1 Thursday, 8 May 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon,
9 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-74-T,
10 the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.
11 Thank you, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
13 Today's Thursday, the 8th of May, 2008. My greetings to the Prosecution,
14 the Defence counsel, the accused, and to all the people helping us out.
15 We have to continue with the examination-in-chief of the witness.
16 Before I give the floor to Mr. Karnavas, there is a housekeeping matter
17 to settle for next week. We have a witness to be called by Dr. Prlic's
18 Defence, and they asked four hours for the examination-in-chief. I note
19 that this witness testified already in the Naletilic case. So I wonder,
20 do you need four hours since we have already heard this witness? At
21 least he was heard one day during the Naletilic trial. Do you really
22 need four hours, Mr. Karnavas, for your first witness next week?
23 MR. KARNAVAS: I believe I do, Mr. President. Good afternoon,
24 everyone. We'll try to keep it to three hours, but I don't want to
25 promise something that I cannot deliver, but I think our assessment was
1 somewhere between three and four. We'll try to move rather quickly. I
2 trust since was -- he testified before, the Prosecution knows -- the
3 gentleman knows what he more or less has to say. Also, I should say in
4 that particular case it was rather different -- it was a different
5 subject and also a different Defence team with different practices and
6 procedures. So next week's testimony, that witness ties in with the
7 following week's, and we did hear rather extensive testimony from the
8 Prosecution in promoting their joint criminal enterprise theory that the
9 Government of Croatia
10 the process they were mistreating the Muslim refugees failed to provide
11 adequate assistance, discriminated their education when they arrived, did
12 not provide them with sufficient humanitarian facilities over there, did
13 not give them adequate housing facilities, all of that. So this
14 gentleman is going to rebut, at least in part, one of the Prosecution's
15 witness. I don't know -- I can't remember whether she testified in open
16 or in closed session -- open -- yeah, that was Ms. Krajsek. So basically
17 it's to rebut her -- and in fact, at the end of the day I was planning on
18 reading -- going over a couple of points to, again, alert the Prosecution
19 as to what I might be going into so that next week we don't have the same
20 objection that was raised earlier, and we want to make sure that the
21 Prosecution is very well prepared so it doesn't cry foul as they did this
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One change to the transcript.
24 Page 27.734, line 27. The word in French "opposantes" should be changed
25 to be "composantes." That was the problem that occurred yesterday in
1 connection with Mr. Praljak when he spoke. We listened to the sound
2 recording and I was right. I said "composantes" and not "opposantes."
3 This being said, you may proceed, Mr. Karnavas, as far as housekeeping
4 matters are concerned. I think we should only have 15 minutes for the
5 next break so that we can finish in time. Thank you. You have the
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. Thank you, Mr. President. I just
8 wanted to perfect my record from yesterday because of the heat of the
9 exchanges and because of the time constraints, sometimes I tend to speak
10 rather fast and maybe not completing my thoughts, and I wanted to make
11 sure that when we had that sort of interesting exchange of ideas on
12 testimony and evidence and whether the person should be an expert or not,
13 I just wanted to make sure that I was clear in my presentation,
14 especially when I indicated to one of the members of the Trial Chamber
15 that they should raise their objection, and I meant -- I made that
16 specifically because unless there is some sort of a decision from the
17 Bench, if there is one of the members who outright rejects the admission
18 of certain testimony for whatever reason, obviously we want to have a
19 record. But I wanted to make sure that I was understood properly and in
20 that context also tie in the concept of professional Judges.
21 Now, if we were in front of a jury, of course, I would be
22 entitled to make my record outside the presence of the jury in order to
23 have a record. Now, because we have professional Judges, we don't need
24 to excuse anybody because it's axiomatic that the professional Judges can
25 hear all of the testimony even if they think that perhaps the testimony
1 is inadmissible, but at least it allows the party to make a full and
2 complete record. Otherwise, for instance, on appeal, let's just say on
3 appeal I wish to appeal a point on the grounds that perhaps there was a
4 abuse of discretion by the Trial Chamber in disallowing certain evidence
5 to come in, it would be very difficult for me to show that there was an
6 abuse of discretion if, for instance, the Appeals Chamber didn't have in
7 front of it the information of which I was trying to elicit from the
8 witness, and they could concretely, the Appeals Chamber could concretely
9 say, Well, I think the Judges should have accepted this testimony or not.
10 So the practice would be, for instance, and again I want to go to
11 the Anglo-Saxon system where you have a jury to make the point very
12 clear. If I object and the Judge says, for instance, I will disallow
13 this testimony, and then I don't have a record from the witness as to
14 what that witness would have said, in other words, what the jurors would
15 have heard because they are the triers of fact, then I have failed in my
16 job because I have not perfected my record, and clearly, the Appeals
17 Chamber cannot do anything because there is no record from which to
18 appeal. So yesterday when I indicated that I -- we should hear the
19 gentleman and that we have professional Judges, it was in that context,
20 in other words, that -- that I make a record.
21 If, however, there is one particular member of the Bench who
22 feels categorically prior to hearing all of the evidence because we do
23 have the civil law system when it comes to the introduction of evidence,
24 in a sense we get to hear all the evidence and the end you get to decide
25 how much weight if any you will give to it. Even when it's hearsay, we
1 get it in. Even when there's a lack of foundation, for instance, you may
2 hear it. You may decide later on not -- to disregard it, but those are
3 the rules that we have been operating under. If, however, there is a
4 particular member of the Bench who strongly feels for whatever reason
5 that this witness is not qualified, not competent to answer certain
6 questions, then, one, I should be allowed to at least ask those questions
7 to make a record, but two and more importantly, I would like
8 categorically for that answer from the Judge to be on the record that
9 under no circumstances they will consider this, so at least later on I
10 can say if it is necessary that there was an abuse of judicial discretion
11 in considering this piece of evidence and, in fact, maybe even go so far
12 as to say that there was a pre-judgement.
13 What I failed to say and what I should have been said yesterday
14 was also one other point, which might have been more important for the
15 exchange that I had with Judge Trechsel because I think I failed in
16 articulating my point in that sometimes there's follow-up evidence that
17 will establish the basis for which he's able to give insight into the
18 evidence of which I'm trying to elicit at the moment. In this case, it
19 was a transcript from 1991 - he wasn't present - the content of which he
20 might be able to -- I might be able to show subject to connection,
21 because of other events and what have you, that he is, in fact, capable
22 of providing insight. As to whether you wish to accept that insight,
23 that's another story. But I should have articulated it more clearly, and
24 that is that perhaps we should allow the witness to provide answers to
25 those questions, subject to connection. In other words, if I can connect
1 it later on that he has the foundation to give insight that at least it
2 merits consideration, and then again you would consider to what extent to
3 give it that -- to give what weight to it.
4 So I want to make sure that we're clear on what I was trying to
5 establish. I'm not complaining in any way. I just want to make sure
6 that we're on the same level.
7 Now, in keeping with all of this because of these presidential
8 transcripts especially, there was a prior decision that indicated that we
9 would be able to introduce them during our case, and in order to
10 facilitate the rest of the trial and not waste time on these matters, I
11 would request that we have some sort of a 65 ter hearing with the Judges
12 and the Legal Officers so we don't take up valuable courtroom time so we
13 can have -- exchange these ideas. We can have an exchange of ideas and
14 maybe come up with some solutions or conclusions so we can save the time
15 so I don't have to make my objections and Mr. Scott or whoever it is from
16 that side take time and respond and what have you. So I just wanted to
17 make those points rather very clear because we want to make sure that we
18 have our record, we have our record. And so I didn't mean any
19 disrespect, Judge Trechsel. When I said, you know, for you to register
20 your objection, that's what I was trying to convey at the time. So
21 that's the one point that I wanted to make.
22 The second point I wanted to make is -- which is something
23 different has to do with evidence -- with the evidence that the other
24 Defence teams intend to use in the -- during this phase of the case. It
25 was my understanding that as of the 31st of March, the Defence teams were
1 to download into the e-court system their documents so others would have
2 access to them. In other words, not merely providing the list but also
3 downloading the documents. That has not been done by all, and I just
4 want some clarification. What is the rule? Because I'm entitled to
5 re-direct, and I shouldn't be in a position where I'm in the dark even
6 because I wanted to make sure that we all understand, we're not in some
7 joint criminal enterprise on this side. I don't know what these folks
8 are doing. I don't know what their defences are. In fact, from one team
9 today, I don't even know what their documents are because I haven't seen
10 them, and so I would ask for a ruling on that, what is the procedure,
11 because it appears to me from what I've heard the Prosecutor was provided
12 with a CD of the documents but our Defence has not. Now, why the
13 Petkovic team did that, I don't know, but I certainly would like an
14 explanation as to what the procedure is because if it's within their
15 right to withhold that, that's fine; if not, I would like it disclosed
16 immediately. That's the ...
17 And then the third point -- part that I wanted --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I don't want to
19 interrupt or intervene in problems that may occur between the Defence
20 teams, but the second issue you've just addressed could have been dealt
21 with if you and your other colleagues had met and had asked the Petkovic
22 Defence how it was that they would send a CD to the Prosecution and would
23 fail to send you a copy thereof, and you should have settled that
24 between, among, yourselves. But you're right in raising the issue as far
25 as I can see, and this is my own personal opinion. When I speak I speak
1 on my own behalf and not on behalf of the other Judges. As far as I can
2 see, it's only normal when a Defence team makes up a list of their
3 exhibits, then everybody should be informed, everybody, including the
4 other Defence team. That's the least you can do. But as far as the
5 second issue, you can easily settle it among yourselves.
6 I believe that Ms. Alaburic is going to do so because she wants
7 to take the floor.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Before she does that, we did ask for the list for
9 today, for instance. We did ask quite politely, quite early, so we could
10 see, and we got what is commonly known as the bum's rush: Wait until you
11 finish your direct, we'll give you. Now, that gives me a certain
12 message. Now, we've been waiting for weeks. We've asked others. Others
13 have provided it, so I'm not in a position to negotiate. I won't
14 negotiate. I want to know what the rules are, and I expect my colleagues
15 to abide by the rules the very way the Prosecution in the Prlic Defence
16 has to.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What can you say, Ms. Alaburic?
18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, first of all, good
19 afternoon to you and good afternoon to everyone else in the courtroom. I
20 would like to say the following. I really have no idea what sort of
21 request or demand Mr. Karnavas is talking about. This is the very first
22 I hear of a list of exhibits that was requested by him from my Defence or
23 anyone else.
24 As for the CD with General Petkovic's Defence documents, which is
25 something that was handed over to the OTP, we only acted pursuant to a
1 ruling by this Court. By the 31st of March, we were supposed to hand in
2 our 65 ter (g) list, and the OTP was supposed to forward documents, and
3 we were supposed to forward hard copies of those documents to the
4 Trial Chamber. The Petkovic Defence team acted entirely in keeping with
5 the Court's ruling. The ruling never says that we have to do these
6 documents in e-court. The fact that we have not done that so far has a
7 purely technical explanation. It is over the last couple of days that
8 we've been working on releasing all our documents into the e-court
9 system. Furthermore, as for the documents to be used by General
10 Petkovic's Defence in our cross-examination of today's witness, I wish to
11 remind my colleague Mr. Karnavas about his own actions and about the
12 actions taken by all of the Defence teams when the Prosecution witnesses
13 were being cross-examined. We never provided lists of documents that we
14 were using to the OTP ahead of time, no sort of list at all before a
15 witness was heard; rather, we handed over to the OTP documents that we
16 were going to use before the very start of our cross-examination.
17 Documents that I will be using today have been prepared. They will be
18 delivered to Mr. Karnavas in much the same way as was the case when
19 the -- during the Prosecution case. Should the Trial Chamber make a
20 different ruling as regards the time that these documents are handed over
21 to be used in our cross-examination, the Petkovic Defence team will abide
22 by any such decision. Therefore, this is no discrimination whatsoever,
23 no refusal to hand over documents. All I'm talking about is we are
24 applying the same treatment now we previously applied to the OTP when we
25 cross-examined their witnesses. Thank you very much.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
2 We understand the problem. We are going to discuss it among
3 ourselves. Let's go back to the first issue discussed by Mr. Karnavas,
4 and my fellow Judge is going to answer, but as the presiding judge, I'm
5 going to say something that is only on my behalf. As to the discussion
6 held yesterday and today, it's a bit of a storm in a teacup. The main
7 thing is not to know whether the testimony of one expert is more relevant
8 than the testimony of an ordinary witness. That's not the issue. The
9 issue is simply this: In what an expert, what an ordinary witness says,
10 what is important for the parties is -- parties' cases. The fact that
11 you are an expert does not necessarily mean that what you say is more
12 relevant than what an ordinary witness says. I said that yesterday. In
13 matters of foreign affairs, in international public law, in international
14 negotiations, if you have a simple witness who happens to have been
15 minister of foreign affairs of his country, who happens to have
16 participated in all relevant international negotiations, I think that
17 what he says may be important, may be as relevant as what an expert would
18 say. That's what I wanted to say at this stage. It's not a problem at
19 all for me. I think all this time would have been better used if
20 questions had been put to the witness, but my fellow Judge wants to take
21 the floor.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm not only changing the language, but my
23 approach is not exactly the same. As you are well aware, I come from a
24 different legal system, and I have good news and bad news for you.
25 First, bad news, perhaps. In our system and our conceptions, there are
1 witnesses and there are experts and they are not the same. There are
2 rules that apply to experts and rules that apply to witnesses, and I
3 started on the assumption that it was the same here. Witnesses tell what
4 they have seen, heard, smelt, you name it. You have often yourselves
5 given the list to the witness. Experts are first tested as to their
6 competencies. You do that very harshly. I'm glad that I'm not an expert
7 here -- well, no, I don't think I would be really afraid, but you know
8 what I mean. And experts give opinions. Now, you have asked in my view
9 questions that were expert questions, and that's why I intervened, and
10 there is still a difference of opinion maybe. That's the bad part.
