Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27642

 1                           Wednesday, 7 May 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the

 6     case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours; good afternoon

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-74-T,

 9     the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             Today is Wednesday, 7th of May.  Good afternoon to the

12     Prosecution, to the Defence counsel, to the accused, and to all the

13     people assisting us in our work.

14             For your information, Mr. Karnavas, you used one hour, 19

15     minutes, so you can add up, and you'll see how much time you have left.

16             Let's have the witness in.

17                           [The witness entered court]

18                           WITNESS:  MOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.  We are

21     going to resume the examination-in-chief.  You have the floor.

22             You may proceed, Mr. Karnavas.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good afternoon, Your

24     Honours and everyone in and around the courtroom.

25                           Examination by Mr. Karnavas:  [Continued]

Page 27643

 1        Q.   And good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul.  Welcome back.  I trust you had a

 2     good evening.

 3             Now, yesterday when we left off, I'd asked you a question about

 4     the concept of confederation, and it was at that point when you were just

 5     about to finish your answer when we had to stop for the day.  We will

 6     discuss in great detail this concept, but with respect to the concept of

 7     confederation, did President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic ever sign

 8     any agreements concerning that?

 9        A.   President Tudjman, President Izetbegovic signed a mutual

10     agreement on the confederation.  I believe that was on the 14th of

11     September, 1993.  The decision was taken that the agreement would be kept

12     secret in a way.  It was never made public.  Each of the presidents kept

13     a copy, and there was another one kept at the mission of the Republic of

14     Croatia at Geneva.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16        A.   Needless to say, I am well aware of the existence of that

17     agreement because I was involved in preparing it, and I actually

18     physically drafted it myself.

19        Q.   All right.  Now, we'll discuss that later on towards the end of

20     your testimony here today, but just to round off this topic, are you

21     aware whether President Izetbegovic ever signed any other agreements with

22     others that would impact or had anything to do with the agreement that

23     you've just indicated to us?

24        A.   Yes.  A mere two days later, President Izetbegovic signed an

25     agreement with Mr. Karadzic.  It was a similar agreement, but it wasn't

Page 27644

 1     about a confederation.  It was about creating republics within the union.

 2     The most noteworthy feature of that agreement was this:  First of all,

 3     Izetbegovic took this step without ever mentioning it to the Croatian

 4     side, or at least not to President Tudjman.

 5             Secondly, the substance of the agreement itself.  What is

 6     noteworthy is the fact that President Izetbegovic subscribed to the

 7     possibility that after two years the Serbs would be allowed to leave the

 8     union.  The possibility, in other words, for Bosnia and Herzegovina to

 9     break up.

10        Q.   All right.  And we're going to get to that, as well, but I just

11     want to make sure I'm crystal clear here and that the Judges understand

12     this.  What you're telling us is this:  That the second agreement between

13     Izetbegovic, two days later that is, and the Serbs called for the

14     possibility of an eventual carving up of Bosnia-Herzegovina two years

15     after that agreement; is that correct?

16        A.   That's correct.

17        Q.   Now, finally before we get into the documents, and when we do so

18     we'll be going through them rather quickly, but finally were you ever

19     present when Izetbegovic offered any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina

20     to anyone else, because it would seem to me that based on this agreement

21     he's offering the Serbs a piece of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Did he ever

22     offer any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to anyone else and, if so,

23     to whom?

24        A.   I was present in Geneva, I think, in the spring of 1993, just

25     before this when President Izetbegovic made a direct proposal to

Page 27645

 1     President Tudjman for Western Herzegovina to be annexed by Croatia.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3        A.   This was during a recess in the Geneva negotiations.  I was with

 4     President Tudjman, and we approached President Izetbegovic.  This was

 5     something that often happened during recesses in negotiations.

 6             At a meeting that had just taken place, there had been very

 7     unpleasant conversation where the Bosniak side with President Izetbegovic

 8     and the Serbs clashed.  I think it was purely human reasons that

 9     motivated or pushed Tudjman to approach Izetbegovic during that recess.

10     I can't remember specifically who was with President Izetbegovic.  I do

11     believe that Mr. Miles Raguz was also with him at the time.

12             They talked and President Izetbegovic made a proposal in no

13     uncertain terms about what I just said, for Western Herzegovina to secede

14     from Bosnia and Herzegovina and join Croatia.  He wasn't specific about

15     the precise extent of the territory on offer.  Nonetheless, President

16     Tudjman refused to talk about this.

17             Later on after we'd left, at lunch the president continued to

18     talk about this.  My impression at the time was he had been somewhat

19     taken aback by this.  He nevertheless believed that regardless of

20     Izetbegovic's motives for that proposal this could never be an

21     appropriate solution for dealing with the crisis in Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina, nor indeed could it be a solution for the status of the

23     Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24             Some time later, perhaps a year or more later, I brought this

25     anecdote up with Minister Granic who at the time was Croatia's Foreign

Page 27646

 1     Minister.  He then shared with me that he, too, once had attended a

 2     meeting at which President Izetbegovic tabled a similar proposal.  This

 3     other proposal that Minister Granic was now telling me about was even

 4     more specific in purely territorial terms.  There was talk of specific

 5     municipalities that would make up this territory.  Nonetheless, at least

 6     based on what Granic told me at the time, Tudjman yet again refused to

 7     discuss any solutions of that nature.

 8        Q.   Okay.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  Mr. Zuzul, you have said that there

10     were human reasons.  That at least is the translation, and I would be

11     grateful if you could elaborate a bit.  Do you mean personal reasons

12     or -- or what does it mean?  I do not understand.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, during that session, and of

14     course I'm telling you about this based on how I remember things to have

15     happened, I think there was quite a severe verbal attack launched, I

16     think, by Mr. Krajisnik against Mr. Izetbegovic.  Mr. Izetbegovic looked

17     hurt, if anything, by this sort of approach that took place as part of a

18     round of negotiations.  Other than that, there had been a number of

19     situations in which the Serb negotiators took a harsh or even vulgar

20     approach in how they accosted the other delegations.  This was one such

21     situation.

22             As to President Tudjman's humanly understandable motives for

23     approaching Izetbegovic thereafter, to be perfectly clear this is just my

24     own personal interpretation of those events.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

Page 27647

 1             MR. KARNAVAS:

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now -- I'm told that maybe you should say in English what

 3     "Lucki" means.  Lucki.  Well, the English translation obviously was --

 4     may be incorrect.

 5        A.   [In English] I would also say it was human approach based on

 6     empathy.

 7        Q.   Empathy.  Okay.  So in other words, Izetbegovic had been

 8     attacked.  He's sitting there by himself.  Tudjman, being the statesman

 9     that he was and a human, went there to comfort another human just to --

10     after that very difficult and vulgar attack by Krajisnik.  Is that

11     basically what it was?

12        A.   That would be my interpretation.

13        Q.   Okay.  And it was during that -- that exchange, if you will, when

14     Izetbegovic offered Western Herzegovina and Tudjman rejected it.

15        A.   [Interpretation] Yes.  But the reaction didn't come immediately.

16     We started talking about a number of different things.  At one point, the

17     discussion settled on the need for a solution.  It was at this time that

18     President Izetbegovic said as follows -- well, I don't think I can quote

19     him with any degree of accuracy, but he made a proposal for Western

20     Herzegovina to secede and join Croatia.

21        Q.   All right.  And just one -- I guess let's stay with this for one

22     second.  Did -- was there any counter-proposal by President Tudjman and

23     say, "Well, I don't need Western Herzegovina.  How about just giving me

24     Neum, and I'll give you that water port that you're looking for," you

25     know, that deep port?

Page 27648

 1        A.   At that time, no proposals were being made by President Tudjman

 2     apart from a crystal clear reply to the effect that this was in no way an

 3     acceptable solution.

 4        Q.   All right.  Now, we're going to go through some documents.  I'm

 5     going to ask you to keep your answers rather short, and then I'll direct

 6     you if I need more amplification.  We have quite a few, so we're going to

 7     go at a rather rapid clip, but nonetheless I think the information you've

 8     provided thus far lays a good foundation for -- for that process.

 9             With you, there should be some binders, unless they took them

10     away.  Are they are?

11        A.   [In English] Yes, they are here.

12        Q.   And if you could to binder number 1, and if you could look at the

13     first document, which is 1D 02039.

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  And incidentally, Your Honours, this is the

15     constitution of the Republic of Croatia.  We've seen it before.  In fact,

16     we saw it with the very first witness.  I mention this because this is a

17     document that is well known to everyone around the court in light of our

18     conversation yesterday, that is.

19        Q.   Now, let me preface my question by saying we had a witness by the

20     name of Donia that came here.  He's an historian who worked for the

21     Prosecution.  And in his report -- in his testimony he made references in

22     respect to the Banovina and quoted others or cited others to support his

23     thesis that President Tudjman had aspirations of re-establishing the

24     Banovina Hrvatska boundaries, and both in his report and his testimony he

25     made reference to the constitution.  In the preamble, that is.

Page 27649

 1             So now I want to go -- I want you to look at this document, 1D

 2     02039, page 1, towards the second to last bullet where it says:  "In the

 3     establishment of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939 by which Croatian state

 4     identity was restored in the Kingdom Of Yugoslavia."

 5             Now, if you could please comment on the preamble recognising

 6     that, one, you did not draft the constitution but you have been a member

 7     of the government and you are from Croatia.  You should be aware of the

 8     constitution.  Can you comment on that and you knew President Tudjman as

 9     well?

10        A.   [Interpretation] Of course I do believe I'm in a position to

11     comment on that.  I think I'm sufficiently familiar with Croatia's

12     constitution both as a citizen and as an official.

13             I declare categorically that this interpretation has nothing to

14     do with what is actually contained in the preamble to the Croatian

15     constitution.

16        Q.   Why is that?

17        A.   Anyone who reads this page without necessarily possessing

18     appropriate legal skills and knowledge must understand that what this is

19     about is the continuity of Croatia's right to sovereignty and not

20     Croatia's right to territory.  Were this about territory and not about

21     sovereignty, this would be entirely absurd.  In that case, having read

22     the whole thing, Croatia's territory would be somewhere between 10 per

23     cent of its present territory and perhaps 200 per cent of its present

24     territory.  It would probably be spilling over into Austria, Hungary,

25     Italy, Slovenia, and perhaps even the Catholic church.

Page 27650

 1             If I may just be allowed to furnish an additional explanation as

 2     to the importance of the Banovina of Croatia in determining the historic

 3     continuity of the Croats' right to statehood.

 4             As is well known from history, and that is something that we see

 5     mentioned here again, there is a reference to 1918 and the break-up of

 6     the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.  After the end of World War I and based on

 7     the principle of self-determination as defined by Woodrow Wilson,

 8     President of the United States, the Croats -- or, rather, Croatia's

 9     representatives at the Versailles Conference opted to unite with the

10     Serbs and the Slovenes, thereby constituting the Kingdom of Serbs,

11     Croats, and Slovenes.  They did, however, keep their sovereignty and

12     their own parliament.  This went on until 1928, when Croat delegates were

13     assassinated in the Yugoslav Assembly.

14             In 1929, the then King of Yugoslavia imposed a constitution on

15     the Croats, defining Yugoslavia as an absolutist monarchy, thereby

16     abolishing any form of sovereignty of the Croatian people.

17             That is why it is so exceptionally important for the idea of

18     continuity as well as its legal foundations that in 1939 following an

19     agreement between the Croatian and Serbian prime ministers, Cvetkovic and

20     Macek, there was a decision by the King to establish the Banovina of

21     Croatia.  In territorial terms, this never came to fruition simply

22     because the Second World War started soon after.  This was, however, of

23     the essence to Croatia because this gave Croatia back its right to

24     sovereignty, and then documents followed in 1943, 1945, and this period

25     spanned all the way to the 1974 constitution.

Page 27651

 1             It is not my intention to pass myself off as a constitutional

 2     legal expert.  I am, however, convinced that this is the only correct

 3     interpretation of the preamble.

 4        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Well, perhaps you might be able to assist

 5     us in -- in more concrete ways given that explanation, of course, but in

 6     a different context.

 7             We had another witness here, John Kenneth Galbraith's son, the

 8     famous economist.  His son came in.  He happened to be the ambassador to

 9     Croatia from the United States, Peter Galbraith, and he testified, and he

10     testified that President Tudjman had territorial aspirations and that he

11     believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would not and should not continue as a

12     sovereign independent state and that a substantial part of Bosnian

13     territory should become the territory of the Republic of Croatia.  He

14     indicated that he formed those opinions having met with him on a frequent

15     basis, sometimes even several times a day.  He talked about Tudjman being

16     prejudiced against the Muslim people, and he also indicated at one point,

17     he mentioned the fact as further -- as further basis for list supposition

18     that Croatia had a policy of granting Croatian citizens to any ethnic

19     Croat who wanted it, and of course as compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina in

20     this period, you know, that would have been one other way of establishing

21     his territorial ambitions.

22             And I'm quoting -- or this is part from the testimony, Your

23     Honours, for the record.  The gentleman testified in open court on

24     September 12, 2006, and passages to basically what I was referring to are

25     from pages 6435, 36, 6427-28, and 6453-54.

Page 27652

 1             First let me ask you this, sir:  Did you know Peter Galbraith?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   And yesterday incidentally, just let me touch on this, you talked

 4     about a Contact Group, and as I understand it in the context in which you

 5     put it, the Contact Group was established as a result of the failure of

 6     the Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg Plans which were UN-EU coordinated

 7     efforts; is that correct?

 8        A.   That was certainly my impression.  I think that is correct.

 9        Q.   You indicated that one of the members of the Contact Groups was

10     the United States, and my first question is Peter Galbraith, being the

11     American ambassador to Croatia, was he the representative of the United

12     States during those negotiations, the Contact Group, to your knowledge?

13        A.   No, he was not the representative of the United States in that

14     Contact Group, not the most active representative of the United States.

15     There was one who was specially nominated for that position by

16     President Clinton, and that was Ambassador Charles Redman.

17        Q.   All right.  And again, how well did you know Peter Galbraith?

18        A.   Quite well, I'd say.

19        Q.   All right.  Now, he indicates that President Tudjman did not want

20     Bosnia and Herzegovina to exist.  Is that statement correct in your

21     opinion?

22        A.   In my opinion, this is an incorrect statement.

23        Q.   And what about his statement that he wanted to re-establish the

24     borders more or less based on the Banovina?

25        A.   Again, I think this is another incorrect statement.

Page 27653

 1        Q.   Now, he talked about this policy.  Policy, and I mention that

 2     word, and I underscore it because in some ways, in some circles, in some

 3     -- under some circumstances it could give sort of a nefarious notion.

 4     Let me ask you this being familiar with the Croatian constitution:  Are

 5     Croats all over the world, wherever they may be born, do they have the

 6     possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to have a Croatian

 7     passport?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Also, do the Croats around the world, wherever it may be, do they

10     have the possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to serve on the

11     Croatian parliament?  I believe it's called Sabor.

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And in fact, if I'm not mistaken, are there some seats that are

14     specifically allocated to those Croats because historically speaking

15     there have been Croatian communities throughout the world that have been

16     organised in order to take care of their particular needs?

17        A.   Correct.  And if I may add to that, because very often it seems

18     to me that this is misinterpreted.  Although there is a number of states

19     across the world that allow their citizens who live abroad and work there

20     to participate in the parliamentary life of their respective states,

21     Croatia has had a number of reasons to allow its citizens that privilege,

22     because when the citizens' will was exercised after the democratic

23     elections and when the free Republic of Croatia was established, which

24     was then internationally recognised, one could not and dared not ignore

25     the fact that there was approximately the same number of Croats residing

Page 27654

 1     within the territory of Croatia proper as those residing outside of the

 2     territory of Croatia.

 3             Why was it that this fact should not have been ignored?  A number

 4     of them had left for economic reasons, but a large number of those Croats

 5     had left for political reasons during the time of Communism, and they

 6     could not even spend holidays in Croatia or visit their family members.

 7     They were not allowed to do so.  In other words, when those Croats were

 8     given an opportunity to participate in the political life of Croatia,

 9     this meant that the injustice was corrected, at least to a certain

10     extent, the injustice that they themselves were not guilty of.  They were

11     not to be blamed for that injustice.

12             A provision was introduced that exists in a number of democratic

13     states when this was done.

14        Q.   Okay.  I think that --

15        A.   Likewise -- if I may.

16        Q.   Okay.

17        A.   I believe that this is very important because your question

18     contained one part that was relative to the possibility of holding a

19     Croatian passport.  Maybe you would like me to comment on that.

20        Q.   Very briefly.

21        A.   It is true that a large number or a majority of Croats who reside

22     in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina also have Croatian citizenship

23     and hold Croatian passport because this is provided for by the law --

24     laws of both Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  However,

25     based on my knowledge and my information, I believe that I can say that

Page 27655

 1     the other state with a number of citizens holding a Croatian passport is

 2     the United States of America, and if we followed Ambassador Galbraith's

 3     logic, would that mean that Croatia also had aspirations towards the

 4     territory of the United States of America?  What I'm saying is this is

 5     just an absurd claim.  These are two things that have nothing whatsoever

 6     to do with each other.  The right to a passport cannot be interpreted by

 7     saying that one nation has territorial aspirations towards the territory

 8     of another nation.

