeting. I think it clearly illustrates the principles that President
2 Tudjman applied when he was thinking about Bosnia and Herzegovina
3 as when acting in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He accepts
4 President Izetbegovic as the president of a sovereign neighbouring
5 country recognised by Croatia
6 the position of the Croats there, the Croats as a constituent nation in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina. He's here tabling a proposal that was anyway
8 based on the proposal put forward by the international community, and I'm
9 referring to Cutileiro's plan to the effect that the Croats within Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina
11 groups there.
12 He also goes on to propose that the Croatian armed forces in
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be placed under a Joint Command to be
14 exercised by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they might be
15 better able to defend themselves from aggression.
16 I think this very paragraph does a great job illustrating
17 President Tudjman's position at the time. Not just at the time. This
18 moment is when it was actually formulated, but what I've been trying to
19 say yesterday and today is this: My impression from the very beginning
20 of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and onward was that Mr. Tudjman's
21 policies were defined by these three principles, and all three can easily
22 and to great advantage be seen in these sentences contained in the
24 Q. Okay. And just before we get down to the next document, did
25 President Tudjman --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
2 MR. KARNAVAS:
3 Q. Did President Tudjman intend to subordinate, to subordinate, the
4 Croatians and the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HVO, under
5 whatever army existed for the Sarajevo
6 "integral part," did he have some other intention?
7 A. No. He wanted both for the Croats to enjoy an appropriate
8 position in Bosnia and Herzegovina's government and its institutions
9 including the BH army command and for the Croatian defence forces to
10 become and integral and indivisible part of the BH army forces [as
12 I think it is impossible to view these two issues separately. He
13 wanted them to effectively become one and the same army, but he also
14 wanted to have a Croat involved in the command structure.
15 Q. Okay. I'm told that it was the defence forces, not the BH army
16 forces. Is that what you meant? Because my disadvantage is I don't
17 understand Croatian, and my colleague here is pointing out at page 85,
18 line 18. So if you could look at that and please tell us again, because
19 we're talking -- there are some nuances here, and I just want to make
20 sure because I can see the Prosecution busily writing away for the
21 cross-examination. I certainly don't want to give him any ammunition as
22 a result of something lost in translation.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note it was interpreted as defence
25 MR. KARNAVAS:
1 Q. Okay. Let's go to the next document. We're told -- we'll move
2 on. It's okay now. We'll move on.
3 P 0 --
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I ask a question,
5 Mr. President? As I'm unable to monitor both my words and the
6 interpretation at the same time, and I have noticed some errors, and
7 given the fact that between my testimony today, my testimony tomorrow,
8 and my next testimony months will have gone by, I have to apologise for
9 my ignorance, but may I please be granted a chance to inspect a
10 transcript of my evidence and all the other documents, especially in view
11 of the fact that I'm perfectly aware that I'm not allowed to contact the
12 Defence, the OTP, or the Tribunal? Is this something that is doable, and
13 is my request a logical one? I do apologise, but this just brought the
14 issue to mind.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Transcripts are public and they
16 normally can be accessed by everyone. So by the time you return in July,
17 you will have ample time through the internet to access the transcripts
18 of today's hearing. No problem at all. Unless the system breaks down.
19 You never know.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
21 MR. KARNAVAS:
22 Q. If we could get to the next document, P 00339, because this is
23 connected to our previous document. P 00339. It's dated July 21, 1992
24 and we could see that there's a title to it. "Agreement on friendship
25 and cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
1 Republic of Croatia
2 Now again just to make sure that we're clear, that everybody is
3 crystal clear, by this point Croatia has recognised Bosnia's
4 independence; is that correct?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Within those internationally recognised borders?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Okay. Now, we don't have that much time to dwell on this, nor do
9 we need to, but if we could go to paragraph number 8. Paragraph number
10 8. And I will go through it step by step. "In consideration of the
11 continuing aggression of the Serbian and Montenegrin military forces
12 against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also largely against
13 the republic of Croatia
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President of the Presidency of the Republic
15 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of Croatia
16 call upon the international community, and in particular the United
17 Nations, the European Community, and the United States of America
18 take real and efficient steps to vigorously stop the aggression against
19 their States, to prevent further loss of human life, persecution and
20 expulsion of their citizens and the destruction of property."