11 Now comes the good part. Contrary to the American, in
12 particular, system, our system does not have an exclusionary rule, so
13 that I am not here having my notes and crossing out entire pages by
14 saying, this in my view is not admissible. I would like this -- these
15 proceedings to go in strict respect of the rules, but I am not
17 Now, you've suggested a Rule 65 ter conference. That, of course,
18 is not for me as one member of this Chamber to answer. The Chamber will
19 certainly take that into account and give you an answer, which the
20 President then will. Thank you.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Judge Trechsel.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's proceed.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
24 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour, but not for the Prosecution to be
25 left out, but my comment will be very, very short, and I do want to pick
1 up on what Judge Trechsel said.
2 Just so the record is clear, Mr. Karnavas is always very active
3 about wanting to make his record, and just so the Prosecution's view is
4 also on the record. We stand by, I stand by, we stand by the comment
5 that I made yesterday. This is nonetheless maybe a different system,
6 indeed, a different system than the American or English common-law
7 system, but it is a system, and inherent in a system is a system has
8 rules. And there are rules for both the parties, the lawyers, and for
9 the Judges, and for the Judges, to follow and respect. Otherwise, Your
10 Honours, we wouldn't need this rule book. We would just have one rule,
11 and you would open the book, and we'd turn to the first page, and rule
12 one would say, everything goes, everything goes, and that's not the
13 procedure, that's not the system we operate in. There are procedural
14 rules, evidentiary rules, for the parties and the Judges to abide by.
15 Thank you.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, the rules for the
18 Judges, you say, could you specify them? Could you tell us to what
19 extent the Judges would fail to comply with the Rules? I'm rather
20 surprised .
21 MR. SCOTT: The rules are in this book, Your Honour. I'm sure
22 the Chamber knows that.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Karnavas.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour. I won't reply.
25 WITNESS: MOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]
1 [Witness answered through interpreter]
2 Examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]
3 Q. Yesterday, Mr. Zuzul, we left off with our conversation
4 concerning various issues that you had been involved with. I want to
5 turn now to document -- I believe it's 1D 00397, and just very quickly,
6 we see on the third page, at the top of the page, it has 128. It says:
7 "Statement by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia
8 If we look at the bottom, it was delivered on the 26th of August, 1992
9 at the London
11 A. No, I wasn't. I was visiting China in my official capacity at
12 the time.
13 Q. And at that time, were you stationed in Geneva, or were you still
14 working in Zagreb
15 A. At the time, I was the deputy foreign minister, and I was based
16 in Zagreb
17 Q. All right. Have you had an opportunity to review this document,
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, to speed things up today a little bit because we need to
21 cover a lot of ground, in the very first page Dr. Tudjman talks about his
22 dissatisfaction with the response of the international community in
23 trying to find a solution concerning the ongoing aggression against
25 A. Yes, definitely. Nothing was changing for the better. Much of
2 international community would be doing anything to change that.
3 Q. Now, I want to read one passage, the bottom of the first page
4 going into the next page, and ask you to comment on this. It says: "The
5 Republic of Croatia
6 escalation of the state and political crisis in the former Yugoslavia
7 into an armed conflict. Accordingly, Croatia proposed the transformation
8 of the former state into a confederal association of sovereign states.
9 When this proposal was turned down and when war ensued, Croatia
10 the peaceful solution by accepting the Vance Plans."
11 Now, the first day that you testified, you talked about a
12 confederation, and you talked about the presidents going around meeting
13 with each other. Is that what President Tudjman is talking about here?
14 A. That's right. President Tudjman is referring to his own proposal
15 for Yugoslavia
16 states, among other things, as he points out in order to avoid a war or
17 an aggression which he saw coming.
18 Q. All right. Now, on the third paragraph on this page he talks
19 about -- he says, the relevant part: "It should be noted that the
20 Republic of Croatia
21 being attacked from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
22 Was that the case at the time?
23 A. Yes, that was the case at the time.
24 Q. And where exactly is Slovonski Brod Zupanja?
25 A. [No interpretation]
1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters can't hear Mr. Zuzul.
2 MR. KARNAVAS:
3 Q. Okay, Mr. Zuzul, if you would sit down, and I apologize for not
4 having handy the number of the document -- the chart that you're pointing
5 to for the record, and we'll get to that in a second, but first could you
6 just tell us exactly what's that area called?
7 A. Generally speaking, this is the Posavina area. One of its parts
8 is in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other in Croatia around the river Sava
9 The Serb forces at the time still believed they were able to achieve
10 their primary aim and create a line stretching from Karlobag to
11 Virovitica. They were carrying out severe attacks from Bosnia
13 THE INTERPRETER. [Previous translation continues] ... wait
14 before he answers because he's not listening to the interpreters.
15 MR. KARNAVAS:
16 Q. All right. You're going to have to slow down a little bit. I
17 know you were pointing at the map, and I apologise for the Court because
18 for the record I'm unable to identify it at this moment, but I think we
19 all know what area Mr. Zuzul is talking about. Incidentally -- and this
20 is 3171 for identification purposes. Now, that area, when was it finally
22 JUDGE PRANDLER: [Microphone not activated]
23 It is only a technical matter. I'm sorry to interrupt -- for
24 interrupting you. The interpreter is asking you, Mr. Zuzul, to be kind
25 enough to use your earphone and to listen to them because otherwise you
1 cannot communicate with each other. So kindly use the -- actually what
2 the interpreters are saying and listen to them. Thank you.
3 MR. KARNAVAS:
4 Q. And to help you out, Mr. Zuzul, 4 is English; 6 is Croatian or
5 B/C/S, I believe, the channel, so there's a channel here so if you want
6 to hear the translation.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And channel 5 for French.
8 MR. KARNAVAS:
9 Q. Okay. And if you could wait, if you could pause a little bit.
10 I'm getting all these instructions here, sort of like cross by committee.
11 But anyway, going back to my earlier question, when was that area
13 A. [In English] I apologise, Mr. Karnavas, I have confusion if I'm
14 listening myself and talking at the same time, so can I speak without
15 having speakers in my -- I apologise. I'm trying to be concentrated to
16 the maximum.
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The idea is, of course, not that you listen to
18 yourself in direct but that you listen to the sound of the
19 interpretation, and you can turn the volume low so that it is not too
20 disturbing, but if you do that, then you get a feeling of whether you are
21 too fast or not, and then you can slow down, and you sense that the
22 interpreters lose thread. It is a bit annoying. We quite understand
23 that, but it's not the pleasure trip to be a witness here, anyhow. I'm
24 sorry. You may have noticed.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm trying to make it as pleasant as possible,
1 Judge Trechsel.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just wait for cross.
3 MR. KARNAVAS:
4 Q. Okay. Now, if we go into the next page, page 130, towards the
5 latter part of the page, it gives certain numbers of refugees and
6 displaced persons. And it says "Croatia still has more than 270.000
7 persons displaced from various Croatian regions while an additional
8 number of more than 80.000 are being provided relief in other countries:
10 "More than 400.000 refugees have fled to Croatia from Bosnia
12 have come from Vojvodina and Kosovo."
13 Now, one quick question: Is this more or less accurate, what
14 President Tudjman is saying at the London Conference as far as the
15 numbers of displaced persons, that Croatia was generating within itself
16 and, of course, the refugees that were fleeing from its neighbour,
18 A. [Interpretation] The figures are certainly accurate. This is a
19 sad picture of the truth as it was at the time. Nearly 8.000 [as
20 interpreted] people were forced to leave their homes.
21 Q. All right. And one last point to make sure that I didn't forget.
22 When President Tudjman was saying --
23 A. [In English] There is mistake in translation. It says nearly
24 8.000. I said nearly 800.000 people were forced to leave their homes.
25 Q. All right. Now, when President Tudjman is saying that Croatia
1 being attacked from Bosnia-Herzegovina, is that truthful? Was that
2 happening at that time?
3 A. [Interpretation] Quite certainly.
4 Q. Okay. Let's move on to the next document, 1D 01935, and we can
5 see at the top of it, it says: "The president of the Presidency of the
6 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, and the president
7 of the Republic of Croatia
8 of Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia
10 that for everyone's attention -- "following talks between the delegation
11 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia
12 which were held on 21 September 1992 in New York during the 47th Session
13 of the General Assembly of the United Nations."
14 Before I go on, let me ask you this question: This Agreement on
15 Friendship and Cooperation, is that what we talked about yesterday?
16 A. Yes, that is the agreement.
17 Q. Okay. Now, let's go on to the next page because -- and I mention
18 that because this was the part where we talked where the Prosecution was
19 alleging that Izetbegovic had been pressed to enter into this agreement.
20 It seems now, a few weeks later, here we have an annex to that agreement,
21 which says: "The diplomatic, political, and humanitarian efforts of the
22 international community has so far failed to stop the aggression."
23 Was that correct?
24 A. Unfortunately, that is correct.
25 Q. And we see it's both for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic
1 of Croatia
2 community of three constituent peoples, that is in Bosnia and
4 A. What was meant was the key thread that runs through all these
5 rounds of negotiations. For centuries in Bosnia, there were three ethnic
6 groups, all equal, and here they were termed constituent. The term was
7 used deliberately here in order to point out their equality, regardless
8 of their respective sizes, which is something that changed over time.
9 Their constituent status and their equal rights before the law were
10 values to be preserved at all costs. This was a given and something that
11 President Tudjman always advocated, and I think the same goes for the
12 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was an ongoing position. It was
13 an ongoing request, and this was something that never changed over the
14 course of the negotiations. However, we see that the international
15 community used the same phrasing. From the very beginning, each of the
16 peace agreements talked about the constituent nature and character of all
17 three ethnic groups. I could provide further comments as to why that was
18 particularly important, if you would like me to. However, we may be
19 coming to that at a later point.
20 Q. Well, let's just do that now so that when we get to it we can
21 breeze through it because I think it might be important, although by now
22 it should be rather obvious to everyone in the courtroom.
23 A. In the briefest possible terms, I will try to sum up the
24 respective positions of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 throughout the negotiations. Negotiations normally result in some sort
1 of compromise. That is normally the case, but if we look at their course
2 in this case, the position of the Serb party was continually to grab as
3 much territory as possible and keep it. Throughout the course of the
4 negotiations, they were always adamant that whatever they had been
5 successful in seizing they should keep. The position of the Muslim side,
6 and then there was a name change, and they became the Bosniak side, and I
7 do think that this is a very fair interpretation of all the documents and
8 all the situations, was this: They wanted to set up a state that would
9 be as unitary as possible. Unitary in which sense? More often than not,
10 it was formulated by the Bosniaks as follows: Bosnia and Herzegovina
11 a state should be set up on the following principle: One man/one vote.
12 This is one of the existing democratic models for organizing states, but
13 this would have severely impinged on the constituent nature of all the
14 three ethnic groups. The Muslims and Bosniaks were the most numerous,
15 and they would end up with an overwhelming majority. This is not
16 something that is peculiar to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most contemporary
17 states are organized along federal lines in order to avoid one particular
18 group ending up with an overwhelming majority in terms of sheer numbers
19 or in terms of territory.
20 Likewise, we see that throughout, the Croats were the smallest
21 group and the group most at risk. Were this principle now to be
22 abandoned and were the unitary principle to be adopted, the Croats would
23 be left facing the most difficult situation of all by a long chalk. That
24 is why the principal departure point in all of the negotiations and I
25 would say the bottom line as far as the Croatian negotiators were
1 concerned was to keep all of the three ethnic groups as constituents.
2 This principle was to be preserved at all costs. I can tell you that all
3 the peace plans, Cutileiro's peace plan, Vance-Owen, Vance-Stoltenberg,
4 the Washington Agreement, the Dayton Accords, if you look at any of
5 those, they all take that as their departure point. They all recognise
6 the necessity regardless of how the community would be organized to take
7 into account the constituent nature of all three ethnic groups. This was
8 the only way in which their equality as well as their survival could be
9 safe-guarded and guaranteed.
10 Q. Okay. Thank you very much for that very complete answer. We
11 won't have to touch on that again. Now --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you have a certain
13 knowledge. You have some particular skills, and as such you can help the
14 Judges, the triers of fact, to understand the matters they are seized of,
15 and I'm thinking of the definition given in the Galic case on the 3rd of
16 July, 2002, regarding two experts, Tabeau and someone else. You are
17 perfectly able to answer a number of questions for us. You've just
18 explained that the existence of these three ethnic groups was taken into
19 account in the international negotiations as far as the Dayton, the
21 constitution of your own country? In Croatia, are these -- is this
22 component of these three ethnic groups included in the constitution of
23 your own country?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was very much taken into
25 account, and I think the issue was dealt with in keeping with the highest
1 possible standards of modern democracy. However, the Republic of Croatia
2 is not a federal state. There was no reason for that simply because none
3 of the other ethnic groups in Croatia
4 such as that enjoyed by the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There
5 were different solutions, and those were referred to in the preamble to
6 the Croatian constitution. We've been looking at that, and I believe a
7 copy somewhere among our documents. There were several solutions. For
8 example, all of the minorities were guaranteed a seat in the Croatian
9 parliament, a total of eight. Three of those went to the Serb ethnic
10 minority; however, they remain ethnic minorities, and that is their
11 status. They are not constituent groups. These are differences of both
12 fact and history and differences in terms of how a state was first
13 created. Bosnia and Herzegovina was always a country that belonged to
14 three different ethnic groups. Ever since the Ottomans left, it was
15 clear who was left, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was their only home. I'm
16 of course referring to the three ethnic groups that are here and rightly
17 so, I believe, defined as the three constituent peoples.
18 I don't believe that anyone in all earnestness ever tried to draw
19 a parallel during the negotiations between Croatia's constitution and
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitution. When models were considered and
21 one had to pick a model to be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the models
22 that were studied were those belonging to countries with a comparable
23 past or with a comparable situation. At one point in time, Belgium
24 model was considered. It's difficult for me to discuss which model is
25 good and which was not, but at one point in time, serious consideration
1 was given to Switzerland
2 cantonisation, about ten cantons along which Bosnia and Herzegovina
3 be organized, but even so, the three ethnic groups would all remain
4 constituent. At one point in time, one considered seriously the
5 constitution of the United States of America. The international
6 community, as well, was considering all these models, and so were the
7 negotiating teams. The question being asked was: What were the models
8 of democracy in our modern world, and what was the model that would best
9 fit these constituent peoples, and what would be the best guarantee for
10 their equal rights without necessarily being at the expense of the
11 appropriate functioning of the state or the country itself?