 9        Q.   All right.  Thank you for that.  Now, we're going to move on to

10     the next document, 1D 02910, and this is a -- a presidential transcript.

11     We've seen it before.

12             It has a D number, Your Honours, because there were some pages

13     that were added.  We translated 12 pages, so that would have been the

14     extent of -- this was P 00037.  So the 12 added pages would have been the

15     addition to burdening everyone around the court with additional reading?

16             Now, if I may, Your Honours, read from the -- the Prosecution's

17     exhibit list and their 65 ter description of this particular document.

18     It will be my vehicle for the next series of questions.

19             If you have that, sir.  Based on -- this is what the Prosecution

20     says:  "This transcript shows that Franjo Tudjman had clear territorial

21     ambitions toward Bosnia.  The transcript also discusses the deal made

22     between the Serbs and the Croats in Karadjordjevo to divide Bosnia," and

23     their reference is to page 2, 5 to 8, and 38 to 39.

24             First -- first of all, let me ask you do.  You have the document

25     with you?

Page 27656

 1        A.   Yes, I do.  I have it in front of me.

 2        Q.   Now, this was a presidential transcript that comes from the 7th

 3     session of the Supreme State Council, 8 June 1991.  First of all, were

 4     you present?

 5        A.   No, I wasn't present because at that moment I was not politically

 6     active at all.

 7        Q.   Have you had an opportunity to -- to go through this presidential

 8     transcript?

 9        A.   Yes, I have.

10        Q.   Now --

11             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  Just -- just a --

12             MR. KARNAVAS:  Technical.

13             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Oh, okay.  A correction in the transcript.  I

14     think it has just disappeared now.  The number of the document is not

15     correctly stated.  There is an 8 too much, and it might later make it

16     difficult to find it.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  It's 1D 02910.

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  That's correct.  Thank you.

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  All right.  And this was Prosecution document P

20     00037.  The only exception is that we've added or translated, I should

21     say, pages 76 to 83, Your Honours, and pages 96 to 100, and you will be

22     able to notice that quite easily if you look at those pages.  They're not

23     numbered, but actually you'll see "Unofficial translation" is at the

24     right top part of the page.

25        Q.   In any event, with that, if we could turn to page 2 just very

Page 27657

 1     quickly.  I want to focus your attention where it says:  "About the sixth

 2     meeting of the presidents of the republic."  Okay?  And then you see:

 3     "As you can conclude from the release, certain progress has been made in

 4     the talks held so far and that Serbia, which means Montenegro, as well,

 5     accepted the basic principle of the establishment of an alliance of

 6     sovereign republics."  And then it goes on.  You also see Izetbegovic's

 7     name at the bottom of the page.

 8             First of all, if you could help us out a little bit in context

 9     because I've noted this is June 8, 1991.  What is happening in and around

10     Yugoslavia at that period?  And I'm going to ask you to, like, either

11     speak a little faster and shorter so we can go through this material.

12             And I apologise to the translators if they're going to have to

13     labour a little bit more.

14        A.   At that moment there were almost panic attempts to find a

15     solution to the break-up of Yugoslavia.  It was absolutely clear that

16     Yugoslavia could not continue existing in the form that it existed up to

17     then.  The collective Presidency stopped functioning.  All the republics

18     had their own governments and their own presidents, and in an attempt to

19     find a solution the presidents met on a regular basis, and this is

20     obviously a meeting that took place after the sixth meeting of the of

21     presidents.

22             The international community at that point in time was not showing

23     very much interest in what was happening in Yugoslavia, in -- it did

24     express, however, its position and stated that Yugoslavia should continue

25     existing in one way or another, in one form or another.

Page 27658

 1             Two western-most republics of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and

 2     Croatia, which I dare say were certainly most developed in economic terms

 3     and also had managed to develop the most democratic relationships within

 4     their respective societies, proposed a model of confederal organisation

 5     of Yugoslavia.  They did not advocate the break-up of Yugoslavia but,

 6     rather, Yugoslavia as a confederation similar to -- to a certain extent

 7     to the European Commission or Benelux at its very beginnings.

 8             This proposal was drafted by a commission -- a joint commission

 9     of Slovenia and Croatia upon the proposal of President Tudjman.  The

10     representatives of Serbia and Montenegro rejected that proposal.  They

11     did not even want to talk about it and tabled a completely different

12     proposal for the survival of Yugoslavia.  According to that proposal,

13     Yugoslavia would have been even more unitarian that it was according to

14     the previous constitution of 1974, and it was absolutely clear that it

15     would be dominated by the Republic of Serbia and Belgrade.

16             The key issue was the position of the president of Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic, and the president Macedonia, Mr. Gligorov.

18     The two of them found it very hard to reach any conclusions or make any

19     decisions.  However, when they finally presented their positions, then

20     their positions were much closer to the position of Belgrade and Serbia.

21             Mr. Izetbegovic at one point stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina

22     would be willing and ready to stay with the Rump Yugoslavia.  After that

23     and only after that Croatia and Slovenia took steps which would lead to

24     their dissolution and secession from Yugoslavia.  At that moment the --

25     there was something that was very much ignored by the international

Page 27659

 1     community but it became very clear already at that point in time that the

 2     situation in Yugoslavia would end up in war because the Yugoslav Army was

 3     ready for an intervention.  At the beginning of 1991, which is now very

 4     clear, they had already prepared themselves for a military takeover.

 5             On the other hand, everybody was clear that Serbia was getting

 6     ready for war.  The slogan which became a chapter in one of the

 7     internationally recognised books which read "If we don't know how to

 8     work, at least we know how to fight," became a -- something that was used

 9     by a lot of politicians in Serbia.  When you read those things today,

10     then you can see that the predictions of the CIA and other analytical

11     services were that the break-up of Yugoslavia would happen in a war and

12     that this war would be a bloodbath, but at that point in time and -- the

13     international community ignored all that.  This, I believe, would give

14     you a general framework within which this discussion took place.

15        Q.   All right.  Now, during those discussions, were there discussions

16     being held to carve up any particular republic, because there are some

17     references here to Karadjordjevo, and that's part of the Prosecution's

18     thesis, that there was a meeting between Tudjman and -- and Milosevic,

19     and at this meeting they had divided to -- they had decided to divide

20     Bosnia.

21        A.   In this document, I did not find any report about any meetings in

22     Karadjordjevo.  I may have omitted this reference, but I don't think it's

23     there.

24        Q.   All right.  Well, let me just go through one passage, and this

25     would be on page 38.  We don't have time to go through this entire

Page 27660

 1     document.  It would take hours.  But just one -- to focus you on this one

 2     page, page 38.  It says:

 3             "The president:  All right.  Let's wrap up this item.  First of

 4     all, regarding this proposal, I said there, and the minutes will reflect

 5     this, that this proposal by Izetbegovic and Gligorov is actually an

 6     attempt to preserve and somewhat bolster the 1974 constitution,

 7     basically, that is, Serbia accepted it, but giving it its own

 8     interpretation in regards to the creating of an effective democratic

 9     federation, and they are sure not to change their position in this

10     regard.  Therefore, the solution lies in what was said there, in the --

11     in the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if -- and if we achieve

12     that, then we can possibly look for a basis for an alliance of sovereign

13     republics and states.

14              "I think we shall achieve it because this is -- this is equally

15     in the interests of Serbia and Croatia.  While the Muslim component has

16     no other exit than to accept the solution, although it will -- it will

17     not be easy to find the solution, but essentially that is it."

18             And then he talks about the next couple -- the next paragraph he

19     talks about the European Community, and then the following paragraph ends

20     with:

21             "Therefore, the question arises whether such a community is at

22     all possible having in mind the economic and other relations in the

23     eastern part of Yugoslavia."

24             Now, if we just looked at this segment in the -- you know, this

25     is just one page out of 163 pages, one might get the impression that what

Page 27661

 1     Tudjman is actually suggesting, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be carved

 2     up among at least Serbia and Croatia.  Did you get that impression from

 3     reading this document?

 4        A.   My impression was that he was just telling about the conversation

 5     that he was reporting about, and the conversation took place among the

 6     six presidents, and I don't think that this was about any proposals

 7     because it transpires from the entire transcript that no such proposal

 8     was ever discussed.  There was discussion about completely different

 9     things, and the thing that was discussed was whether there should be a

10     confederation of all the republics, meaning the six republics that

11     existed at the moment.

12        Q.   All right.

13        A.   For example, he is saying, and I have a Croatian version in front

14     of me, on page 9052 of the Croatian text where President Tudjman says

15     explicitly:  "We can start from the position that Croatia may find its

16     own interest in preserving a union of sovereign states."  And then we

17     come to the guiding thought in my own interpretation of his whole

18     state -- statesman behaviour.  He says:  "In this way we should achieve a

19     peaceful separation."  And he goes on to say:  "A peaceful solution of

20     the Croat-Serb issue on the Croatian territory and the whole -- and the

21     territory as a whole," which means that within the context of the

22     situation that prevailed at the time.

23        Q.   Okay.  Now, in quoting -- and there should be page numbers.

24             MR. KARNAVAS:  The first page number, Your Honour, was page 43.

25     I'm just as alarmed as you are because I want to make a clear record, and

Page 27662

 1     I know you need to follow.

 2             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  We don't have -- it.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the Honourable Judge, please.

 4             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, I think that -- you should have, Your

 5     Honour, page 43 of 163.

 6             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I have page 9, and the next one is page 38, 39,

 7     40.  Okay.  So 34 does not figure in this document.

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  All right.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  You have it?  Oh, this is a discrimination

10     against my person, I note because my colleague seems to have it.  So I

11     will think of the steps that have to be taken.  Thank you.

12             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, we apologise.  We do massive amounts of

13     copying and printing, and I'll blame it on technology, but --

14             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Your apology's accepted.

15             MR. KARNAVAS:  This was translated by the Prosecution, Your

16     Honour.  I'm not suggesting -- I'm not suggesting that the Prosecutor --

17     I'm just merely mentioning this -- that this is part of their --

18     everybody seems --

19             MR. SCOTT:  As the Court knows it's always the Prosecution's

20     fault.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  -- everybody seems to be so touchy around here.

22             MR. SCOTT:  [Microphone not activated]

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  What I meant to say was this portion was

24     translated by the Prosecutor.  We translated other pages.  Therefore they

25     should not have been missing but obviously it was our fault in copying

Page 27663

 1     it.  So the Prosecutor should just relax a little bit.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  [Microphone not activated]

 3             MR. KARNAVAS:

 4        Q.   Now, you quoted -- you quoted from another page --

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One second.  Mr. Witness, I

 6     take this opportunity to ask a question linked to what we're talking

 7     about.  We have a presidential transcript that relates to the 7th session

 8     of the Supreme Council of the state of the Republic of Croatia held on

 9     the 8th of 1991.  Several months ago the Defence challenged those

10     presidential transcripts.  You seem to be somebody who may have taken

11     part in one of those meetings, so maybe you will be in a position to

12     solve of some of the problems that we've been faced with.

13             My first question is as follows:  Did you did you personally take

14     part in the Supreme State Council meetings?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  No, Your Honour.  Participate

16     in this meeting.  I only read the transcript.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Maybe not this one, but did you

18     take part in other meetings?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I participated in a number of

20     them, but once I was appointed in 1992.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  In 1992.  When you

22     took part in those meetings with President Tudjman, was there somebody

23     who was charged with recording everything that was said by all the

24     participants to these meetings?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, yes.  At meetings of this

Page 27664

 1     kind there was somebody.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Who was it, a secretary, an

 3     employee, somebody specialised?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These meetings were recorded, and

 5     then notes or minutes or transcripts were taken, and as far as I know

 6     there were a few professional typists, ladies, who did that.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  You have

 8     by your answers given authenticity to those transcripts.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Honourable Judge --

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  At some point today hopefully we'll get to a

11     transcript where Mr. Zuzul is mentioned.  There is an exchange which we

12     will see he did not participate in.  So authenticity is one thing,

13     accuracy is another, and we'll get to that at some point.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  But I believe the witness

15     wanted to say something else.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It indeed happened in the way

17     Mr. Karnavas described.  As I am reading these transcripts, and this is

18     my first opportunity to read them carefully, I have been able to convince

19     myself that they contain errors, misidentification of person,

20     misinterpretation of their words.  And since I know the conditions under

21     which the recordings were made were far, far from ideal, I'm not

22     surprised to see those errors, but it is my personal impression that

23     every transcript has to be checked and re-checked because of those

24     errors, and I'm going to be able to give you my own example to illustrate

25     one of the errors that are contained in one of those transcripts.

Page 27665

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  Judge Trechsel, did we solve your problem?

 3     Okay.  Thank you.  And we apologise again.  And it was no fault of the

 4     Prosecution's, so they shouldn't -- I just want to make sure that there's

 5     not shifting the blame on anyone.

 6        Q.   Now, I noticed that earlier that one of your answers, you used

 7     the word "unitarian," and -- and I see that on page -- one of the pages

 8     that we translated which would have been -- it should be page 46, 47, 48,

 9     49 -- I mean, 96, 97, 98, 99, I believe right around there.  It says

10     here:  "Therefore it is necessary that we cooperate until all

11     possibilities are exhausted and that we create both in principle and

12     personally the best possible relations because that is in our interest,

13     interest of the army and of individuals, but of course we will not be

14     silent about -- we will not be silent about such cases.  We will present

15     them as an existence of those elements and dogmatic Communist and

16     unitarian Greater Serbia as they do exist in society not only within the

17     army but also in all state -- in all strata of the society as well as

18     extremists among us which hinder achieving a political solution."

19             If you could -- I just want to dwell a little bit on this

20     unitarian Greater Serbia.  What is meant by that, because we've heard the

21     term "unitary government."  Now we have a variation of that word,

22     "unitarian."  What was your understanding of that in the context of which

23     we're speaking of, because it might assist us.

24        A.   Well, for all of us who group up in Yugoslavia the meaning of the

25     term "unitary" was something that we knew from our everyday lives.  It

Page 27666

 1     was not something that was learned from constitutional practice, because

 2     the more the federal state became unitary or unitaristic the less rights

 3     were enjoyed by the republics.  Yugoslavia's history is the history of

 4     defining unitary versus federal system.

 5             In this particular paragraph that you've just quoted, President

 6     Tudjman, in my opinion, is referring to something that had already

 7     happened in Serbia by that time.  While Yugoslavia existed, in 1974

 8     constitution there was the federal system, but Serbia had two autonomous

 9     provinces under this constitution, Vojvodina and Kosovo.

10             At the time when this is being discussed, Serbia had already

11     rescinded the right to the autonomy in both those districts, especially

12     in Kosovo, and from that time until the recent time when Kosovo declared

13     its independence as a state and was recognised as such this was the

14     period when there was the Kosovo crisis, and President Tudjman and all

15     the other participants were quite familiar with this crisis.

16             So he is talking about this unitary Serbia, Serbia that is

17     rescinding all rights to autonomy and urges the creation of a Yugoslavia

18     that would, it is quite clear, be set up not on the federal principles,

19     not on confederal principles, but on unitary principles.  It would be in

20     Serbia's way.  I think that's what this paragraphs actually all about.

21        Q.   All right.  We're going to move on to this next document because

22     we're running a little bit behind.  So if we could go to 1D 00894.  This

23     is from "Balkan Odyssey."  This is a document that we've seen before.  In

24     fact we've seen these pages, again no additional reading for anyone

25     around the court.  No surprise.  But I want to point out one thing and

Page 27667

 1     have you comment on it.

 2             On chapter 2 Lord Owen in his book says, bottom of the first --

 3     of the second paragraph on the first page:  "The Netherlands had the EC

 4     Presidency from the outbreak of the war in July until December 1991, and

 5     in consequence of my visit to The Hague, I discovered that on 13 July

 6     1991, when the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were

 7     just eighteen days old, the Dutch government had suggested to the other

 8     EC members states that the option of agreed changes to some of the

 9     internal borders between the Yugoslavian republic might be explored."

10             Now, I ask you to think about this only because the issue of

11     changing of the borders have come up.  From your experiences were you

12     aware of any of the international negotiators exploring possibilities,

13     that is initiating, because I think that's the word, initiating

14     possibilities of changing of borders?  And I mention this because of the

15     Prosecution's theory of joint criminal enterprise that Croatia was

16     initiating this process of changing borders?