21 Let's pause right here. By this point when this was drafted,
22 when they say "in consideration of the continuing aggression," was the
23 aggression continuing in a manner in which it's stated in this paragraph?
24 A. Definitely.
25 Q. All right. And I know that we talked about this a little bit.
1 They're asking the United Nations, European Union, and the United States
2 of America
3 aggression. I mentioned this before. Let me ask it again. By -- by the
4 date of this agreement, July 21, or thereafter did the United States send
5 in combat troops to protect the territorial integrity of Croatia and/or
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina against the JNA or whoever was the aggressor at
7 the time?
8 A. No. At that point in time, nobody ever considered the sending of
9 troops that would fight the Yugoslav People's Army, and if I may comment
10 upon this paragraph, because I directly participated in the drafting of
11 all this, this is a direct annotation on behalf of both presidents to the
12 United States of America because President Clinton had become president,
13 and even before that President Tudjman had sent him a letter expressing
14 his belief that without direct involvement on the part of the United
15 States of America
16 this in the agreement between the two presidents. Both agreed with that.
17 And if I may add a comment to that with regard to this document
18 for which I believe that it is extremely important. Not that there was
19 no pressure from one side to another, but, rather, we negotiated about --
20 about all this, and I don't really know what we're to use. We measured
21 our words carefully the whole day, not just paragraphs but words,
22 especially Mr. Trnka on the Bosniak side and I and the others on the
23 Croatian side, and this is really a good example of our joint work. The
24 presidents signed the document that had been prepared by the respective
25 delegations that comprised representatives of both states. In other
1 words, this document was prepared in a very, very serious manner.
2 Q. All right. With that in mind, let's go on to the next part of
3 paragraph 8. "With this objective in mind, both States will sustain
4 their -- will sustain their past successful cooperation and continuous
5 coordination of the defensive activities in" -- I underscore "in" -- "the
6 contiguous zones of the two States."
7 Question number one is this an accurate statement? That is, was
8 there past successful cooperation between these two folks with respect to
9 activities in the contiguous zones?
10 A. The successful cooperation implied any attempt to prevent the
11 Yugoslav People's Army from achieving their overall strategic goals, and
12 I mean by that preventing them from establishing new borders or taking up
13 the area all the way down to the Neretva River
14 Q. All right. Let's go on.
15 "Aware of the fact that both States are threatened, unless
16 aggression against them is urgently stopped by further destruction and
17 annihilation of their state entity and integrity, the two states will,
18 should the efforts of the international community remain ineffective,
19 take all necessary steps in order to establish broader cooperation in the
20 military sphere and coordinate military operations in order to
21 definitely --" I think this might be "repel the danger threatening them."
22 So was this an accurate --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to broader cooperation in military -- in
25 the military sphere and coordinate military operations, since you were
1 part of the negotiating process, can you tell us at least at that stage
2 what was envisaged? I know we have the presidential transcripts, and we
3 can probably glean from that conversation, but you being a participant,
4 can you help us out here?
5 A. What this meant at the moment was every possible form of
6 cooperation between the Croatian army and the army of Bosnia and
9 paragraph leaves the possibility open, although not explicitly, about
10 joint military actions whenever those were needed.
11 Q. All right. And then just finally on paragraph 9 very quickly, it
12 says that there was an agreement to have a protocol on the establishment
13 of diplomatic relations between the two states at embassy level signed
14 immediately. Did that occur?
15 A. [In English] Yes.
16 Q. All right. Now, let's move on to the next document.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is an interesting document
18 for me, a document that was discussed with other witnesses before, and of
19 course I am going to seize the opportunity to ask this question to
20 somebody who took part in the generation of the document.
21 The previous document on the presidential transcript, and let me
22 note that the meeting lasted 10 hours and 15 minutes, we have proof that
23 the document was produced right after the meeting and that the witness
24 participated in the production of the document.