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for your answer.
13 MR. KARNAVAS:
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Zuzul, and for Your Honours, if you turn to the
15 very first document, which was 1D 2039, we don't need to do that, but if
16 you do turn to it on page 2, the answer lies there where it talks about
17 the Croatian -- the Republic of Croatia
18 as the national state of the Croatian people and a state of members of
19 other nations and minorities, and I believe Mr. [Indiscernible] helped us
20 with that. But we'll be getting into that a little bit more, too, with
21 one of our other witnesses.
22 If we stick with this document now, on paragraph 3 it talks
23 about: "In keeping with the right to self-defence and to joint defence
24 from aggression, a joint committee will be set up in order to harmonize
25 defence efforts until the aggression stops completely."
1 What was meant by that, if you know?
2 A. Well, this is an elaboration of what was already envisaged in the
3 Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation. It is important to note here
4 that this document was signed in New York. Both presidents attended the
5 General Assembly of the United Nations. I was a member of our
6 delegation, and if I'm not mistaken - and I don't think that I am - I
7 actually worked on this document. This paragraph is an expression of the
8 awareness on the part of both presidents that unfortunately the Yugoslav
9 aggression, or rather, the aggression by the Yugoslav People's Army or
10 the Serbian army had not been stopped, and in a way there is this feeling
11 of disappointment engendered by the knowledge that the international
12 community would fail to put a stop to this aggression any time soon, and
13 that the only way to defend the country was to mount a joint defence. I
14 think that this is just making some items that were already signed and
15 agreed to in the Agreement on Cooperation and Friendship more specific.
16 Q. All right. And I think if we look at the next paragraph, and I
17 think this may be of some importance to complete your answer.
18 "The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of
20 arms into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of
22 Can you tell us a little bit about that, and why was it important
23 to lift the embargo? Because, I mean, the Prosecution's theory as we all
24 know is that there was this joint criminal enterprise, and here it
25 appears that both are seeking the lifting of an embargo for arms to be
1 going into Bosnia and Herzegovina presumably to arm the Muslims for the
2 ongoing aggression that was all over the country and from Bosnia towards
3 the Republic of Croatia
4 A. I don't know how Croatia
5 their weapons. What I do know is that they did manage to obtain weapons
6 because, after all, they managed to defend themselves in the war. I know
7 what avenues were close to them for obtaining weapons. They could not --
8 unlike the majority of the states that were members of the United
9 Nations, they could not simply procure those weapons officially because
10 at the beginning of the Yugoslav aggression an embargo, an arms embargo,
11 was imposed, and applying some sort of weird logic, it applied to all the
12 parts of the former Yugoslavia
13 Because at that time one, or rather, two republics, Serbia and
15 Yugoslav People's Army. But not only that, even the weapons that existed
16 in the republics, that were held by the so-called Territorial Defence,
17 had been seized by the Yugoslav institutions, so that when the war broke
18 out there were three facts that we had to take into consideration. On
19 the one hand, an extremely well-armed military. Some people speculated
20 that it was among the best-equipped armies in Europe. History has shown
21 that not to be the case, but be that as it may, they were very well
22 armed. We had the other republics, first Slovenia, then Croatia
23 finally Bosnia and Herzegovina, that did not have their own military.
24 They did not have these kind of weapons. What little weapons they had
25 under the Territorial Defence system had already been seized. And there
1 is the third fact, unfortunately, and that is the fact that the
2 international community decided to impose an embargo, an arms embargo,
3 that applied across the board to everyone, even those who had no need of
4 importing weapons - that would be the Yugoslav People's Army - and to
5 those who really needed those weapons to defend themselves. That is why
6 at this point - this was a topic that frequently cropped up - the two
7 presidents seek the support of the international community to lift the
8 embargo. I can say, and this will become evident from further
9 transcripts, that we had a lively diplomatic activity in this regard.
10 But unfortunately, at that time, this time that we're now talking about,
11 there was no will to change this decision.
12 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let's move on to the next document, 1D 01540,
13 and this is from the Security Council. You'll see it's dated 2 October
14 1992, and I just wanted to -- very brief comments. From the very first
15 page, it says: "Dr. Franjo Tudjman and the president of the Federal
16 Republic of Yugoslavia
17 September, 1992." Are you -- did that, in fact, occur ?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And it would seem -- it seems from looking at this document, does
20 it not, that this meeting was at the behest and with the encouragement of
21 the international community, that is, those who were involved in the
22 negotiating process at the time, Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Okay. Now -- and just if we go to the very first paragraph, it
25 says, number one: "The two presidents re-affirm the commitment of the
1 international conference in London
2 transcript read in error "viability"] of existing borders other than
3 through changes reached by peaceful agreement."
4 And that statement there, did that include the borders of
6 A. Of course, since at that time Bosnia and Herzegovina was an
7 internationally recognised country within its borders, existing borders.
8 Q. All right. And --
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, this rather changes the sense. In
10 the transcript it says the viability of existing borders, page 26, line
11 7, and I think inviability would be the right word.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Right, I agree, I agree. Thank you.
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm reading a bit fast and it's ...
15 Q. Okay. Now, if we go into the next document 1541. These are all
16 sort of interconnected. Here we see this again is dated 21 October 1992
17 and it appears on the very first page we have Mr. Dobrica Cosic with
18 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, that there was a meeting on 20th October in
20 and 4 very quickly, does it not give the appearance that this is a very
21 similar document only this time it's between the Federal Republic
23 A. Yes, it is indeed a similar document. The co-chairmen encouraged
24 and set up meetings between the presidents, and if I may just note --
25 draw your attention to a very important difference between the two
1 documents. In the first document, paragraph 3, if I'm not mistaken, it
2 is stated that the Yugoslav Army would leave Prevlaka by the 20th of
3 October. Why do I say that? Because yesterday and the day before
4 yesterday we spoke at length about the aggression by the Yugoslav Army on
5 the area of Prevlaka and Dubrovnik
6 about. So here, the Yugoslav president admits that this area was
7 occupied by the Yugoslav Army, and he undertakes that by the 20th of
8 October the army would pull out. Of course, it never happened. After
9 the 20th of October, the attacks escalated, as a matter of fact.
10 Q. All right. And that document that you were referring to is, for
11 example, 1D 01540. Now, if you could go on to 1D 01542, we see that this
12 is from the General Assembly, Security Council, looks like, 22 October
13 1992, and from the very first page we see that this is something between
14 Cosic and Dr. Franjo Tudjman. And if we look at the annex, it says here
15 that there was a -- it appears that there was some sort of a meeting in
17 paragraph 6 where it says: "The two presidents re-affirmed their
18 determination to exert all of their influence toward a just, peaceful
19 solution in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They urge all parties to
20 the conflict to direct all necessary efforts toward a cessation of
21 hostilities and the negotiations of a constitutional arrangement for
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the agreement between the three
23 constituent peoples."
24 So we come back to that thesis. Now, the reason I'm asking for
25 this is I have one question: Was it President Tudjman and maybe
1 Mr. Cosic that were maybe sort of approaching the UN and the
2 internationals to get engaged in the process, or was it the other way
4 A. This document states quite clearly that the meeting was held
5 under the auspices of the co-chairmen, Messrs. Vance and Owen, so the
6 international community organized such meetings.
7 Q. Help me out here. Did the international community ever ask
8 Dr. Tudjman to engage in a particular meeting, to sit down with someone,
9 and he refused? Be it Karadzic, be it Milosevic, be it Cosic, be it
10 someone else? To your knowledge, that is, did he ever refuse to sit
11 down, to meet, to ratify some sort of a negotiated solution to this
13 A. I'm not aware of any such case. Whenever there was an official
14 invitation sent through me as the ambassador or in any other capacity,
15 President Tudjman responded, agreeing to come. But I often heard
16 President Tudjman say -- after all, he was sometimes criticised by the
17 Croatian media for negotiating, for instance, with Milosevic when it was
18 quite obvious that Milosevic was the one perpetrating the aggression. He
19 was in a position to give a simple answer, that's what the international
20 community is asking me to do, and that answer would have been both simple
21 and accurate. But in most cases, he would say, I would negotiate with
22 the blackest devil if it would then result in peace.
23 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the next document, 1D 01543, this is
24 2 November 1992
25 talks between the president of the Republic of Croatia
1 Tudjman, and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic dated 1 November 1992. And if we look
2 at the annex, we look at it, and we see the second paragraph, they say --
3 it says to the effect: They reviewed the implementation of the
4 Friendship And Cooperation Agreement between the two countries and
5 discussed a number of topical issues of mutual interest, especially the
6 recent misunderstandings. This may go in to answer the President's
7 question yesterday as far as whether the international community was
8 aware of this. But are we talking about the Friendship and Cooperation
9 Agreement that we talked about yesterday?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And it would appear that at least everybody is aware of it, that
12 these two countries are trying to cooperate against a common aggressor?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And it goes on to say that: "President Izetbegovic informed
15 President Tudjman that next week Bosnia-Herzegovina was going to appoint
16 its ambassador to Zagreb
17 Now, did they eventually appoint an ambassador to Zagreb
18 A. I think that it was just as announced here.
19 Q. And did Croatia
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Okay. Now, let's -- if we go on to the next paragraph: "The two
23 presidents agreed that the latest conflict between some BH army units and
24 the Croatian Defence Council HVO formations were detrimental to their
25 continued struggle against the joint aggressor. These conflicts should
1 be stopped immediately and the culprits dismissed and punished."
2 And then it says that: "A joint unbiassed commission will be set
3 up to determine individual responsibility. Similar occurrences will be
4 avoided in the future through proper actions involving urgent
5 formation -- including urgent formation of a joint command of armed
6 forces of BH and HVO."
7 Now, to your knowledge, why was it necessary to have this part,
8 to agree to this? I mean, why is Izetbegovic -- or Tudjman, I should
9 say, discussing this matter with Izetbegovic?
10 A. The situation in the field was as follows: The aggression by the
11 Serb forces was ongoing. The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
12 Croatian Defence Council were now mounting a joint defence. I cannot
13 really interpret the events in the field because I was working at the
14 diplomatic level, but it is quite obvious that for various reasons there
15 were some sporadic incidents that are mentioned here at some points in
16 time. The presidents were now trying to find a way to avoid such
17 incidents, ways in which an efficient defence could be mounted, and were
18 trying to see how those two armies could become as well integrated as
19 possible in accordance with the agreement in order to be able to defend
20 the country successfully.
21 Q. All right. If we go to the next document, 1D --
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Microphone not activated].
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Sure. Absolutely.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Microphone not activated].
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: For some reason --
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you, thank you.
3 Now, Mr. Zuzul, the passage you have been pointed to speaks of
4 the fact that: "The culprits must be dismissed and punished ..."
5 Can you see it? It's really in the middle of the first page of
6 the document. Do you know whether any action followed this declaration
7 on either side?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am aware of actions in general
9 terms, but I was not really familiar with the specific situations
10 encountered in the implementation on the ground. This was not something
11 that I was dealing with. I think that action was taken, but I cannot say
12 what action, when, and what the results were.
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
14 MR. KARNAVAS:
15 Q. Okay. If we could go on to the next document, 1D 01312. This is
16 11 November 1992
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And because we're running out of time, I see if we look at the
19 contents under number 4 it talks about working groups in Bosnia and
21 on succession issues, number 9, working group on confidence and security
22 building and verification measures. And then we have a series of
23 annexes, and in the annexes -- so we see, for instance, number 2, the
24 joint declaration issued at Geneva
25 number 6 we have the joint declaration issued on 20th October. We see
1 Tudjman named now -- this is what we have been talking about. Is that
3 A. Correct. This is the document stipulating the manner in which
4 the conference on the former Yugoslavia
5 Q. Okay. Now, we'll move on to the next document, and that would be
6 P 00854. This is 3 December 1992
7 4, withdraw on foreign forces, which would be on page 3, if we just turn
8 to page 3 and 4, but I'm mostly interested in page 4, paragraphs 10 and
9 11, 10 and 11. Because it says in the middle of page -- of paragraph 10,
10 it says: "The Bosnian Serb forces allegedly continued to receive
11 supplies and support from elements of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
12 -- and that is Serbia
13 accounts of foreign nationals fighting alongside, alongside, Muslim and
14 Croat forces."
15 And then if we go to number 11, paragraph number 11: "The JNA
16 has withdrawn completely from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Former members of
17 Bosnian Serb origin have been left behind with their equipment and
18 constitute the 'army of the Serb republic.' Several brigades of the
19 Croatian army are also reliably reported to be actively engaged in the
20 conflict. This provision of the General Assembly resolution, also,
21 therefore, appears not to have been fulfilled."
22 And so, could you comment on that a little bit because it would
23 appear that, yes, you have the Yugoslav forces still there, albeit having
24 a different uniform but basically using the same equipment and same
25 manpower, but also we see that there are references to the -- to the
1 elements of the Croatian army. And in answering that question, I would
2 ask you: Has the situation changed at all; that is, is Croatia, the
3 Republic of Croatia
4 the JNA, by the Serb forces, from Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. Correct. Croatia
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina in various areas but most of all in the Dubrovnik
7 area. We're talking about the same time-frame we discussed at length
8 yesterday, I think. This report of the Secretary-General shows quite
9 clearly that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian forces
10 are fighting side by side. They're fighting a common enemy. It is quite
11 clear from the text as a whole and specifically from paragraph 10. We
12 thought at the time, and it is still the case -- it still seems so to me,
13 that this was in line with the Agreement on Friendship and with the two
14 annexes of the implementation of that agreement.
15 Q. Okay. Thank you.
16 A. And if I may add, this sentence in the reports by foreign
17 journalists about foreigners fighting in the ranks of Muslims and Croats,
18 at that time first reports were published about the Mujahedin units
19 fighting side by side with Muslims, Muslim forces.
20 Q. If we go to the next document, P 00890. This is a presidential
21 transcript dated 10 December 1992
22 were present during this particular meeting?