17             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I'm sorry to intervene.  I'm

18     waiting for my microphone.  Thank you very much.

19             Your Honour, I'm mindful that the Chamber, or at least some

20     members of the Chamber, do not like many interventions from counsel, and

21     I've been quiet all day for the most part I think with one exception, but

22     I am going to object and continue to object.  There is no reason on this

23     basis; that is, there is no reason for Mr. Karnavas to make speeches in

24     connection with his questions and characterise them as this is what the

25     Prosecution says.  This is the Prosecution's theory of the case.  It is a

Page 27668

 1     form of coaching, Your Honour.  It's the key words to the witness to say

 2     this is what the Prosecution says, so I'm telling you now this is what

 3     you, the witness, are supposed to disagree with.  Mr. Karnavas can simply

 4     ask non-leading questions to the witness.  Were you in such a meeting at

 5     this day?  Tell us what happened.  Did you talk to Izetbegovic about this

 6     subject?  What did he say?  Were you at this meeting or not?  No, I

 7     wasn't.  But there is no reason for constant speeches or

 8     characterisations of this is what the Prosecution says, so now I'm

 9     telling you, Mr. Witness, I want you, I'm expecting you to say the

10     opposite.  It's a form of coaching.  We object to it.

11             While I'm on my feet, while I'm on my feet, number two, number

12     two, I want to make the record clear, and I'll say why, in terms of the

13     transcripts, in the last transcript, the presidential transcript that we

14     were looking at, and this is not directed at Mr. Karnavas or the Defence

15     at all, but I just want the record to be clear on something because I

16     know statements have been made in the Croatian press, statements have

17     been made in the Croatian media that the Prosecution, for example, used

18     only -- offered bits and pieces or excerpts of the presidential

19     transcripts that the Prosecution tendered into evidence.  As the Chamber

20     knows, that's not the case.  The Prosecution's position was we tendered

21     the entire transcript, top to bottom, with the exception of a very few

22     where they were long transcripts and it was very clear to any reader that

23     the last 80 pages had absolutely nothing to do with anything at issue in

24     this case, whether to enter into a free trade agreement with China, I

25     don't think we needed 80 pages on that.  With those kind of exceptions,

Page 27669

 1     we tendered every single page of every single transcript, and so when the

 2     Croatian media writes its article tomorrow about the hearing today that

 3     says, well, Mr. Karnavas had to add other excerpts because the

 4     Prosecution had not played fairly, I just want it to be clear, the

 5     Prosecution offered the entire transcripts, and it was the Chamber that

 6     only decided to accept bits and pieces.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, with regard to the media,

 8     that's not the Trial Chamber's problem.  We're not going to issue our

 9     judgement based on some press cuttings.  That's one thing.  That's your

10     problem, not ours.

11             However, with regard to the objection you've just raised.

12     Mr. Karnavas, I believe that the objection is in part justified.

13     Initially you should have asked the witness whether he had any knowledge

14     of possible changes within the internal borders, and he could have said

15     yes, no, and then you could have asked him to look at what Lord Owen said

16     in his book.  Based on that, he would have said, yes, indeed.  Then third

17     step, you can say, "The Prosecution in its indictment claims this and

18     that.  Do you agree or not?"

19             Otherwise, you should have preempt or you lead the witness.

20             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well, Mr. President, but I do want to take

21     exception to the Prosecution's characterisation that I'm coaching the

22     witness.  First of all, we had a narrative.  We had a narrative where we

23     talked about changing of borders or swapping.  We had a narrative where

24     it was Izetbegovic that offered part of Herzegovina.  We had a narrative

25     where it was Izetbegovic that signed an agreement to allow half of Bosnia

Page 27670

 1     to be carved away, so it's not as if I'm coaching the witness, but I

 2     take -- I take your observations and I will modify my -- my technique.

 3        Q.   Concerning this, sir, do you have any knowledge with respect to

 4     international negotiators proposing the possibility at least that they

 5     should explore the alteration of the borders within Yugoslavia made up --

 6     that separated the republics?

 7        A.   I know that the option of peaceful changing of the borders was

 8     mentioned in several international documents.  Lord Owen writes about

 9     that at several places in his book.  This is one of those places.

10             In the first stage of the work of the conference for the former

11     Yugoslavia, that was always on the table as an option, so voluntary

12     changing of the borders in accordance with the mutual agreement.  After

13     all, the case that I described yesterday was initiated by the

14     representatives of the international community, possible territory swaps

15     between Croatia and Serbia.  So I am aware of the fact that there was

16     such thinking, and I know that it was mentioned in several international

17     documents.

18        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Now we move to the next document and that

19     would be 1D 00893.  I think we've seen this document as well.  So without

20     adding too much commentary, I do want to point out that this was a

21     document that is familiar to everyone here.

22             Now, if we can look at this.  This is the European Community

23     conference.  We have a draft convention.  It mentions Lord Carrington,

24     and there's a treaty proposal.  I will ask you to first focus on Article

25     1 where it talks about new relations between the republics, and under

Page 27671

 1     1(c) common state of equal republics for those republics which wish to

 2     remain in a common state.  Under (f), recognition of the independence

 3     within the existing borders unless otherwise agreed.

 4             I then want you to focus on page 16, the section called special

 5     status, which says in addition areas in which persons belonging to a

 6     national or ethnic group form a majority shall enjoy a special status of

 7     autonomy, and it talks about the right to use national emblems,

 8     educational system, et cetera.

 9             First of all, are you familiar with this document?

10        A.   Yes, I am familiar with it.

11        Q.   All right.  And to your knowledge this is what was being

12     discussed at the time?

13        A.   That was the framework for the debate and for the thinking in the

14     period between 1991 and the London conference which took place in 1992,

15     because this was, in fact, the only official document produced by the

16     international community.

17        Q.   Okay.  Now, we see from the very -- the preamble, we see that

18     this is November -- 1 -- we see it was November 1991.  What is happening

19     in Croatia at that point in time?

20        A.   Immediately before this, on the 8th of October, Croatia made its

21     decision to become independent, and in the international sphere Croatia

22     was trying to achieve international recognition based, among other

23     things, on this document as a state within its borders, and soon after

24     this document was produced Croatia was indeed recognised, first

25     unofficially by Germany.  The recognition was then postponed until

Page 27672

 1     mid-January 1992.  This was when the European states followed the

 2     Vatican, the Holy See, and recognised Croatia within its existing

 3     borders.

 4             Internally in Croatia at the time the war escalated.  The

 5     Yugoslav army attacked from several sides, and as I said yesterday, large

 6     areas of Croatia were occupied and Croatia was for all intents and

 7     purposes cut in two.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now, if we go to the next document, P 00089.  It's a

 9     Prosecution document.  We've seen this before.  It's been talked about

10     quite a bit by various witnesses, and it's been referenced, in fact, by

11     some in their works.  This is 27 December 1991.  You more or less told us

12     politically what is happening and physically what is happening in

13     Croatia.

14             First let me begin by asking have you read this presidential

15     transcript?

16        A.   Yes, I have.

17        Q.   Were you present --

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry, could you --

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  P 00089.

20             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  The number is clear.  In which folder is it?  We

21     have five.

22             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, all these documents are in a chronological

23     order, so if you -- the number.  So it would be -- you would need to go

24     to the next binder.  So number 1, number 2 --

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Number 2.

Page 27673

 1             MR. KARNAVAS:  Yep.  We have it that way.  If I do go out of

 2     order, I'll make sure to give everybody the heads-up.  I only have three

 3     binders.  That's why, so ...

 4        Q.   Anyway, while we're looking for those, just some preliminary

 5     questions.  Were you present during this discussion?

 6        A.   No, I was not.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Now, just to touch on a couple of points.  First let me

 8     ask you:  Given your position and your involvement in the various events,

 9     do you feel competent that you might be able to discuss certain contents

10     in this document?

11        A.   I think yes.  I think I can.  I think I can give you some

12     elements regarding the interpretation of this document, and quite by

13     coincidence after I read this document now for the first time, perhaps I

14     can provide some additional information that might shed light on the

15     circumstances, the time when this was going on.

16        Q.   All right.  Well --

17             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, excuse me again --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

19             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, in light of what was just said, I'm

20     going to object to this kind of just simply tell us your interpretation

21     of the document, the document the witness has no personal knowledge of.

22     He was not present at the meeting.  He's told us that.  And, you know,

23     this is what Mr. Karnavas -- a word Mr. Karnavas himself likes to use.

24     This is just spin.  I've got a witness here from the Tudjman government,

25     and I'm going to ask him to give his spin on this material, and that's

Page 27674

 1     all it is.  I have no objection if -- if he asks about a specific

 2     question about something that may have a technical meaning, something --

 3     a moment ago he said something, what would "unitary" mean.  I didn't

 4     object to that.  I think probably that's something the witness might be

 5     able to assist us with.  But to simply take a presidential transcript of

 6     a meeting where the witness was not involved, he wasn't even in

 7     government at that time to my knowledge - this is December 1991 - and

 8     just simply put it before the witness, "Witness, what do you think about

 9     this?  What's your spin on this?"  And that's all this is.  That's all it

10     is.  Objection, Your Honour.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  I've heard the objection loud and clear,

12     and may I respond.  I'll be measured.

13             The Prosecutor brought in Donia, someone who got a degree in the

14     United States on 19th century intellectual Muslims in Sarajevo, had a

15     career in banking -- or in financing.  Twenty-some years later, writes a

16     book with very few footnotes and then becomes a "Prosecution expert,"

17     reads this, cites it.  Ribicic, Constitutional Judge in Slovenia, writes

18     a book supposedly analysing the laws, the basis of Herceg-Bosna, does a

19     constitutional analysis, and if you look at the portions and you look at

20     the transcript, and by the way I did look at it before coming here today,

21     but if you look at it - I'm afraid I didn't bring it in because of time -

22     you will see that I referenced the part where he gets to say, "Once I

23     read this particular transcript, I changed my opinion."  And then if you

24     recall, there was a heated exchange where even you, Judge Trechsel,

25     intervene at one point because I said, well, what about all these other

Page 27675

 1     transcripts.  You know, and he said, well, he didn't read them, and of

 2     course my position at that point was that his report should be stricken

 3     from the record because obviously that report was written when he only

 4     looked at one particular transcript and not the others, at which point as

 5     I recall, Judge Trechsel, you indicated well, you know, he could spend

 6     his lifetime reading all this stuff or that could be supplemented, but be

 7     that as it may, be that as it may, the point that I'm trying to make is

 8     this:  When the Prosecution wants to have somebody who wasn't present and

 9     take one sliver out of a presidential transcript, and I dare say he

10     wasn't quite correct when he said earlier that he's tendered everything.

11     He's only translated portions, translated portions, so tendering is one

12     thing.  Translating is another, so if you only have two or three passages

13     of 160 pages or whatever, he has it.

14             But be that as it may, he brings in outsiders, not participants,

15     to comment, to opine, and then he uses that as the foundation in

16     establishing the joint criminal enterprise, and the first time I bring in

17     someone who is aware of the events, and had Mr. Scott listened because he

18     got a little excited there and was ready for his objection, but he didn't

19     listen to the end of Mr. Zuzul's answer, which was having read that, he's

20     able to comment on certain things.  So he got a little excited, didn't

21     listen to the whole answer, and now here we are wasting valuable time.

22     But I want to point that out.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  We are right.  We are

24     losing and wasting time.  You're both right.

25             You know, Mr. Karnavas, you should, in order to avoid this

Page 27676

 1     objection because you are an experienced professional and you know how to

 2     do it, initially you should have told the witness:  "During the proofing

 3     session, we both looked at this document, P 89, 160 pages long, and we

 4     mentioned this and that page.  Expert Donia in his report said this and

 5     that.  Could you, Witness, enlighten the Trial Chamber on specific

 6     points," because then the Prosecutor would not have anything to object

 7     to.

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  If I may add a point.  It strikes me that you

10     are comparing witnesses, your witness here --

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  Right.

12             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  -- to experts brought by the Prosecution, and I

13     don't think that is really quite equitable.  An expert is asked to give

14     opinions on matters.  A witness is asked to speak about facts that he has

15     witnessed, and the question you put to your witness, in my view, is

16     totally a question for an expert.  Now, your witness has not been

17     presented as an expert.  We do not have any credentials like we have for

18     an expert, and I think there's a little problem here.

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, let me respond to that because I beg to

20     differ with you significantly.  Ribicic read law.  That's what he did.

21     Now, what makes him an expert to take a presidential transcript and to

22     say based on this he's making a constitutional analysis?  And just

23     because we call somebody an expert doesn't make him an expert.  Donia

24     worked for the Prosecution, and I dare say in my 25 years of working in

25     this business, I'm entitled to ask a layperson to provide expert

Page 27677

 1     testimony if they're capable of doing that.  So I've asked -- that was --

 2     that was a foundational question.  Having read it, is he able to comment

 3     on it?  He is an expert in a sense even though a fact witness in some

 4     ways because he spent time over there.  He was with President Tudjman.

 5     He knew the events.  He represented the government.  You're shaking your

 6     head, but that's the fact.

 7             Now, what I would do -- what I would ask -- what I would ask,

 8     Judge Trechsel, is that -- that you begin registering your objections on

 9     the record because it seems to me that at this point, at this point, it

10     is curtailing my defence.  Not only am I limited in time, now I'm being

11     limited in scope, as well, and I don't think I agree with your analysis,

12     but if that's the case I would like a clear record exactly, and give

13     me -- give me the scope.  Tell me how you want me to do it, so maybe I

14     make submissions for an interlocutory appeal, but at this point I must

15     say, with your interpretation I wholly disagree, especially when we say

16     that we're practising before professional Judges, especially because of

17     that, and we can't have it both ways, but I dare say that the gentleman

18     can comment because he was there and he knows the circumstances, and if I

19     was allowed to ask those questions that I wanted to ask, you would see.

20             Now, how much weight you give to that, that's a different story,

21     but I think I have -- I was laying the predicate that would allow me to

22     ask those questions because I wasn't asking him for an expert opinion.

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Well, you have challenged me, and I will give

24     you an answer.

25             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.

Page 27678

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm not making an objection.  I'm just recalling

 2     that we have witnesses, according to the Rules of Procedure, and we have

 3     experts, and it is news to me that -- that they are the same and that you

 4     can switch and take the expert as a witness and the witness as an expert

 5     if it pleases you.

 6             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour --

 7             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  But maybe I'm wrong on this.

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, let me just -- I don't want to have a

 9     philosophical or legal debate, but let's just say hypothetically

10     speaking, hypothetically speaking I brought in as a fact witness a

11     general.  Now, by virtue of his position, by virtue of his knowledge, by

12     virtue of his experience, is not that general able, capable, willing, if

13     I asked the question, to answer technical questions regarding military

14     matters that are outside what he has observed?  Of course.  Do I need to

15     qualify him as an expert?  Of course not.  If it's relevant I should be

16     able to ask that question.

17             Now, it shouldn't be -- I shouldn't be trying to sabotage the

18     Prosecution, but I could certainly ask him technical questions.  It comes

19     within that.

20             Let's just say that I have a regular witness, and I'm asking him

21     if he can identify somebody's voice like you have these recordings.  If I

22     can lay the foundation that that individual does recognise the person's

23     voice because he's heard it a hundred times on the telephone, in a sense

24     that person is giving expert testimony because he's capable of

25     identifying the voice.  So that's how you can.

Page 27679

 1             I'm not bringing this gentleman in as an expert nor was my

 2     questioning eliciting expert testimony.  I was asking him to opine on

 3     what he was able to glean from reading this, and had -- had we been

 4     allowed, he would have been able -- he's indicated that after reading

 5     this he has some personal experience of which he can discuss certain

 6     matters.  That's not an expert.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break, yes,

 8     Mr. Scott.

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I've been patient and

10     hopefully this will give Mr. Karnavas a chance to take a breath.

11             I fully agree with what Judge Trechsel said and that was in my

12     notes, and Judge Trechsel you beat me to it and good for you for that.

13             This is now -- this is now -- the witness is now being tendered

14     as an expert.  That's the difference between the witnesses -- the

15     Prosecution witnesses that Mr. Karnavas cites and this witness.  And I

16     might add in light of the issues that were raised yesterday, we can add

17     now to the deficiencies the lack of an expert report.  We don't have a

18     statement.  We don't have an adequate summary.  We don't have notice of

19     an expert.  We don't have an expert report.  So we just got a

20     free-ranging witness here, a member of the Tudjman government, who can

21     just come in and give his views about anything that Mr. Karnavas wants to

22     ask him about.

23             Now, that is not appropriate.  You cannot simply, with all due

24     respect to this Chamber, all of whom I have great respect for, you cannot

25     appeal every time to say it's professional Judges as if that means there

Page 27680

 1     are no rules.  Yes, you are professional Judges.  There are still Rules

 2     of Procedure and rules of evidence that should be followed and just to

 3     say it's professional Judges, no holds barred, everything is fair, you

 4     can do whatever you want, is not correct.  These are -- further these are

 5     not technical matters.

