1 Tuesday, 4 November 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the
7 case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honour. Good afternoon, Your
9 Honours; good afternoon to everyone in and around the courtroom. This is
10 case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Jadranko Prlic et al.,
11 thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, registrar. Today is
13 Wednesday. I would like to greet -- today is Tuesday. I would like to
14 greet all the people present in the courtroom, Defence counsel, the
15 accused, Mr. Scott, and Mr. Kruger, as well as Mr. Tomic, of course, who
16 has been with us for a number of days now already. And I would also like
17 to greet all those people who are assisting us.
18 I would first of all like to ask the registrar to move into
19 closed session for a few minutes, please.
20 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber, after
22 Mr. Scott's cross-examination, discovered that --
23 THE REGISTRAR: There has been -- [Microphone not
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
1 [Private session]
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Oral decision relating to the
16 appearance of the expert witness of the Prlic Defence team Svetlana
18 On the 7th October 2008, the Prosecution filed a written
19 submission requesting the Trial Chamber, inter alia, for it to cancel the
20 testimony of expert witness Svetlana Radovanovic on the grounds that the
21 Defence -- the Prlic Defence team had not as yet disclosed the expert
22 report and the related exhibits.
23 On the 20th of October, 2008, the Prlic Defence filed the expert
24 report of Svetlana Radovanovic pursuant to Rule 94 bis of the Rules.
25 On 22nd of October, 2008, the Prosecution forwarded a letter to
1 the Trial Chamber in which it informed it that it had read the report of
2 Ms. Radovanovic but that the Prosecution was withdrawing its motion filed
3 on the 7th of October, 2008. In addition, the Prosecution informed the
4 Trial Chamber that it would be able to cross-examine Svetlana Radovanovic
5 possibly in the week of the 24th of November, 2004, as has been planned
6 in the most recent witness list or schedule provided by the Prlic Defence
7 team on the 22nd of September, 2008.
8 The Trial Chamber therefore acknowledges that the Prosecution has
9 withdrawn its motion filed on the 7th of October, 2008, and rules that
10 Svetlana Radovanovic will appear and come and testify as of the 20th of
11 November, 2008, onwards.
12 Mr. Scott, you have the floor for the rest of your
14 MR. SCOTT: Good afternoon, Mr. President, to all Your Honours.
15 Sorry, I was just distracted looking at the transcript and I think there
16 might be an issue so my apologies for being distracted.
17 Good afternoon, Mr. President, all counsel, everyone in the
18 courtroom who is helping us, each of Your Honours.
19 Your Honour, just now in terms of scheduling, you'd indicated at
20 one point that that there would be the possibility of the witness
21 testifying the week of the 24th of November, and then at least it came
22 out in translation that she would then be testifying on the 20th of
23 November. So I'm not sure about the difference between the 24th and the
24 20th. Or at least that's how it came out on the record. Are you we
25 talking about the 20th of November or the 24th of November? 20th, I
1 believe, is in fact a Thursday, I believe.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, was it the 20th
3 or the 24th? If the 20th is a Monday, he's coming on Monday the 20th; is
4 that right? Or if the Monday is the 24th, then he would be coming on the
5 24th. I don't know. I don't have a calendar in front of me. You're the
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I'm not an expert on these matters, but it
8 is the 24th, which would be a Monday, and it's a woman, it's a she. We
9 keep calling her a he, but ...
10 MR. SCOTT: All right.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So the 24th is a Monday.
12 MR. SCOTT: Thank you very much, Your Honour. Appreciate the
14 WITNESS: NEVEN TOMIC [Resumed]
15 [Witness answered through interpreter]
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]
17 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Tomic. Just one -- I think maybe one
18 question arising from our conversations yesterday before moving back to
19 where we left off.
20 When we were looking at the map of Mostar, as you will remember,
21 and we were marking a number of locations, I think if I heard you
22 correctly you said that at least for part of that time period when you
23 were living at location 1 and 2 that -- with Mr. Prlic that there were
24 two other persons who also lived at that same location, if you were
25 sharing a flat or what have you, but just so we have that, could you tell
1 us who the other persons were who shared the residence with you and
2 Mr. Prlic?
3 A. While staying in my flat at location number 1, my friends were
4 there, my friend's vehicle, Slavko Bevanda and Vidan Raspudic. And while
5 staying at location number 2, the owner of the house, Mr. Dinko Slezak
6 was there.
7 Q. All right. So at location number 1 there were four of you living
8 in the house or flat, whichever it was, and then location number --
9 location number 2 there were the three of you, just to be very clear.
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. All right. Thank you very much. Sir, if we could then go back
12 to the topic where we left off yesterday, and we were talking about some
13 of the financial matters, and we were talking about the Bosnian dinar and
14 the Croatian dinar, and we came to the point where I was going to ask you
15 a couple of questions about the national bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 Now, if I'm wrong please correct me, but my understanding is that
17 the national bank, albeit in perhaps difficult circumstances, did
18 continue to exist and operate throughout the war. Is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And I think you were shown two documents, and if -- if we can
21 avoid looking at them it would maybe save everyone a bit of time and
22 effort. You were shown two documents, 1D 01765 and 1D 01764, which were
23 documents submitted to the national bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the
24 purposes of obtaining permission, or I suppose one might call it a
25 charter to open a bank, a Croatian bank in Mostar. Do you recall that?
1 A. Yes, I'm familiar with that document.
2 Q. And in fact, I think you testified that it was necessary in order
3 for that bank to legally -- the Croatian bank in Mostar to legally exist
4 or operate it had to have a legal document from the national bank of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there was also documentation that was required in
6 order for that bank to be I think you used the phrase acknowledged
7 internationally. Is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And in fact, those permissions or that documentation was
10 forthcoming; was it not? And based on that documentation a bank in
11 Mostar was established; is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And just so we have it at this point in the record, as I said I'm
14 always talking about dates, this series of documentation was being
15 exchanged, if you will. Can you confirm that that was in November 1992?
16 A. Yes. The decision was signed in November 1992.
17 Q. Now, moving on the same topic but moving to June of 1993, I
18 believe you were also shown a document which was marked 1D 01928 which
19 was the application by the national bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina for a loan
20 from the Prvedna Bank Zagreb
22 A. I wasn't aware of the existence of that document but I can see
24 Q. Do you have it there in front of you now or at least on the
25 screen? Is that what you're referring to?
1 A. Yes, I can see it.
2 Q. So just going back, sir, to where we were -- to what we confirmed
3 a few moments ago, again you will agree -- you do agree, don't you, that
4 the bank continued to exist and operate throughout the war?
5 A. Yes. The bank was in Sarajevo
6 national bank was outside of Sarajevo
7 Q. Well, I think if we go back and look at the documentation, sir,
8 the correspondence from that official comes -- comes out of Sarajevo.
9 You're saying that's not correct?
10 A. The document says Sarajevo
12 money is being sent from Celje, the document that accompanied the first
13 time that Bosnia and Herzegovina dinar was issued, in that document it
14 said the national bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina Zagreb. So that was in
15 November. As far as I know, Mr. Stijepo Andrijic, the then governor, did
16 not later return to Sarajevo
17 Q. Well -- all right. Well, let's take a step at a time then just
18 to be clear. So you're confirming that there was a national bank of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina which had a location in Sarajevo throughout the war,
20 and you're saying that -- you're suggesting that there was also an
21 operation of that bank in Zagreb
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. All right. And in terms of -- and in terms of the locations and
24 the documentation would you agree with me it would be best to look at
25 whatever the documents themselves indicate? Or do you have a specific
1 memory of those particular transactions?
2 A. I can remember what happened in November, but the document before
3 me is one I have only just seen. I can't comment on it. It says
5 don't know.
6 Q. Now, going to -- back to the Bosnian dinar, I think that your
7 testimony made it clear that the dinar continued to be used in various
8 parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout -- throughout the war, and there
9 were also -- there were also times that it was used in the area claimed
10 to be part of Herceg-Bosna, and there were indeed times when the
11 Herceg-Bosna government or authorities sent or provided BH dinars to HVO
12 operations in Central Bosnia. Do I understand that correct -- all of
13 that correctly?
14 A. Well, the HVO HZ HB sent aid to Central Bosnia in the form of
15 Bosnian and Herzegovinian dinars. That's what I was talking about.
16 Q. So the question to my answer -- the answer to my questions,
17 excuse me, are yes, the dinar continued to be used in various parts of
19 Herceg-Bosna from time to time and the HVO authorities in fact sent BH
20 dinars into Central Bosnia. That's my question. All of that's true;
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So there again, just so there's no confusion, the BH dinar at no
24 point, at least during this time period, 1992, 1993, 1994, the BH dinar
25 did not cease to exist and there was nothing about it that was -- I'm
1 going to use the phrase there was nothing about it that was inherently
2 dysfunctional. It may have been more widely used in some places than
3 others, but it continued to exist and continued to be -- to be used in
4 transactions in various parts of Bosnia throughout the war; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And, for example, we were just talking about and it may be worth
7 looking at one document as one of the examples that you were just talking
8 about, sending dinars to Central Bosnia. Could you look, please, at
9 1D 02127, which will be in the Defence binder. 1D 02127.
10 Now, that was a document, I believe, which showed that a number
11 of dinars were being sent in to -- sent to Central Bosnia. Just a
12 moment, please. Am I believe again -- I don't think there's anything
13 controversial about that. You mentioned that the other day, and you
14 again confirm that that in fact took place; correct?
15 A. That's correct. This money was physically transported there as
16 assistant -- as assistance to the municipal HVOs in Central Bosnia.
17 There was no other way of doing it, no other financial transactions were
19 Q. All right. So just again on this point about the dinar before
20 moving to another topic. You weren't, you being the HVO HZ HB, I mean,
21 you weren't sending your colleagues and friends in Central Bosnia, the
22 municipal HVOs in Central Bosnia, you weren't sending them worthless
23 money, were you? You were sending them something that had value and that
24 they could use in conducting their affairs in that area; correct?
25 A. In that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina it was possible to use
1 that money.
2 Q. Now, let's turn next to the -- to the German mark a bit more. If
3 we can just agree on a few propositions I'll put to you, sir, and if --
4 I'll be grateful if you can answer these yes or no, if you can. I think
5 they're all things you basically said, I think, in the course of your
6 testimony before.
7 The Deutschmark was widely used in Bosnia-Herzegovina as early as
8 1991, 1992; correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And I think according to a report prepared by Mr. Cvikl, the man
11 that I asked you about yesterday, in his report he cites you to support
12 the fact that in fact at that time the most widely used currency in
13 Herceg-Bosna was the Deutschmark. Did he cite you correctly?
14 A. Well, it depended on the period. There were periods during which
15 the German mark was used the most. That was at the very beginning. And
16 then the Croatian dinar was more present, and then when there was an
17 absence of such money the German mark was used the most. That's why it
18 was also used for official payment transactions.
19 Q. All right. Well, I'm going to need you to help us as much as you
20 can, please, with times and dates again as much -- as much as we can,
21 because you just broke the use of the mark into about three different
22 categories or times.
23 You said in the very beginning the German mark was used the most.
24 So when you say the very beginning, sir, can you give us approximately
25 the time you're talking about, at least by year, for example?
1 A. Well, I'm talking about the time when this financial system in
3 set up, that was the end of 1991, the beginning of 1992.
4 Q. I'm not --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The Bosnian currency
6 had not yet been introduced.
7 MR. SCOTT:
8 Q. I'm not sure where that leaves us sir, to be honest. I find it,
9 at least as interpreted, a bit confused.
10 You said in the very beginning the German mark was used the most.
11 So are we talking about the period 1991, 1992? Please give us -- help us
12 as much as you can.
13 A. During that period of time the German mark was the currency that
14 citizens placed their faith in, and they tried to exchange the Yugoslav
15 dinars that they had into German marks. That was why there was a black
17 Q. Sir, let's try to keep it as simple as possible. All -- right
18 now I'm just trying to get times and dates from you, not what they wanted
19 to exchange on the black market, what this -- just dates. That's all I'm
20 asking about.
21 The Deutschmark, you said in the very beginning, and I just asked
22 you, so are we talking -- excuse me.
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Perhaps I should just explain what's happening.
24 We are getting the files that we left in Courtroom III last night, which
25 normally are brought with us to other courtrooms. This time it wasn't
1 done, and that's what is happening here. Nothing mysterious about it.
2 MR. SCOTT: I think it's best, Your Honour, if I just pause until
3 it's done.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, please proceed.
5 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Mr. Tomic, again please, what I'd like you to assist us with now
7 is just strictly dates. So when you said just a few minutes ago that
8 this was in the very beginning, and I -- just if I can try to move us
9 forward, that's what I'm trying to do, but also trying to give you an
10 opportunity to be as clear as possible. I said were you talking about
11 1991/1992? So the answer to that question is either yes or it was some
12 other time period, and if it was some other time period, please tell us
13 exactly when it was.
14 A. I said that towards the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 the
15 German mark was something that people trusted, and that's why most of the
16 payments were carried out against German marks, but companies at the time
17 still operated with Yugoslav dinars.
18 Q. Sir, I'm going to tell you now because as you've learned, our
19 time is limited, and I have to be unfortunately sometimes perhaps not as
20 courteous as I would like to be, and when you answer the question I need
21 to move on to another question. So my question now was not what
22 companies did. We're talking about dates.
23 Then you said there was a time when the Croatian dinar was used,
24 and then the third period of time you said was that there wasn't enough
25 currency or there were other issues involved and the Deutschmark once
1 again became the dominant currency.
2 So my question to you now is similar. Give us the dates for
3 that. What was the time -- the dates for this third period when the
4 Deutschmark once again became the dominant currency? And that's
5 specifically my question, the dates.
6 A. That was the beginning of 1993. HZ HB regulations provided for
7 the monies from non-resident accounts to be transferred onto the HZ HB
8 accounts because the German mark became more present in all the
9 transactions, and there was no need to convert German marks into Croatian
10 dinars in the accounts in Croatia
11 monies into your foreign currency accounts in the HZ HB, i.e., you could
12 deposit German marks.
13 Q. And you testified last Tuesday also that in terms of value the
14 Deutschmark was the most important currency in circulation in
15 Herceg-Bosna; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. The Deutschmark was certainly, would you agree with me, a more
18 valuable -- both a more valuable and a more stable currency than the
19 Croatian dinar?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And fairly soon after the Croatian dinar began to be more widely
22 used in, I believe we just established roughly sometime in early 1992,
23 mid-1992, it very quickly became subject to rapid inflation or
24 devaluation; correct?
25 A. Yes, correct.
1 Q. And we might just -- we might just glance very quickly at
2 Exhibit P 09255. P 0 -- yes. That will be in the second -- second
3 binder. P 09255.