23 A. Yes, I was, that's correct.
24 Q. And I wanted to ask you one question when you -- the first day
25 you testified because you mentioned someone by the name of Biscevic,
1 who's also featured in this particular transcript. Just to make sure
2 that we have one minor detail nailed down, you indicated that he had been
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. And at one point he had -- President Tudjman had asked you to
6 bring him along to assist you in some negotiations where, I believe, it
7 was Komsic from Sarajevo
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Now, Biscevic, as I understand it at the time, he was a Croatian
10 but he was Muslim; is that correct? Muslim I guess by way of religion,
11 not to distinguish -- to make the distinguish -- to distinguish it from,
12 say, a Bosniak or a Muslim from Bosnia-Herzegovina as a constituent
14 A. I know Ambassador Biscevic quite well. I don't know what his
15 faith is because we didn't really discuss that, but it is quite true that
16 he is of Muslim origin.
17 Q. All right. Now, in this particular transcript, I wanted to just
18 focus you on something, and perhaps you can provide us with some insight
19 because you were there. On page 41, we have the president speaking. He
20 begins speaking, and there's a long exchange, but again, because of the
21 time constraints we'll have to cut it short. And if we go to page 42,
22 the second-to-last paragraph where it says -- it starts with: "Let's
23 face the situation. The issue is not just Croat/Serb antagonism in the
24 area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it's not just the problem of Muslims
25 within that; rather, it is the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the
1 conflict of the Western world with the Islamic world. That was the path
2 between the devil and the deep blue sea that we had to pass and why
4 aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina we have been witnessing to this very
5 day. Why did it then try to transfer the blame on us for its action in
6 that? However, we have come out of it, so with this thing that the
7 Western world had to thrust aside the attempt of transferring the blame
8 on us, remember what -- it wasn't even two or three months when they
9 asked a question even the sanction against Croatia, wasn't it? So they
10 had to throw away that idea. On the other hand, the Islamic world also
11 had to accept the fact that we had been the ones who recognised Bosnia
12 and who accepted, et cetera, et cetera. Thus, in both the Western and
13 the Islamic worlds, in the most delicate for us, this gap, this situation
14 we have managed to establish ourselves through our consistency. That is
15 something that seemed to me as squaring the circle from the very
17 But then he goes on to say: "But it's clear, that's the truth.
18 That's truth, and we have to be aware of it, for it is true that
19 Izetbegovic and his were not fundamentalists in the sense how to -- how
20 to spread, and I don't know what -- but they wanted an Islamic state, and
21 it's true that they, not only moderate Muslim states like Turkey
23 the area of Europe
24 fundamentalists in the West."
25 Can you tell us what exactly is President Tudjman talking about?
1 Because in that very first transcript that we talked about yesterday,
2 there were references to Iran
3 bit of time with Tudjman, and you see the issue of Iran again at some
4 point. So can you help us out here since you were one of the insiders?
5 A. It's very difficult to sum this up in just a couple of words.
6 What is President Tudjman doing here? He's drawing some sort of a
7 conclusion. He's summing up and commenting on reports that were
8 submitted to him at this meeting. If you read the transcript, you will
9 see that this is about foreign policies. The main body of the report is
10 a report submitted by the then foreign minister Mr. Skrabalo, who along
11 with Mr. Biscevic visited several Muslim states to talk specifically
12 about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and generally about
14 say that this was something that Tudjman was very mindful of. It was
15 right after this meeting that I as deputy for the minister was tasked
16 with visiting a number of other Islamic centuries, as a matter of fact,
17 nearly all of those that remained after the first visits made by the
18 minister, the objective being to talk about the future of Bosnia
20 could forestall an incursion by Islamic extremists into Europe through
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's difficult to be more specific than that,
22 but I think President Tudjman was very mindful of that.
23 May I just bring something else up. It was back in 1991, 1992,
24 and 1993 that the issue of Islamic extremism came up throughout the
25 world. If I'm not mistaken, Samuel Huntington right about this time
1 published an article on the clash of civilizations in the Foreign Affairs
2 magazine. The article caused a lot of stir and drew a number of emphatic
3 reactions. President Tudjman always liked to consider things within the
4 wider context of history as a whole, so this is precisely what we see him
5 doing now. He's raising a question that, to be quite frank, I'd already
6 heard raised by many prominent statesmen and thinkers, including Samuel
7 Huntington himself.
question came down to this: Would Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 possibly be used as a gate for Islamic extremism to penetrate Europe
10 This is in global terms. He talks about the consistency of his policies,
11 and again, there is one thing that I can point out because this was a
12 message that I and before minister Skrabalo and Mr. Biscevic had taken to
13 Islamic countries. What was consistent about this was the fact that
15 there; it was a neighbouring country. Croatia believed that it was
16 necessary to have a friendship with Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 however, Croatia
18 Croats within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation
20 continues] ... answer. I can see that Mr. Karnavas has taken a new
21 binder. It may be time for the break because it's going to be 4.00 soon.
22 Based on our count, you have another 30 minutes, Mr. Karnavas, so we're
23 going to keep a close watch on you. After you, we're going to have
24 cross-examination, but obviously enough, we are not going to have time to
25 hear all the Defence counsel in their cross-examination. I don't know
1 who's going to start.
2 Is that you certainly, Ms. Alaburic? So she might be the only
3 one today.
4 Yes, Ms. Alaburic.
5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we didn't really
6 coordinate this, but I suppose we'll be doing this in the usual order.
7 The first Defence first. If Ms. Nozica has no cross-examination, as she
8 said yesterday she might, then it will be General Praljak's Defence to
9 start it off, and then I will pick up from there. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
11 Well, if you're not finished by 18:25, we'll continue in July
12 next time. Anyway, we'll remember everything by then.
13 Let's have a 20-minute break.
14 --- Recess taken at 3.41 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 4.05 p.m.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you have about
17 half an hour left.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. If I could have, like,
19 a 5-minute warning, as well, so I know. But I have stream-lined, so we
20 won't go through all the documents.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Rest assured that I will warn
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, thank you. I have no doubts.
24 Q. If we could go to the next document, which would be 1D 02567, so
25 we're skipping a couple, and we'll go to 1D 02567, and I'll ask you to
1 just -- the next few documents are very quick. And you see that this is
2 dated June 1, 1993
4 May 31, 1993
5 of 19 fighters left the command district of the Slunj home guard regiment
6 towards your command district. All of them are equipped and armed with
7 equipment and weapons from warehouse of 5C."
8 And then I think on the same document if we go to page number 4,
9 we see -- after paragraph 19, we see: "In your command district there
10 are six foreign nationals. Please enable the foreign national who is
11 with this group to establish contact immediately with Mirsad Veladzic.
12 And then, if we go to the very last page because this may be of some
13 importance, we see that there is a stamp, and it says, military
14 representative, office of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
15 Republic of Croatia
16 And, of course, we've already talked yesterday or saw yesterday
17 Avdic, who was then a president of the Presidency of BiH, at one point
18 had come over asking to set up Main Staff in Rijeka and other offices.
19 Can you opine as to what exactly is this document about? What
20 does it demonstrate?
21 A. I can give you my interpretation of this document. I see the
22 names of a group of fighters - they appear to be Muslims judging by their
23 names - as well as a couple of foreigners. They were trained by the
24 Slunj home guard regiment in Croatia
25 crossed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were trained, they were given
1 weapons, and the weapons they were given are specified.
2 Q. Okay. And would this be a further demonstration of the
3 Friendship and Cooperation Agreement?
4 A. I assume that might be an accurate interpretation of the
5 agreement, and this seems to be the materialisation of certain elements
6 of that agreement.
7 Q. All right. If we go on -- now we're going to skip a couple -- a
8 few documents, and we're going to go on to 1D 0 --
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. Could we just make clear to whom
10 they are sending -- it says the 5th Corps. There are corps, of course,
11 in all armies.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Right. Okay. We -- that's correct, and perhaps
13 we should also see above, it says: "We are forwarding the report of the
14 office of Bihac counties."
15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That's not the area of the indictment. It's the
16 north-western corner of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand, Mr. -- Your Honour. I guess what
18 I'm trying to establish is that there is close cooperation between
20 was an agreement, and now we're seeing proof of the agreement, and also
21 we see a date, June 1, 1993
22 joint criminal enterprise to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina. So I think
23 this is the whole purpose of it, to show that we have these resolutions.
24 The resolutions don't say exactly where these fighters are, but we see
25 now that there's close cooperation. And so it also demonstrates -- I
1 mean, President Tudjman, you know, has indicated over and over again that
2 he is for a Bosnia and Herzegovina, contrary to the Prosecution's theory,
3 and here's further demonstration. They've got Muslim fighters trained in
5 they get there, they're mobile. They can go wherever. You know, they
6 can -- they can go to whatever front and shoot at anyone or kill anyone
7 or maim anyone for that matter. But that was the purpose, and I hope
8 this time wasn't taken off my 30 minutes. Okay.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That was my question.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. I know. All right. I just want to make
11 sure that -- Mr. Registrar, sometimes seems that he doesn't turn off the
12 timer. Okay.
13 Q. Now, if we go to the next document, and it might also be of some
14 assistance, Judge Trechsel, which is 1D 2573, again same variation, same
15 theme. 1D 02573. Here we see that this is from the club Unski Ljiljani,
16 Lilies of Una, and it's Zagreb
17 is what it says: "Confirming that representatives of the Unski Ljiljani
18 club from Munich
19 of the Bihac County
20 that is active in the territory of Bihac
21 Is this further verification of the implementation of the
22 friendship agreement in your opinion, Mr. Zuzul?
23 A. I think this all falls within the framework of the Agreement on
24 Friendship and Cooperation.
25 Q. Okay. We'll have to skip the next document. We touched on it.
1 The document that I wanted to discuss was 2896, and that had to do with
2 the preliminary agreement between the Republic of Croatia
3 of the constitutional agreement establishing the union of republics of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but just very briefly, having looked at this
5 document, would this document be consistent with what you told us the
6 first day as far as Croatia
8 A. That's right. I think this document was prepared by the UN.
9 This is even in the next document, the report of the co-chairmen to the
10 secretary general, who brings up the idea of talking about the access to
11 the sea being granted. This is also about the constitutional order of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina and its relations to the Republic of Croatia
13 Further, it is noteworthy that Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 defined in no uncertain terms in what is known as a land-locked state in
15 international law, a state, therefore, or a country that has no direct
16 access to the sea.
17 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, if we go on to the next series of
18 documents, they're kind of interconnected, 1D 01320, and with that we
19 will discuss, also, just so everyone can cue into this, 1D 01321 and 3D
20 00451. They're sort of as a package, and we can see from 1D 01321 that
21 this is from a text by Ivo Komsic, who, when, and where, divided BiH. Do
22 you know Mr. Komsic, and very briefly, who is he, so I can go straight to
23 my next question.
24 A. I know Mr. Komsic. I met him during the negotiations. He is a
25 Croat from Bosnia
1 had a number of different hats on during those.
2 Q. All right. Now, if we look at the document, we see that this is
3 a joint declaration, September 14, 1993. It talks -- it's between
4 Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, accepting the principles of the
5 London Conference, and if we look at paragraph number 5, it talks about
6 establishing a working group for issues pertaining to the territorial
7 division between the two republics in the envisaged union of BiH,
8 including the issue of access to the sea as a joint development interest
9 and so on.
10 Very quickly, is this what you were talking about in the first
11 day when you said that there had been a joint declaration signed by
12 Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic?
13 A. That's right. That is the document that I spoke about the first
14 day or yesterday. It's a document that was prepared by Mr. Biscevic and
15 me on our side and Mr. Komsic and Mr. Silajdzic on behalf of Bosnia
17 Q. Okay. Now, if we look at the next document 1D 0 --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One minute, please.
19 Witness, before we move on to the following document, I have a
20 question about this particular document, the joint declaration by Tudjman
21 and Izetbegovic dated September 14th, 1993. We can see here that you
22 took part in this process because we see your name here. You have better
23 knowledge of these type of issues than any other experts. At the
24 beginning of this declaration, I see that reference is made to the London
25 Conference, to the conference in Geneva, and I read: "On the
1 constitutional system of the future union of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 future union of republics."
3 Talking about this concept of union of republics, was everybody
4 aware of that in Geneva
5 document in line with all the work conducted starting in London and in
7 republics a part of a peace solution with access to sea, et cetera? Was
8 the final objective the creation of the union of republics?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At this point in time, the
10 initiative for a meeting like this, an agreement like this, came from
11 President Tudjman. He instructed me, and I promptly got in touch with
12 Mr. Haris Silajdzic. President Tudjman believed that things were moving
13 too slowly within the conference, and he believed that we should first
14 consider the common interest of the Muslims and the Croats, which would
15 then be used as a base for reaching some sort of an agreement, and that's
16 why this meeting was organized. As I said, the four of us attended this
17 meeting to discuss various possibilities. As you have just suggested,
18 Mr. President, we used the plans proposed by the international community
19 up to this point, and we took from them elements that we believed could
20 be useful to building a future for Bosnia and Herzegovina. We tried to
21 include all the key issues in order to arrive at a comprehensive
22 proposal. We did, in fact, formulate a proposal. This is the proposal.
23 It was signed by persons who at the time had the greatest political
24 impact or influence, if you like, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
25 One thing, Mr. President, that I can add to this is that in
1 addition to this document, on that same day, in fact, another document
2 was signed that was believed to be a comprehensive solution to relations
3 between Croatia
4 would guarantee stable relations in the region on a permanent basis.
5 This was a document regarding a possible confederation between the
6 Republic of Croatia
7 among these documents because it was agreed at the time that it would be
8 kept secret. Although a mere three copies were made of the document, I
9 think that it eventually surfaced somewhere. At any rate, I am quite
10 familiar with the document.
11 At the time, there was a lot of optimism and enthusiasm on both
12 sides. I believe that all of us that were present - and this was a
13 document that was signed at the Croatian mission in Geneva - believed at
14 the time that we had just succeeded in resolving a major problem in an
15 historical perspective. I can even go so far as to say that members of
16 the Bosnian delegation, including Mr. Ganic, who was always the most
17 critical and the most difficult negotiating partner, came to visit the
18 building that housed our mission, asking themselves whether the building
19 would be large enough to house both countries. This wasn't just a joke;
20 they were actually raising issues of possible additions to the building.
21 I think both we on the Croat side and the Muslims, too, for their part
22 sincerely believed at the time that we had reached a solution.