25 Here is my question: This document is signed by both presidents.
1 It is an agreement of friendship and cooperation between the two
2 republics. For your country, was this document distributed? Was it
3 published in the Official Gazette of your republic?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document was made public on the
5 same day, or maybe the following day. I'm not sure -- sure, and I'm not
6 an expert either to tell you whether this type of agreement should have
7 been published in the Official Gazette, whether it falls under that
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. I had another question.
10 This is an international agreement. According to your law, unfortunately
11 I didn't have the time to check it myself, but was this document due to
12 be ratified by the parliament, or was it up to the president to commit
13 his country to an international agreement without necessity to -- for the
14 document to be ratified?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that for this document no
16 ratification was necessary. In my view, under the then-prevailing
17 constitution the president of the republic could have signed this
18 agreement without this document being ratified by the parliament. I
19 believe that under the current constitution of the Republic of Croatia
20 this type of agreement could have -- could be signed even by the Minister
21 of Foreign Affairs, which for that matter is the case in other states as
22 well. But I believe that given his constitutional competencies, the
23 president could sign such a document today.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Several revolutions of the
25 Security Council are referred to in this document, particularly the one
1 on the 13th of July, 1992. Did you officially send this document to New
3 And in the next document - Mr. Karnavas was maybe about to talk about this
4 document - another Resolution is mentioned. So did you send that document
5 to the international community so that everybody could be made aware that
6 from now on the HVO army was a component part of the army of Bosnia
7 and Herzegovina as provided for in paragraph number 6 of the document?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We informed the international
9 community about this document on the following day.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] These were all my questions.
11 Mr. Karnavas.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Now if we could turn
13 to --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Hold on a second. Mr. Praljak
15 is on his feet. I don't know why.
16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Well, then, very well.
17 If --
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, let me just go on.
19 Q. The next document is 1D 02295. Okay. Okay. I will --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.
21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, your words
22 have been translated into Croatian as the document saying that the HVO
23 would be opposed to the BiH army. That's how it has been translated into
24 Croatian. Can this please be taken into account?
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's not what I said. There
1 has been an error in the interpretation. What I said is that the HVO
2 army, according to the document, was an integral part of the army of
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's what I said. So I'm calling upon the
4 interpreters to be very vigilant because on several occasions we've seen
5 the importance or the significance of -- of nuances such as a comma or
6 full stop. So, please, if you note any problems or misinterpretation,
7 please don't hesitate to let us know for -- in everybody's interests.
8 MR. STEWART: May I point out that exactly the same error appears
9 in the English transcript, so what Your Honour has just said will
10 constitute a correction of that as well.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well indeed, because when
12 I speak I don't necessarily check the transcript in English. I look at
13 you rather than -- than at the screen. I'd rather look at the Defence
14 counsel than at my screen.
15 Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: [Overlapping speakers] Thank you. First, I have
17 to thank General Praljak for that correction, and that's an important
18 one, and we thank him very much. And we thank that he insisted on making
19 that correction. The dangers of circumstantial evidence sometimes, of
20 jumping to conclusions.
21 Q. 1D 02295. That's the next document. It's dated 6 August 1992,
22 obviously some time after the agreement we've seen, and it says here at
23 the very top: "I have come to the territory of the Republic of Croatia
24 at the decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia
1 Abdic. Do you know who this person is?
2 A. Yes, I knew Mr. Abdic.
3 Q. All right. And we'll hear more about him through other
4 witnesses. Now, if you go further down, I don't want to -- he does
5 indicate: "My task is to organise activities which are at this moment of
6 particular importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina."
7 Skipping the next sentence and going down it says: "In view of
8 the recently signed interstate agreement, we consider Croatia
9 right place to set up a number of activities which are of consequence for
10 both republics. With your consent, we intend to establish a Main Staff
11 for providing support to Bosnia and Herzegovina with its headquarters in
14 And then if we go to the very last paragraph, first sentence:
15 "We kindly ask that you adopt a decision legalising the work of our Main
16 Staff and regional staff in the Republic of Croatia
17 which will be determined by mutual agreement."
18 My first question is when he's talking about the recently
19 interstate agreement, were there any other agreements other than the one
20 that we just saw that presumably, if we are to believe some, Alija
21 Izetbegovic was pressed to sign? Were there any other agreements, or is
22 this the agreement that Mr. Abdic is referring to?