4 And, sir, this is -- the cover sheet, if you will, the cover page
5 is a compilation of information that has been taken from the business
6 publications or newspapers that are attached in terms of exchange rates,
7 et cetera. You'll see those behind, if anyone wants to look at those.
8 But would you agree with me, and I certainly don't think you have this
9 committed to memory, but would it seem to you about right that for
10 example in January 1992 one Croatian dinar equalled 55 -- no, excuse me.
11 My apologies. It was 55 Croatian dinars to the mark, and by the 27th of
12 May, 1994, it was 3.716 Croatian dinar to the mark? Is that correct?
13 Something like that.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. I believe you said last Tuesday, and I think you maybe said it
16 again just a few minutes ago, that the Deutschmark was used for payments
17 between the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herceg-Bosna during
18 that time, during this period 1992, 1993, 1994; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And I think you also testified last Tuesday that during the
21 conflict the international organisations, UNPROFOR, the humanitarian
22 organisations, most of the international organisations and
23 representatives who were on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina used the
24 Deutschmark; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And in fact, sir, isn't it correct that ultimately it was
2 essentially the Deutschmark at the end of the war that was -- or after
3 the war that was in fact accepted as the new currency of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and ultimately became known as the convertible mark,
5 or KM? Is that correct?
6 A. Yes. All the currencies that were present in Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 were converted into the German mark first, and then the so-called
8 convertible mark was introduced, and its rate of exchange was 1 to 1
9 against the German mark, the Deutschmark.
10 Q. So, sir, wouldn't it be fair to say throughout this period, from
11 1991 to its ultimate adoption, I believe it was in 1997 that the
12 convertible mark was introduced, throughout that time period from a
13 monetary perspective the Deutschmark always made more sense as a
14 currency? It was more valuable. It represented the most value in
15 transactions in the country. It was use by the internationals. It was
16 more stable, subject to less inflation. It was by all measures superior
17 to the Croatian dinar or the Bosnian dinar; correct?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. And I come back, sir, to the question I put to you yesterday.
20 Based on all that, would you agree with me that the selection or use of
21 the Croatian dinar by Herceg-Bosna was not a function, a monetary
22 analysis or monetary reasons, but it was essentially a political choice,
23 wasn't it?
24 A. No, it was not a political choice. It was just a reflection of
25 the reality, because the Croatian dinar had been present through the flow
1 of goods and people from Croatia
2 Konjic, to Central Bosnia. It had its value, which obviously in this
3 period here experienced devaluation, but it is seen from this that during
4 the period when the German mark was re-established as the most -- the
5 more important currency and when the Croatian dinar devaluated then it
6 was the German marks that was the legal tender or, rather, the most
7 present tender in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 The next problem was the issue of notes and currencies. The
9 smallest coin of one pfennig or five pfennigs did not exist, and that's
10 where the Croatian dinar had a role to play as a transitional tender that
11 was used in the territory of the HZ HB. And as I say, it was used only
12 in one part of the HZ HB.
13 Q. And the Republic of Croatia
14 kuna in May of 1994; is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And once again at that time Herceg-Bosna accepted the kuna as a
17 currency to be used in Herceg-Bosna; correct?
18 A. Kuna replaced the Croatian dinar in monetary transactions. It
19 looked differently and the name was different.
20 Q. But once again, sir, you would agree with me, based on what
21 you've just said, it was -- it was the Croatian currency, whatever it
22 was, whether it was called the Croatian dinar, whether it was called the
23 kuna, whatever the Croatian currency was, that's the currency that
24 Herceg-Bosna wanted to use; correct?
25 A. The Croatian currency was used in the territories of the HZ HB.
1 Q. All right. I would like you next, please, look at -- it will be
2 in the Defence binder, 1D 02148. And as you're looking at that, let me
3 just ask you some introductory questions, if you will.
4 During 1993, or the latter part of 1992 and continuing into 1993
5 since we see this document is dated the 2nd of February, 1993, how was
6 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO meeting its needs for oil and petrol both for
7 military and civilian purposes?
8 A. Oil and petrol were obtained from the Energopetrol company based
9 in Sarajevo
10 centre in Mostar, and that business centre moved its office first to
11 Split, then to Ploce. In Ploce there was also a warehouse from which the
12 area of the HZ HB was supplied.
13 Before the war Ina had a large number of gas stations in the
14 territory of the HZ HB, and Ina continued to supply these gas stations.
15 Q. All right.
16 A. And I already said that there were some private gas stations
17 which continued their business operations.
18 Q. And I take it, sir, that apart from whatever deliveries were made
19 on the -- on the coast, be it at Split
20 oil tankers, oil and petrol would be distributed throughout
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time primarily then by tanker trucks, lorries;
22 is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, if you look at this document which is -- comes from
25 Mr. Prlic as president of the HVO HZ HB, this appears to be concerning an
1 oil purchase, and I take it from the letter, and if you're looked at the
2 letter, is it fair to say that this appears to be a transaction involving
3 both the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Herceg-Bosna
4 authorities? Is that right, that somehow this oil is being split, or am
5 I misunderstanding the document?
6 A. I've already said I was present at a meeting in Zagreb in the
7 office of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina together with the head
8 of the department -- the department for economy, who expressed the need
9 for one part of the oil and --
10 Q. [Previous translation continues]... I apologise. So the answer
11 to my question is yes. Now -- and so was the oil divided between Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And then what I take this letter to be the further details to be
15 of the 50 per cent of the oil -- of the available -- it says of the
16 available quantity. Fifty per cent of that was being distributed to the
17 department of defence of the HVO HZ HB, and then on down through the rest
18 of the numbers. So this is how the Herceg-Bosna's share, if you will,
19 was then being apportioned out as reflected in the letter. Is that
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And was this a unique transaction, or did you see or were you
23 aware of similar transactions in 1992, early 1993?
24 A. I believe that the implementation of the Zagreb agreement is
25 reflected in this document, and I don't remember any other such
2 Q. This was a one-time deal. Is that -- is that what you're telling
4 A. As far as I can remember, it was a one-off, just a one-time deal.
5 Q. Very well. Now, sir, we saw a few moments ago, and you can --
6 and you talked about it again last week, that we saw that the national
7 bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina was involved in approving the establishment of
8 the Croatian bank in Mostar. We talked about that again already this
9 afternoon. You also testified last week that the HVO was able to obtain
10 the needed SDK software from the director of the SDK office in Sarajevo
11 and now we've seen an example of a transaction being conducted with the
12 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I put it to you, sir, that it
13 appears that whenever it suited the HVO they could have and did have
14 contact and dealings with the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
16 necessary approval to open a bank. They could make arrangements to
17 purchase oil. They could do all those things, but on the other hand,
18 when it suits you or when it suits others, were told that the BH army was
19 "cut off."
20 Now, was -- isn't that correct, sir? Isn't this a moving target?
21 It's on one hand whenever it's convenient Sarajevo was cut off, the BiH
22 government is cut off, but on the other hand whenever you need it for
23 something, it's always there?
24 A. One cannot really put it that way. These were just individual
25 activities which did not represent the functioning of the system, i.e.,
1 the government. What this boils down to are decisions that were
2 implemented individually by people who left Sarajevo or dealt with the
3 issues of that sort in Zagreb
4 communication in the sense that institutions of the system could function
5 like that. The governor of the Central Bank would use a customary
6 procedure according to which he should have received a request from the
7 regional office of the Central Bank that existed in Mostar before the
8 war. However, there was no longer a regional office which would -- which
9 could file a request, nor could that document be sent to Sarajevo. It
10 should have complied with all the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina and deliver
11 to -- delivered to the Central Bank governor who would then issue his
13 What we're talking about here are individual arrangements and
14 deals and not about the functioning of the government and the organs of
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that's the context I would like to put this
17 Q. Individual transactions and deals add up to lots of individual
18 transactions and deals, sir. And let me about on to communications. Let
19 me put a similar question to you.
20 You've said that the communications with Central Bosnia were cut
21 off, but I have to tell you, sir, and I think it's fair for me to do so,
22 that this Chamber in the last two and a half years has seen or heard
23 about hundreds of communications between Mostar and Central Bosnia
24 1992 and 1993. Now, how does that fit in with your assertion that
25 communications with Central Bosnia were cut off?
1 A. I was talking about the financial sector which was my purview.
2 We used telecommunications as the customary way of functioning in payment
3 transactions and in the bankers' system. However, that did not function.
4 Those communications were interrupted. There were only the type of
5 communication of physical nature.
6 A person could come from Central Bosnia and go somewhere, and
7 that's what we did. Central Bosnia functioned in payment transactions,
8 as did Posavina. That was isolated as an island. And then we would do
9 our accountancy between these two islands, and the physical difference in
10 the money was transferred from one part to another which largely depended
11 on the balance that had to be covered.
12 When I say communication, I mean the electronic communications
13 which are indispensable for the implementation and the functioning of
14 payment transactions and bankers' system.
15 Q. I appreciate that, sir. I'm talking to you now and I'm asking
16 you about the questions that I'm putting to you are not limited to
17 banking -- electronic banking transactions. And I'm putting to you, sir,
18 that isn't it correct that your position on Central Bosnia being cut off
19 in terms of communications really a bit like your position on the
20 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina being cut off? It's cut off when it
21 suits you and it's not cut off when this doesn't suit you. Isn't that
23 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm going to object to the form of the question.
24 How does one answer this question, Your Honours? In which sense? How
25 can the gentleman be allowed -- be asked to answer this question. Look
1 at the question as it's framed. It's unfair to the witness, and it
2 really gets us nowhere.
3 MR. SCOTT: Well, let me rephrase -- let me come at it
4 differently then.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Go for it.
6 MR. SCOTT: Let me come at a differently. And I don't need any
7 comments from counsel. I'll try to do the best job I can.
8 Q. Let's come at it from the other way. If Central Bosnia was cut
9 off, sir, then I suppose that none of the territories that supposedly
10 belonged to Herceg-Bosna in Central Bosnia, Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak,
11 Vares, those were likewise really -- really they weren't part of
12 Herceg-Bosna, because they were cut off. Correct?
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Again I'm going to object to the form of the
14 question. He was talking about cutting off in the sense from his
15 perspective dealing with finances. He also talked about how money would
16 be transferred physically from one place to the other. So this term "cut
17 off," the way it's being use by the Prosecution is -- is not properly
18 being used in the same way as the gentleman.
19 Also, look at the type of question that he's framing. How does
20 one answer this question? Again, it's vague, it's unclear, it's ill
21 phrased, and perhaps he may want to take another shot at it.
22 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, it seems that when
24 you say "cut off," the witness seems to say something else and
25 understands something else than cut off. So ask him whether according to
1 him Central Bosnia was totally isolated from the rest in terms of
2 telephone communication, transfer of -- financial transfer, goods
3 transferred, so forth, so whether being isolated or cut off meant that
4 there was no financial link between Central Bosnia and Mostar or Sarajevo
5 but that on the other hand, circulation was possible.
6 Try to get him to be more specific. I believe that maybe we have
7 an ambiguity between the -- what you understand and what the witness
9 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I'll try. I would just
10 like to just very briefly respond to the objection just so that the
11 record is clear and perhaps to the extent may assist the Judges.
12 Your Honour, I submit to the Chamber that in the last two and a
13 half years the Chamber has heard that term used extensively, including by
14 the Defence. Sarajevo
15 think everyone in the courtroom knows what that means. It's not a term
16 that I just invented today.
17 Secondly, I was very clear in my question to the witness, and I
18 was trying to assist the witness to say that he may have been talking
19 about electronic banking transactions but that's not what I'm talking
20 about, and I'm asking the questions, with due respect. So I'm asking the
22 Q. Sir, I'm not talking about electronic banking transactions, I'm
23 talking about communications more broadly. And if I could pick up on a
24 word the President just suggested, is it your position that Central
1 just electronic banking transactions, but it was isolated? There wasn't
2 exchange of people, there wasn't exchange of goods, there wasn't exchange
3 of currency? What was it? Or not? Or in fact, sir, isn't it a fact
4 that it was not isolated, that it was not isolated in the way that some
5 would like the Judges to believe.
6 A. There were moments and periods during which it was impossible to
7 even physically go to Central Bosnia. There were such moments when you
8 could not even physically go there during the conflicts.
9 I know that in order to carry out any financial transactions, to
10 execute payment orders, even HVO helicopters had to be used.
11 Q. All right. Let's go now to -- unless the Court has -- Judges
12 have questions, I'll change topics.
13 Sir, I'd like to talk to you now a bit about the customs system
14 and the border operations that you have testified about, and again I'd
15 like to see if I understand you correctly, and we can have a base on
16 which to go forward. As I understand your testimony, sir, you agree that
17 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO authorities in 1992 and 1993, at least, perhaps
18 also thereafter but at least during that time, established a customs
19 system and conducted border operations primarily on the border with the
20 Republic of Croatia
22 Are we in agreement on that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And I also understood you to say last week that you recognise
25 that such things as operating a customs system and conducting border
1 operations, those are functions that we normally associate and that you,
2 sir, would normally associate with being conducted by a state; is that
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And I further understood your testimony to be that at least some,
6 if not all of the customs and border-related revenues that were collected
7 by Herceg-Bosna, some or all of that money should have been in fact sent
8 to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of its general budget
9 revenues and then to be reallocated and apportioned as part of the budget
10 process. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes. That's what I said. I mentioned that it was normal
12 procedure. That's how the customs administration of a state functions.
13 Under normal circumstances the money goes to the budget, and then from
14 the republic's budget needs financed in accordance with the various items
15 on the budget.
16 Q. And I understand that that didn't happen in the sense, and what I
17 mean by that is the revenues collected by Herceg-Bosna as a result of the
18 customs and border operations, those monies were not, during the period
19 1992, 1993, 1994, those monies were not in fact sent on to the government
20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?
21 A. Well, the money from customs, from duty imposed on goods arriving
22 in the area of Herceg-Bosna was sent to the budget of the HZ HB, paid
23 into that budget.
24 Q. So the answer to my question is no, the monies were not sent to
25 the BH government; correct?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. And as I understand your testimony, the reason that you gave for
3 that was -- I think we're back to this notion that there wasn't a means
4 to do so. Sarajevo
5 to make these payments which otherwise should have been made. Is that
6 your testimony?
7 A. Yes. That's one of the reasons.
8 Q. We saw a document at one point that said that Herceg-Bosna, the
9 HZ HB Presidency, was refusing to accept or, if I can say, take on board
10 any financial obligations or debt incurred by the government of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina unless some way that debt was directly linked to
12 providing some benefit to Herceg-Bosna; is that correct?
13 A. That was a decision according to which it would be accepted if
14 one-third was to be directed to the territory of the HZ HB.