23 Unfortunately, as mentioned yesterday, a mere two days later,
24 Mr. Izetbegovic signed an agreement with Karadzic.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's something else,
1 something different, but I would like to relate this document to what the
2 American ambassador in Zagreb
3 months ago, and he told us that he would meet Tudjman on a daily basis -
4 I'm paraphrasing what he told us - and my conviction was that the US
5 embassy or the US
7 September 1993 had the agreement of the Americans.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ambassador Galbraith is a dear
9 friend, to be quite frank. I am somewhat uncomfortable making comments
10 on him like this, but I don't know [as interpreted] when it was that any
11 of the ambassadors were meeting Tudjman. I don't think that there is
12 even a theoretical possibility of an ambassador visiting Tudjman on a
13 daily basis. There's one thing you must know. President Tudjman had a
14 great respect for the United States, and that applied from the outset.
15 He liked to talk to people; nevertheless, he was also a very formal
16 person. He cared for formalities, and he respected issues of protocol.
17 Communication between an ambassador and a state president is always a
18 matter of protocol. It is easy enough to ascertain when and if such
19 meetings took place.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Minister, of course I have
21 nothing to teach you when it comes to protocol and visits and such-likes,
22 but telephone exists.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right, Mr. President. I
24 can't rule out the possibility that they occasionally spoke over the
25 phone. However, based on as much as I know, Ambassador Galbraith didn't
1 really discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina that much with President Tudjman.
2 He was far more involved, if I may tell you my opinion, in bringing about
3 a solution in Croatia
4 However, and I must be perfectly frank, I don't believe that he shared
5 information about this agreement with anyone at the time the agreement
6 was reached, nor do I believe that it was necessary at the time to inform
7 him at all, as would --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to stop here. I've
9 heard enough.
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would like to ask a different question
11 relating to the same document. In number 5, on top of the second page,
12 there is mention of: "Establish a working group for issues pertaining to
13 the territorial division between the two republics in the envisaged union
14 of BiH."
15 Could you specify what is meant with this territorial division
16 that is mentioned here?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as can be seen if you look at
18 the agreement, at the heading, at the course of the negotiations, this
19 was supposed to be a union comprising republics, regardless of the fact
20 that the republics were to be within a single community. One still
21 needed to define their respective territories, which is always the case
22 in any federal or confederal country. The territories of their
23 respective federal units or republics must be defined, so that's what
24 this was about: How to define each of the units' respective territories
25 within the union. In the case of Croat-Muslim relations in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this wasn't always simple.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. Thank you.
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there is an error in
4 the transcript. I think it's quite material, otherwise I wouldn't be
5 springing to my feet. Page 46, line 11, it reads: [In English]
6 "uncomfortable making comments on him like this" -- it was about
7 Ambassador Galbraith -- "but I don't know when it was that any of the
8 ambassadors were meeting with Tudjman."
9 Your Honours, I'm quite sure because I was listening on regional
10 Croatian language and the transcript in English that actually the witness
11 said "it would be easy to establish" instead of "but I don't know." He
12 literally said: It would be easy to establish when it was that any of
13 the ambassadors were meeting Tudjman. And I think this is the
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You are right in the
16 interpretation from B/C/S into French. This is exactly what I heard, so
17 there must have been something that went wrong in the English transcript.
18 Please proceed. Well, the time goes on.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
20 Actually, this should count on your time, Mr. President, the next
21 question because it was touched upon as a result of your question. If we
22 go to 1D 01321.
23 Q. You spoke about some sort of a secret agreement between, I
24 believe -- I'm sorry. Let's look at the next document, and then we'll
25 talk about this. It's 1D 01321. Here, it says: "Mr. President, in
1 accordance with the joint declaration signed yesterday, I submit the
2 names of our members of the agreed-upon working group."
3 And then we see that this -- the next page is September 15, 1993,
4 and if we look at the commentary at the bottom, which would have been
5 from Mr. Komsic, the very last sentence, it says that: "Alongside this
6 declaration that was drafted from several versions, another declaration
7 was signed that wasn't made public and was kept only by Izetbegovic and
8 Tudjman. This declaration contains provisions on maintaining the
9 integrity of BiH, the alliance between Croats and Muslims, and the
10 confederation between BiH and Croatia
11 confederation, he had this declaration in mind."
12 Now, first of all, do you know anything about this declaration
13 that they're talking about, this version of the declaration that
14 Mr. Komsic speaks about?
15 A. Yes. Unfortunately, I did not read Mr. Komsic's book, so I was
16 unaware of the fact that he was talking about that, but that is the
17 declaration that I commented on a little while ago, and that was the
18 situation that I was describing a little while ago when our side thought
19 that a historical agreement had been reached.
20 Q. All right. Now, compliments of the Praljak Defence team, and I
21 must thank them for that, I am told there is a document that they have in
22 the e-court system. It is 3D 00298, I just learned of this just this
23 second ago, so this is all impromptu. I'm not trying to pull a fast one
24 on anyone. If we can pull that up on the e-court, and maybe it's -- it's
25 not in the binder. If we could pull that up on the e-court, and I
1 believe it's an English version -- both in English and in Croatian, but
2 it's been translated. And perhaps, Mr. Usher, could you assist our good
3 witness to make sure that he can see it on e-court.
4 A. [In English] Yes, I see it.
5 Q. Oh, you can see it. Okay. I'm trying to micromanage the
6 courtroom around here.
7 Now, if you could look at that document. I haven't seen it, I
8 haven't read it, but if you could look at that because I'm just told that
9 that was available. Can you tell us with any degree of certainty whether
10 that's what was referring -- what Mr. Komsic was referring to in his
11 book -- the portion of his book which is 1D 01321.
12 A. [Interpretation] Well, last time I saw this document was before I
13 left Geneva
14 the document. I participated in drafting this document. I think that
15 actually I myself wrote it physically.
16 Q. All right. And then perhaps the Praljak team may have a question
17 or two, I don't know, but we'll move on because I think the next document
18 is a rather telling one. And this is 3D 00451, 3D 00451.
19 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
21 JUDGE PRANDLER: Still about that document which you have shown
22 to us, now -- and after the document it was signed by Alija Izetbegovic,
23 we find I think that it is the last page before the resolution of the
24 Security Council will be coming. So -- and here it is written that this
25 declaration is the first -- is the first serious attempt to stop the war
1 conflicts between the Army of BiH and HVO and to normalise the relations
2 between the Muslims and the Croats in BiH.
3 Now, I -- is this part of the document, what Mr. Komsic wrote, or
4 is it a comment from any other document? That is my question, that from
5 which part or which document, if any, this -- in a way this assessment of
6 the document is coming. Thank you.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Right. This is a comment by Mr. Komsic. This is
8 his -- Mr. Komsic, who was involved in various activities, but this is
9 his comment to the document as well as the one --
10 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: -- that he talks about the secret -- the secret
13 Q. Now, if we go to the next document, 3D 00451, because you spoke
14 earlier in one of the questions that was posed by His Honour that
15 unfortunately two days later there was another agreement, joint
16 declaration, signed between Alija Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic and
17 Slobodan Milosevic. Is this the document that you were referring to?
18 A. Correct. I think that this is the document.
19 Q. All right. Now, if we could focus on paragraph number 5,
20 paragraph number 5, and it says here, I'm going to skip a little bit the
21 first part, and then the second sentence, it says: "This is an addition
22 to the commitment already made to find a permanent solution to the
23 governance of the Sarajevo
24 mutually acceptable resolution to the territorial delimitation" -- I
25 guess -- "of the three republics within the union and during the initial
1 two-year period of the union's existence, there shall be a provision for
2 a referendum to be held on a mutually agreed date within the Republics of
3 the Union
4 agree to remain in the Union
5 "In the case of a dissolution of the Union, all the rights of the
7 the United Nations, shall be automatically vested in the republic with a
8 predominantly Muslim majority."
9 Now, I want to focus on that -- on this particular passage.
10 Could you please explain to us what is meant by this, what -- how it was
11 understood by President Tudjman and others because I believe we'll come
12 across some documents that clearly demonstrate that this became known,
13 this became a topic of discussion, and you were aware of it, so I lay the
14 foundation on that one.
15 A. It is true that we learned about this document immediately.
16 After all the co-chairmen co-signed this document, the co-chairmen of the
17 international conference. Our first reaction was that this was an
18 attempt to cheat in relation to the document that was signed a mere two
19 days ago because the Croatian side, President Tudjman, and I think that
20 the same goes for the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, were not aware
21 of this.
22 Secondly, President Izetbegovic signs and agrees to the
23 possibility that the Serbian side could leave Bosnia and Herzegovina
24 is true that this option was envisaged by all peace plans, provided that
25 it happened by peaceful means. But before that, nothing of this kind had
1 ever been signed. And if I may, I would like to note one thing.
2 Recalling the offer that President Izetbegovic made to President Tudjman
3 about western Herzegovina
4 annexed to Croatia
5 the logical conclusion was that the Muslim leadership was trying to set
6 up a unitary Muslim state with the Muslim majority in terms of population
7 and that through this agreement it actually wanted to transfer the rights
8 of a successor state to itself, including the right to membership in the
9 United Nations. So that was our reading of this document at that time,
10 and I have no reason to change this interpretation, that Bosnia
12 join whoever it wished. Croats should be convinced that western
14 rest would become a state with the Muslim majority, and this state would
15 then be granted continuity. It would be the successor state of Bosnia
16 and Herzegovina
17 United Nations.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation
19 continues]... Mr. Karnavas.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. [Microphone not activated]
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone, please.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: And if I may, Your Honour, again, that was part of
23 the question that you had asked, so if the time -- I could be given some
24 extra time for that. Anyway. Okay. P 05155.
25 Q. This is a presidential transcript, 17 September 1993, and I
1 understand that you've had a chance to go through this transcript in the
2 Croatian version. Not all of it was translated, but you were able to go
3 through it, and as I understand it, you are mentioned in this particular
4 transcript; is that correct?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. And to save time, is it also my understanding that where you saw
7 yourself mentioned having read that part, you are convinced that that is
8 not you speaking; is that correct?
9 A. Yes, it's correct. I cannot recall whether I attended this
10 meeting, but I can state categorically that I never uttered the words
11 that are quoted here under my name.
12 Q. Now, just for the record --
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Could you -- I'm sorry. You have said, Mr.
14 Karnavas, that not all was translated. Could you point out what is
15 translated because I seem to have a text which is entirely in Croatian.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour, what was translated by the OTP,
17 and I have here pages 48 to -- 48 and 49. That's what they translated.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes. Thank you kindly.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay? We attached the Croatian, so you have both.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I found it. Yeah.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: And it just -- now since we have the Croatian and
22 the Judges have the Croatian, I wasn't aware that you had it.
23 Q. Now that you have it, could you please tell us what page number
24 that's on in the Croatian.
25 A. In Croatian, that would be page 01865828.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: I think that's the ERN number that's being read.
2 Q. Now, just very briefly, could you tell us why you think that is
3 not you in the transcript speaking because sometimes the question is how
4 accurate truly these transcripts are as opposed to whether they're
6 A. Well, the person speaking here talks about some boards of
7 management that I was never a member of. That person speaks about
8 meetings held every seven or ten days, meetings that I could not have
9 attended physically because at that time I was in Geneva. And this
10 person mentions the name of the person who sat next to him last time,
11 that is Mr. Fizilic [phoen], and I really can't recall an occasion where
12 that man sat next to me.
13 Q. Now, Judge Trechsel asked what was translated. Good question.
14 Let's turn to that text because it might be of assistance because we have
15 -- apparently the Prosecution translated for one reason. I would like
16 you to look at that part, and this is page 48 and 49, keeping in mind
17 what we've already discussed concerning the joint declaration between
18 Izetbegovic, Karadzic, and Milosevic. And if we could look at this, this
19 part, 48 to 49, because it says: "You saw the position in collusion with
20 the services from abroad" -- opposition. I'm sorry. I'm just getting
21 tired -- "in collusion with the services from abroad who are still not in
22 favor of a sovereign Croatia
24 "What for, if not to overthrow Tudjman. That's a bit difficult.
25 That failed. Then to break the HDZ, Croatian Democratic Union, and with
1 regard to that, they partly managed part of our people, too, a wrong
2 policy on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as written.
3 "As you see, the policy was not wrong. On the contrary, from the
4 start, it was the only right one in the interests of both the Croatian
5 people in Bosnia
6 seen, he himself signed, after visiting the whole world, actually what he
7 said, what he discussed with us in private in addition to what we
8 publicly signed. We had talked -- we had talks and agreements that the
9 Bosnian Muslim and Croatian republic was to go for close cooperation
10 there, until later confederal ties with Croatia, et cetera, but also that
11 the thing might develop in such a way that it would be better for them to
12 be independent.
13 "So, he signed it with the Serbs and made it public, so it can
14 survive for two years at most. Now, look at the map of what will be the
15 Croatian state, not just with the Croatian Republic but clearly it
16 belongs to us, or the Bihac region, too, will be an integral part of the
18 "Therefore, Croatia
19 history, but they raised the need for a shift. So the problem is in the
20 completely wrong assessment by those who raised that.
21 "Why do I mention that? I mention that because those people from
22 those same circles gave directions not only to their own people but
23 elsewhere that the -- that HDZ should and Tudjman in the area of the
24 economy, that we should take matters into our own hands. In the
25 interests of Croatia
1 holding such responsible positions that you have to be aware of all those
2 roads leading astray and all those wanderings. It is up to you to
3 implement Croatian policy, which would upon the conclusion of the war
4 with such borders which would be most favourable for Croatia, which would
5 ensure, that is, economic sense, which would not create economic basis
6 for the dissolution of such policy. Please keep that in mind."
7 Now, in light of what we previously discussed, can you tell us if
8 you can, what is Tudjman talking about? Because it appears that the
9 agreement that was signed between Izetbegovic and Milosevic and Karadzic
10 has now become public.