 6             I added a moment ago -- I asked a moment -- I made the comment a

 7     moment ago:  If someone says it was a term of art and a witness could

 8     say, "Well, I'm a general and I happen to know that when that term is

 9     used this is what it means."  These are not technical matters.  These are

10     clearly political matters, political matters of the most direct kind.

11     I'm going to give you my political interpretation on these events, and

12     I've never -- I wasn't at the meeting, I've never seen this before, but

13     now that I've read it I'm going to give you my political interpretation

14     of events and that's all we're getting, Your Honour, and I we do object

15     and I'm going to continue to object to this kind of testimony.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well Your Honour -- Your Honour --

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment.  Let me give my own

18     opinion.  First of all, I do not agree with what Mr. Scott has just said.

19     We are here with a witness who was a Minister of Foreign Affairs in

20     Croatia, who was the representative of Croatia in international

21     negotiations, who also participated in the work related to the Vance-Owen

22     Plan.

23             The Defence counsel is examining the witness on issues related to

24     borders, to meetings between Tudjman and other individuals with regard to

25     these geopolitical problems.  Without the witness being an expert but in

Page 27681

 1     his field of foreign affairs, he's no doubt an expert because if you have

 2     a minister of foreign affairs who would not be able to address issues of

 3     foreign affairs, where are the experts, then?  And I do remind you that

 4     the Trial Chamber is made up of two former ambassadors among the Judges,

 5     and I believe that the Defence are entitled to ask questions of the

 6     witness.

 7             The only residual issue that may remain is to make sure that the

 8     questions as they are asked are not leading because we're dealing here

 9     with a common law procedure.  So as the chief examiner, he should not put

10     leading questions.  So that would be a cause for objections by the

11     Prosecution.  But, I mean, if he asked questions that could challenge the

12     case of the Prosecutor, that's another matter.  There should not be

13     automatically objections if the Prosecution's case is being challenged.

14             We have just spent about half an hour on procedural matters

15     whereas I and I believe my colleagues, too, are interested in the

16     substance of the case.

17             We are going to break for 20 minutes, and we shall resume

18     thereafter.

19                           --- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

22             Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.

24        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, if you could turn to page 27 of this particular

25     document.  We're still on P 00089, 27 December 1991, and I'm going to

Page 27682

 1     read a portion here, and I'm going ask you if you're able to comment on

 2     it.

 3             It says here "the president," so that would be President Tudjman.

 4     I'm going to go to the bottom of the page first.  It says, "There are

 5     numerous indicators that, you see, that America would gladly accept

 6     Serbia in the policing role against the Muslims to forestall the

 7     establishment of a Muslim state in Europe."

 8             Now, throughout those years that you were involved in the various

 9     positions that you held, was that ever a concern, that is, that they

10     might be -- that the US or other countries, Western countries, were

11     reluctant to see the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe?  And that

12     would be, of course, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13        A.   That was certainly what President Tudjman had in mind.  He

14     believed there was concern both in America and in some of Europe's

15     countries about the possibility to establish a pure Muslim state in

16     Europe.

17        Q.   Okay.  At this point in time, 27 December 1991, had Croatia

18     recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence?  This is December 27,

19     1991.  Or I should put -- I should rephrase it.  Had Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina opted for independence at that point in time?

21        A.   I believe they were preparing for independence, but no

22     international recognition had been granted by this time.  I'm certain

23     about that.

24        Q.   Now, further down -- in the next page, page 28, I'm just going to

25     hit this rather quickly, certain passages, it says, "Izetbegovic, even

Page 27683

 1     Stipe may recall," and I suspect that he's talking about Stipe Mesic,

 2     "once openly said that he would favour a solution whereby Slovenia would

 3     go.  Croatia would have somewhat more, and Bosnia would be more closely

 4     associated with Serbia.  The establishment of borders, will we set up

 5     border crossings between Croatia and Herzegovina so that a Croat from

 6     Herzegovina may not go to his own Croatia or Croat from here may not go

 7     there?  Shall we set up customs office?  Shall we set up customs?  Shall

 8     we make it so that one has to, as the government has already issued and

 9     rightly so, an order that petrol may be sold and so on?  Shall we --

10     shall we a currency in the end," as written, "all this together?  These

11     are the problems that arise in everyday administrative and legislative

12     sense, which establish new relationships which would be unbearable among

13     according to this view, not only for Croatia in view of the shape of its

14     borders but also for the Croatian part of the Herzegovina and Bosnian

15     territory.

16              "In addition, if Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain whole,

17     what are Croatia's prospects there?"

18             If we go down to the -- to the next paragraph.  "During the talks

19     under these circumstances, we supported the position of preserving a

20     sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina precisely because the Greater Serbia

21     policy raised the issue of Serbian areas in Croatia.

22              "Therefore, in such circumstances, it would have been

23     politically unwise for us to raise the issue of demarcation of borders in

24     Bosnia and Herzegovina otherwise.  However, if you recall as early as

25     1989, we said in our delegation the historic HDZ declaration" I'm sorry,

Page 27684

 1     "the historic HDZ declaration that we were for a sovereign Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina unless its existence came into question because in that case,

 3     in view of the interests of the Croatian people, we have to raise the

 4     issue of Croatian borders."

 5             First of all, let me ask you this:  By this point this time were

 6     you a member of -- of HDZ?  We're talking December.

 7        A.   I became a member in October that year, but I was just an

 8     ordinary member.

 9        Q.   And how much, if any, of Croatia's territory had been occupied or

10     was under attack at that point in time?

11        A.   At that point in time virtually a third of Croatia's territory

12     had been occupied already.  Vukovar had fallen.  Eastern Slavonia was

13     under occupation, and on the 10th of September the siege of Dubrovnik and

14     attacks on the town began.  Dubrovnik was now under siege, and at this

15     time was being subjected to heavy gunfire.

16        Q.   In light of your background, experience, and knowledge, are you

17     able to decipher, if you would, where on page 28 President Tudjman says:

18     "Izetbegovic, even Stipe may recall, once openly said that he would

19     favour a solution whereby Slovenia would go, Croatia would have somewhat

20     more and Bosnia would be more closely associated with Serbia"?

21        A.   Yes, indeed.  That's what I was talking about earlier on.  There

22     were clear indicia as far as a solution for the former Yugoslavia was

23     concerned.  The Muslim leadership had certain inclinations in favour of

24     Serbia, and I think Izetbegovic didn't hold that back.  I think he said

25     as much even when the attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina were first being

Page 27685

 1     launched.  Even prior to this there were villages in Dubrovnik's

 2     hinterland, in Eastern Herzegovina that had already been attacked by the

 3     JNA already and had been destroyed in their entirety.

 4        Q.   What kind of army did Croatia have at the time?

 5        A.   Croatia had already managed to set up a proper army.  We

 6     established defence lines and put a stop to any further advances by the

 7     JNA.  However, at the time it was still unable to defend its territory in

 8     its entirety.  I think I did spend a great deal of time discussing that

 9     yesterday.  Now, however, just before the turn of the year in 1992, the

10     greatest danger was the Dubrovnik situation and the possibility that

11     Dubrovnik might fall, as well as the entire area.  Not just the area

12     around Dubrovnik but, rather, the city of Dubrovnik itself as well.

13        Q.   All right.  Let me -- let me just walk you step by step on this

14     now.  At this point in time, is the -- are the JNA forces in Bosnia and

15     Herzegovina, and, if so, where are they?

16        A.   There is no doubt that they were there.  I don't think anybody

17     had asked them by this time to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina officially.

18     I think didn't that happened until sometime later, but it's quite certain

19     that there were JNA units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It is quite certain

20     that they were launching attacks on the republic of Croatia from there.

21     I mentioned several times the area around Dubrovnik and the forces that

22     were arriving from Herzegovina, from Montenegro.  These JNA forces were

23     attacking Dubrovnik, but there were attacks like that going on in the

24     Posavina area, as well, and just north of Knin.  There were several areas

25     in which the JNA were carrying out attacks from Bosnian territory.

Page 27686

 1        Q.   All right.  And yesterday you told us that you had joined the

 2     army.  At that point in time, where -- were you in the army or working

 3     for the department of defence?

 4        A.   I was partly in the Croatian army at the time.

 5        Q.   Okay.  And were you stationed in anyplace in particular?

 6        A.   We were stationed in Zagreb, but it was precisely around this

 7     time that I and my colleagues travelled south to Dubrovnik, our intention

 8     being to reach Dubrovnik.  However, that wasn't possible.

 9             Perhaps a month and a half before this, I had been to the Opuzen

10     area.  I said that I might have some additional explanations that might

11     shed light on the background of this meeting.

12        Q.   Let me -- let me just lead you step by step because before we get

13     there, I just want to make sure that I'm crystal clear.  It's December

14     1991.  Croatia has declared its independence.  Croatia is under attack by

15     the JNA.  The JNA is staging attacks using Bosnian -- from the Bosnia and

16     Herzegovinian territory, and as I understand yesterday from your

17     testimony, Bosnia and Herzegovina did nothing to stop it.  Perhaps it

18     could not do anything.  Let me ask you this question based on this

19     background:  What -- let me make sure I phrase it in a way that it can be

20     answered in a non-leading fashion.

21             Were there discussions with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina's

22     viability as a state and, if so, can you please tell us?  And we're

23     talking about historically that period in time because we know that

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet declared its independence, but at that

25     point.

Page 27687

 1        A.   There probably were, but in the context of defending Croatia

 2     there was no one to raise this with in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a

 3     serious issue.

 4        Q.   All right.

 5        A.   I will try to be more specific.  I'm talking about the leaders of

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 7        Q.   All right.  Okay.  And did -- as far as you know, and I'm asking

 8     you -- maybe you didn't know back at the time, that is back in December,

 9     but thereafter did you ever learn, given your experience and the

10     positions that you held, what Izetbegovic's position was at that point in

11     time?  Did you ever come out and expressly say, "We are for independence.

12     We are against Yugoslavia.  We want this or that"?  Was there ever some

13     sort of a public expression which we could look at and identifiably know

14     exactly where that man, given his position and his responsibility, stood

15     at at the time?

16        A.   His position as to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not

17     entirely clear.  He said he had a preference for Belgrade's solution.  As

18     far as war was concerned, his position unfortunately was clear.  He said

19     this wasn't their war and that he had no desire to interfere.  If we try

20     to interpret this, and we look at transcript one, the Croatian

21     representatives, he talks about his own meeting with General Kadijevic,

22     Mr. Kljuic's specifically.  His conviction is not only that the army

23     would not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina but, rather, that the army would

24     be allowing political parties to take control in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25             We know now that this was quite gullible as a line of reasoning

Page 27688

 1     since the war had already begun, a war true and proper.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now, to make sure that we fully understand, who is

 3     Mr. Kadijevic?

 4        A.   Mr. Kadijevic was at the time the defence minister of a

 5     disintegrating Yugoslavia.

 6        Q.   All right.  And when you say "army," which army are we talking

 7     about?

 8        A.   [In English] Yugoslav People's Army, JNA.

 9        Q.   All right.  Just to make sure I'm crystal clear, because I'm just

10     a little confused here, at this period of time we see an exchange between

11     Tudjman and Kljuic.  Of course we all knew because Kljuic was here that

12     at the time he was president of the HDZ.  And what exactly is Kljuic

13     saying to Tudjman so we are -- and be as precise as you can so we can

14     understand that.

15        A.   [Interpretation] The transcript is quite long.  We see Kljuic as

16     president of Bosnia and Herzegovina's HDZ, and we realise that he had

17     just talked to General Kadijevic.  Tudjman asked him an explicit

18     question; namely, whether he had talked to Izetbegovic and Karadzic, who

19     were then the political leaders of the other two ethnicities in Bosnia

20     and Herzegovina.  It appeared clear that he had not talked to them.  He,

21     much like Izetbegovic, still believed, at least that's how it comes

22     across to me, that the JNA could be part of a solution and not one of the

23     sources of crisis.  Apart from Kljuic, there was a large delegation of

24     Bosnia and Herzegovina's Croats attending this meeting.

25        Q.   I just want to make sure.  I don't want to get into the whole

Page 27689

 1     debate, but this issue here is very important.  Kljuic is under

 2     discussion with Kadijevic, and -- because you said that they were

 3     somewhat naive or gullible, gullible, I believe the word was, I think

 4     that's the part that we want to be crystal clear, because we know in

 5     context that Croatia is being attacked from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

 6     now we have the highest Croat representative, and he's saying words, at

 7     least if I understand you, that they think that they can do business with

 8     the JNA, that is, Sarajevo government.  So could you please tell us what

 9     is it that is being said in that, because you understand the events

10     better than we do.

11        A.   That is precisely what I was about to point out.  On the one

12     hand, we have Mr. Kljuic; and on the other, Mr. Kljuic who is saying just

13     what I've been telling you about.  That's my impression, and I think

14     you've just summed it up.  That was his conviction.  He said he still

15     believed that an agreement could be reached, even an agreement with the

16     Yugoslav Army.  On the other hand, there were a group of Croats from

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina on their way to see President Tudjman, the

18     president of Croatia, with their own proposals, a whole list of those, in

19     fact, that were strikingly different from what Kljuic was suggesting at

20     the time.

21        Q.   All right.  Now, in this transcript we see the name of Mate

22     Boban.  At that point in time, did you know him?

23        A.   Yes, I did.  I had known him for quite some time before the war

24     erupted.  I can't say I knew him well.  He was older than me.  I grew up

25     in a small town call Imotski, however, and Mr. Boban worked there.  He

Page 27690

 1     was the manager of one of the major companies based in the area.  It was

 2     called Napredak.  That was when I made his acquaintance.  During the war,

 3     however, just before the developments that I have now been discussing, I

 4     had been directly in touch with Mr. Boban.

 5        Q.   All right.  Now, I believe you wanted to say something earlier,

 6     and I cut you off of a little bit --

 7             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Yes, Mr. Karnavas.  I apologise for interrupting

 8     you, but since we have been dealing with the document here, with the

 9     minutes of this meeting under the chairmanship of the President Franjo

10     Tudjman, I would like to take this opportunity, not tomorrow when the

11     Judges are supposed to ask questions, to ask the witness about a

12     particular point since we are here at the document and you have

13     already -- I mean, Mr. Karnavas, you have already asked several questions

14     about the document, pages 28, I believe, and others.  And now I would

15     like to address myself to the -- to page 31, 31, of this very document,

16     that is the document 00089, I believe.  And 31, you -- concerning the

17     future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are interesting remarks.  Let me

18     quote or -- it's a long quotation.

19             President Tudjman said:  "In other words, the sovereignty of

20     Bosnia in the present circumstances from the Croatian standpoint is such

21     that not only do we not have to advocate it, we must not even raise the

22     issue openly.  However, why not accept this offer of demarcation -- " the

23     demarcation which would have demarcated into three parts Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina, and of course it would offered, as we recall, we spoke about

25     it this morning, and I continue now with the quotation.  "However, why

Page 27691

 1     not accept this offer of demarcation when it is in the interest of the

 2     Croatian people, the Croatian people here in this republic, and the

 3     Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because I do not see a single

 4     reason, a single serious reason, against it.  Moreover, in the talks I --

 5     that I personally conducted with Izetbegovic and Milosevic, in addition

 6     one of our people in Bosnia drafted a proposal for demarcation, whereby

 7     the Croatian areas and those that you have included in this community of

 8     Herceg-Bosna and in the community of Croatian Posavina, in the event of

 9     demarcation, Croatia wouldn't get not only those two communities, Croatia

10     would not only get those two communities but also for geopolitical

11     reasons Cazinska and Bihacka Krajina, which would satisfy almost ideally

12     the Croatian national interests, not only present but also for the future

13     and then from the remaining areas."  End of the quotation.

14             And now my question is to Mr. Zuzul.  If -- how would you in a

15     way view this excerpt of the transcript as far as the position, of course

16     it was in late 1991, position of President Tudjman concerning the future

17     of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I thank you, Your

19     Honour.  May I say this isn't just because I was part of Tudjman's

20     cabinet, which I was.  It is because I wished to tell the truth, the

21     truth that I saw and the way I saw it.  I want to tell you how I think

22     about this when I think about it.

23             I think one thing that this transcript shows is one of the

24     principles -- or, rather, all of the principles that Tudjman was applying

25     whenever he thought about the future.  The first thing being protecting

Page 27692

 1     Croatia's borders, the second thing being protecting the rights of the

 2     Croatian people -- the rights of the Croatian people in Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina, and the third thing being putting a stop to the war.