15 Q. All right. And which actually leads me to my question. Where
16 did the one-third come from, and what was that based on?
17 A. I don't know. It was a decision of the Presidency of the HZ HB.
18 I don't know. I assume that it had to do with -- I don't know, in fact.
19 Q. All right. And can we agree, though, sir, if we apply that same
20 principle and if we're going to be objective and neutral about it and
21 we're going to apply that same principle, then two-thirds of all the
22 revenues and taxes and monies collected by Herceg-Bosna, the HVO, should
23 have been sent on to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?
24 A. No, that's not correct. We're dealing with taking out loans with
25 the debts of the state, and representatives of the HZ HB didn't
1 participate in this and they didn't know what the intention of these
2 funds was.
3 Q. Sir, I'm applying the principle a bit more broadly because you
4 said -- we established a few minutes ago and you said, you agreed with
5 me, as you testified last week, that when Herceg-Bosna was conducting
6 these customs operations and generating revenue, you agreed that that
7 money should have gone to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And then
8 we talked about this principle of one-third. And I'm just saying if you
9 apply that principle fairly, would you not have to say that any other
10 revenues and monies collected by Herceg-Bosna, be it taxes, be it levies,
11 be it fees, two-thirds of that money should go to the government of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?
13 Or it was a one-way street, is that what you're telling the
14 Judges? You could keep your money, Herceg-Bosna could keep its money,
15 but on top of that it expected to get money from the government of
17 A. We're dealing with two types of revenue, and you cannot make such
19 Q. Let's go to 1D 02744 in the Defence binder. Do you have 1D, sir,
20 02744? Again, this is a document that we've already discussed about, so
21 I'm not showing you something you haven't seen before. This concerned a
22 salt transaction, the purchase -- the purchase of salt in December 1992.
23 Excuse me a moment, please. And I just wanted to understand a bit better
24 about, again, some of the things you talked about last week in terms of
25 some of the financial aspects.
1 If we look at the second page under "Payment Method," or wherever
2 you find that in the duty, sir. The first method of payment apparently
3 was the transfer, what appears to be a -- what we've been calling an
4 electronic funds transfer to a bank account in Croatia at the Zagrebacka
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And can we -- based on what you were telling us last week, can we
8 understand from that that somehow apparently there was the means for this
9 purchaser, in paying for this transaction, to pay for the salt had the
10 means of making an electronic transfer involving a bank in Croatia
11 that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And then the second method of payment we see is in Bosnian dinars
14 to go to giro account, and then there's a number at the Tuzla SDK, and I
15 believe you touched on that last week but I just wanted to see if I
16 understand. So at some link in the chain of these transactions, and
17 we're going to talk about that for a moment, but somewhere in this link
18 of transactions, series of transactions, there was an electronic link or
19 what you've called an SDK link that was operating; is that correct?
20 A. Here we have a typical contract, and it's true that 30 per cent
21 could be paid in Croatian dinars into a resident account. Buyers also
22 had non-resident accounts and they could perform such transactions from
23 one account to another in Croatia
24 says quite precisely through the SDK branch in Zenica or other branches
25 that deal with payment transactions with the SDK Tuzla branch. So this
1 shows that in Bosnia and Herzegovina the branches don't have anything to
2 do with the branches in Tuzla
3 branch or other branches in the Tuzla
4 That is why the second paragraph says that if the buyer had money in an
5 account in Zenica he could pay in Tuzla
6 Q. Sir, I'm just trying to confirm that that was -- I understand it
7 correctly. So there was an electronic transactions link between --
8 apparently between Zenica and Tuzla
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And I take it then from what you've said over the last few
11 minutes that in order to get the money to Zenica before it could then be
12 transferred electronically on to Tuzla
13 Zenica some other way. Do you know how money -- this money would have
14 been communicated to Zenica in December 1992?
15 A. The money could only be physically transported, which wasn't a
16 good idea, given the way one had to travel. So most of the payments were
17 made by paying sums of money into non-resident accounts abroad. And here
18 we -- in this case cash was paid in by the UNHCR.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, on looking at this
20 type of contract, you're saying that this is a standard contract. Seen
21 from the outside, one has the feeling that three currencies are being
22 used, the Croatian dinar, the BH dinar, and the Deutschmark. The three
23 currencies are used on the basis of 30 per cent, 50 per cent, and 20 per
24 cent. That's a ratio.
25 So were these widely circulated contracts when such transactions
1 were made?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because -- well, part was paid
3 in Croatian dinars, because the company would buy goods for that money
4 because transport costs were at a minimum then. It was for their
5 workers. Fifty per cent was in BH dinars so that workers in Tuzla
6 be paid their salaries and so that they could cover their expenses that
7 were paid in dinars in the municipality of Tuzla
8 these marks were used to obtain goods from outside Croatia, goods that
9 they needed to operate. So this is how companies tried to maintain the
10 value that they had.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
12 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. And in fact, you finished
13 the remaining questions I had on that particular document. So I'll move
14 on to another item unless the other Judges have questions.
15 Q. Sir, in addition to that transaction, we also discussed last
16 week, and it actually was mentioned a few minutes ago or earlier today,
17 the transfer of Bosnian dinar to the central Bosnian municipal HVOs, and
18 we looked at I think in the course of last week several examples of that.
19 I think there was at least one in January of 1993 and at least another
20 one in March of 1993. And I don't know that we really need to look at
21 the documents, to take the time to do that.
22 In one instance, for example, there were 3 billion dinars. There
23 was the approval by the HVO HZ HB to convey or provide 3 billion BH
24 dinars to the Central Bosnia HVO. And how would this -- how were the
25 dinars then transported to the Central Bosnia HVOs, or provided I guess.
1 To say transported perhaps gives the answer, but how were they going to
2 be provided and put in the hands, if you will, of the municipal HVOs in
3 Central Bosnia
4 A. Authorised officials from municipal HVOs would come under escort,
5 a police escort usually, and take over from the treasuries of the SDK in
6 Posusje or Siroki Brijeg the money in question. They would then
7 transport that money to Central Bosnia.
8 Q. And let me next direct your attention to similar situations where
9 Croatian dinars were provided to locations in Central Bosnia. Again I'm
10 not going to take the time to go to the particular documents, but we
11 looked at two instances -- we saw two instances of that last week at
13 For the record, one was reflected in 1D 02114. Another one was
14 reflected in Exhibit 1D 02137.
15 I think in the first one there was a transfer of 5 million dinars
16 to the HVO Sarajevo
17 way were 5 million Croatian dinars put in the hands of the HVO Sarajevo
18 in March 1993?
19 A. The Sarajevo
20 physically received that money. They received that money themselves,
21 then made use of it.
22 Q. Again going back to one of our themes for the day, if Sarajevo
23 was cut off or isolated, how did you get the 3 million Croatian --
24 5 million Croatian dinar to the people in Sarajevo?
25 A. Usually the money was used to buy goods, and this is how the
1 population of Sarajevo
2 convoy in the same way that other goods entered Sarajevo, because
3 Croatian dinars couldn't be used in Sarajevo
4 Q. Well, sir, it appears from the documents, and it may, if it
5 assists us, we made need to look at the document, but it appears from
6 1D 02114 this was the approval to send 5 million Croatian dinars to HVO
8 the HVO municipality. And at least on the face of the document, sir, it
9 appears that it is currency, it is money, it is dinars that is being
11 Now, do you know for a fact that was not the case?
12 A. I apologise, but I haven't understood your question. The 5
13 million, that was a decision taken, and that money was handed over to the
14 HVO representatives of Sarajevo
15 impossible to forward that money electronically.
16 Q. How did these people get from Sarajevo to pick up and collect the
17 5 million Croatian dinar?
18 A. Well, some of the official representatives -- one official
19 representative managed to leave Sarajevo
20 money and then had that money at his disposal.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Tomic, there's something I
22 don't understand. If somebody comes from Sarajevo to pick up these
23 5 million Croatian dinars and goes back to Sarajevo with these
24 dinars - we are now talking about March, 1993 - you said a few moments
25 ago that one could not use this money in Sarajevo because it was not the
1 legal currency, so to speak. What is the point of bringing in money
2 which cannot be used? That's what I'm trying to figure out.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, you haven't fully
4 understood me. They received 5 million Croatian dinars, and they used
5 this money to buy goods. They turned the money into goods. It was
6 possible to go to Sarajevo
7 and in such cases they joined convoys and entered Sarajevo with goods,
8 not with Croatian dinars.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In other words, if I have
10 understood you correctly, those's 5 million Croatian dinars were used to
11 pay for goods that entered Sarajevo
12 another route. Is that what you're saying?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
14 MR. SCOTT: A few more minutes?
15 Q. Very well, sir. And let me turn to another topic which actually
16 relates -- well, maybe it does. We'll see.
17 We've been told at various points in the trial that the
18 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina had certain logistics offices or in fact
19 that the government had certain offices in Zagreb. Is that correct? Are
20 you aware of that as well?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And I take it these logistics offices in Zagreb were for the
23 purpose, at least for a time, of again buying -- buying materials,
24 whatever they were, and getting those materials in some fashion to
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And do you know where these offices located in Zagreb and perhaps
3 other parts of Croatia
4 their business to pay for these transactions, to pay for goods?
5 A. The office of the government of the Republic of Bosnia
7 meeting it was located in that street.
8 As to how they were financed, well, that was an issue for the
9 then government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which used
10 accounts in Croatia
11 order to cover the expenses of their operations.
12 Q. And the banks that Herceg-Bosna used also had both, I take it,
13 electronic and physical means of communication with Zagreb; is that
14 correct? Banks in Split
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia
16 relationships or the ability to conduct banking transactions in Zagreb
17 and elsewhere?
18 A. The banks in Croatia
19 possible for them to make payments to Zagreb.
20 Q. Which brings us back, sir, to this point, and that is if in fact,
21 as you've told us, Herceg-Bosna was collecting this customs revenue and
22 border-related revenue and collected it, and if, as you say, you
23 recognised that was a state function, and if, as you say, that money
24 should have been paid to the Bosnia-Herzegovina but according to you,
25 there was no means to do so, couldn't it have been transferred to these
1 banks in Zagreb
2 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the government accounts or
3 Herceg-Bosna accounts and which that money could have been transferred if
4 Herceg-Bosna had really wanted to pay that money?
5 A. Well, technically speaking, yes.
6 Q. So the fact that the money wasn't paid wasn't due to a lack of
7 means, sir, it was due to a political decision. Herceg-Bosna was not
8 about to send that money on to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
9 it had nothing to do with the lack of means to do so; correct?
10 A. No.
11 Q. You've just told us that there were ways of conducting
12 transactions between Croatia
13 MR. KARNAVAS: I object. The gentleman was about to explain his
14 answer, now he's entitled to explain, even under cross-examination,
15 even -- if the answer requires an explanation, he's entitled to do so.
16 Look at the question. Look at the answer.
17 MR. SCOTT: I won't intervene further, Your Honour, except I
18 think it was Mr. Karnavas who said I don't know how many umpteen times
19 yes, no, I don't know, was the appropriate answer.
20 Q. But in any event, go ahead he, sir. Go ahead and tell us why it
21 is, why it is you -- Herceg-Bosna and the HVO authorities couldn't make
22 payments, couldn't transfer money to accounts or representatives of the
23 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina if they had wanted to.
24 A. At the time that this was happening, at the time this financial
25 system was being set up, it was a key issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 The key issue was the issue of defence, and the HVO was a part of the
2 armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this money was used for
3 defence. And at a meeting that we had with Mr. Izetbegovic in Mostar
4 towards the end of 1992, this issue wasn't even openly discussed. We
5 explained that we had to establish supervision over the goods entering
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina, establish borders, et cetera. We said we were
7 following republican instructions and applying them to the extent it was
8 possible in the area of the HZ HB. We said this was a matter of
10 Q. All right, sir.
11 MR. SCOTT: And I note, Your Honours, before the break we can
12 finish on this point, I hope.
13 Q. All that being as it may, sir, what we've come to -- would you
14 agree with me that the conclusion that we've come -- the point we've come
15 to is that the non-payment of these fees, the fact that Herceg-Bosna did
16 not pay or send on this money to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 had nothing to do with the lack of means to do so? Correct?
18 A. I would agree with you only partly. At that time we did not
19 receive any information from Sarajevo
20 were, what accounts belonged to the budget, what accounts belonged to the
21 customs, tax authorities, and others. Those were the accounts that were
22 mostly used for assistance and the procurement of goods and defence
23 supplies by the government in Sarajevo
24 know what accounts those were, and there was no way for us to be able to
25 pay any money into those accounts. We learned about these accounts much
1 more through the transactions that you have just shown me.
2 Q. You didn't -- you didn't think to ask some of these
3 representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina, "Oh, by the way, where are your
4 bank accounts and what are the account numbers? We'd like to send you
5 some money." When you met with Izetbegovic in Zagreb, when you met with
6 Izetbegovic in Geneva
7 Bosnian government, did Mr. Boban or did Mr. Susak or Mr. Tudjman or
8 anyone say, "By the way, we'd like to send you some money because we owe
9 it to you. Where should we send it?" Or you were just -- you were
10 happy to just keep the money and not say anything more about it? Is that
11 what you're telling us?
12 A. First of all, let me tell you that I never participated in any
13 political negotiations or meetings except for the meeting with
14 Mr. Izetbegovic when he came to Mostar. I've told you that the contact
15 that we had with the government or the office of the government in Zagreb
16 is another one, and no account numbers were given to me. We were not
17 given any possibility to pay money. We were only talking about using the
18 external aid that arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's all that we
19 talked about.
20 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's a quarter to 4.00, and we
22 will have a 20-minute break.
23 --- Recess taken at 3.49 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 4.14 p.m.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
1 MR. SCOTT:
2 Q. Mr. Tomic, staying on the topic of customs and border-related
3 revenues, if we could go forward, didn't this same situation in fact
4 exist in 19 -- even by 1995, where Herceg-Bosna was collecting this
5 revenue and not providing any of it to the government of
7 A. In 1995 an agreement was reached about the complete separation of
8 revenues within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the
9 areas under the control of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
10 areas under the control of the HVO. And this was done because of the
11 purposeful utilisation of the budget in the areas, and the key was in the
12 establishment of a federal budget and unique system of payment
13 transactions, and then the two budgets were merged and the revenues from
14 the customs duties collected were then channeled into the revenue of
16 Q. If you please look at Exhibit P 10683 which should be in binder
17 number 3. Binder 3, P 10683.