11 A. I don't recall this meeting, really. I believe that I did not
12 attend it. However, having read the whole transcript in Croatian because
13 the small portion that has been translated into English, even if we
14 disregard the errors such as the one -- such as the fact that I am listed
15 here, it is difficult to conclude what this is all about. But this is a
16 meeting between President Tudjman and people who are in charge of
17 economic policy, enforcing economic policy in Croatia. So this is a
18 meeting about economic issues, not political issues, and at this meeting
19 President Tudjman makes comments about the political situation, about the
20 opposition, as is often the case by -- with politicians. He comments on
21 those who criticise him, and in this context he makes comments about the
22 agreement that he signed with us that Izetbegovic and the agreement that
23 Izetbegovic in turn signed with the Serbian side. So one should, I
24 think, look at those excerpts in this broader context because his
25 comments at this time are not quite certain because it is not obvious at
1 that time whether the confederation that had been agreed with the
2 Bosniaks would, in fact, be implemented, whether this agreement would be
3 implemented or not.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe your time is up.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: [Microphone not activated]
6 THE INTERPRETER: Your microphone, please.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, have a last question.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. We'll skip some documents. We'll get
9 to them through somebody else.
10 Q. But one last document we can go through, and I invite the
11 Trial Chamber to read it thoroughly and carefully, all of it. And this
12 is 1D 02911. Now, regrettably, the time does not permit me to go into
13 this. We would need at least one day for this particular document.
14 You're mentioned in here. In this document, it touches upon the issues
15 that you talked about, including the agreement between Izetbegovic,
16 Karadzic, Mladic, the US
17 they would prefer having the Serbs leave, but the Muslims under no
18 circumstances to be on their own, there should be no Muslim entity in
20 Could you please comment since you were there, I believe, and
21 give us a full explanation of your understanding of this presidential
22 transcript, which we will revisit with other witnesses, as well, who
23 attended that meeting.
24 A. I attended this meeting, and my recollection of it is relatively
25 good, and I remember quite well everything that preceded this meeting.
1 And I think, if I may be allowed to give my opinion, I think this is an
2 important document because it is indicative of the final -- of the end of
3 one stage in the peace process and embarking on the next stage. We, I
4 myself and some other people, made some presentations to President
5 Tudjman, but before this meeting took place, we had been in intensive
6 communication with various states. I, for instance, was communicating
7 with Mr. Redman from the USA
8 international conference was no longer a viable institution, and despite
9 the fact that Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg were still the co-chairmen,
10 it was not possible to find a solution through the conference. It also
11 became quite clear - Mr. Redman, as President Clinton's Special Envoy,
12 stressed this several times in Geneva
13 United States wanted to be involved in the effort to find a solution.
14 You will recall that President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic had
15 urged the United States to take part on several occasions. I think that
16 this was welcomed by our side, at least by our side. I met with
17 Mr. Redman, and then I organized the meeting between him and Minister
18 Granic about the month before this meeting took place. And we heard from
19 him what his views were of possible cooperation between Muslims and
20 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, how he saw it. After a lot of debate,
21 after Mr. Granic visited the Vatican
22 to renew the idea of stronger links between Muslims and Croats, and this
23 was widely debated.
24 Likewise, as a result of different information, different inputs,
25 President Tudjman suggested to the leadership of the Croats from Bosnia
1 and Herzegovina
2 in this transcript of this meeting, there is a lot of talk about who
3 would represent Croats, and it is quite clearly stated that the
4 representatives should be the people who will not be seen as obstacles on
5 the road to establishing good relations and peace.
6 After this agreement -- or rather, I apologise, after this
7 meeting, there followed concrete negotiations that resulted in the
8 signing of the Washington Agreement creating -- laying a foundation for
9 the Dayton
10 agreement and at this meeting the principles behind President Tudjman's
11 policies are clearly seen. He is concerned about the Republic of
13 and Herzegovina
14 There is another thing that is evident. I think that I did not
15 really mention that, and I did witness this. The international
16 community - I will be very frank now - criticised Croatia at times about
17 its involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet this very same
18 international community consistently and persistently asked Croatia
19 President Tudjman to be the party involved in the effort to find a
20 solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. I'm not saying that he and all of
21 us involved in this did not make any mistakes. Hindsight is a great
22 thing, but with hindsight I think we can show this principled position in
24 because this marks a watershed in the peace talks. After this meeting
25 and after the agreement that was signed after this meeting, regardless of
1 the quality of this agreement, the final purpose was achieving peace, and
2 this peace was finally achieved in Dayton, and this is the importance
3 that I give to this meeting, to this transcript.
4 Q. Thank you very much.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.
6 MR. KARNAVAS:
7 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Zuzul. I appreciate you coming here.
8 We thank you very much, and we hope that you will be as honest and
9 forthright with your answers to the Prosecution or to anyone else's
10 questions as you have been with me. Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. We are going to break
12 for 15 minutes. We'll resume in 15 minutes. I'll give the floor to
13 Mr. Kovacic, and we'll stop at 6.25 sharp.
14 [Witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 5.02 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 5.17 p.m.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.
18 Mr. Kovacic, you have the floor.
19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. But we need the
21 witness, of course. It's always a pleasure to listen to you, but --
22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] In fact, Your Honour, my idea was
23 to deal with procedural aspects before the witness is in the courtroom.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] But if you would like me to, of
1 course I can wait.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed.
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in keeping with the
4 instructions I received previously, I move that General Praljak be
5 allowed to ask the witness a couple of questions himself. This will not
6 take longer than 10 or 15 minutes. Questions will be about the siege of
8 occasions, and also about the presence of the Croatian army in eastern
10 Libertas convoy, which travelled to Dubrovnik carrying humanitarian
11 assistance. Praljak had direct knowledge of this. He was involved in
12 these events. He knew what was going on, and therefore, he has every
13 qualification to ask the witness questions about that. Therefore, I move
14 that General Praljak be allowed to ask these questions. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. I'm going to consult my
16 fellow Judges.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, after considering
19 the matter, the Judges allow you to ask questions but only questions that
20 relate to military matters, not to diplomatic matters or other issues.
21 But since you met the witness at a time when you were conducting a
22 military operation, a military defence operation, I'm going to ask you to
23 address only military-related issues because we know that the witness is
24 knowledgeable in military matters as well. We know that from the
25 presidential transcripts.
1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your
2 Honours. I'll first be asking those questions, and there is something
3 else I have to say.
4 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness. Good afternoon, Mr. --
6 Professor Zuzul. That is how I will be addressing you from now on.
7 Do you know that by the 31st of October, 1991, Dubrovnik had been
8 under siege for a total of 33 days from the south, from the north, from
9 the sea, and from the west as well?
10 A. Yes, I know that very well.
11 Q. Do you know that at the time, because of that territory you
12 talked about, in order to prevent a JNA attack and keep the JNA from
13 penetrating further into Croatian territory towards Ploca and so on,
15 specific brigades now - in a narrow strip and because of that they had to
16 across into Herzegovina
17 familiar with that?
18 A. Yes, I know that there was this necessity and that this was,
19 indeed, the case.
20 Q. Thank you very much. Do you know that at the time Veljko
21 Kadijevic was the minister of the armed forces of socialist Yugoslavia
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I'll be quoting from a book now. We shall be tendering this into
25 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour --
1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] -- do you know that --
2 MR. SCOTT: I apologise to Mr. Praljak for interrupting, but
3 again, as we start this phase of the case, I think it's important to
4 establish the appropriate procedure. Your Honour, this is not
5 cross-examination. This is a friendly examination. I don't think
6 leading questions are appropriate. All the questions so far have been
7 leading, asking only for a yes or no answer. This is not
8 cross-examination. This is just further examination-in-chief.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if I may respond, if I may respond,
10 that is incorrect. This is proper cross-examination. He's entitled to
11 cross, and in any system you can ask either an open-ended question or a
12 closed-ended question or a leading question. In this case, he's been
13 asking leading questions, proper cross-examination, and I don't see why
14 the Prosecution is even objecting.
15 MR. SCOTT: Well, I'll tell you why. I'll make it very clear why
16 because the way -- excuse me.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, Mr. Scott. The
18 Trial Chamber has issued a number of guide-lines that cover all issues.
19 You can't really surprise us by raising a problem we never considered.
20 In these guide-lines, we decided, we stated, that during the
21 cross-examination the Defence should deal with matters related to the
22 examination-in-chief of the Defence. But in case the accused deals with
23 matters related to his own case, then we would consider that as part of
24 the examination-in-chief and deduct it from the accused's time.
25 Mr. Praljak has not said anything. He's practically said nothing. Let's
1 just wait and see. The witness answering questions put to him by
2 Mr. Karnavas dealt with military matters. We had the map. We had
4 is now talking about Dubrovnik
5 MR. SCOTT: It makes no bit of difference what the topic is.
6 That does not determine whether it is a direct examination or
7 cross-examination. This is not cross-examination. This is friendly
8 examination of a friendly witness. It is absolutely true, this is not
9 cross-examination. On a direct examination, you cannot ask leading
10 questions, and I would ask all the Judges to participate in this
11 decision. This is not just a decision just for the President. This is a
12 decision for the entire Chamber to make. This is not cross-examination,
13 and the reason it's relevant is because of the way the time for the
14 Prosecution questioning -- the time for the Prosecution's time --
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this comment.
16 Let me repeat what I've said. Thank you for this comment. That
17 goes directed to my heart. Before establishing whether he asked a
18 leading question, let's hear him out. Let's wait for the end of the
19 question. You are standing up, but we have no idea what the question is.
20 MR. SCOTT: It doesn't matter, Your Honour. Every question so
21 far has been leading. Every question Mr. Praljak has asked so far has
22 been leading, every one. Look at the questions in the transcript.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: And the questions are back -- first of all,
24 they're background information that has already been covered; and
25 secondly, and I invite all the Judges to read books on evidence, there is
1 nothing that says that cross has to be hostile as in hostility. You can
2 be -- you can be friendly. I try it occasionally, you know, but you can
3 be friendly in cross. It depends on the circumstances.
4 MR. SCOTT: It is not a question of the style. It is the
5 question of what it is. Yes, I agree. I have been practicing common-law
6 adversary system for more than 20 years. Sometimes cross-examination can
7 be conducted in a friendly manner, and of course, I have done that many
8 times as perhaps Mr. Karnavas has. I'm not so sure, but the point of it
9 is that no matter what the style is -- we're not talking about style.
10 We're talking about what it is, and this is not cross-examination of a
11 hostile witness; this is direct examination.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The matter of deciding whether
13 the witness is friendly with the accused or not is secondary, but let me
14 go back to what the Trial Chamber wrote in its guide-lines. If the issue
15 has already been dealt with during the examination-in-chief, the person
16 conducting the cross-examination, even if that's a member of the Defence,
17 is allowed to put leading questions to the witness.
18 Secondly, if the issues raised were not dealt with during the
19 examination-in-chief, then the person asking the questions is not allowed
20 to put leading questions to the witness. The following example is given.
21 We can take the following example. If he deals with Dubrovnik and
23 leading questions. But if Mr. Praljak suddenly decides to deal with a
24 topic that was not addressed by Mr. Karnavas, for example, the
25 ammunition, the calibre of the ammunition, then if he decides to do so,
1 he is not allowed to put leading questions to the witness. This is part
2 and parcel of our guide-lines. We spent hours and hours drafting these
3 guide-lines. We thought that this could be a contested matter; that is
4 why we drew up these guide-lines. Let him ask his questions. If he does
5 not comply with the guide-lines, then raise an objection, and the
6 Trial Chamber unanimously will go along with you if you're right. But at
7 the moment as things stand, I can't say anything about his questions.
8 MR. SCOTT: Well, first of all, Your Honour, it is not
9 cross-examination. You can call it whatever you want. This is not
10 cross-examination. You can call it, you know, a blue turnip. It is not
11 cross-examination --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If you -- Mr. Scott,
13 Mr. Scott --
14 MR. SCOTT: If the Chamber wants to make that the policy, then I
15 invite the Chamber to re-examine its policy if this is what's really
16 intended because this allows someone to take a friendly witness and ask
17 leading questions to -- is it true this, is it true this, is it true
18 this, and that is not -- this is not cross-examination. This is absurd.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. I'm going to give
20 the floor to my colleague, but first, Mr. Scott, if you did not agree
21 with the guide-lines, you should have asked for a request for
22 certification against the guide-lines because obviously, the witnesses
23 called by the Defence are not Prosecution witnesses, obviously. That's
24 first -- and we all agree on this.
25 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Secondly, why would you expect
2 him or want him to attack the witness as a Prosecutor would if the
3 witness is a Defence witness or a hostile witness? You want him to work
4 under the same conditions as you, but it's not the case --
5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Previous translation continues]...
6 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You can't hear me?
8 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Okay. I was saying that I'm not very optimistic
10 about a fruitful continuation of this dialogue in this setting, and I
11 would suggest, as there seems to be a different conception of what
12 cross-examination means, that you put in writing to the Chamber a --
13 maybe a request for interpretation or for clarification where you set out
14 your views, and then the Chamber can deliberate and give an opinion.
15 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Judge Trechsel. I will do that. The
16 Prosecution will do that. We had stated this position previously. In
17 one of the Status Conferences, we raised this issue, so it's not a new
18 issue. I won't take any more time except to say that what the President
19 said a moment ago in lines -- around line 20 and 21 of page 67 are
20 exactly the reasons why it's not cross-examination. It's the questioning
21 of a friendly witness by someone on the same side, and that is not by
22 definition cross-examination.
23 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm really
24 embarrassed to join this time-wasting exercise. I wanted to gloss over
25 this debate, but I simply find myself unable to. Both Your Honours and
1 my learned friend mentioned several times that I think three weeks ago
2 the Chamber adopted a set of rules and guide-lines that were perfectly
3 clear as to how this kind of examination conducted by the Defence would
4 be seen. We are parties to these proceedings, the six Defence teams, and
5 the OTP, plus, of course, the accused. We are here on behalf of the
6 accused, needless to say. We have very thoroughly studied the
7 guide-lines. This is a peculiar situation; that much is true. We are
8 operating here in a mixed system when no one can invoke their own
9 practice from national jurisdictions and systems. My colleague and I
10 spent an entire day poring over this in a bid to analyse situations that
11 Your Honours envisaged in those guide-lines. I'm sure you remember that
12 we raised several issues or questions about one particular matter, and we
13 weren't sure what the Chamber had in mind. We submitted a request for
14 review or perhaps even an appeal if we went any further. This appears to
15 be becoming a matter of style. A decision comes along; the OTP just
16 ignores it. I'm not going into any of that.