 4             When he discusses this, what he actually means is a division

 5     within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this is what I was trying to point out

 6     having read the transcript:  Tudjman is facing a proposal made by a

 7     delegation of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The proposal was

 8     formulated as a set of 19 issues or items.  If you look at item 27 -- or,

 9     rather, page 27, that Tudjman was not familiar with those conclusions.

10     He did, however, show respect to this group of Croats who came to see

11     him, and I can comment why, if you like.  And he responds as to why he

12     believed that the only solution acceptable, and this is earlier on before

13     the negotiations, was a demarcation within the borders of Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina.

15             Regardless of the fact that President Tudjman at the time knew

16     that such a response was not likely to satisfy everyone since there were

17     people around who really believed that some parts of Bosnia and

18     Herzegovina's territory should be annexed by Croatia, since some people

19     sincerely believed at the time that this was the only direction that this

20     moment in history could possibly take, nevertheless we have those

21     opinions on the one hand and President Tudjman's opinions in his capacity

22     as president on the other, and I think the distinction between the two is

23     perfectly clear.

24             If I may just add something based on my own knowledge of the

25     situation and something specific about Mr. Boban.  It is due to a sheer

Page 27693

 1     coincidence that I know about the following:  Not long before this

 2     President Tudjman had first been in touch with Mr. Boban in a way that

 3     illustrated the totality of what was going on at the time.  I can testify

 4     to this based on my own direct experience.

 5             I was part of the Croatian army, as I have pointed out already,

 6     and we were headed for Dubrovnik, I along with several of my other

 7     colleagues, university lecturers.  We were trying to contribute to the

 8     defence effort.  We reached Opuzen and realised that the situation was

 9     bordering on sheer panic.  The Croatian army, which was only in the

10     process of being organised, was simply unable to defend the area.  They

11     were short on manpower and equipment.  We spoke to the command there, and

12     someone raised the following issue:  What about the Croats from

13     Herzegovina?  It was a well-known fact that many of those had volunteered

14     to the Croatian army in order to defend Croatia.

15             Among our group, representatives of the Croatian army from

16     Zagreb, there was also Mr. Marinko Boban.  In Croatia, his reputation is

17     due to the fact that he is the father of probably the most famous

18     Croatian football player ever, Zvonimir Boban.  A little indiscretion, if

19     I may.  I was travelling with Marinko Boban in a car that his son had

20     received as a gift from his own football club, FC Milan.  That's what the

21     times were like.  There is nothing else I can say.  We were trying to set

22     up some sort of defence.

23             At one point in time, someone at the table had raised the

24     following issue:  Maybe Boban would be able to help.  Maybe he could make

25     available some volunteers.  He might give us a hand.  The person they

Page 27694

 1     meant was Mato Boban, who had by this time had been appointed to lead the

 2     Croats in Herzegovina -- or, rather, that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 3     We made a call to President Tudjman.  Following our conversation, I

 4     understood that he knew about Mate Boban but that they had never met.

 5             Just to be specific about the time line, I'm talking about late

 6     October, possibly early November.  So this is just under two months

 7     before the Zagreb meeting.  Nevertheless, President Tudjman agreed that

 8     Mr. Marinko Boban should travel to Herzegovina, of which he, too, was a

 9     native, and that he should talk to his relative Mate Boban and ask him if

10     he could help with defending Dubrovnik.

11             Marinko Boban returned the same night late - it was well past

12     midnight - to inform us that Mate Boban had made a promise to secure an

13     entire battalion of volunteers who would be prepared to defend and attack

14     the JNA in Herzegovina.  Those volunteers were Croats, but they were

15     Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Marinko Boban later told me and

16     President Tudjman that this really occurred, that this materialised.

17             Several days later, a group of Croat volunteers from Herzegovina

18     crossed to Eastern Herzegovina, Dubrovnik's hinterland, and this was

19     possibly one of the key factors in the defence of Dubrovnik and the

20     eventual success in defending the city.

21             I'm talking about telling the truth as I saw it.  Why did I deem

22     it important to point out this very fact and to address this particular

23     meeting?  President Tudjman knows that he not only enjoys the political

24     support of the Croats from Herzegovina.  He also knows that he needs them

25     in order to do something that constituted one of the most important

Page 27695

 1     strategic goals at the time, which was to defend Dubrovnik.  He pays his

 2     respect to them at that meeting.  He values their presence.  It wasn't a

 3     matter of agreeing or disagreeing with what they were actually saying.

 4     He knew that they were the only ones at the time capable of carrying this

 5     extra burden of defence.

 6             I don't know whether between the episode that I've just described

 7     and the meeting there was any actual communication between President

 8     Tudjman and Mr. Boban.  I simply don't know.  I do, however, believe,

 9     Your Honours, that if we place this against that sort of a background

10     then reading the entire transcript is cast in an entirely different

11     light.  These proposals are being made but not by President Tudjman.

12     He's discussing these proposals.  He's discussing these proposals with

13     people that he respects, with people who are members of the same

14     political party.  They respected him in political terms.  That was one of

15     the reasons.  But if you ask me, I'll say this quite openly, he realised

16     at the time how important these people were and how crucial they were to

17     his ability to obtain his own political goals and in terms of helping

18     Croatia's defence as a whole.

19             I'm sorry if I'm trailing off here into some sort of

20     interpretation rather than telling you what you expected me to say, but I

21     do believe that this is something that casts a truly different light on

22     the transcript itself.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You provide very long answers.

24     They should be shorter.

25              I use the opportunity from my colleague's question, and this

Page 27696

 1     will not be taken out of your time, Mr. Karnavas, rest assured.

 2             I use this opportunity to raise an issue that seems to me

 3     extremely relevant, and your very words raised -- focused my attention on

 4     this issue.

 5             I see that there was this meeting between Tudjman and the

 6     delegation of Herceg-Bosna, and under item 1 it is stated that:  "The

 7     Community of Herceg-Bosna is going to give its full support to the

 8     recognition and the final establishment of the Republic of Croatia."

 9     That's item 1.

10             But based on this, since you were very close to President

11     Tudjman, you held very high functions indeed, I'd like to know the

12     following:  Why did the Republic of Croatia fail to recognise officially

13     at one point in time the Republic of Herceg-Bosna?  And I'm raising this

14     issue based on the recent model where you had various countries that

15     recognised Kosovo.  Why is it that back then Croatia did not want to or

16     was not able to officially recognise the Republic of Herceg-Bosna?  Could

17     you answer this question?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you meant the

19     Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and sometimes this term was used to imply the

20     organisation of Croats, as far as I know Croatia never seriously thought

21     about recognising this as an independent republic.

22             As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the Republic of

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, Croatia was the first state,

24     if I'm not mistaken, that recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina at the moment

25     when Bosnia and Herzegovina sought the recognition.  I'm again speaking

Page 27697

 1     off the cuff.  At that moment Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet sought

 2     recognition either from Croatia or from the international community.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are telling us that at

 4     no point in time did Croatia envision to recognise the Republic of

 5     Herceg-Bosna, that it was never a concern of the then leaders of Croatia

 6     and that you never heard this possibility being mentioned.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard a reference being made to a

 8     possibility of the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina and separation of

 9     different parts of Bosnia according to different models.  I heard that at

10     various international negotiations because reference was made to that,

11     but the unilateral recognition by Croatia of the organisation of Croats

12     in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that appeared under different

13     names, one of them being Herceg-Bosna, I never attended any such meeting

14     that a reference was made to that, and I don't know that such a

15     possibility was ever seriously considered by the Croatian leadership.

16             As for the paragraph that the Honourable Judge pointed to, one

17     can see hear that he makes a clear distinction between the

18     internationally recognised Croatia, which means that he speaks with a

19     certain degree, if you allow me my own interpretation, a degree of pride

20     because he knew that very soon after that Croatia would be recognised.

21     He speaks in one way about the international borders, and he speaks in

22     another way which doesn't lend itself to an easy interpretation about the

23     Croatian territory or the Croatian interest, territory, or the territory

24     where Croats lived, and he primarily implies 30 -- or the 28

25     municipalities.

Page 27698

 1             It seems to me that one can see the difference very clearly,

 2     especially within the context of the previous question.  He does consider

 3     certain possibilities and options, but he leaves room for future

 4     decisions and reactions.  And there are also areas where he's very firm

 5     and categorical, one of them being the borders of Croatia.

 6             I think that Tudjman could not be as categorical and as proud at

 7     the moment about the recognition, the upcoming recognition of Croatia, if

 8     he had thought at the time that the international borders of Croatia

 9     would change.  Tudjman was not naive.  That's at least what we thought of

10     him.  And if he had thought in that way he would have appeared naive.

11             On the one hand he speaks about the recognised borders and the

12     recognition of Croatia, and on the other hand he speaks about different

13     ways to solve the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the different

14     options for that.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Karnavas.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  Any other questions?  Otherwise, we'll go on to

17     the next document.  And I think from now on where we -- where there's a

18     need I think it's perfectly acceptable, and in fact the best thing is for

19     the Trial Chamber to ask their questions as we go through this.

20        Q.   The next one is P 00130.  This is another so-called presidential

21     transcript.  And just to save a little time we can see this is 3 March

22     1992, and we can see from the very first page that your name is on -- is

23     on as one of the -- somebody that was present at the meeting.  P 00130.

24     Do you have it?

25        A.   [In English] Yeah.

Page 27699

 1        Q.   All right.  Now, because I don't want to lose too much time on

 2     this one, have you had an opportunity to read this -- this particular

 3     transcript?

 4        A.   [Interpretation] Yes.

 5        Q.   And the one part that I want to focus on just very briefly before

 6     I ask you for any other things that you may wish to point out, on page

 7     65, at the second paragraph, it says:  "I think that this is a big

 8     problem that should be resolved urgently, namely the problem of

 9     communication.  The Croatian War Navy, the Sixth Operational Zone, and

10     especially in the context of the problem of Herzegovina."

11             Now, this is several months after the previous transcript that we

12     saw.  Can you tell us how the situation had changed if at all in Croatia

13     vis-a-vis the JNA and the aggression that we spoke about yesterday?

14        A.   At that moment the overall situation had changed to a certain

15     extent.  Croatia was a recognised state and UNPROFOR zones had already

16     been established in certain parts of Croatia or their establishment was

17     under way, so there was no military danger in Croatia.  The situation was

18     frozen, in military terms, at that point.  However, there was still a

19     direct threat in the area around Dubrovnik.  Even after the recognition

20     of Croatia, the UNPROFOR mandate never extended to the area around

21     Dubrovnik and south of Dubrovnik.

22             We're talking about, me and others, which was the main purpose of

23     this meeting, was in relation to the general problems of the army.  I and

24     the others who were with me had all just come back from a visit to the

25     territory around Dubrovnik, and we spoke about the problems faced by the

Page 27700

 1     defence there, one of the problems being communication between the

 2     different branches the Croatian army, more concretely between the navy

 3     and land army, and the impossibility of formal communication with the

 4     units.  I better say -- I don't know whether I can call them units in

 5     formal terms, but with the volunteers in Herceg-Bosna from the territory

 6     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those that I referred to a while ago.  And

 7     this is what this particular sentence refers to as well as the rest of my

 8     presentation.

 9             I would like to add to that the group that I was with was dealing

10     with the psychological and information activities; i.e., problems in

11     communication with the different parts of the military were an integral

12     part of our everyday work.

13        Q.   You're going to have to slow down a little bit now.  Now we might

14     be going a little bit too fast, but is there anything else on this

15     transcript?  Otherwise we'll move on to the next document.  I only

16     mention that because you were present.

17        A.   As for the context in which this happened, I believe that a lot

18     has already been said about that.

19        Q.   All right.  Now, if we go to the next document, 1 -- it's P

20     00131, and the Prosecution says that this particular document is relevant

21     because this transcript records discussions by the senior Croatian

22     military command and shows Croatian logistical assistance of both arms

23     and military units to the Bosnian Croats.  And there's a reference to

24     page 27, and we can see that on that particular page there are references

25     to sector Dubrovnik.

Page 27701

 1             Now, before we get into the specifics of this, if we just look at

 2     the very first page we'll see that you were present at this meeting.

 3     This is the following day from the previous transcript, 4 March 1992, and

 4     all sorts of other individuals are present, as well, including an

 5     individual by the name of Daidza, and perhaps you could begin by telling

 6     us did you know this person, who was and what position he held?  Just

 7     very briefly.

 8        A.   I met Mr. Daidza during one of my visits to the southern front.

 9     I don't know whether this was immediately prior to this event.  At the

10     moment when I met him, he was the commander of a unit which mostly

11     consisted of Muslim volunteers.  At the moment when we met them, they

12     were in training in Croatia.  If I'm not mistaken, this was somewhere

13     near Makarska.  Maybe in Backa Polje, but I'm not a hundred percent sure.

14     But I know for a fact that he was the commander of that unit of Muslim

15     volunteers who fought together with the Croatian volunteers against the

16     J -- the Yugoslav Army.

17        Q.   Okay.  I'm going to have to ask you to slow down a little bit,

18     but you say Muslim volunteers.  Would they be Muslim volunteers from

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina, or are they Muslim volunteers from Croatia?

20        A.   From Bosnia and Herzegovina.  From Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21        Q.   Now, you also mentioned the word "training."  I take it that you

22     meant military training.

23        A.   Yes.  I believe that this was primarily military training.

24        Q.   All right.  And just prior to that you had pointed to what has

25     been previously marked as 3D 03171.  That's the map itself.  And you had

Page 27702

 1     pointed towards the area of Dubrovnik.  At this -- so I want to focus

 2     your attention, and perhaps you might be able to comment.  On page 25 of

 3     this transcript where you say -- when Daidza says:  "I was assigned a

 4     task to arrange the valley of the Neretva River together with the other

 5     commanders because it was our very last defence line.  I would like to

 6     give a brief statement."  And then he gives a statement, and then on page

 7     27, at the very last sentence there is a reference from a Luka --

 8        A.   Djanko.

 9        Q.   -- Djanko, thank you, where he talks about the zone of

10     responsibility of Dubrovnik sector covers only the short preliminary

11     territory of the municipalities of Dubrovnik, Metkovic, Ploce -- I always

12     have problems with this one.

13        A.   Vrgorac.

14        Q.   Vrgorac in Western Herzegovina.  And then it goes on:  "It is

15     specific about of few elements, Neum and Herzegovina cut it off and it is

16     shallow for the Defence.  The Dubrovnik municipality is encircled and

17     facing subjective problems in commanding, and I will say a few words.

18             "There are actions in Herzegovina without written orders issued

19     by the staff, and I'm already there with two of my brigades.  Croatian

20     people of Herzegovina are incapable to defend the line from Mostar to

21     Popovo Polje, and I think that they have approximately 22.000 barrels of

22     artillery which is enough.  I'm going to say a few words," and then

23     there's a further discussion.

24             Now just so I'm clear, do these reflect what you were saying

25     yesterday with respect to Neum and the difficulties of covering the

Page 27703

 1     entire Croatian -- southern Croatian territory?

 2        A.   Yes.  This is a very specific illustration of my own words.  I

 3     can provide you an example and give you an episode.  The first time I met

 4     Mr. Djanko down there he was the commander of the Croatian army in the

 5     area but not of the navy.  According to some information, Yugoslav tanks

 6     were moving towards Opuzen -- or, rather, towards the line on the Neretva

 7     River.  At the moment when we arrived, he was considering the possibility

 8     of blowing up a bridge on the river Bistrina in the area.  However, when

 9     we looked at a map we could see that this would not make any strategic

10     sense, because if he blew up that bridge, he would have prevented their

11     passage through the narrow territory of Croatia.  But they could proceed

12     and went on moving to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13             What I'm trying say is this:  It was absolutely clear that it was

14     absolutely impossible to defend that territory unless the defence of the

15     part of the territory in Herzegovina was involved in that overall

16     defence, because it was from that particular area that all the attacks

17     came from.

18        Q.   All right.  Okay.  Thank you.  We're going to move on to the next

19     three documents.  I will try to cover them in succession, so I'll just

20     point out some relevant passages and then ask you to comment on them if

21     that's okay with the Trial Chamber just to save some time, because they

22     relate more or less to the same matter.

23             So we'll be looking first at P 00205.  This is from the Security

24     Council.  It's 15 May 1992.

25             Before we go to the document, is Croatia at this point in time

Page 27704

 1     sending troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina to attack the Sarajevo

 2     government?

 3        A.   Of course not.

 4        Q.   Have they sent in troops at this point in time to attack the

 5     Muslim people?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And you just told us just previously that in fact there

 8     were Muslim volunteers who were being trained in Croatia, assisting

 9     Croatia in its defence against the JNA which was launching attacks from

10     the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina onto Croatia; is that correct?

11        A.   Correct.

12        Q.   Right.  Now, if we look at this Security Council Resolution, and

13     if we go to the second page under item number 2, it says:  "Welcomes the

14     effort -- the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the

15     framework -- framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements

16     for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the auspices of the conference of

17     Yugoslavia; urges that the discussion be resumed without delay; and urges

18     the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate actively

19     and constructively in these discussions."  And it goes on and on?