18 This is something called a VIP Daily News Report, and while there
19 is a date on the top -- for the top of the first page under the
20 letterhead, if you will, of October 17th, 2008, you'll see in the footer
21 of the document that the document is actually dated 23 January 1995. If
22 I might just indicate that the October 17, 2008 date seems to be a
23 function of when it's accessed on the computer, on the internet. But if
24 you look, sir, at the --it will be on the second page of the English
25 version, but there is a section that is -- gives a report about this
1 issue of customs revenue in which it is reported that Neven Tomic said
2 the federation's entire customs income would go only to Herceg-Bosna,
3 although the federation parliament adopted a common customs law last week
4 in Sarajevo
5 were collecting 1 million Deutschmarks in customs duties every day at the
6 Doljani border crossing from Croatia
7 Is all of that correct?
8 A. No. A federal law was indeed passed. However, no federal budget
9 was passed, and it was never said how the institutions of the federation
10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be funded. The biggest pressure was for the
11 revenues that were collected in the territory of the HZ HB to be
12 channeled into the budget in Sarajevo
13 still not established. The federal pension fund was still non-existent.
14 In other words, the beneficiaries of the budget had still not been
15 established, and by the agreement within the Minister of Finance
16 Mr. Kreso and myself, it was clearly defined that in the transitional
17 period before these institutions were established, the revenues that were
18 collected for which the end user was the importers in the HZ HB should
19 remain in the HZ HB. As for the revenues that were channeled towards the
20 areas under the control of the BH army would then be channeled into the
21 budget of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Q. Is it correct, sir, that the Croat authorities, the Herceg-Bosna
23 authorities around this time were in fact collecting approximately 1
24 million Deutschmarks in customs duties every day at the Doljani border
1 A. Not correct. The Doljani border crossing was --
2 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... P 10685.
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours. My
4 learned friend may wish to explain the document that we have just seen in
5 front of us, the VIP
6 versions were shown, but they're not one and the same text, and it's very
7 hard to tell what the original is, whether the original is English
8 translated into Croatian or vice versa. Both bear the number 403.
9 However, the dates are different. 23 January 1995 in Croatian and 18
10 October in English. And when you look at the contents, you will see that
11 the two versions do not correspond to each other. The sequence is
12 different, and not all the articles are in there.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, in Kovacic found out
14 that the English text dates -- one text is January 23, 1995, whereas the
15 other one is 17 October 2008
16 some light on this?
17 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I believe that the original
18 publication is an English publication. I may be wrong on that. At least
19 that's the -- well, I think that's the case. I can't swear to that, to
20 be honest. It looks to me like having seen translations for the past ten
21 years here, it appears that the document attached in the Croatian
22 language is a prepared translation.
23 As to the date, I thought I was trying to preempt that question
24 by explaining that this document was downloaded from the internet.
25 Perhaps other people in the courtroom have experienced that sometimes
1 whenever you download something from the internet you get a date of
2 download or date of printing as an electronic function.
3 The footer of the article in the English version and in -- is
4 January 23, 1995
5 date, the 23rd of January, 1995. It certainly wasn't a few weeks ago in
7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm grateful for this
8 explanation. However, I'm still confused. In the translation, i.e., in
9 the Croatian text, the title of the first article is the same as in the
10 English version, "Contact Group in Pale, in Sarajevo
11 into the same thing in Croatian. However, when you read the article
12 itself, the contents do -- are different, as if the two sets of materials
13 have been mixed up.
14 In the English version there is no reference to Karadzic, Tomas
15 who are mentioned in here. This is something I can't see in the English
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, there is. Yes, there is.
18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. Maybe I have a wrong
19 copy. Maybe my binders got mixed up.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. If we could go on to Exhibit 10685. So this is another article
23 apparently from the Ljubljana Oslobodjenje dated the 20th of April, 1995
24 So it's about four months, approximately four months later than the first
25 article. And it appears in this article that in fact the same situation
1 continues to exist. Federal -- title "Federal Partners In Conflict Over
2 Customs." In the first paragraph: "The decree on temporary measures for
3 the importation and trade in products adopted by authorities operating on
4 territory under the control of the HVO ... does not confirm to federal
5 regulations and is causing consequences for the entire territory of the
7 Now, wasn't this same thing going on, sir, in -- in 1994, 1995?
8 It might have been resolved at some point but for a substantial period of
9 time Herceg-Bosna continued to collect and keep all the customs revenue;
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me. Before the gentleman answers the
12 question, we don't have the original version in the B/C/S. I guess
14 whatever. So perhaps the gentleman should be given the opportunity to
15 look at the original version before he can comment on it.
16 MR. SCOTT: If it's not in the binders, Your Honour, it may be --
17 if it's not in the binder, Your Honour, then there hasn't -- a
18 translation has not yet been obtained. I can put -- I can certainly read
19 to Mr. Tomic any relevant portions of it.
20 Q. The point, sir, is wasn't this an ongoing issue and what I just
21 said is true, whether you see it in this article, can you just confirm to
22 the Judges that during this period, 1994, 1995, Herceg-Bosna was
23 continuing to collect and keep all the customs revenue?
24 A. This is a text from Oslobodjenje which was not a Slovenian paper.
25 Oslobodjenje was a Sarajevo-based newspaper which was printed during the
1 war, and during that period of time it was printed in Ljubljana.
2 Throughout all the period after the Washington Agreement of which
3 I've already testified, the approach to the implementation of the
4 Washington Agreement on the part of the Bosniak partners in the
5 government was to simply have the institutions of Herceg-Bosna abolished
6 and join the work of the republican institutions which had hitherto
7 functioned in the territories under the control of the BH army.
8 According to the Washington Agreement we were supposed to build
9 new institutions. In that period, the package of the laws to regulate
10 new institutions was not adopted.
11 Who were the beneficiaries of the budget? This was not
12 established, and this was the subject of a major pressure exerted by the
13 Bosniak side through the Sarajevo
14 not the truth. The border crossing Doljani that I just mentioned a while
15 ago was the least-used border crossing which is reflected in the
16 budgetary revenues of the HZ HB, and as a result of this the situation
17 that we ended up with --
18 Q. Sir, in the next-to-last paragraph of the article it says this,
19 and if you don't have it in your own -- I have the impression perhaps you
20 can read English, but be that as it may, it can be translate to you. In
21 the article it says: "Herceg-Bosna is constantly finding new forms of
22 financing that are not controllable."
23 Wasn't Herceg-Bosna and the HDZ throughout this period doing
24 everything possible to obstruct the establishment and the working of the
1 A. Incorrect. We insisted on the establishment of new federal
2 institutions, and that was the fundamental cause of the slowness in
3 procedure and the functioning of the government and federation within the
4 same package. When the agreement was signed on the implementation of the
5 federation before the Dayton
6 federation was established and where -- and also the government of the
7 republic as a separate government, then the functioning and the merger of
8 the territories under the control of the BH army and the HVO respectively
9 started because new institutions were being established and introduced.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: I just -- just for a point of clarification, Your
11 Honours, this is a quoted part that was quoted in the question. This is
12 from a Hasan Muratovic. So it's not that the article is saying it. This
13 is what this gentleman claims, at least in this particular article, which
14 I find rather interesting because it says Ljubljana not Sarajevo
15 Oslobodjenje. And it also talks -- it says something about
16 Serbo-Croatian. By this point the Muslims have their own language, which
17 is Bosniak or Bosnian, depending whether it's the federation or the
19 to Serbo-Croatian after all that bellyaching that they didn't have a
21 So if this is in 1995, this is printed in some place other than
23 suspect. And now we're quoting from it and we're not saying we're
24 quoting from Dr. Hasan Muratovic, but rather, we're saying this is what
25 is in the article as if somebody did actual research.
1 So I would suggest, Your Honours, given that there is a lack of
2 foundation on this particular document that we just move on.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, it's this Muratovic
4 person who is talking in the paragraph starting with "Herceg-Bosna is
5 constantly finding new forms." This is Mr. Muratovic saying this, isn't
7 MR. SCOTT: It appears to be so, Your Honour. It is quoted in
8 the article, and I put that proposition to the witness, which he can
9 agree with or disagree with. Everybody in the courtroom certainly has
10 the document. And the report itself, Your Honour, in terms of -- the
11 lack of translation is one issue and that will certainly have to be
12 corrected, but apart from that, this is absolutely no different from the
13 hundreds of other media articles that the Chamber has seen in the last
14 two and a half years. So I think that that's the point of putting it to
15 the witness, to ask him if that was continued -- if these facts were
16 true. He's expressed his disagreement with some of this, and the
17 Chamber's heard his testimony. So --
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour, I would just ask --
19 MR. SCOTT: I'm not sure what the problem is.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: I would just ask my colleague to be a little more
21 careful. He's not just -- he's not quoting the text. He's quoting an
22 individual that's in the text. And if you go back to the question, he
23 never gives notice to the gentleman that this is what Mr. Muratovic is
25 I do think that it is fair to -- for the witness to know who it
1 is that is making this accusation or assertion, and it's within that
2 context that the answer can be given.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, we've already
4 mentioned this at length. You know my answer very well. You know that
5 the media, when they quote someone, you know, they put it in quotes, and
6 this sentence is in quotes. And then we have Muratovic says or says
7 Mr. Muratovic. So we know it's a quote. And Mr. Tomic seemingly was
8 also interviewed, because he's also mentioned.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: But, Your Honour, he doesn't have the original
10 version. That's -- that was my point. Unless we're saying that some
11 witnesses, if they can plough through English, good or bad, they should
12 just look at the English text.
13 In this instance Mr. -- Mr. Scott indicated that he would read
14 from the text because we didn't have the original. Fair enough. But if
15 we go that route then at least we should go the extra step and say
16 so-and-so claims the following. That's all I'm saying. If he had the
17 original, fair enough. Then he would obviously look at the original and
18 then he could say. That's my point. I'm not trying to obstruct or to
19 deny the gentleman the opportunity to pose the question.
20 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm going on, anyway, and
21 on that point I understand Mr. Karnavas's point since the witness doesn't
22 have it in front of him. If I had read the full passage he would have
23 had more information, so on that point I think there's some merit to
24 what's been said. But in any event, I think the witness knows the issue.
25 He knows the situation. He's able to address it and he has addressed it.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that the witness
2 wanted to answer. You can answer.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I've just looked at
4 the whole text. Look at the second paragraph on the same page starting
5 with "Dr. Nikola Grabovac." I would kindly ask you to read this
6 paragraph, and you will see that this was the position that I held at the
7 time and that I'm sharing with you now. Mr. Grabovac quoted me because
8 he was the only person there at the meeting that was being held.
9 We were in favour of the functioning of the federation. However,
10 we insisted on establishing institutions that would be treated as federal
11 institutions. Every day Bosniak side would accuse us because they wanted
12 Herceg-Bosna to stop functioning and for us to be incorporated within the
13 system of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 MR. SCOTT:
16 Q. Sir, during the time that you were the Minister of Finance of the
17 Croatian Republic
18 Minister for the federation and, if I understand correctly, at least for
19 a time Finance Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 consider that you owed any sort of allegiance or duty to the Republic of
22 A. I was the Minister of Finance in the government of the Federation
23 of Bosnia and Herzegovina where I represented the Croats from Bosnia
25 institutions and the implementation of the Washington Agreement.
1 Q. Were you --
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. Witness, I've
3 listen to you carefully. You were Minister of Finance of the federation.
4 I thought that you were the Ministry of Finance -- Minister of Finance,
5 because you're extremely competent in this area and you were appointed to
6 this position, but you have added that you represented the Croats. So I
7 can't really understand this. A person is Minister of Finance because
8 he's competent, be it whether he's a Croat, a Serb, or a Muslim, or are
9 we Minister of Finance because we represent the Croats here?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the distribution of functions in
11 the government after the Washington Agreement the position of the Finance
12 Minister was given to a Croat, i.e., a person of Croatian origin. Of
13 course that person had to be competent, but he also had to be Croat.
14 That was the political agreement of the signatories of the Washington
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well.
17 MR. SCOTT:
18 Q. Sir, if you can turn in your binder to -- I'll tell you the
19 number in just -- the binder in a moment. P 08818. It should be in
20 binder number 2. P 08818. And this is a record of a meeting with
21 President Tudjman on the 7th of February, 1998. And can you tell us as
22 we begin looking at this document what, if any, position Mr. Prlic held
23 in any part of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the federation at
24 that time?
25 A. I believe that at the time he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs
1 of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 Q. All right. Now, if you turn to page 11, please, of this
3 transcript. There's one part that I would like to ask you about.
4 Starting at about the middle -- above the middle of page 11,
5 continuing over to the top of page 12, we have this statement attributed
6 to Mr. Prlic, and I'll start with the third paragraph.
7 A. I apologise. These pages are missing from the Croatian version.
8 I have 7 and then I have 14, nothing in between.
9 Q. Perhaps we can assist you if that's the case.
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The same here, Mr. Scott. We have --
11 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: 15 -- no, 8 and then 15.
13 MR. SCOTT: Well, obviously, Your Honour, my apologies, if
14 there's been an error. If we can work in the e-court then.
15 Q. And, sir, it should be available to you. You should be able to
16 see it on the screen in both English or certainly Croatian in a moment.
17 If you go back to page 11, please. Okay. Thanks very much.
18 Mr. Prlic says in the third paragraph under his intervention:
19 "Mr. President, last year the surplus between Croatia and us was 400
20 million marks." I note that we're still talking in German marks. "It is
21 an enormous amount; goods that cannot be sold in any other market, only
23 were trying to put an end to it. Only thanks to Tomic and me has it not
24 been stopped yet.
25 "In a couple of days the united customs zone will start
1 functioning in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... control, and we will not be
2 able to oppose that. We are facing a threat, because if the Republika
3 Srpska is inside, it means that Yugoslavia
4 "In that regard, I think that this matter is not discussed here
5 enough. As regards to the economy, it is extremely important; 400
6 million marks of surplus are very important to Croatia."
7 Sir, when Mr. Prlic and you were acting in your official
8 positions on behalf of the federation and the Republic of Bosnia
10 their best interests or in the best interests of the Republic of Croatia
11 A. We were supposed to protect the interests of Bosnia and
13 Q. And Mr. Prlic says here that in terms of this favourable
14 treatment Croatia
15 were trying to put an end to it. Only thanks to Tomic and me has it not
16 been stopped yet."
17 It was the other authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 trying to put a stop to this arrangement; correct?
19 A. No. The Bosniak side tried to stop that unilaterally, without
20 passing documents that had been envisaged by the Washington Agreement.
21 According to the Washington Agreement, the documents of the then
22 existing administrative arrangements of Herceg-Bosna would be in effect
23 until the moment either federal or the republican documents were passed.
24 Since we wanted new institutions and new agreements to be established,
25 the result was as Mr. Prlic put it.