17 What I believe is this: The Chamber has passed a set of
18 guide-lines, which is what the President has just said. It is our duty
19 to read them and to study them. If we don't agree, of course there are
20 legal remedies. There are mechanisms in place for dealing with that kind
21 of situation, but I don't think it is ethically right to have this
22 discussed in open court, especially once the guidelines have taken effect
23 and have become final because nobody appealed the guide-lines. If anyone
24 did, then it was us, this particular Defence. We did not believe that an
25 appeal would be necessary because we were certain that it was a simple
1 error. It was for procedural reasons that we were talking about an
2 appeal, but actually we were asking for an amendment. Therefore, I think
3 it is entirely pointless now to raise issues such as fairness or accuracy
4 of this approach that was decided on by the Trial Chamber. These are
5 biding guide-lines, and they have to be complied with in this courtroom.
6 Thank you very much.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, proceeded.
8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Professor, are you aware of the fact that at that time, the 31st
10 of October, the 1st of November, a convoy, a naval convoy was headed
11 towards Dubrovnik
12 A. I don't know the exact date, but I do know that it was going on
13 at that time.
14 Q. Do you know that Mr. Mesic led the convoy, at that time he was
15 the president of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic
17 A. Well, I think so, but I cannot be certain about that.
18 Q. Thank you very much. I will now read an excerpt from a book very
19 briefly, and then we're done. Mr. Mesic says the following: "I talked
20 about Admiral Stane Brovet, cool, cold Slovene. He was Mr. Kadijevic's
21 deputy. The only thing that I was completely sure about, Slavija 1" --
22 that's a vessel -- "must not enter Zelenika. If I allow that, most of
23 the Croatian intellectuals and artists on board the ship would be
24 arrested, tortured, mistreated, and perhaps even convicted. As for
25 myself, it would be an easy matter. They would send a helicopter and
1 just take me back to Zagreb
2 jugular. We have reliable information that there are volunteers and
3 weapons on board this ship. If that is not true, why don't you want to
4 go to Zelenika? Let the ship be inspected, and everything will be
6 Mr. Brovet replies. "Admiral Brovet, do you know what it is that
7 you are doing? You suspect your Commander-in-Chief, your president, of
8 being involved in terrorism. The cold Slovene did not budge. He was
9 malicious and cheeky, but he didn't want -- he was still polite with a
10 thin smile.
11 "Brovet: Leave that for your merry sessions of the Presidency,
12 president, people are being killed here. There are no politicians' tales
13 and one-upmanships here."
14 Mr. Zuzul, this text was made public. It was published in the
15 newspapers, but do you know that the commander of the JNA, the president
16 of the Presidency, was in fact almost captured by Kadijevic's deputy and
17 treated as a nobody?
18 A. After you've read this, I do recall that President Mesic did make
19 such statements and that such reports were published.
20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I did this in
21 order to show that the president of the Presidency and the
22 Commander-in-Chief of the JNA did not really have a function at all.
23 This is the command responsibility of a man of this kind. At the same
24 time, this JNA was on the rampage in Croatia and before that in Slovenia
25 So now I've dealt with this, and I would now like to ask you the
1 following. I've repeated so many times that this is a court of law and
2 that the truth must be established for the sake of the victims. It is my
3 inalienable right to contest the absurd indictment.
4 And, Mr. Scott, you cannot get me to just lie down by force. I
5 will not stand for the denial of my right to use my knowledge gained
6 through the four and a half years of this war to let all this go down the
7 drain just because somebody, for God knows what political reasons - and
8 now we're talking about Madam Carla del Ponte - who claims that Croats as
9 a people are --
10 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me --
11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] -- vile sons of bitches --
12 MR. SCOTT: [Overlapping speakers] -- the Prosecution.
13 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No, no, this is my comment.
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, you have been allowed to ask
15 questions relating to military matters. You have, however, now embarked
16 on pleadings against the indictment, and I think you should comply with
17 the President's orders because the President rules these proceedings and
18 not you.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, you are attacking
20 the Prosecution. Why? Why are you doing that? Because you had the
21 opportunity to intervene several times before. Why are you doing this
22 during the cross-examination of this witness?
23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Well, because it all boils
24 to the fact that I have three minutes, and this is my life, my facts, my
25 knowledge, my search for the documents, my truth that I have the right,
1 the factual right to present before this Court, lawyers or no lawyers. I
2 wanted to stand up and ask why I am not given the right to ask questions
3 that serve your purpose, the purpose of finding the truth of all that. I
4 don't want to face the guillotine without being accorded the right to
5 defence. I did not abuse your time. I'm not saying superfluous things,
6 but you, Your Honours, have to see that the president of the
7 Presidency -- thank you very much.
8 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Praljak, you have been given the time as the
9 Chamber ruled, and you have been given the time to ask questions. But
10 you have not been given the time to make comments on Carla del Ponte's
11 remarks and to use words which are, of course, not for this Chamber to
12 deal with. So that is why I am saying that you had the opportunity, and
13 I agree that the Chamber has given to you this. But you have in a way
14 took more time to deal with other matters which are not within the ruling
15 of this Chamber. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge Trechsel
17 [as interpreted]. I thought that somebody else would be asking the
18 question. Thank you, anyway. I apologise. I do apologise, Your Honour,
19 Judge Prandler.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Microphone not activated]
21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I thought that somebody
22 else would be asking the question or perhaps the Prosecution would
23 volunteer the apology for what Madam del Ponte, chief Prosecutor, said in
24 her book, that I'm a member of a people that is composed of vile sons of
1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] There is an interpretation error
2 here because Mr. Praljak said something that is not recorded in the
3 transcript. He said that this completes his examination and that he
4 wanted to make a comment. He said: I'm done with my examination, and I
5 want to address the Chamber. Nobody stopped him. He just kept talking.
6 I want to deal with another thing. That's why I rose. The
7 document from which General Praljak read the excerpt is in e-court. The
8 number is 3D 01067. That's -- in English, that's page 3D 261917. In
9 Croatian, original, that's 3D 261916 -- 06. The -- this document is
10 listed on the Defence 65 ter (g) list. It's in e-court. It's a book by
11 the current president of the Republic of Croatia
12 entitled: "The Citizen President." We would like to tender this into
13 evidence for the record.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What about the exhibit? You
15 did not hand a copy of that exhibit to us.
16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes, that is right.
17 We did not provide this in preparation for the cross-examination, but
18 General Praljak deemed that this would be a good time to ask the witness
19 about this because the witness has knowledge of that, because we were not
20 preparing for the witness.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We can give it an MFI number,
22 and once we've received the document, we'll give it a definite number.
23 Please, Mr. Registrar, can we have an MFI number for this book
24 mentioned by General Praljak, a book authored by Mr. Mesic.
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you. Of course,
1 every technical solution is a good one. It is in e-court, and then
2 tomorrow, just like with the IC document, we will be submitting a list.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You do as we did
4 during the Prosecution case. You'll have your -- you'll make up an IC
6 Very well. Ms. Alaburic, you can start. I hope there won't be
7 any other procedural problems. You never know.
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, good afternoon to
9 everybody in the courtroom. For the time being, we don't have any
10 procedural matters, but we will resolve any that might crop up as we go
12 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Zuzul, good afternoon.
14 A. Good afternoon.
15 Q. First of all, could you please tell the Chamber, and I think that
16 our learned colleagues from the Prosecution would find this interesting.
17 I want to ask you: Did I take part in your proofing for this evidence --
18 for your evidence here?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Did I contact you? Did I let you know that I would like to meet
21 with you before you entered this courtroom?
22 A. No -- or rather, you called me once on the phone.
23 Q. Did I tell you on that occasion that I told the Prlic Defence
24 about this wish on my part, but at the time when I called you I had not
25 received any answer from them?
1 A. Yes, as far as I can remember, that is the case.
2 Q. So at the end of the phone call -- from the end of the phone call
3 until your arrival in the courtroom, we did not meet -- or rather, we
4 just passed each other by in the corridors here at the Tribunal?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Mr. Zuzul, I thought that I would be questioning you in two
7 parts. In the first part, I would be referring to what you said in your
8 examination-in-chief, and in the second part, I would like us to try to
9 analyse the procedures or the acts, the attitudes, of the Muslim
10 delegations in the talks about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina
11 I would like to do that on the basis of the transcripts from the sessions
12 of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But for the
13 beginning, let us deal with what you said in your examination-in-chief.
14 Your last answer to the Prlic Defence was that the international
15 community wanted President Tudjman to participate in the peace talks
16 about Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you remember that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you know that many representatives of the international
19 community, ambassadors, and so on, gave interviews to the Croatian media
20 where they explained this, providing the following justification, that it
21 is much easier for them to try and solve anything that has to do with
22 Croats with one person, President Tudjman, and then let President Tudjman
23 coordinate things with the Croats in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina
24 and secondly, that President Tudjman, in this effort to coordinate the
25 solution of the problem in accordance with the wishes of the
1 international community, might be more efficient than the representatives
2 of the international community themselves.
3 Are you familiar with those explanations? Do you recall those
5 A. I think that there were several such interviews where such
6 explanations were proffered.
7 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Antonetti asked you about the
8 constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He asked you questions
9 about the constituent peoples, if any, in the Republic of Croatia
10 I would like us to deal with Bosnia and Herzegovina in greater detail for
11 a very simple reason, to try and explain to Their Honours whether this
12 issue of the constituent status of the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 was an issue that cropped up in 1990 as a topic that was important for
14 the solution of the crisis, or was this an important question for the
15 settlement of the relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina even in socialist
16 times? Can you confirm that? I can ask leading questions, that the
17 issue of the constituent status of the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 was a very important topic while Bosnia and Herzegovina was a socialist
20 A. Yes, I can agree with you on that.
21 Q. Do you know that as early as in 1944, Zavnobih - that was the
22 land antifascist council of the national liberation of Bosnia and
24 Serbs, Muslims, and Croats were unified in the national liberation
25 movement and that Zavnobih is actually the expression of the constituent
1 status of those three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Are you
2 familiar with that?
3 A. Well, more or less.
4 Q. Do you know that in the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
5 from 1974, the preamble and the general principles list Muslims, Croats,
6 and Serbs as peoples that constitute Bosnia and Herzegovina?
7 A. I heard that several times; in other words, I am familiar with
9 Q. In light of the fact that at that time the three peoples were
10 defined as constituent peoples but Bosnia and Herzegovina was not a
11 federation, it is logical that to somebody not familiar with the
12 situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina might ask himself how was the equal
13 footing of those constituent peoples ensured? Because we are familiar
14 with it, we are more or less of an age, and we know how the socialist
15 system functioned, I would say that the constituent status was ensured
16 through the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
17 personnel policy that ensured that at all major political and economic
18 levels there are representatives of all three peoples, Muslims, Serbian,
19 and Croatian proportionate to the percentage of those peoples in the
20 overall population. Can we agree on that, more or less?
21 A. Well, not going into political analyses of how it was done, I can
22 agree with you more or less that that's how the three peoples were
24 Q. Can we agree that the League of Communists was the factor of
25 integration, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in the whole of
2 A. Well, I can definitely agree with that fact.
3 Q. Can we agree that once the League of Communists was gone from the
4 political scene, there was this need to resolve some issues, in this case
5 the equality of the constituent peoples, in some other way? So once the
6 League of Communists was no longer there, it could no longer perform this
7 integrative function, was it necessary to ensure the integration of a
8 state as such in some other way?
9 A. Well, I think that now we have gone very deeply into the
10 political side of the matter. It is my personal opinion that when a new
11 state emerges and it gains sovereignty, it is necessary to define the
12 position of the people or peoples in -- within this new sovereign polity,
13 so I would say that I agree with you in general terms, but I think that
14 if we would go too far in interpreting this in political terms.
15 Q. Can we agree with the conclusion that the representatives of the
16 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina thought that if Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 had a complex internal structure that would ensure that there were three
18 entities based on the ethnic principle, there could be proper integration
19 in Bosnia
20 A. I think so.
21 MR. SCOTT: Objection.
22 I apologise, counsel. In addition to my ongoing and standing
23 objection to leading questions in this fashion, just so that I'm not told
24 that I should have objected when I didn't, and I am, and I'll continue to
25 object to it, in addition to that on this particular question, I don't
1 think -- this witness cannot purport to speak for all representatives of
2 all Bosnian Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina as if they are all one
3 single group of people all having the same view. That can't possibly be
4 the case.
5 "Can we agree with the conclusion that the representatives of the
6 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina ..."
7 What representatives? What Croats in Bosnia
9 Stjepan Kljujic, Mate Boban, Dario Kordic? This witness cannot possibly
10 answer that question.
11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, page 78, line 24,
13 when you spoke of representatives of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 you know how complicated it is. Some had varied and very different
15 political views. So before you tackle this issue, ask the witness
16 whether he's aware of the political situation of Croats in Bosnia
18 the trends were before you address this issue because Mr. Scott is right
19 in saying that your question seems to encompass everybody, whilst the
20 situation is far more complex than that.
21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may, two
22 explanations, the first about the nature of my questions. I would like
23 to advise Mr. Scott to look at the questions I asked in the
24 cross-examination of one of his witnesses, Mr. Herbert Okun and also
25 Mr. Manolic. The answers of my questions, then, my theories and the
1 answers that I expect are all entirely identical. As for the other
2 remark, I entirely take it on board. I simply tried to avoid wasting too
3 much time on this subject. I believe it to be generally known that in
4 this courtroom that in 1990 at the first multi-party elections in Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina
6 If my information is not correct, I stand corrected, but I didn't think
7 there was any dilemma about us talking about 1990 and early 1991 and that
8 we were talking about the policies of the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Had
9 my question been about 1993, I would have been very precise about it. I
10 would have told you whether it was about Kljujic, Komsic, or Boban or
11 somebody else, which is precisely what I'm going to do the next time we
12 deal with the transcripts from the BH Presidency.
13 Q. Mr. Zuzul --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, you're right, but
15 from the very beginning in the matter of a few seconds, you could have
16 asked him: Do you know what the electoral results were in 1990? He
17 could have said: Yes. And then you could have started asking your
18 question, but go ahead.