20             First question is:  Were you aware of -- of these activities?

21     There was -- there were undergoing discussions concerning the

22     constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23        A.   I was aware of that.

24        Q.   Okay.  And at any point in time -- this is a foundational

25     question for future questions.  At any point in time, were you involved

Page 27705

 1     in any sorts of activities, negotiations, discussions, drafting of -- of

 2     agreements or what have you, that were based in part -- were due to

 3     the -- the discussions on the constitutional arrangements of Bosnia and

 4     Herzegovina?

 5        A.   Most certainly over the entire period of time, on several

 6     occasions.  At this point in time, I was in a certain way involved in

 7     negotiations and talks.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now let's look at point number 3.  It demands that

 9     all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including

10     the units of the Yugoslav People's Army, JNA, as well as elements of the

11     Croatian army cease immediately and that Bosnia and Herzegovina

12     neighbours take swift action to end such an interference and respect the

13     territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

14             First question, to your knowledge were there elements of the

15     Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, if so, where

16     would they have been located at that point in time in light of the

17     circumstances and the activities that you've already discussed thus far?

18        A.   I don't have any concrete information about that, but I believe

19     that there were elements of the Croatian army on the territories of

20     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I don't have any reason to doubt this report,

21     but it is also absolutely clear from the overall situation that at that

22     moment they were fighting exclusively against the JNA, which was at the

23     time in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also confirmed

24     by this particular Resolution.

25        Q.   All right.  Now, we're going to get other Resolutions, but if you

Page 27706

 1     could just help us out a little bit because yesterday we talked about the

 2     UN and their lack of effort to send combat troops to defend the

 3     territorial integrity and the lives of Croatians as a result of the

 4     aggressive actions taken by the JNA.

 5             Assuming, assuming, and you told us that you were in that area

 6     and you know it very well, so we have the foundation for that.  You were

 7     in the military, so we have the foundation for that, as well, so let's

 8     assume that those elements of the Croatian army had withdrawn from that

 9     area around Dubrovnik and further up by Neum and what have you, and let's

10     assume for the sake of our hypothetical, but we will see later on that in

11     fact that was the case, that the JNA did not withdraw from that

12     territory, what would have happened to the southern part of Croatia?

13        A.   Yesterday I said that at that time there already was enough

14     compelling information to the effect that it was the plan of the Serbian

15     army, because the Yugoslav army at that time was completely controlled by

16     the Serbian leadership, to establish the border along the Neretva River.

17     It is my impression that had it not been for the volunteers from

18     Herzegovina, Croats, and the volunteers of Muslim ethnicity who fought

19     side by side with them, again I have to say this is my personal

20     impression, and the assistance they received from the Croatian army, and

21     the elements of the Croatian army, that they would not have been able to

22     achieve this goal militarily.

23             Now, as for the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as for the course

24     that the peace talks would take, this is something that we can only guess

25     and speculate, but it is a fact that all the peace talks about Bosnia and

Page 27707

 1     Herzegovina had as their starting point the fact that the Serb side was

 2     in control of certain territory, and at times they side-stepped the issue

 3     as to how Serbs actually got to hold this territory.

 4        Q.   All right.  Let me just move on for the sake of -- there's a

 5     point number 4.  We've seen this before where it talks about -- it says:

 6     "Demands that those units of the Yugoslavia People's army and elements of

 7     the Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be withdrawn

 8     or be subject to the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina or

 9     be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective

10     international monitoring, and request the Secretary-General to consider

11     without delay to what international assistance could be provided in this

12     connection.

13             First, let me ask you this starting with the latter part of this

14     segment.  What if any assistance, what international assistance, was

15     provided at this point in time in that particular area?

16        A.   Primarily monitoring it seems to me.

17        Q.   Okay.  Were the monitors in a position to fight back the JNA

18     should they continue with their attacks on Croatia?

19        A.   I think that they did not have this kind of mandate at that time.

20     I'm sure that they didn't have it at that time.  They didn't have the

21     forces to do it either.  And we know, I think from the judgements

22     rendered by this Tribunal, that even when they had the forces they were

23     not in a position to intervene and to prevent some major humanitarian

24     catastrophes.

25        Q.   Now, the next two documents are dated --

Page 27708

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A follow-up question if I may

 2     on the document we've just been reviewing.  It is document 205 if I'm not

 3     mistaken.  Is this the right document, Mr. Karnavas?

 4             MR. KARNAVAS:  Correct, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the Resolution, on page 2 in

 6     the English version, item 4, it is demanded that the Croatian army units

 7     in Bosnia be withdrawn.  It is something we've discussed for hours, for

 8     dozens, maybe hundreds of hours.

 9             To your knowledge, sir, were there units of the Croatian army in

10     Bosnia and Herzegovina?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that at that time there

12     were elements of the Croatian army in some areas of Bosnia and

13     Herzegovina.  Now, as to how one can define those elements, it's a

14     different issue, but they all fought side by side with all those who were

15     trying to defend themselves against the Yugoslav army and the Serbian

16     aggression as I have already said.  We in the Republic of Croatia, for

17     instance, welcomed this resolution.  At that time, I was in the Foreign

18     Ministry.

19             Why did we welcome it?  Because this resolution offers two

20     options.  One, for the Yugoslav army to withdraw from Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina.  At that time, there was still some optimism among the

22     international institutions, and some hoped that this could actually come

23     to pass.  In that case, the question of any elements of Croatian army

24     remaining there would become immaterial.  They would have nothing to do.

25     But if that did not happen, the Resolution goes on in paragraph 4 as it

Page 27709

 1     continues offering another option for those forces to be placed under the

 2     authority of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 3             Your Honour, I can vouch that at that time we were already in

 4     contact with Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of operationalising the

 5     conclusions stemming from this Resolution.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I was only referring to the

 7     month of May 1992.  For the rest, we'll see later.  Thank you very much.

 8     Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.

 9             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10        Q.   Now, the next two documents are May 1992, and again, they sort of

11     touch upon the same issues that we've discussed, and if we look on

12     page -- page 2 of P 00232, sort of in the middle of the page it says:

13     "Deeply concern also at the developments in Croatia, including persistent

14     cease-fire violations and the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians

15     and at the obstruction of and lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR in other

16     parts of Croatia."

17             If you could assist us a little bit.  What are they talking about

18     when they say the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians?  Are we

19     talking about in Croatia?  What part?  What are they talking about?

20        A.   They're talking about the events in so-called UNPROFOR zones.

21     Those were parts of Croatia that had been occupied by Serbs where the

22     so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina had been set up.  The international

23     forces arrived in the areas, yet despite that, the expulsion of non-Serbs

24     continued in that zone and in other zones, and when they're talking about

25     the lack of cooperation, it is obvious that at that time what happened

Page 27710

 1     was that the self-proclaimed authorities in those occupied forces were

 2     refusing to cooperate with UNPROFOR.

 3        Q.   Well, were those self-proclaimed authorities being assisted by

 4     any particular armed force, or were they just capable on their own to

 5     conduct those expulsions?

 6        A.   Right from the beginning, they received direct support and

 7     assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army.  They received weapons from

 8     them.  The command structure was for the most part taken over from the

 9     Yugoslav army.  One of the commanders in the area in -- in the Knin area

10     was Ratko Mladic before he moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina, so it is no

11     secret that it was a mix of self-proclaimed leaders who advocated the

12     idea of Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav army, which in the meantime had

13     dropped every pretense of the effort to save Yugoslavia.  They merely

14     occupied Croatia, and soon they moved to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina

15     too.

16        Q.   And again before I -- before I ask my next question concerning

17     this particular document, can you tell us at this point in time how much

18     of the -- of Croatian territory is occupied?  It might be relevant

19     because sometimes in this courtroom we tend to forget the percentage of

20     the country and the devastation that Croatia underwent.

21        A.   Well, I don't want to pretend to be an expert.  From what I've

22     read and from the documents that I received in my diplomatic career, the

23     international documents, the percentage of the territory was between 25

24     at the lower end, but the figure that was quoted most often was 30 per

25     cent of the Croatian territory.  That would be one-third of the overall

Page 27711

 1     territory of Croatia that was occupied at that time.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And we see now in this -- in paragraph 2 -- I mean on page

 3     3, item 2, I'm sorry, page 3 item 2 it says:  "Demands that any elements

 4     of the Croatian army still present in Bosnia-Herzegovina act in

 5     accordance with paragraph 4 of Resolution 752 very quickly."  Had the

 6     situation say, just in the southern part of Croatia, where we talked

 7     about earlier, had that changed in the 15 days between the document that

 8     we saw earlier, that is P 0025 and this one P 00232, had the situation

 9     changed on the ground at all?

10        A.   No.  The situation did not change, but in the meantime the

11     diplomatic activities between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were

12     stepped up, and they would soon result in the signing of the agreement

13     that would fully meet the demands of the UN Security Council.

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  I'm told that there's a wrong number in the

15     transcript.  It should be P 00205.

16             THE WITNESS:  This is P 00232.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Yes.  For the record, for the transcript, I

18     probably misspoke and that's why it was written down.  I was referring to

19     earlier.

20        Q.   Okay.  Now when we get to this document P 00233, which is the

21     last document in this series, it's dated the same date, and you told us

22     that the JNA has not left at least the areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina

23     where they're attacking Croatia.

24             Now, if we look at -- I just wanted to point a couple of things

25     out again.  So we can take a reality check over here, or do a reality

Page 27712

 1     check.  In paragraph 10:  "As regards the withdrawal of elements of

 2     Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, information currently

 3     available in New York suggests that no such withdrawal has occurred.

 4     UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian army personnel in

 5     uniforms operating within and as part of military formations in

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7             The Croatian authorities have consistently taken the position

 8     that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina have left the Croatian

 9     army and are not subject to its authority.  International observers do

10     not, however, doubt that the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina are under the

11     control of the Croatian military --"

12        A.   [In English] to the portion.

13        Q.   To the portion -- I'm sorry, the portion I can't read.  "The

14     portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Croatian

15     military and it's whether -- whether belonging to the local territorial

16     defence, to paramilitary groups, or to the Croatian army.  It is unclear

17     in the circumstances how their withdrawal or disbandment as required by

18     the council can be achieved."  We spoke of Mr. Daidza.  Was Daidza under

19     the -- to your knowledge, that is - if you can answer the question; if

20     not, we won't bother - but was he under the control of the Croatian

21     military or the Croatian authorities or the Croatian army?

22        A.   I couldn't give you an answer to that question.  I think it was

23     quite clear to me who Daidza and his volunteers were fighting, but as to

24     under whose control he was, I couldn't really venture an opinion.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 27713

 1        A.   But Mr. Daidza was from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That is a

 2     notorious fact.  Everybody knew that, myself included.  He was from some

 3     place in Central Bosnia, if I'm not mistaken.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A general question, Witness.

 5     At the time you no doubt read the Resolutions of the Security Council, I

 6     suppose.  Your department within the ministry kept close scrutiny of

 7     anything that was written at the time.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Surely.  At that time, I was

 9     at the Foreign Ministry at the time.  We were familiar with those

10     Resolutions, and we were trying to take steps in accordance with those

11     Resolutions.  Now I'm talking about the Foreign Ministry.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you know, those Resolutions

13     result from different information coming from the international forces

14     present on the ground, from other sources, and so on and so forth.  In

15     your position, in your capacity, did you observe at any time major

16     mistakes in the Resolutions when certain facts were mentioned?  Do you

17     have specific cases in mind where you could say that what was written

18     down was obviously wrong, inaccurate, based on unreliable information?

19     Do you have in mind one or two examples that you could give us from the

20     top of your head?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, I can't now

22     think of any Resolutions or reports of the UN Secretary-General such as

23     this one where I spotted some major errors.  If there were any such

24     cases, we reacted while the Resolutions were in the process of being

25     drafted.  At times, it appeared that the idea behind the Resolutions was

Page 27714

 1     to establish some kind of a balanced approach towards -- where all sides

 2     would be treated in the same way, and to us who knew what the situation

 3     was like on the ground, they did not seem an accurate reflection of that.

 4             I can tell you that because I had direct relations, good

 5     relations, with a number of international representatives.  I would

 6     sometimes bring that up.  At times, I would officially put -- make an

 7     official protest, but most often I would receive the following reply:

 8     They were there to establish facts and not to judge what is going on, who

 9     is to blame and who is not.

10             It seemed to us that this approach was not always productive, but

11     that may have been just our impression because, after all, I was there to

12     represent the Republic of Croatia, and I allow the possibility that I was

13     subjective in my approach.  But I couldn't really say that I noticed any

14     major glaring errors in those documents.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break --

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  If I could, just one last point on this document,

17     and we'll take our break.

18        Q.   Sticking with the same document, because this is 233, because you

19     mentioned Mladic, and I think it might be relevant here.  If we look at

20     paragraph number 5 on page 2, it says:  "The bulk of JNA personnel who

21     were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were citizens of that republic

22     and were not, therefore, covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision of

23     4 May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Most of them appeared to

24     have joined the army of the so-called Serbian Republic of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia

Page 27715

 1     and Herzegovina" -- I can't read that next word -- "which is under --

 2     which is under the political control of the Presidency of that republic.

 3     Others may have joined various irregular forces operating there."

 4             Now, you said earlier -- you talked earlier about General Mladic,

 5     who was in Croatia at one point, JNA officer.  Now, can you explain a

 6     little bit about what is being said in paragraph 5, why it might be

 7     significant about the JNA personnel?

 8        A.   In an effort to report objectively, I was talking about it a

 9     moment ago, it is my interpretation that the Secretary-General in this

10     report as it is worded, that the members of the Yugoslav army from Bosnia

11     and Herzegovina have now joined the newly formed armies.  In actual fact,

12     nothing changed.  Those were the same troops.  They retained their

13     equipment; I think the equipment is actually mentioned somewhere in this

14     report by the UN Secretary-General, and they had the same command

15     structure.  And unfortunately time would tell.  I think this is the first

16     time that General Mladic is actually referred to in a document

17     originating from the United Nations, but as time went by we went on to

18     see under whose command he operated and what he actually did.  So this

19     was just pretense.  The same troops remained there under the same

20     command.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you.  That's it, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll take a

23     20-minute break.

24                           --- Recess taken at 5.40 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.

Page 27716

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you may proceed.

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas, to stop you, but before

 5     we break I didn't want to take your time.  I only would like to have a

 6     question from Mr. Zuzul, and it is about a clarification.

 7             During the very last minutes of -- of the witness, you spoke and

 8     he spoke about some of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security

 9     Council, and I believe it was page 74, lines 1 and 2, that -- that

10     Mr. Zuzul you mentioned that, and I quote:  "I was there to represent

11     Croatia," et cetera.  And now my question of clarification is the

12     following:  According to -- to your -- I mean the summary of what we have

13     received, there is not very much clearly stated, if you will, also posted

14     in New York or only in Geneva.  This morning you -- I mean, previously

15     you mentioned that you were posted in Geneva as the permanent

16     representative of Croatia to Geneva.  Now, I gathered from your last

17     statement that -- that if you were also in New York as representing

18     Croatia as a permanent representative or only as a member of delegation,

19     et cetera.  So my question is to clarify if you were permanently in

20     Geneva or sometimes you participated at the General Assembly sessions in

21     New York or at the meetings of the Security Council.  Thank you.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  When the

23     Resolutions were passed, I was with the foreign ministry.  I was, in

24     actual fact, assistant minister.  I had started dealing with the

25     negotiations already.  I had not yet been appointed ambassador.  Soon

Page 27717

 1     after this, I became deputy foreign minister.

 2             You talked about the position of ambassador to the UN in Geneva.

 3     I was appointed on the 1st of February, 1993, to that particular

 4     position.  However, even while working as assistant and deputy foreign

 5     minister in Geneva, I was a regular member of our delegations in New

 6     York, as well, and I was quite involved in the work of our delegations,

 7     and I took part in discussing all the Resolutions on the Croatian side,

 8     needless to say.

 9             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Thank you very much.

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Judge Prandler.

11        Q.   And I wanted to point out something on page 74, line 24, because

12     it was translated as -- in an effort for those folks to be objective, and

13     I believe my colleague tells me that you used the word "Pokusaj," if I'm

14     pronouncing that correctly.  Could you please tell us whether that means

15     "effort" or "attempt," because it may be a slight variation.  It may be

16     slightly nuance, but just to have a more accurate -- what did you exactly

17     mean when you were asked the question about the reports?  Were they

18     making an effort, or were they attempting?  I don't want to put words in

19     your mouth, but I'm told that you actually used the word.  We don't have

20     a Croatian transcript.  So if you could think back?