23 A. I think that Mr. Abdic was referring to the agreement that we had
24 just looked at and discussed, because this letter is only a logical part
25 of the implementation of this agreement. He may even be referring to one
1 of the earlier agreements, the one that was signed in June that I have
2 mentioned, but I would rather be inclined to say that it -- it is
3 referring to the last agreement we discussed.
4 Q. All right. And when he's talking about setting up a Main Staff,
5 with the intent to establish a Main Staff, what did you -- if you can
6 tell us, what do you think he means by that? What is he asking? Are we
7 talking about the military or civilian sector? What are we talking
9 A. My interpretation would be that this primarily applies to the
10 military and logistical centre. As you can see in the map,
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina has a border only with Serbia from which aggression
12 came from, and the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina for that matter
13 was occupied by the Serbs. So the only the connection of Bosnia and
15 and that's why all the numerous refugees and all the supplies went
16 through the Republic of Croatia
17 aid, medical aid, food, and clothes. All those things went through the
18 Republic of Croatia
19 and Herzegovina
20 international community.
21 And I would like to apologise to the Honourable Judge and correct
22 myself. A decision or an embargo on the import of arms had been imposed
23 on the Republic of Croatia
24 republics were not -- were poorly armed, and they were facing a very
25 well-armed enemy, which was the Yugoslav People's Army.
1 Bearing that in mine, everybody has to be clear and understand
2 that they resorted to various means to arm themselves. I wouldn't be
3 able to testify about the ways and means, the arms reached the Republic
4 of Bosnia and Herzegovina because I'm not well-informed about that. But
5 whoever who looks at the map will understand how it went. A lot has been
6 written about that.
7 My understanding is that a large part of the international
8 community was actually aware of the fact that they had issued a very
9 unjust decision, and by issuing that decision they had prevented the
10 state from arming itself and defending itself. A large part of the
11 international community turned a blind eye, I would say, when it came to
12 the supply and transport of both weapons as well as all the other
13 different military equipment through the territory of Republic
14 into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 If you will allow me another comment, I would like to say that
16 the Republic of Croatia
17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it would not have made much sense to
18 issue a decision to the effect of helping it to arm itself, and I'm sure
19 that it did help in every possible way.
20 Q. All right. And tomorrow we'll see some documents to that effect.
21 All right.
22 Now, if we could go through the next document, P 0386, P 00386.
23 We see that this is 13 July. This is a week after Mr. Abdic made that
24 request. This is Resolution 771, and --
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, how much time,
1 please, has been used by Mr. Karnavas?
2 MR. KARNAVAS:
3 Q. Okay. If you look at this document and you look at the next
4 document, which is P 387, and we look at the other one -- the other
5 document that follows that, the other P document, P 00406, if we can just
6 spend a few seconds looking at them. They're all from the UN. The first
7 one, 386, is 13th of August, the second one is 13th of August, and the
8 third one is 25th of August. If I can just ask you very briefly, had the
9 situation changed on the ground, that is, had the -- had the JNA or
10 the -- or elements of it, had it left the -- the territories of Bosnia
11 and Herzegovina
12 that is?
13 A. Nothing major changed in Croatia, and as for Bosnia
15 Army gradually occupied territories and violated all international rules.
16 In one of the items of this Resolution, makes an explicit reference to
17 ethnic cleansing. Where is that? I think it's item 2, which mentions
18 the operations of the Serbian army in the territory of Bosnia
20 Q. You're referring to which document, but there are three
22 A. Document 386.
23 Q. Okay. All right. But say, for instance, in the other document
24 where they're talking about, for instance, 406, you'll see under page 3,
25 paragraph number 3: "Demands further that those units of the Yugoslav
1 People's Army and elements of the Croatian army now in Bosnia and
3 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
4 Okay. Now if we pause a little bit at this, it seems to me from
5 your previous answer that the Yugoslav People's Army is still there.
6 Would it be fair to say the elements of the Croatian army remained --
7 seemed to be in -- within Bosnia and Herzegovina?