19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Fine.
20 Q. Mr. Zuzul, yesterday and today you were examined by Mr. Prlic's
21 Defence. You talked a great deal about the Agreement on Friendship and
22 Cooperation reached by Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic. This is P
23 339. It's in my binder as well. This is something that I prepared for
24 the Chamber and everyone else just for the ease of handling.
25 Mr. Antonetti asked a question to the effect whether this document was
1 published or not; therefore, I prepared a copy of Croatia's constitution.
2 Rather wasting any time on that now, I'll be asking you a very brief
3 question, and I expect you to know the answer to that question.
4 Articles 132 and 133 of the constitution talk about who was in a
5 position to conclude international agreements. It is the president, and
6 then Article 133 defines that some international agreements must be
7 verified, or ratified if you like, by Croatia's parliament. As a rule,
8 any agreements ratified by the parliament are then published in the
9 Official Gazette.
10 Can we, therefore, agree that the Agreement on Friendship and
11 Cooperation did not have that nature; it did not require verification by
12 the parliament or publication in the Official Gazette?
13 A. That was my position at the time and now. I still believe that
14 the president had the power to sign such a document himself without
15 necessarily having it ratified by the parliament.
16 Q. Fine.
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours wanted to analyse
18 part of this Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation. In particular, I'm
19 talking about item 2, the armed components of the HVO as part of the
20 unified armed forces of the BH. I think His Honour Judge Antonetti asked
21 a question about that very subject.
22 Q. I would like us to dwell a little longer on that. If you look at
23 my set of documents, you will find 4D 409. Mr. Zuzul, that's my set of
24 documents. You've been handed the set. 4D 409, this is the decree law.
25 I will be speaking as you're reading.
1 "Decree law on the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia
3 Article 2 reads: "The Republic's armed forces shall comprise the
4 army of the republic."
5 I'll be continuing my question, and then we'll sum up at the end.
6 If we look at the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation dated the 14th
7 of September -- rather, the 21st of July, 1992, Article 6 reads: "The
8 armed component of the Croatian Defence Council is a component of the
9 unified armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
10 Croatian Defence Council shall have its representatives in the joint
11 command of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
12 Mr. Zuzul, can we agree that this Agreement on Friendship and
13 Cooperation would require an amendment to the decree law on the armed
14 forces, saying that only the republic's army was the armed force of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can we agree that it would be necessary to enter an
16 amendment to this decree law and bring it back in line with the Agreement
17 on Friendship and Cooperation?
18 A. I think so.
19 Q. Fair enough. Can we now look at 4D 410. Let us look at how the
20 authorities in Sarajevo
21 changes and amendments to the decree with the force of law on the armed
22 forces, and then Article 2 is here amended, and it now reads: "The armed
23 forces of the republic shall comprise the army of the republic. The
24 constituent part of the army shall comprise the Croatian Defence Council
25 as well as other armed compositions placing themselves under the single
1 command of the army."
2 My question, Mr. Zuzul: Do you believe that there is a
3 considerable difference between what was agreed in the Agreement of
4 Friendship and Cooperation and the amendments adopted by the Sarajevo
5 authorities? Instead of making the HVO a part of the unified armed
6 forces in terms of equality, the Sarajevo
7 a part of the BH army. The other difference would be instead of having a
8 joint command set up of the armed forces, the Sarajevo authorities hereby
9 amend the regulations by saying that they are all under the single
10 command of the army.
11 Can we agree that there is a significant difference, in fact,
12 between the agreement on the one hand and the Sarajevo amendments on the
14 A. Yes, I think there is a distinction, also in terms of the spirit
15 of the agreement and the phrasing itself.
16 Q. Do you know anything indicating that Herceg-Bosna's authorities
17 considered this amendment by the Sarajevo
18 betrayal of the principles espoused in the Agreement on Friendship and
20 A. I can't remember anything about that specifically.
21 Q. The Prlic Defence asked you about the Banovina of Croatia and
22 about it being mentioned in the preamble to the Croatian constitution --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm not at the same level as
24 the Defence. We have in front of us a decree. Please look at Article 1,
25 4D 410. The way I read Article 1 of this decree, it appears that
1 Mr. Izetbegovic does recognise that the HVO is part of the Army of the
2 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you have the same reading as I
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I've
5 never set eyes on the document before. I do, however, remember well the
6 atmosphere and the debate about this particular segment. It was easy for
7 both presidents and everybody else to agree about the fact that the BH
8 army and the Croatian Defence Council would mount a joint defence. The
9 essential issue was how this integration would take place. This is what
10 I believe. The way it's regulated by this decree law, this is what the
11 Muslim representatives were pushing at the very beginning of the
12 negotiations. The HVO would become a part of it, but it would actually
13 become part, be subsumed, by the BH army and not be integrated as one of
14 its components. I remember that this was a much-debated issue at the
15 time, and a compromise was reached to the effect that there would be a
16 single army but not by simply having the HVO subsumed under the BH army.
17 I apologise. I'm not really a lawyer myself, but I do remember the
18 negotiations. This was a very prominent feature, and I think the way it
19 is formulated here is headed in an entirely different direction from what
20 had been agreed and eventually signed in the Agreement on Friendship and
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but what about deciding
23 whether they would be integrated in a parallel structure or in another
24 way? That's the -- what would happen within this structure. But you
25 went to Geneva
1 Peace Plan. Could a negotiator from another country have said that
2 Izetbegovic had recognised the existence of the Croatian Defence Council
3 because he has integrated the Croatian Defence Council in its army.
4 Would a Frenchman, a Dutchman, or whoever reach that conclusion after
5 reading that text?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think you're entirely right.
7 Were someone to show me a decree law like this, my first reaction would
8 be that from a Croatian point of view there is a positive here.
9 Mr. Izetbegovic appears to be recognising the HVO and its units; however,
10 there is something else, and this is about the way in which he imagines
11 the integration should go forward. Mr. President, we have been talking a
12 great deal about this, and this was one of the most salient problems
13 during the negotiations. Bosnia and Herzegovina, whatever formed, it
14 would eventually assume, as a state, whether a unitary state or a state,
15 that would meet the demands and needs of all its peoples. I think this
16 is about nuance. It's about the nuance of the wording, and this is where
17 the nuance of the wording is headed. Therefore, I think the
18 interpretation by Ms. Alaburic is also correct. It's about unitary
19 control, establishing unitary control, and not any sort of control where
20 there would be equality. So I have to point out that this would be my
21 interpretation too.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Microphone not activated]
24 [Interpretation] I thank the Chamber.
25 Q. We're back to the Banovina of Croatia, and your answers to the
1 Prlic Defence. You explained that the fact that the Banovina of Croatia
2 was mentioned in the preamble was just what it said. It was about
3 independence, it was about statehood, and another of its expressions was
4 about the Banovina of Croatia
5 that. What about the 1990 constitution? There were opposition members
6 in the Croatian parliament when the constitution was passed, right?
7 A. Yes, as far as I know.
8 Q. Do you know whether anyone ever in Croatia, as far as this is
9 concerned, the mentioning of the Banovina of Croatia as one of the
10 sources of Croatia
11 purported territorial claims of the Croatian government at the time?
12 A. This is not something that was ever suggested to me by anyone.
13 Q. Very -- fine then. Can we please go back to one of the Prlic
14 Defence documents. Probably there, there was no time to show it. This
15 is 1D 2039 -- it's also in my binder if you're looking for it, sir. I'm
16 not certain, that might be simpler for you, actually. 1D 2039. You
17 have -- you have the amendments to the constitution, 2001, here.
18 Mr. Zuzul, who was in power in Croatia
19 A. A coalition comprising several political parties, not including
20 the HDZ, the party that used to be in power.
21 Q. Can we therefore say that the elections took place in 2000 and
22 the election was won by the socialists and liberal democrats who had
23 formed the coalition?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you know that these amendments were then proposed by the
1 then-government, the social democrats and the liberals?
2 A. Yes. That's right.
3 Q. At that point in time, nobody in Croatia, not even the social
4 democrats or the liberals who were in power, had any ideas about amending
5 anything to do with this portion that refers to the Banovina of Croatia?
6 A. I think you're entirely right.
7 Q. Can you tell us whether --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, I don't want to
9 interfere in your cross-examination, but I'm comparing the English and
10 the B/C/S of this document. In the English version, the second part of
11 the document seems to be missing with Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4.
12 Apparently, this is missing from the English version of the text.
13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] May I have the Prlic Defence's
14 leave to comment on their text. This document was prepared just for the
15 preamble, the source. It was no one's intention to use the entire text,
16 and that's why only the preamble was translated and not any of its
17 individual provisions, the provisions of the constitution, I mean. I
18 believe this document would satisfy the needs of my cross-examination in
19 their entirety.
20 Q. Mr. Zuzul, another question about the Banovina of Croatia and
21 about the constitution. Mr. Stipe Mesic, the President of the Republic
22 of Croatia
23 Do you think that he has the right to initiate any amendments to the
25 A. I think so.
1 Q. But do you know that Stipe Mesic would have initiated any
2 amendments to the Croatian constitution in order to have the part about
3 the Banovina of Croatia thrown out?
4 A. I never heard about anything like that --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: These proceedings are
6 being interpreted. Could the speakers please be asked clearly to make
7 pauses between questions and answers. Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Did you hear that, Ms. Alaburic? The
9 interpreters are complaining. You have to make pauses before you take
10 the floor when answering, and this also applies to you, Mr. Zuzul. When
11 you have heard the question, naturally you immediately want to answer,
12 but you should wait until the interpreters have gone through the
13 translation. Otherwise, they completely lose, and we lose in the end,
14 and everyone. Thank you. I'm sorry.
15 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honours, and while we're on an
16 interruption, I would just again object similarly to this question. I
17 don't think the witness can speculate as to what Mr. Mesic could or might
18 have done. If he had a conversation with Mr. Mesic and Mr. Mesic said
19 something to him specifically that the witness can recall, but he cannot
20 speculate about what Mr. Mesic could or would have done or might have
21 done in some situation. And a standing objection to the leading
22 questions. Friendly -- leading questions to a friendly witness.
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise to Your Honours and
24 to the interpreters for speeding up. It is -- this is what happens when
25 you speak the same language. I did not hear the interpreter's remark
1 because it was not made on channel 6, which is the channel that I'm
2 listening to.
3 I think that as far as Mr. Scott's objection is concerned, it is
4 unfounded because I was not asking Mr. Zuzul about the intentions,
5 desires, and so on of President Mesic, but I merely asked him whether he
6 was aware that President Mesic initiated those amendments to the
7 constitution. So I asked him about a fact.
8 Q. One explanation about the agreement between Alija Izetbegovic and
9 the Serbs on the 16th of September, 1992, that you were talking about,
10 that was document 3D 451 that you talked about with the Prlic Defence.
11 Could you please look at 4D 1040 in my set of documents. This is an
12 excerpt from a book by Miroslav Tudjman that contains this declaration.
13 And at the end it is noted that this declaration was not signed by
14 Radovan Karadzic but by Momcilo Krajisnik, and that it was signed by
15 Thorvald Stoltenberg and by David Owen as witnesses, and that the
16 original document does not have the signatures of Momir Bulatovic and
17 Slobodan Milosevic.
18 To avoid any misunderstandings about the signatories of this
19 declaration, can you tell us, if you know, is this correct what Miroslav
20 Tudjman says in his book about this document?
21 A. Well, it seems to me that it was signed by Haris Silajdzic and
22 Momcilo Krajisnik as the plenipotentiaries of the President Izetbegovic
23 and Radovan Karadzic respectively, but that's as best I can recall.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, we are going to
25 stop here because I have a number of recommendations to give the witness
1 with respect to the following hearing.
2 You'll proceed with your cross-examination the following -- at
3 the following hearing.
4 You understand the situation, Witness. It was impossible to
5 complete your testimony this week. You were witness to all the
6 procedural problems we had to deal with, and the Prosecution has not even
7 started its cross-examination.
8 Furthermore, the Judges have a number of questions to put to you.
9 You made the solemn declaration. You are under oath. You are a witness,
10 a witness in the service of justice, and as a result of this, you should
11 have absolutely no contact whatsoever from now on with Mr. Karnavas and
12 with the other counsel who may examine you later or re-examine you as
13 part of the re-examination. And of course, you are not supposed to have
14 any exact with the Prosecution, who will also put questions to you later
15 on. And of course you're not supposed to have any contacts with the
17 If you're faced with administrative problem, then you should get
18 in touch with the Victims and Witnesses Unit. They are supposed to deal
19 with the -- your travel arrangements and make sure that you come back
20 here on the 18th of July. As I told you yesterday, we won't be able to
21 complete your testimony on Friday. The Prosecution will have five hours,
22 but considering possible procedural incidents, that will probably take
23 longer. Therefore, your testimony will resume on Monday in the
24 afternoon, and then we'll be able to complete your testimony. That's
25 what I wanted to say.
1 If you have a question, please put it to me now. Otherwise, I'll
3 Yes, Mr. Scott.
4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, without trying the Chamber's patience
5 too much, could I just ask that also the witness be -- it be clarified
6 that not only should the witness not have any contact with either the
7 Defence or the Prosecution, or as you said yourself, the Judges, but in
8 fact with nobody, with no one, no other person whatsoever, any members of
9 the Croatian government, any members of a political party, no contact
10 with anyone about his testimony. About his testimony.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, excuse me, excuse me. I think this is
12 being a little bit unreasonable. Now, he can have contact, but he can't
13 talk about the case. I think --
14 MR. SCOTT: About his testimony.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. I think that everybody should just calm
16 down a little bit and just relax, but I think within reason he
17 shouldn't -- obviously not speak about the case and about what was
18 discussed here or what has to do with his testimony. But other than
19 that, I think, you know, we would have to be rather measured.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It goes without saying, and the
21 witness who has held high-level positions is perfectly aware of that sort
22 of thing. Please avoid dealing with your -- or mentioning your testimony
23 with anyone. Do not say that you were asked such and such question and
24 you answered this or that. But it's so obvious to me that I thought I
25 didn't need to mention it. Thank you very much. We'll see you on the
1 18th of July. Thank you.
Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.23 p.m.
3 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 13th day of
4 May, 2008, at 9:00 a.m.