1 We did not fight for Croatia
2 Agreement to be implemented in the form in which it was signed.
3 Q. Sir, I put it to you again that Herceg-Bosna and the HDZ
4 throughout this time period was doing everything possible to obstruct the
5 Washington Agreement, weren't they?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Now, if we can go to -- sir, if we can go to the question of the
8 use of the term "Bosnia and Herzegovina" in fact on various documents or
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, Mr. Scott. The
11 witness answered your question, which is an important question since you
12 say that he was obstructing the Washington Agreements. The witness says
13 no, and then you move on to something else. It might have been
14 interesting to hear the witness on this point, why he wasn't standing in
15 the way of the Washington
16 MR. SCOTT: I leave the witness in your hands.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After the signing of the Washington
18 Agreement, we went to Sarajevo
19 lives on Igman, and when passing -- and we passed through the tunnel to
20 get into Sarajevo
21 This isn't obstruction. This demonstrates one's intention to do
22 one's job as specified in the Washington Agreement, namely the
23 construction of new institutions from the Central Bank to new customs
24 administration of the federation, to the federation budget. We insisted
25 on this.
1 At that time the media in Sarajevo circulated a story according
2 to which we were acting in an obstructive way, because it was impossible
3 to perform our duties as ministers in the government of the federation of
4 the republic because we were in Sarajevo
5 territory under the control of the HVO. Well, we stated that as a
6 precondition for our future work it would be necessary in that
7 transitional period to have people who were in Sarajevo who were
8 ministers in Herceg-Bosna. We were again appointed as ministers in
9 Herceg-Bosna, but why? So that the process of implementing the
10 Washington Agreement and of creating institutions could be carried out in
11 a competent way by those who were familiar with the situation on the
13 The problem is that the media and those in favour of the
14 government, as stated in these documents, and that meant pro-Bosniak at
15 the time, the problem was that they kept circulating a story according to
16 which we were seizing revenue in the territory of Herceg-Bosna
17 never imposed on goods and were being sent to territory under the control
18 of the ABiH. And there was a continual conflict of this kind, continual
19 clash, but it wasn't possible for us to clarify the situation through the
20 media, to explain what was at stake. And for this reason and other for
21 reasons I claim that we didn't obstruct anything. We tried to implement
22 what had been stated in the documents.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] With this in mind, why didn't
24 you say that all the custom duties levied by the -- by the Herceg-Bosna
25 would be paid into the government of the federation? Why was this never
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, look, the agreement between
3 the minister who was in the government of the republic and myself, and at
4 the time I was a deputy in Herceg-Bosna, this was after Washington, the
5 agreement was during the transitional period and up until the time
6 federal institutions were established, new institutions, these were new
7 institutions, there was no budget I could pay money into, this was the
8 budget of that BH republic whose new constitution hadn't yet taken force.
9 So we can't pay money that is the federation's money into the budget
10 republic -- the republican budget. It was a game and there was pressure
11 for us to pay this money into the republic's budget.
12 The federation shouldn't even have to be established, because --
13 as I have already said in the course of my testimony. The Bosniak side
14 accepted all solutions as transitional solutions until a final state
15 solution. It wanted to keep things in its hands until this issue was
16 dealt with. We wanted part of -- we wanted a role in the power in
17 accordance with the Washington Agreement. And that's why we had the
18 agreement on bringing to life the federation, and this was before Dayton
19 In this agreement the government of the federation was separated from the
20 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this is when the process
21 actually took off.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
23 MR. SCOTT:
24 Q. Sir, didn't -- and continuing the same issue, didn't the
25 international community and a number of non-governmental organisations
1 throughout this period repeatedly, repeatedly find the HVO, the HDZ,
2 Herceg-Bosna being complete obstructionists to both Washington and
4 after report was coming out at the time saying these things.
5 A. There were reports. The question is who discussed these reports
6 with those people. The people who spoke to me never conveyed such a
7 position in any reports. I had contact with people from the World Bank,
8 from the IMF, from the European bank, and finally under their supervision
9 we -- we established those federal institutions, as I said. There was a
10 group of 10 or 12 of us in Sarajevo
11 infrastructure of our own. We had no communications, and we were being
12 supervised by Sarajevo
13 Well, in such a situation what could we have done? How could we
14 have explained to someone what was being done when people from ministries
15 said that they were from federal ministries, which was not at all the
17 Q. Let me ask you please --
18 A. And I sa that --
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... P 10279. P 10279. That's
20 the third binder, first document in the third -- binder number 3. And
21 this is a document that's previously been admitted. In line with what
22 you've said in the last few moments, I'd like to show it to you.
23 Sir, this is part of a report that was issued in April 2000 by
24 the International Crisis Group, which I believe is an extremely reputable
25 international organisation.
1 If you look at the first page, page 1, I will read it -- some of
2 the passages to you. It starts out the introduction: "Mostar is a city
3 divided." Going to the end of that first paragraph: "Since the war, the
4 Bosnian Croat HDZ, Croatian democratic party, has actively opposed all
5 efforts, both figurative and literal, at bridge building."
6 Skipping to the third paragraph: "In terms of achieving,
7 actually achieving reunification, international community and EU efforts
8 have failed. After six years of international community assistance and
9 supervision the administration, economy, infrastructure, education,
10 police, and legal systems of Mostar remain sharply divided along ethnic
11 lines. The only real achievement to date in Mostar has been freedom of
12 movement. The greatest indication of the international community's
13 failure today has been the persistent and largely unchallenged
14 obstruction by the HDZ implementing property laws and refugee return."
15 Going to the next paragraph: "Since 1994, the HDZ leadership, in
16 cooperation with the HDIDRDA, which the Chamber heard about several weeks
17 ago from another witness, and powerful Herzegovinian economic interest
18 has repeatedly blocked not only international community efforts to
19 reunite Mostar but also the implementation of the federation agreement
20 and the Dayton
21 Going over to page 2, section A, HDZ Obstruction: "Since signing
22 the first agreement in Geneva
23 the HDZ, has prevented all progress by blatantly obstructing over 30
24 subsequent agreements ... the HDZ has carried out a policy of
25 maintaining a divided city, canton and federation, obstructing all
1 agreements at various official levels and at different times, engaging in
2 a continuous game of good cop-bad cop with the international community."
3 Now, I don't think I need to read more.
4 That was the common consensus among the international community
5 throughout this time period, was it not, leading in fact to various
6 actions being taken by the office of High Representative against the
7 senior leadership of the HDZ?
8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have an objection.
9 The Prosecutor has said that this is the assessment of the international
10 community. We don't know what the ECG group is. First of all we should
11 know what ECG means. We can't just say that it's the international
12 community. This is very abstract.
13 Secondly, it's a document from the April 2002. As far as I can
14 remember, the witness was a mayor in Mostar, if I remember correctly, but
15 this line of questioning that has been pursued for over an hour, half an
16 hour now, well, as far as I know, and I think I do know, the time-frame
17 of the indictment is until the Dayton
18 Agreement. I apologise. So why are we now dealing with events in Bosnia
19 and Herzegovina
20 rather, after the time-frame covered by the indictment?
21 And thirdly, if this is what we're dealing with, well, then we
22 have to deal with this up to this very day, because some of these
23 problems, as far as I know, given the supervision law that we have about
24 it, well, some of these problems are still present today. So this line
25 of questioning is not relevant.
1 Thank you very much.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, do you wish to
3 respond? But you have responded a few weeks ago when you said that as
4 far as you were concerned, the JCE still prevailed after the Washington
5 agreement. Isn't that what you said?
6 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, in this sense, and that is that
7 we -- what the Prosecution's case is and the Chamber may ultimately agree
8 or disagree, but it's the Prosecution case that Herceg-Bosna represented
9 a long-term project that did not end with Washington or Dayton
10 reason that's relevant is because among -- among other things is because
11 the Defence has repeatedly said it was temporary, it was provisional, it
12 wouldn't last after the war, and this witness -- the further answer is
13 this witness himself has this afternoon said everything that the Bosnian
14 Croats and the HDZ was trying to do to implement the Washington Agreement
15 and everything that was being done and they were holding out because they
16 didn't want to organise this institution or they didn't want to do this
17 or they couldn't pay the customs revenue in to them yet because of some
18 reason. So he's made all of this, Your Honour, directly relevant, and
19 I'm challenging his testimony on that point. And I do submit that this
20 is only one document, but again we have a very educated man in front us
21 who has been a senior government official. He must have known. I assume
22 he was reading the newspapers at the time. He was meeting with senior
23 government officials. He must have known. He must have known that these
24 were issues and allegations that were being brought against the HDZ
25 almost every day.
1 Now, if he wasn't aware of that and he wasn't following, watching
2 the news, watching the television or reading the newspaper or watching
3 CNN, then maybe he didn't know but I submit to you that he did, and he --
4 he has every capable means of responding to my questions that I put to
5 him several times this afternoon, "Sir, isn't it true that the H -- the
6 Herceg-Bosna that continued to exist and the HDZ were doing everything
7 possible to obstruct the Washington Agreement?" And several times he
8 said no. This exhibit is directly relevant to that.
9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your leave I
10 would like to respond. Unless I misheard something, but I think I heard
11 this correctly and I've been following the transcript, the Prosecution is
12 now claiming before this Tribunal that joint criminal enterprise, and we
13 know what we're talking about, the enterprise covered in the indictment,
14 was a long-term project and did not come to an end with the Washington
16 take it to be an amendment to the indictment.
17 I have already raised this objection, and you, the Chamber, tried
18 to persuade me that the Prosecution wasn't amending the indictment. But
19 if the Prosecution is making such a claim when this comes to
20 investigating the circumstances and events, and this is outside the scope
21 of the indictment, well, in such a case the only possible explanation is
22 that the Prosecution is thereby amending or changing the indictment.
23 And one other thing I would like to add, I didn't mention it
24 because I wanted to be brief, the Prosecution is again being given a
25 certain right. The Prosecution is not asking whether it could put
1 questions outside the scope of examination-in-chief.
2 I'd like to remind you of Rule 19(H)(i), you can go beyond the
3 scope, but one has to explain why. If the explanation is that one wants
4 to go beyond the scope of examination-in-chief because the claim that --
5 because of the claim that the joint criminal enterprise is a long-term
6 project, well, then the Prosecution has to say that and say why this is
7 his opinion and also say whether he is amending the amendment. The Prlic
8 Defence case is coming to its end. Five other Defence teams have to
9 start their cases. We can't define the limits of our defence case if in
10 a certain sense, the implication is that the time-frame of the indictment
11 is being broadened. That is my objection and I would like it to be dealt
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Based on -- based on what I heard, it would appear
14 now that it is an expanded indictment, and I certainly would ask at least
15 with the conclusion of this witness's testimony that we be given
16 additional time to, one, do further investigation and, two, additional
17 time to put on a case.
18 Recently I just read comments made by the supervisor in Brcko
19 district, who happens to be an American ambassador who talks about the
20 Bosniaks continuing their project for a unitary state, the Serbs
21 wanting -- Republika Srpska wanting to break away because in part of this
22 unitary project where the Croats are still interested in having a third
23 entity in BiH.
24 Now, if we are going to allow the Prosecutor to talk about 2000
25 and thereafter, then we must be given an opportunity to now discuss what
1 is going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina even today while there are discussions
2 on amending the constitution, because one of -- one of the abusers of the
3 Dayton Peace Accord has been indeed the international community, none
4 other than the office of the High Representative where they're imposing
5 laws, violating the letter and spirit of the Dayton Accords and the
6 annexes which are the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
7 constitution of the federation, the constitution of the Republika Srpska,
8 and even the final award which created the Brcko district.
9 So if we're going to go into this area and if you're going to
10 allow this kind of questioning, then it is an acknowledgement by the
11 Bench that it is indeed going to consider this information and this
12 evidence, that it is allowing the Prosecution even at this late stage of
13 the game to expand the indictment, and therefore we need to take certain
14 actions on our part. We need to defend against this. And I -- as I take
15 it based on the question that you posed, Mr. President, and the answer
16 that we got, that indeed the indictment has been amended to include all
17 these other things.
18 So I do think that maybe this is not the time to argue this, but
19 we need to have a session to figure out what is it are we supposed to
20 defend against? Is it the indictment, the four corners of this -- of
21 this mega document, or are we going to go beyond? We need to know.
22 Especially I need to know because if I knew that I was going to go into
23 post-Dayton implementation 2000 plus, then obviously be would be prepared
24 for that to put on a case, but I have been limited and my time has been
25 limited based on the indictment.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I don't have the
2 indictment before me but if I remember correctly from memory, in the
3 indictment it is stated that there is a JCE was started before, comma,
4 from such a day to such a date and afterwards. We have the words
5 "before" and "after." This is in the indictment, so read the indictment
6 again. There is a date that is mentioned as a start date and an end
7 date -- it has a start date. You have the words "before" and "after."
8 So read the indictment again. I don't have it before me.
9 Mr. Scott has already said this, and the Trial Chamber has said
10 that it would assess this time period in light of the material adduced.
11 Mr. Praljak.
12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours --
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. Before I give the
14 floor to Mr. Praljak, I would like to read [no interpretation ...
15 approximately and after -- various people, so on and so forth.
16 Let me read it again. This hasn't been recorded on the
17 transcript. Paragraph 15: "From on or before the 18th of November,
18 1991, to about April 1994 and thereafter," comma, so we are talking about
19 the period before the 18th of November, 1991, and April, 1994. What we
20 talk about from on or before and about April 1994.
21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I'd like a brief break so
22 that I can consult my lawyer. I didn't believe I would have to listen to
23 an indictment of a political nature again, which is what I had to do in
24 Communist Yugoslavia from the middle ages to the present day, lasts from
25 the middle ages to the present day. If the HZ HB obstructed anything
1 after the Dayton
2 Americans created Republika Srpska after everything it had done, so what
3 is at stake here is that the political right of those who are powerful is
4 transformed into someone's right at court. This is just a display of the
5 imperial power of the Prosecutor who isn't even acting in accordance with
6 the laws of this Tribunal.
7 I am requesting that we have a break so that I can examine how I
8 proceed. Thank you very much.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: This is an important issue that we've had
10 before, and maybe it would be good if -- if the Chamber sat on it and
11 answered the questions that have been raised on both sides.
12 My suggestion is that we postpone this for at least next week,
13 because we have this witness who is an important witness, as the Defence
14 rightly has argued, and whom we cannot keep into tomorrow, and I think we
15 should really use the time now to take advantage of everything this
16 witness can tell us.
17 I wonder whether my colleagues agree.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, Mr. Scott showed you
19 this document, which is a document prepared by the ECJ. According to
20 Mr. Scott this international crisis group is a well -- very well-known
21 group. I had never heard about it before. And the International Crisis
22 Group talks about a number of issues. What is your answer to this?
23 Mr. Kovacic, please sit down. My colleague has said that this
24 issue will be discussed next week, but for the time being the witness
25 needs to finish his testimony.