8 A. If I may explain. This is a -- a Resolution of the
9 General Assembly, which differs from the Resolution of the Security
10 Council. It differs because it doesn't have an executive force and also
11 by the way it was passed. It took a longer time to prepare this
12 Resolution, and it always does then for the Resolutions of the Security
13 Council. If that wasn't the case, then it would be a totally superfluous
14 to mention the Croatian forces because the agreement that deals with this
15 issue evokes the already-signed Resolutions, which means that the
16 conditions of the Resolutions had been met.
17 I can tell you that I'm aware of this Resolution. When the
18 diplomacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an initiative to issue this
19 Resolution Croatia
20 personally took the text of the proposal of the Resolution to President
21 Tudjman, and he authorise I had me to instruct our diplomats to give
22 their full support to the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina
23 this Resolution was being passed.
24 As you know, it takes 100 -- over 180 States or over half a
25 majority of the Assembly of the United Nations pass a Resolution. This
1 Resolution was more political than executive in nature, but as far as the
2 diplomacies of the Republic of Croatia
3 concerned, this meant that this was an implementation of our friendship
4 agreement, and we in Croatia
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Well, I see our time is up for the day,
7 Mr. President. I don't want to keep anyone here any longer.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you've used three
9 minutes -- three hours, sorry, and 45 minutes. So you'll have one hour
10 and 15 minutes left tomorrow.
11 Now, what about tomorrow? I'm turning to the other Defence
12 counsel. Will you cross-examine this witness? If you wish to
13 cross-examine this witness, you'll have two hours and 30 minutes.
14 Mrs. Alaburic, is --
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I believe that
16 it would be very good to use Mr. Zuzul's time, because Mr. Zuzul knows a
17 lot about topics that are very relevant for us. I do intend to put
18 several questions to Mr. Zuzul. I have half an hour at my disposal, and
19 I've asked the Defence teams of Mr. Pusic and Mr. Stojic to give me their
20 time if I find this to be necessary and of benefit to the Trial Chamber,
21 and I'm also going to talk to the other Defence teams if they're not
22 interested in cross-examining to give me their times.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you will
24 cross-examine this witness during an hour and a half.
25 Mrs. Nozica.
1 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. For the
2 time being I do not intend to -- to examine the witness. In any case, we
3 will decide by tomorrow, and if we do not intend to examine we will give
4 our time to Mrs. Alaburic.
5 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honours, we expect not to have any questions.
6 Perhaps Mr. Praljak will have one or two very short, but it is still
7 under consideration. More probably not than yes, but if, we are talking
8 really about couple of minutes.
9 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as things
10 stand now, we are not going to have any questions. We will make our
11 final decision tomorrow. And as Mrs. Nozica has already told you, in
12 that case we will give our time to Mrs. Alaburic.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Anyway, tomorrow we will
14 conclude at 6.30 at the latest. Judges may need some time to ask
15 questions as well. If there isn't enough time left, you know that the
16 hearing will resume on the 18th of July. Witness, the 18th of July is a
17 Friday. The Prosecutor will have five hours to cross-examine you. Of
18 course there have been administrative issues, objections, and so on, and
19 it appears that we won't have enough time to finish everything on Friday.
20 We may have to continue on Monday morning. Therefore, you will have to
21 stay over during the weekend between the 18th of July and the 20th. I
22 hope this is not going to cause any difficulty for you since, in
23 particular, weekends in The Hague
24 nice. So please make the necessary arrangements to be at the disposal of
25 the Chamber on Friday, the 18th of July, and most probably on the
1 following Monday because after the Prosecutor's cross-examination, there
2 will most probably be redirect. So we need to schedule for two days and
3 not just one, just for your prior information. I know July is still far
4 away, but I just wanted to give you that information so that you can make
6 Now, you may have planned some holidays in July. I don't know.
7 It may not be very convenient for you, but it is impossible to do
8 otherwise. The Prosecutor was not in a position to start his
9 cross-examination this week. This is obvious.
10 This is all I wanted to say at this stage. We will resume the
11 hearing tomorrow at 2.15 in the afternoon. Let me reiterate the
12 recommendations I gave you yesterday. No communication with anyone while
13 you're still under oath. Thank you. See you tomorrow.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.
15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day
16 of May, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.