21        A.   [In English] I would say that they were making efforts.

22        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Now, if we could go to the next document, and

23     we're probably going to move through the next couple of documents rather

24     quickly so we can get some more substantive areas.  The next one is a P

25     document for Prosecution, P 00263.  This is a presidential transcript.

Page 27718

 1     Now, this is dated 15 June 1992, and of course the Prosecution in its

 2     exhibit list indicated that the relevant pages for them are 66 to 67 and

 3     that this transcript shows army of Republic of Croatia units being sent

 4     into Bosnia and setting up check-points there.

 5             Now, if I could direct you to that page, page 67, it also shows,

 6     by the way, that you were present.  I don't know if you recall being

 7     present, but in any event, the first page shows that you were present.

 8     Page 67, as I understand it, you had an opportunity to read not just the

 9     English version but also to make some comparisons with the Croatian

10     version, and it might be of some significance, I don't know, we'll leave

11     it up to the Trial Chamber, but could you look at that, the very last

12     paragraph where it starts:  "The numbers of theft and larceny cases has

13     also increased."  Did you notice anything missing, any words missing in

14     that?

15        A.   That's true, I was at this meeting.  Naturally having read the

16     transcripts it came back to me.  It has been 16 years since, after all.

17     However, when I read both English and the Croatian versions, I noticed

18     that the English is missing a word which in this case might change the

19     overall meaning.  In the English it's page 67.  In the Croatian -- I

20     don't know exactly how the pages were marked, but I think it's 714.

21     Anyway, the word "return" is missing.  Therefore, if we try to translate

22     this paragraph over here there is a word missing, the word "return,"

23     which can be translated into English -- well, I am certainly no expert,

24     but to the extent that I can tell, it could be translated in two ways

25     perhaps, "withdrawal," which is I think the word that most people would

Page 27719

 1     have used in this case, or "return," which is another possibility.

 2             If you add that word to the paragraph, no matter if you actually

 3     opt for the word "withdrawal" or the word "return," I think this changes

 4     the meaning entirely, and the paragraph shows that those elements of the

 5     Croatian army that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina were now returning home

 6     and while withdrawing were perpetrating certain crimes.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And with respect to the -- to the issue of check-points --

 8     well, perhaps you could read the paragraph itself, which is only a few

 9     lines.

10        A.   [In English] Excuse me, the same paragraph.

11        Q.   Yeah.  And you can read it in Croatian.  It can be translated or

12     you can read it in English, however you feel more comfortable.  Croatian

13     is the original language of the transcript, so ...

14        A.   Maybe I'll read it in Croatian so maybe we'll get new translation

15     then.

16        Q.   All right.

17        A.   [Interpretation] "Cases of theft and larceny have been on the

18     increase.  The movable property, too, has been stolen, and in the last

19     cases at local check-points machines and equipment has been moved over

20     from Herceg-Bosna where units and individuals who were involved over

21     there along various front lines while returning to Croatia have been

22     hauling in as war booty tractors, and all other kinds of agricultural

23     machinery, et cetera.

24              "However," and that's the next paragraph, "However, we have set

25     up very effective check-points here, and I can now say that we have been

Page 27720

 1     particularly effective at putting a stop to this kind of practice."

 2        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Can you, being there, and now that we have the

 3     context and having read it and spotted the error, can you tell us when

 4     they say "we have set up check-points here," what are they talking about?

 5     What kind of check-points, and what does "here" mean in this context?

 6        A.   I can't tell you exactly where the check-points were.  I simply

 7     don't know.  However, looking at the overall context, I think these are

 8     check-points in Croatia itself.

 9        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Let's go on --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Just for the record, Mr. Karnavas, wouldn't it

11     be good to mention that it is Mate Lausic who is speaking here?  It's not

12     Boban.  It's not the witness.

13             MR. KARNAVAS:  Right.  Right.  I should apologise.  I should have

14     done that.  I'm just getting a little tired but --

15             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Of course.  We all are.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  -- you're absolutely correct.

17        Q.   All right.  And now just for the record, who is that individual

18     so we know?

19        A.   I think at this time he was the commander of the military police

20     of the Croatian army.

21        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Now, if we go on to the next -- next document,

22     P 00336.  This is a presidential transcript dated 21 July 19 --

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  We have to change the folders.

24             MR. KARNAVAS:  Sorry.

25        Q.   21 July 1992, and first context.  At this point in history, what

Page 27721

 1     is happening in Croatia?  Has the JNA withdrawn?  Have the attacks

 2     stopped, or is it -- and has the territory up to 30 per cent, as you've

 3     indicated, does Croatia have total control over its territory within its

 4     internationally recognised borders?

 5        A.   There were no considerable changes in Croatia at this time.

 6     Large tracts of Croatian territory were still under occupation.  There

 7     was nothing much going on in terms of warfare, as far as I know, since

 8     all of those were by now UNPROFOR-controlled areas.  However, there

 9     wasn't anything in particular moving in a good, positive direction

10     either.  Nevertheless, relations were changing between Croatia and Bosnia

11     and HerzegovinaBosnia and Herzegovina had by this time been

12     internationally recognised.  It had been recognised by Croatia as well.

13             In the context of this story, one thing that strikes me as worth

14     mentioning is that at a referendum before Bosnia and Herzegovina was

15     established, there were only Bosniaks and Croats participating.  The

16     Serbs refused to be involved.  President Tudjman issued a public call on

17     Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to go to that referendum and to vote in

18     favour of an independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19             Soon after the proclamation, Croatia recognised Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina.  We started with diplomatic consultations immediately.  This

21     document is in relation to the first major meeting following the

22     recognition.  However, in the context of the Resolutions that I have been

23     talking about, there is one thing that I would like to note.  Sometime in

24     mid-June President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic issued a joint

25     statement.  I was with President Tudjman when we prepared the statement.

Page 27722

 1             Among other things, the statement also dealt with issues

 2     mentioned in the Secretary-General's letter as well as in the Resolutions

 3     of the Security Council.  Croatia wanted to act on those documents

 4     immediately.  So this gives you the general background.  There was a lot

 5     of diplomatic activity going on.  This meeting was agreed and eventually

 6     held between the leaders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

 7     the leaders of the Republic of Croatia in Zagreb.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now -- thank you.  Let me walk you step by step, but I'm

 9     happy that you put that into context because let me use this to segue

10     into my next question.  The Prosecution in the 62 ter description in

11     describing this particular presidential transcript, and I'll use a word

12     that they attribute to me that is "spin", this is what the Prosecution

13     says:  That this transcript --

14             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, as I objected earlier this afternoon,

15     I'm also going to object again to this now.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well.

17             MR. SCOTT:  There's no point in putting these preparatory

18     comments and criticisms.  He can ask the question.  If he can point him

19     to the page and say -- if -- assuming it's otherwise a fair question,

20     there's no reason for these other preparatory remarks.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  I am entitled -- I am entitled -- this is the

22     Defence, Mr. President.  I am defending allegations.  The allegation --

23     the spin by the Prosecutor who wasn't there at the time is suggesting

24     that -- that Tudjman is -- presses the Bosnian president.  The gentleman

25     is particularly familiar.  That's their spin.  He's going to comment.

Page 27723

 1             MR. SCOTT:  This is further coaching of the witness, Your Honour.

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  How is it coaching of the witness?

 3             MR. SCOTT:  Because I'm now telling you what the Prosecution

 4     position is, so you can be sure to disagree with that.  That's your queue

 5     to disagree.

 6             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honours.

 7             MR. SCOTT:  This is objectionable.

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honours.

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Just ask the question.

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honours, let's take a reality check.  I met

11     with the witness.  I went through the documents.  If I wanted to coach

12     him, I would have coached him back then.

13             MR. SCOTT:  Maybe you did.

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  This is absolutely ridiculous, and this Prosecutor

15     has met with every single witness, gone through the documents, and we've

16     seen them testify.  So I'm -- they allege a joint criminal enterprise.

17     They allege that Tudjman is pressing the Bosnian president, entering into

18     a particular agreement, which is the very next document.  That's their

19     spin.  I'm entitled to -- I'm entitled to point that out because the

20     gentleman can comment.  To suggest that I'm suggesting is utterly and

21     patently ridiculous, and I'm being generous at this point.

22             MR. SCOTT:  Well, I do suggest it, and also, Your Honour, I ask

23     the Chamber and not just Judge Antonetti.  I ask all the Chamber in

24     fairness.  Remember back during the Prosecution case and when the

25     Prosecution put on its witnesses.  I didn't say, and I'm telling you,

Page 27724

 1     Mr. Witness, what the Prosecution case is, and this is the answer I want

 2     you to give, and if you look at paragraph so-and-so of our indictment,

 3     this is the Prosecution's theory.  I didn't preface my questions, and the

 4     Prosecution counsel didn't in that way.  You ask a witness to come in.

 5     You put questions to the witness.  You don't argue your case.  You don't

 6     say, I'm telling -- I'm putting your spin on it.  You ask questions.

 7             MR. KARNAVAS:  It's called burden of proof, Your Honour, burden

 8     of proof.  They are alleging.  They have the power.  They draft that

 9     indictment the way they want it.  They decided to put the spin on this

10     particular presidential transcript in order to get it in.  That's their

11     interpretation.  I'm not inventing anything.  That's their invention.

12     They got to proof that.  I'm attacking.  I'm defending.  That's -- so if

13     he thinks that's the case --

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, the Judges are

15     thinking about how to speed up trials, and the both of you have just

16     illustrated the need for Judges to intervene at times.

17             Mr. Karnavas, you want to highlight one point.  Very well.  In

18     order to do so, you tell the witness, "Look at this transcript.  There is

19     this particular sentence."  He can say yes.  He can say no.  He can say,

20     "I don't know."  Thereafter, afterwards you say, "well, it appears in the

21     indictment that this is being alleged," and then we can move forward.

22             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well, Mr. President, but it's not in the

23     indictment.  It's in their description of the evidence, but very well.

24     And I understand that the description is not evidence, and you'll see a

25     motion that I filed where I objected to these characterisations.  That's

Page 27725

 1     parted of this -- my whole attack on the Prosecution case, that in trying

 2     to get in evidence they've had to put certain descriptions as to what

 3     they believe the evidence shows.  So that's part and parcel.  And then

 4     when I objected to that, they came back and they said, "No.  Our -- our

 5     characterisations are part of the evidence."  But I take your point.  Let

 6     me move on.  Let's go straight to the document.

 7             Okay.  Let's everyone calm down a little bit.

 8        Q.   21st of July, 1992, there's a discussion, and I just want to

 9     focus you very briefly because we're going to go on to the next document.

10     On page 59, we have Dr. Franjo Tudjman, who is the president, and there

11     he's -- he says, and I quote:  "Mr. President Izetbegovic, our time is

12     limited, so can we finish with this part of the discussion as the base --

13     as the presumption for further interstate conversations, that both

14     delegations agree that the status of the Croatian people in

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised on the basis of three constitutive

16     units of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and second, that the defence forces of

17     the Croatian Defence Council are considered to be an integral part of the

18     defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they are to be

19     represented in the command, the Joint Command of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

20             Now, can you tell us given the position that you held and your

21     involvement, can you tell us exactly why is President Izetbegovic

22     pursuing this sort of policy, if you will, with President Izetbegovic at

23     the time -- I mean, President Tudjman, why is he pursuing this with

24     President Izetbegovic?

25        A.   I attended this meeting.  I think it was a very important

Page 27726

 1     meeting.  I think it clearly illustrates the principles that President

 2     Tudjman applied when he was thinking about Bosnia and Herzegovina as well

 3     as when acting in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He accepts

 4     President Izetbegovic as the president of a sovereign neighbouring

 5     country recognised by Croatia.  He is here expressing his concern about

 6     the position of the Croats there, the Croats as a constituent nation in

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He's here tabling a proposal that was anyway

 8     based on the proposal put forward by the international community, and I'm

 9     referring to Cutileiro's plan to the effect that the Croats within Bosnia

10     and Herzegovina should be on an equal footing with all the other ethnic

11     groups there.

12             He also goes on to propose that the Croatian armed forces in

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina should be placed under a Joint Command to be

14     exercised by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they might be

15     better able to defend themselves from aggression.

16             I think this very paragraph does a great job illustrating

17     President Tudjman's position at the time.  Not just at the time.  This

18     moment is when it was actually formulated, but what I've been trying to

19     say yesterday and today is this:  My impression from the very beginning

20     of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and onward was that Mr. Tudjman's

21     policies were defined by these three principles, and all three can easily

22     and to great advantage be seen in these sentences contained in the

23     proposal.

24        Q.   Okay.  And just before we get down to the next document, did

25     President Tudjman --

Page 27727

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for counsel, please.

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:

 3        Q.   Did President Tudjman intend to subordinate, to subordinate, the

 4     Croatians and the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HVO, under

 5     whatever army existed for the Sarajevo government, or when he says

 6     "integral part," did he have some other intention?

 7        A.   No.  He wanted both for the Croats to enjoy an appropriate

 8     position in Bosnia and Herzegovina's government and its institutions

 9     including the BH army command and for the Croatian defence forces to

10     become and integral and indivisible part of the BH army forces [as

11     interpreted].

12             I think it is impossible to view these two issues separately.  He

13     wanted them to effectively become one and the same army, but he also

14     wanted to have a Croat involved in the command structure.

15        Q.   Okay.  I'm told that it was the defence forces, not the BH army

16     forces.  Is that what you meant?  Because my disadvantage is I don't

17     understand Croatian, and my colleague here is pointing out at page 85,

18     line 18.  So if you could look at that and please tell us again, because

19     we're talking -- there are some nuances here, and I just want to make

20     sure because I can see the Prosecution busily writing away for the

21     cross-examination.  I certainly don't want to give him any ammunition as

22     a result of something lost in translation.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note it was interpreted as defence

24     forces.

25             MR. KARNAVAS:

Page 27728

 1        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next document.  We're told -- we'll move

 2     on.  It's okay now.  We'll move on.

 3             P 0 --

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I ask a question,

 5     Mr. President?  As I'm unable to monitor both my words and the

 6     interpretation at the same time, and I have noticed some errors, and

 7     given the fact that between my testimony today, my testimony tomorrow,

 8     and my next testimony months will have gone by, I have to apologise for

 9     my ignorance, but may I please be granted a chance to inspect a

10     transcript of my evidence and all the other documents, especially in view

11     of the fact that I'm perfectly aware that I'm not allowed to contact the

12     Defence, the OTP, or the Tribunal?  Is this something that is doable, and

13     is my request a logical one?  I do apologise, but this just brought the

14     issue to mind.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Transcripts are public and they

16     normally can be accessed by everyone.  So by the time you return in July,

17     you will have ample time through the internet to access the transcripts

18     of today's hearing.  No problem at all.  Unless the system breaks down.

19     You never know.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:

22        Q.   If we could get to the next document, P 00339, because this is

23     connected to our previous document.  P 00339.  It's dated July 21, 1992,

24     and we could see that there's a title to it.  "Agreement on friendship

25     and cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

Page 27729

 1     Republic of Croatia."

 2             Now again just to make sure that we're clear, that everybody is

 3     crystal clear, by this point Croatia has recognised Bosnia's

 4     independence; is that correct?

 5        A.   Correct.

 6        Q.   Within those internationally recognised borders?

 7        A.   Correct.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now, we don't have that much time to dwell on this, nor do

 9     we need to, but if we could go to paragraph number 8.  Paragraph number

10     8.  And I will go through it step by step.  "In consideration of the

11     continuing aggression of the Serbian and Montenegrin military forces

12     against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also largely against

13     the republic of Croatia from the contiguous areas of the Republic of

14     Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President of the Presidency of the Republic

15     of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of Croatia

16     call upon the international community, and in particular the United

17     Nations, the European Community, and the United States of America, to

18     take real and efficient steps to vigorously stop the aggression against

19     their States, to prevent further loss of human life, persecution and

20     expulsion of their citizens and the destruction of property."

21             Let's pause right here.  By this point when this was drafted,

22     when they say "in consideration of the continuing aggression," was the

23     aggression continuing in a manner in which it's stated in this paragraph?

24        A.   Definitely.

25        Q.   All right.  And I know that we talked about this a little bit.

Page 27730

 1     They're asking the United Nations, European Union, and the United States

 2     of America to take real and efficient steps to vigorously stop the

 3     aggression.  I mentioned this before.  Let me ask it again.  By -- by the

 4     date of this agreement, July 21, or thereafter did the United States send

 5     in combat troops to protect the territorial integrity of Croatia and/or

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina against the JNA or whoever was the aggressor at

 7     the time?