1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...
2 agree. I don't really want to take the floor but I think my client has
3 the right to ask for a brief pause to consult his Defence regardless of
4 Mr. Trechsel's suggestion and I personally except the suggestion. I
5 believe that the Chamber should take a decision, it would be good for the
6 Chamber to take a decision. Perhaps you can give us a short break nor or
7 perhaps later. It's for you to decide, naturally.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
10 MR. KHAN: Microphone, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You will be able to talk to
12 Mr. Praljak during the break. The Bench would like to say that when the
13 court is back in session this question will not be addressed. However,
14 the witness will have to respond and provide an answer in light of the
15 document that's been shown to him by the Prosecution.
16 --- Recess taken at 5.13 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 5.32 p.m.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is half past 5.00.
19 Mr. Scott, you have used up five hours and four minutes so far. How much
20 longer do you need?
21 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I hope to use less than my allotted
22 time, but I'm certainly not counting on doing substantially less than the
23 eight hours and seven minutes that Mr. Karnavas has used. I may do
24 better, but I may not. I can't commit to doing better than that,
25 although I hope to. But Mr. Karnavas -- well, I mean that quite
1 sincerely, Your Honour. I spent a considerable matter of time since
2 yesterday cutting my outline substantially, but at the same time
3 Mr. Karnavas got his time, and I expect to use the same amount of time.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I'm putting to
5 question to you, because you know that there is no hearing schedule
6 tomorrow because the Krajisnik case is going to sit all day. There might
7 be an another problem. But that means that this witness may have to come
8 back another time.
9 Let me ask Mr. Tomic a question. Is there a possibility for you
10 to come back, to return at some point in time? We still have an hour and
11 a half to go, but he will not have -- the Prosecutor will not have been
12 finished with his eight hours, and Mr. Karnavas might have additional
13 questions. He's suggesting that he will probably need two hours, two
14 additional hours. So you will have to return at one point in time.
15 There's no other way around. So it's up to you, Mr. Witness. We might
16 have a spot -- a slot for you for your return. There will be a couple
17 weeks where we have nothing, notably the first week in December. I'm
18 talking out of memory. So maybe you could return for the first week of
19 December, or the second week of December.
20 Mr. Karnavas.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, Mr. President. Next week we have a witness,
22 but the following week, the 17th, we don't. We don't have any witnesses.
23 So that would be the 17th of November.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good. There's an
25 additional slot that just opened up, November 17th. So you could come
1 back on November 17th. It might take two days at most, I mean, at most,
2 worst case scenario. There's no other way around.
3 I know that you are having a company. This creates great
4 problems for you.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I also have some family
6 commitments, so I wouldn't be able to tell you off-the-cuff which slots
7 are available to me because I have some family travel planned, also some
8 business travel planned. There are some things pending.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, we have scheduled this
10 for November 17th. Next week we have a witness scheduled, and then we
11 have an open slot, November 17th. That could be very -- that could be
12 possible for you. So check with your wife, see maybe how to manage this,
13 but rest assured, now we have an hour and 15 minutes left for today.
14 Mr. Scott will thus have two more hours to finish his cross-examination.
15 Mr. Karnavas needs two additional hours for redirect, but that
16 four hours means two days, so that's Monday to Tuesday at most.
17 Mr. Scott, let's waste no additional time and please proceed.
18 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 MR. KOVACIC: Ken, if you -- [Interpretation] Your Honours, I
20 don't wish to take any more of your time. However, I've looked at the
21 record, and I'm not sure about your decision. His Honour Judge Trechsel
22 proposed that this very important issue be put on a -- on the agenda of a
23 special session perhaps next week, to have a discussion, because
24 obviously we are hard pressed for time. The witness is here. I don't
25 want to take the witness's time or the Court's valuable time. However, I
1 believe that the temporal framework of the indictment has to be discussed
2 and the Trial Chamber has to give us their opinion, otherwise we are in
3 the dark.
4 If this is your decision according to what Mr. -- His Honour
5 Judge Trechsel said that we will have a special date dedicated to that,
6 then we will agree to that. Otherwise, this kind of a cross-examination
7 will be considered a pure politicising and --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will discuss this among
9 ourselves, and we'll keep you informed on Monday at 2.15. We'll tell you
10 whether there will be a special hearing just on this case -- on this
11 problem that will be organised or not.
12 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
14 MR. SCOTT:
15 Q. Sir, some -- some minutes ago now we -- I was asking you -- going
16 to the question of during your direct examination, and again this arises
17 in particular in connection with customs and borders, border controls,
18 and there was some questioning about what was on the badge, I think, and
19 what was on the identity card use by the officers, and I think there was
20 something to the effect saying that there was something of the words
21 "Bosnia-Herzegovina" at least on some of those items, whether it was on
22 the identity card or the badge or something, but I do note that you
23 testified about this last Tuesday.
24 Sir, isn't it correct that those such words as "Republic of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina" were on Herceg-Bosna stationary and on various
1 documentation really primarily for appearance's sake? It's what the
2 Judges have heard in this case as the two-track policy. On one hand you
3 profess allegiance and loyalty to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand,
4 on the second track, there's actually a different agenda. And that was
5 the nature of that language in such items, wasn't it? It was for
6 appearance's sake.
7 A. No. We adopted republican decrees. Our stamp featured the title
8 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our headings, the logo of our
9 letters featured that as well.
10 Q. Sir, isn't it correct that again those words and things like that
11 were added to this documentation for political reasons and in fact
12 because that was the guidance given to the HVO from Zagreb?
13 A. I am not aware of that guideline. I know that the first
14 documents that I drafted featured the name of the Republic of Bosnia
16 immediate threat of war temporary nature. This was my starting
17 guideline, and this is the principle that guided me when I establish the
18 system of finance as a part of the HZ HB system.
19 Q. If you will please turn in the Defence binder to 2D 01262. It
20 will be again in the smaller fourth, or Defence, binder, so to speak.
21 2D 01262.
22 Sir, this is the record that -- I think we've looked at it
23 earlier in the course of your testimony, but it's the record of a meeting
24 of the of HZ HB Presidency on the 17th of October of 1992. Apparently
25 the meeting was presided over by Dario Kordic, and we see a number of the
1 people who were found to be present, including Bozo Rajic, president of
2 the HVO HZ HB Jadranko Prlic, Department For Finances Neven Tomic, excuse
3 me, department for justice and administration Zoran Buntic, et cetera.
4 Now, if I can please direct your attention to the record of this
5 meeting, and it will be page 14 of the English version. And if you can
6 find it, sir. It will be under -- you will find on the page there are
7 some markings 11 -- 9, 10, 11. And if you find one that's for item
8 number 11, "Proposition of the directive on administrative taxes."
9 That's not what I'm going to direct you to, but I'm just -- I'm trying to
10 assist you in terms of finding your way through the document.
11 Do you see that? Agenda item 11, "Proposition of the directive
12 on administrative taxes."
13 After that is: "Neven Tomic - Head of Department for Finances,"
14 if that again helps you find it.
15 Do you have it?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Now, if you'll go above the item 11 about four or five paragraphs
18 you will find a paragraph that starts with these words: "President Mate
19 Boban posed a question why RBiH appears in all HZ HB acts, and Mr. Buntic
20 gave explanation to this question by emphasizing that this was necessary
21 from political reasons and because Zagreb
23 And that was the case; correct?
24 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm going to object at this point, Your Honour.
25 Mr. Buntic was here. The opportunity to have raised this issue in
1 putting the case to the witness would have been at that point in time,
2 not to this particular witness. He's now being asked to validate or
3 speculate as to another witness's testimony. So there's a clear rule
4 that you have to put to -- your case to the witness, and that's exactly
5 the reason why we have this rule. We don't have it in the States, but it
6 is something that we've inherited in this -- in this Tribunal from the
7 British and the Australian system.
8 MR. SCOTT: Sir, this witness -- Your Honours, this witness
9 was -- this witness was at the meeting. We just saw that. And the -- he
10 has made in particular this particular section relevant by his direct
11 testimony in which he talked about -- he was asked and he gave answers to
12 what was on the documentation, what -- what was on the badges, et cetera,
13 et cetera. So it's directly relevant to the testimony of this witness.
14 And he was at the meeting.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The witness attended the
16 meeting, so we can all -- we can at least ask the witness what he thinks
17 of someone else's answer, an answer given by someone else in this
19 But it is true, Mr. Karnavas, this question should have been put
20 to Mr. Buntic directly. You're also right.
21 MR. SCOTT:
22 Q. Sir, wasn't that the advice that was put forward at the meeting
23 on the 19th of October, that the reason all these -- the reason this was
24 being done was for the reasons -- excuse me, the 17th of October, for the
25 reasons stated here?
1 A. The way I understood political reasons was the Republic of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We were just a temporary solution within the
3 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Zagreb insisted on that because it
4 had recognised the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's the way I
5 understood the situation, and I continued drafting my documents in the
6 way I did in the month of September.
7 Q. Sir, I would like to go to the topic of the language of the
8 referendum in February -- or, yes, in February 1992. You were asked some
9 questions about what your -- what the Croat desired position was in terms
10 of the organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Last Thursday you
11 testified if that was your position essentially that Bosnia and
13 units. Mr. Tomic said yes. When asked whether BiH should have been set
14 up "comprising several constituent units and each of these constituent
15 units should have been set up in such a way that criteria ethnicity was
16 taken into account." And you talked about that in reference to the
17 referendum language.
18 And isn't it not correct, sir, that the actual language desired
19 by the -- a majority of the HDZ was a very different question than the
20 one that was actually on the referendum? You remember that, don't you?
21 A. I remember the referendum question. The Croatian side adopted
22 the referendum, adopted Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was outlined at that
23 moment that the organisation of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be
24 organised in a different way for which the Croats believed that it could
25 protect their own possession in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 Q. If you can please go to Exhibit P 00117, which will be in the
2 first binder. P 00117.
3 In this record of another -- a meeting of the HDZ Central Board,
4 HZ BiH central board on February 9, 1992
5 will find the item number 3, a referendum on a sovereign independent
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 Do you recall, sir, that the HDZ leadership or some of them at
8 least were unhappy with the formulation of the referendum question as it
9 was to be about on the ballot a few weeks later? That existing language
10 says something to this effect, and we can see it further below on that
11 same page: "Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia
13 Serbs, and other peoples who live in it?"
14 And if you look above that, sir, do you recall that the language
15 desired by the HD -- the alternative language desired by the HDZ was:
16 "Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 a joint state of the constitutive and sovereign Croatian, Muslim, and
18 Serbian peoples in their ethnic areas (cantons)?"
19 That was the question -- that was the form of the referendum that
20 the HDZ leadership wanted; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And as stated there would that -- would you have agreed? Was
23 that also your position at that time? Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
24 set up on the basis of three ethnic units?
25 A. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state inhabited by three equal
1 peoples, and the organisation of the state should have been such to make
2 sure that all the three peoples are able to exercise their rights. At
3 that moment one couldn't speak about the final model, and that is why the
4 referendum question did not include the addition that had been proposed
5 by the HDZ.
6 Q. And continuing on with your testimony, was it -- you essentially,
7 as I take it, and I understand your testimony and you can correct me, you
8 were essentially against an integrated society in the former Yugoslavia
9 in the sense that the notion -- in any sense that the notion of persons
10 who were Croats, Serbs, or Muslims would go away or become less
11 significant. You were against that, weren't you?
12 A. I'm afraid I didn't understand your question.
13 Q. Well, you testified last week on Thursday. You said it was your
14 personal opinion that in the Communist system over a long period of time
15 had tried to build an artificial nation, an artificial nation, the
16 Yugoslav nation, and eliminating other nations or ethnic groups in the
17 process. In other words, the number of Croats, Serbs, and Muslims would
18 decrease at the expense of the Yugoslavs, whose numbers would rise. And
19 you were against that, weren't you?
20 A. I've explained the situation, for example, in Mostar and how it
21 transpired. I didn't say whether I was in favour or against. I just
22 explained the situation as it prevailed at the moment after the elections
23 in Mostar, and I hope that that's been recorded properly. I did not
24 voice my opinion on any of the variants because that was not a question
25 that I was supposed to answer.
1 Q. Well, I'm doing asking you now, sir. Is that your view, and was
2 that the view that you endorsed at the time in 1993?
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, what view, Your Honours? You have
4 constituent peoples that live in Yugoslavia
5 or a Croatian or a Serbian. Now, is the question is that they should
6 abandon their heritage to become Yugoslavs? Is that the question?
7 The question is unclear as is stated, and perhaps my learned
8 friend doesn't understand what a constituent person is.
9 MR. SCOTT: Perhaps I -- perhaps I do, Mr. Karnavas. Perhaps I
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, could you
12 reformulate your question, please --
13 MR. SCOTT: Well --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] -- so that it is clear? The
15 witness said that the question was not put to him that way. So please
16 reformulate your question, and if he can answer he will answer, and if he
17 can't, he won't.
18 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I was simply quoting the witness's
19 testimony back to him as a basis for my question. Last Thursday he
20 testified as follows: "My personal opinion is that the Communist system
21 over a long period of time tried to build an artificial nation, the
22 Yugoslav nation, and eliminating, eliminating, other nations or ethnic
23 groups in the process. In other words, the number of Croats, Serbs, and
24 Muslims would decrease at the expense of the Yugoslavs whose numbers
25 would rise." And based on that testimony under oath I asked him did that
1 reflect his view, and he was -- to the extent that he was against an
2 integrated society, to the extent that those notions, those ethnic
3 notions would become less significant and people might think of
4 themselves as -- excuse me.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: And, Your Honours, and I think this is the problem
6 that's causing some concern here, is that the question he's asking -- the
7 question he's asking, whether he is willing to abandon his national
8 heritage in order -- that's what it is, Judge Trechsel. I mean, if --
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Could you point to the text precisely where
10 that --
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Based on that --
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: -- abandonment of national heritage is referred
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, because -- because in order to become a
15 Yugoslav, you have to stop being a Croat or a Serb.
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You are interpreting this.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: No. But that's what it says here.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You're interpreting it here.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm not.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Where does it speak of the heritage and of --
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It's a general view of a political development
23 and the witness can say whether he approved of such a development or
24 whether he rejected it. It is not even laden with any value judgement.
25 One might then say he was right this way or he might even be equally
1 right. It's just his opinion. I for one am not quite sure what the
2 relevance of the answer is.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, that's my question.
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: There -- there maybe we can agree, but I think
5 there is no harm done if he simply answers the question as it was put.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, very well.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, this question gives
8 rise to some passion, as you have noticed.
9 Mr. Coric is on his feet. Mr. Coric.
10 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the Prosecutor
11 tried to accuse this witness here, because he opted to be against
12 eliminating three nations, the Serbs, Muslims, and the Croats in the
13 former Yugoslavia
14 in a given year, and he also draws a parallel and says that this witness
15 is against the multi-ethnic life of these peoples.
16 If one continues to pursue this route, well, the elimination of
17 three peoples is tantamount to pure and simple Fascism. This is pure and
18 simple Fascism in the Tribunal here and the Prosecution is giving us a
19 subdued version of this from day to day, from hour to hour. And what I
20 wanted to say -- and Judge Trechsel, you can interrupt me as much as you
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No, Mr. Coric. I don't think
23 that the Prosecutor wishes to put his question in a Fascist light, that
24 there is a Fascist connotation to his question.
25 Before you step in, I think it would be better to listen to what
1 the witness is about to say because the question is put to him. If he is
2 outraged, he will say what you have just said, but maybe he understood
3 the question differently.
4 I'm trying to understand the question, and I'm waiting for the
5 answer. Mr. Coric, wait for him to answer, and if necessary you can take
6 the floor again afterwards.
7 Witness, you have understood what the Prosecutor told you. You
8 have heard what Mr. Coric has just said, what Mr. Karnavas has said, what
9 Mr. Praljak, who is on his feet, also might have to say. Do you wish to
10 answer or would you like the Prosecutor to phrase his question again?
11 Either you haven't understood the question, or maybe you understood it
12 too well. I don't know.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will try to answer the question.
14 This question was in response to a Defence question in which I was asked
15 about my opinion relating to the situation that prevailed in Yugoslavia
16 and relating to the break-up and so on and so forth. I expressed my
17 opinion with regard to that matter, and I didn't state what my position
18 is. I said I personally think that this happened for such-and-such a
20 I was a Croat at the time of Yugoslavia
21 duties as a Croat, and I had nothing against Serbs or Muslims, or
22 Yugoslavs for that matter. That was a matter for people to decide about,
23 a matter of their personal opinion. But I was discussing the process and
24 how it ended. That's what I did when I was discussing assemblies in
25 Mostar for electoral purposes and when I said that SDS, HDZ, and SDA
1 groupings and the two parties that gathered Yugoslavs, I said that they
2 were viewed by an equal amount of people, but at the elections one noted
3 that people made their decisions on national lines. The Yugoslavs either
4 decided not to be Yugoslavs anymore or forgot that they were Yugoslavs.
5 And to this very day I believe that if someone still believes that he or
6 she is a Yugoslav, well, that's a matter of their personal opinion. But
7 I was saying that in my opinion this is one the reasons for which
9 this respect were not fruitful. The policies were not fruitful because
10 the Yugoslav nation did not become an element allowing one to implement
11 what the policies advocated at the time.
12 If I have understood the question correctly, that would be my
13 answer to the question.
14 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. President, thank you. I would only like to
15 make the following comment: As far as I know, and of course I stand to
16 be corrected, the issue of being a Yugoslav or not had been included
17 in -- on two occasions in -- actually when the statistics had been drawn
18 up, if I am not quite -- if I am sure. Then I would say that in 1990
19 last time, and before probably around 1980 when the issue of being
20 Yugoslav had come up. Now as far as also I know, there had been mainly
21 people of -- with mixed marriages, and being Hungarian I also heard that
22 vote in Vojvodina and other places some people had chosen being Yugoslav
23 because of probably thinking that it might help them to get along with
24 the majority nations, et cetera.
25 So therefore I was a bit surprised when Mr. Coric mentioned that
1 it was a Fascist thing, pure Fascism to ask the question. So as far as I
2 know, in 1990 there was an increase among the people who had chosen as
3 being Yugoslavs. Of course after this whole issue had been removed from
4 the -- from these questions. And I heard very recently even in Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina
6 a kind of statistical possibilities to -- probably because they do not
7 want to go into any clashes or conflicts concerning the nationality
9 So that is why I believe that we have to calm down and to look
10 into this issue as -- as it was raised during those decades and years and
11 not to -- not to emphasise the -- in a way some kind of Fascist or
12 whatever -- whatever kind of names for it, because I believe that it was
13 not the situation. Thank you.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, the witness has
15 answered your question in line with what he'd said previously. So this
16 is very precise.
17 I shall give you the floor back now.
18 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. Sir, so then having referred back to your testimony from last
20 week and then looking at the language from the HDZ meeting in February
21 1992, I just want -- it brings us back full circle, and if you didn't say
22 it before, I may ask you to say it again.
23 Was it your position, your personal view in 1992 and 1993 that
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be -- should be established and set up on
25 the basis of three separate ethnic units? Whatever you want to call
1 them, entities, republics, cantons. Was that your view or position?
2 A. If you put the question in that way, my answer is no.
3 Q. All right. Let me ask you to look at Exhibit P 10698, which will
4 be in the third binder. P 10698.
5 Sir, this is a -- while people are still looking, let me say for
6 the record this is a Reuters news article dated the 28th of October,
7 1992, and about the middle of that page there is a reference to
8 Mr. Prlic. Above that it says: "In an attempt -- in an attempt to head
9 off a carve-up of Bosnia
10 Muslims, Vance and Owen proposed a state with a bare minimum central
11 government and some autonomous -- excuse me, some ten autonomous regions.
12 "But Jadranko Prlic, president of the republic declared by Croats
13 in the area of Bosnia
14 achieve a stable solution was to have three national units whose parts
15 need not be physically connected."
16 Now, that sounds to me like three national units, national, I
17 take it being here, national being Serb, Croat, and Muslim. So I asked
18 you a question a few moments ago and your answer to me was, when I put it
19 that way, your answer was no. Did you share the view stated here and
20 attributed to Mr. Prlic, the only way to achieve a stable solution was to
21 have three national units?
22 A. My opinion is that that is not the only way.
23 Q. Well, I didn't really ask you that, sir. I said did you -- do
24 you agree what -- let me restate it then. Given what we've looked at in
25 the last half hour or so, the statement of the referendum in which the
1 Central Board of the HDZ voted in favour of a referendum formulation
2 which called for the ethnic groups in their separate ethnic areas, I've
3 now shown you this article giving comments concerning Mr. Prlic, and I
4 think, sir, in all fairness, I made it pretty clear to you and there
5 shouldn't be any basis for confusion. Was it your position in 1993 that
6 the way that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be arranged was on the basis of
7 three separate ethnic units?
8 Now, you -- it's quite clear, my question and the documents I've
9 shown you, sir. Was that your view?
10 A. Well, any solution that put an end to the Croats' fear and
11 ensured that they had an equal footing in Bosnia and Herzegovina
12 such solution would be an acceptable one, whether the solution amounted
13 to having cantons or regions or republics. Any structure, the
14 functioning of which would ensure that the three peoples would have a
15 constituent status would be for me an acceptable structure, an acceptable
17 Q. The notion of the three separate units that's reflected in the
18 HDZ formulation of the referendum and in the article that we looked at a
19 moment ago, that was based on a view at the time, was it not, it was okay
20 or better or ethnic groups to live in proximity to one another but not,
21 as some might say, not on top of each other. Do you remember that kind
22 of language and discussion being in the public dialogue at the time? "We
23 can live next to each other but not on top of each other?"
24 A. In public life in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was also possible to
25 hear such statements.
1 Q. If you can turn, please, in your binder, it should be in the
2 first binder, Exhibit P 00108.
3 Sir, this is a record of a meeting in the presidential offices in
5 before. If I can direct your attention -- and this is a meeting
6 involving, among others, President Tudjman, the Croat from
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina named Franjo Boras and a Bosnian Serb named Nikola
8 Koljevic, and others, but if I can direct your attention, please, to page
9 number 3 in that record where Mr. Koljevic starts talking, and he says:
10 "Thank you, Mr. Boras. I think that we can somehow name - we all know
11 what is involved - that we can somehow name the most general
12 pacifications of Serbo-Croatian relations and the attempt at our
13 agreement on a political solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have several
14 things written down, but that would be a general common point."
15 Let me skip to some of that language -- over some of that
16 language, and if you can go over to page 4. And the page numbers should
17 be the same in both the English and the Croatian versions of the
18 document, so it should be on page 4.
19 First when Mr. Boras says -- excuse me, Mr. Koljevic says:
20 "First, allow me to say, turning to this political crisis of ours, that
21 the people in the Serbian Democratic Party have nothing either against
22 the creation of a Croatian state, or against Croatian political
23 organising in the form in which it suits the Croatian people in Bosnia
24 and Herzegovina
25 communication, I think this could have happened earlier."
1 If I can direct your attention to page number 7. Page number 7,
2 the last paragraph beginning on that page.
3 "We essentially proposed a tripartite community, essentially
4 considering that these institutions which ought to be separate should be
5 separate, and that common ones would be found. We thought that the three
6 national communities should recognise that fact and not falsify it.
7 Because three national communities exist and they should normally, if we
8 wish to speak democratically, have all opportunities for normal national
9 development and for normal neighbourly development, because what we say,
10 we have the custom of saying nowadays - to live next to each other. But
11 not on top of one another."
12 Then if I can direct your attention, please, to page 42.
13 President Tudjman comes back into the conversation on the top of page 42
14 and says: "Wherever national problems so conceived emerged as they did
15 with us, that was resolved from World War I and World War II, that was
16 brought to a conclusion by exchanges ..."
17 "Koljevic: I just wanted to say that I think what you have said
18 about the ultimate goal, that this would be the way."
19 And Mr. Tudjman goes on to say: "I agree, but we have to know
20 that the serious world -- that the serious world that is not involved in
21 petty politics, I'm thinking of the international factor ..." et cetera.
22 In the next paragraph it says, I'm just trying to save a couple
23 of moments: "If what Mr. Koljevic just said exists, if such agreement
24 exists on the level of the Serbian party -- or part, then there will
25 be - I must say that in the initial talks before this terrible war,
1 Milosevic was very inclined towards such a solution. He told the leaders
2 in Bosnia
3 count on having such partners, and then this terrible war broke out."
4 That was the sentiment that was being expressed at the time not
5 only in the presidential offices of President Tudjman between Franjo
7 the leadership of Herceg-Bosna and the HVO; correct?
8 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm going to object to the form of the question.
9 First of all, we have skipped over some 40 pages. The gentleman has not
10 been given an opportunity to look at the entire exchange. We have cherry
11 picked here and there, highlighted certain portions, and now we're
12 putting a global question to the gentleman without giving him a fair
13 opportunity under the rule of completeness to look at all of it and then
14 if he wishes to pose that question or any other question, then it may be
15 fair game. But to simply cherry pick and take out of context why was
17 the gentleman to also hear Mr. Boras's testimony about this particular
18 exchange and how it was that they went there at Mr. Koljevic's insistence
19 that he had a proposal for Mr. Tudjman.
20 So if we're going to do this, let's do it properly. I object to
21 this line of questioning. I object to the form of the question. I think
22 it's highly improper and it's highly unfair. The gentleman cannot be
23 asked to opine on something without seeing the entire exchange.
24 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, this is -- this is the way that the
25 Chamber has proceeded and the trial has proceeded for the last two and a
1 half --
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, this is the way that the case has
4 proceeded and the trial has been conducted for the past two and a half
5 years, and the Chamber well knows that excerpts of documents have been
6 used and various bits and pieces of documents have been used, in fact, at
7 the Chamber's direction. And we don't go through every document. We
8 don't tender the entire document sometimes and that's what the Chamber
9 has told us to do.
10 Now, if the Chamber wants to follow a different procedure at this
11 point and would like to take a recess and give Mr. Tomic the time to read
12 the entire transcript, then that's certainly within the Court's power,
13 but this is no different than the way that the Chamber's conducted this
14 trial for the last two and a half years.
15 You know, Mr. Karnavas always says -- talks about cherry picking,
16 but there is no way -- the entire courtroom knows that there would be no
17 way that we would ever finish this trial if every time there was a
18 40-page document we read the entire 42 pages in the courtroom.
19 So I think I proceeded properly. It arises from the -- excuse
20 me. That's really not appropriate when there's commentary coming from
21 the other side. They may disagree with me and I don't expect them to
22 always agree with me but there should not be personal commentary being
24 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, for what little it may add, for my part,
25 I don't see a problem with the question put forward by my learned friend.
1 It can't be possible that every time a document is put to a witness the
2 entirety of the document is read by the witness. I mean, if a volume of
3 the Encyclopedia Britannica is referred to it couldn't be right to expect
4 the witness to go through all of those pages. Ordinarily, of course, any
5 ambiguity or unfairness to one of the parties can be cured by
6 re-examination and in my respectful submission the real thrust of the
7 objection is not so much focused or premised on the question but the fact
8 that because of the constraints of time areas that could be otherwise
9 clarified in re-examination are somewhat curtailed because a party may
10 not feel they have enough time to go into areas that have arisen in the
11 course of cross-examination. So, Your Honours, I don't see for my part
12 any objection with what my learned friend Mr. Scott is doing. I do think
13 that there are sometimes issues about the time given for re-examination
14 to clarify certain parts of documents that are put in in their entirety.
15 Your Honours, I don't know if that assists but it's my observation.
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you, Mr. Khan. I think there might be a
17 reasonable intermediate way. When parts of the document are skipped, and
18 these documents of course are very well known to the Defence, if there is
19 a point that was skipped that would have been relevant and the Defence
20 puts that out and shows that there are -- is a passage which could change
21 the assessment, I think then really a case has been made, but to blindly
22 say that everything should be put, I agree with Mr. Khan. It really is
23 not practicable and it doesn't make much sense either.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I would agree on a very limited point and I
25 will take exception with Mr. Khan, because this is a highly complex
2 Now, this is a very lengthy document. I don't have it -- I don't
3 have the entirety before me. You do make a very logical, sensible, and
4 appropriate observation, Judge Trechsel. However, when I'm only given
5 parts of the document, how am I at this point to say point -- you know,
6 this should be read and that should be read. That is part of the
7 problem. If we had the entire transcript, then I could say, well, he
8 should read this portion and that portion. So I entirely agree with you,
9 and I'm not suggesting that we read all 46 pages, but it has to be put
10 into some kind of context. And there is such a thing as the rule of
11 completeness. If there is a previous section or a latter section that
12 would be necessary for the witness to be aware of in order to give a
13 meaningful answer, then they should be entitled to look at it, but the
14 way this is -- the way Mr. Scott proceeded and the way the evidence I
15 have in front of me, this document, it's virtually impossible for me to
16 say he should also read page 11, page 22, section -- you know. I think I
17 made my point.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you, absolutely. I think again a solution
19 might reside in that until the witness comes back, you look or you have
20 someone look at this and then you counter-cherry pick, as it were, and
21 present these cherries in redirect. But I think for the time being you
22 should let Mr. Scott continue.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, please proceed.