 8        A.   No.  At that point in time, nobody ever considered the sending of

 9     troops that would fight the Yugoslav People's Army, and if I may comment

10     upon this paragraph, because I directly participated in the drafting of

11     all this, this is a direct annotation on behalf of both presidents to the

12     United States of America because President Clinton had become president,

13     and even before that President Tudjman had sent him a letter expressing

14     his belief that without direct involvement on the part of the United

15     States of America, the crisis would not be solved, and that is why we put

16     this in the agreement between the two presidents.  Both agreed with that.

17             And if I may add a comment to that with regard to this document

18     for which I believe that it is extremely important.  Not that there was

19     no pressure from one side to another, but, rather, we negotiated about --

20     about all this, and I don't really know what we're to use.  We measured

21     our words carefully the whole day, not just paragraphs but words,

22     especially Mr. Trnka on the Bosniak side and I and the others on the

23     Croatian side, and this is really a good example of our joint work.  The

24     presidents signed the document that had been prepared by the respective

25     delegations that comprised representatives of both states.  In other

Page 27731

 1     words, this document was prepared in a very, very serious manner.

 2        Q.   All right.  With that in mind, let's go on to the next part of

 3     paragraph 8.  "With this objective in mind, both States will sustain

 4     their -- will sustain their past successful cooperation and continuous

 5     coordination of the defensive activities in" -- I underscore "in" -- "the

 6     contiguous zones of the two States."

 7             Question number one is this an accurate statement?  That is, was

 8     there past successful cooperation between these two folks with respect to

 9     activities in the contiguous zones?

10        A.   The successful cooperation implied any attempt to prevent the

11     Yugoslav People's Army from achieving their overall strategic goals, and

12     I mean by that preventing them from establishing new borders or taking up

13     the area all the way down to the Neretva River.

14        Q.   All right.  Let's go on.

15             "Aware of the fact that both States are threatened, unless

16     aggression against them is urgently stopped by further destruction and

17     annihilation of their state entity and integrity, the two states will,

18     should the efforts of the international community remain ineffective,

19     take all necessary steps in order to establish broader cooperation in the

20     military sphere and coordinate military operations in order to

21     definitely --" I think this might be "repel the danger threatening them."

22             So was this an accurate --

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Okay.  Now, with respect to broader cooperation in military -- in

25     the military sphere and coordinate military operations, since you were

Page 27732

 1     part of the negotiating process, can you tell us at least at that stage

 2     what was envisaged?  I know we have the presidential transcripts, and we

 3     can probably glean from that conversation, but you being a participant,

 4     can you help us out here?

 5        A.   What this meant at the moment was every possible form of

 6     cooperation between the Croatian army and the army of Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina.  And I'm not referring to the Croats in Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina but the Croatian army.  There were even talks, and the

 9     paragraph leaves the possibility open, although not explicitly, about

10     joint military actions whenever those were needed.

11        Q.   All right.  And then just finally on paragraph 9 very quickly, it

12     says that there was an agreement to have a protocol on the establishment

13     of diplomatic relations between the two states at embassy level signed

14     immediately.  Did that occur?

15        A.   [In English] Yes.

16        Q.   All right.  Now, let's move on to the next document.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is an interesting document

18     for me, a document that was discussed with other witnesses before, and of

19     course I am going to seize the opportunity to ask this question to

20     somebody who took part in the generation of the document.

21             The previous document on the presidential transcript, and let me

22     note that the meeting lasted 10 hours and 15 minutes, we have proof that

23     the document was produced right after the meeting and that the witness

24     participated in the production of the document.

25             Here is my question:  This document is signed by both presidents.

Page 27733

 1     It is an agreement of friendship and cooperation between the two

 2     republics.  For your country, was this document distributed?  Was it

 3     published in the Official Gazette of your republic?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document was made public on the

 5     same day, or maybe the following day.  I'm not sure -- sure, and I'm not

 6     an expert either to tell you whether this type of agreement should have

 7     been published in the Official Gazette, whether it falls under that

 8     category.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.  I had another question.

10     This is an international agreement.  According to your law, unfortunately

11     I didn't have the time to check it myself, but was this document due to

12     be ratified by the parliament, or was it up to the president to commit

13     his country to an international agreement without necessity to -- for the

14     document to be ratified?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that for this document no

16     ratification was necessary.  In my view, under the then-prevailing

17     constitution the president of the republic could have signed this

18     agreement without this document being ratified by the parliament.  I

19     believe that under the current constitution of the Republic of Croatia,

20     this type of agreement could have -- could be signed even by the Minister

21     of Foreign Affairs, which for that matter is the case in other states as

22     well.  But I believe that given his constitutional competencies, the

23     president could sign such a document today.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Several revolutions of the

25     Security Council are referred to in this document, particularly the one

Page 27734

 1     on the 13th of July, 1992.  Did you officially send this document to New

 2     York for information so that the international community be informed?

 3   And in the next document - Mr. Karnavas was maybe about to talk about this

 4   document - another Resolution is mentioned.  So did you send that document

 5   to the international community so that everybody could be made aware that

 6   from now on the HVO army was a component part of the army of Bosnia

 7   and Herzegovina as provided for in paragraph number 6 of the document?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We informed the international

 9     community about this document on the following day.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] These were all my questions.

11             Mr. Karnavas.

12             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Now if we could turn

13     to --

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Hold on a second.  Mr. Praljak

15     is on his feet.  I don't know why.

16             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Well, then, very well.

17     If --

18             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, let me just go on.

19        Q.   The next document is 1D 02295.  Okay.  Okay.  I will --

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.

21             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, your words

22     have been translated into Croatian as the document saying that the HVO

23     would be opposed to the BiH army.  That's how it has been translated into

24     Croatian.  Can this please be taken into account?

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's not what I said.  There

Page 27735

 1     has been an error in the interpretation.  What I said is that the HVO

 2     army, according to the document, was an integral part of the army of

 3     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That's what I said.  So I'm calling upon the

 4     interpreters to be very vigilant because on several occasions we've seen

 5     the importance or the significance of -- of nuances such as a comma or

 6     full stop.  So, please, if you note any problems or misinterpretation,

 7     please don't hesitate to let us know for -- in everybody's interests.

 8             MR. STEWART:  May I point out that exactly the same error appears

 9     in the English transcript, so what Your Honour has just said will

10     constitute a correction of that as well.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well indeed, because when

12     I speak I don't necessarily check the transcript in English.  I look at

13     you rather than -- than at the screen.  I'd rather look at the Defence

14     counsel than at my screen.

15             Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  [Overlapping speakers] Thank you.  First, I have

17     to thank General Praljak for that correction, and that's an important

18     one, and we thank him very much.  And we thank that he insisted on making

19     that correction.  The dangers of circumstantial evidence sometimes, of

20     jumping to conclusions.

21        Q.   1D 02295.  That's the next document.  It's dated 6 August 1992,

22     obviously some time after the agreement we've seen, and it says here at

23     the very top:  "I have come to the territory of the Republic of Croatia

24     at the decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina."  And if we look at the bottom, we're talking about Fikret

Page 27736

 1     Abdic.  Do you know who this person is?

 2        A.   Yes, I knew Mr. Abdic.

 3        Q.   All right.  And we'll hear more about him through other

 4     witnesses.  Now, if you go further down, I don't want to -- he does

 5     indicate:  "My task is to organise activities which are at this moment of

 6     particular importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina."

 7             Skipping the next sentence and going down it says:  "In view of

 8     the recently signed interstate agreement, we consider Croatia to be the

 9     right place to set up a number of activities which are of consequence for

10     both republics.  With your consent, we intend to establish a Main Staff

11     for providing support to Bosnia and Herzegovina with its headquarters in

12     Rijeka and several regions -- regional staffs in different locations in

13     Croatia."

14             And then if we go to the very last paragraph, first sentence:

15     "We kindly ask that you adopt a decision legalising the work of our Main

16     Staff and regional staff in the Republic of Croatia, the locations of

17     which will be determined by mutual agreement."

18             My first question is when he's talking about the recently

19     interstate agreement, were there any other agreements other than the one

20     that we just saw that presumably, if we are to believe some, Alija

21     Izetbegovic was pressed to sign?  Were there any other agreements, or is

22     this the agreement that Mr. Abdic is referring to?

23        A.   I think that Mr. Abdic was referring to the agreement that we had

24     just looked at and discussed, because this letter is only a logical part

25     of the implementation of this agreement.  He may even be referring to one

Page 27737

 1     of the earlier agreements, the one that was signed in June that I have

 2     mentioned, but I would rather be inclined to say that it -- it is

 3     referring to the last agreement we discussed.

 4        Q.   All right.  And when he's talking about setting up a Main Staff,

 5     with the intent to establish a Main Staff, what did you -- if you can

 6     tell us, what do you think he means by that?  What is he asking?  Are we

 7     talking about the military or civilian sector?  What are we talking

 8     about?

 9        A.   My interpretation would be that this primarily applies to the

10     military and logistical centre.  As you can see in the map,

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina has a border only with Serbia from which aggression

12     came from, and the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina for that matter

13     was occupied by the Serbs.  So the only the connection of Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina with the rest the world goes through the Republic of Croatia,

15     and that's why all the numerous refugees and all the supplies went

16     through the Republic of Croatia, and I'm talking about the humanitarian

17     aid, medical aid, food, and clothes.  All those things went through the

18     Republic of Croatia.  Unfortunately, the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia

19     and Herzegovina were exposed to an unjust decision on the part of the

20     international community.

21             And I would like to apologise to the Honourable Judge and correct

22     myself.  A decision or an embargo on the import of arms had been imposed

23     on the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Both the

24     republics were not -- were poorly armed, and they were facing a very

25     well-armed enemy, which was the Yugoslav People's Army.

Page 27738

 1             Bearing that in mine, everybody has to be clear and understand

 2     that they resorted to various means to arm themselves.  I wouldn't be

 3     able to testify about the ways and means, the arms reached the Republic

 4     of Bosnia and Herzegovina because I'm not well-informed about that.  But

 5     whoever who looks at the map will understand how it went.  A lot has been

 6     written about that.

 7             My understanding is that a large part of the international

 8     community was actually aware of the fact that they had issued a very

 9     unjust decision, and by issuing that decision they had prevented the

10     state from arming itself and defending itself.  A large part of the

11     international community turned a blind eye, I would say, when it came to

12     the supply and transport of both weapons as well as all the other

13     different military equipment through the territory of Republic of Croatia

14     into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15             If you will allow me another comment, I would like to say that

16     the Republic of Croatia really had wanted to annex part of the territory

17     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it would not have made much sense to

18     issue a decision to the effect of helping it to arm itself, and I'm sure

19     that it did help in every possible way.

20        Q.   All right.  And tomorrow we'll see some documents to that effect.

21     All right.

22             Now, if we could go through the next document, P 0386, P 00386.

23     We see that this is 13 July.  This is a week after Mr. Abdic made that

24     request.  This is Resolution 771, and --

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, how much time,

Page 27739

 1     please, has been used by Mr. Karnavas?

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:

 3        Q.   Okay.  If you look at this document and you look at the next

 4     document, which is P 387, and we look at the other one -- the other

 5     document that follows that, the other P document, P 00406, if we can just

 6     spend a few seconds looking at them.  They're all from the UN.  The first

 7     one, 386, is 13th of August, the second one is 13th of August, and the

 8     third one is 25th of August.  If I can just ask you very briefly, had the

 9     situation changed on the ground, that is, had the -- had the JNA or

10     the -- or elements of it, had it left the -- the territories of Bosnia

11     and Herzegovina, and had the danger ceased to exist, concerning Croatia,

12     that is?

13        A.   Nothing major changed in Croatia, and as for Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina, it became more and more evident that the Yugoslav People's

15     Army gradually occupied territories and violated all international rules.

16     In one of the items of this Resolution, makes an explicit reference to

17     ethnic cleansing.  Where is that?  I think it's item 2, which mentions

18     the operations of the Serbian army in the territory of Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina at that moment.

20        Q.   You're referring to which document, but there are three

21     documents.

22        A.   Document 386.

23        Q.   Okay.  All right.  But say, for instance, in the other document

24     where they're talking about, for instance, 406, you'll see under page 3,

25     paragraph number 3:  "Demands further that those units of the Yugoslav

Page 27740

 1     People's Army and elements of the Croatian army now in Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina must either be withdrawn or be subject to the authority of

 3     the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

 4             Okay.  Now if we pause a little bit at this, it seems to me from

 5     your previous answer that the Yugoslav People's Army is still there.

 6     Would it be fair to say the elements of the Croatian army remained --

 7     seemed to be in -- within Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 8        A.   If I may explain.  This is a -- a Resolution of the

 9     General Assembly, which differs from the Resolution of the Security

10     Council.  It differs because it doesn't have an executive force and also

11     by the way it was passed.  It took a longer time to prepare this

12     Resolution, and it always does then for the Resolutions of the Security

13     Council.  If that wasn't the case, then it would be a totally superfluous

14     to mention the Croatian forces because the agreement that deals with this

15     issue evokes the already-signed Resolutions, which means that the

16     conditions of the Resolutions had been met.

17             I can tell you that I'm aware of this Resolution.  When the

18     diplomacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an initiative to issue this

19     Resolution Croatia provided its full support to this initiative.  I

20     personally took the text of the proposal of the Resolution to President

21     Tudjman, and he authorise I had me to instruct our diplomats to give

22     their full support to the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina when

23     this Resolution was being passed.

24             As you know, it takes 100 -- over 180 States or over half a

25     majority of the Assembly of the United Nations pass a Resolution.  This

Page 27741

 1     Resolution was more political than executive in nature, but as far as the

 2     diplomacies of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were

 3     concerned, this meant that this was an implementation of our friendship

 4     agreement, and we in Croatia fully supported the passing of this

 5     Resolution.

 6             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  Well, I see our time is up for the day,

 7     Mr. President.  I don't want to keep anyone here any longer.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you've used three

 9     minutes -- three hours, sorry, and 45 minutes.  So you'll have one hour

10     and 15 minutes left tomorrow.

11             Now, what about tomorrow?  I'm turning to the other Defence

12     counsel.  Will you cross-examine this witness?  If you wish to

13     cross-examine this witness, you'll have two hours and 30 minutes.

14             Mrs. Alaburic, is --

15             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I believe that

16     it would be very good to use Mr. Zuzul's time, because Mr. Zuzul knows a

17     lot about topics that are very relevant for us.  I do intend to put

18     several questions to Mr. Zuzul.  I have half an hour at my disposal, and

19     I've asked the Defence teams of Mr. Pusic and Mr. Stojic to give me their

20     time if I find this to be necessary and of benefit to the Trial Chamber,

21     and I'm also going to talk to the other Defence teams if they're not

22     interested in cross-examining to give me their times.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So you will

24     cross-examine this witness during an hour and a half.

25             Mrs. Nozica.

Page 27742

 1             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  For the

 2     time being I do not intend to -- to examine the witness.  In any case, we

 3     will decide by tomorrow, and if we do not intend to examine we will give

 4     our time to Mrs. Alaburic.

 5             MR. KOVACIC:  Your Honours, we expect not to have any questions.

 6     Perhaps Mr. Praljak will have one or two very short, but it is still

 7     under consideration.  More probably not than yes, but if, we are talking

 8     really about couple of minutes.

 9             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as things

10     stand now, we are not going to have any questions.  We will make our

11     final decision tomorrow.  And as Mrs. Nozica has already told you, in

12     that case we will give our time to Mrs. Alaburic.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Anyway, tomorrow we will

14     conclude at 6.30 at the latest.  Judges may need some time to ask

15     questions as well.  If there isn't enough time left, you know that the

16     hearing will resume on the 18th of July.  Witness, the 18th of July is a

17     Friday.  The Prosecutor will have five hours to cross-examine you.  Of

18     course there have been administrative issues, objections, and so on, and

19     it appears that we won't have enough time to finish everything on Friday.

20     We may have to continue on Monday morning.  Therefore, you will have to

21     stay over during the weekend between the 18th of July and the 20th.  I

22     hope this is not going to cause any difficulty for you since, in

23     particular, weekends in The Hague are pretty pleasant when the weather's

24     nice.  So please make the necessary arrangements to be at the disposal of

25     the Chamber on Friday, the 18th of July, and most probably on the

Page 27743

 1     following Monday because after the Prosecutor's cross-examination, there

 2     will most probably be redirect.  So we need to schedule for two days and

 3     not just one, just for your prior information.  I know July is still far

 4     away, but I just wanted to give you that information so that you can make

 5     arrangements.

 6             Now, you may have planned some holidays in July.  I don't know.

 7     It may not be very convenient for you, but it is impossible to do

 8     otherwise.  The Prosecutor was not in a position to start his

 9     cross-examination this week.  This is obvious.

10             This is all I wanted to say at this stage.  We will resume the

11     hearing tomorrow at 2.15 in the afternoon.  Let me reiterate the

12     recommendations I gave you yesterday.  No communication with anyone while

13     you're still under oath.  Thank you.  See you tomorrow.

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day

16                           of May, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.

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