24 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honour, two just very
25 brief observations in response to the comments made and they'll be less
1 than 30 seconds. Everyone knows the time issue is a serious concern for
2 everyone in the case, including the Prosecution, and there is a wealth of
3 material and a wealth of questions I would like to put to this witness
4 concerning his testimony that I will never have a chance to because I
5 don't have time to cover them. So the time issue is one that cuts in
6 every direction. I've had to be very, very selective about what I can
7 put to the witness given the time limitations that exist.
8 Secondly, Your Honour, I can only observe and I'm sure everyone
9 can appreciate it, if we put every presidential transcript in its
10 entirety in the binders, instead of having four binders, you'd have about
11 eight and I've already in the course of the day heard about three people
12 dropped their binders. I'm sorry for that. It's an inconvenience for
13 everyone, for everyone, but that's where we are, and putting in excerpts
14 is just one practical way, unfortunately, of limiting the material.
15 The entire document certainly is available to Mr. Karnavas. I
16 understand that he may not have it in the courtroom. It's also available
17 in e-court. And that's where we are. I'm sorry, I think I went more
18 than 30 seconds.
19 Q. Sir, I think the pending question to you some minutes ago was,
20 the views expressed -- I put it to you, I'm putting my case to you, you
21 may disagree, but the views expressed by Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Koljevic and
22 Mr. Boras in this record that I've just read to you in part, which we got
23 started on, if you remember I asked you -- do you remember hearing at the
24 time there was a certain phrase or view being expressed in the public
25 discourse at the time that, well, you know, we can live next to each
1 other but not on top of each other, and indeed that was the very phrase
2 that Mr. Koljevic used during this meeting? Was that not the sentiment
3 held by the leadership of Herceg-Bosna and the HVO at this time?
4 A. In my answer I said that in the territory of Bosnia
6 transcript. This was a thesis that Serb representatives pointed out and
7 emphasised, which is similar to what Mr. Koljevic was saying in here.
8 During this period which is January 1999, the HVO HZ HB did not
9 exist, and as -- from the beginning of the work of the HVO HZ HB, not for
10 a moment did such a concept exist in terms of ethnically pure units or
11 maybe functioning of the HVO HZ HB as a unit of Croats in Bosnia and
13 tried to organise a life in the territories under the control of the HVO,
14 in the territory of the HZ HB, was different.
15 Q. Did you ever become aware, sir, of such things as efforts of
16 persons going into the various HVO detention camps or facilities and
17 offering Muslim prisoners that they could be released if they signed
18 loyalty oaths to the HVO?
19 A. I've not seen any such documents.
20 Q. Wasn't it the case, sir, that various senior Herceg-Bosna HVO
21 officials said that the desired solution was indeed to have three
22 separate ethnic territories, again call them what you will, cantons,
23 units, republics, mini states, that three separate entities, ethnic
24 entities, but at the same time along for the possibility to have -- that
25 there were a few Muslims in government and business that served as a good
1 window dressing to make things look -- at least look a little more
2 multi-ethnic? Wasn't that the view expressed by the HVO Herceg-Bosna
3 leadership during this time period?
4 A. HVO HZ HB organised life in the territory of the HZ HB within the
5 framework of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was our
6 primary task and goal. There were no positions to the effect of
7 separation or eliminating people. In our work or at least to my
8 knowledge, we did not implement any such thing. The concept that I
9 adopted and my firm belief was that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
10 organised as agreed through the negotiations conducted under the auspices
11 of the international community, and that was one of the reasons why we
12 adopted the first agreement and we wanted to implement it immediately for
13 that precise reason and we also wanted implement the Washington Agreement
14 immediately. However, as I've already told you, my observations were
15 what they were and I can corroborate my observations with a hundred of
16 situations that I myself went through and experienced.
17 Q. Let's go please --
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, just a small intervention. The
19 gentleman keeps using the word "area," and it keeps getting translated as
20 "territory." Now, I know we've gone back and forth on this, but I just
21 want to make sure that it's -- at least my record is being recorded that
22 he's saying area as opposed to territory. Now, how you all want to
23 interpret that, that's a decision I leave to -- to others.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Okay. It's on the record.
25 MR. SCOTT:
1 Q. Sir, if you could next turn to P 07876 which should be in the
2 second binder. P 07876.
3 Sir, this is a decision dated the 16th of February, 1994
4 the name of Mr. Mate Boban, and naming the presidential council at the
5 time of the Croatian Republic
6 the members of that council, including such persons as Mr. Zubak,
7 Mr. Bender, Mr. Markovic, number 6 Mr. Prlic, number 8 Mr. Coric, number
8 9 Mr. Akmadzic, and others.
9 Then in III
10 a man named Vladislav Pogarcic. Did you know Mr. Pogarcic?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And prior to this time of being named as the secretary of the
13 presidential council, what positions or functions had he held in
14 Herceg-Bosna and/or the HVO?
15 A. I know that Mr. Pogarcic had arrived from Sarajevo. He was a
16 member of the HVO side and then he arrived in Grude, and he was with the
17 office of Mr. Boban. I don't know what he was at that particular moment,
18 but I know that after the Washington
19 Foreign Affairs.
20 Q. During the time when he was with Mr. Boban, would it be fair to
21 characterise him as sometimes the term is used Chief of Staff or Chef de
22 Cabinet? Was that Mr. Pogarcic's function for a time with Mr. Boban?
23 A. I know that he was in his office, but I wouldn't be able to
24 remember what his exact position was.
25 Q. Did you have any particular dealings with Mr. Pogarcic during the
1 time that he held these various positions or functioned in the ways that
2 have been mentioned in the last few minutes?
3 A. No, not particularly.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you are not in the
5 list of the members of the council, the presidential council. You are
6 not mentioned, and I note that Mr. Prlic is just a member. The president
7 being Mr. Kresimir Zubak.
8 In terms of domestic policy in the republic, the Croat Republic
9 of Herceg-Bosna, how can you analyse this presidential council? Why is
10 it that you're not a member?
11 And second question, what is this meaning of Mr. Prlic being just
12 a member and nothing more?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that time I was -- let me just
14 see when this was. Yes, it was in February. I was the Deputy Minister
15 of Finance, and I was not appointed to that council.
16 And as for Mr. Prlic, he was appointed a member. My personal
17 feeling is that Mr. Prlic was not -- let me put it this way, he did not
18 enjoy Mr. Boban's trust. He was not a yes man, to put it that way. And
19 the selection of Kresimir Zubak at that moment was just a way for
20 Mr. Prlic's position to be reduced in size. That was on the part of
21 Mr. Boban.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which municipality did
23 Mr. Zubak come from?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Zubak came from the HVO Usora.
25 Before the war it was part of the Doboj municipality, and after the
1 Washington Agreement it became a municipality, that municipality of
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Q. This presidential council that was established in February 1994,
6 in terms of the membership Mr. Prlic, although he was a member, listed
7 only as a member of the presidential council, he continued to be prime
8 minister; correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And Mr. Jozo Martinovic was the Minister of Finance to whom you
11 were his deputy; correct?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And Mr. Coric by this time had taken what ministry position?
14 Ministry of Interior?
15 A. I believe so.
16 Q. All right. It's correct, is it not, sir, that this presidential
17 council was formed at the time that Mr. Boban was in serious trouble with
18 the international community and was essentially on his way out, and this
19 presidential council was picked and approved in Zagreb; correct?
20 A. I don't know who approved it. I can only see that the document
21 was signed by Mr. Boban.
22 Q. Mr. Martinovic, the Minister of Finance, is it correct that he
23 had been a senior finance official in the Croatian government before
24 coming to Herceg-Bosna and taking this position?
25 A. Before he arrived in Herceg-Bosna he was an advisor in the
1 Privredna Banka of Zagreb
2 that he was the Minister of Finance in the Republic of Croatia
3 Q. When was he approximately the Minister of Finance in the Republic
4 of Croatia
5 A. I believe that he was a member of the first government in 1991,
6 if my memory serves me right. When I first met him he was already an
7 advisor in Privredna Banka, and I met him in 1992.
8 Q. And how long did he remain the Minister of Finance of
9 Herceg-Bosna before returning to Croatia?
10 A. I can't remember. I can't remember off-the-cuff.
11 Q. Well, approximately 11 months later in January 1995 you took on
12 the position of Minister of Finance; correct?
13 A. Yes, but I believe it was somebody else in the meantime, but I
14 wouldn't be able to tell you who exactly.
15 Q. Now, going back to Mr. Pogarcic, if I can ask you, please, to go
16 to Exhibit P 08623, which will be in the second binder. P 08623.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that this document
18 was placed under seal, has been given a number but is under seal. Is
19 that the case? Rule 70 seems to apply. We'll check this. I will ask my
20 legal officer to check this, but please proceed.
21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. I think that it's one of the
22 documents that has been Rule 70 at previous points in the Tribunal's life
23 but has not necessarily continued to have that status. So it may be that
24 it's one of those documents that can be used in the courtroom but not
25 broadcast, provided outside the courtroom, if you will, whereas someone
1 can come and collect it as has been the case with some other documents
2 from other sources.
3 Q. Sir, this is an interview with Mr. Pogarcic given on the 9th of
4 December, 1995, to Slobodna Dalmacija, titled "Deputy Foreign Minister
5 Opposes Integral States." "Interview with Vladislav Pogarcic, ethnic
6 Croat deputy Foreign Minister of the republic and federation of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. An integral Bosnia is the least desirable solution
8 for everybody. If people want it, it will be divided."
9 And if I can ask you to go to the second page, presume in the
10 translation as well, second page in the English version. And if you can
11 find, sir, there's a point where the interviewer asks this question, if
12 it will assist you, the question put to Mr. Pogarcic is: "Do you really
13 think that the peaceful division of Bosnia is possible?" Do you have
14 that? Do you have that passage, sir?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And then Mr. Pogarcic responds -- it's a rather -- it's a bit of
17 a long text but I think an important one. "Yes, in fact the possibility
18 is the only clear result of these four years of war. Remember how Bosnia
19 was described at the beginning of the war as a 'leopard skin?' Today,
20 however, it is a country of three ethnic communities each having its own
21 strictly delineated territory. This might be thought to be ugly. There
22 are people who are even disgusted by this. But they should know that it
23 is the result of the will of the population itself. The Serbs, Muslims,
24 and Croats have ethnically cleansed territories wherever they could.
25 Meanwhile, it must not be forgotten that the Pandora's box of ethnic
1 cleansing was forced open by the Serbs, although the two other nations
2 could not resist the temptation to take a look into it until they reduce
3 the number -- the members of the other ethnic communities to 10 per cent
4 or less of the total. With 10 per cent or less of the total, one cannot
5 threaten the political position of the majority while simultaneously the
6 minority functions as an ornament and can even serve as proof of the will
7 to create a 'multi-ethnic society.'"
8 Now, that was Mr. Pogarcic's view at the time as stated in this
9 article. Was that view held by a number of the other people that we just
10 looked at a few moments ago who were members of the presidential council
11 and the other Herceg-Bosna HVO leadership at the time?
12 A. This certainly wasn't the opinion of the other members. I would
13 like to point out that Pogarcic actually said that he believed that the
14 Dayton Accords were acceptable for the Croats, and then he continued to
15 provide his own opinion with which I personally and some other people in
16 the council would certainly not agree.
17 Q. Would you agree, sir, that with the statement in this document
18 that all three of the ethnic parties --
19 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Apologise. Your
20 Honour -- Your Honours, I apologise. I would like to react at this point
21 because the Prosecutor ties this statement -- we don't know whether this
22 is a statement or not. We don't know how credible the article actually
23 is -- with Mr. Pogarcic's statement as a member of the presidential
24 council, and then he ties that to the opinions of the other members of
25 the presidential council, assuming that the opinion was the same as the
1 opinion of their secretary.
2 Mr. Pogarcic provided a statement as the deputy Minister of
3 Foreign Affairs of the republic and federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 Maybe it would be more correct to ask the witness whether the entire
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina held the same opinion,
6 because that was the gentleman's position at the time, which is clearly
7 visible from the title of the article in the Croatian version. And I
8 can't even see the date. I don't know when this was. It was in December
9 1995, which was much later than his appointment in the presidential
10 council. It is even disputable whether he was still the secretary of
11 that council, whether that council was still operational at the time when
12 he provided this interview.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Your observation is
14 on the transcript. We have to finish in a few minutes and I have some
15 advice to give to the witness. I would like the registrar to tell me
16 exactly how much time has been used up so far by the Prosecution. The
17 Prosecution so far with all these objections only used five hours and 50
18 minutes. It still has 2 hours and 10 minutes left.
19 Witness, you are the witness of justice now. You have made the
20 solemn declaration. You are under oath. You can no longer contact
21 Mr. Karnavas throughout the entire time between your -- now and your new
22 testimony. Mr. Karnavas must not call you. If we hear about this, you
23 know, this would really create a big problem. You are now almost
24 finished with the cross-examination. Of course you're not supposed to
25 contact Mr. Scott either. You can go back to your own business, but
1 please do not mention your testimony so far. Please make sure that with
2 the -- to go to the -- to the witness section to ask them for a plane
3 ticket so you can come back on November 17th. The Prosecution will have
4 two hours and ten minutes for the cross-examination so normally it should
5 wrap up its cross-examination on the Monday when we resume with your
6 testimony hoping that we won't run into any dramas or objections, lengthy
7 objections. The next day Mr. Karnavas told us that he would need at
8 least two hours, maybe less, for additional questions and then that will
9 be -- and then you will be done with your testimony.
10 You were one of the very important witnesses in this case not
11 only for the Prlic Defence, especially in terms of the time required for
12 your examination, so we will have the pleasure of seeing you again in a
13 few weeks.
14 We will now -- we'll be hearing the witness schedule for next
15 week. You have set aside four hours for this witness, Mr. Karnavas, is
16 that it?
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, Mr. President, I did. We will try to be --
18 to get it under four, but we've asked for four, but I do not suspect it's
19 going to go over four, but we are -- we are expecting the witness to come
20 in on time, and he was prepared last time. We will have to re-prepare
21 again, but we'll try to be as efficient as possible.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. It's true we've already
23 seen him, and this -- for this witness it will also be a second time.
24 It's almost 7.00. I wish everyone a pleasant evening, and we
25 will meet again next Monday.
1 I wish a safe return home to Mr. Tomic. Just for a while,
2 unfortunately, but we will be very happy to see you again.
3 The hearing is adjourned.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Monday, the 10th day
6 of November, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.